CSCAP

REGIONAL SECURITY

OUTLOOK 2017 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2017

COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION EDITOR Ron Huisken IN THE ASIA PACIFIC Adjunct Associate Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Established in 1993, the Council for Security Cooperation Australian National University in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the premier Track Two organization in the Asia Pacific region and counterpart to the Track One processes dealing with security issues, namely, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) EDITORIAL ASSISTANT and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus Forum. It provides Elke Larsen an informal mechanism for scholars, officials and others Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs in their private capacities to discuss political and security The Australian National University issues and challenges facing the region. It provides policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies, convenes regional and international meetings and establishes linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of EDITORIAL PANEL the world to exchange information, insights and experiences Ric Smith in the area of regional political-security cooperation. CSCAP Australia Anthony Milner CSCAP Australia Philips Vermonte CSCAP Indonesia Jusuf Wanandi CSCAP Indoensia Front cover image The Musudan missile, an intermediate range ballistic missile based on a Soviet-era design that North Korea has under development. Source: Reuters LETTER FROM THE CO-EDITORS On behalf of CSCAP, we are pleased Back cover image to present the CSCAP Regional Security Bamboo Bridge over a tributary of the Nam Song River near Outlook (CRSO) 2017. Inaugurated in Vang Vieng in northern Laos. 2007, this is the tenth annual CRSO Source: Jan Huisken volume. The CRSO brings expert analysis to bear on critical security issues facing the region and points to policy-relevant alternatives for Track One (official) and Track Two (non-official) to advance multilateral regional security cooperation. The views in the CRSO 2017 do not represent those of any Member committee CSCAP thanks the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, or other institution and are the responsibility The Australian National University, for their support with this of the individual authors and the Editor. publication. Charts and images in the CRSO 2017 do not necessarily reflect the views of the Designed and printed by CanPrint Communications, chapter authors. Canberra, Australia.

ISBN: 978-0-9942248-3-5

Copyright © 2017 by CSCAP www.cscap.org

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CONTENTS

4 The Outlook for Security in the Asia Pacific: Adverse Trends Gaining Momentum Ron Huisken

7 Challenges to U.S. Leadership— Abroad and at Home—Portend Greater Uncertainty for the Asia-Pacific Bates Gill

10 East Asia 2016: A Year of Destabilization Yu Tienjun

13 The Defense Force of Japan Awakens to Address the Contemporary Security Environment Hideshi Tokuchi

16 Russia in Asia and in the World: Back to the Future as a Great Power Victor Sumsky

19 India in the Asia Pacific: Strengthening Asian Multipolarity Sanjay Pulipaka

22 Security in the Asia Pacific: A South Korean Perspective Jong Kun Choi

25 Defence Outlook: Australia Andrew Carr and Stephan Frühling

28 DPRK’s Nuclear Deterrent: The Magic Bullet for Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia Choe Un Ju

31 DPRK Nuclear Developments and the ROK Response: Looking to 2017 Cho Namhoon

34 North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Capabilities: The Emerging Escalation Ladder Hideya Kurata

37 Dealing with the DPRK: Exploring the Trump Administration’s Options Ralph A. Cossa

40 China’s “Island-Building” in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security Robert Beckman

43 The South China Sea Tribunal’s Award: New Prospects for Cooperation? Nguyen Thi Lan Anh

46 On Pivots and Puzzles in the South China Sea Jay L Batongbacal

48 Solving a Puzzle in the South China Sea Fu-Kuo Liu

51 The Future of Dispute Resolution and Management of the South China Sea: A Post Arbitration Analysis Haryo Budi Nugroho

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The Outlook for Security in the Asia Pacific: Adverse Trends Gaining Momentum

Ron Huisken

It is a melancholy fact that, a decade hence, security analysts are likely to cite the current period as a recent example of realism at work. It is a source of melancholy because both principals – the United States of America and the Peoples Republic of China – believed themselves to be too wise and wily to stumble into a replay of the Sparta-Athens drama but now stand exposed as international actors capable of exactly that. The first eight papers below all confirm this in ASEAN summit 7 September 2016. Source: ASEAN.org. various ways.

The United States saw what China with the full economic, political and In the broadest terms, the outlook for could become way back in the mid- psychological fallout of the Iraq war the Asia Pacific is for a prolonged 1990s but elected, as the unipolar and the GFC, it encountered a China period of geopolitical contestation state, to play it cool, welcoming that was more confident and more that will at best yield gradual change China into the club of major powers prepared to press for change. and probably feel like a hazardous and counselling it to find its niche in stalemate. This will occur against the a peaceful and stabilizing manner. A Geopolitical contention, so stoutly back-drop of a broader sensation that decade later, when China’s spectacular denied over a number of years, the constellation of circumstances that relative gains had become only too intensified markedly, and was at produced decades of comparative clear, Washington continued to feign last more openly acknowledged. order and stability, and managed a indifference but, as a precautionary Fortunately, any tilt in the balance of peaceful end to the Cold War, is now measure, began to discreetly hedge its power and influence in Asia is likely badly eroded and in need of significant bets, including through basing more to be neither quick nor decisive. repair and/or re-configuration. aircraft carriers, ballistic missile and Although the drift of the US-China Russia’s new prominence as a security hunter-killer submarines in the Pacific relationship toward difficulty and actor as well as the on-going stresses rather than the Atlantic. coolness inescapably heightens the that stem from Islamic extremism are risk of inadvertent incidents, neither For its part, China matched important in this regard. side has any interest in conflict. For Washington playing it cool, by one thing, the trade and investment Finally, the recent elections in the stressing relentlessly that it had studied relationship delivers enormous US have unexpectedly transformed the experience of past rising powers benefits to both sides. Secondly, the America into a major new source of with great care. China insisted that balance in military power remains uncertainty. President-elect Trump takes it had the wisdom and experience starkly favourable to the United States. an essentially commercial approach to avoid the destabilizing mistakes Thirdly, both powers are conscious toward the merits of alliances, is hostile other rising powers had made. The of their exceptionalism and will strive to freer trade and insists that the US associated narrative of peaceful to ensure that their future status is not must counter Chinese manipulation of development began to taper off stained indefinitely by perceptions of the value of its currency to distort trade rather conspicuously during the having succeeded through bullying, and investment flows to its advantage. second term of President George coercion and other practices unworthy The incoming administration will W. Bush. From around 2009, as the of truly great powers. almost certainly be less radical than Obama administration came to terms the campaign rhetoric would suggest.

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That said, we should anticipate that the has no more important business than of dialogue, cooperation and stability. United States will present a new mood to address what will or should be the and a new orientation that will in many shape of this new order and determine Korean Peninsula respects be broadly representative how to get there peacefully. The US of that rhetoric. Moreover, as the and China have had great difficulty The 1950-53 conflict on the Korean United States is still unambiguously addressing this challenging task peninsula both emphatically confirmed the largest economy in the world, has effectively. Indeed, as argued above, the state of Cold War between championed freer trade throughout it would appear that they have been East and West and proved to be an the post-war period and anchors a losing ground in recent years. There inexhaustible source of belligerence network of alliances still perceived to may be merit, therefore, in a small and tension. The Korean peninsula be an essential part of the fabric of coalition of other resident powers has long had the dubious distinction security, particularly in Europe and offering an independent view on the of being the most highly militarized Asia, even the serious possibility of desirable characteristics of a future real estate in the world. Moreover, the significant change in direction or regional order and on the modalities forces on and around the peninsula emphasis on these fundamental issues of both achieving these characteristics are kept in high states of military will have far-reaching consequences. and making them durable. This readiness and exercise sustained would be an exceedingly difficult – vigilance. The relentless hostility that The new mood and orientation and possibly politically hazardous has characterized relationships on the might, for example, be a more self- – undertaking. There could well be peninsula is difficult to comprehend, centred America that is less hung a role for Track two processes such especially after more than 60 years. up on being the recognized leader as CSCAP to help spark such an On several occasions over these of the international community and undertaking. decades, the peninsula has hovered therefore more deaf to allies, friends at the edge of renewed open warfare, and even others that still want to rely It can do no harm for the biggest states testing the patience, resolve and on a Washington that cares deeply for to be reminded that others also see ‘high diplomatic skill of all the immediate that role and the policy interests and stakes’ in the outcome. Similarly, such players but especially that of the US. postures attached to it. This America an exercise would help a wider group may signal a more distant and looser of states to appreciate the difficulties This state of sustained anxiety in security relationship with wealthy involved and to be more constructive a highly militarized environment, allies in Europe and Asia and an participants in the on-going business now faces the prospect of the DPRK associated tolerance of stronger and of building a flexible but resilient conducting its affairs while possessing more independent security postures on regional community characterized by a functioning but rudimentary and their part, up to and including nuclear reassuring checks and balances on possibly quite fragile and erratic weapons. Just how such changes in the power of individual states. Not missile-based nuclear weapons American priorities would play out over least, it would assist states in meeting capability. Setting aside the possible time in our wider region is anyone’s a key leadership responsibility, namely ramifications of this development guess but there can be little doubt that managing public expectations and for the integrity of the nuclear non- it would test the region’s capacities to public images of other states. The East proliferation regime, the political and preserve good order and stability. For Asia Summit suggests itself as a forum military anxieties that characterise the one thing, we have in China a state that could play an important part in peninsula will then be intensified very that has the capacity and has clearly such an enterprise. sharply indeed and pressures to pre- signaled its willingness to provide a empt will follow suit. South Koreans, form of leadership in the region quite In the meantime, we have two focal in particular, are confused, angry different from the Pax Americana that points for contestation that constitute but, above all, in despair. Despite has become so familiar over the past a growing menace to the peace and a seemingly debilitating sanctions 70 years. stability of our region. Over the longer regime, North Korea is accelerating term, both need to be defused in a its drive for an operational nuclear A Trump administration does not manner that develops and reflects the arsenal while the South deals with materially change the grounds we parameters of an enduring regional an acute domestic political crisis, the have to be confident that open conflict order. The more immediate priority abject failure of a sustained strategy to in the Asia Pacific is very unlikely but is to agree on ways to change the persuade China to get tough with the would it be smart to be content with current trajectory of these disputes so North, and the prospect that the US such a prospect? The Asia Pacific now that they begin to trend in the direction may find it harder to give its undivided

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attention to the Korean peninsula As former Australian Foreign Minister, Ron Huisken when circumstances demand it. These Gareth Evans observed, the Tribunal’s Adjunct Associate Professor, Strategic & are the considerations that led to the award ‘cut the legal heart out’ of Defence Studies Centre, ANU. Korean peninsula being highlighted in China’s position on these matters. this Outlook as the most acute security challenge confronting our region. China had pre-emptively declared There is an urgent need to either the Tribunal, and any judgements reverse the DPRK’s nuclear weapon that it might make, to be invalid program or to build more resilient and therefore of no consequence. political relationships, especially However, although China continued between the two Koreas. to quietly develop the capacities of its new artificial islands, it avoided South China Sea any further actions in the area that symbolized exclusive ownership and This issue has arisen somewhat control. And, for good measure, Beijing surreptitiously. Most states, if they appeared to signal that it had found a focused on the issue at all in the period new and quite different international before China’s ‘reform and opening preoccupation, namely, the One Belt, up’ began to bear fruit, may have One Road initiative. The other states been doubtful that China, as the more directly involved have been similarly distant littoral state, would be fully careful to avoid exacerbating a tense determined to pursue its historic claim situation. While there have been no to the greater part of the South China formal changes in position, we did see Sea. Indeed, China may itself have positive changes in the atmospherics been ambivalent at times on whether of some relationships, notably that it could or should pursue its claim with between Manila and Beijing. the adamancy that it felt had to attend all issues concerned with sovereignty. The region has been left holding its After all, claiming exclusive ownership breadth on this issue. China may see the and effective administration of features island-building blitz as transformative in a semi-enclosed sea – none of which and irreversible, calculating that no has in all of history naturally attracted other interested party will find the permanent human habitation and will and the means to put these gains nearly all of which are submerged at at risk. This is not a stable situation. high tide every day - must have been Nor is it desirable as a template for regarded with some bemusement by how issues should be addressed and the other littoral communities 2000 resolved in the Asia Pacific (or Indo years ago as well as more recently. Pacific) of the future. This issue could provide an immediate focus for the Whatever the circumstances are coalition of ‘middle powers’ mentioned eventually revealed to have been, the above. That group might identify the South China Sea issue has been in the rules, principles, and conventions that vanguard of the more assertive posture could underpin a stable and resilient that China has presented to the world regime for the South China Sea. The since around 2009. This assertiveness widespread hope, confirmed by the peaked in 2014-15 with the frantic views expressed in this Outlook, is but spectacular conversion of seven that the confluence of the Arbitral low-tide elevations in the Spratlys into Tribunal award and the ramifications substantial artificial islands, some with of the aggressive erection of artificial airstrips and harbours and, therefore, islands will alter the political calculus military potential. Then, in July 2016, in key capitals and give new traction came the award of the Arbitral Tribunal to one or more of the collegiate ways on issues raised by the Philippines on forward identified in these pages. maritime rights in the South China Sea.

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Challenges to U.S. Leadership— Abroad and at Home—Portend Greater Uncertainty for the Asia-Pacific

Bates Gill big changes will be needed at home Malaysia and Thailand—are likewise as well. moving contrary to U.S. interests. In 2009, on his first trip to Asia as With the death of Thailand’s King president, Barack Obama declared, Looking abroad, it is clear the Asia- Bhumibol in October the Thai military “There must be no doubt. As America’s Pacific has become a more difficult looks all the more likely to govern, first Pacific president, I promise you arena for U.S. leadership. In spite of undemocratically, for the long-haul that this Pacific nation will strengthen tightening sanctions, North Korea has and has forged closer ties with China. and sustain our leadership in this doggedly pursued a nuclear weapon vitally important part of the world.” and the means to deliver it against In Kuala Lumpur, the Najib government regional neighbours, including the is dallying with hardline Islamists In the wake of that statement, United States. In 2016, North Korea in order to buttress its diminishing America’s ’pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ to the conducted its fourth and fifth nuclear popular support. Prime Minister Asia Pacific aimed to boost American tests and carried out multiple ballistic Najib was in China in November influence in the region by focusing missile tests, including one from a and signed on to a range of deals, more attention and resources on the submarine. including on defence and military- region. This included deepened technical cooperation with Beijing. economic interaction, greater America now faces a regime in These agreements included a deal to diplomatic engagement, stronger Pyongyang with a nascent nuclear- purchase littoral mission ships from promotion of human rights and weapons capability and next to China. democratisation, and an increased no intention of bargaining it away. U.S. military presence and military-to- Meanwhile, Beijing has begun to show In the South China Sea, China’s military exchanges. The ‘rebalance’ even greater reluctance to pressure island-building and positioning of has been one of the Obama Pyongyang to rollback its provocative military assets on those islands have administration’s most prominent nuclear and ballistic missile programs. gone largely unanswered. The foreign policy initiatives. The Chinese leadership continues to sweeping rejection of the basis for see the maintenance of the Kim Jong- China’s territorial claims in the South The policy has seen many successes, un government and with it a modicum China Sea by the arbitral tribunal in and it is not difficult to see why. of ‘stability’ as the least bad of several The Hague has made little difference American engagement in the bad options available at this stage. in altering facts on the (reclaimed) Asia-Pacific is not only a strategic ground. In spite of calls by the United imperative for the United States, but As such, U.S. options toward North States and others that China abide by is also encouraged and welcomed by Korea are growing narrower by the the tribunal decision, Beijing over the most of the region. day. If developments in North Korea past 12 months has achieved more continue on the current pathway, at in asserting its power and presence However, the rebalance now seems some point in the next year or two, in the South China Sea than it could stalled and that is not good news for the U.S. administration will face a have possibly expected when the year regional stability and security. The past very difficult choice: either accept a began—all the more so as President year has been an especially difficult rudimentary North Korean ability to Duterte discarded the arbitral ruling one for U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific. deliver a nuclear weapon against U.S. and cut a deal with China in return and allied targets, or do something to Looking ahead, the next U.S. for billions in Chinese economic forcibly prevent that outcome. administration and Congress will have assistance. a lot of work to do to sustain and fully In Southeast Asia, newly-elected Come inauguration day on January realise the benefits of deeper strategic Philippine President, Rodrigo Duterte, 20, 2017, President-elect Donald engagement in the Asia Pacific. It declared his country’s ‘separation’ Trump must deal with an increasingly is critically important to understand from the United States and appears divided and less-predictable Southeast that not all the challenges emanate to have thrown in his strategic lot with Asia even as the region of 640 from the region. Many of America’s Beijing. Domestic politics elsewhere million people becomes an arena challenges are self-inflicted meaning in the Southeast Asia—such as in for competition between the United

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President-elect Donald Trump campaigning in Arizona, 19 March 2016. Source: Gage Skidmore, Flickr.

States and China. China’s growing regional allies and friends about the leaders could be even more confident economic and military clout creates American commitment and resolve and risk-taking in 2018 and beyond. formidable incentives for China’s to maintain stability but does not neighbours to strike a balance precipitate an unwelcome downward But in many respects, challenges in the between Washington and Beijing. A spiral in U.S.-China relations and— region are not the biggest problems lack of commensurate leadership and in a nightmare scenario for most Washington faces in the Asia-Pacific. incentives on America’s part makes it Asia-Pacific governments—U.S. Rather, many of the biggest challenges only easier for regional governments expectations that they choose sides. come from home, arising out of the to hew this path. American domestic political scene. This problem is certainly not going The U.S. election campaign exposed China looms large across all the away. Beijing will continue to assert a deepening chasm in American important security issues in the its influence and interests, through politics—not dissimilar from what has region, and will become even more both hard and soft power means, in been on display elsewhere around influential diplomatically, militarily, ways that will challenge and look to the world. On one side of the rift and economically in the years ahead. weaken American leadership around are those who argue for more active The conundrum at the heart of U.S. China’s periphery. American engagement and leadership policy toward China will become in the world. On the other side are even more pointed for the next U.S. Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist those who say America is already president: How to strike the right Party leadership are unlikely to do overcommitted, underfunded, and balance between cooperation and anything rash as they will be primarily that an “America first” retrenchment is th competition with China, all the while focused on the 19 Party Congress called for. ensuring that competition does not at the end of 2017. Xi will want to bring the relationship to the point of be sure he gets a strong mandate for Looking to the Asia-Pacific region, crisis or conflict. his second five-year term and will try the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade to install as many trusted acolytes as agreement (TPP), the economic More broadly, how to strike this he can. If, as can be expected, he is cornerstone of the American rebalance balance in a way which reassures largely successful in this effort, Chinese strategy, has been an early casualty of

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this divided political landscape. Both and resolve in the face of challenges Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump and opportunities on the international vehemently disavowed it. With the stage. victory of Donald Trump, it became quickly clear that the TPP would not be At this point, it remains unclear how taken up by Congress during the lame the Trump administration intends to duck session. With that decision, wrestle with these big issues. While it is America’s role in the TPP is over. normal for there to be some uncertainty At best, with the passage of time, about incoming US administrations, President Trump may try to re-open a Trump presidency is an entirely negotiations with TPP partners, strike different matter as the outside world some new understandings and return knows so little about his foreign policy the treaty to Congress for approval— thinking. As such, effective American but that is mostly wishful speculation at leadership in the world and in the Asia this point. Pacific is in doubt in unprecedented ways, a situation likely to persist well Donald Trump’s scathing in to 2017 and perhaps beyond. disparagement of American allies generally, and Japan and South Korea Regardless of the political bickering in particular, also reflect an emergent and uncertainty which now body of nativist opinion in the United characterise the United States, the States. These views eschew global larger strategic stakes for America commitments and demean the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific region are alliance system which is one of the crystal clear. The challenges as well most fundamental pillars of American as the promising possibilities in the influence and power abroad, dynamic Asia Pacific region are too especially in the Asia-Pacific. important to ignore or avoid. Strong and effective U.S. engagement in Unfortunately, even though the the region is an enduring strategic presidential election has been imperative for American interests. decided, the United States is headed Moreover, such engagement makes for a period of continuing divisiveness a critically important contribution to at home. The Trump administration the continued stability, prosperity, and will have enormous domestic debates positive sociopolitical development to tackle. It will have to do so with across the region. half of the country in opposition to his presidency. Even his own party will be But the events of the past year and wary of his intentions. Congressional the prospects for U.S. politics in the Republicans will fight hard for their years to come raise serious questions prerogatives and ultimately their re- as to whether American leaders fully elections, so will not necessarily follow appreciate this. If not, we are in for his lead in all things. some rocky times ahead. This divisiveness will also extend Bates Gill to foreign policy—the notion that Professor of Asia-Pacific Strategic Studies, partisan politics stops at the water’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU. edge seems quaint and old-fashioned today.

