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The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement

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The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement International Journal of Korean History(Vol.7, Feb.2005) 133 The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement Choi Jeong-soo* Introduction On November 30, 1908 American Secretary of State Eliuh Root and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington Takahira Kogoro initialed an agreement which has now come to be known as the Root-Takahira Agreement. In this agreement, both governments agreed to: 1) maintain the status quo in the Pacific; 2) assure equal opportunity to develop trade and industry in China; 3) recognize the territories possessed by each country in the Pacific region; 4) respect China’s territorial integrity and independence.1 In other words, this agreement contained two overarching themes, namely, the open door policy and respect for each other’s territorial possessions. Although the Root-Takahira Agreement was concluded during a period which has come to be known as that of the era of the revolution in diplomacy, very little attention has to date been paid to it. This agreement came to light during a period in which two camps were competing to have the U.S. join their proposed tripartite alliances (with one consisting of China and Germany and the other of Japan and England). In other words, the U.S. possessed the casting vote needed to maintain the balance of power between these two military governments. It is a well-known fact * Lecturer , Dept. of History, Hanyang University 134 The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement that the imperial powers were divided into two military camps during this period and that the isolation of Germany was one of the main causes of the outbreak of WWI. In other words, prior to the outbreak of WWI, the U.S. did not pursue a policy based on isolation from the international community. Moreover, the fact that Japan was able to speed up the process of formally annexing Korea following the signing of this agreement should also be kept in mind. While prior to this agreement Japan had hesitated between keeping Korea as a protectorate and annexing it outright, its decision to annex the country was made shortly after this agreement was reached. This can be perceived as having been no coincidence. More to the point, the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 can be regarded as having been a landmark event even when viewed solely from the standpoint of its influence on the international situation at that time. This being the case, let us now look at the reasons why the U.S. chose to sign this agreement. A closer look at the contents of this agreement reveals two overarching U.S. motivations. While the first can be identified as the desire to assure the continuation of the open door policy in China, the second revolved around the protection of its territorial possessions in the Pacific. Moreover, these twin objectives represented a constant in the U.S.’ East Asian policy. Nevertheless, most studies on this agreement have tended to focus almost exclusively on its relation to the open door policy in China. The majority of scholars, including A. Whitney Griswold, have claimed that this agreement involved the U.S. silently acquiescing to Japan’s preponderant position in East Asia in return for securing concessions from Japan on the immigration issue.2 Meanwhile, Thomas A. Baily has argued that because of this agreement, the U.S. position in Manchuria was greatly enhanced. Thus, this agreement did not give Japan a free hand in Manchuria, but rather resulted in strengthening the open door policy in Manchuria, which in turn removed the largest source of complaint for American entrepreneurs.3 Others have claimed that this agreement allowed the U.S. to avoid being completely excluded in Manchuria.4 Choi Jeong-soo 135 However, it is hard to envisage that the main purpose for the U.S. with regards to this agreement was to secure the continuation of the open door policy. This is because this objective runs contrary to some of the other provisions contained in this agreement; for example, the recognition of its territorial possessions in the Pacific and the maintenance of the status quo. First, this agreement contained a clause which called for the mutual recognition of the territories in the Pacific region possessed by each country. The recognition of its overseas territories had been an overarching concern for the U.S. since 1898 when its expansion into Asia began in earnest following its victory over Spain. These concerns became even more widespread following the performance of the Japanese military in the Russo-Japanese War. From that point on, American strategists became preoccupied with one issue: should a crisis break out, could the U.S. protect its overseas territories in the Pacific, including the Philippines, from the Japanese? Second, the U.S. position during this period did not allow it to simultaneously pursue the continuation of the open door policy and the securing of its overseas territories in the Pacific. Originally, the U.S. had attempted to play Russia off against Japan in order to facilitate its own ability to catch two birds with one stone. However, this strategy was no longer feasible in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, as Russian military power was greatly curtailed as a result of its defeat at the hands of Japan. Furthermore, as part of its pursuit of a tripartite entente structure with Japan and France, Russia made it clear after 1907 that it had no intention of attempting to restrain Japan in the military and diplomatic spheres. What’s more, the signing of a military alliance between Japan’s ally England and Russia and France in effect resulted in creating a four- nation security arrangement consisting of England, France, Russia, and Japan. In other words, the only country capable of restraining Japan in the Pacific was the U.S. As such, as the strategy of playing Russia off against Japan was no longer feasible, the only means of preserving the open door policy in China was to defeat Japan in a military conflict. However, the U.S. government deemed at the time of the Russo-Japanese War that 136 The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement should the U.S. and Japan come to blows, there was no way for Washington to protect its overseas possessions in the Pacific. Third, the clause pertaining to the open door policy also does not mesh with the provision regarding the maintenance of the status quo. From the U.S. standpoint, the continuation of the status quo was necessary in order to assure the security of its overseas territories in the Pacific. However, from the Japanese standpoint, the status quo meant that its preponderant position in Manchuria, which it had acquired in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, was recognized by the U.S. Therefore, when viewed from the standpoint of logic, these two provisions are inherently contradictory. In other words, if the U.S. had intended to include Manchuria as falling within the sphere of its open door policy in China, Japan would never had agreed to sign this agreement. As pointed out above, given the international situation at that time, could the U.S. really have simultaneously dealt with the issues of the open door policy and the securing of its overseas territories? Thus, this is why these two provisions found in the agreement were of a contradictory nature. Thus, could it not be asserted that the main objective of the U.S. in pursuing such an agreement was in fact the acquirement of a Japanese guarantee of the security of its overseas territories in the Pacific rather than the continuation of the open door policy in China? This paper is intended to prove that the real reason why the U.S. signed the Root-Takahira Agreement was in fact what has been postulated above: to secure a promise from the Japanese to keep their hands off the U.S.’ overseas possessions in the Pacific. In order to achieve this objective, this paper is focused on analyzing the international situation which prevailed at the time of the agreement, rather than the actual contents of this agreement as has been the case in previous studies. This is because the circumstances surrounding this agreement allow us to read between the lines and to properly comprehend what the contents of this agreement really pertained to. Special attention has been paid to the U.S. perception of the Russo-Japanese War, its decision to build its main Pacific naval base in Hawaii (1908), and its attitude towards the 2nd Hague Peace Choi Jeong-soo 137 Conference (1907). These events provide us with a window through which to perceive the main American concerns during the period leading up to the signing of the Root-Takahira Agreement. The first part of this paper will deal with the U.S. decision to alter its plans to build its main Pacific naval base in the Philippines in favor of constructing it in Hawaii. An attempt will be made herein to prove that this decision was an important factor which led to the conclusion of a U.S.-Japan agreement. Moreover, this paper will prove that the potent Japanese naval power put on display during the Russo-Japanese War forced the U.S. to move its main naval base in the Pacific to Hawaii, and that the U.S. had no choice but to rely on diplomacy in order to protect its territories in the Pacific until this naval base, which would provide the U.S. with the retaliatory force it would need in case of a Japanese attack, was completed.
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