DOCSLIB.ORG

Using Indicator-And Event- Based Surveillance to Detect Foodborne Events

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Using indicator-and event- based surveillance to detect foodborne events Stage One Booklet Strengthening surveillance of and response to foodborne diseases Strengthening surveillance of and response to foodborne diseases Stage One Booklet Using indicator- and event-based surveillance to detect foodborne events Strengthening surveillance of and response to foodborne diseases: a practical manual. Stage 1. Using indicator- and event-based surveillance to detect foodborne events ISBN 978-92-4-151324-1 © World Health Organization 2017 Some rights reserved. This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO licence (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo). Under the terms of this licence, you may copy, redistribute and adapt the work for non- commercial purposes, provided the work is appropriately cited, as indicated below. In any use of this work, there should be no suggestion that WHO endorses any specific organization, products or services. The use of the WHO logo is not permitted. If you adapt the work, then you must license your work under the same or equivalent Creative Commons licence. If you create a translation of this work, you should add the following disclaimer along with the suggested citation: “This translation was not created by the World Health Organization (WHO). WHO is not responsible for the content or accuracy of this translation. The original English edition shall be the binding and authentic edition”. Any mediation relating to disputes arising under the licence shall be conducted in accordance with the mediation rules of the World Intellectual Property Organization. Suggested citation. Strengthening surveillance of and response to foodborne diseases: a practical manual. Introductory module. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. Cataloguing-in-Publication (CIP) data. CIP data are available at http://apps.who.int/iris. Sales, rights and licensing. To purchase WHO publications, see http://apps.who.int/bookorders. To submit requests for commercial use and queries on rights and licensing, see http://www.who.int/about/licensing. Third-party materials. If you wish to reuse material from this work that is attributed to a third party, such as tables, figures or images, it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that reuse and to obtain permission from the copyright holder. The risk of claims resulting from infringement of any third-party-owned component in the work rests solely with the user. General disclaimers. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WHO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. The mention of specific companies or of certain manufacturers’ products does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by WHO in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. Errors and omissions excepted, the names of proprietary products are distinguished by initial capital letters. All reasonable precautions have been taken by WHO to verify the information contained in this publication. However, the published material is being distributed without warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied. The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material lies with the reader. In no event shall WHO be liable for damages arising from its use. Printed in Geneva Table of Contents Acronyms used in this module vi 1. How to use this module 1 2. Introduction to Stage One 3 Minimum Requirements 5 Objectives of the surveillance and response system 5 Vision for the surveillance and response system 6 3. Indicator-based surveillance: strengthening surveillance of notifiable diseases 8 Identifying diseases and syndromes already under surveillance that might indicate a foodborne disease 10 Database 11 Conducting regular analysis and using thresholds to detect foodborne disease clusters 12 Publishing national surveillance data in a regular bulletin 18 Surveillance protocol 19 Options for strengthening notifiable disease surveillance 20 4. Event-based surveillance: strengthening the ability to detect foodborne events 23 Designate a focal point 26 Managing data about foodborne events 26 Reporters 29 Summary of options for strengthening EBS 30 5. Rapid risk assessment of foodborne events 32 Rapid risk assessment team 33 Protocols for rapid risk assessment 34 Summary of options for strengthening rapid risk assessment 40 iii 6. Response 42 Gathering epidemiological evidence during a response 43 Gathering laboratory evidence during a response 53 7. Multisectoral collaboration 58 Focal points 60 Mechanism for rapid