As such, not only will America likely be consumed by domestic political wrangling, it will also have trouble forging bipartisan consensus on issues of American leadership, commitment,

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East Asia 2016: A Year of Destabilization

Yu Tiejun Geun Hye. Xi once again stressed also jeopardize the security interests that China was firmly committed both of other countries in this region. China In recent years, China has stressed to realizing the denuclearization was explicitly opposed to such actions the importance of amity, sincerity, of and to safeguarding peace and and expressed hopes that the relevant mutual benefit, and inclusiveness in stability on the Peninsula. Park replied parties would give China’s concerns its neighborhood diplomacy. But the that the ROK hoped the international serious consideration and act with security environment facing China in community would enhance its corresponding prudence. East Asia deteriorated steadily over the coordination and that the UN Security course of 2016. Council would respond as soon as China’s warning was largely ignored. possible so as to effectively deal with On 8 July, South Korea decided to allow the US to deploy THAAD missile Troubled Neighborhood the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. Worried by North Korea’s defense battery on its territory by the Even though China has continually increasing nuclear capability, ROK end of 2017, which prompted harsh demanded a denuclearized Korean also began to consider the Terminal and immediate condemnation from Peninsula, North Korea has continued High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) China. A few days later, the ROK to develop nuclear weapons, deployment issue with the US, which government disclosed that the battery conducting its fourth and fifth nuclear has been a security concern between would be deployed in Seongju, about test on 6 January and 9 September China and ROK for many years. 220 kilometers southeast of Seoul. 2016, respectively, plus a series From the perspective of China, the of missile tests, both successful and China was deeply worried about this. deployment of the THAAD radar unsuccessful. The tests posed a serious On February 16, 2016, Vice Foreign raises several serious concerns: (1) the challenge to regional security as well Minister Zhang Yesui stated that radar is clearly technically capable of as the international nonproliferation China was gravely concerned over observing ballistic missiles deep within system. As North Korea’s closest the announcement made by the US Chinese territory; (2) the radar could neighbor and its nearly-exclusive and the ROK to launch discussions on directly observe the launches and source of economic support and the deployment of the THAAD missile relay information back to the US long- energy assistance, China, again, defense system in the ROK. Zhang range national missile defense system became the focus of the world’s said that THAAD deployment would in the event of actual Chinese missile attention. On 2 March, China voted escalate tensions in the region, damage launches; (3) China likely views the to pass the Resolution 2270 of the China’s strategic security interests, and deployment of THAAD as a significant UN Security Council that aims to further tighten the sanction against the North Korea. China even arrested some businesspersons suspected of smuggling banned merchandise across the China-DPRK border. These actions were regarded as a sign of real change in China’s policy towards the North Korea.

However, China’s initial response to the DPRK’s 4th nuclear test in January was regarded as both hesitant and weak. The hot line existing between China and the ROK seemed to not work for crisis management. It was only on February 5, 2016, almost one month after North Korea’s fourth nuclear detonation that President Xi Jinping held telephone talks with Park A representation of the One Belt One Road initiative. Source: Wikimedia commons.

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step toward an integrated regional ‘exclusive defense’ policy, and possibly the arbitral process and would ballistic missile defense system such as leading to the remilitarization of Japan not participate in its proceedings, European Phased Adaptive Approach; in the future. The regular passage of recognize any of its decisions or (4) the THAAD deployment could be China’s navy through some channels implement its demands. China a further step towards greater co- and its accidental activities in some thought that the nature of the case operation in missile defense between waters were regarded as provocative was, in fact, mainly about territorial ROK and the US and the integration of and malicious towards Japan without sovereignty, and that sovereignty ROK into a US-led East Asian missile reason. The Maritime and Airspace was beyond the scope of UNCLOS defense system.1 These concerns are Communication Mechanism Dialogue jurisdiction. Regarding maritime rights more strategic than technical issues. between the two militaries remained disputes, China filed a declaration in essentially dormant despite being 2006 to exclude disputes concerning The THAAD controversy is still ongoing, revitalized in 2015. When President maritime delimitation from compulsory and the possibility that China, the Xi Jinping met with Prime Minister Abe arbitration and other dispute settlement US and ROK may negotiate some in Hangzhou during the G-20 Summit procedures. With the large-scale and compromise cannot be ruled out, but in September, he characterized the fast-speed of land reclamation on the issue itself has caused significant current Sino-Japanese relationship as several features owned by China, damage to the strategic trust that having “now entered a key phase, Beijing felt both legally and materially had been gradually built up between where no progress means regression.” secure, and insisted that only direct China and the ROK in recent years. It is really hard to make progress under bilateral negotiations, rather than China’s relationship with South Korea the heavy trust deficit. In practice, a third party mechanisms, could provide under President Xi and President Park, competitive security dynamic between solutions to these maritime disputes. which had been acclaimed as the best the two countries is looming large in example of China’s ‘neighborhood the East China Sea and even beyond. Since Duterte became the President diplomacy’ in the past several of the Philippines in June, the focus years began to stumble, and it is Regarding the Cross-Strait situation, of the South China Sea confrontation unlikely to warm up in a short term. since Tsai Ing-wen took power in between China and the Philippines Compared with the security situation Taipei early this year, Mainland China actually began to move from the on the Korean Peninsula, the Sino- and Taiwan seem to be sailing into legal to the political and diplomatic Japanese relationship is another troubled water. Unlike Nationalist arena. At the invitation of President Xi kind of headache. The bilateral Party leader Ma Yingjiu, Tsai Ing-wen Jinping, President Duterte undertook relationship hit rock bottom in 2012 declined to openly accept the 1992 a state visit to China from 18 to 21 over the persistent territorial dispute consensus that Taipei and Beijing are October 2016. After their talks, the surrounding the Diaoyu Islands and part of one China, with each side two leaders issued a Joint Statement remained chilly until now. Although the interpreting what that means, which which included 13 signed cooperation Foreign Ministers, Prime ministers and is regarded as the bedrock of Cross- documents covering economy, trade, even the supreme leaders have met Strait relations. As a result, cross-strait investment, production capacity, with each other in several occasions, communications have encountered agriculture, news, quality inspection, the absence of strategic trust is still very a political stalemate, and the way tourism, drug control, finance, clear. According to both Chinese and ahead is uncertain. coastguard, infrastructure construction international polls, strong majorities in and other areas. both countries held a negative image But the most eye-catching flashpoint of the other side. of 2016 has been the South China Article 40 of the Joint Statement Sea. On 12 July, 2016, the arbitral was regarded as the most important Against this background, each side tribunal organized under the Annex because it addressed the South China tends to view the other as a deliberate VII of the 1982 UN Convention on Sea issue, declaring that “(b)oth sides troublemaker and to decode the other the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled affirm that contentious issues are not side’s policy and action with the logic on the complaint brought by the the sum total of the China-Philippines of the worst case scenario in mind. Philippines that China’s actions in the bilateral relationship. Both sides The issue of Japan’s new security South China Sea had encroached on exchange views on the importance bill, which took effect on 29 March, its maritime rights. The tribunal ruled of handling the disputes in the South was regarded as threatening and largely in favor of Manila. Since the China Sea in an appropriate manner. destabilizing for East Asian security, very beginning, China’s position has Both sides also reaffirm the importance fundamentally changing Japans’ been to insist that it did not accept of maintaining and promoting peace

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and stability, freedom of navigation in the Chinese features in the South that destabilized East Asia. Against and over-flight above the South China China Sea both before and after the this strategic background, conspiracy Sea, addressing their territorial and arbitration ruling. The latest one took theories and worst case scenarios tend jurisdictional disputes by peaceful place on 13 Oct. 2016. Chinese naval to thrive on both sides. This perception means, without resorting to the threat vessels and planes took immediate gap can be narrowed, if both sides or use of force, through friendly action in response and warned the choose not to see only the worst from consultations and negotiations by US warship away. Chinese Foreign the other side and if they pay more sovereign states directly concerned, Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying attention to crisis management and in accordance with universally condemned it as highly irresponsible confidence building measures. recognized principles of international and provocative and warned that law, including the Charter of the United the Chinese side would continue We are facing an East Asia blending Nations and the 1982 UNCLOS.” In to monitor closely the situation in intensified geopolitical rivalry, Article 41, both sides also commit to relevant waters and airspace and deteriorated security dilemma and the full and effective implementation take all necessary means to defend increasing internal pressures resulting of the 2002 Declaration on the China’s territorial sovereignty and from rising populism, declining Conduct of Parties in the South China maritime rights. It seems that both economy, fragmented societies Sea (DOC) in its entirety, and to sides are unlikely to give in and thus and dis-functional decision-making work substantively toward the early make crisis management mechanism mechanisms. Different countries may conclusion of a Code of Conduct in a useful policy instrument in their future have different policy priorities but the South China Sea (COC) based on encounters. there can be no doubt that strategic consensus. self-restraint, especially by the The arbitration ruling against Chinese major powers, strengthening crisis As a consequence, China has shown claims in the South China Sea has hurt management mechanisms at all levels, some tolerance of foreign fishing China’s reputation and its relations revisiting cooperative security and activities in the waters surrounding with ASEAN countries. While holding CBMs, and building a multi-level, Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal). its position on the arbitration, China complex, open and inclusive regional When asked by the media to comment started to repair its relations with security framework will all be useful on whether the Chinese coastguard ASEAN countries by signing The Joint objectives in a gradually destabilizing permitted Philippine fishermen near Statement of the Foreign Ministers of East Asia. the Huangyan Dao, China’s Foreign ASEAN Member States and China on Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying the Full and Effective Implementation of No country wants to be only feared replied, “The Chinese side has always the DOC adopted in Vientiane on 25 by its neighbors. Americans may like been exercising normal jurisdiction July, 2016, and pledging its support to be called a benevolent hegemon, over Huangyan Dao. The situation for a COC in the South China Sea as but China also wants to be a “big there is and will remain unchanged. well as stabilizing the region. and amicable” country, as the late We have seen all-round improvement Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said. For its part, China’s overriding goal of of China-Philippines relations following Intensified Geopolitical Rivalry, President Duterte’s visit to China. Under peaceful development and national such circumstances, the Chinese side Deteriorated Security Dilemma rejuvenation can only be fulfilled makes proper arrangements based on and Increasing Internal Pressure within a stable and prosperous East the friendship between China and the Asia. Philippines in response to the issue of How did China’s supposed purpose President Duterte’s concern.” Clearly, of amicable neighborhood diplomacy Yu Tiejun and the outcome of China’s East Asian this posture is driven by political rather Associate Professor, School of International than legal considerations. It is likely that policy become so disparate? Beijing Studies, Peking University both China and the Philippines come blames the United States strategy of back to Deng Xiaoping’s wisdom of rebalancing its focus on East Asia, 1 shelving sovereignty disputes in favor claiming that it encouraged its allies Theodore A. Postol and George N. Lewis, “The in this region to confront China, to Illusion of Missile Defense: Why THAAD Will Not of joint development, and allowing the Protect South Korea,” Global Asia, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall next generation to find a way out. keep China from challenging U.S. 2016), hegemony in this region. Instead, pp. 82-84. The US has continued its Freedom the United States and its allies said it of Navigation operations near was China’s increasing assertiveness

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The Defense Force of Japan Awakens to Address the Contemporary Security Environment

Hideshi Tokuchi

Today’s Regional Security Environment

Singapore’s Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan, reminded us recently that we live in an age without inherent definition. A quarter century after the end of the Cold War, we still define our times by reference to the age that preceded it. This tells us that today’s international security environment is opaque. We see not only the dark side of globalization but also traditional security challenges in the Asia-Pacific. Our region is simultaneously part of a “world society” without national borders, and of an “international Adm. Scott Swift, Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, inspects Japan Maritime Self-Defense society” of sovereign nation states. Force sailors in June, 2016. Source: U.S. Pacific Fleet. Survival in this intricate environment mandates a dual approach. While North Korea would consistently take would be their targets. The attacks traditional security challenges have to the strategic line of pushing forward in Dacca in July 2016 were a further be addressed in a traditional way that on the dual front of economic reminder for the Japanese public that recognizes that preserving a balance development and boosting its nuclear the terrorist threat remains very real. forces in terms of both in quality and of power will be the basis of regional Finally, threats to global commons order, it is also the case that new quantity. On September 5, 2016, North Korea launched three ballistic originating from this region, such as forms of multilateral cooperation are the maritime domain, outer space necessary to address the dark side of missiles toward the Sea of Japan, which flew about 1,000km and fell at and cyber space, are serious. In globalization. This is the environment particular, recent Chinese actions on surrounding Japan. approximately the same point within Japan’s EEZ. This demonstrated and over the East and South China Traditional security challenges in this that North Korea was making Seas have caused grave concerns. region include territorial disputes important improvements in its missile China insists that the award of the in the South China Sea and the capabilities and technologies. Four Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) north-south division on the Korean days later, it conducted its fifth nuclear rendered in July 2016 on the South Peninsula. When we look at this test. North Korea later claimed said China Sea disputes between the region from a non-traditional security that it would be able to produce as Philippines and China is not valid perspective, we can point out the many smaller, lighter and diversified and that China does not accept it. following: nuclear warheads of higher striking In the Sino-Japanese summit meeting power as it wants. in September, Japan’s Prime Minister First, proliferation of WMD and Shinzo Abe urged China’s President their means of delivery. North Second, this region is not free from Xi Jinping to seek peaceful settlement Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile the threat of international terrorism. of the disputes based on international developments are matters of serious In January 2015, when ISIL murdered law, but President Xi told Prime concern. North Korean leader Kim Japanese nationals in Syria, it Minister Abe that Japan was not a Jong Un said in May 2016 that declared that Japanese nationals party to the South China Sea issue

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and should exercise caution in its no reason to exclude China. the US. Although the US is obliged to words and deeds in regard to that defend Japan, Japan is not obliged to matter. Possibly in response to The hub and spokes system can defend the US. Instead, Japan has the Japan’s advocacy of the PCA award, also provide an integral basis for obligation to provide military bases a large number of Chinese fishing a regional security cooperation to the US. The asymmetrical nature boats operated off the coasts of network. In fact, bilateral cooperation of the alliance has made it difficult to Japan’s Senkaku Islands and China’s between the tips of the spokes, such manage. It is becoming important to law-enforcement vessels illegally as Japan-Australia, and trilateral make it more symmetrical. Second, in intruded into Japanese territorial cooperation, such as Japan-Australia- today’s globalized world, no country waters surrounding the islands in early US, is in progress. In short, the hub can achieve security single-handedly. August. It is difficult to expect that and spokes security system is the key This notion is particularly important for China will easily change its stance in instrument for regional security and the Japan, as it is heavily dependent on respect to either the Senkaku or the Japan-US alliance is the most critical maritime trade. Third, preserving a South China Sea issue. element of that system. Accordingly, balance of power requires not only the strengthening ties with the US sits at efforts of individual states but also an Two things could be regarded as the top of Japan’s security agenda. international effort to bring necessary crucial to addressing such a complex forces together. environment. One is a robust US Reinterpreting Japan’s presence based on the so-called hub The security legislation has several and spokes security system in this Constitution and the New important characteristics. First, this region to preserve the balance of Security Legislation legislation, by enabling the exercise of power. The other is the network of the right of collective self-defense and regional security cooperation. The new interpretation of the also by enabling US asset protection, constitution regarding the use of will contribute to making the alliance The Japan-US Alliance is the most force, and the subsequent security more symmetrical and thereby important spoke of the regional security legislation to embed the changes, increase its credibility. Second, the system for a number of reasons. First, gives Japanese forces authorization exercise of the right of collective Japan and the US share essentially to engage in new missions. The self-defense is limited even under all the core security issues in play more prominent examples of these the new interpretation, because it such as China, North Korea, Russia, new missions include, first, they can follows the basic logic of the previous and international terrorism. No other respond to an armed attack against interpretation. Specifically, measures US ally shares all these issues with a foreign country that is in a close for self-defense are permitted in the US. Second, Japan hosts about relationship with Japan, although in inescapable circumstances pertaining 38,000 US troops. Japan is one of a limited way. Second, in peacetime, to imminent unlawful situations where the few countries in the region which Japanese forces can protect US assets Japanese nationals’ rights to life, can provide a dependable stationing engaged in intelligence, surveillance, liberty and the pursuit of happiness environment for US forces. Third, reconnaissance (ISR) operations for are fundamentally overturned, due to Japan is a mature democracy, and this the defense of Japan. Third, Japanese an armed attack by a foreign country. fact constitutes the very basis of the troops contributing to international Here, the consistency with the previous Japan-US relationship. missions, such as UNPKOs, can interpretation is maintained and will aid foreign troops operating in the The prevailing security system in the help assure sceptical neighbors. Third, same mission in the event they are the new legislation not only underpins Asia-Pacific does not include the assaulted. Fourth, Japanese forces region’s biggest economy, China. the right of self-defense and enhanced can provide wider logistics support Japan-US defense cooperation, it also The stability that the system generates to foreign force units engaged in has become correspondingly fragile. expands the opportunities for Japan legitimate combat missions. Fifth, in to engage in multilateral cooperation. It follows that involving China in emergency situations, Japanese forces security cooperation endeavours will Importantly, this would even include may engage in operations to rescue cooperation with China in UNPKO’s be important for the region. Rapid Japanese nationals abroad. globalisation provides an additional and other contexts. reason to have China in the framework The backdrop of these legal measures The recent debate in Japan on the of regional cooperation. As long as can be summarized in three crucial security legislation warrants some Chinese security interests overlap with observations. First, the necessity to contextual observations. First, as noted those of others in the region, there is strengthen the alliance relationship with by Professor Koji Murata, remarks by

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some Japanese that glorify Japan’s mainly at providing the political- Fourth, “partner.” In this globalized pre-war history cast the legislation in military framework for studies on world, the networking of like-minded a negative light. However, the new contingency planning in the case countries is more important than ever, security legislation has nothing to do of an armed attack against Japan. and the Japan-US relationship must with the history issue. The legislation Since then, the Guidelines document be appropriately positioned in this is based on serious reflection on the has evolved, adapting itself to the network. Thus, it is natural for both past, but its focus and its effects lie in changing environment. The character countries to advance shared goals by the future. Second, the overarching of the Guidelines renewed in 2015 promoting deeper security cooperation security policy of Japan had been are well expressed by five key words: with regional partners. set out in the 2013 National Security “seamless,” “effective,” “whole-of- Strategy, but those who opposed government,” “partner,” and “global.” Fifth, “global.” When the first the legislation often lacked a strong Through determined implementation, Guidelines were established in 1978, and comprehensive understanding the new Guidelines will ensure that they focused on joint operations in of this key policy statement so the the Japan-US alliance will continue the event of an armed attack against debate often became one-sided. The to contribute to regional peace and Japan. Today, however, the context legislation needs to be understood as stability. for bilateral defense cooperation is far an integrated package grounded in broader. Reflecting the global nature the National Security Strategy. Third, First, “seamless.” As a means to of the alliance, it now encompasses those who opposed the legislation demonstrate Japan-US joint resolve to such areas as counter-terrorism, argued that the key concepts in it cope with common security concerns, counter-piracy and HA/DR. were too vague. Actually, they are both countries need to cooperate in all imaginable contingencies: In order to address both the traditional abstract, but not vague. In addition, and non-traditional security agenda, the legislation sets out strict procedures through peacetime, ‘gray zone’, and all-out military confrontation. It is Japan has engaged in an intense for giving orders to the Defense Forces political effort to establish a new for operations. Unfortunately, not increasingly important to cooperate in gray zone situations in order to avoid security framework by reinterpreting everyone was prepared to approach the Constitution and renewing the it in this way. escalation. In addition, both countries need to expand the geographical Guidelines for Japan-US Defense horizon of cooperation and to include Cooperation. Together, this will Strengthening the Japan-US new strategic domains, such as outer contribute to preserving the balance Alliance space and cyber space. of power in the region, enhance the deterrent value of the alliance, and The Japan-US Alliance constitutes one Second, “effective.” Timely response also provide a basis for an enhanced of the basic pillars of the national enabled by quick coordination and multilateral security cooperation security of Japan. The new “Guidelines swift decision-making is critical to network. Japan has pursued these for Japan-US Defense Cooperation”, addressing contemporary threats. innovations as essential to its own completed in 2015, could be regarded Therefore, the Alliance Coordination security and is confident that they will as the most remarkable achievement Mechanism is indispensable. Similarly, have wider positive consequences for of the alliance in recent years. The both sides need to give priority to the region. new division of labor established by laying the foundations for lasting the Guidelines will make the alliance cooperation, including interoperability Hideshi Tokuchi more symmetrical, and thus contribute and common situational awareness. Non-resident Fellow, the Fletcher School of to the strengthening of the relationship. Third, “whole-of-government.” Law and Diplomacy. The US political commitment to the Security and defense cooperation defense of Japan would be hollow if it cannot be conducted by the military were not undergirded by a framework establishments alone. It must involve for military cooperation. The 2015 all relevant agencies of the respective “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense governments, including law- Cooperation” serve as the overarching enforcement organizations. The new political-military framework for Alliance Coordination Mechanism will alliance cooperation in the changing ensure the unity of effort necessary security environment. to achieve a whole-of-government approach. The original 1978 guidelines aimed

