German-Polish Reconciliation in Comparative Perspective: Lessons for Japan? ドイツ・ポーランド和解を比較的視野に置 く——日本にとっての教訓たり得るか
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Volume 8 | Issue 16 | Number 1 | Article ID 3344 | Apr 19, 2010 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus German-Polish Reconciliation in Comparative Perspective: Lessons for Japan? ドイツ・ポーランド和解を比較的視野に置 く——日本にとっての教訓たり得るか Lily Gardner-Feldman Japan, has chosen to entertain the possibility of a paradigm shift in how Japan deals with China German-Polish Reconciliation in and South Korea. In a June 2009 visit to the Comparative Perspective: Lessons Republic of Korea as head of the Democratic for Japan?1 Party of Japan (DPJ), when elaborating on his vision for an East Asian or Asian-Pacific Lily Gardner Feldman Community, Hatoyama drew on the Franco- German experience of creating a regional The Japanese Case and the Benefits of organization for embedding their relationship Comparison on foundations of permanent peace. In 2008 and 2009, a series of historical issues once again defined the public space of Japanese-South Korean and Japanese-Chinese relations: the revisionist essay of General Tamogami Toshio; Prime Minister Aso Taro’s acknowledgement of the use of slave labor in his family’s wartime mine; new flare-ups in the longstanding territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Takeshima/Dokdo islets; ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine; and Japanese government approval of another amnesiac history textbook whitewashing Japan’s World War II aggression.2 These developments could be viewed as another episode in the periodic eruption of Hatoyama (left) and Lee in Seoul, October history-related problems that have affected 9, 2009 Japan’s bilateral ties openly since 1982, with the anticipation that they will ebb and flow Since assuming office, Prime Minister depending on domestic and international Hatoyama’s first visit to Seoul instead of circumstances. Alternatively, these events also Washington, D.C. (usually the first destination), could be understood as contaminants that severely impede Japan’s foreign policy, with the and his pledge that neither he nor any of his hope that now is a time to imagine fundamental cabinet members will visit the Yasukuni Shrine, change. have signaled his interest in Japan’s Asian neighbors and his emphasis on a reconciliatory Hatoyama Yukio, the new Prime Minister of tone toward them. 1 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF In addition to the election victory of the the goal and underestimating the considerable Democratic Party of Japan, there are signs that obstacles, crises, and vicissitudes that have a path toward genuine reconciliation inaccompanied these long processes of bilateral Northeast Asia might now be approachable. peace-making, and whose surmounting has First, there is the reality of generational permitted authentication of reconciliation. change, which means the physicalParticularly notable in Jennifer Lind’s work is disappearance of some conservative,the assumption that there has been no backlash nationalist, and right-wing forces opposed to to the German government’s confrontation with reconciliation and the emergence of a cohort the past. While not as ferocious as the right- with no historical experience of World War II. wing backlash in Japan, there was intense Second, there is evidence of a growingGerman opposition to government and societal differentiated view among some conservatives, reconciliation behavior on a variety of for example the Yomiuri Shimbun’s War occasions. The key lesson to be learned from Responsibility Reexamination Committee and those German experiences is that eventually (?) Watanabe Tsuneo’s criticism of ministerial political and moral vision by German leaders visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.3 Third, public successfully challenged the opposition and opinion surveys demonstrate that “thethereby authenticated and strengthened affirmative view of the war...is being rejected reconciliation. Political and moral avoidance by the wider society.”4 are not part of the toolbox of reconciliation.7 As scholars and practitioners have sought to The following analysis of German-Polish understand the power of history issues in Asia experience with reconciliation is useful for the and the possibilities for ending the logjam over Japanese case as it reveals both the persistence reconciliation, in the last decade many have of historical issues and a robust looked to Germany’s experience with a foreign institutionalization that can limit the past’s policy of reconciliation. The literature on explosive potential. It also refers to three other Northeast Asian reconciliation that considers cases of reconciliation in German foreign policy the German case is welcome, but it is limited in – relations with France, Israel and the Czech four significant ways: (1) Often the