information exchange 60 8. Monitoring and evaluation 64 Monitoring 66 Evaluation 66 9. Managing implementation 70 Decision-trees 71 Identifying priority capacities for implementation 71 Strategic plans 72 Annex 1: Foodborne disease agents 73 Annex 2: Identifying priorities in stage 1 79 Annex 3: Minimum data requirements for notifiable disease surveillance in stage 1 85 Annex 4: Example of a data dictionary for the notifiable disease surveillance database 87 Annex 5: Example of a surveillance log 90 Annex 6: Examples of data analysis 92 Annex 7: Example of an event report form 97 iv Annex 8: Minimum data requirements for a database of foodborne events 100 Annex 9: Examples of information sources that can be used in rapid risk assessment of a foodborne event 104 Annex 10: Example of risk characterization of a foodborne event 107 Annex 11: Mapping agents, specimens and laboratories 111 Annex 12: Examples of monitoring indicators for foodborne diseases 113 Annex 13: Managing implementation in stage 1 116 References 124 v Acronyms used in this module CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (of the United States of America) EBS event-based surveillance ECDC European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control FETP Field Epidemiology Training Programme FOSCOLLAB Global platform for food safety data and information GuiaVETA Guidelines for surveillance system for foodborne disease and outbreak investigation HCW health care worker HUS haemolytic uraemicsyndrome IBS indicator-based surveillance IHR International Health Regulations INFOSAN International Food Safety Authorities Network ORT outbreak response team STEC Shiga-toxin-producing Escherichia coli STEEEP social, technical, economic, environmental, ethical and political considerations WHO World Health Organization vi 1. How to use this module 1 Stage one This module is intended for countries that are in stage 1 of strengthening their surveillance and response system for foodborne diseases, and contains specific guidance on strengthening indicator- and event-based surveillance. Users of this module are encouraged to read first the introductory module of this manual, which sets the context for the guidance contained here and defines the scope and target audience. A glossary of terms contained at the end of the introductory module explains some of the technical terms used in the manual. It also discusses the different risk-related terms used in the various disciplines involved in the prevention and control of foodborne diseases. The present module contains specific advice on: indicator-based surveillance (IBS) (notifiable disease surveillance); event-based surveillance (EBS); rapid risk assessment of foodborne events; response to foodborne events; multisectoral collaboration; monitoring and evaluation; managing implementation. Most sections contain decision-trees, which display a step-by-step pathway for developing capacities for surveillance and response for foodborne diseases. The section on managing implementation contains a tool that countries can use to document the capacities that have already been met and the steps that need to be taken to further strengthen the system. 2 2. Introduction to Stage 1 3 Stage one A country in stage 1 of strengthening its surveillance and response system for foodborne diseases is building on its existing system to meet the minimum core capacity requirements under the International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO, 2008a), which include foodborne diseases.This module describes options for: strengthening the surveillance system to: monitor trends in priority syndromes through indictor-based surveillance; detect foodborne outbreaks through indicator-based surveillance; detect acute foodborne events through event-based surveillance. strengthening the response system to: assess the risk posed by foodborne disease events; ensure that foodborne disease outbreaks are investigated; identify the sources of foodborne disease outbreaks; ensure that timely control measures are undertaken; capture information from investigations to guide future long-term interventions. 4 Stage one Minimum requirements Minimum requirements Before the surveillance and response system for foodborne diseases can be strengthened in this way, the following should be in place: • an IBS and an EBS system that collect data from the local level and collate the data at national level; • a team at the national level that can assess and respond to acute public health events. Objectives of the surveillance and response system All data collection should be based on well defined objectives
Recommended publications
  • Certified Calibration Solution for Yessotoxin

