INDIA-PAKISTAN DIALOGUE: BRINGING THE SOCIETY IN The Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) is an independent, non-profit and non-governmental organization for collaborative research, networking and interaction on strategic and international issues pertaining to South Asia. Set up in 1992, the RCSS is based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The RCSS is a South Asian forum for studies, training and multi-track dialogue and deliberation on issues of regional interest. All activities of RCSS are designed with a South Asia focus and are usually participated by experts from all South Asian countries. The Centre is envisaged as a forum for advancing the causeof cooperation, security, conflict resolution, confidence building, peace and development in the countries of the South Asian region. The RCSS serves its South Asian and international constituency by: (a) networking programmes that promote interaction, communication and exchange between institutions and individuals within and outside the region engaged in South Asian strategic studies; (b) organizing regional workshops and seminars and sponsoring and coordinating collaborative research; and (c) disseminating output of the research through publications which include books, monographs and a quarterly newsletter. The RCSS facilitates scholars and other professionals of South Asia to address, mutually and collectively, problems and issues of topical interest for all countries of the region.

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India Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

ASMA-UL-HUSNA FAIZ

REGIONAL CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES COLOMBO Published by Regional Centre for Strategic Studies 410/27, Bauddhaloka Mawatha Colombo 7, Sri Lanka. Tel: (94-11) 2690913/4 Fax: (94-11) 2690769 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.rcss.org

© Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2007

First published 2007

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form Or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies. It is distributed with the understanding that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise be sold, lent, hired or otherwise circulated without the prior consent of the RCSS.

Views expressed in materials published in RCSS Policy Studies are of contributors, and not necessarily of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies.

ISBN 978-955-8051-35-1

Printed at Design Systems (Pvt) Ltd. 23/1, 1st Maligakanda Lane Colombo 10, Sri Lanka Contents

Acknowledgements

I Introduction 09

II Towards a Conceptual Framework 14

III Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 52

IV Dialogue between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 83

V Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 111

VI Conclusion 153

Endnotes 159 RCSS is grateful to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) for its generous support of the RCSS-NTI Award on which this report is based. Acknowledgements

This study is the outcome of a research grant that I received from the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in March 2005. I am grateful to Prof. Sridhar Khatri and RCSS for giving me an opportunity to undertake this study. I appreciate the generous contribution of all the citizen peace activists who shared their experiences with me and thus provided an insight into the operational dynamics of the peace process to enrich this study. God has been very kind to me in giving me strength to overcome all the obstacles. The support extended by my family, friends and colleagues at the Area Study Center, Quaid-i-Azam University, is priceless. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, teacher and mentor Prof. Mohammad Waseem. This study would not have been possible without his guidance, kindness and patience.

Chapter I Introduction

This study aims to evaluate the contribution of citizen diplomacy to the Indo-Pakistan peace process. The linkage patterns, effectiveness, and impact of people power on conflict resolution and peace building in South Asia are the focal points of this project. The last two decades have seen the rise of people- to-people contact between India and Pakistan. Various non-state elements such as the business community, media, and prominent citizens like entertainment and sports celebrities have increasingly interacted with each other in various manners. We plan to develop an understanding of the impact of people-to-people contact on Indo-Pakistan relations. In this regard, we shall analyse the origin, development, working, efficacy and challenge of citizen peace initiatives to facilitate normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. We shall explore a variety of concepts and approaches to conflict resolution and peace building developed by peace theorists. As the roots of citizen peace activism are often found in the failure of official and semi-official processes to produce any improvement in the situation, we shall look into Track One and Two diplomacy in South Asia and discuss their failures. This project is an attempt to understand the theory and practice of citizen diplomacy in the context of Indo-Pakistan relations. The Indian and Pakistani governments revived the Composite Dialogue Process in 2004. This process includes a number of confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as the return of diplomatic missions to full strength, restoration of sports ties, resumption of travel links, and exchange of visits by parliamentarians, businessmen, journalists, writers, artists, academics and students. A bus service between the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir was started in April 2005. It was hailed as an important CBM, only 10 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in disrupted by the devastating earthquake of 8 October 2005. Lately, the rail link between Khokhrapar in Pakistan and Munnabao in India was revived after a break of four decades. The Indian and Pakistani governments recently held talks on the proposed Iran– India gas pipeline project which would further the process of trust- building between the two sides. There appears to be a change in the official postures of India and Pakistan after decades of hostility. It is essential that new academic research is conducted into various aspects of the current trend towards peacemaking in South Asia. We aim to develop a perspective on the challenges of peace building between India and Pakistan. This monograph seeks to analyse the influence and contribution of citizen diplomacy to the Indo-Pakistan dialogue. There has been an evident rise in popular interaction in South Asia during the last two decades, a new factor in Indo-Pakistan relations. As we witness the increasing people-to-people interaction, there has been a parallel process of official efforts at conflict resolution and reconciliation. We shall attempt to develop a linkage between the two phenomena as we examine the trend of citizen peace activism in South Asia. The current negotiations between India and Pakistan enjoy widespread legitimacy amongst the people. There is tremendous pressure on the governments in India and Pakistan to sustain this process. The citizen peace community has grown significantly during the last two decades. There is strong linkage between popular peace activism and the melting of ice between the two governments. It is only pertinent that this phenomenon be studied by the academics of South Asia. To date, this development has received scant consideration in the discourses on South Asian politics. The present project is an effort to fill a void in the current debate on South Asia by understanding the potential of citizen peace initiatives. This is especially true for Pakistan, where hardly any research into the dimensions of Track Three diplomacy has been conducted in a systematic way. In other words, this study endeavours to study a critical and as yet not-fully- explored aspect of the Indo-Pakistan dialogue. There has been increase in the pressure put on the two governments by external parties and the civil society to show Introduction 11 restraint and flexibility in their pursuit of strategic goals. The end of the Cold War led to peace building and cooperation in various regions around the world. But the Cold War in South Asia continued unremittingly. Indo-Pakistan relations gained added significance in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. The campaign for peace gained momentum due to the shadow of nuclear weapons hanging over the subcontinent. Moreover, the arms race between the two is a direct consequence of the unsettled disputes. In order for stability and prosperity to prevail in South Asia, a successful resolution of disputes is indispensable. This project seeks to explore the challenges of peace building in South Asia from outside the regular channels of state-to-state dialogues. The current dialogue between India and Pakistan appears to be the best opportunity for peace in a long time. The process enjoys enormous popular support. It is true that the conflicts between India and Pakistan are enormously complex. However, the current dialogue is unique due to the tremendous participation of the civil society through people- to-people contact. At present, the Indo-Pakistan dialogue is taking place at various levels in the form of Track One, Track Two, and Track Three diplomacy. The Track Three process is far from a high- profile exchange of ideas and persons. Instead, this society-based dialogue is a long-term process, aiming at gradual normalization of relations between the two nations. It is high time that this novel development be subjected to serious academic inquiry. This study relies on the concepts, theories and frameworks developed by theorists in dealing with issues of conflict resolution and peace building. Peace Studies as an academic discipline has come a long way. There is need to explore the theory and practice of peace in South Asia by utilizing the works of peace theorists. In this regard, we shall attempt to develop a conceptual and comparative framework of peace research across the globe to analyse the dynamics of peace and conflict between India and Pakistan. We shall attempt to relate peace research across the globe with the challenge of peace building in South Asia. The first chapter of this study aims to develop a conceptual and comparative perspective on the notions of peace and conflict. We shall examine a few instances of successful 12 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in transition from conflict to peace in different regions of the world. Thus, the chapter is an attempt to look into the theory and practice of peace building and conflict resolution in the contemporary world, to enable us to appreciate the challenges of peace building between India and Pakistan. In Chapter 2, we shall endeavour to analyse the Indo-Pakistan dichotomy. Drawing upon theorization of regions and regional rivalries, we shall define different aspects of rivalry between India and Pakistan in terms of conflict as well as various channels of communication used by the two sides to resolve their bilateral disputes. Chapter 3 seeks to examine Track One and Two diplomacy as a channel of conflict resolution in South Asia. We shall take an overview of the official negotiations between the two countries during the last six decades. We shall attempt to develop a model of Indo-Pakistan diplomacy through the concepts developed by negotiation theorists. Here, the emergence of Track Two diplomacy between India and Pakistan following the failure of official negotiations to break the impasse will be examined in great detail. We shall assess the failure of official and semi-official dialogues to resolve contentious disputes between the two countries. Finally, Chapter 4 shall analyse citizen peace diplomacy with emphasis on Pakistani citizen activism. In this regard, we shall look into the activities of a wide spectrum of citizen peace groups such as the media, youth, women, artists, writers and ex-soldiers. We shall also examine the level and scope of people-to- people contact in South Asia to develop a perspective on the nature of popular interaction within which citizen diplomacy operates. We shall assess the potential of citizen peace initiatives to normalize relations between India and Pakistan. The present study seeks to engage in stocktaking of citizen peace activism with special emphasis on Pakistan. The aim of these activities is to overcome the trust deficit and change perceptions about each other. The participants of Track Three dialogues attempt to build bridges across the divide. With the rise in popular exchanges across national boundaries, the citizens of India and Pakistan are starting to reacquaint themselves with each other. People-to- people contact has facilitated the partial and gradual erosion of Introduction 13 old stereotypes between Indians and Pakistanis. There has been an institutionalization of this sentiment with the rise of numerous peace groups. To date, only a handful of systematic studies of the rationale, working and contribution of citizen dialogues have been conducted by the academics of South Asia. The current study will be one of the first attempts to comprehend the vision of a peaceful South Asia espoused by civil society. The ultimate objective of this project is to provide a fresh perspective on Indo-Pakistan relations, which could be adopted in the policy agendas of the governments. It is hoped that this effort to analyse the hitherto-ignored civil society–oriented peace dialogues can contribute to peace in the region through an understanding of the societal input into the ongoing process of dialogue. We shall use both primary and secondary sources in our enquiry into the processes of conflict resolution and peacemaking in South Asia. Unfortunately, few official documents are released dealing with contemporary events. We shall frequently use primary documents released by citizen peace activists to develop an understanding of their activities. We shall also refer to the available scholarly studies of the dynamics of peace and conflict between the two countries. An important component of our enquiry will be interviews of a number of Pakistani citizen peace activists in order to get their first- hand account of activities in the public domain. We hope that this study will fill a gap in the contemporary discourse on peace and conflict resolution in South Asia. Chapter II Towards a Conceptual Framework

Introduction

There has been a marked improvement in the traditionally antagonistic relations between India and Pakistan during the last two years. The Indo-Pakistan acrimony is rooted in one of the oldest and most complicated conflicts in the world. The 1998 nuclear tests resulted in renewed concerns about the future stability of the region. Since 2003, there has been a marked reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan after the ‘eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation’ in the wake of the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The stalled ‘Composite Dialogue’ process was restarted in early 2004. Apart from increased official exchanges, interaction between the peoples of the two countries has expanded enormously. Increased people-to-people contact between the two countries has resulted in an unprecedented level of communication between their citizens. These developments have generated optimism about the prospects of peace between them, and stimulated interest in the academic studies on the issue. This chapter is an effort to develop an understanding ofthe notions of peace and conflict. It will facilitate us in developing a conceptual framework to conduct our enquiry into challenges of peace building between India and Pakistan. In this regard, this chapter seeks to develop a conceptual and comparative framework based on the work of peace theorists belonging to the discipline of Peace Studies. The end of the Cold War, along with vast changes in the political, economic and social spheres has had tremendous consequences for peace in theory and practice. We shall begin our study by looking at the evolutionary process through which peace research has passed. In this context, an attempt will be made to dwell Towards a Conceptual Framework 15 upon the definitions and interpretations of peace found in the peace literature. Developing a conceptual understanding and clarity is the first step towards finding a peaceful solution to the conflict between India and Pakistan. The contributions of multi-track diplomacy to the processes of conflict resolution and reconciliation will also be analysed in this regard. Following this, we shall focus on conflicts where peace building efforts have succeeded in bringing an end to hostilities. The idea is that the lessons learnt from these cases should enable us to develop an insight into the challenge of peace building between India and Pakistan.