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Russia in Asia and in the World: Back to the Future as a Great Power

Victor Sumsky Under massive external pressures, the the emergence of the EU with unified country is restoring its great power Germany at its core, the gradual For the ruling Western elites, the year of status, and doing it in a way that transition towards multipolarity was Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory in the nobody would have anticipated at the epitomized by the rise of such giants as US presidential elections was a horror dawn of the Third Millennium. China, India and Brazil, plus Russia’s show. Stunned as they are by these recovery from the chaos of the 1990s. ‘impossible’ events, they have plenty of Before presenting the arguments to None of these four players (joined later reasons to add one more point to their support the view that in 2016 Russia by South Africa to form BRICS) was in list of frustrations: just like in 2014 and continued to improve its position in the mood to boldly challenge the status 2015, they honestly tried but failed to Asia and the world, the author would quo. After all, it seemed more or less do away with Russia as an independent like to share some observations about conducive to their continued progress. force in global affairs. Having how and why the world has moved Nevertheless, the very fact that they tried every trick in the handbook of from what it used to be in the 1990s were making progress was prompting subversion – be it economic sanctions, and 2000s, to what it is in the second the United States to hedge its pre- undisguised attempts to engineer half of the 2010s. eminence through a set of preemptive regime change, hasty military buildup The global shift towards the multipolar and interventionist moves. on the Russian borders or a campaign world order was already under Thus, the former Soviet republics of hatred unprecedented in the modern way during the late Cold War era. era – they have achieved nothing were systematically drawn into the Once this era was over, the process US orbit. The foundation of strategic meaningful. More than that, the overall continued within the framework of a effect of Western attempts to subjugate understanding represented by the US- unipolar system. Apart from a series Soviet ABM Treaty was unilaterally Russia is strikingly counterproductive. of East Asian economic miracles and

Meeting of the BRICS during the G20 conference on 4 September 2016.Source: GovernmentZA, Flickr.

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dismantled. New military bases and EU has remained, up to the present, the When Russia refused to extradite anti-missile defense facilities were biggest trading partner of the Russian Edward Snowden to America and installed in close proximity to Russian Federation, Moscow and Beijing were provided support to Bashar al-Assad territory. By means of synchronized steadily increasing and diversifying in the Syrian civil war, the United eastward enlargement of the EU and their links, with China becoming a States and its allies went berserk. The NATO, Russia was all but squeezed out major Asian destination for Russian oil, combination of a violent coup in the of the European security system. All this especially after the opening in 2012 of Ukraine, a worldwide media campaign was correctly read in the Kremlin as a the East Siberia- Pacific Ocean pipeline to demonize the Russian President, and variation on the theme of containment system. the imposition of economic sanctions, and a sign that Washington was seemed tantamount to attempted not viewing Moscow as an equal Although the Obama administration regime change. partner. Russian President Vladimir initially tried to convince both Russia Putin declared this in February 2007, and China that it was willing to improve What have they got in return? Crimea’s in his famous speech at the Munich bilateral relations, it ended up focused bloodless and joyful reunification with Conference on Security Policy. on cutting Russia’s linkages with Europe Russia, and later on a determined and creating a split between China and antiterrorist campaign in Syria brought Retaliation came in August 2008 in Asia. The first of the two objectives was Vladimir Putin’s popularity ratings to the form of an exemplary proxy war. to be achieved by concluding the US- unprecedented heights. State of the Georgia, patronized by the United EU agreement on Transatlantic Trade art military equipment – be it Kaliber- States as the next candidate for NATO and Investment Partnership, as well as guided missiles fired at the ISIS/Daesh membership, launched an attack by transforming Ukraine into an EU- targets from the Caspian Sea or testing on Russian peacekeepers in South affiliated and fiercely anti-Russian state. military robots operated from Moscow Ossetia – only to lose this province, As for the second objective, Obama on Syrian battlefields – demonstrated as well as Abkhazia, after a Russian and his team were pressing hard for to the world the technological depth of counteroffensive, proving that dealing an early conclusion of the Transpacific Russian industry. with Moscow in that manner was a Partnership Agreement that would way to disaster. Nevertheless, those leave China out. They also endeavored Deeds speak louder than words, and who should have been concerned with to exploit, to Beijing’s disadvantage, choruses of professional Russophobes this lesson preferred to ignore it. From the tensions in the South China Sea cannot change that. By virtue of its that time on defining Russia and Putin and on the Korean Peninsula. deeds, Russia is reemerging as a great as ‘bullish’, ‘assertive’, ‘expansionist’ power with no reservations, one of the and ‘aggressive’ became the daily It is hard to understand why Washington very few sovereign players on today’s norm not just of Western journalism but, pursued this course so stubbornly, global stage. increasingly, of political leaders. particularly as it must have occurred to some that the US was driving Russia’s head-on collision with the The conclusions drawn by the Moscow and Beijing closer together. West has brought about yet another Russians – not only officials, but a One explanation is that they became momentous change. The phase great majority of the people – may be hostages to their old belief that Moscow when the world was moving towards illustrated by quoting one of President and Beijing could not make it together multipolarity in an evolutionary, step- Putin’s expressive remarks: “Weakest under any conceivable circumstances, by-step manner is over. The world in which we find ourselves now is an open goes to the wall” (Слабых бьют). and the US had no reason to worry. In response to these challenges, the Apart from that, they basically struggle over the issue of multipolarity. Russian government initiated a 10- continued to judge Putin’s Russia by The New Great Game is played year program of accelerated military the metrics of the Yeltsin era, seeing it simultaneously not just on one but on modernization; identified the task of as a hopelessly weak element in the several grand chessboards. No twist developing the Russian Far East and emerging Russia-China combination. in the geopolitical scenario that has Siberia as “the national project for the In this scheme of things, the easiest started to unfold is pre-ordained. No whole of the 21st century” (another way to nip the unfriendly alliance in true achievement is possible without famous Putin’s formula), continued to the bud would be to break the spine consistent, purposeful and calculated pursue the economic reintegration of the of the Russian state by subjecting it to coordination that can only come from post-Soviet space; and started looking unbearable pressures, and then to deal a stable, well-functioning state and a more pointedly for new partnerships, with China one on one before it grew popular, legitimate leadership. both economic and political, in the too strong for that. Is Russia ready for the trials of this dynamic Asia Pacific region. While the new phase in global affairs? Judging

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by the trends and events of 2016 and medium business sector. At the now includes India and Pakistan). (and of the two preceding years), same time, it continues to implement These examples illustrate the point it is. The remarkable resilience with such future-oriented mega-projects that neither the Ukrainian crisis, nor which Russia has been responding to as comprehensive improvement of the war in Syria are distracting the the diverse Western pressures, would facilities for commercial navigation government of Russia from its declared have never been there in the absence along the Northern Sea Route, that priorities concerning the development of efficient governance. Russia has stretches along the Arctic coast of Russia of the Far Eastern areas of the country used the evolutionary era in global from Novaya Zemlya Archipelago to and promotion of stronger connectivity affairs to develop new capacities in the Bering Strait, and the construction with its East Asian neighbors. Is this not fields as varied as strategic planning of the new spaceport in the Amur another sign of Russia’s strength as a and military production, information Region. Work is in full swing on the proponent of the emerging multipolar technologies (IT), agriculture, urban 19-kilometer rail-road and automobile world order? beautification, and diplomacy. bridge across the Kerch Strait that will link mainland Russia with Crimea by Looking at these developments as a In his State of the Nation Address in the year 2018, and on the Power of whole confirms that Russia has taken a January 2015, Barak Obama proudly Siberia pipeline which will transport major step toward long-term, strategic announced that Western sanctions natural gas from Yakutia to China and self-determination in Asia – and given pushed Russia into isolation and left other neighboring countries via Russian further proof of its re-emergence as a its economy “in tatters”. Until today Far East. great power with a clear vision of the those pundits whose primary sources future it seeks to build. on Russia are the New York Times and In the meantime the Ministry for the CNN persist in the conviction that the Development of Russian Far East Victor Sumsky Russian economy is backward and created in 2012, on the eve of the Director of ASEAN Centre in MGIMO primitive, fully dependent on exports of APEC Summit in Vladivostok, to University, MFA of Russia hydrocarbons and immersed in endless coordinate the implementation of state- crises. All this is said and written at the initiated development programs in that time when the share of oil and gas in part of the country is setting up what the budgetary revenues of the Russian is known as Territories of Advanced Federation is dropping below the Development. These are enclaves with 40 percent and the inflow of foreign a business-friendly regime conducive investment is increasing. Signs of to domestic and foreign investments revitalization on a new, modern basis into export-oriented manufacturing. are observable in a wide spectrum of To boost Vladivostok’s transformation industries – from food production and into a regional trade hub, it has been biotechnologies to machine building, legally proclaimed a porto franco with civilian aircraft construction and simplified customs regulations. Since production of precision weapons, not Pacific Russia has an obvious need in to speak of IT. If in 2014 Russia was domestic migrants who will contribute ranked 18th in the Bloomberg Index of to its economic growth, the Ministry Fifty Most Innovative Economies, then came forward with the proposal about a year later it went up to 14th position, allocating one hectare of vacant state- and in 2016 to 12th. Its total score is owned land on a free-of-charge basis 78.85, not so far behind the US, now to any citizen who intends to use it ranked 8th with 82.84 points. productively. Last April this bill became Federal Law. While promoting import substitution to neutralize the impact of the sanctions Further evidence of Russia’s new and consolidate the position of Russian energy and expanded horizons producers on the domestic market, can be found in the several recently the government is creating new credit initiated forums exploring enhanced agencies such as the Russian Export economic cooperation among the Center to support the growth and Russian Federation, its Eurasian diversification of the country’s export neighbours, ASEAN, and the Shanghai potential, particularly in the small Cooperation Organisation (which

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India in the Asia Pacific: Strengthening Asian Multipolarity

Sanjay Pulipaka*

In the past one year, rising China’s territorial assertions, an absence of robust regional security architecture, and the growing stress on the US alliance system in Asia Pacific became glaringly evident. For India, it is not the emergence of China as the second largest economy that has been a source of concern; China is one of India’s biggest trading partners . It is a combination of China’s economic rise coupled with double- digit growth in defence expenditure, and aggressive territorial/maritime assertions that have generated concerns in India. Further, an unwillingness to accommodate India, even when China’s core interests are India-U.S.-Japan trilateral exercise Malabar, held June 2016. Vice Adm. Bisht, Rear Adm. not at stake, amplifies Indian unease. Manabe, Dep. Commander Hurley shake hands. Source: U.S. pacific Fleet. For instance, India’s application for membership into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) did not make region. This became strikingly obvious United States.’ This prompted questions much progress at the June 2016 after the recent the Permanent Court of as to whether Duterte’s shift will have plenary meeting in Seoul.. There was Arbitration (PCA) ruling on the South cascading effects, propelling others to a strong opinion in India that China China Sea. The Association of Southeast recalibrate their foreign policy postures sabotaged its candidature; an Indian Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign away from balancing approaches. government spokesperson referred to Ministers meeting, in July this year, did In the recent past, India has been the “procedural hurdles persistently not refer to the PCA decision on the concerned that neighbouring countries raised by one country”. In October South China Sea in its communiqué. could bandwagon with others and this year, much to the dismay of India, This once again demonstrated that, scaled up its engagement accordingly. China extended its technical hold in spite of having various frameworks on designating Jaish-e-Mohammed such as the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Bay of Bengal: The New Locus of leader Masood Azhar as a terrorist Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN by the 1267 Sanctions Committee at Regional Forum, the region lacks Regionalism the UN. The China-Pakistan Economic robust institutions to address traditional Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s Corridor (CPEC) gained momentum, security challenges. Further, the hope government sought to promote South in spite of India’s objections that that the East Asia Summit (EAS) Asian regional cooperation in its initial the project is being operationalised forum would evolve into a genuine days in office. However, with the through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. leadership led platform to address deterioration in India-Pakistan relations As can be seen, 2016 has been a the security concerns in the region is and improvements in India’s relations particularly challenging year for India- yet to materialise. To compound the with other neighbours, the locus of China relations. challenges, the US alliance system regional cooperation has witnessed an in Asia Pacific is experiencing stress. This downturn in the relationship with eastwards shift. During a recent visit to China, the China is happening in the absence President of the Philippines, Rodrigo In 2014, Modi was the first Indian of robust security architecture in the Duterte, declared ‘separation from the PM to visit Nepal after 17 years and

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announced substantive development loan for various projects in India that were held in June last year. India and aid. This bilateral relationship may facilitate greater connectivity with Australia, which have a Framework experienced stress after Nepal adopted Bangladesh. This demonstrates that for Security Cooperation in place, a new Constitution in September 2015. India and Japan are collaborating in also conducted their first maritime India’s call for an inclusive Constitution creating plurality of supply chains with naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal. was seen as an unwarranted Bay of Bengal as an important node in Given these developments, there intervention by the Nepal government the Asia Pacific. have been suggestions that it is time headed by K. P. Oli. In August 2016, to operationalise a quadrilateral with Pushpa Kamal Dahal taking over Relations with ‘Rest of Asia’: framework involving India, US, Japan the reins, there was a considerable and Australia, an idea first mooted improvement in India-Nepal relations. Established Power and New more than a decade ago. Some Nodes of Engagement scholars and policymakers in India India’s relations with Bangladesh have noted that there is a dichotomy showed substantive improvements with The cooperation in the Bay of Bengal in the policy preferences of Australia’s the conclusion of the Land Boundary region indicates that Japan has strategic community and its business Agreement and coastal shipping emerged as a significant pillar of community in responding to China’s agreement. Bangladesh is emerging India’s Act East Policy. Japan was rise. Nevertheless, the Indian as an important fulcrum for sub- the first country that PM Modi visited approach seems to suggest that two regional frameworks. In the middle outside South Asia. In 2014, Japan triangles make a quadrilateral. of the last year, Bangladesh, Bhutan, promised to invest approximately India, and Nepal (BBIN) signed a $US35 billion over five years and, a As a part of Act East policy, India has Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA), year later, a additional $US12 billion expanded the area of engagement which would facilitate easy movement into a Make-in-India Special Finance from Mongolia to Fiji. The creation of passengers, personnel and cargo Facility. India hopes to leverage and the regular summit meetings vehicles between the four countries. The Japanese investments and technology of the Forum for India-Pacific BBIN is gaining traction with member in various sectors such as high-speed Island Countries (FIPIC) indicate states now discussing the possibility trains, industrial townships, and the seriousness with which India is of a railway agreement. In a related economic corridors. Localisation of approaching the expanded area of development, India hosted the Bay high-speed train technologies, with operation. In September this year, of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral spill-over impact on other industries, India and Vietnam have upgraded Technical and Economic Cooperation will be a key objective for India. In the their partnership to a ‘Comprehensive (BIMSTEC) Summit in October this security realm, Japan is now a regular Strategic Partnership.’ India extended year. The emergence of BBIN and partner in the Malabar exercises with a US$100 million Line of Credit for BIMSTEC indicate growing eagerness India and the US, this year held in defence procurement and agreed to among India and some of its eastern Sasebo, Japan. It is distinctly possible sell high-speed patrol boats. News neighbours to develop Bay of Bengal that India may purchase US-2 reports suggest that India may sell centred cooperative framework that amphibious aircraft from Japan. Both Brahmos missile systems to Vietnam. would also act as a bridge to South- countries are reflecting on possibilities In the past few months, India hosted east Asian countries. of collaboration in the realm of new Myanmar’s president Htin Kyaw and defence technologies. There is a State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi The Bay of Bengal oriented connectivity growing mini-lateral component in in quick succession, indicating an networks are receiving significant India-Japan relations. The first US- upscaling of the relationship. support from other international actors India-Japan Trilateral Ministerial as well. Two years ago, Japan launched dialogue took place in New York India is focused on developing the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth last September, prompting some relationships with a wide variety of Belt (BIG-B) to strengthen infrastructure Indian officials to suggest identifying countries in Asia and this emphasis in Bangladesh. In June this year, the concrete projects which can be on the ‘rest of Asia’ is not impacting Bangladesh government and the Japan operationalised in India’s immediate its relationships with the established International Cooperation Agency eastern neighbourhood. powers. India and the US now (JICA) have signed loan agreements characterise themselves as the for the construction of projects that In a related development, the ‘closest partners.’ Both countries have would improve connectivity with India. secretary-level trilateral talks articulated a Joint Strategic Vision for Recently, JICA has also approved a soft involving India, Japan, and Australia the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean

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Region. Some of the irritants relating region. It should be noted that, two Japan and Australia) and collaborate to the civil nuclear deal and divergent years ago, India abided by a PCA with friendly countries in the rest of policy approaches on Climate ruling on a maritime dispute that went Asia; (c) develop the capacities of Change have been addressed. in favour of Bangladesh. friendly countries in the region [eg: India-US defence trade, which was Vietnam] and strengthen the bilateral near zero in 2005, today stands Along with political and security relationships at the societal level at approximately $US13 billion. issues, three themes dominated [emphasis on Buddhism]; (d) work During Indian Defence Minister India’s engagement with the Asia to strengthen ASEAN centrality as Manohar Parrikar’s visit to the US in Pacific in the recent past. First, well as the trilateral frameworks of August this year, Washington agreed economic diplomacy became an engagement; (e) expand the areas of to treat India on par with its ‘closest important component with aggressive engagement (For example, reaching allies’ to facilitate defence trade and campaigns for enhanced foreign out to the Pacific island states); and technology sharing. Subsequently, direct investment and participation (f) reiterate the necessity of rule-based the reports that Lockheed Martin, in the “Make in India” initiative. It regional order. an American aerospace company, should be noted that, between 2000 is interested in starting an F-16 and 2016, the Asia Pacific region These core strands of Indian policy production line for the Indian Air Force accounted for over 31% of total have been in consonance with the as well as for global exports indicates FDI inflow into India. If promised US Rebalance to Asia and Japan’s the growing comfort between the investments, such as Foxconn’s engagement with Southeast Asian two countries. The acquisitions $5 billion investment proposal, countries. However, there is some from the US have been a force Japan’s High-speed trains, and the concern in India that Russia’s pivot multiplier for India’s power projection US defence companies proposals to Asia has given greater strategic capabilities, which was evident when materialise then the Asia Pacific space to China. The incipient Russia- India recently deployed the C-17 region’s FDI contribution in India China entente may get diluted Globemaster in the border regions of will increase substantially. Even with the expansion of Russia-Japan Arunachal Pradesh. This August, both from the perspective of Asia Pacific economic engagement. The recent countries have agreed on bilateral countries, India is emerging as a conversations between Russian and Logistics Exchange Memorandum of major destination for investment. Japanese policymakers on energy Agreement (LEMOA). The LEMOA Second, there has been an emphasis projects and the proposed visit of Putin will enable the United States and on engaging the Indian Diaspora to Tokyo, therefore, hold a promise Indian defence forces to access to invigorate fraternal business links of enhanced bilateral relations each others’ facilities for repair and and develop a constituency for between the two. The improvement replenishment of supplies. India is enhanced ties with India. Finally, of the Japan-Russia relationship may leveraging the US influence to join cultural assets, including Buddhism, reinforce Asian multipolarity. the international frameworks such have received a new prominence in as the Nuclear Supplier Group India’s outreach efforts. Given the Sanjay Pulipaka spread of Buddhist culture across (NSG) and the Asia Pacific Economic Senior Consultant, Indian Council for Cooperation (APEC). large parts of the Asia Pacific, an Research on International Economic Relations emphasis on shared cultural heritage (ICRIER), New Delhi. India has consistently stressed the is aimed at developing new nodes of *These are the author’s personal views. need for ASEAN-centred processes to engagement at the societal level. address security concerns in the Asia Pacific region. The need of ensuring The above discussion indicates that freedom of navigation and the rules- strengthening the natural multi-polarity based order in the Asia Pacific of the Asia Pacific constitutes the region have figured in many bilateral core of India’s Act East policy. In this and multilateral foreign policy direction, India has been working with pronouncements involving India. like-minded countries to: (a) leverage After the recent Permanent Court of strategic partnership to enhance Arbitration (PCA) ruling, India clearly domestic capacities in manufacturing, stated the necessity of maintaining new technology and defence sectors freedom of navigation based on the (b) become proximate to global and principles of international law in the regional powers (such as the US,