    Certified Calibration Solution for Yessotoxin

    CRM-YTX-c (Lot # 20151125) Certified Calibration Solution for Yessotoxin The yessotoxins (YTXs) are a group of polycyclic ether compounds produced by various dinoflagellate algae including Protoceratium reticulatum, Lingulodinium polyedrum and Gonyaulax spinifera [1]. The maximum allowable levels of certain YTXs in shellfish for human consumption is regulated [2]. CRM-YTX-c is a certified calibration solution of YTX in methanol and is a replacement for CRM-YTX-b, which was released in 2012. Table 1: Certified concentration value for CRM-YTX-c Compound µmol/L (at +20 °C) Yessotoxin (protonated form) 4.3 ± 0.2 NaO3SO HO H O H H O NaO3SO H H O H H O O H H O H H H H H O O H O O H OH H H O Yessotoxin (protonated form) CAS registry No.: 112514-54-2 Molecular formula: C55H82O21S2 Molecular weight: 1143.4 g/mol [M-H]- : m/z 1141.4717 [M-2H]2- : m/z 570.2322 Yessotoxin (sodium salt form) Molecular formula: C55H80O21S2Na2 Molecular weight: 1187.3 g/mol Period of validity: 1 year from date of sale Storage conditions: -12 °C or below Biotoxin CRMs CRM-YTX-c 2/8 Intended Use CRM-YTX-c is a certified calibration solution designed for analytical method development and accurate quantitation of YTX. The concentration of CRM-YTX-c makes it suitable for preparing a dilution series for calibration of liquid chromatography (LC) and liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry (LC-MS) instrumentation, as well as for spiking shellfish control samples for recovery experiments. Instructions for Storage and Use To ensure the stability of CRM-YTX-c, ampoules should be stored at -12 °C or below.
  • Comparing National Infectious Disease Surveillance Systems: China and the Netherlands Willemijn L

    Comparing National Infectious Disease Surveillance Systems: China and the Netherlands Willemijn L

    Vlieg et al. BMC Public Health (2017) 17:415 DOI 10.1186/s12889-017-4319-3 RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access Comparing national infectious disease surveillance systems: China and the Netherlands Willemijn L. Vlieg1,2, Ewout B. Fanoy2,3*, Liselotte van Asten2, Xiaobo Liu4, Jun Yang4, Eva Pilot1, Paul Bijkerk2, Wim van der Hoek2, Thomas Krafft1†, Marianne A. van der Sande2,5† and Qi-Yong Liu4† Abstract Background: Risk assessment and early warning (RAEW) are essential components of any infectious disease surveillance system. In light of the International Health Regulations (IHR)(2005), this study compares the organisation of RAEW in China and the Netherlands. The respective approaches towards surveillance of arboviral disease and unexplained pneumonia were analysed to gain a better understanding of the RAEW mode of operation. This study may be used to explore options for further strengthening of global collaboration and timely detection and surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks. Methods: A qualitative study design was used, combining data retrieved from the literature and from semi-structured interviews with Chinese (5 national-level and 6 provincial-level) and Dutch (5 national-level) experts. Results: The results show that some differences exist such as in the use of automated electronic components of the early warning system in China (‘CIDARS’), compared to a more limited automated component in the Netherlands (‘barometer’). Moreover, RAEW units in the Netherlands focus exclusively on infectious diseases, while China has a broader ‘all hazard’ approach (including for example chemical incidents). In the Netherlands, veterinary specialists take part at the RAEW meetings, to enable a structured exchange/assessment of zoonotic signals.
  • Inclusion of Poliovirus Infection Reporting in the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System

    Inclusion of Poliovirus Infection Reporting in the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System

    06-ID-15 Committee: Infectious Diseases Title: Inclusion of Poliovirus Infection Reporting in the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System Statement of the Problem In September 2005, a type 1 vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) was identified in a stool specimen obtained from an Amish infant undergoing evaluation for recurrent infections, diarrhea and failure to thrive, and subsequently diagnosed as having an immune deficiency disorder (1). Hospital investigations did not find a healthcare-associated source for the infant’s infection or evidence of nosocomial transmission from the infant to other patients or healthcare workers. Investigation of the infant’s central Minnesota community identified 4 other children in 2 other households infected with the VDPV, and serologic tests indicated that 3 of the infant’s siblings had likely been recently infected with a type 1 poliovirus. Analysis of genomic sequence data from the poliovirus isolates suggested that the VDPV had been introduced into the community about 3 months before the infant was identified. Together, the data suggested that there had been circulation of the virus in the small community. Investigations in other communities in Minnesota and nearby states and Canada did not identify any additional infections and no cases of paralytic poliomyelitis were detected. Although oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) is still widely used in most countries, IPV replaced OPV in the United States in 2000 (2). Therefore, the Minnesota VDPV infections were 1) the result of importation of a vaccine-derived poliovirus into the United States, and 2) the first documented occurrence of VDPV community transmission in a developed country (3-4). Circulating VDPVs have recently caused polio infections and outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis in several countries (3-5).
  • Summary of Notifiable Infectious Diseases and Conditions — United States, 2014