Peace Research: An Introduction

In this section, we shall start with an inquiry into the evolution of peace research both in time and space. How has peace research grown as an academic discipline with the passage of time? What has been the impact of the end of the Cold War on peace research? How can peace research contribute more effectively towards the attainment of peace in the world? How can the prevalent matrix of peace theory help us in analysing the situation in South Asia? Peace research seeks to contribute to the elimination of conflict and violence and lead to the establishment of peace across the globe. It studies causes of conflict as well as the eventual resolution of disputes. Consequently, it includes research, education and action. Different factors and events can influence the direction and growth of this field, such as historical events, societal changes, ornew innovations in the methodology of science. For example, the end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11 have affected the discipline of the study of war and peace tremendously. In addition to these changes in the international system, any new developments within a region can transform the focus or direction of peace studies. An instance of this phenomenon can be found in South Asia, where the softening of official rhetoric between India and Pakistan has generated interest in the hitherto-overlooked discipline of peace research. What distinguishes Peace Studies from other fields of knowledge is the fact that it does not just dwell upon what has 16 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in already happened or what might happen, but it also attempts to find a course through which visions of an ideal future can eventually be transformed into reality. Therefore, peace research tries to utilize all resources available to move towards realization of these futures. It places itself at the junction of a diversity of kinds of peace knowledge, peace perspectives, and peace actors.4 The sub-field of peace research came into its own only in the twentieth century, although philosophers and thinkers have been concerned about the issues of war and peace throughout history. Indeed, it was in the mid-1950s that peace research started to emerge as a modern and scientific field of study. It surfaced on the scene when the international system was under the shadow of the East– West arms race and both sides had the ability to kill and overkill. It was felt that the divided world had to be brought together and science had to lead the way to salvation. Peace research was not only an academic exercise: it was about acquisition of knowledge which would be used to find a solution to the problems of war and peace. Not surprisingly, all definitions of peace research focus on the problem-oriented nature of this discipline, immersed in the value- orientation of peace relating to the agenda of promoting peace.5 The decade of the 1950s saw the establishment of institutions which intended to deal with concepts of ‘conflict analysis’, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘peace research’. It included peace research centres operating in Groningen, Ann Arbor and Oslo.6 These institutions operated both inside and outside universities. One of the first activities pointing the emergence of a peace research community was the publication of the first issue of the International Newsletter on Peace Research in the winter of 1963 for the International Consultative Committee on Peace Research and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Now known as the International Peace Research Newsletter, it covered such events as the establishment of the Gandhi Peace Foundation in 1958, the creation of a Division for Research on Conflict and Peace in the Oslo Institute for Social Research, later converted into the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (IPRIO), and the founding of the Canadian Peace Research Institute in 1961 ‘to Towards a Conceptual Framework 17 conduct research into the causes and prevention of war, and the relief of international tensions’.7 A meeting of the American and British Friends Services Committee in Clarens, Switzerland, for scientists who were anxious about the chances of war breaking out led to the founding of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). These are some of the initiatives which paved the way for the emergence and institutionalization of peace research as a distinct field of knowledge. In order to understand the expansion of peace research and to comprehend the impact that it has had on society, it is necessary to pay attention to its constituent elements, i.e. ‘peace’, and ‘research’. Peace research aspires to be in tune with the existing political conditions. The topical relevance is a key element in this regard. At the same time, it needs to be detached from partisan positions on conflicts in order to have a broader focus upon methodologies, analysis and critique. Consequently, it is appropriate to study the progression of peace research on two lines: the formation of the ‘peace agenda’, and the construction of the ‘analytical agenda’. Peace research has emerged as the most relevant field of study in the twentieth century. This period is considered to be one of the most violent, bloody and conflict-prone periods in human history. Other more positive developments include the formation of regional or global alliances and innovation of new tactics for conflict prevention, such as peace keeping. The agenda of Peace Studies has been enriched by these developments. The experiences of the First and Second World Wars inspired researchers such as Sorokin and Wright to engage in systematic analyses of historical experiences of war.8 Understanding the causes of the origin of war is an enduring feature of Peace Studies. However, the agenda has gradually involved new analytical questions, pointing towards new possibilities for the discipline. Peace Studies is organizationally a distinct sub-field of the larger study of war and peace, international relations, foreign policy, and even sociology, economics, law, theology and technology. During the Cold War, the scholars writing in the discipline of Strategic Studies used to criticize the concepts of Peace Studies for being too idealistic, even utopian. However, now there is greater 18 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in acceptance of the credentials and contributions of the field of peace research. Indeed, Peace Studies have influenced Strategic Studies by giving relatively comprehensive definitions of security. In addition to the study of war, non-violence, peaceful resistance and democracy (inasmuch as democracies are supposed not to go to war with each other) have become the dominant themes in peace research. Galtung proposed the concept of ‘structural violence’ in the form of inbuilt oppressions in the social fabric, thus pointing to the need to bring more equality and justice within the societies. From the late 1960s, the agenda for development has also become part of Peace Studies. It led to enquiry in to causal linkages between inequalities within societies, wars and revolutions. Obviously, the use of force to control efforts to redefine these structures of inequality moved into the realm of peace research. The need to emancipate various oppressed groups within a society has created a new momentum for study of new areas such as gender relations within the framework of Peace Studies. An increasing focus on oppressed groups has eventually contributed to the rise of international peacekeeping operations. In this way, the last 50 years have seen tremendous expansion in the scope and promise of the discipline of Peace Studies. In addition to these global factors, regional and local events also influenced the agenda of peace research. For example, peace research in Japan has been influenced tremendously by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. African Peace Studies have been influenced by struggle against apartheid, colonialism, poverty and neocolonialism. Similarly, resistance to the perceived American hegemony, existence of an unequal society, and military coups have been the focus of peace researchers in Latin America. In the Middle East, concerns about the future of the Arab-Israeli peace process and consequences of the presence of oil resources in the region have shaped the agenda of Peace Studies. The US’s confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was the biggest influence on the growth of peace research. In Europe, the ideological and territorial divisions during the Cold War rooted in fear of a Third World War were major concerns of Peace Studies. After the Cold War, concerns about prospects Towards a Conceptual Framework 19 of peace dominated the peace agenda.9 However, academic study of peace and conflict resolution in South Asia is at an early stage. Considering that there are numerous conflicts across the region, there are only a handful of centres and institutes engaged in research on issues of conflict and peace in the region. A few universities have opened departments of Peace Studies in India and Bangladesh. In the last two decades, several new research centres engaged in study of conflict and peace were opened, like the International Center for Peace Initiatives (Mumbai [earlier Bombay]), the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, the Institute of Conflict Management and the International Center for Peace Studies (New Delhi), and the Centre for Policy Research and Analysis under the Faculty of Law at the Colombo University. In Pakistan, there are no separate departments of Peace and Conflict Studies in the universities. While the Institute of Regional Studies, the Institute of Strategic Studies and the Islamabad Policy Research Institute conduct research on conflict and peace, their scope is limited, considering the fact that these institutes are sponsored by the government. There are a handful of institutes in the private sector in Pakistan which focus upon issues of war and peace, such as the Foundation for Research on International Environment, National Development and Security, the Institute of Policy Studies, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, and the Regional Institute of Peace and Security Studies.10 There is clearly a need for the development of Peace Studies in South Asia in the perspective of a lack of a culture of peace in the region. With the gradual expansion in the ‘peace’ agenda of peace research, there has been a parallel growth in the methodologies used in this field. The field of Peace Studies has been developing new and more effective methodologies which can enhance the practical contribution of this discipline to elimination of conflict and sustainability of peace in various societies. The first methodological challenge came from statistical methodology. Statistical and quantitative elements were included in the early peace studies conducted by Sorokin and Wright, who looked at the numbers of wars, levels of intensity and related dimensions. Statistical methodology has made a significant contribution to the expansion 20 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in of the agenda of peace research. Similarly, during the Cold War, game theory provided a major conceptual framework to analyse the relations of major powers in behavioural terms. However, the critics of both statistical and behavioural methodologies have labelled them as being too empirical. They point to the vital role played by structures in growth ofa conflict, which cannot be easily measured. Notable in this regard is the contribution of Marxist writers who pointed to the limitations of these statistical or behavioural approaches. Another critique of the behavioural approach has emanated from the constructivist perspective. The constructivists argue that selection of evidence is a subjective phenomenon, as reality is what lies in the mind of the observer. The same phenomenon will be observed in an entirely different manner by another researcher. Hence, it focuses onthe presence of a bias in studies which can be overcome with the inclusion of new dimensions in peace research. Feminist theory and post-modernist discourses are examples of these new approaches. The adoption of these new methodologies has led to a shift in the basic unit of research analysis. Attention on the units of analysis generated an interest in global- and regional-level peace research. The rise to prominence of different transnational non-state actors has been another new development in this regard. Transnational corporations, trans-boundary trafficking of arms, goods and human beings and contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to issues of war and peace have entered the agenda of peace research.11 We shall cover these currents of thought in Peace Studies by focusing on the levels of analysis, rise of non-state actors and transnational citizen networks during the course of our study into the foundations of peace and conflict in South Asia. The expansion of Peace Studies has led to various dilemmas and contradictions faced by the scholars of this discipline. Herman Schmidt argues that peace research loses its assumed neutrality due to the existence of linkages between peace researchers and decision makers at the supranational level.12 Since Peace Studies is an applied or ‘oriented’ science, it has to be applied by someone who has the necessary power to apply it. Hence, the universalist ideology Towards a Conceptual Framework 21 of Peace Studies in practice becomes an act of identification with those who have power in the international system. Eventually, peace research could turn into a force for maintenance of the status quo by providing the required knowledge for control, manipulation and integration of the system with the decision makers at the top. In theoretical terms, the peace researcher is trained in the ideology of internationalism. The objective is to achieve ‘negative peace’ and avoidance of conflict, as well as prevent the breakdown of the system. The agenda dominating peace research is to control the international system in order to prevent major breakdowns, and integration of the international system to make it more stable. This dilemma is evident in the way various conflicts within and between the Third World states are studied by peace and conflict- resolution researchers, be it the civil wars of Africa or the Indo- Pakistan conflict. These studies explore the roots, dimensions and resolution of conflicts with a certain bias in favour of international perspectives, often with an attempt to establish ‘negative peace’. Thus, the peculiar conditions and factors necessary to establish a just, stable and lasting peace in a particular conflict are overlooked. In other words, Peace Studies need to broaden its perspective by looking beyond the status quo–oriented perspectives if it is to be accepted as an objective and scientific field of inquiry. After the end of the Cold War, students of peace and conflict started to dream of a peaceful, prosperous and conflict-free world. There appeared to be a consensus between the leaders and masses alike about facing future challenges of security and peace by strengthening of international organizations at the global and regional levels and laying the foundations of a new world order. But the end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to conflict, as new and more complex conflicts emerged, specially in the former Communist countries. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was a dreadful blow to those who were dreaming of a new world order. The international alliance which eventually succeeded in forcing Iraq to vacate Kuwait showed the strength of the world community standing together against aggression. But it also pointed towards a future world dominated by a single superpower, which 22 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in seemed to be capable and willing to ignore the aspirations of other states and international organizations. Hence, the hopes of the peace research community about the prospects of sustainable peace being established in an integrated, multipolar world were quickly overcome by a new scepticism and a renewed focus on traditional research and advocacy efforts. It was feared that despite all the declarations of peace by world leaders and a strong universal craving for peace, the following decades were not going to be devoid of conflicts and the world would not come any closer to anageof Kant’s ‘eternal peace’, the vision of ‘stable peace’ or ‘positive peace’ conceived by Kenneth Boulding.13 Galtung declared that ‘peace workers’ should continue to pursue their goals either in research and education, or in campaigns and field work of the peace movements seeking to approximate the final destination of a global peace order incrementally, with occasional reversals.14 It is observed that the end of the Cold War brought new challenges for peace theorists and activists in the form of numerous conflicts across the globe. The post-Cold War period is characterized by the coming of age of the discipline of Peace Studies. It developed a perspective of its strengths, weaknesses, evolving issues, concerns and internal differentiation. A cluster of new theoretical and empirical works regarding the search for methods and techniques to resolve conflicts in a nonviolent manner evolved. A survey of all the major works appearing in Peace Studies after the end of the Cold War, with a focus on literature dealing with conflict resolution and peacemaking, provides no final or conclusive answers as to how can peace be achieved. At best, they provide preliminary and partial findings which can be explored further. There is a plethora of terms available in the literature such as reduction, termination, transformation, settlement, analysis and prevention of conflict in addition to the traditional terminology of conflict management. There is a feeling that conflicts are severe and intractable, and, therefore, a complete resolution of conflicts is extremely difficult.15 Theorists have conceptualized the notions of conflict in a variety of ways. Galtung connects peace with the reduction of violence (cure) and its avoidance (prevention). He considers violence to be Towards a Conceptual Framework 23 direct, structural, as well as a cultural phenomenon, and declares it to be a combination of attitudes/assumptions, behaviour, and contradiction/content.16 For him, conflicts are inextricably linked with the individual human being and his psychological and physical features. On the other hand, Louis Kriesberg dwells upon the different dynamics of ‘social conflicts’, which differ from each other due to the diversity of issues in contention, characteristics of the adversaries, relations between adversaries, the social context of the conflict, and the modes used in the struggle. For Kriesberg, values other than peace, such as freedom, justice, equality should also be emphasized in order to motivate individuals and groups in moving towards peace.17 Herbert C. Kelman regards the non-fulfilment or threat to the fulfilment of some basic psychological needs, such as identity, security, recognition, autonomy, self-esteem and the sense of justice, as the essential basis of conflict. Similarly, John Burton also attempted to establish a direct link between the basic human needs, such as identity, recognition, and survival with the outbreak of interstate and intrastate conflicts.18 The social–psychological perspectives on the prevalence of conflict as conceived by Herbert Kelman and John Burton appear to provide the most appropriate framework for our enquiry into the Indo-Pakistan conflict. As we shall see in the following chapters, conflict resolution and peace building between India and Pakistan require the fulfilment of fundamental social and psychological needs of groups, in addition to dispute settlement processes at various levels. Peace research has become a global activity involving various institutions, institutes, departments, groups and networks in all regions of the world. Therefore, it is essential to explore what its agenda is or may be, or how can it contribute to the attainment of its goals of a peaceful, secure and stable world. The creativity of peace research may not be held up by obstacles of administrative bureaucracy. New institutions can pay attention to how and in which sphere they can contribute, while older institutions should reassess their strategy and actions. Most of the peace research is centred in the US and Europe. In order for it to become more effective, it has to expand into Africa, Asia and Latin America. Additionally, women peace researchers can 24 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in play a critical role by focusing upon the roots of militarism, violence and other forms of peacelessness.19 Sometimes, it is suggested that peace researchers should engage in constructive and healthy dialogues amongst themselves. An element of positive challenge and competition can prove fruitful to growth of the discipline. Peace research must be at the crossroads of all disciplines so that it can draw on the knowledge of all disciplines and also receive criticism from them. It should try to define a vision of a peaceful world which would benefit from dialogue amongst all states, nations, cultures and groups, whether big or small, rich or poor. It must also be at the crossroads of peace education and action.20 It has also been argued that problem-solving peace research can become really effective when it adopts the mode of action research. Rapoport called it a ‘fusion’ of peace research and peace action.21 An example of such an endeavour would be the declaration of war as a criminal act. In this way, it could bring about a change in attitudes and perceptions. How far this can happen in South Asia remains a question. In this section, we have attempted to explore the origins and growth of different dimensions of the discipline of peace research. It is argued that the sub-field of peace research which was born at the height of the Cold War has flourished tremendously with passage of time, specially after the end of the Cold War. The ‘peace’ and ‘research’ agendas of peace research are constantly being redefined. There are efforts to strengthen the peace research community in all corners of the globe with the inclusion of erstwhile marginalized groups such as women. We have endeavoured to look at the relevant literature on various factors which underline the agenda for peace in South Asia. In the next section, we shall attempt to develop a theoretical understanding of the concept of peace a well as various efforts of peacemaking.