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Security In the Asia Pacific: A South Korean Perspective

Jong Kun Choi started to question whether United on the Korean Peninsula should read Nation Security Council Resolution ‘grey and gloomy’. Many security observers and policy 2270 has any genuine prospect of makers in Seoul could not dispel curtailing Pyongyang’s rogue behavior. UNSC 2270 and THAAD the whirl of disappointing thoughts Their optimism that strong sanctions when North Korea conducted its 5th would bring Kim Jong Un back to the The UN Security Council condemned nuclear test on September 9th. While negotiating table has turned into into North Korea in the strongest terms describing the nuclear test as a “nuclear a circle of confusion, anger, and even following its fourth nuclear test on 4 warhead detonation test,” North Korea fatigue. And it seems that the nuclear January 2016, declaring that the test used the terms “standardization,” quagmire is impenetrable – there is no constituted a dire challenge to the “miniaturization,” “lightweight,” and light at the end of the tunnel. Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear “diversification.” A nuclear warhead Weapon (NPT) and to peace and detonation test is normally conducted Ultimately, South Korea’s security stability in Northeast Asia. In that spirit, with the objective of confirming a environment has not improved over the 15-member Council unanimously design that can be attached to a the past year. Rather, a variety of adopted resolution 2270 and also missile. The latest test made it more developments have further complicated criticized North Korea’s launch of a likely that North Korea would acquire the security landscape on the Korean long-range rocket on February 7, which the capacity to mass produce nuclear Peninsula: North Korea continues was using ballistic missile technology. weapons. This means that North to develop its nuclear and missile Resolution 2270 authorised the Korea’s nuclear tests would no longer technologies, the UN sanctions regime toughest sanctions yet imposed, be desperate measures; they would appears ineffective, South Korea’s including mandatory inspections of become, instead, a routine activity acceptance of the US THAAD (Terminal cargo leaving and entering North associated with improving its nuclear High Altitude Area Defence) system Korea by land, sea or air; a ban on arsenal. As North Korea brandishes has soured relations with Beijing and all sales or transfers of small arms and its misplaced faith in nuclear weapons, South Korea’s messy domestic politics light weapons to Pyongyang; and feelings of rage and helplessness are with President Park’s “shaman advisor” expulsion of North Korean diplomats rampant in South Korean society. South scandal. All of these problems can who engage in ‘illicit activities.’ The Koreans are utterly sick and tired of the be expected to endure into 2017 resolution also banned the export of North’s nuclear program. Many have suggesting that the forecast for security natural resources such as coal, iron

THAAD missile interceptor battery. Source: Mark Holloway, Flickr.

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and iron ore allegedly being used to stipulated that THAAD would be able Breaking the Nuclear Taboo fund North Korea’s weapons of mass to intercept North Korean missiles. destruction programs, only exempting Disturbingly, the argument that natural resources for general To date, South Korea, fearful of South Korea should also acquire its economic purposes. It also explicitly upsetting China, had dodged the own nuclear weapons to counter prohibited all exports of gold, titanium, American request to host the THAAD North Korea began to emerge not vanadium ore, rare earth minerals, missile defense system on its soil. from the far right but rather from the and restricted aviation fuel exports Instead, Seoul has long deployed ruling Saenuri Party. A group of 31 including kerosene-type rocket fuel. the Patriot system, which intercepts Saenuri Party lawmakers, including The resolution required UN member missiles at lower altitudes. President floor leader Chung Jin-suk, formed states to freeze the financial assets of Park’s decision essentially reversed a policy forum to find a solution to companies and other entities linked South Korea’s regional security policy the North Korean nuclear issue. The to North Korea’s nuclear programs. and invited China’s fierce opposition. group released a statement on Sep. It essentially choked the money route Foreign Minister Wang of China 12 arguing that South Korea “should to Pyongyang by prohibiting all warned, “I will hear what kind of mobilize all available means, including countries from opening new branches, practical actions South Korea will take nuclear armament, to guarantee the subsidiaries, and representative to protect the unwavering relations safety of the Republic of Korea and offices of North Korean banks, and between us.” China indicated that its people.” While calls for nuclear banned any financial institution from South Korea’s acceptance of the armament run the gamut from an setting up joint ventures or conducting deployment of THAAD system “has independent nuclear deterrent for the financial transactions with these undermined the foundation for our purpose of self-defense to having the banks. Moreover, the resolution bilateral trust.” China’s cold-hearted US deploy tactical nuclear weapons mandated that member states close all resentment filled the air of Sino-Korean in South Korea, they are all arguments North Korean banks within 90 days. relations. for blocking nuclear weapons using nuclear weapons. These arguments The sanctions regime was intended to Moreover, President Park’s decision to appear to have the support, not only send a harsh final message to bring host THAAD in South Korea worsened of Saenuri Party leader Lee Jung- Pyongyang back to the negotiating relations with China at a time when hyun, but also of leading presidential table on denuclearization. its collaboration was needed on contenders in the party, including Kim enforcing sanctions on North Korea To show North Korea that this time was Moo-sung, Kim Moon-soo and Oh Sei- and encouraging Pyongyang to end very different, South Korea shut down hoon. Nationalistic nuclear scientists its development of nuclear weapons. the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and conservative nationalistic China perceives the U.S. Missile (GIC) on February 11 despite fierce security experts have also supported Defense (MD) system as a threat to opposition from opposition parties an independent nuclear weapons its own limited nuclear second-strike and the factory owners in the GIC. program. These pro-nuclear views capability. China and Russia insist that The South Korean Government have not attracted nation-wide support, the deployment of the THAAD system showcased its commitment to bear but they do reflect how frustrated some by the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) not the cost of shutting it down so that South Koreans are about the inability only exceeds the defense needs of the North could be in no doubt about to resolve the North’s nuclear problem. South Korea, but also shatters the its determination and resolve. But One may wonder how South Korea, strategic balance among the U.S., many critics in Seoul argued that the which once believed that unification China, and Russia. In other words, Park government cut this last point of on the peninsula was desirable and they consider that the US is using the strategic leverage vis-à-vis Pyongyang within reach, could get to a mental North Korean threat as a pretext to too early and that its impact would state so desperate that responsible accomplish this strategic objective. not be substantial. With the launch of opinion leaders are even entertaining As a result, South Korea’s policy North Korea’s long range missiles, the the idea of a counter-vailing nuclear coordination with China on reinforcing Park government formally announced weapon capability. This highlights the sanctions regime was derailed. The the decision to accept the request to the desperate need for a new and focus of the policy debate in Seoul has deploy THAAD from the United States bold approach to North Korea to put been diverted away from sustaining on the grounds that South Korea and an end to what may become a very the sanctions regime on the North the United States needed an enhanced dangerously uncontrollable situation. missile defence shield to weaken toward the importance of THAAD to North Korea’s capacity to engage in the security of South Korea. nuclear blackmail. The military logic

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Political Mess and Nuclear which in fact started with the loss of its create conditions under which it could majority in legislative elections in April, maintain some levels of influence over Stalemate in 2017 2016 – the first time in 16 years. This Pyongyang even if the US alliances Now that it has been 10 years since poses a further risk to policy momentum. with South Korea and Japan are the North’s first nuclear test in 2006, For example, even if the government further intensified. This could mean and with Pyongyang showing almost wants to finalize the deployment of that 2017 will be distinguished as zero signs of retreat, are there any THAAD by the end of 2017, two a year of sharper regional security grounds on which Seoul could expect opposition parties – the Democrat Party divisions: North Korea with China fundamental policy changes from and National People’s Party, have and in turn Russia, South Korea with Pyongyang? It is very hard to lay out a already insisted that this commitment the US and Japan. Such a regional clear outlook for 2017 on the Korean requires parliamentary ratification. environment could be expected to peninsula because South Korea’s The South Korean government and strengthen Pyongyang’s determination messy domestic politics will hinder US Force Korea planned to have the to accelerate its nuclear and missile the crafting of any bold approach to THAAD battery set up by December programs. Pyongyang. This is because the recent 2017, which is when South Koreans The failure to discourage the North from scandal means that the very legitimacy are going to elect their next president. conducting nuclear and missile tests of President Park’s presidency will Currently, South Korean presidential even after the most powerful sanction be harshly challenged on legal and hopefuls, especially from the opposition imposed on Pyongyang has led Seoul moral grounds. South Korean President parties, maintain policy platforms to beef up its alliance posture with the Park will be in deep political trouble calling for THAAD to be subject to US while damaging its relationship as her so called “shaman advisor” more rigorous assessment in terms with Beijing. As Pyongyang’s nuclear Choi Soon-sil is expected to be the of its military usefulness, diplomatic and missile technologies progress, source of a corruption scandal that implication and environmental impacts a sense of helplessness in Seoul will fatally undermined the legitimacy of on the local site. All these domestic grow along with antagonism towards the Park regime and the credibility circumstances will spill over into the Kim Jong Un. Any policies advocating of her leadership in her final year as national security areas, especially some sort of negotiation are likely to president. A tablet PC drive, allegedly when people question who actually encounter strong public skepticism belonging to Choi, was found to made the decisions – President Park or and opposition. Presidential hopefuls contain classified documents, including her shaman adviser Choi. cannot even comment that the current foreign policy materials, and major If South Korea seems unlikely to come sanctions have not generated the speeches with her written corrections. up with bold new approaches, a new desired outcome, let alone speculate What has shocked the nation was that administration in Washington will also on why this might be the case. President Park relied on Choi’s advice need some time to review its options on Voices echoing hardline policies will for different issues, ranging from such the Korean peninsula and the strategies be rampant while those promoting trivial matters as coordinating her dress to achieve them. This means the likely engagement with the North will be codes, to whom to appoint to public absence of energetic diplomacy, very marginal. Thus, the stalemate in office roles. leaving the US, in particular, to respect of the North Korean nuclear Many key decisions in the national depend on little more than the hope program will continue. Unless a security arena - such as shutting the that sanctions will eventually topple the formidable political entrepreneur GIC, changing the F-X project’s final regime, a regime which to date has emerges, someone who can formulate choice from Boeing’s F-15SE to F-35 JSF, survived famine, leadership change, a roadmap that bravely argues for and accepting the US request for the failing food supply, economic crises security assurances in exchange for deployment of THAAD - which were and continuous unilateral sanctions. denuclearization as an end goal, any made without systemic consultations In short, a genuinely fresh policy processes to stop a future where North with her cabinet, are now under critical track from Seoul and Washington to Korea emerges as a state with an scrutiny both from the general public engage North Korea in negotiation operational nuclear weapons arsenal and the political opposition. In short, for denuclearization is unlikely to may be not possible. President Park’s leadership, especially in occur in 2017. national security arena, will be critically China will maintain its economic Jong Kun Choi constrained. linkage with North Korea since Associate Professor, Department of Political China’s strategic interest is not to Science & International Studies The ruling Saenuri party must also Yonsei University contend with a fierce power struggle, cause a North Korean collapse but to

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Defence Outlook: Australia

Andrew Carr and Stephan Frühling to confront Russia after the downing focus was also compounded by the of MH17 over Ukraine; one of the crucial position of South Australia’s One of the most pressing questions first countries to commit forces to Nick Xenophon in the Senate—the for analysts of the Asia Pacific is fight the Islamic State or ‘death cult’, upper house of parliament— who how to understand the interaction as Tony Abbott liked to refer to it; strenuously advocated for domestic of domestic and regional political and it quickly built a close rapport shipbuilding. The shipbuilding plan trends. Populism, demagoguery, with Japanese Prime Minister Abe released in April 2016 was an and debates over the legitimacy of that promised much closer security almost complete turnaround of the democratic governance are on the and defence links. The incoming Coalition’s original policy settings. rise in many states, most notably Abbott Prime Ministership therefore There was a decision to build all 12 the Philippines, Thailand, the United promised a more muscular, engaged new submarines in South Australia, States as well as many European and risk-tolerant approach to defence to commence a ‘continuous build’ countries. These domestic changes than Australia had displayed programme of surface combatants, are also playing an increasingly before. A similar spirit extended to and to construct new and significantly important role in the development defence industry. As the government larger Offshore Patrol Vessels to of state security strategies. was willing to let Australia’s car replace the Armidale-class patrol Understanding how leaders manage industry wither on the vine, it was boats. and balance domestic and external no great surprise that the Coalition pressures is therefore an imperative Government looked offshore for two After much delay, the Turnbull for assessing the behaviour of all new supply vessels for the Royal government under its Defence regional states—including outwardly Australian Navy (RAN), and was Minister Marise Payne released the stable countries such as Australia. attracted by the promise of an easy new Defence White Paper on 25 off-the-shelf purchase of Japanese February 2016. Given the trajectory Australia’s domestic politics is Soyu submarines. of defence policy and debate over the famously rambunctious. There have previous years, and Turnbull’s need been five Prime Ministers in the last When it came to naval shipbuilding to position himself—with an eye to six years. A landmark eight-week however, the government found itself the internal machinations in his own election campaign in mid-2016 left increasingly at odds with public party— as both strong on defence the conservative government with opinion. In February 2015 Tony but also less prone to ‘captain’s a one seat majority in the House of Abbott had to abandon his ambition calls’ like his predecessor’s reported Representatives. In the Senate, the to buy Japanese Soyu submarines plans for Japanese submarines, it government fell 6 seats short of a in order to stamp out an internal is perhaps not surprising that the majority, which forces it to rely on a challenge to his leadership. In the document combines both orthodoxy coalition of independent and populist face of dipping polls, the government and seeming radicalism in Australian parties from the centre-right to pass also overhauled its approach to defence policy. its legislation. While Australian defence industry. In September politics is traditionally ‘bipartisan’ 2015 it announced the ‘historic’ On the one hand, none of the major when it comes to national security domestic build of 12 new frigates, shifts in defence capability that and defence policy, domestic politics reportedly forcing a re-write of parts had been subject of the Australian can still influence defence policy. This of the capability plans in the then-still- defence debate for several years influence seems to be increasing. forthcoming Defence White Paper. could be found in the White Paper: That same month Abbott faced a Despite significant investment in The Abbott government assumed second party room challenge. He new armoured vehicles, Army did office in late 2013 and commenced lost the vote, with Malcolm Turnbull not acquire the heavy armoured a sweeping review of defence policy replacing him as Prime Minister structure that would be required for and organization, starting with the on 15 September. Turnbull’s conventional manoeuvre warfare in development of a new Defence White central argument for change was the Middle East or on the Korean Paper as well as a ‘First Principles the domestic unpopularity of the peninsula. Nor does the ADF intend Review’ of the defence department government, particularly in key states to transform into a force focused itself. It was vocal in its willingness such as South Australia. This domestic on humanitarian disaster-relief to

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A Collins Class submarine in Sydney Harbour. Source: Royal Australian Navy, Flickr. deal with natural and man-made the nature of Australia’s global and increase in the various airframes disasters, away from state-on-state regional interests in a way that more that replace the ageing P3C Orion warfighting. There was no doubling- closely linked it to current conflicts maritime patrol aircraft, which may down on amphibious capabilities, and great power behaviour—be it in end up constituting a 50% larger through a marine brigade, marinized Ukraine, the Middle East or the South fleet with significantly expanded helicopters, amphibious tanks or China Sea—than before. capability. There was also significant the like. Nor were the two new investment into Australia’s basing amphibious assault (LHD) ships that In decoding these conflicting signals, infrastructure, air defence command had just joined the RAN converted it is as usual necessary to follow the and control system, and the return of into mini-aircraft carriers for use by money. The signalled increase in the Australian Army’s coastal defence Australian or US STOVL JSF, as had Australian defence engagement in role, through the planned acquisition been reportedly mooted as part of the the region is a continuation rather of land-based anti-ship cruise missiles. White Paper process. than departure from the trajectory The investment decisions of the White already set—although not funded— Paper demonstrate an increasing On other hand, there is seemingly in the previous Labor government’s concern that Australia must prepare radical change in the way the White 2013 Defence White Paper. for the possibility that the strategic Paper describes Australia’s defence Australia now has a bipartisan trend-lines in the Asia Pacific may priorities: For the first time, it raises commitment to increase defence directly threaten its own security— the importance of global security, spending significantly to 2% of GDP, rather than ‘merely’ regional order— and of the security of its Indo-Pacific and the Turnbull government included in coming decades. neighbourhood, to the same level as in the White Paper a table of defence that of Australian territory itself. By budgets out to 2025-2026. Major One of the key sentences in the linking these priorities to repeated areas of growth in the ADF force document is that “The future force strong endorsements of the ‘global structure are in the doubling of the will be more capable of conducting rules-based order’, the government submarine fleet to 12—now also a independent combat operations to also found a way of articulating bipartisan commitment— and an defend Australia and protect our

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interests in our immediate region.” Such coherence has long been to the US president is likely to The term ‘self-reliance’ and its a challenge. The domestic reinforce Australia’s commitment to political connotation of distance from considerations of Australia’s political the three main pillars of its defence Australia’s allies, which had been parties do not always neatly mesh policy: The maintenance of a robust so prominent in Australian defence with their foreign policy perspectives. Australian Defence Force capable of policy from 1976 to 2009, has largely The governing Liberal Party remains independent operations if necessary, disappeared from the White Paper close to—largely China-friendly— economic and political engagement and official discourse. Yet the 2016 business, whereas their rural-based with Asia where possible, and White Paper also did not contain National coalition partners are more support for a combination of US any significant new commitments to opposed to ‘selling out the farm’. The military presence and multilateral the 2012 US Force Posture Initiative, minority Greens combine scepticism incentives to manage the emergence whose slow implementation is in about the US alliance with aversion to and rise of new powers in the some contrast to Australia’s vocal China’s domestic political system and international order. The degree to support for the United States strategic human rights record. The Opposition which all three continue to remain in posture in Asia. And as tensions in Labor Party has argued for greater line with domestic political opinion the South China Sea rose in early acceptance of China’s growing status will, however, be a crucial factor 2016 in the lead-up to the 12 July in the international system, while in determining Australia’s defence International Tribunal ruling on the also trying to wedge the government outlook in coming years. dispute, Australia’s government was with calls for a more robust policy notably reticent to heed US calls for opposing Chinese expansion in the Andrew Carr joint ‘Freedom of Navigation Patrols’ South China Sea. Research Fellow, Strategic and Defence in the disputed waters. Overall, Australian foreign and Studies Centre, Australian National University. If there has been an increasing defence policy remain an elite concern about China’s rise and preoccupation. The bipartisan Stephan Frühling assertive policies, the focus in consensus around major policy Associate Professor, Strategic and Defence Australia in many ways remains on settings is as much the result of Studies Centre, Australian National the domestic manifestations of this similar approaches to neutralize University. He was a member of the Australian Government’s external panel of development. Chinese commercial varied domestic pressures as a experts on the development of the 2016 investments in Australia, especially convincing strategic approach to Defence White Paper. farm land and the leasing of the the uncertainty facing Australia and port in Darwin raised significant its strategic environment. Although media coverage. Concerns about Australia is now undertaking an the defence implications of Chinese impressive expansion of its maritime investment in critical infrastructure capabilities, the political imperative fed into populist aversion to foreign for a domestic build means that much ownership. In addition, there are of the capability is still decades away increasing concerns about the from launch. The appointment after influence of the Chinese Communist the 2016 election of South Australian Party (CCP) in Australia. This is Senator Christopher Pyne as Minister occurring in the political arena with for Defence Industry has created controversies over donations; in the an almost unprecedented situation media where there is growing CCP where Australia now has two Cabinet advertising and messaging; and in ministers for the defence portfolio the attitudes of Australia’s Chinese with somewhat unclear hierarchy and community towards the legitimacy responsibilities. of the CCP and China’s place in the world. While each of these trends is Polling before the US election manageable and unlikely to lead to suggested that Donald Trump’s significant policy shifts, they represent success could signal a substantial an important domestic political shift in public attitudes against the challenge in the development of a alliance. However, in the absence of coordinated and coherent Australian truly radical change in US policies approach to China. in Asia, uncertainty and aversion