    Summary of Notifiable Infectious Diseases and Conditions — United States, 2014

    Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report Weekly / Vol. 63 / No. 54 Published October 14, 2016, for 2014 Summary of Notifiable Infectious Diseases and Conditions — United States, 2014 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report CONTENTS Preface .......................................................................................................................1 Background .............................................................................................................1 Data Sources ...........................................................................................................2 Interpreting Data ...................................................................................................6 Transitions in NNDSS Data Collection ............................................................7 Method for Identifying which Nationally Notifiable Infectious Diseases and Conditions are Reportable ...................................................7 International Health Regulations ....................................................................7 Highlights for 2014 ............................................................................................ 10 PART 1 Summary of Notifiable Diseases in the United States, 2014 ............ 29 PART 2 Graphs and Maps for Selected Notifiable Diseases in the United States, 2014 ......................................................................................... 75 Selected Reading for 2014
  • Combined Oral Toxicity of Azaspiracid-1 and Yessotoxin in Female NMRI Mice

    Combined Oral Toxicity of Azaspiracid-1 and Yessotoxin in Female NMRI Mice

    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Marine Institute Open Access Repository (OAR) Combined oral toxicity of azaspiracid-1 and yessotoxin in female NMRI mice John A. B. Aasen*1, Arild Espenes2, Christopher O. Miles3,4, Ingunn A. Samdal3, Philipp Hess5,6, Tore Aune1 1Norwegian School of Veterinary Science, Department of Food Safety and Infection Biology, P.O. Box 8146 Dep., 0033 Oslo, Norway. 2Norwegian School of Veterinary Science, Department of Basic Sciences and Aquatic Medicine, P.O. Box 8146 Dep., 0033 Oslo, Norway. 3Norwegian Veterinary Institute, P.O. Box 750 Sentrum, NO-0106 Oslo, Norway. 4AgResearch Ltd, Ruakura Research Centre, Private Bag 3123, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand. 5Marine Institute, Renville, Oranmore, Co. Galway, Ireland. 6 IFREMER, Department of Environment, Microbiology & Phycotoxins, Rue de l’Île d’Yeu, 44311 Nantes Cedex 03, France. 1 Abstract For many years, the presence of yessotoxins (YTXs) in shellfish has contributed to the outcome of the traditional mouse bioassay and has on many occasions caused closure of shellfisheries. Since YTXs do not appear to cause diarrhoea in man and exert low oral toxicity in animal experiments, it has been suggested that they should be removed from regulation. Before doing so, it is important to determine whether the oral toxicity of YTXs is enhanced when present together with shellfish toxins known to cause damage to the gastrointestinal tract. Consequently, mice were given high doses of YTX, at 1 or 5 mg/kg body weight, either alone or together with azaspiracid-1 (AZA1) at 200 µg/kg.
  • Chapter 9: Monitoring, Surveillance, and Investigation of Health Threats