Theorizing Peace and Peace Building

In this section, we shall attempt to develop a theoretical understanding of the concepts of peace and peace building. We shall look at the peace literature to develop a perspective of the Towards a Conceptual Framework 25 meaning and approaches of peace and peace building. What do we understand by the notion of peace? What are the major theoretical approaches to peace? How can transformation from conflict to peace be achieved? How can reconciliation be achieved between conflicting groups? What is the contribution of diplomacy to peace building? In this context, we need to point to dissatisfaction with an understanding of peace as avoidance of war, rather than as contributing directly to harmony between communities and nations. The meaning, context, approaches and rewards of peace have been the focus of intense speculation and reflection across the dimensions of time and space. Philosophers, thinkers, mystics and leaders have given interpretations of peace focusing on the need for elimination of wars, protection of the existing social order, and the proper conduct of social and political life. Generally, peace is equated with the absence of war. Gray Cox presents a critique of mainstream approaches to the concept of peace.22 He argues that these definitions only point to what needs to be avoided, rather than what needs to be done. Hence, a fundamental principle of logic is negated when peace is defined by what it is not. Indeed, the mainstream thinking about peace includes the idiom of annihilation, because peace is considered to be absence of conflict. The idea is that conflict arises due to the violent and aggressive nature of human beings. Therefore, peace would ultimately mean extinction of humanity.23 This dissatisfaction with the existing theories and paradigms of peace has led to emergence of new concepts and interpretations. The search for a new paradigm of peace is considered tobe the greatest intellectual adventure of our time. The contemporary peace literature presents two paradigms: the Popular, and the Numinar paradigms. The Popular paradigms include those concepts which are predominant in interpretation of peace and have gained legitimacy over time. According to these paradigms, peace concepts are materialistic, international, and external. The materialistic aspect relates to the prosperity which is missing due to the absence of peace. Hence, attainment of peace is considered to be a step in the direction of prosperity. In this paradigm, efforts to develop a culture 26 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in of peace start at the interstate level, which points to the factor of internationality. Last, peace lies outside the individual. It does not result from interaction among individuals. Rather, it grows out of social structures and institutions.24 There are two major approaches to the concept of peace within the Popular paradigm. The ‘negative’ interpretation equates peace with the absence of conflict or war. There are some who have a more ‘positive’ view of peace, linking it to the creation of social justice. According to the ‘negative’ view of peace, it is seen ‘not in terms of any attributes of its own but in terms of what is taken to be its opposite, war’.25 For example, the discourse on the prospects for peace in South Asia refers to the termination of hostilities and resolution of disputes between India and Pakistan. The ‘positive’ view relates peace to existing social and political factors. They give primacy to structural violence over physical violence. Johan Galtung argues that structural violence affects human beings ‘so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations’.26 His interpretation focuses on macro-social structures having international and external features. The adoption of a macro-social approach to the concept of peace is the common denominator between the ‘positive’ and the ‘negative’ views. According to this approach, reorganization of the macro-social structures such as governments can be a critical factor in eliminating conflict from societies. Thus, de-institutionalization of war by governments and diverting resources to social reform and development will bring prosperity. Rinehart calls it the ‘trickle down peace dividend’.27 The Popular paradigm is fear-motivated, as human nature is considered to be aggressive, conflictual, and competitive. It has been argued that a kind of ‘pessimistic pragmatism’ dominates the Popular paradigm. The superpowers and their allies generally adopted this view in their policy agenda during the Cold War. The Numinar paradigm provides an alternative to the prevalent discourse on the idea of peace. This paradigm has a different social origin. The word numinar means a numinous existence that is beyond ordinary understanding. The difference between these Towards a Conceptual Framework 27 two paradigms relates to the difference between the ordinary and extraordinary experience. Here, peace is conceived in idealistic terms, as it does not relate to material aspects such as economic development and prosperity. The starting point for the attainment of peace is an individual. Peace first exists within an individual, later entering the domain of interactions between individuals. The emphasis is on interaction rather than social structures, even as it does not ignore the necessity of reforming social structures. This is where the external and internal dimensions come in. In Gray Cox’s words, ‘to make peace with people, we need to understand them. To understand them, we need to engage in a holistic and participatory research which treats social reality as structured in purposive, value- laden, institutional and non-axiomizable ways.’28 The Numinar paradigm features concepts like ‘oneness’, ‘tranquillity’, and ‘harmony’. It relates to the nature of relations between the individual and the larger ‘other’ such as God, society, nature, and the cosmos. This form of peace building emphasizes mediation between conflicting parties, as they listen to each other and resolve their differences. This leads to a micro-social approach to peace. People attain peace within them, which leads to a more harmonious relationship between individuals in the larger society. Beginning at the individual level, social reality is reconstructed through interactions. In the Numinar worldview, faith has primacy over fear as the motivating force. Human nature is not considered to be fundamentally flawed, aggressive, violent and conflictual. Similarly, the world is considered to be a place of opportunity for growth. There also exists a grey area between the two paradigms, as there are some concepts which do not completely fit into any of these approaches. For example, the works of Galtung or Gandhi fall in between the two paradigms. The Gandhian view falls closer to the Numinar paradigm as he talked about personal transformation through satyagraha. This personal transformation will then lead to the creation of a just and fair order.29 The two divergent approaches to the notion of peace offered by peace theorists assist us in developing a perspective on the nature and meaning of peace in South Asia. We can relate to the ‘positive view’ of peace provided in 28 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in the Popular Paradigms as the relevant conceptual framework for our enquiry in to conflict and peace between India and Pakistan. After the end of the Cold War, dozens of new conflicts erupted in the form of civil wars. There has been a reduction in interstate wars, but not elimination. In addition to interstate conflicts, there are more subtle forms of conflict, such as structural conflict. When societies are laden with structures of inequality, then individuals are subject to all forms of discrimination and violence.30 The rise of protracted intergroup conflicts led to the adoption of new innovative approaches of conflict resolution which attempted to deal with the complex issues of identity and freedom. De-escalation of conflicts is not an easy task as it involves bringing into play a variety of ethnic, political and economic factors. A conflict being less of an event and more of a process, de-escalation is a source of perpetuation of conflict. For example, the traditional approach to conflict resolution adopted by the UN in the outbreak of a violent intergroup conflict is to work towards the attainment of ceasefire. After the ceasefire is established, the UN deploys peacekeeping forces to maintain the ceasefire and put an end to hostilities. This shows the limitation of the traditional approaches to peacemaking, as peacekeeping is not necessarily a stepping stone to a successful project of peacemaking. What is needed is a linkage between these two processes, which is provided by peace building. Thus, peace building comprises a set of activities which are designed to improve the relationship between parties and to meet their primary needs so as to bring about de- escalation in the conflict.31 Johan Galtung provides a description of three approaches to peace building. According to Galtung, peacekeeping is the first step in the direction of peace, when a third party intervenes in the conflict to prevent the warring parties from engaging in violence with each other. This approach is useful in the case of a horizontal conflict. However, in a vertical conflict characterized by asymmetry of power between the two parties, peacekeeping can end up being counterproductive as it aims at maintaining the status quo in favour of the dominant party. This is followed by the peacemaking approach, which is an attempt to surpass the incompatibilities Towards a Conceptual Framework 29 that obstruct human progress. This approach also does not have the ability to go to the roots of structural violence, and serves to maintain the status quo. In other words, the integral role in this scenario is performed by the peace building approach. According to this approach, the causes of war are eliminated by creating structures of peace both within and between the nations. These structures are established by developing linkages between groups and parties on the basis of equality, leading to establishment of interdependence between them. In this way, peace building can be achieved through a process of social change that is quintessentially non-violent. The peace building approach aims at eventual transformation of societies and their relations, leading to development of attitudes of harmony in place of hatred and animosity. This sequencing of efforts and approaches towards the attainment of peace has recently come under criticism from new perspectives, such as the contingency model of third-party intervention presented by Fisher and Keashly.32 Their argument is based on the notion that the success of any intervention depends on the characteristics of the conflict at a given point, whether it is in escalatory orde- escalatory mode. A third party can assist in the beginning of the de- escalatory phase. In the early stages of the de-escalation of a conflict, strategies such as conciliation, consultation, and mediation can lead to reduction of hostility. Subsequently, peacekeeping forces can be deployed to maintain the ceasefire achieved in the previous phases. What distinguishes this approach from others is the emphasis that is placed on the contribution of peace building with its interactive and developmental forms. In this regard, external intervention works towards the removal of grievances harboured by all sides which are at the heart of conflict-resolution efforts. The conflict in Cyprus is an instance of the potential effectiveness of this approach. The UN peacekeeping forces were deployed in Cyprus in 1964 when communal relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots suffered a breakdown. Since then, the peacekeepers have engaged in numerous humanitarian and confidence-building activities in addition to their customary peacekeeping responsibilities, thereby highlighting the role of peacekeeping as a base for peace building initiatives. 30 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Peace research has developed an array of new and innovative approaches to peace building in the late twentieth century. New concepts such as economic development as well as political, economic and information equality have come up in the discourse on peace building. In addition to this, new actors in the form of NGOs have emerged striving to achieve peace.33 Which particular strategy is to be applied depends on the nature of the existing threat on the ground, as well as the attributes of that particular approach. At the beginning of the twentieth century, these strategies were couched in diplomacy and the balance-of-power system. In the aftermath of the First World War, the first international organization, in the form of the League of Nations (LON), was created with the sole objective of resolving conflicts peacefully so that wars could be avoided. In response to the weaknesses of the balance-of-power system, the Covenant of the LON highlighted new approaches to be used in the pursuit of peace, such as the principles of collective security and peaceful settlement of disputes and arms control and disarmament.34 After the end of the Second World War, the UN devised several new strategies which focused on the need for humanity to develop common policies in order to remove socio-economic inequality, which was considered to be responsible for the emergence of conflicts. Economic development, self-determination, non-violence, Track Two diplomacy and citizen diplomacy are some of the new tools used for peace building purposes.35 One of the new strategies adopted by the UN is peacekeeping. The two major principles included in the UN Charter are ‘collective security’ (Chapter VII), and ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ (Chapter VI). Peacekeeping was meant to bridge a perceived gap between the two principles. Not surprisingly, peacekeeping is sometimes declared to be Chapter VIΩ of the UN Charter. With passage of time, there has been a widening of the agenda of peacekeeping operations beyond their traditional roles of merely monitoring the ceasefire. Now, the peacekeepers are entrusted with responsibilities such as maintaining internal security conditions, monitoring elections, taking control of the civil administration, Towards a Conceptual Framework 31 verifying demobilization and demilitarization of forces, providing humanitarian relief to refugees and repatriating them, as well as working to bring about reconciliation between the warring parties.36 The UN operations in former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda provide illustrations of widening responsibilities of international peacekeepers. The UN peacekeepers were also deployed across the Indo-Pakistan border in the disputed region of Kashmir following the 1947–48 war between the two rivals. However, as we shall see later, that the UN has played an extremely limited role in mediating the conflict between India and Pakistan. Humanitarian intervention is another strategy that has increasingly been used by the UN in pursuit of peace. This phenomenon led to the formation of the United Nations Observer Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM). Some declare it to be interference in the internal affairs of a state. Others argue that the international community should use all methods in order to stop bloodshed in any conflict- prone region, even if it amounts to interference in the internal affairs of a state. The agenda of peacemaking and peace building is augmented by preventive diplomacy. It is defined as ‘action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed forceÖ by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change’.37 Different proposals are now being discussed to gauge the contribution of preventive diplomacy. It is argued that rise of new complex and intractable conflicts has led to introduction of new approaches and methods of peace building by the theoreticians and practitioners of peace. Reconciliation is a process which is initiated once a settlement has been reached between the warring sides, and structures are created to establish long-lasting peace between them. In this way, reconciliation could be considered a post-war reconstruction strategy. This approach is often overlooked in the literature on conflict resolution and peace building. The notion of reconciliation consists of elements of equality, trust, partnership, active friendship, and 32 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in acceptance of cultural and economic differences. Alice Ackerman provides a case study of the post-War Franco-German relationship as an example of application of the principle of reconciliation by the two sides.38 In addition to reconciliation, other political, economic and security interests influenced the process of rapprochement between the two sides. However, Germany and France did not adopt policies of reconciliation at the expense of the national interest. It is observed that in certain situations, reconciliation may not prevent the crisis, but can, nevertheless, facilitate communication between the warring parties. If reconciliation is followed by the development of strong economic, political, social, cultural, and security linkages, then these could act as powerful deterrents to the breakdown of the relationship. The Franco-German rapprochement through successful peace building after centuries of distrust is of particular relevance to our study of conflict between India and Pakistan. Reconciliation contributes to the healing of wounds in war- torn societies. It helps in establishment of stable peace between the former combatants as they attempt to move beyond violence and estrangement. Reconciliation in post-settlement peace building in civil wars is attempted at different levels and in various forms such as small encounter groups, creation of truth commissions, and apologies extended by leaders for their past crimes.39 John Paul Lederach adopts a more holistic approach, as he perceives reconciliation to be a system in itself. In his view, ‘reconciliation must be proactive in seeking to create an encounter where people can focus on their relationship and share their perceptions, feelings, and experiences with one another with the goal of creating new perceptions and a new shared experience’.40 This could mark a new beginning in the relationship between the previously hostile groups. Reconciliation is necessary to bury the past, because individuals and groups often transfer their memory of suffering, trauma and hatred to following generations. This factor is of particular interest to us, as Indo-Pakistan relations have been under the shadow of past bitterness for the last six decades. For peace to prevail in South Asia, similar processes of healing and reconciliation are required. In countries which are undergoing transition from dictatorship Towards a Conceptual Framework 33 to democracy, public truth telling has become a common practice, as was the case in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. In some countries such as Spain, a policy of collective amnesia has been adopted. In these situations, the political context is the biggest factor in determining the practice, consequences, and contributions of reconciliation. However, Charles Lerche provides a critique of these practices of reconciliation by arguing that there are crimes which can not and should not be forgiven. A good example is provided by the Argentinean group Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, which consistently rejected overtures of reconciliation offered by the Argentine Government unless an independent inquiry was conducted into the disappearance of thousands of people and perpetrators of the crimes were punished.41 In South Africa, on the abolition of apartheid, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established to try to remove the historical animosity between whites and blacks. However, critics argue that such efforts can only create false reconciliation. Important questions relating to reparations and forgiveness need to be delicately negotiated. Lerche argues that there are several limitations of the prevalent reconciliation approach.42 The scope of this framework is quite limited, because it focuses only on victims and aggressors. The link between organized political violence and crime is not explored. Similarly, the debate on reconciliation does not take into account widespread abuses conducted against women. A more proactive approach is needed to make reconciliation more effective as it focuses only on overt violence, not dwelling on structural violence. Thus, the agenda of conflict resolution can gain tremendously by improving the dynamics of the relationship between the parties through reconciliation. However, it appears that reconciliation as an approach to peace building in conflicts between and within societies needs to be further explored. While reconciliation as a tool needs further elaboration, diplomacy is the predominant method adopted by states and groups to settle their disputes in an amicable and non-violent manner. Traditionally, diplomacy was defined as the management of peaceful relations among states through negotiations between 34 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in their accredited representatives. This definition might appear to be dated. In the post-Cold War era, many changes have taken place in the global political, economic, and social systems, leading to the emergence of new definitions of diplomacy. The rising involvement of international organizations, NGOs and citizen networks in matters of war and peace has shed new light on diplomacy, leading some to label it ‘post-modern diplomacy’.43 Another innovation in the domain of diplomacy is the phenomenon of multi-track diplomacy, which has gradually assumed importance in the last five decades. Track Two and Three negotiations have become effective tools of conflict resolution and peace building. Modern diplomacy has undergone tremendous changes with the end of the Cold War. According to Marshall, numerous factors have influenced the rise of new diplomatic practices. These include greater economic interdependence between states, increased public interest and involvement in international affairs, greater demands for self-determination, and the increasing significance of issues pertaining to human rights. In addition to these demands, emergence of new threats to security relating to the environment, drugs, HIV/AIDS, transnational crime and terrorism, the impact of the information revolution, and the rising significance of non- state actors in international relations have also paved the way for maturation of new diplomatic norms. New definitions of diplomacy have emerged. It has been defined as ‘the mechanism of representation, communication, and negotiation through which states and other international actors conduct their business’.44 This new form of diplomacy entails growing participation of non-state actors, known as unofficial diplomacy, informal diplomacy, or Track Two diplomacy. The conceptual roots of Track Two diplomacy lie in the paradigms which make a distinction between diplomacy conducted through official and unofficial channels. Modern diplomacy has become too complicated to be confined to formal and official channels and institutions. However, official channels continue to be the most important avenues of diplomacy. Track One diplomacy involves official dialogues between representatives of different governments Towards a Conceptual Framework 35 reflecting their official positions. But the meetings organized by expert networks and NGOs have increasingly influenced the agendas of official diplomacy. In Track Two diplomacy, discussions are considered to be relatively open-minded, as governments are not supposed to be restricting the agendas of such negotiations. The rationale behind such activities is the hope for resolution of conflicts by appeal to goodwill and reason. John McDonald describes Track Two diplomacy as being ‘nongovernmental, informal and unofficial’.45 It involves interaction between private citizens or groups of people within a country or from different countries, all outside the formal governmental power structures. Track Two aims to ‘reduce or resolve the conflict by decreasing the anger, tension, and fear between peoples, by improving communication and understanding of the other side’s point of view’.46 Harold Saunders argues that citizens who participate in Track Two diplomacy engage in ‘policy-related, problem-solving dialogue’ which can also include discussions on ‘elements of the overall political relationship, solutions to arms control problems, resolution of regional conflicts, issues of trade policy, or other areas of competition’.47 This ‘shadow diplomacy’ attempts to provide a second line of communication between states, bridging the gap between official positions by engaging government officials in their private capacities.48 Theoretically, Track Two groups are created to influence the official policy by conducting studies and investigations for which governments had neither the time nor the initiative. In reality, the governments could actually sponsor Track Two activities to provide justification for their decisions and policies. Track Two diplomacy is formally considered to be independent, as it involves non-government experts who do not belong to any particular group. In reality, some Track Two groups are mere extensions of their respective governments.49 While Track Two diplomacy operates in an informal setting based on negotiations between former government officials and experts, Track Three diplomacy is often referred to as ‘citizen diplomacy’. It is defined as people-to-people diplomacy undertaken by both individuals and NGOs. Kraft argues that Track Three 36 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in diplomacy is rooted in the workings of ‘transnational advocacy networksÖorganized (across national borders) to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of (state) interests’.50 These groups emerge in situations where domestic channels for critical evaluation of official policies are absent. Thus, proponents of Track Three diplomacy claim that these processes provide a medium to those groups and communities which are alienated from a system demanding uncritical acceptance and adherence to the dominant discourse. These processes act as a means of communication between those activists who use ‘different international forums to get around the issue of domestic inaccessibility’.51 These processes lead to the growth and development of constituencies which provide alternatives to the official policies and question conventional practices and beliefs. Keck and Sikkink contend that these groups can pressurize other states to, in return, put pressure upon the targeted states.52 Kraft argues that as much as these processes are detached to the official channels of communication, these do fall in the domain of diplomacy.53 There are several factors which distinguish the Track Two and Three processes. While Track Two dialogues often involve government officials in their private capacities, participants of Track Three processes belong to non-governmental circles. These dialogues are based on perspectives which criticize the official policies by questioning the priorities and assumptions of the official decision- making circles. Track Three dialogues endeavour to shape the framework for debate which forms the basis of government policies. The ultimate objective of these dialogues is the promotion of social transformation. Indeed, the history of engagement of citizens’ groups around domestic and international issues predates the rise of Track Two diplomacy.54 The information revolution, specially the Internet, has provided new means of communication to these networks that otherwise suffered from scarcity of resources. Even though citizens’ groups have been operating before the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web, their numbers have multiplied in the last one Towards a Conceptual Framework 37 and half decades with innovations in information technology. Now almost every issue or area of importance in international politics, such as security, human rights and governance or global economy has benefitted from the rise of citizen networks. There are different opinions about the significance of these groups. According to some, the rising influence and power of the citizen networks can counter the hegemony of the global market forces and states. The international system, which has been dominated by nation states, is now witnessing ‘genuine democratic participation’ through these non-state groups and networks.55 As opposed to this, there are more sombre assessments of the effectiveness of citizen networks. It has been argued that with the explosive growth in the numbers of citizens’ groups due to the information revolution, the result could be ‘an endless gridlock’ on every major issue. For some conservative sceptics, these citizens’ groups usually end up advocating progressive positions. However, the positive linkages drawn between citizen groups and the rising democracy of the international system do not pay attention to the gulf between ‘information haves and have-nots’.56 Opinions about the effectiveness and contribution of citizens’ groups to the regional and international system might vary, but this phenomenon has certainly left a deep impact on modern diplomacy. In this study, we shall attempt to explore the practice of multi- track diplomacy in detail. We shall focus on the way Tracks One and Two have fallen short of meeting their agenda of conflict resolution and establishment of peace and the way it has led to the emergence of a dynamic process of Track Three diplomacy. There is a long history of official negotiations between India and Pakistan, which have often failed to resolve disputes between them. Not surprisingly, the number and significance of unofficial dialogues in the last two decades has increased tremendously in South Asia. We shall look into the development and contributions of the Track Two and Three dialogues during our enquiry into the processes of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. In this section, we have attempted to develop a theoretical understanding of the concept of peace, moving towards a 38 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in conceptual understanding of the processes of peace building and peacemaking. Attainment of peace in theoretical or practical terms is an arduous task. Peace theorists have come up with an array of definitions of the concept of peace. In this context, the ‘positive view’ of peace presented in the Popular Paradigm seems to present the most appropriate perspective for our study into the challenges of peace building in South Asia. Diplomacy lies at the heart of conflict resolution and peace building efforts. Modern diplomacy is complicated as it involves a large number of actors operating at official, non-official and popular levels. We propose to developa conceptual framework of modern diplomacy within which we can locate the meaning and challenges of peace building between India and Pakistan. The idea is to put our area of investigation inthe framework of a growing set of conceptual tools. In this regard, the macro-social approaches to peace, the notion of reconciliation, and the phenomenon of multi-track diplomacy are of particular relevance to us.