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DPRK’s Nuclear Deterrent: The Magic Bullet for Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia

Choe Un Ju Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence Since the late 1960s, it has conducted joint military drills with South Korea 2016 has been marked by an is an Inevitable Choice for the in which they exercised the practical unprecedented intensification of DPRK for its Self-defence use of those weapons. These annual nuclear confrontation between the US-South Korea joint nuclear war DPRK and the US in the Korean It rings true to many people that the exercises have continued for more peninsula. Entering the 2nd half Korean peninsula issue is a vicious than 40 years. of 2015, the US and its military cycle of the DPRK’s nuclear and subordinate, South Korea, clamored rocket tests, aggravation of tension, The DPRK has made strenuous efforts about a ‘decapitation raid’ targeting sanctions and another round of DPRK to eliminate the US nuclear threat. the DPRK supreme headquarters and nuclear and rocket tests. However, To this end, it has tried dialogue and threatened to practice it in the joint these people fail to see or simply turn negotiation for the establishment of a military exercises of 2016. Such a deaf ear to the reality that each link denuclearized zone and reliance on moves by the US and South Korea of the cycle is directly connected to the international laws. Despite these have been successfully deterred by the hostile policy of the US and the efforts, the US has not withdrawn its the DPRK with a series of measures to consequent nuclear threat against the nuclear threat toward the DPRK but, bolster its nuclear deterrent. DPRK. instead, it has gone so far, in 2002, as to officially designate the DPRK as a This paper seeks to explore the The US nuclear threat against, and target for its nuclear preemptive strike. strategic background of the DPRK-US blackmail of, the DPRK is neither a Given the fact that neither dialogue nuclear confrontation and the outlook temporary phenomenon that has nor international laws helped, and for the future. started recently nor a fictional concept. faced with the world’s biggest nuclear It is an actual concrete threat that the threat from the world’s biggest nuclear US has imposed on the DPRK for the power, the DPRK was left with no other past decades because it is US policy to choice but to resort to nukes to cope protect the option of a preemptive with nukes. nuclear strike on the DPRK. The US, which had already plotted Even after acquiring a nuclear a nuclear strike against the capability, the DPRK left no stone DPRK in early 1950s, unturned to establish a solid deployed a large peace regime and realize the number of nuclear denuclearization of the Korean weapons in South peninsula. It has participated in several Korea since late rounds of 6-party talks, disabled its 1950s. nuclear facilities and agreed to a moratorium on nuclear tests.

Nevertheless, US hostility and the nuclear threat it posed has increased rather than diminished. In April 2010, the Obama administration excluded the DPRK from the list of states that the US pledged would not be targeted with nuclear weapons, again revealing its ambition of a nuclear preemptive strike against the DPRK. The US has since made further official statements to this effect.

Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Monument. Source: (stephan), Flickr.

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The spearhead of the Asia Pacific In these grave circumstances, with the military alliance becomes fully-fledged, pivot policy initiated by the Obama US going on the rampage against the ongoing US-South Korea and US- administration in 2012 is directed the DPRK while upgrading its nuclear Japan military exercises could develop towards northeast Asia with the DPRK weapons ferociously, the DPRK is into US-Japan-South Korea tripartite as its first target. Both the scale and forced to accelerate the development military exercises and thus increase the the frequency of the US-South Korea of its own nuclear weapons to defend radius of the US-led military operations joint military exercises have increased its social system and national security. and its offense capability in northeast dramatically in recent years. Before Asia. The deployment of ‘THAAD’ in 2012, the joint military exercises It stands to reason that the DPRK seeks South Korea, in particular, a practical involved 400,000 troops and were to develop its nuclear arms in quality development of the triangular military staged around 30 times annually. and quantity to match the increasing alliance, would only mean implanting the However, since 2012, the scale level of nuclear threat from the US. root of evil that would make the Korean increased to 500,000 personnel and peninsula a regional showdown site. the frequency to more than 40 times. Security Impact of the DPRK’s Given all the facts, had the DPRK Since 2012, the frequency of US Nuclear Deterrent on the Korean aircraft carrier visits to waters around been devoid of war deterrence, the Korean peninsula have increased Peninsula and Northeast Asia it would only provide the US with conditions favorable to its strategy to 3-4 times per year from 1-3 times. The US pursues two major purposes and undoubtedly threaten the regional Special operations targeting the DPRK through constantly aggravating security balance. In this sense, the supreme headquarters were openly tension in the Korean peninsula. included in the 2012 joint military DPRK’s strengthening of nuclear exercises. In 2013, they made public, One is to provide an excuse for the arms ensures peace and security for the first time, the air raid drills for reinforcement of its armed forces in in the peninsula and the region by nuclear strategic bombers and the and around the Korean peninsula. containing the arbitrariness of the US. During the Cold War, the US increased movement of nuclear submarines, Meanwhile, the US is effectively its military deployment in South Korea, thus impregnating the exercises with exploiting the north-south confrontation including nuclear arms, under the the atmosphere of a real war. The policy of the current South Korean pretext of deterring the former Soviet ‘Tailored Deterrence Strategy’, agreed authorities to help realise its Asia Union’s ‘southward invasion’. Having upon by the US and South Korea in Pacific pivot policy. In the initial period lost this excuse with the end of the 2013 aimed at a nuclear preemptive of their term, the current South Korean Cold War, the US consistently poses strike against the DPRK and was first authorities, at least paid lip service to a military threat to the DPRK and uses introduced in the 2014 joint military notions like ‘unification diplomacy’, the the tension to justify enhancing its exercises. The strategy constituted ‘northeast Asia peace and cooperation military presence. The US considers the ‘4D OPLAN’ concept in 2015 initiative’, ‘Trustpolitik’ and the ‘Dresden that constant tension in the Korean and was further broken down into declaration’. But today they have thrown peninsula provides conditions most a ‘decapitation raid’ and ‘precision away their deceptive masks and openly favorable to its Asia Pacific pivot strike’ in 2016. Accordingly, the pursue ‘pressure diplomacy’ towards strategy, by justifying the introduction masks of ‘annual’ and ‘defensive’ the north and recklessly seek ‘system of more strategic assets, to contain the military exercises have been torn off unification’, which totally violates DPRK and the neighboring countries. to reveal the true colors of nuclear existing north-south agreements. attack exercises. Today, US nuclear The other purpose is to create a However, the South Korean authorities strategic bombers dare to conduct air favorable environment for the formation have neither the capacity nor the raid drills just tens of kilometers from of the US-Japan-South Korea triangular courage to confront the DPRK on its own. DPRK territory. military alliance which has a key role Just as mariners will accept any port in The US plans to dissipate a trillion in its Asia domination strategy. With a storm, they rely on foreign forces. For US$ in the coming 30 years to détente, Japan and South Korea would this reason, the South Korean authorities upgrade its nuclear arsenal which is hardly come together in a military fanatically reject transfer of war-time already the most advanced both in alliance owing to the historical and military control, approve the introduction quality and quantity because the US territorial issues that complicate their of more US military equipment including has conducted the greatest number of relations. Apprehensive of this, the US ‘THAAD’ and stage larger-scale joint nuclear tests in the world. seeks a ‘shock remedy’, namely the war drills more frequently. The US is aggravation of tensions. If the triangular taking advantage of this tendency to

Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Monument. Source: (stephan), Flickr.

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speed up its Asia domination policy. In a nutshell, developments on the All told, South Korea’s aspiration for Korean peninsula in 2017 will depend ‘system unification’ accelerates US largely on whether the US and other military deployments and endangers the regional countries squarely recognize peace and security of the peninsula and the DPRK’s nuclear weapon status and the region. adopt reasonable policies, or not.

The strategic nuclear forces of the DPRK emasculate such reckless maneuvers Choe Un Ju by the US and South Korean Research Fellow, Institute for Disarmament authorities, thus promising a bright and Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DPRK future for the peaceful reunification of an independent Korea. It also enables the peninsula to serve as a buffer zone that will prevent a nuclear war in the region. To all intents and purposes, the stronger the DPRK’s strategic nuclear arms become, the more securely will the peace and security of the peninsula and the region be guaranteed.

It is contradictory and self-defeating for the neighboring countries to oppose the US aggravation of tension while joining the US-led ‘sanctions’ against the DPRK. This will only help the US push its strategy to weaken the DPRK and contain the neighboring countries.

There will be administration changes in the US and South Korea in 2016 and 2017 respectively. However, as long as the hostile anti-DPRK policies remain unchanged, the US nuclear threat and the move to form the triangular military alliance will continue. It is quite obvious that these will only stimulate the DPRK to further strengthen its nuclear deterrent both in quality and quantity.

No matter how the situation and the surrounding structure may change, the principled position of the DPRK will be constant. As long as the nuclear threat against the DPRK by the hostile forces continues, the DPRK will hold fast to its nuclear deterrent, an invincible sword, and make every possible effort to defend its sovereignty and security, strive to realize the independent reunification of the Korean peninsula and ensure regional peace and stability.

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DPRK Nuclear Developments and the ROK Response: Looking to 2017

Cho Namhoon

North Korea is proceeding with its nuclear development at an accelerated rate. On Sept. 9, North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test, less than a year after the fourth test on Jan. 6. It appears that the ‘three-year cycle principle’ of nuclear testing in North Korea no longer holds.

At the same time, the development of missile systems for the delivery of nuclear warheads is also proceeding at a rapid pace. North Korea has been conducting test firings of various missiles this year with each The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts resolution 2276 on 24 March 2016, extending sanctions on the DPRK until 24 April 2017. Source: UN News & Media. test confirming new capabilities in such terms as range, accuracy and actually deploy nuclear missiles becomes imminent, such an indulgent reliability. For example, on June 22, because it still lacks core technologies posture cannot be sustained. the Musudan missile, flew 400 km, such as reentry technology. On the despite being launched at a high angle. other hand, others argue that North In Korea and the U.S., the demands to On Aug. 24, North Korea’s submarine Korea’s development of nuclear prioritize the North Korean issue and launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the weapon systems is proceeding at a to seek new ways of dealing with it Pukkuksong-1, flew 500km, bringing the rate much faster than most people are becoming more vocal. With a new country a step closer to the successful expected, as can be seen in the American administration imminent, development of an SLBM capability. examples of the Musudan missile active discussions are taking place on options available for dealing In addition, in September 2016, North or SLBMs. Despite such differences with North Korea. Furthermore, Korea’s media unveiled a new rocket of opinion, both sides agree on the U.S. presidential candidate Donald engine with propulsion power of 80 fact that miniaturization of nuclear Trump’s assertion that ROK and tons. If the success of the rocket engine warheads is imminent. Indeed, 2017 Japan should be allowed to acquire development is confirmed, it could be could be decisive as the year in which their own nuclear weapons if North said that North Korea has acquired the North Korea’s nuclear weapons Korea cannot be diverted from its engine technology necessary for the development program reached a current path has been linked to the development of an ICBM. Furthermore, basic level of maturity. issue of nuclear non-proliferation, 38 North, a U.S-based website The ROK, U.S., and Japan will feel raising numerous controversies. specializing in North Korea, claims that the greatest threat from North Korea’s the DPRK is developing a new type of nuclear weapons deployment. It is not A year after the U.S. presidential submarine capable of loading several clear, however, that these countries election, a presidential election SLBMs. It is apparent that North Korea have responded with an urgency will occur in the ROK. It will be a is working toward the deployment of commensurate with the pace of North year in which Koreans will have to mid- and long-range nuclear weapon Korea’s nuclear accomplishments. It choose between progressive and systems. is hard to erase the impression that conservative options, following 10 years of conservative rule. It seems Expert opinion is divided on they have put forward the “virtue of inevitable that the North Korean the evaluation of North Korea’s waiting” within the frame of “strategic nuclear issue will be prominent and capacities. Some argue that it will patience.” As the deployment of North controversial in this process. Both the take more time for North Korea to Korean nuclear weapon systems

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progressives and the conservatives in by the international community in early a strong and direct interest in acquiring Korea agree on the principle of North 2016 should be given time to take effect. an operational nuclear arsenal. Korea abandoning nuclear weapons. In light of all these considerations, However, the two sides differ on the international sanctions against North As a result, the argument that methods to achieve this objective, Korea led by the U.S. and Korea will North Korea will never give up the such as acquiring of tactical nuclear continue even stronger in 2017. development of its nuclear capacities weapons, deployment of Terminal until it possesses an operational nuclear High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), For the North Korean sanctions regime arsenal is persuasive. In fact, North sustaining sanctions against North to be continued, it must be deemed, Korea will attempt to gain greater Korea and attempts at inter-Korea eventually, to be working. If no leverage through achieving nuclear dialogue. ROK policy toward North noticeable effects are observed, not weapons development and recognition Korea could change significantly only China, which is hesitant on strong as a nuclear weapon state. This is depending on who is elected as North Korea sanctions, but also ROK because North Korea views this as president in 2017. In the meantime, and US public opinion, may demand the only way to deter U.S. attacks and if North Korea conducts another other policy measures. This makes it to force the US to accept guarantees nuclear test, public opinion in ROK prudent for the ROK and the US to of regime security for North Korea in favor of redeployment of tactical develop other policy measures as soon as a quid pro quo for any negotiated nuclear weapons along with strong as practicable and not rely solely on controls or limitations on its nuclear North Korea sanctions will grow. sanctions. forces.

While it is true that a review of options It cannot be said that the current North In light of these judgments, we can be is likely to be a priority issue for the Korea sanctions are yielding clear confident that North Korea will focus on new US administration, this cannot be results. North Korea’s trade with China, nuclear development in 2017. The North expected until well into 2017 at the which accounts for about 90% of its Korean government will publicize earliest. We therefore have a situation foreign trade, has in fact increased the strengthened international where the current policy of ‘strategic since the adoption of the UN Security community’s pressure and sanctions patience’ cannot be maintained but Council Resolution 2270. Also, the as something that must be endured for where no realistic alternative can be foreign exchange rate and price levels nuclear development, demanding the expected in the short-to-medium term. in North Korean markets are relatively perseverance of North Korean residents By default, therefore, U.S. sanctions stable. Hence, if sustaining sanctions is already facing impoverishment. Under against North Korea will continue to be politically viable, it is imperative such circumstances, North Korea for the time being. Even if the new that they have an impact over the will not respond to Korean and U.S. U.S. administration feels the need for course of 2017. proposals for dialogue on abandoning nuclear development in 2017. Even if a dialogue with North Korea, it will The consensus among experts is that take considerable time to review the North Korea does engage in dialogue, the development of nuclear capacity it will remain a formal gesture. procedure and the alternatives. has been integral to the North Korean The situation in both the U.S. and South government’s plans for a long time. Under People who face imminent difficulties Korea in 2017 points to continued Kim Il-sung and his successor Kim Jong- often dream of a dramatic last minute support for the sanctions regime il, North Korea pursued clandestine overturn of events. However, in the against North Korea. Indeed, the ROK nuclear development under the guise present case, such possibilities are government may have little choice but of “Byeongjin (parallel development) virtually nil given the conditions on to enact even stricter sanctions in the Policy of Economy and National the Korean peninsula and the behavior lead up to the presidential elections Defense Capability” and “Seongun of the Kim Jong-un government. In simply because North Korea is unlikely (military first) Policy”. However, the fact, North Korea may respond to the to change course and sanctions will current leader Kim Jong-un has brought international community’s pressure be the only policy tool available. A nuclear weapons development to with a direct military provocation in hastily agreed dialogue is improbable the fore with “Byeongjin (parallel 2017. It could strike at the five islands because it risks being seen as an development) Policy of Economy and on the West Sea, or cross the Northern acknowledgment of North Korean Nuclear Weapons”. Nuclear capacity Limit Line (NLL) and attack ROK Naval nuclearisation. Furthermore, the ROK may have been a negotiating lever vessels. However, the possibility of government thinks that the strict for North Korea in the past but this no such provocations may be reduced the sanctions that began to be imposed longer seems to be the case. It now closer North Korea gets to achieving appears that North Korea simply has its nuclear weapon objectives. This

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is because military provocation at a events as evidence of Kim Jong-un’s firm point when it is close to completing its grip on power. nuclear development could be counter- productive if it triggered a decisive It is uncertain which side is correct. response from the international What is clear, however, is that the community and the ROK. The possibility stronger the the sanctions on North of limited provocations will remain, Korea become, the more difficult it depending on who is actually leading will be for North Korea to obtain the North Korea’s nuclear development. If funds needed for its nuclear program, it is a non-military agency, such as the making desperate and riskier efforts Organization Guidance Department to circumvent sanctions more likely. in the Workers’ Party of Korea, which Under such circumstances, it is only is in charge of nuclear development, inevitable that unrest and conflict in the this may be resented by the military elite class will increase and this may and incline the generals to agitate for aggravate instability in North Korea limited military provocation to protest in 2017. Despite this, however, the well- the sanctions regime. In summary, while structured surveillance system and the the risk of limited military provocation strong governmental authority of the by North Korea in 2017 appears small North Korean regime will likely prevent it is not zero. such unrest and conflict from being actually acted out and escalating into Despite Kim Jong-un’s “Byeongjin clashes. (parallel development) Policy of Economy and Nuclear Weapons”, Ultimately, 2017 will be a year when it is indisputable that North Korea’s North Korea continues to defy growing nuclear aspirations are depriving the sanctions and remains focused on civilian economy of a minimum level of its nuclear program in circumstances resources. Furthermore, the acceleration devoid of significant dialogue with the of the nuclear program inevitably leads international community. Unfortunately, to reductions in funding for conventional any internal momentum in North Korea weapons procurement. This could that might potentially be strong enough also act to raise dissatisfaction in to be a game changer and arrest the the North Korean military, becoming nuclear program will remain immature an element that may cause the North in 2017. Korean military to attempt limited military provocation. However, if Kim Cho Namhoon Jong-un’s control over the military is Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for firm and if he prefers to avoid limited Defense Analyses, ROK military provocations as the nuclear program matures, the possibility of a limited military provocation would be significantly lessened.