    Chapter 9: Monitoring, Surveillance, and Investigation of Health Threats

    Chapter 9: Monitoring, surveillance, and investigation of health threats SUMMARY POINTS · Monitoring, surveillance and investigation of health threats are vital capabilities for an effective health system. The International Health Regulations (2005) require countries to maintain an integrated, national system for public health surveillance and response, and set out the core capabilities that countries are required to achieve. · Systematic monitoring of serious infectious diseases and other conditions is typically achieved through notifiable diseases legislation based on clinical observation and laboratory confirmation. Clinical and laboratory-based surveillance also provides the basis for systematic collection of vital statistics (births, deaths, causes of death), and may extend to the reporting and analysis of risk factors for noncommunicable diseases and injuries. Systematic collection of these data informs the allocation of resources and facilitates evaluation of community-based and population-level prevention strategies. · Clinical and laboratory surveillance are passive systems that may be enhanced by sentinel surveillance and/or community-based surveillance strategies that rely on a wider range of people, including non-medical personnel. Suspected cases identified in this way must be treated with respect, protected from discrimination, with diagnosis confirmed by qualified health workers at the earliest opportunity. · A significant degree of stigma may attach to some diseases, such as HIV, sexually transmitted infections and diabetes. Notifiable diseases legislation should require the protection of personal information, and clearly define any exceptions. Concerns about discrimination and breach of privacy may be addressed by requiring certain diseases to be reported on an anonymous or de- identified basis. · In some countries, legislation or regulations may be used to establish or enhance a comprehensive public health surveillance system.
  • Infectious Diseases Infectious

    Infectious Diseases Infectious

    Infectious Diseases 45 Injuries Infectious Diseases Infectious diseases are caused by microorganisms, including bacteria, viruses and parasites. Some infectious diseases can spread easily through food or from person to person and can cause outbreaks that make a large number of people ill. The Georgia Department of Public Health, under the legal authority of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (section 31-12-2), requires that health care providers report cases of specific diseases to the local health department. This section covers some of these “notifiable diseases.” DeKalb County Board of Health monitors and investigates notifiable diseases to understand trends and to prevent and control outbreaks in the county. SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES Many infections are transmitted through sexual contact. These are commonly referred to as sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) or infections (STIs). Chlamydia, gonorrhea and syphilis are STDs that spread during unprotected vaginal, anal or oral sex. They can also pass from mother to baby in the womb or during vaginal childbirth. In DeKalb County from 2008 through 2012, there were 24,147 cases of chlamydia, 9,709 cases of gonorrhea and 872 cases of primary and secondary syphilis. (An individual with primary syphilis has no or few symptoms, while an individual with secondary syphilis has more symptoms.) As Figure 18 shows, in DeKalb County from 2008 through 2012: There were at least twice as many chlamydia cases as gonorrhea cases. The number of cases of syphilis remained consistent. Figure 18: Number of S exuall y Transmitted Disease C ases by Type and Year, DeKal b County, 2008-2012 Figure 18: Numbers of Sexually Transmitted Disease Cases by Type and Year, DeKalb County, 2008-2012 6,000 5,000 Chlamydia 4,000 Gonorrhea 3,000 Primary/Secondary 2,000 Syphilis Number of Cases 1,000 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Year Source: Sexually Transmitted Disease, Online Analytical Statistical Information System, Office of Health Indicators for Planning, Georgia Department of Public Health, 2014.
  • [SUPERSEDED] Giardiasis (August 2011)

    [SUPERSEDED] Giardiasis (August 2011)

    Alberta Health and Wellness Public Health Notifiable Disease Management Guidelines August 2011 Giardiasis Revision Dates Case Definition August 2011 Reporting Requirements August 2011 Remainder of the Guideline (i.e., Etiology to References sections inclusive) October 2005 Case Definition Confirmed Case Laboratory confirmation of infection with or without clinical illness[1]: Detection of Giardia lamblia in stool, duodenal fluid or small bowel biopsy specimen OR Detection of Giardia lamblia antigen in stool by a specific immunodiagnostic test (e.g., EIA). Probable Case Clinical illness[1] in a person who is epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case. [1] Clinical illness is characterized by diarrhea, abdominal cramps, bloating, weight loss, fatigue or malabsorption. Superseded 1 of 7 Alberta Health and Wellness Public Health Notifiable Disease Management Guidelines Giardiasis August 2011 Reporting Requirements 1. Physicians, Health Practitioners and others Physicians, health practitioners and others listed in Sections 22(1) or 22(2) of the Public Health Act shall notify the Medical Officer of Health (MOH) (or designate) of all confirmed and probable cases in the prescribed form by mail, fax or electronic transfer within 48 hours (two days). 2. Laboratories All laboratories, including regional laboratories and the Provincial Laboratory for Public Health (PLPH) shall in accordance with Section 23 of the Public Health Act, report all positive laboratory results by mail, fax or electronic transfer within 48 hours (two days) to the: Chief Medical Officer of Health (CMOH) (or designate), MOH (or designate) and Attending/ordering physician. 3. Alberta Health Services and First Nations Inuit Health The MOH (or designate) of the zone where the case currently resides shall forward the preliminary Notifiable Disease Report (NDR) of all confirmed and probable cases to the CMOH (or designate) within two weeks of notification and the final NDR (amendment) within four weeks of notification.
  • Book of Abstracts