Peace Building across the Globe

In this section, we shall look at peace building efforts across the globe. Building peace within or between nations is a Herculean task. It needs the investment of economic, military, political and emotional resources. Earlier, we attempted to look at approaches to peace building in theoretical terms. We now turn to the actual practice of conflict resolution and peace building. We shall study both inter- and intrastate conflicts where peace building has been achieved, comprehend the roots of conflicts, the role played by various forces in the society and the contribution of external actors. This will facilitate us in developing an insight into the dynamics of peace building efforts with reference to our enquiry into the challenges of peace building in South Asia. Kampuchea [earlier Cambodia] provides a unique example of peace building in recent history where the international community collectively participated in the politico-economic restructuring of a fragmented state. In May 1993, elections were held in Kampuchea, Towards a Conceptual Framework 39 which marked a new beginning after decades of bloodshed and carnage. It had experienced war, massacres, the worst kind of ethnic cleansing, destruction and foreign invasion in the previous decades. It took years of multiparty negotiations and 15 months of peacekeeping by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) for Cambodians to vote in the momentous elections of 1993. It has not been a perfect transition from war to peace. Even after the elections, the country continued to suffer from violence, political infighting, attacks on minorities, and economic stagnation. Peace was perceived by different factions to be an opportunity to continue war by other means. The difficulties and challenges of peace building in Kampuchea relate to the complexity of this conflict. During the Vietnam War, Kampuchea faced massive bombings followed by the killing of more than one million Cambodians at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. In December 1978, in response to constant challenges by the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea and installed the Heng Samrin–Hun Sen regime. In response to these developments, three major resistance groups emerged on the scene, embodying the resistance of the Cambodian people to Vietnamese domination. These were Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s party National Union Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), Son Sann’s Khmer People’s National Front (KPNLF), and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK or the Khmer Rouge). All these groups, including the Heng Samrin– Hun Sen Government claimed, to be the legitimate government of Kampuchea. In 1982, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China persuaded the three resistances groups to join hands and form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The civil war in Kampuchea was a multidimensional phenomenon. Apart from being a civil war, it also had dimensions of an interstate conflict in the form of Vietnam occupying Kampuchea. The solution lay in the withdrawal of occupation forces. The Hun Sen regime and its international supporters, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, considered it to be a counter-insurgency war against a 40 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in genocidal opponent, the Khmer Rouge. The CGDK and its external supporters, such as ASEAN, the US and UN blamed Vietnam for occupying a sovereign country. Both the CGDK and the Hun Sen Government claimed to be the legitimate representatives of the Cambodian people. However, the international community faced difficulty in extending recognition to the government. The Hun Sen regime exercised control over 80 per cent of Kampuchea, but the UN extended recognition to the CGDK. The Cambodian civil war reads like another story of typical Cold War proxy conflicts. All the factions depended on the support of external backers, involved in a tussle with other external supporters. The US supported the republican forces, the Europeans supported FUNCINPEC, Russia supported the Hun Sen Government, and China supported the Khmer Rouge.57 This gives us an idea of the complexity ofthe situation in Kampuchea. In 1987, efforts for peace building gained real momentum. Regional actors like Indonesia and ASEAN spearheaded the peacemaking efforts. In July 1989, France organized the first Paris Peace Conference. As the Vietnamese forces began to withdraw from Kampuchea, the Cambodian factions disagreed with each other over plans for establishment of an interim quadripartite government in the country. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council drew up an all-inclusive peace plan, which envisaged a strong role for the UN in Kampuchea. In September 1990, at a meeting in Jakarta, the four factions of Kampuchea accepted this plan and announced the formation of a Supreme National Council (SNC). This was followed by 11 months of negotiations, which ultimately resulted in the signing of agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of Kampuchea on 23 October 1991. The Paris peace accord was a ground-breaking effort at political settlement in a war-torn society. This was the first time in the history of the UN that it was given the responsibility to lead the efforts of political and economic restructuring of a member state. The UN was entrusted with the task of helping to rebuild the legitimacy of the Cambodian state. Two institutions were established in line with the provisions of the peace accord, viz., the Supreme National Council (SNC), and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia Towards a Conceptual Framework 41