Military and civilian elites in North Korea experienced considerable turmoil in 2016 giving rise to opposing opinions on the stability of the regime. There is a view that Kim Jong-un is still in the process of solidifying his rule, based on the fact that several elites in the Workers’ Party of Korea and North Korean military were executed or demoted in 2016. On the other hand, there are those who interpret the same

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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Capabilities: The Emerging Escalation Ladder

Hideya Kurata* fission technologies have become used “to repel invasion or attack more advanced and reliable. from a hostile nuclear weapons state No First Use Revoked and make retaliatory strikes.” This Beyond questions about its technical statement left open the option of first North Korea ushered in 2016 with nuclear competencies, North Korea use of nuclear weapons provided an alleged hydrogen bomb (H-bomb) has made important but ambivalent ‘hostile’ nuclear states attacked North test on 6 January. Although this is statements about how it intends to Korea even with conventional forces. doubtful, the government issued a wield its nuclear forces. A Foreign In the same vein, a statement following statement following the test, as it Ministry statement announcing its the nuclear test in January 2016 had done after its first test in 2006 first nuclear test on 3 October 2006 pledged that North Korea would not but not for the two subsequent tests, gave an unconditional commitment be the first to use nuclear weapons as suggesting that device was different to no first use (NFU) of nuclear long as hostile aggressive forces did from those tested earlier. North weapons. This commitment, however, not encroach upon its sovereignty. Korea may have attempted a boosted was overturned by the Law on This statement also protects the option fission test wherein a limited nuclear Consolidating Position of Nuclear of first use of nuclear weapons. fusion component is incorporated to Weapons State, adopted by the enhance the explosive force of the Supreme People’s Assembly in April Some have labelled North Korea’s device. If this was the case, it would 2013. The law stipulated that North emerging nuclear posture as one of suggest that North Korea’s nuclear Korea’s nuclear weapons could be ‘minimum deterrence,’ under which

Japanese PM Shinzo Abe shaking hands with US President Barack Obama at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, 31 March 2016. Source: IIP Photo Archive, Flickr.

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nuclear weapons will be used only March reportedly confirmed that in order to deter a first strike. Taking for second strikes in retaliation for North Korea had the design and assertion of nuclear preemptive nuclear first strikes. The statements the materials to withstand the heat strikes into consideration means characterized above clearly suggest and pressure of ballistic re-entry. North Korean capabilities are not a more ambitious nuclear posture. After a series of test failures with the necessarily confined to second strike. Moreover, leadership remarks over Musudan (Hwasong-10) intermediate It would appear that North Korea is the course of 2016 seemed to be range ballistic missile, there was a not disposed to distinguish clearly intended to ensure that opposing success on 22 June 2016. North between first and second strike governments remained uncertain and Korea reported that the test was nuclear capabilities. unsettled. Specifically, in opposition conducted using ‘the high-angle fire to the US-South Korea joint military system’ and that the warhead had The aforementioned Musudan would exercise in March, Kim Jong-un landed in the targeted waters 400km be one case in point. Converted from stated that a policy switch would be away after flying to a maximum the former Soviet Union’s SLBM R-27, it made from military counter-action height of 1413.6km. Though was fired from a mobile Transportable to preemptive attack, followed North Korea could not salvage the Erector Launcher (TELs) without any by Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong’s warhead, it attempted to monitor its prior notification or assertion of the declaration that the switch had been resistance to the stresses of re-entry to right to the peaceful use of space. made. Shortly afterwards, however, the atmosphere. Kim Jong-un as well as Ri Su-yong in a report to the 7th Congress of the might have had the Musudan in mind Korean Workers’ Party in May, Kim For second-strike readiness, it is in March 2016 when they referred Jong-un stated that North Korea would desirable that ballistic missiles be to switching North Korea’s military not use nuclear weapons unless its solid-fueled. North Korea currently posture from retaliation (counter- sovereignty was encroached upon by possesses short-range Toksa, code- action) to preemptive attack. an aggressive hostile force with nukes named KN-02 solid-fuel missiles. Applying these technologies to The Musudan’s effective range is (emphasis added). Unlike the Law on estimated to be 2000-4000km, Consolidating Position of Nuclear longer-range missiles, North Korea conducted a ground test of a high- allowing it to reach Guam as well as all Weapons State in 2013, Kim Jong- of Japan. Though Guam is inhabited, un confined the first strike to nuclear powered solid-fuel rocket engine and its cascade separation in March its Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) weapons. Although Kim Jong-un’s is regarded as a base for bombing remarks can be regarded as a NFU 2016. Kim Jong-un has stressed the need to be able to make nuclear North Korea in a contingency. A few pledge in themselves, he has spoken days before the successful Musudan a number of times of a nuclear strikes from anywhere on the ground, in the air, at sea and underwater, and test-fire, North Korea’s National preemptive strike, even after the Party Defense Commission spokesman Congress. North Korea’s nuclear solid-fuel engine technologies are necessary to support such versatility. labelled Andersen AFB as ‘a logistic posture, therefore, appears to be a base for invading the DPRK’, hinting murky duality, aspiring simultaneously The ability to launch missiles underwater is especially important at nuclear first-use. Given its range, to both credible preemptive and mobility and readiness, the Musudan second strike capabilities. to survivability. After demonstrating successful pyrolysis and control, North straddles the capabilities called for Korea applied these technologies to by a posture of retaliation or second Dual Capabilities the Bukgeukseong (Polaris)-1, code- strike and the much more demanding named KN-11, Submarine-Launched aspiration to be able to threaten a Credible second strike capabilities preemptive or first strike. The missile consist of survivability and readiness Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tests in April, July and August. could be characterized as a counter- in addition to an assured delivery force weapon against Guam and a capability. North Korea has pursued Under the concept of ‘minimum retaliatory counter-value capability in these capabilities with great energy deterrence,’ second-strike capabilities the case of Japan. and determination, particularly over threaten larger, easier to strike, the course of 2016, and recorded counter-value targets, rather than Escalating and De-escalating some significant successes. aspire to destroy the adversaries’ With respect to warheads with forces (so-called counter-force Paradoxical though it might be, North an assured delivery capability, targeting); threatening intolerable Korea contends that its demonstrated a laboratory experiment in mid- retaliatory damage to adversaries preparedness to escalate tensions

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both horizontally and vertically, is in determine the power of a nuclear range of the KN-09 to enable it to fact a manifestation of its will to de- warhead newly developed and threaten US/ROK forces in most of escalate tensions in a contingency. manufactured by its scientists. South Korea. Given its absolute inferiority in The statement also referred to the conventional as well as nuclear forces ‘standardization’ of warheads North Korea clearly hopes that vis-à-vis the US, the domains in which mounted on the strategic ballistic demonstrating its determination to North Korean forces might have a rockets of the Hwasong artillery use nuclear weapons first in response meaningful advantage are limited to units of the Korean People’s Army to a US attack with conventional irregular warfare at the tactical level. (KPA)’s Strategic Force and to the forces and concurrently threatening ‘miniaturization and diversification’ saturation attacks on US-South Korea It could be said that North Korea is of the warheads. This suggests combined forces, will deter US-South seeking to convince its adversaries that the test device had the weight Korea’s use of force and help prevent that it has the capability and will to and dimensions of an operational escalation in the event of a crisis. At establish escalation dominance over missile warhead. It is estimated that the same time, setting out to deter war them, especially through nuclear North Korea’s nuclear technologies and discourage escalation in a crisis, capabilities and a deliberately have developed to the level where by displaying a stronger appetite for hazy doctrine on nuclear use that warheads could be produced steadily brinksmanship, is just as much a high- negates US conventional and nuclear and delivered to the KPA Strategic risk venture that could end in all-out superiority, leaving the DPRK’s Force. war with all available weapons. preparedness to engage in irregular warfare to tip the scales in its favor. In parallel, North Korea has Hideya Kurata From a DPRK perspective, establishing displayed its intention to deter an Professor, National Defense Academy of escalation dominance amounts to the attack with conventional forces. In Japan ability to de-escalate tensions in a the midst of the US-South Korea contingency. Ssangyong exercise in March, North Korea conducted tests of its Chuje-100 *For further details on the issues addressed in this In March 2016, furthermore, Kim (code-named KN-09), 300mm paper, see, Hideya Kurata, Formation and Evolution Jung-un foreshadowed a period of Kim Jong Un’s ‘Nuclear Doctrine’: Current State of multiple rocket launcher system North Korea’s ‘Minimum Deterrence’ in Comparison,” of intensified ballistic missile and modeled on Russian BM-30 Smerch. The Kim Jong Un Regime and the Future Security nuclear tests, and this is precisely Environment Surrounding the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has extended the range Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2017 (forthcoming). what transpired. The SLBM tests in of this system to approximately June were followed by a series of 200km, enough to cover not only the test-fires of the Rodong intermediate South Korea Gyeryongdae complex ballistic missile that landed inside and Gunsan AFB, but Osan AFB Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Pyongtaek, where the bulk of (EEZ) in August and September, US forces are planning to move. that is, within 200 nautical miles of North Korea deters use of these Japanese land territory. bases for a conventional attack by Furthermore, on 9 September 2016, threatening KN-09 saturation attacks North Korea’s national foundation with ‘fragmentation mine shells’, day, the DPRK conducted its fifth ‘underground penetration shells’, and nuclear test, marking the first time two ‘scattering shells’. nuclear tests were conducted in the A rather clear process of action- same year. The explosion is estimated reaction is visible here. In 2011, the to have had a yield of approximately US and South Korea agreed to extend 10kt, some 5-10 times bigger than the range of the latter’s ballistic missile that of the first nuclear test a decade to 800km which would allow all of before, and approaching the force North Korea to be targeted even of the nuclear weapon dropped on from the southern tip of the Korean Hiroshima in August 1945. Peninsula. The KN-09 was developed According to the statement released in response to a Kim Jung-un directive by North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon in 2012. Following this, from 2014, Institute, the test was conducted to North Korea took steps to extend the

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Dealing with the DPRK: Exploring the Trump Administration’s Options

Ralph A. Cossa that “the notion of getting the North ROK, Japan, Taiwan, etc. Likewise, Koreans to denuclearize is probably a a march on Pyongyang to once One of the major challenges facing lost cause.” So where does this leave and for all remove the toxic regime, president-elect Donald Trump will be President Trump as he tries to determine while within US/ROK capabilities, what to do about the challenge to what’s next? would result in unacceptable levels of Northeast Asia peace and stability collateral damage and should only posed by the growing nuclear weapons The Korean Peninsula has been called be contemplated in response to an capability of the Democratic People’s the “land of bad options.” If there was egregious DPRK military provocation. Republic of Korea (DPRK or North a simple or easy solution to the North The solution, if there is one, lies Korea). Pyongyang has made it clear Korea nuclear weapons challenge somewhere between these extremes. that it will not even begin to discuss the it would have been pursued by now. Let me offer a few alternatives without prospects of denuclearization unless But doing nothing, while waiting for pretending my list exhausts all future Washington agrees to a bilateral the North to either relent in the face possibilities. peace treaty, which DPRK interlocutors of sanctions or collapse – the so- called “strategic patience” approach insist must include an end to the ROK- Leap Day Two US alliance and a withdrawal of US attributed to the Obama administration forces the nuclear umbrella from the – has thus far failed to work. And, as At times, DPRK interlocutors have hinted Korean Peninsula. Washington has Pyongyang rushes toward the ability that Pyongyang would be willing to steadfastly (and, in my view, rightly) to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and return to a “freeze for humanitarian refused this condition, insisting that fit it on a ballistic missile capable of assistance” agreement along the the price of normalization of relations reaching the United States – a “game lines of the ill-fated 2012 Leap Day and Pyongyang’s acceptance changer” that some assess as perilously Agreement, announced on Feb 29 and into the community of nations is near (and a few, including Pyongyang, undermined 16 days later when the denuclearization. claim is already here) – it would appear North announced its intention to launch that time is on the DPRK’s side. a satellite. We should have no illusions: Pyongyang, under its “byungjin” or a new agreement will not solve the “simultaneous pursuit” policy, has A range of options – the two extremes problem, nonetheless, it potentially proclaimed the dual goals of economic being to yield to Pyongyang’s demands helps stop things from getting worse. development and nuclear weapons. or to pursue a final military solution Even then, the only verifiable freeze The US – indeed the international – must be examined by the new US would be a halt to missile and nuclear community, including the DPRK’s administration, with the understanding tests, which are easily detected, and primary benefactor, China – has said that no option will work unless perhaps a freeze on reprocessing the North can’t have both. The long Washington and Seoul are in lock step at Yongbyon (halting the known list of UN Security Council sanctions is and others like China and Russia are, if plutonium and uranium enrichment aimed, in part, at leading Pyongyang not enthusiastically supportive, at least efforts), which can be monitored. Most to make the right choice. As US Deputy not working to undermine the effort. analysts believe there are additional Secretary of State Anthony Tony Japanese support is also crucial but uranium enrichment sites outside Blinkin has observed, Washington is much easier to assume. Yongbyon which would not be affected “working every single day to build a First let’s rule out the two extremes. and, of course, scientific research comprehensive and sustained pressure No US administration could or and laboratory work would continue campaign on North Korea. Not to should enter into any bilateral peace virtually unimpeded. Nonetheless, one bring Kim Jong-un to his knees, but to accord negotiation with Pyongyang can argue that a new freeze is better bring him to his senses and back to that cuts Seoul out of the discussion. than where we are today, is most likely the table to engage meaningfully on Normalizing relations with a still to be supported by Beijing, and could denuclearization.” But US Director of nuclear weapons-equipped DPRK potentially lead to deeper cooperation National Intelligence James Clapper would, in all probability, sound a death down the road, but only if it is seen as recently opined what most Korea knoll for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation the first step toward a genuine process watchers have believed for years, Treaty as other dominos will likely fall: of denuclearization, which at some

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US-ROK 2+2 ministerial meetings on 19 October 2016: US Secretary of State Kerry, Secretary of Defence Carter , ROK Foreign Minister Yun and Defense Minister Han. Source: U.S. Department of State, Flickr. point must include intrusive verification treaty with Seoul but without direct willingness by each side to accept measures and North Korea normalizing North-South rapprochement, it seems the other’s existence and to agree to its regional relationships. impossible to achieve a normalization respect the other’s right to exist would of relations with Washington, which create a positive atmosphere that Simultaneous US-DPRK and realistically speaking can only come would make all other things possible. after denuclearization. This approach The odds of this happening I must admit ROK-DPRK dialogues leading to would immediately test Pyongyang’s are rather slim but it is an approach step-by-step normalization sincerity and its willingness, finally, worth considering and encouraging. to treat the Seoul government as a It does not directly address the nuclear Another approach might be to sovereign equal. issue but could set the stage for more propose simultaneous dialogue efforts meaningful discussions or pursuit of aimed at both denuclearization and one of the other options. normalization with the US taking the Creation of a North-South lead on the denuclearization front while Federation or Confederation Seoul takes the lead on peace treaty Serious tightening of financial discussions. This could take place within Another approach would be to sanctions to bring the North’s encourage Seoul and Pyongyang to the context of the currently moribund economy to the brink of economic Six-Party Talks, which had a number of take the first step by substituting the simultaneous working groups, or could current hostile policies toward one collapse focused on peaceful coexistence. Both proceed along parallel bilateral tracks. This could be called the “much, much countries have had leaders who in the A “freeze for humanitarian assistance” more of the same” approach but past offered similar proposals including could be the first step for either or both with a greater sense of urgency and former ROK President Kim Dae-Jung of these efforts. In the past, Pyongyang comprehensiveness; it’s the logical has been reluctant to discuss a peace and DPRK Founder Kim Il-Song. A

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extension of the current administration’s the US, ROK, and others have really Ralph A. Cossa policy, and with the recognition that reached the conclusion that nothing will President, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu. perhaps the only way to “bring him stop Kim Jong-Un from pursuing nuclear to his senses” is to bring Kim Jong-un weapons and his ability to hold the US literally to his knees. There are certainly mainland at risk is rapidly approaching stronger economic, political, and or is already here. The concern here diplomatic steps that the US, ROK, and is not that the US will suddenly fear a Japan can take unilaterally and that surprise DPRK nuclear attack. Such an the United Nations Security Council action is the equivalent of instant suicide (UNSC) could, but probably won’t, take for the North Korean state. The concern multilaterally that could really tighten is that Kim will think he has Washington the screws on the North’s economy deterred and will then start stepping up and really force it to choose between provocative actions that could lead us continuing to develop nuclear weapons down a slippery slope. Likewise, in a or face economic collapse. Chinese period of increased tension, if it was interlocutors have told me Beijing is determined that the North had a long- indeed prepared to support such an range missile potentially equipped with approach in the face of continued a nuclear warhead on a launch pad, DPRK recalcitrance and defiance, but preemption by the US would have to so far Beijing’s actions have fallen short be considered a likely option, again of its words. As long as Pyongyang with escalatory consequences. is convinced that Beijing will not turn off its life support, it is hard to have For such an effort to work (or at least to much confidence in this approach. increase the prospects for success), the Fortunately, the reverse is also true, US and ROK would have to coordinate but one wonders what Pyongyang has with Beijing and Moscow in advance to do to finally convince Beijing that and indicate that, if they cooperate, enough is enough. The North Koreans the US/ROK would be open to the seem to believe that China needs possibility of the survival of the North them more than they need China. Korean state, but not the current Unfortunately, Chinese actions to date leadership. reinforce this belief. This approach To be clear, I am not recommending could still work without active genuine that the new administration pursue this Chinese participation and support, but option . . . at least not yet. This is a it would obviously be harder and take potentially risky strategy that should a lot longer. not be taken lightly. But neither should it be taken completely off the table. Regime change by other than Circumstances may make it the only overt military means viable option short of war to ensure future peace and stability. If the North Regrettably, the time is rapidly continues to steadfastly refuse to give approaching, if not already here, up its nuclear weapons and continues that a policy of actively pursuing and to demand it be accepted as a promoting regime change also needs nuclear weapon state, it condemns its to be clearly put on the table as a neighbours to live with an explosive serious option worth considering. All situation and leader and potentially too often, regime change is equated to be subjected to nuclear blackmail or military action but there are a number worse. The risks associated with not of overt and covert steps that can be taking more dramatic steps in dealing taken aimed at destabilizing and with the North may shortly exceed the ultimately replacing the Kim Jong-Un risks of doing nothing and continuing regime that need to be considered if to hope for the best.

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China’s ‘Island-Building’ in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security

Robert Beckman Third, the Tribunal held that all of the Jurisdiction over low-tide elevations other features in the Spratly Islands belongs to the state in whose EEZ, or The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in group that meet the definition of continental shelf, they are located. July 2016 in the Philippines v China an “island” under Article 121(1) of case was a resounding victory for the UNCLOS (a naturally formed area of In reaching the above conclusions on Philippines on the issue of its maritime land surrounded by and above water the status of the features, the Arbitral rights in the South China Sea. at high tide) are “rocks which cannot Tribunal only considered evidence of sustain human habitation or economic the status of the features in their natural First, the Tribunal ruled that China does life of their own” under article 121(3) of state. It did not take into account any not have historic rights in the exclusive UNCLOS. This ruling applies not only man-made activities that enlarged the economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines. to the features occupied by China, but features, brought them permanently above water at high tide, or otherwise Second, the Tribunal held that also to the features occupied by the altered their natural condition. Scarborough Shoal and five of other claimants. Notably, the Tribunal the features occupied by China in ruled that the largest natural island in Although the main objective of the the Spratly Islands (Johnson Reef, the Spratly Islands, Itu Aba, which is Philippines’ arbitral proceedings Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, occupied by Taiwan, is also a “rock” against China was to decide on the Gaven Reef [North] and McKennan entitled to no EEZ or continental shelf extent of China’s maritime entitlements Reef) are “rocks which cannot sustain of its own. Fourth, the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea, the Award human habitation or economic life of ruled that four of the features in the contains several findings which have their own” within article 121(3) of the Spratly Islands that are occupied significant implications for China’s United Nations Convention on the Law by China (Subi Reef, Gaven Reef reclamation and island-building of the Sea (UNCLOS). Consequently, [South], Hughes Reef and Mischief activities. these features are entitled to a 12 Reef) are “low-tide elevations”. Low- nautical mile (M) territorial sea, but they tide elevations are not subject to a are not entitled to an EEZ or continental claim of sovereignty and not entitled shelf of their own. to any maritime zones of their own.

USS John C. Stennis moves through the South China Sea on 3 May, 2016.Source: U.S. Pacific Command, Flickr.