    Book of Abstracts

    PICES Seventeenth Annual Meeting Beyond observations to achieving understanding and forecasting in a changing North Pacific: Forward to the FUTURE North Pacific Marine Science Organization October 24 – November 2, 2008 Dalian, People’s Republic of China Contents Notes for Guidance ...................................................................................................................................... v Floor Plan for the Kempinski Hotel......................................................................................................... vi Keynote Lecture.........................................................................................................................................vii Schedules and Abstracts S1 Science Board Symposium Beyond observations to achieving understanding and forecasting in a changing North Pacific: Forward to the FUTURE......................................................................................................................... 1 S2 MONITOR/TCODE/BIO Topic Session Linking biology, chemistry, and physics in our observational systems – Present status and FUTURE needs .............................................................................................................................. 15 S3 MEQ Topic Session Species succession and long-term data set analysis pertaining to harmful algal blooms...................... 33 S4 FIS Topic Session Institutions and ecosystem-based approaches for sustainable fisheries under fluctuating marine resources ..............................................................................................................................................
  • Notifiable Disease Report Form

    Notifiable Disease Report Form

    NOTIFIABLE DISEASE CONDITION REPORTING District Health Office Contact Information DISTRICT 1-1 / ROME / Northwest Health District DISTRICT 5-2 / MACON / North Central Health District PHONE: 706-295-6656; FAX: 706-802-5342 PHONE: 478-751-6303; FAX: 478-751-6074 www.nwgapublichealth.org EMAIL: [email protected] Counties: Bartow, Catoosa, Chattooga, Dade, Floyd, Gordon, Haralson, http://www.northcentralhealthdistrict.org/ Paulding, Polk, Walker Counties: Baldwin, Bibb, Crawford, Hancock, Houston, Jasper, Jones, Monroe, Peach, Putnam, Twiggs, Washington, Wilkinson DISTRICT 1-2 / DALTON / North Health District PHONE: 706-529-5757; FAX: 706-529-5752 DISTRICT 6 / AUGUSTA / East Central Health District EMAIL: [email protected] PHONE: 706-667-4263; FAX: 706-667-4792 http://www.nghd.org/ http://www.ecphd.com/ Counties: Cherokee, Fannin, Gilmer, Murray, Pickens, Whitfield Counties: Burke, Columbia, Emanuel, Glascock, Jefferson, Jenkins, Lincoln, McDuffie, Richmond, Screven, Taliaferro, Warren, Wilkes DISTRICT 2 / GAINESVILLE / North Health District PHONE: 770-519-7661; FAX: 770-535-5848 DISTRICT 7 / COLUMBUS / West Central Health District EMAIL: [email protected] PHONE: 706-321-6300; FAX: 706-321-6155 http://www.phdistrict2.org/ EMAIL: [email protected] Counties: Banks, Dawson, Forsyth, Franklin, Habersham, Hall, Hart, http://www.westcentralhealthdistrict.com/ Lumpkin, Rabun, Stephens, Towns, Union, White Counties: Chattahoochee, Clay, Crisp, Dooly, Harris, Macon, Muscogee, Marion, Quitman, Randolph,
  • Report on Analysis of Shellfish Samples for the Presence of Yessotoxins (YTX)