(UNTAC). There was going to be a transitional period starting from the signing of the agreement (23 October 1991) to the establishment of an elected sovereign government, which eventually happened in September 1993. In this period, the SNC, which had the four major Cambodian factions as its members, enjoyed legal sovereignty over Kampuchea. UNTAC was entrusted with the multidimensional task of protecting human rights, managing the civil administration, organizing elections, bringing hundreds of thousands of refugees back home, and facilitating economic rehabilitation. It created an opportunity for the ordinary Cambodians to participate in the running of the country. UNTAC might not have achieved all the objectives that it set out for itself in the beginning, but it did contribute to the return of peace to Kampuchea.58 The central role played by the international community in resolving the conflict in Kampuchea provides us an insight into the significance of external intervention. In Kampuchea, the conflicting groups eventually accepted the external pressure and agreed to a comprehensive political settlement. Later, we shall look at the phenomenon of external intervention in our investigation of the conflict in South Asia. In this context, we shall consider the current thaw between India and Pakistan in the wake of post-9/11 developments. How significant the contribution of external intervention is to the prevalence of war and peace between India and Pakistan is a crucial aspect of the present study. As compared to Kampuchea, which experienced a civil war within the same community, South Africa represented a case of conflict between two separate communities within the same country. The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed the incredible transformation of South Africa from a racist, oppressive, apartheid state to a democratic, pluralistic and inclusive one. This transformation was a result of the combined efforts of a large number of groups and organizations. The African National Congress (ANC) led by Nelson Mandela had waged a long struggle of resistance and defiance against the apartheid government. However, in the 1980s, a large number of NGOs became active in pursuit of their ideology of a non-violent struggle. This was the beginning of the end of the 42 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in apartheid regime in South Africa. The rise of NGOs advocating and agitating for a non-violent change in South Africa was a remarkable phenomenon in a country which was deeply polarized between the whites and the blacks. The battle lines were drawn along racial lines, as access to power and privileges depended upon one’s racial identity in the apartheid system. The brutal crushing of the Soweto uprising in 1976 showed how far South Africa was from the dream of a peaceful change. A state of Emergency was imposed in the country from 1986 to 1990, as the governing National Party resorted to oppressive tactics to maintain its dominance. On the other hand, the ANC, which had been banned in 1960, had reached the conclusion that passive resistance could not free South Africa from the shackles of apartheid. An armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was, thus, engaged in the armed struggle since the 1960s. At this point, it appeared that the communal conflict was sliding towards greater bloodshed. Two major techniques of resistance, viz., guerrilla warfare and non-violent resistance, did not appear to be very promising. The cause of peace and non-violence apparently delegitimized the resistance movement. The violent struggle enjoyed universal legitimacy as it aimed to topple the apartheid regime. UN Resolution 2396 of 1968 declared apartheid to be a ‘crime against humanity’. In such an unequal and oppressive system, the concept of peace was deeply interwoven with the idea of justice. In other words, peace meant not just the absence of violence, but a complete transformation of the society. That is how the concept of ‘peace with justice’ became popular.59 The movement to achieve ‘peace with justice’ was spearheaded by a network of NGOs which equated the attainment of peace with an end to structural violence at the heart of the apartheid system. In the 1980s, a consensus emerged amongst these groups that change was inevitable. At the centre of this initiative were the groups and organizations working to achieve the goal of a non- racial and pluralistic South African society. They formed non-racial democratic structures so as to provide a glimpse of the future for which they were struggling. These groups were engaged in various Towards a Conceptual Framework 43 efforts to provide alternative religious, educational, health, welfare and legal services. Various structures were established to facilitate or bring about conflict management and dispute resolution in South Africa, including the Centre for Intergroup Studies (CIS), now the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA), and the Quaker Peace Centre (QPC). Other organizations made efforts to present an objective account of the situation. This was the focus of activities of groups like the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). The main objective behind these activities was to promote an understanding of the existing situation which was missing at the time. These NGOs were made up of members of all racial groups who wanted to construct a free and inclusive South Africa. Many of these organizations were affiliated with the United Democratic Front (UDF), which included around 800 organizations and a membership of about three million people. The UDF developed a strategy in the mid-1980s to work towards the goal of creating a new society in South Africa. It also had secret links with the ANC and the South African Communist Party. It is interesting to see the involvement of progressive religious groups amongst the network of NGOs committed to the task of creating a new society in South Africa. The religiously motivated opposition to apartheid was provided by the Christian Institute (CI), the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC), and the South African Council of Churches (SACC). In the sphere of education, alternatives were provided by the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), the South African Committee for Higher Education (SACHED) and the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC). Alternatives to the South African health and welfare system were provided by the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA) and the Organization for Appropriate Social Services for South Africa (OASSA). In the legal system, some organizations like the Legal Resource Centre (LRC) attempted to protect the basic human rights of all South Africans even under the apartheid system. They also challenged the government’s legislation in courts. Some groups such as Five Freedoms Forum (FFF) and 44 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) attempted to provide an alternative to the apartheid political system.60 These non-governmental groups became active in the 1980s with the agenda of laying the foundations of a future non- racial democratic society in South Africa. As opposed to popular theories about the future of South Africa, the initiative of citizen- based mass movements projected the vision of a peaceful and multicultural South Africa before it actually happened. This is how a network of NGOs brought change in South Africa by getting rid of apartheid. The rise of citizen peace groups to bring an endto apartheid in South Africa points to a new trend in international politics. In South Africa, the citizen peace movement proved to be the biggest catalyst for end to the oppression and violence of the apartheid system. We shall look in detail at the rise and growth of citizen peace activism in South Asia during the course of our study. We can now take an example from a third continent in our pursuit of a comparative framework of conceptual orientation of peace movements. Guatemala is a Third World country, with a multi-ethnic and multicultural population. In the second half of the twentieth century, it was home to a vicious 36-year-long bloody civil war, which was finally ended by the 1996 peace accords. The troubles of Guatemala were deep, complicated and multidimensional owing to the history of Spanish colonization, the rise of authoritarian military governments, marginalization of the indigenous Maya peoples, and economic, ethnic, cultural, political and ideological polarization. The breakdown of political, ethnic and social relations led to the outbreak of bloody civil war resulting in the death of around 200,000 people. Guatemala has a poor record when it comes to various indices of socio-economic development, with 57 per cent of the people living in poverty in 2002. In terms of political development, Guatemala has travelled on a rocky path with a long history of authoritarian military rule in the country.61 Since the early 1960s, Guatemala was in the throes of guerrilla uprisings. At that time, some junior officers of military Guatemalan Army who had been trained by the US launched a rebellion in Towards a Conceptual Framework 45 eastern Guatemala, which continued for the next three decades. In the late 1970s, the indigenous population of the country started to extend support to two of the four guerrilla groups. Between 1980 and 1983, the army attempted to forcefully suppress the rebellion by adopting a scorched earth policy, which included massacres of civilian population in the north and north-west of Guatemala. This is known as the ‘holocaust period’ of Guatemalan history, when the army killed 200,000 people, suppressing the rebellions. Washington suspended military aid under President Jimmy Carter, as a reflection of embarrassment at the US-supported army’s awful human rights record. In 1983, economic aid to Guatemala was also cancelled by the US. By the end of the 1980s, the futility of continuing with the armed struggle dawned on both the army and the guerrilla groups, thus paving the way for starting the peace process. Initially, the external mediators and the Catholic Saint Egidio of the peace building community helped to start a dialogue process between the army, guerrillas and politicians. This dialogue was sustained with the help of local mediators and international observers. All of them attempted to develop some trust and confidence between the army and the guerrillas. The UN also became involved in the negotiations; however, the height of its involvement was the Mission of Verification of the United Nations for Guatemala (MINUGUA). The official negotiations between the two parties began in1994, facilitated by the UN and a group of countries called Friends of the Peace Process, which included Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the US and Venezuela. It sought to develop a consensus among the parties on the major issues of negotiations, such as human rights, amnesty, laying down of weapons, and an effective ceasefire. Following this, an agreement on human rights was reached which focused on reform of the judicial system. Subsequently, agreement on resettlement of the displaced and the rights of the indigenous people was reached. Next were the ambitious accords on alleviating poverty relating to socio-economic and agrarian problems. In 1995, a definitive ceasefire was reached as the guerrillas handed over their weapons to the UN. Constitutional reforms and referendum were 46 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in proposed at the time. The guerrilla front Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was accepted as a legitimate political party and was allowed to participate in Guatemalan politics. MINUGUA was entrusted with the task of supervising and overseeing the verification and implementation of the accord. Its tenure has been extended several times.62 A very important element of peace building in Guatemala was the establishment of the Commission for Historical Verification (CEH). An indigenous educator, Otilia Luz de Coti, and two lawyers, Christian Tomaschat from Germany and Guatemalan Alfredo Balsells Tojo, headed this commission. The law on National Reconciliation which had been passed before the signing of the accords limited the mandate of the CEH as the military and the guerrillas were exempted from prosecution. The main task of the CEH was not to pass judgements, but to rewrite the history of Guatemala so that those responsible for the disastrous civil war could be identified. The report of the CEH declared the concentration of economic and political power, the racist and discriminatory attitude of the elite towards the majority indigenous population, and the social and economic exclusion of Mayan and ladino to be the key sources of conflict in the country. The military’s actions were considered to be acts of genocide and it was blamed for 93 per cent of the 42,000 deaths that were investigated by the commission. Civil society played a vital role in building and sustaining peace in Guatemala. Foro Guatemala and Barometro are two of the groups actively engaged in efforts to bring about reconciliation in the society and promote constructive dialogues among different groups. Religious groups have also been very active in peace building efforts. Churches have tried to bridge the gaps existing between various groups by forming brotherhoods and sisterhoods. The Catholics, Evangelicals and Mayans have all provided networks of communication between groups in trying to heal the wounds of the society. Guatemala is still struggling with deep-rooted political and social problems, but the process of healing the wounds has started with the peace building efforts. The transition of Guatemala from conflict to peace provides us with valuable lessons in our quest to analyse the challenge of Towards a Conceptual Framework 47 peace building in South Asia. It is argued that foremost among the factors responsible for successful termination of conflict in Guatemala were the effective intervention of the international community and the rise of citizen peace groups. In the next chapters, we shall focus on the similar external and internal pressures faced by the governments in India and Pakistan to initiate the process of conflict resolution in the region. We can now turn to a region which has been a conflict zone for the last six decades. In the Middle East, the September 1978 Camp David Peace Accords resulted in a landmark peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. It stands out as a unique instance of conflict termination. Extremely hostile and tense relations existed between the two states since the establishment of Israel in 1948. Egyptians considered Israel to be ‘the illegitimate Zionist enemy’ which had caused suffering and dispossession to the Palestinian people. Israeli involvement in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 further intensified their hostility. However, the June 1967 war proved to be a turning point as it resulted in Israel occupying the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. These were the first major losses for Egypt and Syria, demonstrating to them the cost of supporting the Palestinian people. At this point, Israel had no incentive to enter into negotiations with the Arabs. The USA and Soviet Union did not show an avid interest in peace building in the Middle East for various reasons. In 1972, President Sadat expelled the Soviet advisers based in his country. This marked a significant change in the Egyptian foreign policy, as it decided to turn towards the USA.63 The real impetus to peace building in the Middle East was provided by the 1973 Arab- Israeli war. The US began to feel the need for peace in the region after the Arab imposition of an embargo on the supply of oil to Western countries. In the aftermath of the 1973 war, different agreements relating to the disengagement of forces were reached between Egypt, Syria and Israel. The first step towards conflict resolution was the 1975 Geneva Conference mediated by the US and Soviet Union. This initiative collapsed due to wrangling over issues of Palestinian representation and the future 48 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in status of Palestinian territories under Israeli occupation. President Carter of the US started a new initiative for peace in the Middle East in 1977. The May 1977 elections brought the Likud Party led by Menachem Begin to power in Israel. At this point, President Sadat was interested in developing an understanding with the Israelis. The Israeli prime minister was apprehensive of growing links between Egypt and the US, and wanted to enter into some settlement so as to continue the close relationship with the latter. Momentum for peace was generated by the visits of Sadat and Begin across the border in 1977. The US intensified the peace building efforts in the region and extended an invitation to Sadat and Begin for a summit meeting at Camp David.64 At the beginning of the Camp David negotiations, two controversial issues emerged which spoiled the early part of the summit. They related to the role of the US in the negotiations, and the format of the summit. The Egyptians wanted the US to be present in the negotiations as a full partner. On the other hand, the Israelis wanted the US to perform a limited role of mediation. The second controversy related to the format of the negotiations. President Carter believed that high-profile, secluded negotiations provided the best format for successful negotiation of the disputes. However, his advisers argued that the much-hyped atmosphere was putting too much pressure on the parties. Thirteen days of difficult negotiations eventually resulted in the signing of a historic peace accord between Egypt and Israel on 18 September 1978. The Camp David Summit would not have succeeded in bringing an end to Egyptian-Israeli antagonism without the personal involvement of President Carter.65 Thus, the Camp David Peace Accords provide us with some interesting observations. These accords marked the beginning of a new relationship between two states after decades of intense hostility. The peace building efforts originated in realization of the futility of continuing with hostility on the part of the leadership in both countries, specially Egypt. The most critical factor was the involvement of the US. The US’s close relations with both parties enabled it to pressurize them to settle their disputes. An interesting contrast in this regard can be observed between democratic Israel Towards a Conceptual Framework 49 and authoritarian Egypt. President Sadat had a monopoly over decision making in Egypt, which was used to full advantage by the US. Last, the significance of personalities in diplomacy cannot be underestimated. It was the close personal rapport between Presidents Carter and Sadat which helped bring about a successful end to the negotiations. The Egyptian–Israeli rapprochement provides valuable parallels with the situation in South Asia. Both are instances of extreme hostility between two states over long periods of time. Here, the role of external intervention becomes principally important. The US, having the resources and credibility, fully pursued the objective of peacemaking between Israel and Egypt. In this context, we shall pay great attention to the role of third-party mediation in our study of the conflict between India and Pakistan. In this section, we have attempted to gain an understanding of the dynamics of the peace building process by looking at instances of successful transition from conflict to peace. In this context, Kampuchea, South Africa, Guatemala and the Middle East were the focal points of our study. It is argued that there are several common factors which played a decisive role in bringing an end to these conflicts. The phenomenon of external intervention appears to have played a critical part in all of these examples. There were different forms, levels and instruments of external mediation, but they significantly affected the processes of reconciliation and rapprochement. In some cases, it was the intervention of a superpower like the US which broke the impasse between the conflicting parties. In others, it was the UN and its peacekeeping missions which participated in the signing and implementation of the peace accords. Citizen peace initiatives appear to be another key factor in successful peace building in the above-mentioned examples. This is especially true in the cases of South Africa and Guatemala. In both these conflicts, citizen groups and NGOs came to the forefront of the peace movement, putting pressure upon the leadership to take steps towards conflict resolution. There was an element of weariness in all these cases, as the parties realized the futility of continuing with these conflicts. These observations assist us in delineating a framework of peace building for South Asia. In our study of the 50 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Indo-Pakistan conflict, we shall look at the phenomenon of external intervention and citizen peace activism. The external and internal pressures upon the Indo-Pakistani governments to re-evaluate long- held policies of confrontation will be analysed in detail.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have attempted to develop a conceptual and comparative perspective on conflict resolution and peace building to assist us in our enquiry into conflict and peace between India and Pakistan. We relied upon the conceptual contributions made by peace theorists in the relatively new discipline of Peace Studies. We also conducted a comparative study of the process of conflict resolution and peace building in four different regions of the world. These theoretical and comparative observations can help us in delineating a framework of analysis for our study of the conflict in South Asia. We conducted a brief survey of the origins and evolution of peace research as well as the conceptual and methodological growth of Peace Studies in the last five decades, with emphasis on post-Cold War developments. We looked into the patterns of conceptualization of conflict resolution and peace building processes. We studied the contribution and effectiveness of reconciliation and diplomacy as instruments of conflict resolution and peace building. The macro-social approaches to the study of conflict which underline the non-fulfilment of basic needs such as identity, security, autonomy, and freedom as the basis of intra- and interstate conflict appear to provide pertinent conceptual perspectives in our quest to explore the roots of conflict between India and Pakistan. Similarly, the ‘positive peace’ perspective with its emphasis on construction of structures of peace and development of linkages between conflicting groups provides a suitable paradigm to explore the potential of peace building in South Asia. The comparative study of peace building in four conflicts discussed above presents important lessons for analysis of the regional conflict. In this regard, we shall examine in detail the contribution of multi-track diplomacy as a key instrument of peacemaking between India and Pakistan. The emergence of Towards a Conceptual Framework 51 institutionalized linkages between citizens across the divide creating the space for peace, as was the case in South Africa and Guatemala, will also be analysed in detail during the course of our study. Chapter III Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we discussed various concepts, interpretations and trends of peace research to develop a theoretical and comparative perspective on the process of conflict resolution and peace building. We aimed at developing a framework of analysis to guide our research into the dynamics of conflict and peace between India and Pakistan. This prepared us to now look into the various dimensions of conflict and conflict resolution in South Asia. This approach is in line with the new discourses of International Relations (IR) which give due emphasis to the regional systems. What are the new concepts of regional security systems and regional integration? How do these theoretical developments apply to the South Asian region? The biggest example of interstate rivalry in the region is the Indo-Pakistan hostility. We shall endeavour to develop an understanding of the roots, sources and dimensions of this rivalry at various levels. This insight into the nature of conflict between India and Pakistan can facilitate our search for possible avenues of conflict resolution between them. It is only pertinent that after dwelling on the discourse on conflict, we turn to the study of conflict resolution. We want to explore what the different channels of conflict resolution that have been employed by the two states are to find a solution to their conflict. We shall study in detail different successful and not-so-successful channels of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. This will underscore our subsequent study of diplomacy, including citizen diplomacy as it has operated in recent years. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 53

Conceptualizing the Conflict in South Asia

In this section, an effort will be made to conceptualize the conflict in South Asia. We shall attempt to understand various conflicts in line with the emergence of new discourses inIR relating to regionalism. We shall dwell on the study of concepts like regionalism, regional security systems, regional rivalry and regional security organizations and relate them to South Asia. We shall address the question whether the Indo-Pakistan conflict can be considered a regional conflict, or it is an instance of bilateral conflict. In this context, we shall compare the traditional and revisionist discourses on conflicts in South Asia. The idea is to develop a conceptual understanding of various dimensions of conflict between India and Pakistan. The end of the Cold War proved to be a watershed inthe process of changing global paradigms of IR. During the 1990s, the international system moved from bipolarity to unipolarity. The IR literature also reflected this change by shifting the focus away from globalism to regionalism, as there emerged a perceived discontinuity between the global and regional systems. The global powers did not appear to be very keen on attempting to intervene in the regional systems, which meant greater responsibilities as well as freedom for members of regional communities. The post-Cold War era has also witnessed more active participation in matters of war and peace by global and regional organizations such as the UN and NATO. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his famous report Agenda for Peace, emphasized the increasing responsibility put on regional organizations to bring peace and stability to their respective regions.66 Defining a region has not been an easy task as there areno definitions of regions available in literature on which widespread consensus prevails. Joseph Nye argues that there are no absolute or well-defined regions.67 Relevant geographical boundaries vary with different purposes. One region defined in a military-strategic context may not be a suitable unit in economic terms. Barry Buzan defines the regional system in terms of Regional Security Complexes 54 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