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China’s Reclaimation and Island- while the case was before the Tribunal, Militarization of the Artificial China had violated its obligations under Building Activities UNCLOS and general international law Islands After the commencement of arbitral to refrain from activities that would China has maintained that its land proceedings by the Philippines in aggravate or extend the dispute. reclamation works and construction January 2013, China took major steps Second, the Tribunal ruled that China activities have been solely for civilian to change the physical landscape and had violated its obligations under purposes, a characterization which the create a new status quo concerning its UNCLOS to protect and preserve the Tribunal accepted. However, there are physical presence in the South China marine environment with respect to allegations that China is taking steps to Sea. China engaged in major land fragile ecosystems and the habitat of militarize the islands in order to change reclamation and construction activities depleted, threatened or endangered the balance of power in the South China that converted seven features (Mischief species in the waters surrounding the Sea. Such actions would pose a threat Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands. to the security interests of the United Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, States as well as the security interests Commentators have suggested that Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef) into large of other States in the region. Other China is openly defying the Award of artificial islands that are several times claimant States are likely to respond by the Tribunal by continuing to occupy larger than the natural islands occupied taking measures to enhance security on the artificial islands and by continuing by the other claimants. China in effect the features they occupy, and Vietnam to build installations and structures on built large artificial islands with has reportedly already done so. Also, them. However, the Tribunal made no airstrips, port facilities, buildings, and the United States and its allies are ruling on whether China’s reclamation other installations. likely to take measures to counter any activities were in principle illegal. security threat that they perceive arises Nor did it make any ruling limiting the China’s land reclamation and from such actions. The result could be types of installations and structures construction activities sent a clear a series of “actions and reactions” that China could place on the islands or message to the other claimants, and that would create a serious threat to stating that it would be illegal for China the international community at large, maritime security in the region. that it was very serious about its claim to militarize the islands. These issues to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, are not governed by UNCLOS, and the and that the other claimants would have Tribunal did not consider them. US Freedom of Navigation to adjust to a new status quo concerning However, special legal issues arise Operations China’s physical presence in the Spratly as a result of the Tribunal’s ruling on Islands. A threat to maritime security could Mischief Reef. The Tribunal ruled that also be triggered by actions of the Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation United States and its allies. The United Award of the Tribunal on within the EEZ of the Philippines, and States has conducted several freedom Legality of China’s Activities that consequently, it is legally under of navigation (FON) operations in the jurisdiction of the Philippines. the waters surrounding the Spratly The Philippines was permitted by the Therefore, China would have no right Islands over the past two years. The Tribunal to amend its pleadings in order under international law to occupy or FON operations were intended to send to take into account China’s large-scale carry out activities on Mischief Reef a message to China that the United land reclamation and construction without the consent of the Philippines. States intends to exercise traditional activities. However, the Arbitral Also, since it is a low-tide elevation, “high seas freedoms” in and above the Tribunal only had jurisdiction over it is not entitled to any maritime waters in the South China Sea as is disputes relating to the interpretation zones, including a 12 M territorial sea. permitted by international law. or application of the provisions Therefore, foreign military vessels can in UNCLOS. There are no express legally navigate very close to Mischief Threats to maritime security could provisions in UNCLOS setting out Reef and engage in activities such as arise if the United States decides what activities States can undertake reconnaissance that would normally to undertake FON operations in the on disputed offshore islands and reefs be prohibited under the rules governing waters surrounding Chinese artificial under their occupation and control. innocent passage in the territorial sea. islands because China believes these operations are both a security threat That said, the Tribunal made two rulings and illegal.. China maintains that military with respect to China’s land reclamation vessels must seek authorization before and construction activities. First, it ruled exercising the right of innocent passage that by engaging in these activities

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through the territorial sea, whereas the Prospects for Managing Threats in the negotiations or in documents United States maintains that military setting out the cooperative measures. vessels may exercise the right of to Maritime Security The most serious security issue is innocent passage without seeking In the weeks and months immediately whether tensions between China and authorization or giving prior notice. following the Award of the Arbitral the United States can be reduced. Further, the United States supports Tribunal there is little evidence that China’s artificial islands do not traditional ‘freedoms of the seas’ in the threats to maritime security have necessarily pose a threat to freedom waters beyond the limits of territorial increased. Both China and the ASEAN of navigation or freedom of overflight seas, including freedom of navigation, States appear to be making a serious in the South China Sea, especially freedom of overflight, and the freedom effort to refrain from actions that would for commercial vessels and aircraft. to conduct military activities including increase existing tensions. China has However, if the United States concludes reconnaissance. China takes a different denounced the Award of the Tribunal that the artificial islands are part of view and argues that such activities as null and void, but it has refrained an effort by China to challenge the are contrary to international law if from assertively defying the decision. military dominance of the United they threaten the security interests of The Philippines and the other ASEAN States in the region, threats to maritime the coastal state. Notwithstanding claimants were likely to have been security in the region are likely to whose view of international law is very pleased by the Award, but they increase. Therefore, it is hoped that the correct, FON operations in the waters have acted with caution so as not to United States and China will engage near China’s artificial islands pose a enflame relations with China. In fact, all in discussions and negotiations which potential threat to maritime security. the states concerned seem to be taking enable them to accommodate each Hopefully, China and the United States the time to absorb the changes that other’s interests and manage potential will be able to reach a negotiated have resulted from the fundamental two conflicts. compromise that minimizes the risk of changes in the status quo. In addition, conflict at the operational level without the election of Rodrigo Duterte opened requiring either State to accept the an opportunity for China and the Robert Beckman other’s interpretation of international Philippines to develop a new bilateral Centre for International Law, National law. relationship. University of Singapore

Additionally, China could threaten There have been no reports of incidents maritime security if it were to take between vessels of China and the measures in the waters and airspace ASEAN States. In fact, reports in late surrounding the disputed islands: areas October suggest that talks between that the US and other powers believe the Philippines and China have resulted amount to “excessive maritime claims” in Philippine fishing vessels returning to in defiance of international law. For Scarborough Shoal. This is consistent example, if China were to draw straight with the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal. baselines connecting all or some of the features in the Spratly Islands and claim If China is able to demonstrate to the a territorial sea, many states are likely ASEAN claimants that it is interested to challenge the legality of such a claim; in developing practical measures the United States is likely to conduct to enhance economic and political FON operations while other states may cooperation, and that its artificial take action through diplomatic protests. islands are not a threat to their Similarly, if China were to declare security or to the natural resources either an Aerial Defense Identification in their EEZ, there is a good chance Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, it that relations between China and the is very likely to be challenged by the ASEAN claimants will improve. Any United States both diplomatically and cooperative measures that are agreed through FON operations. upon are likely to take into account both the new status quo on the legal issues and the new status quo on physical presence. However, neither of these issues would have to be mentioned

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The South China Sea Tribunal’s Award: New Prospects for Cooperation?

Nguyen Thi Lan Anh* and maritime claims, particularly incidents occurred frequently in the those related to their history like the areas near the Paracels, Scarborough Some view the South China Sea nine-dashed line. In this regard, the and the EEZs of littoral states. Tribunal’s Award as a win-lose solution award will be helpful in providing that would not contribute to long-term clarity for all parties and an objective The Award clearly ruled on fishing dispute settlement in the South China basis for Chinese leaders to make rights by distributing maritime zones Sea. Others consider this assessment concession based on international into three legal regimes, namely to be a spontaneous and subjective law. traditional fishing zones, EEZ and high reaction to the award. A closer look sea. In each regime, the sovereign that moves beyond the interests From a broader perspective, the right and jurisdiction of coastal states of particular parties in the South South China Sea is a test case for are provided for under customary China Sea may offer a more benign the peaceful rise of China. If China international law and UNCLOS. strategic picture where prospects for shows its goodwill to adhere to This legal basis will be helpful in cooperation in the South China Sea international law and become a promoting fishing cooperation within look feasible and where the Award responsible power, the current world the region. order, which all have enjoyed since may actually facilitate the Code of Regarding traditional fishing zones, Conduct negotiation process. the end of the Second World War, will be preserved. The Award offers the Award clearly stated that the a legal foundation for other countries Scarborough Shoal has been a A benign strategic picture to voice their support for international traditional fishing ground for many law and persuade China to rise in nations, including the Philippines, The South China Sea has loomed China (including Taiwan), and Viet as a contentious choke point on the accordance with what most of the international community desire. This Nam (Merits Award, Para 805). This world security map since 2009. The conclusion opens the possibility of situation further deteriorated in recent will help to build a stable strategic security environment for the region. cooperation to preserve traditional years with the massive construction fishing practices in the Scarborough and militarization of artificial islands. Shoal. Furthermore, given the nature The main cause of tension is the Feasible prospects for of fishing practices in the Paracels and different views contesting parties hold cooperation Spratlys, the parties may establish an on the capacity of maritime features to analogical model of joint traditional generate maritime rights and, hence, To date, the disputes over territories fishing within 12nm of high tide about the authority to enforce these and maritime rights have led to features. rights in the South China Sea. China, mismanagements of the precious on the one hand, insists that its claims resources and the common heritage Beyond 12nm of the high tide features have a historical foundation. Others of the South China Sea. Depleted of the Scarborough, Paracels and rely solely on international law, as is fish stocks, a degraded marine Spratlys, the maritime zones in the stipulated in the 1982 United Nations environment, insecure sea-lane of South China Sea has been definitely Convention on the Law of the Sea communication and a heightened attributed to coastal states’ EEZs or (UNCLOS). The Award resolved this risk of incidents are among the more classified as high sea. Within the EEZ, difference through determining that prominent challenges that have coastal states have sovereign right UNCLOS was decisive in defining the emerged in the South China Sea. The over living resources. This sovereign limits of maritime zones for coastal Award has opened new prospects right, however, does not preclude states.1 The Award also found that for cooperation to address these sharing access to fish stocks with China’s claim to historical rights to challenges. other countries where feasible. This living and non-living resources within may give rise to the establishment of the ‘nine-dash line’ has no legal The South China Sea has long been joint fishing arrangement in the South basis (Merits Award, Para 262). known as a popular fishing ground for China Sea. Nationalist sentiments make it hard littoral states. Unfortunately, fishing for any country to give up territorial has been politicalized as a tool for In addition, based on the conclusions asserting maritime claims. Fishing of the Tribunal that no high tide

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US President Obama and Vietnamese President Quang speak at a press conference in Hanoi 23 May 2016.Source: IIP Photo Archive, Flickr. features in the Spratlys is capable of Besides fishing resources, life than anything the author had seen generating an EEZ and continental hydrocarbon and minerals may well in his four decades of investigating shelf, a high sea will exist in the South be the subject for cooperation either coral reef degradation (Merits China Sea and create a common under the model of joint ventures in Award, Para 958). This factual fishing ground for all states under the places within the continental shelf of information constitutes an urgent call principle of freedom of the sea. The coastal states or under regulation of for environmental protection in the existence of various fishing regimes the International Sea Bed Authority in South China Sea. So far, the Coral in a semi-enclosed sea, like the South applicable areas of the South China Triangle Initiative (CTI) has proven its China Sea, further raises the need for Sea. effectiveness in gathering high-level fishing cooperation. political will and adopting many Regarding the marine environment, actions to strengthen the management Another widespread practice in the the Award confirmed that bad fishing of seascapes, promote an ecosystem region which is not only threatening practices in the South China Sea, approach to fisheries management, law enforcement, but also the including the harvest of endangered establish and improve the effective sustainable management of fishing species, the usage of explosives, management of marine protected stocks, is illegal, unregistered and poisons, electricity, and the mass areas, improve coastal community unreported fishing (IUU fishing). destruction of coral reef for harvesting resilience to climate change, and The conclusions of the Award have giant clams or for the construction of protect threatened species. Further, provided the parties with clear limits artificial islands did impair fishery the professional literature includes on their fishing zones which should resources. The Award cited a recent a number of recommendations to facilitate law enforcement efforts to evaluation by Professor McManus establish national and transnational address IUU fishing. This also opens that showed that almost 70 square Marine Protected Area (MPA) or up the possibility of joint patrols kilometers of coral reef had been Particular Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) to between law enforcement to police damaged by giant clam harvesting better protect the marine environment their jurisdiction in overlapping or using propellers, a practice that is of the South China Sea. With the adjacent EEZs. more thoroughly damaging to marine

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clarity afforded by the South China the Malacca Straits in the form of joint rights of coastal states on fishing Sea Tribunal’s Award, the littoral maritime and air patrols and joint resources, conducting construction states now have firm legal basis to exercises can also be applied to the within a coastal state’s EEZ without establish national and transnational South China Sea to better suppress the consent of that coastal states MPA, in which 12 nm surrounding transnational maritime crimes and were ruled to be grave violations of high tide features of the Paracels, maintain the safety of navigation. international law. Beyond sovereign Spratlys and Scarborough. Even the rights and jurisdiction, the parties high seas in the South China Sea may Facilitation of the Code of Conduct concerned are also obliged to well be eligible for the establishment (COC) Process respect the provisions of UNCLOS of a transboundary MPA, following on safety of navigation and marine the CTI model of cooperation. Initiated since the 1990s, the environment protection. These endeavor to conclude a COC in obligations apply regardless of the Beyond the destructive consequences the South China Sea for dispute legal regime for the maritime zones. for the marine environment, the management and cooperation has In addition, pending final settlement, Award also addressed the legality encountered strong headwinds. The the parties are obliged to exercise of construction activities on Mischief agreement, in 2002, to conclude self-restraint and not exaggerate Reef. The Award determined that the more general and non-binding the disputes. This dimension of the only the Philippines has the right Declaration on the Conduct of Parties Award can be utilized to enrich the to construct artificial buildings on in the South China Sea (DOC) did list of “DOs and DONTs” as the first Mischief Reef, a low tide elevation not significantly improve the outlook step in a road map for drafting the located within its EEZ. Several other for the COC. In 2013, China and COC. Third, the clarity of the Award low tide elevations like Subi Reef, ASEAN countries resumed efforts to also offers the prospect of additional Gaven South Reef and Hughe Reef conclude the COC by initiating a cooperation in a number of important which also have constructions are consultation process. In the last three fields as part of the implementation within 12 nm of Sand Cay, Gaven years, the consultation process has of the DOC, a process that would, in North, Nayit Reef, Kennan Reef, proceeded slowly with no substantial turn, impart momentum to conclusion and Sincow Island. This proximity achievement. Fortunately, the Award of a COC. made the right to construct on these could impart new momentum to the features subject to a determination COC process. Like it or not, the South China Sea on sovereignty and any subsequent Award is a decision made by a delimitation of overlapping territorial First, the COC’s scope of application credible arbitration panel authorized seas which was outside the jurisdiction had always been a primary stumbling by UNCLOS. The arbitrators have of the South China Sea Award. block. The Award, however, has generated new opportunities. It now Pending such settlement, it would be narrowed the disputed area in depends on the parties to use the desirable and certainly sensible that the South China Sea to the 12 nm Award to open the knot of the disputes the massive constructions be shared surrounding the high tide features of and aspire to build a foundation for for civilian purposes, notably search the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal. stability in the South China Sea that and rescue, humanitarian assistance An analogical application of this helps realise the dream of every and disaster relief. These are most conclusion to the Paracels will have littoral state. desirable of the common interests a comparable effect. Pending final of the parties concerned given the settlement, these legal clarifications Nguyen Thi Lan Anh vulnerability of the region to natural provide a sharper focus for provisions Institute for East Sea (South China to regulate the conducts of parties disasters and climate changes. Sea) Studies, Diplomatic Academy of under the condominium regime. Vietnam. Last but not least, there are many other non-traditional threats to maritime Second, the legality of a wide range

security in the South China Sea, of activities conducted by the parties *The views expressed in this paper are strictly those especially transnational maritime has been analysed and assessed of the author and do not necessarily reflect any official position of the institution where she works. criminal activity including smuggling, in the Award. Among them, the armed robbery, and piracy. These obligation to respect the sovereign 1Para 321 of the Award on the Merits in the matter of threats require more coherent rights and jurisdiction of coastal states the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribu- coordination and cooperation among within their EEZ and continental shelf nal constituted under Annex VII of the UNCLOS between the Philippines and China, http://www.pcacases.com/ law enforcement forces. In this have been elaborated in details. For pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20-%20Award. regard, the model of cooperation in example, not respecting the sovereign pdf (hereafter referred to as the Merits Award)

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On Pivots and Puzzles in the South China Sea

Jay L Batongbacal

In the four short months since the landmark arbitral award in Philippines v. China, the situation in the South China Sea has taken rather unexpected turns. The award was announced just weeks into the term of newly-elected Philippine President Rodrigo R. Duterte. At his very first Cabinet meeting, Duterte declared that his government would not “taunt or flaunt” the ruling and instead seek a “soft landing” with China on the issue. How soft he wanted it became clear at the ASEAN Summit in September, when, despite expectations to the contrary, the Philippines no longer pushed hard on giving the issue prominence in the The arbital court ruled 12 July 2016 in favour of the Filipino claims in the South China Sea. traditional communique. In a surprise Source: Permanent Court of Arbitration. turn of events, Duterte also began throwing expletive-ridden tirades at US reiterating the importance of the welcomed the US President-elect, even President Barack Obama and the US, arbitration award. comparing himself favorably to him. He at one point also signaling an intention also reiterated the strong friendly ties to end the Philippine-US alliance. At the end of October, Duterte’s visit between the Philippines and the US, to China bore its first tangible fruit in emphasizing that he would maintain The following month, after an the SCS when Philippine fishermen, the alliance. “icebreaker” meeting spearheaded in the presence of the China Coast by former President Fidel V. Ramos to Guard, were no longer prevented Duterte’s famously-described “pivot identify matters of common concern, from fishing on Scarborough Shoal. to China” has been portrayed by President Duterte followed up with a This was followed by Philippine Coast some observers as an astute strategy visit to China at which he met personally Guard vessels “testing the waters” to play off the principal geopolitical with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and and conducting patrols near the competitors, China and the US, made a grandiose announcement feature, despite Duterte’s previous against each other in order to extract of “separating” the Philippines from announcement in August that the greater concessions from both sides. the United States “economically and Philippines would no longer patrol its But neither China nor the US have militarily,” sending jitters throughout EEZ. Later, Duterte backtracked on his bought into the story, with China’s the region and the US. As soon as previous declaration that the Philippine lack of enthusiasm for his “separation” he returned to Manila with USD 24 US joint exercises in 2016 would be and the US not convinced of a major Billion in Chinese aid and investment the last, and instead announced its split in alliance in the absence of pledges, however, he began to qualify continuation, albeit bereft of its external concrete follow-up. Both China and this statement, saying that he only defense capability-building aspects. the US perceive the Philippines’ well- meant that he wanted to have a foreign entrenched economic, social, and policy that was “independent” and less Donald Trump’s upset win in the US political relationships to be more attuned with the US. Two weeks later, presidential elections generated a new resilient that the firebrand’s frequent on a visit to Japan, he described his wave of uncertainty. Trump’s wild and tirades, and have carefully calibrated statement as being merely “personal” provocative campaign, with its frequent their responses. For now, China and not having anything to do with jabs at free trade and Asia-based appears to be ahead: by declaring government. He also signed a joint competitors in manufacturing, sent a Sino-Philippine relations to have been statement with Japanese Prime Minister pall throughout the region. But Duterte fully repaired, pledging a considerable Shinzo Abe which included a much immediately changed his formerly amount of economic assistance, and more strongly worded paragraph antagonistic tune toward the US, and not obstructing Philippine fishing in