    Report on Analysis of Shellfish Samples for the Presence of Yessotoxins (YTX)

    Report on Analysis of Shellfish Samples for the Presence of Yessotoxins (YTX) Marine Institute February 2001 Report on Analysis of Shellfish Samples for the Presence of Yessotoxins (YTX) Marine Institute February 2001 - ) 0 C> <./-11 ' {~ b~ IJ\llwt~ o~ w_ <b 9? lt-1112-'D ~,{r\l lflL(fo\ OO L/-lf2'bq O 52-S:TS 4 "------ . --- marine Institute Foras na Mara To: Minister of State Hugh Byrne T.D. Molluscan Shellfish Safety Committee S. White, Department of the Marine and Natural Resources 31/01/01 Re: Analysis of shellfish samples for the presence of Yessotoxins and other marine biotoxins I. Sample Tests. In order to determine the cause of the positive mouse bioassay results obtained in mussel samples from several shellfish production areas (including Bantry Bay, Kenmare Bay, Cromane and Lough Foyle), samples were sent in December 2000 and January 2001 for analysis to the laboratories listed below. • EU Reference Laboratory on Marine Biotoxins, Vigo, Spain • UK Reference Laboratory on Marine Biotoxins, Aberdeen, Scotland • Italian Reference Laboratory on Marine Biotoxins, Cessnatico, Italy • Japan Food Research Laboratories, Tokyo, Japan • ESR, Porirua, New Zealand. The following analyses were carried out: • DSP Mouse Bioassay - EU Reference Laboratory, Italian Reference Laboratory • Okadaic acid, DTXs - EU Reference Laboratory and UK Reference Laboratory • Azaspiracid - UK Reference Laboratory • ASP toxins (Domoic acid) - EU Reference Laboratory • Y essotoxins - EU Reference Laboratory, Italian Reference Laboratory and Japan Food Research Laboratories II. Results: Positive mouse bioassay results were obtained, using the Yasumoto (1978) assay, in the EU Reference Laboratory and using the Yasumoto (l 984) assay in the Italian Reference Laboratory.
  • Lc Qqq Marine Biotoxins

    Lc Qqq Marine Biotoxins

    LC QQQ MARINE BIOTOXINS Dr. Jerry Zweigenbaum Agilent Technologies Agilent Americas Food Group Breaking News...... Recently, legislation in the EU introduced liquid chromatography coupled to tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS-MS) as the soon to be, reference method for the detection of lipophilic marine biotoxins in live bivalve molluscs, tunicates and echinoderms. Annex 1, SCoFCAH, 18-11-2010, SANCO/6831/2009 rev 7 amending EU Regulation 2074/2005. This change in legislation allows for significant developments in the area of mass spectrometric detection for phycotoxins. Marine Biotoxins: Why analyse for them? Marine biotoxin related illness can range from headaches, vomiting and diarrhoea to neurological problems, and in extreme cases can lead to death. Is it really an issue? Agilent FC 24 Website RASFF Alert notifications are sent when a food or feed presenting a serious health risk is on the market and when rapid action is required. The RASFF member that identifies the problem and takes the relevant actions (e.g. withdrawal of the product) triggers the alert and allows other countries to search there own outlets. Responsibilities for Producers of shell fish They must ensure their product must not contain marine biotoxins in quantities that exceed.... •800 micrograms per kilogram for paralytic shellfish poison (PSP), • 20 milligrams of domoic acid per kilogram for amnesic shellfish poison (ASP) •160 micrograms of okadaic acid equivalents per kilogram for okadaic acid, dinophysistoxins and pectenotoxins in combination, •1 milligram of yessotoxin equivalents per kilogram for yessotoxins, •160 micrograms of azaspiracid equivalents per kilogram for azaspiracids. The picture beforeSite Closuresharvesting 2005 – Ireland (locality) Assessment of Irish beds in 2005 Yellow: ASP Red: DSP Blue: AZP Green: DSP+AZP Courtesy of Dr.