(RSCs), as ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently close that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another’.68 This definition broke away from some essential elements of traditional IR such as balance of power and the sovereignty of nation states. The new approach declared RSC to be ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization or both are interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’.69 The term RSC was applied generally to ‘a cluster of nation states within which security interdependence is relatively more intense inside it than across its boundaries’.70 In other words, securitization and de-securitization of states in the international system appear in the form of regional clusters. In an RSC, security interdependence is established between the constituent units of the region. Threats travel in an easy manner over shorter distances as compared to longer ones. States perceive threats emanating from their own RSC to be greater than those perceived from outside it. Even if global powers penetrate these RSCs, a substantial degree of autonomy is still enjoyed by these states. Buzan identifies four levels (domestic, regional, interregional, and global) at which a security structure operates, and two forms of security interdependence: positive interaction, and negative intervention. Positive interaction would amount to the formation of a regional security community, while negative intervention would be conflict between members of the same RSC.71 The focal point of analysis is the region. All elements of power polarity, discourses of enmity and amity are studied at the regional level in order to understand new trends and predict future patterns. The only exception is when a region is completely dominated by foreign powers, such as under colonialism or during the Cold War. Buzan argues that the regional level is most relevant in considering the security situation in the aftermath of the Cold War.72 In an RSC, the relations of power, amity, enmity and alliances emerge as a result of multiple historic, political and material conditions. However, this does not mean that these historical, political and material perspectives can provide an understanding of the regional complex Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 55 on their own. The actual security structure, formed by interplay of domestic, regional, interregional and global factors, defines what an RSC really is. During the Cold War, Asia consisted of three RSCs: North-East, South-East, and South Asia. In the first two, politics was completely overshadowed by the events of the Cold War, while the third region, South Asia, was influenced by its own regional security dynamics. As other RSCs in Asia benefited from the withdrawal of the superpowers at the end of the Cold War, South Asia retained its traditional characteristics. India persisted with its efforts to gain recognition as a great power at the global level, while still facing the challenge from Pakistan within the region.73 The IR literature is dominated by the issues of war and peace. The term ‘rivalry’ has been used extensively in literature but rarely defined properly. During the Cold War, terms such as ‘East-West rivalry’ were often used, equating rivalry with competition. Kuenne argued that what distinguishes rivalry from competition was the non-anonymity of the actors involved, who knew what the impact of their actions would be on their rivals.74 It has been argued that enmity involves two or more actors who consider each other to be a threat to their welfare. Accordingly, there are three types of enemies: social enemies, who harbour ill-feelings towards each other; political enemies, who oppose each other’s power aspirations; and military enemies, in the form of states who are hostile to each other, occasionally resorting to war. Hence, rivals at international level do not just compete with each other, but also view each other as enemies. Rivalry is defined to be a competition over tangible or intangible scarce goods which are perceived in a zero-sum context. It is argued that ‘a rivalry relationship is a militarized competition between the same two states over a given period of time’.75 Thus, it can be observed that militarized disputes are a critical component of interstate rivalry. The psychological aspect of interstate rivalry is highlighted by the definition of interstate rivalry as ‘a relationship characterized by extreme competition, and usually psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are governed primarily by their attitude towards each other rather than by the stakes at hand’.76 56 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Regarding interstate rivalry, D. Scott Bennett emphasizes that:

Two states disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time, leading them to commit substantial resources (military, economic or diplomatic) towards opposing each other, and in which relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges to the disputed status quo are made by one or both of the states.77

Thus, we can observe that interstate rivalry is a dyadic relationship between states which disagree with each other on certain issues. They are preoccupied by relative gains and losses, viewing each other as security threats. In this regard, they tend to militarize their relations. As a reflection of conceptualization of regionalism and interstate rivalry, regional rivalry has gradually gained significance in the theoretical literature on war and peace in international relations. McGinnis defines regional rivalry as ‘two states engaged in a long-standing competition over regional issues that could easily go to war’.78 Examples cited in this regard include Greece–Turkey, Ethiopia–Somalia, India–Pakistan, Iran–Iraq and North–South Koreas. McGinnis’s analysis was more in line with the view prevailing during the Cold War, in which regional factors were de-emphasized. According to the relatively more comprehensive definitions of Clermont, ‘regional rivalry is a spatial, positional or ideational competition between two states of the same (regional) security complex, who perceive each other as threats to their national security and largely determine their foreign and defense policies against one another’.79 The term ‘spatial’ refers to competition over resources, territory, waterways, fishing zones and trade routes, and amply applies to Indo-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir. Positional rivalries include the struggle between states for political–military influence and increased relative power in the RSC. The notion of ideational rivalry refers to ideological competition between two states that are driven by conflicting perceptions of their national identities. A case in point is the China–Taiwan rivalry. Three dimensions of regional rivalry have been identified by Clermont: political, military, and intersubjective, with the economic dimension being a possibility.80 Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 57

Regional rivalries are political in nature, as these are competitions between rival governments which adopt various policies in line with their objectives against each other. These rivalries are also expressed in military terms, especially hostile military doctrines against each other. These rivalries are intersubjective as they are socially constructed. In addition to the political and military dimensions, there is the psychological dimension, whereby an image of an enemy between the two states is created. After defining the notion of regional rivalry, we now look at the instances of regional conflicts. In any given regional setting, a number of conflicts arise: intrastate, that involve different groups in conflict within a state; intramural, between the member states; external, involving those states that are not members of a regional arrangement; and extra-regional, involving actors lying outside the regional setting.81 In the post-Cold War era, 16 regional conflicts were observed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project. These include the conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus, Palestine, the Gulf region, the Kurdish conflict complex, East Africa, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, Sahel region in West Africa, Indo- China, South Asia, Central Asia, and Central America.82 Several peace agreements signed in recent times belonged to these regions (including Latin America) where these agreements were supportive of each other. Wallensteen identifies two approaches to the resolution of regional conflict complexes: the conflict by conflict approach; and a bolder most difficult conflict first approach.83 In the post-Cold War era, regional organizations played a role in solving conflicts within an RSC. A regional security organization is defined as a formal intergovernmental organization among geographically proximate states in a distinctly defined region. One of the fundamental responsibilities of such a regional organization is considered to be maintenance of peace and security in the region. Not all the states of the region are necessarily members of such an organization. However, the effectiveness of the contribution of such an entity depends on the willingness of the members.84 The regional security organization can play its role in line with three well-defined objectives, i.e. conflict prevention, conflict 58 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in containment, and conflict termination. In the realm of conflict prevention, the organization attempts to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and the overt use of force by a state or group of states applying the strategies of socialization, integration, reassurance, and deterrence.85 To contain a conflict, the organization aims to deny victory to the aggressor by stopping it from achieving its goals and by persuading it to undo its actions. Conflict is also contained by preventing it from spilling over into other countries. The strategies of isolation and containment can be most helpful in this regard. In the process of conflict settlement, an agreement is reached to stop the use of violence. Attention is given to the more immediate sources of conflict. From conflict settlement, there is movement forward to remove the sources of conflict in a grand effort at conflict resolution. This process involves two major strategies: intermediation, whereby the regional security organization can facilitate the use of regional and global mechanisms to attain a peaceful solution to the conflict; and internationalization, when the regional organization feels incapacitated at playing an effective role, and turns to the strategy of appealing to the international community.86 In spite of presence of multiple forms of commonalities such as a shared colonial legacy, existing religious, linguistic and ethnic linkages, South Asia is home to one of the most intricate rivalries in recent times. Unlike so many other regions of the world, it failed to reap the post-Cold War peace dividend due to the persistent confrontation between India and Pakistan. In the geopolitical dynamics of this RSC, India enjoys a dominant position due to its location, size, access to natural resources, and the size of its economy. India shares land or maritime boundaries with all the other members of this regional complex, while no other countries have common boundaries except being located across the ocean. This geographical centrality is also used by India to put forward claims of its regional dominance, which are resisted and resented by other countries, especially Pakistan. The 1998 nuclear tests added a deadly dimension to this conflict. While other regions of the world have devised their own regional mechanisms in the form of regional security organizations to deal with issues of war and peace, South Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 59

Asia seems to lag behind. Not surprisingly, the citizens of South Asian states are most adversely affected by this geopolitical scenario in terms of economic development.87 In addition to the interstate conflicts, the multi-ethnic societies of South Asia are torn apart by internal divisions along religious, communal, ethnic, linguistic, ideological and sectarian lines. Some of these, such as the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, rank among the most violent in the world. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war is a rare example of internal strife being transformed into an interstate war. Unlike other regions, the governments of South Asia have resisted international peacemaking efforts to find a solution to their conflicts. The national investment in violence is far greater as compared to that in peace. Some of these are the most protracted conflicts in the world, such as the Kashmir issue and the Nagaland problem in the Indian north- east. Due to geographical proximity and interdependent politico- strategic relations of states, conflicts often tend to acquire regional dimensions. 88 The standard discourse on Indo-Pakistan hostility considers it a given. It focuses on the emergence of competing Hindu-Muslim nationalisms preceding Partition, wars between India and Pakistan after 1947, and the Kashmir dispute as factors which give a sense of inevitability to the Indo-Pakistan conflict. However, the revisionist view challenges the assumptions of this discourse by pointing to several instances in which the two key members of the South Asian RSC were able to settle their problems in a peaceful manner. One is the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. Similarly, the attempts of the BJP Government under Vajpayee to negotiate contentious issues with Pakistan point to opportunities for a peaceful resolution of conflicts. Indeed, Mitra considers Indo-Pakistan relations to bea tale of missed opportunities for peace.89 The end of the Cold War brought in its wake significant changes in the politics of different regional complexes such as Europe, North-East and South-East Asia, and Latin America. However, South Asia remained largely unaffected with regard to Indo-Pakistan relations in the South Asian RSC. Otherwise, examples of improved relations include India–Bangladesh, India–Nepal and India–Sri 60 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Lanka relations. In the case of India and Pakistan, a crucial factor is the differing levels of their identification and commitment with the region. While other regions such as South-East Asia and Europe made significant progress towards the goal of regional integration, India and Pakistan have a rather cold response towards the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India joined SAARC in order to prevent the emergence of an anti-India bloc within its fold. Pakistan did not want India to dominate SAARC, thus followed suit.90 There is a marked difference in the regionalist component of the strategic discourse of both India and Pakistan. As opposed to India, Pakistan had to struggle to identify itself with the South Asian region after it opted out of British India in 1947. This crisis of identity was accentuated after the emergence of Bangladesh. Before 1971, even in the absence of a regional organization such as SAARC, Pakistan had showed commitment to its South Asian regional identity. When the events of 1971 determined India’s place as the dominant power in South Asia, Pakistan turned to other regions such as south-west Asia and Central Asia. Pakistan’s disenchantment was reflected in a loss of interest in maintaining cordial relations with Nepal and Sri Lanka. The geographical disconnect certainly did not help in this regard.91 Indeed, Pakistan always turned towards extra-regional powers in its quest to establish parity with its eastern neighbour, which was deeply resented by India. The US was the traditional supporter of Pakistan, even as it left the latter when it lost interest in the South Asian RSC. Hence, like other regional hegemons, India wants to adopt a regional and bilateral approach in its dealings with other South Asian states. The Vajpayee Government’s invitation to President Musharraf to visit India in 2001 reflected its desire to prevent the US from playing a more active role in bringing about rapprochement between the two. Globalization and expanded trading zones are the new forces which seek to transform the regional approach of South Asian countries. In spite of changes elsewhere in the world, the performance of SAARC as a trading zone has been dismal. The intra-regional trading exchanges in South Asia as a ratio of global Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 61 regional exchanges have been very low. Trade in areas like water, energy and information technology can prove very fruitful for South Asia, which can also facilitate an easing of tensions in the military, strategic, diplomatic and political spheres. An example of this is provided by the positive contribution of the so-called ‘pipeline diplomacy’ in Central Asia involving Turkmenistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Clearly, the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have not come out of the shadows of the Cold War, as various other states have markedly improved their ties with each other. The disparity in the regional doctrines of India and Pakistan reflects the weakness of the regionalist component of the national visions of India and Pakistan.92 Mitra points to the gap between the self-perception of India and its perception by other members of RSC.93 India increasingly wants to project itself as a global superpower like neighbouring China, while other countries of the region shy of it. For India to succeed in its quest for great-power status, it needs to solve its problems in the South Asian RSC. But to date, Indian strategic thinking has shied away from taking any steps to overcome the conceptual disarray visible in its strategic discourse and develop a clear-cut strategic vision for itself. The end of the Cold War rekindled interest in regionalism and regional security systems. New concepts like RSC have gained currency in the mainstream discourses of IR. New themes such as regional rivalry and regional security organizations have come under renewed inspection. As trends of regional cooperation emerge in different regional systems, South Asia remains relatively unaffected. Indo-Pakistan relations are still characterized by mistrust, apprehension, and hostility, even as bilateral relations in the region have improved considerably. We need to examine different sources and dimensions of Indo-Pakistan rivalry in detail.

Indo-Pakistan Relations: A Dichotomous Model

In this section, we shall try to explore various dynamics of Indo-Pakistan rivalry. We shall begin our enquiry by defining Indo- Pakistan relations in theoretical terms. We shall then take a historical 62 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in overview of conflicts between the two countries, looking into the key sources of dispute, such as the Kashmir issue. In this regard, we shall attempt to develop a broader perspective of Indo-Pakistan rivalry by exploring the psychological and perceptual divergence between the two countries. Insight into the roots of conflict in South Asia can assist us in finding ways of conflict resolution in the region. In Racine’s words:

A bloodbath of secession in the name of the Partition of the Indian Empire, four wars in fifty years, the intractable question of Kashmir, a climate of suspicion and continual accusation: the history of relations between Pakistan and India is a history of failure.94