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Scarborough Shoal, China has almost initiatives to re-negotiate or adjust the in the status quo would likely limit the completely removed the standing cause terms of existing agreements in a way utility of the Code of Conduct as far of tensions with the Philippines that that brings jobs back to the US. Long- as dispute resolution is concerned served as the basis for an increased US standing US interests in the freedoms but it may be productively redirected military presence and activities on the of the seas and overall regional peace toward conflict management and western flank of the SCS since 2012. and stability will keep the US military avoidance. With the Philippines China remains unimpeded in its ability active in the region, but the realities of having turned back toward the to finish and bring to full operational its resource limitations will mean that path of quiet bilateral diplomacy status all of its brand-new artificial it will continue to try to hand-off much with China, followed by Malaysia’s islands for both military and civilian of its stabilizing role to regional allies renewal of close relations with Beijing purposes. Indeed, the increased and partners. This will be manifest in and Vietnam’s multi-track approach tempo of its military and para-military continuing pressures to have Japan, toward the dispute, it seems that the maritime presence has normalized, Australia, and South Korea become ASEAN Code of Conduct will have to and its expanded fishing and marine more active in regional strategic find a new role in a greatly changed research operations remain ongoing, affairs, as well as the cultivation of regional geopolitical seascape. If the and are still being conducted within lower-profile strategic partnerships Southeast Asian claimants continue Philippine EEZ waters. America’s with countries like Vietnam. this trend toward individual bilateral rotational military presence similarly dealings with China, and if the key appears to have remained essentially This could become a source of tension geopolitical competitors, China and constant as Philippine-US military with China, especially if Japan does the US, decide to de-prioritize the cooperation has not yet been directly indeed become more active in the South China Sea interactions, middle affected, even though officials on both South China Sea. However, this is powers like Australia, India and sides fretted each time the Philippine probably not feasible in the near- Japan could choose to play more President issued another invective- term, as Japan is still very cautious active roles in molding the regional laden threat to the alliance. about taking on a more prominent dynamics. However, it appears that regional security role. For the near none are inclined to do so beyond US President-elect Trump currently term, it appears to be content with what they are doing now. presents a new uncertainty. It is not providing support and capacity- clear what his Asia-Pacific policy building assistance to like-minded In sum, the massive victory of the would feature, other than to scuttle countries or strategic partners like Philippines in its arbitration case the Trans-Pacific Partnership which the Philippines. As part of its initial over the South China Sea, and comprised the economic component strategic outreach, Japan is providing the remarkable legal clarification of the US pivot to Asia. With an axe the Philippines with civilian maritime that it has brought to the status and to grind against China, which Trump law enforcement vessels and training, allocation of its waters is indeed a has accused of currency-manipulation and maritime patrol aircraft. Japan’s turning point in the legal discourse and unfair trade, future US Asia- soft strategic outreach is nevertheless over littoral countries’ legitimate rights. Pacific policy may be skewed toward causing consternation in China, which But clarification of the geopolitical being primarily military-strategic in is extremely allergic to any increased situation has obviously not followed, character. Trump is said to want to Japanese role in the South China Sea and in fact has become even more again build-up the US Navy, which and has pointedly threatened Japan problematic and uncertain in light of has shrunk in numbers due to US to not get involved. changes in the political landscape budget sequestration policies, and and in the absence of immediate to never again allow economic The sudden reduction of tensions strong follow-through on the award. considerations like trade to override in the South China Sea has been a The year 2016 will be remembered US strategic interests. What this relief for ASEAN, as the group is as the year of upsets, and the coming means for the Asia-Pacific, including no longer under immediate pressure twelve months will likely be marked by the South China Sea, remains to to deal squarely with the issue and tentative and uncertain readjustments be seen. In the absence of more thereby implicitly take geopolitical as the region comes to grips with a concrete information and actions, it sides. The presence of China’s new and unsettled economic and may be assumed that his “America artificial islands, however, calls into political balance in the Asia Pacific. First” policy will cause some friction question ASEAN efforts to agree on a Code of Conduct, the idea for which with key Asia-Pacific countries like Jay L Batongbacal China, South Korea, Japan, and the was borne under extremely different circumstances back in the late 1990s Director, Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law Philippines that face the possibility of the Sea, University of the Philippines of tougher trade relations due to and early 2000s. The marked change

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Solving a Puzzle in the South China Sea

Fu-Kuo Liu

The U-shaped line (also known as China’s 9 dashed line/Taiwan’s 11 dashed line) in the South China Sea has been very much at the centre of discussion and debate in recent times. Most recently, it was among the issues clearly addressed by the arbitration tribunal that considered Philippine maritime rights in the South China Sea. When the United States and China accelerate strategic competition in the region, the South China Sea becomes a core issue, the crux of which happens to be the definition of the 9-dashed line. Many, including the United States and China, have already engaged in talks and debates on the South China Sea where a core issue is the content and intent of the U-shaped line. Yet, most people do not have clear understanding A satellite image of Itu Aba, Spratly Islands, taken 20 May 2016. of how it came about, why it appears Source: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. this way, and what function it has performed. The complicated and history because such an understanding 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the unsettled relationship in the Taiwan suggests that the arbitration tribunal’s Sea (UNCLOS). Over the last seventy Strait between China and Taiwan has award is counterproductive to regional years, the U-shaped line has generated also contributed to comparatively few stability. The most critical point to be certain practices in the South China people having detailed knowledge of realized is that the U-shaped line has Sea. As such, interpretation of the line the origins of the U-shaped line. been part of the politics of the South should be a more balanced process China Sea since the end of WWII. taking into account both customary law In the overarching context of great power The line did not come out of nowhere, and UNCLOS. strategic interests, the current trend in as much commentary tries to suggest. the region of questioning the legality Rather, it is very much based on the of the U-shaped line is unfortunately Rationale of the U-shaped Line accepted rules of international law and very misleading and distorted. This diplomatic practice in place at the time Those unfamiliar with how the U-shaped is especially true as the line is always of its inception. To be more precise, line came about can be prone to jump linked to China’s assertiveness in the beyond claiming sovereignty over to conclusions based on a general region, as if the line is exclusively all maritime features, China (both the understanding of UNCLOS, and to an expression of power politics. The ROC and the PRC) assert that the line criticize China’s assertive posture on its U-shaped line has roots in history, a also refers to historic rights including claims inside the line. Before and after firm legal base, and a clear diplomatic fishing, navigation, and exploration, WWII, when Asia’s modernization purpose. The process that gave rise and exploitation of resources. Although process was still in its infancy, the to the line should not be forgotten; its there were no clear rules on the national boundaries surrounding the existence as part of the status quo in maritime rights of coastal states beyond South China Sea were indefinite and the South China Sea for more than the extent of their territorial seas at that undecided. For various natural and seventy years cannot be ignored. It is time, this does not rule out Chinese historic reasons, large parts of the important to appreciate that the claim historical rights under traditional maritime features in the South China to maritime rights inside the U-shaped international law. The U-shaped line Sea were uninhabited, even though line has a firm rationale rooted in should not be assessed only against the

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the Chinese had records of their fishery the Chinese government. In order or acceptable to judge the U-shaped and commercial activities on some to discourage such advances by its line based on the strategic interests of islands dating back hundreds of years. neighbours, the Chinese government an individual state. Until comparatively recently, the issues decided to publish the U-shaped of sovereignty and maritime order and line map as a formal declaration The U-shaped line is certainly not engaging in maritime delimitation as a of sovereignty. Third, the U-shaped indisputably clear. Nor is it easy to matter of routine were underdeveloped line was based on the traditional reconcile with UNCLOS. Its existence, in Asia. Later, conflicting claims of international law regime under which however, connects the earlier (circa sovereignty over some maritime islands could generate nothing more WWII) regional order with today’s features among claimants did threaten than three nautical miles of territorial maritime legal regime, and this deserves regional peace from time to time. As a sea. The line indicated that all maritime the careful attention of the policy way of reducing military conflict over features inside it belonged to China but community in the region. The regional territorial disputes and in an effort to it did not attempt to regulate the waters maritime order needs to take both treaty clarify national boundaries, the then- beyond three nautical miles. Most law and customary law into account. Chinese government (the Republic of particularly, it did not give a specific China), used historic facts and other meaning to the term “adjacent waters.” Significance for Regional Stability rationales to develop the 11-dashed Since then, however, commentators line as a preliminary legal regime often claim that the Chinese government Much of the current debate on South for the South China Sea.4 In the regards the adjacent waters inside China Sea issues leans toward a immediate post-WWII environment, the U-shaped line as in some sense an provocative American posture of the Chinese government was unable internal sea or part of its territorial seas. resisting and minimizing Chinese gains. to negotiate delimitation agreements It is clear that the world is waiting for Based on different interpretations of the with any neighboring countries, as China and Taiwan to update the nature U-shaped line and the related maritime Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the of adjacent waters in accordance with rights claimed, the US and China have Philippines were still either under UNCLOS. Fourth, every dash of the accelerated their strategic competition colonial control or just newly exercising 11-dashed line was drawn according to to a point that almost overshadows their independence. To prevent further the base of median lines between the the original nature of the territorial complications with these neighboring islands within the line and the opposite disputes among claimants. As strategic countries, the line was originally c o a s t s o f t h e n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s . competition continues, regional players intended to serve national security and find it much more difficult to stand diplomatic purposes. Today, while many criticize the line as independently between these two great incompatible with UNCLOS, its historic powers. In some instances, the US- The U-shaped line does seek to address foundations are almost disregarded. China competition has even forced the a range of security, diplomatic and legal Much of the argument against the regional players – ASEAN members for interests. First, based on traditional legality of the line focusses narrowly or example - to take sides. This suggests international law and customary law, exclusively on a legal interpretation of that provocation at this moment is the 11-dashed line was left as an open UNCLOS in respect of historical titles. counterproductive to regional stability. dashed line. It was primarily intended According to UNCLOS, only under While the arbitration tribunal award as an islands attribution line claiming certain exceptional conditions would sovereignty over all maritime features focused interest on the legality of the the historic rights of coastal states be U-shaped line, hardly any attention and defining the status of the waters accepted. Since the U-shaped line was inside the line. Most importantly, it has been paid to the ongoing process not established by treaty law but was and diplomatic efforts directed at the left room for future negotiations on presented as a preliminary legal regime maritime boundaries with neighboring negotiation of a Code of Conduct in derived from customary law and state the South China Sea between China countries. The origins of the line show practice, any judgements should weigh that the Chinese government had and ASEAN. The arbitration case as all these contributing considerations presented may not be as useful as always had the clear intention to solve in the balance. Obviously, UNCLOS territorial disputes through diplomatic originally hoped for settling the territorial should be the main legal basis for dispute disputes. Strategic competition and the negotiation. Second, immediately after settlement, but it should not become the the end of WWII, French troops tried legal campaign against China may have exclusive point of reference. As such, unhelpfully twisted the focus of the to occupy some islands in the South it is not correct to judge the U-shaped China Sea, which made protecting effort to address territorial disputes in line exclusively from a narrow legal and the South China Sea. What the region sovereignty an urgent priority for political perspective. Nor is it correct

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should recognize is the reality that the U-shaped line could be challenging. In U-shaped line derives from a historical response to the arbitration award, the process, and that the six South China Chinese government clearly highlighted Sea claimants have quite different that China has historic rights in the perspectives on it. While China and South China Sea. This is the core issue Taiwan base their position on historic that China and Taiwan have yet to facts, traditional international law elaborate clearly to the international and customary law, and insist that the community. line has legitimacy, the remaining four claimants look essentially to UNCLOS Although the historical process of and have a contrary view. promulgating the U-shaped line back in the 1940s may not have been fully It is obvious that there are clear completed from a legal standpoint it differences in the sovereignty claims does, however, make clear, then and now, in the South China Sea. The territorial China’s position on all features within disputes in the South China Sea will the line. It is obvious that both Taiwan not have an easy solution, while and China will continue to insist on their the different interests of claimants claims, perhaps in a different manner. and non-claimants complicate the On strengthening the legitimacy of situation even further. The arbitration the U-shaped line, Taiwan and China tribunal’s award reminds us that a would seem to be on the same page. legal campaign should not be the However, political transformation in only approach to resolving territorial Taiwan may in due course challenge its disputes on the ground. Rather, the conventional policy stance. Especially, key will be a process of diplomatic when the pro-Taiwan independence negotiation. After all, understanding Democratic Progressive Party is in and consideration is the Asian way power, it could become a political issue of settling disputes. between China and Taiwan. As the DPP rejects the “one China” foundation, Taiwan, China, and Discourse on there is a high political risk that it may step away from its traditional claim the U-shaped Line in the South China Sea. Such a change The historical validity of the U-shaped may make the future of the U-shaped line was rejected by the arbitration line more uncertain. tribunal. The award was seriously prejudiced, leaning as far as it could Fu-Kuo Liu toward the interests of the Philippines Research Fellow, Institute of International and the United States and displaying Relations, National Chengchi University little interest in the historical and official evidence available that supported the 1 Chinese view. This made it inevitable For additional information on the main themes of this paper see Zhiguo Gao and Bingbing Jia, “The that China and Taiwan would reject nine-dashed line in the South China Sea: history, status, and implications,” American Journal of Inter- the award. Basically, the Chinese national Law, vol. 107, (2013), pp. 98-124. government has defined the U-shaped line with clear elements: sovereignty over maritime features within the line, sovereign rights over surrounding waters as defined by UNCLOS, and historic rights over fishing, navigation, and resource exploration and exploitation. Taiwan has traditionally taken a similar position. According to UNCLOS, claiming “historic rights” within the

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The Future of Dispute Resolution and Management of the South China Sea: A Post Arbitration Analysis

Haryo Budi Nugroho Philippines, can therefore be resolved through The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal bilateral negotiations. Thitu, instituted by the Philippines against presumably not claimed by China under the United Nations Malaysia or Brunei, can be Convention on the Law of the Sea resolved through trilateral (UNCLOS), rendered on 12 July negotiations between 2016, marks a new chapter in China, the Philippines and the South China Sea question. Vietnam. It is best to work Unsurprisingly, China, which through the disputes with the had refused to participate in the least parties involved first, proceeding, has also refused to beginning with the bilateral acknowledge the Award. Following disputes, and working up the Award, China has reaffirmed its through the rest. position that it will settle the dispute through negotiations with other In continuing the negotiation claimants, and that it will continue route, China, as well as to participate in the negotiations for other claimants, needs to the early conclusion of the Code of be prepared for a process Conduct in the South China Sea. that will be neither smooth nor short. The experience China’s affirmation to settle the of Indonesia and Malaysia, dispute with other claimants needs in resolving the ownership to be respected. Indeed, the South of Ligitan and Sipadan, China Sea dispute can only be demonstrated that decades resolved by the claimants, if they of negotiations would not settle the ownership issues over the guarantee a solution. Both Arbitral Tribunal award released 12 July 2016. Source: Permanent Court of Arbitration. maritime features and determine the claimants, after having maritime boundaries in accordance relentlessly defending their with international law. However, claim of original title since 1969, The Pedra Branca dispute between before starting the negotiation, all eventually decided to settle the Malaysia and Singapore provides a claimants will need to clarify their dispute through the International different insight. The dispute involved position on the features to which they Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1997. It took the question of transfer of ownership, claim ownership. Not all features in another five years before the ICJ which claimants in the South China the South China Sea are claimed made its decision in 2002. The case Sea may also face. The determination by all claimants. This clarification of Gibraltar is also a stark example of of transfer of title can be done only will help to identify the negotiation how a territorial dispute can remain through an adjudication process, counterpart for China, in order to unresolved for more than 300 years. as no claimant would admit that a solve the dispute. Other examples of the long list of territory it once held, has changed ownership disputes yet to be resolved ownership. After the ICJ rendered While acknowledging there are include the Falkland/Malvinas Island its award on ownership in 2008, features requiring trilateral or multi- between Argentina and the United Malaysia and Singapore have yet claimant negotiations, negotiation Kingdom, the Abu Musa, the Greater to delimit the maritime boundaries, can begin with features that are Tunb and the Lesser Tunb between which will involve a trilateral process claimed by two claimants only. Iran and the United Arab Emirates, as with Indonesia. Eight years have The features in the Paracel group well as Hans Island between Canada passed, and the three countries have currently claimed by China and and Denmark. not started the negotiation. Vietnam, and the Scarborough Shoal that is claimed by China and the

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With regard to the South China Code of Conduct, which was soon Over the coming year, China’s Sea situation, it is highly likely that after the adoption of the 2002 commitment to seek negotiated claimants will face a long debate Declaration on the Conduct of Parties outcomes to solve the South China over historical facts, and rather in the South China Sea, has passed. Sea dispute will be tested. The unlikely that they will agree to settle However, China appeared to signal Philippines continues to demonstrate the dispute through the ICJ or another that the process is still on-going even its willingness to consider a negotiated international adjudication body. Even after the Award, taking the position in resolution, particularly with China. if the dispute is resolved, the domestic the Philippine-China Joint Statement Additionally, the ASEAN states will repercussions are an additional of 21 October 2016, and elsewhere, likely wait to see if and how China factor that claimants need to consider that it was committed to the full and intends to move forward in the Code because solving the ownership effective implementation of the 2002 of Conduct negotiations. China is dispute is not a win-win situation, it Declaration and would continue to developing its signature Maritime is, in fact, a win-loose situation. work substantively towards the early Silk Road initiative, which places the conclusion of the overdue Code of incredibly difficult task of resolving the It has to be expected that sooner Conduct. South China Sea disputes or at the very or later, bilateral negotiations to least, managing them constructively – determine ownership of the features Despite this affirmation of China’s squarely in China’s best interest. likely will face a deadlock, and commitment, the Code of Conduct claimants will need to explore other process will be no less difficult than it options. A plausible alternative is has been over the past 14 years. The Haryo Budi Nugroho to split the disputed features. While Code of Conduct negotiation process Office of the Special Envoy to the President it is possible to split Paracel group will be dominated by debates on the of the Republic of Indonesia for Maritime Delimitation. This article is his personal given that it consists of a number of Award of the Arbitral Tribunal. China view. different features, it is difficult to split will seek to simply ignore the Award, a small isolated feature such as the while the ASEAN member states will Scarborough Shoal. In such cases, remain split. Indonesia and Singapore joint ownership, joint management, or would probably honor the Award, or at even the creation of a joint authority least strive to ensure that the Code of to develop the disputed feature Conduct is not drafted in contradiction may become options. Nevertheless, with the Award. The Philippines, whose these options are mainly political in government initiated the Arbitral nature, a cosmetic overlay to hide Tribunal but where the domestic the unresolved ownership dispute. situation has changed since Duterte For example, Germany and the came into power, would be more lenient Netherlands took this route to end the and appears to be leaning toward delimitation in the Ems River. In 2014 Beijing. both states signed an agreement that regulates the disputed maritime areas Taking into account these fundamental without drawing a definitive boundary differences in position and perspective line. It is not a bad result, as long as as well as giving weight to the Award, both claimants are satisfied with the the discussion of the Code of Conduct arrangement. As noted above, there would be limited to issues that are not are many ownership disputes that are affected by the Award. Thus, the only left unresolved for various reasons. part of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties that can be further As the claimants continue their elaborated in the Code of Conduct is endeavors to solve the ownership the issue of self-restraint. Practically, dispute, the effort to maintain regional all other forms of cooperation, will stability should continue to be pursued. involve discussion as to what can or The early conclusion of the Code cannot be done in a specific maritime of Conduct is the most anticipated zone, and necessarily trigger the outcome in this regard. Indeed, the debate over UNCLOS and the Award. ideal time for the conclusion of the

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CSCAP STUDY GROUPS

Study Groups are CSCAP’s primary mechanism to generate analysis and policy recommendations for consideration by governments. These groups serve as fora for consensus building and problem solving and to address sensitive issues and problems ahead of their consideration in official processes. CSCAP currently has active study groups on the following themes – • Harmonisation of Air and Sea Search and Rescue; • Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; • Asia Pacific Contribution to Peace–keeping Operations; • Marine Environment Protection; • Preventive Diplomacy; • Nuclear Energy Experts’ Group; • Strategic Trade Controls.

CSCAP MEMBER COMMITTEES CSCAP PUBLICATIONS

CSCAP membership includes almost all of the major countries of the Asia Pacific and also includes the European CRSO Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) Union: The CRSO is an annual publication to highlight regional Australia security issues and to promote and inform policy relevant outputs as to how Track One (official) and Track Two (non- Brunei official) actors can, jointly or separately, advance regional Cambodia multilateral solutions to these issues. Canada China CSCAP Memoranda European Union CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of Study India Groups approved by the Steering Committee and submitted Indonesia for consideration at the Track One level. Japan Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea CSCAP General Conference Reports Republic of Korea Since 1997, the biennial CSCAP General Conference, is Malaysia designed to be an international forum where high ranking officials and security experts from the Asia Pacific region Mongolia meet every two years to discuss security issues of relevance Myanmar and to seek new ideas in response to evolving developments New Zealand in Asia Pacific security. The forum is usually attended by approximately 250 participants; making it one of the largest The Philippines gatherings of its kind. Through its publications, CSCAP’s Russia recommendations have been well received by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Singapore Thailand United States of America Vietnam Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Associate Member)

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