references Republic – to demonstrate the pattern and to Germany are glancing or anecdotal.5 (2) richness of the German example. The essay Where greater elaboration does occur, it concludes with a brief review of the Japanese centers on single topics, such as memory, case under Prime Minister Hatoyama. narratives, textbooks, education, or territorial Comparison is utilized here as an analytical disputes, largely ignoring the many other framework and as a clarifier of choices with examples of Germany’s non-governmental keen awareness that simple replication is bilateral institutions and most of theneither desirable nor possible for the Japanese governmental illustrations.6 (3) The most situation. Even when there are inevitable developed arguments for learning from the systemic and political culture differences, German case focus on either Franco-German or comparison can sharpen the contours of debate German-Polish relations, excluding the rich and illuminate policy preferences. Thomas lessons provided by Germany’s partnerships Berger alerts us to three key differences with Israel and the Czech Republic, the two between Germany and Japan: in historical cases where history issues in fact have been experiences; in allied involvement in shaping stickiest. (4) Even where there is a fuller new narratives; and in the treatment of Germany, the understanding of international/regional settings in which the two the German model of reconciliation is flawed, countries evolved from pariah status after overestimating harmony and perfect peace as World War II.8 Yet, as he points out, the two 2 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF countries face the same challenge ofcommunity of fate that involves confronting the indelibility of the past at a time vicissitudes.10 Reconciliation is a long and when history issues are high on the global difficult process, as German chancellor Willy agenda. At a time when Japan shows signs of a Brandt noted when writing about German- political will and commitment to grapple with Polish reconciliation in 1976: “The soil in which the past, Germany can provide an important reconciliation could flourish required careful guide for the opportunities and hurdles etched spadework.”11 Germany’s first chancellor, in the long, arduous and necessary process of Konrad Adenauer, had also used a gardening reconciliation. metaphor when speaking of Franco-German reconciliation and the 1963 friendship treaty The Significance of the Polish Case between the two countries: “This friendship between France and Germany is like a rose that I have a maximal, “thick” definition ofwill always have buds and flowers,” and he reconciliation that has also been called 12 added “thorns.” It is this dual character of “structural.” By "reconciliation" I mean the abundant blooms and sharp points that is at the process of building long-term peace and heart of my understanding of reconciliation. cooperation between former enemies through bilateral institutions and relationships across In outlining my framework of reconciliation, I governments and societies. Reconciliation try to answer the basic question of whether involves the development of friendship, trust, German-Polish relations are durable, and empathy and magnanimity. It involves both therefore reparable, after the downturn in their ethical and emotional dimensions and practical relationship in the years 2000-2007 and material aspects. In fact, two German (particularly the last two years under Jaroslaw words, according to Polish analyst Artur Kaczynski as Prime Minister), or whether they Hajnicz, embrace the full meaning ofwere permanently damaged. The downturn was 9 reconciliation: Versöhnung and Aussöhnung. real, but it has to be considered against the Germany’s pursuit of reconciliation hasbackdrop of the accumulated relationship built consistently reflected both meanings, melding over forty years and against the reality of less moral imperative with pragmatic interest. This public, stable and positive institutional concept of reconciliation does not infuse peace relations at both the governmental and societal with a vision of harmony and tension-free levels. My approach is to see relations both coexistence, but rather integrates differences horizontally (over time) and vertically (across between peoples. Productive contention about levels). In many respects, the dimensions of history in a shared and cooperative framework reconciliation evident in German-Polish for identifying and softening (but notrelations can be identified also in Germany’s eliminating) divergence is a more realistic goal relations with France, Israel and the Czech than perfect peace. Authentication ofRepublic. reconciliation thus emerges from challenge. The Four Dimensions of Reconciliation The sense of reconciliation used here for the German-Polish relationship accords with the In reconciliation, the mix of pragmatism and characterizations