The Indo-Pakistan conflict is considered to be one of the most intractable conflicts in the world. The end of the Cold War did not lead to a conflict-free world. There were 34 armed conflicts in the world in 2001, most of them civil wars which claimed over one thousand lives. Coleman defines conflict as an experience of incompatible activities, goals, claims, beliefs, values, wishes, actions and feelings, and intractable conflicts as being ‘recalcitrant, intense, deadlocked and extremely difficult to resolve’.95 He uses the terminology of ‘protracted intractable conflicts’ to describe those conflicts which defy the usual techniques of conflict resolution.96 Numerous factors such as the particular context, issues, relationships, processes and outcomes of the conflicts interact with each other in line with the ‘principle of circular causality’ to render a conflict intractable and protracted.97 The Indo-Pakistan conflict can be considered a glaring example of protracted and intractable conflicts. Stephen Cohen considers the Indo-Pakistan conflicts, like most of the other intractable conflicts of the world, as a paired minority conflict.98 In these conflicts, the perceptions held by groups believing themselves to be a besieged, threatened minority fuel the sentiments of anger, hostility, fear and distrust of the other side, even though the political, economic and demographic realities might be completely different. These types of conflicts are typically found within states, such as the Tamil–Sinhalese conflict of Sri Lanka. The Arab-Israel conflict, the Iran-Iraq dichotomy and Indo-Pakistan rivalry are Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 63 examples of such conflicts at the interstate level. These conflicts are characterized by an intense level of mistrust between the two sides. This disallows concessions to the other sides which could be perceived as a sign of weakness. In typical paired minority conflicts, the moral element is a significant part of the equation because each side believes its claim to be the just one, thus lending a semblance of legitimacy to these conflicts. India and Pakistan share a mutually hostile and distrustful profile of the other. A deep sense of insecurity prevails onboth sides. This might appear to be slightly paradoxical in the case of India, which is seven times more populous and five times bigger in size and which dealt Pakistan a severe blow in 1971. The first generation of leaders such as Nehru and Jinnah did not believe that a conflict was imminent between the two countries. The Indian leaders assumed that Pakistan would not be able to maintain its existence as an independent entity for long. Thus, there was no need to initiate a conflict with a soon-to-fail state. Jinnah, in many of his speeches, expressed his hope of establishment of stable and normal relations between the two countries having considerable numbers of Hindus and Muslims as minorities on both sides, which could turn into hostages to their respective states. In the 1950s, both sides made some important agreements with each other regarding trade, transit, hotlines and other confidence-building measures (CBMs). This process was halted due to the two traumas, i.e. the Indian defeat at the hands of China in 1962, and the dismemberment of Pakistan by India in 1971. As a consequence, both countries hesitate in adopting a posture of accommodation towards the other fearing the wrath of their peoples. Both in India and Pakistan, the traumas of 1962 and 1971 led the leadership to resort to policies of militarization, including the nuclear option. There is a shared tendency on the Indian and Pakistani sides to pick selective discourses from each other’s traditions and religions proving their jingoistic attitudes about the other. Opposite views of history and civilization prevail on both sides. Pakistanis believe the entry of Islam in South Asia to be the start of a process of emancipation of the peoples of the Indian subcontinent. Indians 64 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in blame it for weakening the superior Indian civilization. Pakistan’s policy of forming alliances with the global powers such as the US did not go down well with the Indians. The nature of the Pakistani state with its multiple problems such as authoritarianism, limited cultural and civilizational inheritance, ethnic and economic problems and reliance on foreign aid is viewed as a threat to India. The paranoia about the ‘other’ is even deeper on the Pakistani side. The post-Independence leadership of Pakistan believed that India never accepted its existence as a separate independent country and had all the designs to reverse Partition. This fear gained credence in the aftermath of 1971. Pakistan’s dilemma is similar to that of Israel, as both states were created by groups which felt a sense of insecurity living as minorities. Indians argue that the anti-India sentiment in Pakistan is necessary to keep its major ethno-linguistic groups unified.99 Kashmir has emerged as a symbol of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. After Partition, these two countries have fought two of their three wars over Kashmir, i.e. the 1947–48 and the 1965 war. Kargil was the scene of a limited war in 1999, fought by the two adversaries, again pertaining to the Kashmir dispute. India and Pakistan have made claims over the entire state of Jammu & Kashmir, but the real bone of contention is the valley of Kashmir. The Valley is under Indian control since the 1947–48 war, while Pakistan has attempted to reverse the status quo.100 The origins of the Kashmir dispute lie in the ambiguities and flaws of transfer of power by the British and the tragic events of Partition itself. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 had, in theory, left the states legally independent. The princely states had to choose between India and Pakistan. According to the 1941 Census, out of the total population of Kashmir at 4,021,616, Muslims accounted for 3,100,000 as compared to 809,000 Hindus. The crisis ensued in Kashmir when the Muslims started a rebellion against the Maharaja in which they were soon joined by the tribesmen of NWFP. Prompted by Secretary for Princely States in India V. P. Menon, the Maharaja joined India on 26 October 1947. This was followed by the entry of the Indian troops in the state to suppress the uprising, which led to the first Indo-Pakistan war. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 65

By the end of the year, there was a stalemate in the war and India took the matter to the UN. Gowher Rizvi argues that in the 1950s India and Pakistan had come closer to reaching some settlement of the Kashmir issue, but differences crept in due to the joining of US-sponsored security alliances by Pakistan.101 In 1965, Pakistan attempted to take Kashmir by force by launching Operation Gibraltar, misperceiving India to be in a position of vulnerability due to the humiliation in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 as well as the rise of an apparently weak leader Shastri, after Nehru. A stalemate over Kashmir persisted in the 1970s and 1980s, which ended with the beginning of the armed insurgency in Kashmir in 1989. During this time, two other related issues of conflict erupted between India and Pakistan: the Siachen Glacier dispute, which reached its climax in November 1984 when India deployed its battalion to make territorial gains to which Pakistan responded by sending its own forces; and the Wular Lake dispute, in which India decided to construct a barrage at River Jhelum in order to improve water facilities in Kashmir, thereby gaining strategic control over water flow to Pakistan. This remains an irritant between the two countries.102 In Kashmir, the situation deteriorated with the constant intervention of Delhi in the affairs of the state, the high point of which was the rigging of the 1987 elections.103 This was the beginning of an uprising in Indian-held Kashmir. This movement was in response to serious violations of the fundamental rights of the Kashmiri people by successive Indian governments. Pakistan’s role came under serious criticism, as India declared it to be a sponsor of cross-border terrorism.104 In May 1999, Pakistani troops along with Kashmiri fighters occupied a chunk of Indian territory on the strategic route from Kargil to Ladakh and Siachen. This led to a fourth war between the two countries, which was eventually averted by American intervention. The Kashmir dispute has been discussed by Ashutosh Varshney as a consequence of struggle between competing nationalisms, i.e. the religious nationalism of Pakistan, the secular nationalism of India, and the ethnic nationalism of the Kashmiri people.105 Varshney argues that religious nationalism was the basis for establishment 66 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in of the state of Pakistan. Following this logic, Pakistan believes that Kashmir should automatically join Pakistan, as the majority of the Kashmiri people are Muslims. However, there is contradiction in the Pakistani claims. On the one hand, Jinnah had agreed at the time of Partition that in case of princely states, it was the rulers of these states who had the final say on the decision to join India or Pakistan. Also, around 35 million Muslims were left behind in India after Partition, which meant that their existence could be threatened if Pakistan tried to change the status quo regarding Kashmir. On the other hand, India was founded on the basis of secular nationalism as espoused by the Indian National Congress, which was also challenged by the religious nationalism of the Hindu right-wingers such as the Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Kashmir being the sole Muslim-majority state, is required to stay in India as a symbol of the triumph of secular nationalism. If Kashmir is to secede from India, it would be a blow to the secular Indian nationalist discourse. The Kashmiri ethnic nationalism has its own set of innate contradictions. On the one hand, staying in India would mean that Kashmiri nationalism was part of Indian nationalism. On the other hand, if Kashmir decides to join Pakistan, what would be the fate of the non-Muslim Jammu and Ladakh? There might be different interpretations of the nature of the Kashmiri uprising. While Varshney’s argument does not allow a change in the status quo, it reflects the complexity of the Kashmir dispute. The intricacy of the Kashmir question can be linked withits induction into the state ideologies of India and Pakistan. Even the third-generation leadership in these countries feels constrained by the pressure of public opinion in taking some steps regarding the resolution of this dispute. The Indian elite view the problem in Kashmir as a political question, relating it to the blunders of the central and state governments for decades. In Kuldip Nayar’s view, it is a consequence of denial of ‘basic democratic rule’ and economic stagnation, which gave an impetus to the Kashmiri people to start their uprising against the Indian state.106 Recognition of dissatisfaction of the Kashmiri people with the state of India is now prevalent among Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 67 the Indian elite. However, Pakistan is held responsible for having exploited this dissatisfaction to its own advantage by sponsoring a terrorist campaign in Indian-held Kashmir. It has been alleged that Pakistan has hijacked the Kashmiris’ quest for peace and development by sending its own mercenaries into Indian-held Kashmir in pursuit of its strategic objectives. The argument is that Pakistan got involved in the Kashmir issue to thwart India’s march towards great power status. The mainstream thinking prevalent among Indian opinion makers does not support the option of going to war with Pakistan over Kashmir, apart from some fringe hawkish elements. Similarly, the utility of plebiscite as a solution to the Kashmir dispute does not enjoy credibility in the eyes of the Indian elite. A consensus exists in India on the finality of Kashmir’s accession to the Indian Union. Three major approaches to the resolution of the Kashmir conflict exist among the Indian opinion makers: putting emphasis on the need to restore the democratic political process within the troubled state; initiation of dialogue with the militant Kashmiri groups; and with Pakistan under the rubric of the Simla Agreement.107 The Pakistani elite believe differently. Pattanaik argues that Pakistan hardened its stance on the Kashmir question after the beginning of insurgency in Kashmir by abandoning the preceding step-by-step approach.108 The Kashmir movement is described as an indigenous movement which had risen against ‘Indian domination’, in which Pakistani contribution was confined to the provision of moral and political support. The problems of the Kashmiri people are discussed within the larger framework of Muslim identity in South Asia, declaring it to be a ‘Muslim question’. The Pakistani elite hold the Indian government responsible for failing to protect the lives, property, honour and the liberty of the Kashmiri people. Others view it as an opportunity for Pakistan to take revenge for the defeat at the hands of India in 1971 and to modify the status quo of South Asia. War as a solution to the Kashmir issue does not enjoy support among the Pakistani elite. However, it is believed in some quarters that the Kashmiri mujahideen will be able to defeat India just as the Soviet Union was disgraced in Afghanistan. Pakistan adopted a dual approach of extending support to the Kashmir 68 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in insurgency on the one hand, and offering to enter into negotiations with the Indian government on the other. The Pakistani elite have diverse opinions about the relevance of the Simla Agreement for a settlement for the Kashmir question as well as for Indo-Pakistan relations. Plebiscite as a conflict-resolution strategy regarding the Kashmir dispute enjoyed widespread support among the Pakistani elite till recently. Pakistan forged alliances with extra-regional powers in an effort to reduce the impact of India’s dominance. This hasseen Pakistan forming an ‘all-weather friendship’ with China as well as being an ally of the US.109 India prefers to adopt a bilateral approach towards all issues in the region. This shapes up to be another source of discord between the two neighbours. Mitra talks about the ‘Indira Doctrine’, which expressed a desire to keep South Asia immune from the influence of foreign powers.110 The only challenge to this so-called Monroe Doctrine of India comes from Pakistan, which has resisted Delhi’s efforts to establish hegemony over the region and developing the nuclear weapons to undo the conventional weapons imbalance. Pakistan was the ‘most allied ally’ of the US from 1954 to 1965 and from 1979 to 1988. It joined the anti-Communist security alliances led by the US such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). It entered into a bilateral alliance with the US in 1958. In the 1990s, the US policy towards South Asia underwent a shift, when sanctions were applied on Pakistan due to its nuclear ambitions, military rule and alleged support to terrorism, while a warming up ensued between the US and India. However, Pakistan once again became a ‘frontline’ ally of the US in its war against terrorism after 2001. In June 2004, the Bush Administration declared Pakistan as a non-NATO ally. In return, Pakistan is required to make efforts to curb extremism at home, control its western border from being used by members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, and stop infiltration from across the Line of Control (LoC). However, the new trend in the US policy towards South Asia is in the form of ‘de-coupling’ or ‘de-hyphenating’ its relations with India and Pakistan.111 Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 69

Both India and Pakistan have struggled to define their status in the regional and global contexts. A major source of impasse in South Asia is India’s efforts to translate its size into power over its neighbours.112 Ramesh Thakur wondered about the extent of India’s power insofar as ‘India is neither rich enough to bribe, powerful enough to bully, nor principled enough to inspire’.113 Pakistan’s struggle to achieve ‘strategic parity’ with India goes back to Partition when the Muslim League demanded parity for Muslims with the majority Hindus. There is deep resentment in Pakistan to any notions of being inferior to a hegemonic India. Pakistan’s deep involvement in the affairs of Afghanistan in the last two decades was rooted in its effort to gain ‘strategic depth’ vis-‡-vis India.114 In line with this ongoing struggle for status, Pakistan and India have divergent visions of regional security and political order. Pakistan’s perceived insecurity vis-‡-vis India has led to securitization of Islamabad’s regional diplomacy from the beginning. India emphasizes the need for initiation of CBMs in South Asia and wants maintenance of the status quo in the region. As opposed to this, Pakistan is a revisionist power. It aspires to undercut India’s hegemony in South Asia. In this context, Pakistan wants expansion in the agenda of SAARC to deal also with security issues of the region.115 In this section, we have made an effort to briefly explore different dimensions of the Indo-Pakistan rivalry. We first attempted to define this relationship in theoretical terms, specially with reference to concepts of paired minority conflict and protracted intractable conflicts. We took a historical overview of the biggest sources of Indo-Pakistan hostility, such as the Kashmir dispute. We observed that the complexity of the Indo-Pakistan dichotomy relates to the divergence of opinions and world views that prevail on both sides of the divide. This conflict has also been defined in the context of an ongoing struggle of status between the two dominant countries of South Asia. After briefly exploring different aspects of the Indo-Pakistan dichotomy, we need to turn to the channels of conflict resolution in the region which were activated in search of peace. 70 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Channels of Conflict Resolution in South Asia

In this section, we shall undertake a study of the available channels for dispute settlement between the two countries. In this regard, we shall look at some of the disputes between these South Asian rivals which were resolved successfully. We shall focus on the way resolution of these conflicts took place. In addition to the success stories, we shall analyse diplomacy surrounding the unresolved conflicts. What has been the role of different regional and international organizations such as the UN and SAARC in this perspective? How did the outside powers such as the former Soviet Union and the US respond to Indo-Pakistan conflicts? How far did the global powers succeed in containing, if not eliminating, Indo- Pakistan conflict? We shall attempt to answer these questions in the following paragraphs. The Rann of Kutch arbitration is an exceptional event whereby India and Pakistan reached the settlement of a contentious issue. In the case of this territorial dispute, an international tribunal was created which delivered its judgment after long deliberations and scrutiny. Its arbitration stands out in the history of South Asia as a distinct example of peaceful settlement of an international dispute. The Rann of Kutch, a barren marshland located at the boundary of the Pakistani province of Sindh and the Indian state of Gujarat, covers approximately 8,400 square miles.116 Conflicting descriptions of this region were given, ranging from it being described as ‘a useless frontier area of mud flats’, to an area rich with natural resources such as lignite, gypsum and bauxite.117 Wright argues that the significance of the Rann of Kutch was not due to its economic or strategic importance; rather, it turned into yet another symbol of Indo-Pakistani nationalism.118 At the time of Partition, no delimitation of boundary was carried out at the Rann of Kutch. The Indian government made claims on the Rann citing it as part of the princely state of Kutch, while Pakistan argued that the portion of the Rann which was north of the 24th parallel had been under the administrative control of the Sindh government, now falling under Pakistani sovereignty. These contesting claims formed the Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 71 background to the conflict in 1965. The 1965 conflict was initiated when the Indian Gujarat’s border police claimed that the Pakistani frontier forces had entered Indian territory. Claims and counter-claims were exchanged till fighting erupted on 9 April 1965. After the active diplomacy of the British government, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the two rivals on 29 June 1965.119 The heart of this agreement was Article 3, which stipulated that in case of failure of the two governments to reach consensus on the demarcation of boundary between the two sides, the matter would be referred to an arbitration tribunal. Both governments accepted that the decision of the tribunal would be binding, which could not be questioned by them on any grounds. This tribunal had three members from ‘neutral’ countries. India and Pakistan nominated a judge each from Yugoslavia and Iran respectively. UN Secretary General U Thant appointed the Swedish judge Gunnar Lagergren as the chairman of the tribunal.120 This three-member panel was known as the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal, which, after 170 meetings, completed its investigation on 14 July 1967. The judges were split two to one in Pakistan’s favour, though the Pakistani claim was not fully accepted. Eventually, Pakistan got approximately 10 per cent of the area of the Rann while 90 per cent went under Indian control. Pakistan’s nominee agreed with the chairman’s decision while the Indian nominee did not accept the idea of control being exercised by the Sindh government at any point in history.121 Despite a great deal of criticism within the country, Indira Gandhi accepted this decision. Consequently, the Rann of Kutch arbitration stands out as a distinct illustration of India and Pakistan resorting to international law and institutions to find solutions to their conflicts, especially in a period of heightened tensions in the wake of the 1965 war. The critical role in this issue was played by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who persuaded India and Pakistan to accept the provisions of the ceasefire agreement, laying the foundations of international arbitration. Both parties eventually accepted the decision of the arbitration tribunal. The Indus Water Treaty is another extraordinary example of 72 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in peaceful resolution of an issue which was made possible by the intervention of an external mediator, the World Bank. This treaty settled a critical dimension of the Indo-Pakistan dichotomy relating to the distribution of river waters between the two countries. On the eve of Partition, Pakistan signed a Standstill Agreement with India, as the Radcliffe Award had allocated the Ferozepur headwaters to India based on continuation of pre-Partition sharing of the Indus Basin irrigation system. When this Standstill Agreement expired on 1 April 1948, India cut the water supply to Pakistan on the plea that the latter had not renewed the agreement. Critics describe it as a tactic used by India to pressurize Pakistan into backtracking on its Kashmir policy, or even to jeopardize the country’s existence.122 India considered itself to be free of all pre-Partition water agreements as it redesigned the Bhakra project, allegedly using Pakistan’s share to turn water from the Sutlej river to new areas in Rajasthan. India also expressed a desire to build a dam on Lake Wular near Srinagar, which could stop the flow of water to Pakistan. It was argued that India held all the cards and was, therefore, in a position to choke Pakistan.123 Pakistan could ill afford to use force against India on this issue, as the latter had a clear strategic advantage. Subsequently, the Pakistani government sent a delegation to India to negotiate the distribution of water between the two countries. This led to an Inter-Dominion Agreement on 4 May 1948, which required Pakistan to pay for its share of water resources. However, it failed to solve the dispute. India declared its intentions of constructing dams which could ultimately lead to the drying up of the eastern part of Pakistan. India justified its actions on the basis of property rights as all the rivers originated in India, while Pakistan emphasized on the pre-Partition allocation of water in support of its claim. The latter wanted India to give a permanent status to the Inter-Dominion Agreement, which made it compulsory for Pakistan to pay for its share of water. The foundations of external intervention were laid by the visit of the former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the US Atomic Energy Commission, David Lilienthal, in 1951. He was convinced that the heart of Indo-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir was Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 73 the struggle for water resources which flowed into Pakistan from the disputed region. In an article in Collier’s magazine, Lilienthal emphasized the linkage of water disputes with the Kashmir issue, and also expressed an urgency to settle the latter dispute. He floated the idea of storage of water by India and Pakistan as it was a question of their survival. Pakistan immediately accepted the idea of water storage, which was then picked up by World Bank President Eugene R. Black. One encouraging development in this regard was the fact that both India and Pakistan agreed on the separation of the question of water from the Kashmir dispute. By the end of September 1951, both countries accepted the good offices of the World Bank for settlement of water disputes, even as the matter was delayed due to the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan. The World Bank–mediated negotiations between India and Pakistan started in May 1952. Nehru agreed to continue the supply of water to Pakistan pending the final solution. In October 1953, the two countries submitted their own plans for water distribution to the World Bank. The Pakistani plan dealt with only the Pakistani part of the Indus Basin, while the Indian plan looked at the whole Indus Basin irrigation system. Pakistan made its claim on the basis of pre-Partition water arrangements. Both countries were unwilling to have an integrated water irrigation system, as was envisioned by the World Bank. According to the World Bank plan, the waters of three western rivers were given to Pakistan, while India was to benefit from the waters of three eastern rivers. Pakistan stressed the storage facilities for itself which were critical for irrigation in the summer months and the winter season. In May 1958, the World Bank was able to break this gridlock. On 19 September 1959, Nehru, Ayub Khan and W. A. B. Illaf signed the Indus Water Treaty.124 Thus, the World Bank’s mediation was the decisive factor in settlement of the critical water dispute between India and Pakistan. The World Bank possessed the necessary capabilities and legitimacy to mediate in arduous negotiations between India and Pakistan. The Indian and Pakistani governments also displayed willingness and flexibility in extending concessions to each other, culminating in peaceful resolution of the dispute between the two countries. 74 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Among mediators, the UN stands out as an effective player on the diplomatic scene. The UN has been involved in efforts to bring about conflict resolution between India and Pakistan with reference to the Kashmir dispute. The UN’s involvement in the Kashmir issue has been given a lot of importance by different writers. The Kashmir issue is one of the early disputes to come on the UN’s agenda, giving it an opportunity to mediate in international disputes. Kashmir has been the focus of many reports and publications within the UN, which shows the interest that was initially generated in this issue in the organization. However, the UN’s efforts have been restricted to providing its good offices for mediation between the two antagonists or devising strategies for possible resolution of the question. It never had the mandate or power to force the parties to move towards a settlement. Its role has been one of making recommendations or suggestions.125 The Kashmir question was taken to the UN on 1 January 1949 under Article 35 of its Charter by Indian Prime Minister Nehru on the advice of Lord Mountbatten, but against the advice of some of his colleagues.126 India referred to Pakistan’s alleged aggression in Jammu and Kashmir, which had acceded to India, and asked the latter to stop ‘invaders’. Pakistan denied these charges and asked the UN to arrange a ceasefire and ultimately arrange a plebiscite in the state. The UN Security Council passed different resolutions during the course of the next two years and established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The basic responsibilities of UNCIP related to helping India and Pakistan restore law and order in the troubled state, and then making efforts to achieve an atmosphere conducive to the holding of a plebiscite. Unlike the UN’s mission to Korea, here the UN was only acting as a mediator, not as an enforcer of international law.127 After visiting the Indian subcontinent and deliberating upon the matter, the UNCIP argued that the ‘question of accession to India or Pakistan was to be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite which was contingent upon having a cease-fire’.128 The ceasefire came into force on1 January 1949, which was to be monitored by the United Nations Military Observers’ Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 75

President of the UN Security Council General A. G. L. McNaughton of Canada made some proposals to settle the Kashmir issue, which failed to win India’s support. After this failure, the UNCIP suggested its own dissolution and appointment of a single UN representative to India and Pakistan. A jurist from Australia, Sir Owen Dixon, was the first UN representative to these countries. He floated the idea of ‘regional plebiscite’ which could effectively lead to a partition of Jammu and Kashmir.129 In the absence of progress on the Kashmir question, the American Senator from North Carolina, Dr Frank Graham, was appointed the next UN representative. He went on to submit six reports in the following years, which were mostly rejected by India. In 1957, President of the Security Council Gunnar Jarring of Sweden visited the region and submitted a report to the UN Security Council. But the UN Security Council rarely debated the Kashmir issue. The UN’s contribution remained confined to assisting the two countries in the enforcement and monitoring of a ceasefire. It was partly due to the presence of UN observers that there was no new full-scale war between India and Pakistan till 1965, because they prevented occasional skirmishes from escalating to major conflicts. As the Cold War deepened, the UN was further hampered in its efforts due to persistent warnings of the Soviet veto. But even before the hardening of the East-West divide, the UN was not able to use coercive economic or military means against India and Pakistan in order to bring about a forced resolution of the conflict. From the middle of 1949, it functioned as an ‘invalid mediator’.130 Hence, we see that the UN failed to play an effective role in resolving the Kashmir question, which lay at the heart of Indo-Pakistan rivalry in South Asia. Over the years, the failure of the UN to effectively resolve various conflicts of the world has severely damaged its credibility as the principal international organization in the international system. Another international organization which has failed to contribute substantially to the cause of peace in South Asia is the Commonwealth. The South Asian countries form the core of the Commonwealth because 1.2 billion people, i.e. 70 per cent of the total population of this forum, hail from this region. On 27 April 76 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

1949, the new Commonwealth of Nations came into existence with Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as its founding members. An important convention of the organization prohibits the discussion of bilateral disputes arising between two of its members. The Commonwealth would perform the functions of mediation only if it was requested by the concerned countries to do so. That points to the limited capabilities of the Commonwealth in facilitating conflict resolution between its member countries.131 Liaquat Ali Khan’s efforts to get Kashmir discussed at the January 1951 meeting of the Commonwealth prime ministers did not materialize due to Indian opposition. The Pakistani Prime Minister threatened to boycott this meeting. As a result, an informal discussion was held at 10 Downing Street on 16 January 1951 between the Pakistani, Indian, British and Australian prime ministers. Menzies of Australia floated the idea of deploying of Commonwealth forces in Kashmir during the plebiscite, but this was rejected by India. In 1953, at the meeting of the Commonwealth prime ministers, the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers met to discuss the ‘regional plebiscite’ proposal which was being considered as a probable solution of the Kashmir issue.132 But that was to no avail. The Commonwealth has not been able to play an active role in resolving the Indo-Pakistan disputes such as Kashmir. Its contribution was restricted to providing a forum for the leaders to discuss contentious issues. At the regional level, the two-decade old SAARC has similarly failed to play any substantive role in bringing about conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. Established in 1985, SAARC provides a unique example of a regional coalition which includes the two antagonists. Like the Commonwealth, the SAARC Charter prohibits the discussion of bilateral disputes in its meetings. The two major powers within South Asia, India and Pakistan, do not have a shared economic, political and security outlook. Still, SAARC has provided a forum where regional leaders can meet and engage in formal or informal negotiations with one another. A case in point is the meetings between Indian and Pakistani leaders on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in 2004. In other words, SAARC Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 77 can contribute towards inter-elite reconciliation which can lead to emergence of a culture of peace in South Asia.133 Extra-regional powers often played an important role in preventing a conflict from escalating into a full-fledged war. However, divergence of opinion exists between New Delhi and Islamabad concerning the role of these powers. India does not view with favour the involvement of ‘third parties’ in its bilateral disputes with Pakistan or other South Asian countries. On the other hand, Pakistan has always attempted to engage outside powers in its disputes with India due to the perceived asymmetry of power between them. India has been particularly uncomfortable with the US involvement in South Asian affairs, due to that country’s alleged support for Pakistan. Amongst the global powers attempting to gain influence in South Asia, we can discuss the role of Britain, the Soviet Union/Russia and the US. Also, China failed to gain a diplomatic initiative in South Asia due to the adverse effects of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and Beijing’s close relations with Pakistan. We have already mentioned how Britain gradually lost much of the influence that it enjoyed in South Asia after its withdrawal from the region in 1947. However, one conspicuous example of Britain mediating between India and Pakistan to de-escalate the situation is found in the Rann of Kutch crisis. When fighting erupted between the two countries in April 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson took a personal interest in mediating between the two governments. After sending personal letters through the British high commissioners in the two countries, the Wilson Government sent official communication to the Indian and Pakistani governments calling for ceasefire and resumption of dialogue. Initially, the two governments did not pay heed to this offer. But Wilson persisted in his efforts and arranged for informal negotiations between Indian and Pakistani leaders on the sidelines of the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference in London during 17–25 June 1965. As relations between the two countries were too tense for the leaders to engage in direct talks, the British prime minister and his Commonwealth relations secretary acted as intermediaries. The draft agreement, laying the basis of a ceasefire 78 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in between India and Pakistan during the Rann of Kutch crisis was prepared by the British government, which was signed by the two sides on 29 June 1965. Consequently, British mediation helped to bring about a peaceful solution of the Rann of Kutch crisis through an international tribunal as discussed earlier.134 The Tashkent Agreement of 1966 brokered by the Soviet Union between India and Pakistan marked the high point of Soviet diplomacy in the region during the Cold War. It came in the wake of grave tension between the two antagonists culminating in the Rann of Kutch dispute followed by the 1965 war. The chances of Soviet success hinged upon the improvement of its relations with Pakistan, which had been disrupted by the latter’s close relationship with the US. The Soviet Union was apprehensive of the growing influence of China in the region. Pakistan had tilted towards China after being disenchanted with Western support to India during the 1962 Sino-India war. From 1962 to 1965, the Soviet Union attempted to improve its relations with Pakistan, so as to reduce China’s influence in Islamabad, while simultaneously seeking to wean it away from the US. In this process, the Soviet Union also changed its approach to the Kashmir issue. Earlier, it extended unequivocal support to the Indian view. But in September 1965, when a resolution was passed in the UN Security Council regarding the ongoing military conflict between India and Pakistan, the Soviet Union did not veto it. The Soviet initiative started with the dispatch of telegrams by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin on 4 September to Shastri and Ayub Khan, offering to provide Soviet good offices to resolve the conflict between the two sides. Initially, this offer was not accepted, but by December 1965, both sides realized the futility of continuing with the conflict and accepted mediation. This was the period of extreme tensions between the Soviet Union and China. Chinese influence in South Asia was not acceptable to the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, it put great effort and energy into the Tashkent Summit, as failure would have forced it to revise its South Asia policy.135 In the Tashkent conference, India adopted a position that Kashmir was an integral part of India, which was not up for discussion. It was only interested in a no-war pact and a friendship Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 79 treaty with Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan wanted to move towards a resolution of the Kashmir question. It also wanted those areas of Azad Kashmir back which had come under Indian control during the 1965 war. The Tashkent Summit appeared to be heading for failure. The two sides had reached a point of stalemate over the wording of the agreement when Kosygin suggested an amendment, which was acceptable to both sides.136 Kosygin won high praise for his ‘very correct, cautious, and constructive role’.137 It has been claimed that the secret of the Soviet Union’s success in brokering an agreement between the two sides related to its established disinterest and neutrality. Soviet diplomacy succeeded where the US, UN, Great Britain and other Commonwealth countries had failed.138 However, the US has played a decisive role in de-escalating Indo-Pakistan conflicts during the 1990s and early 2000s. The initial American engagement in South Asia was part of its efforts to prevent the spread of communism in the region during the Cold War. In the early phase, the American attitude towards Indo-Pakistan conflict was ambivalent. The Eisenhower Administration tried to mediate between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute. Under the Kennedy Administration, India and Pakistan entered into dialogue with each other after the Sino-Indian war of 1962. In the 1971 India–Pakistan war, the US sent its aircraft carrier USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal, which failed to bring about any change in the situation.139 In another instance, in 1990, in the aftermath of outbreak of insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir, India and Pakistan had mobilized troops to the front positions and were on the verge of declaring war on each other, with the possibility of use of nuclear weapons. The US then engaged in preventive diplomacy at two levels to avert the crisis. On the one hand, the American ambassadors in the two countries were constantly in touch with the leadership on both sides. On the other hand, the chief of the CIA, Robert Gates, visited the Indian subcontinent and held talks at Delhi and Islamabad. This active intervention by the US helped in preventing the crisis from sliding towards war and also started the process of negotiations and CBMs between the two hostile neighbours. The US was again actively involved in reducing tensions between 80 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

India and Pakistan during the 1999 Kargil crisis. It was due to the pressure exerted by the Clinton Administration that Pakistan withdrew its regular and irregular forces back from the heights of Kargil. This brought about the formal end of the Kargil crisis. The US involvement in the South Asian region increased tremendously in the aftermath of 9/11. The 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament again threatened to destabilize the region as India mobilized its troops to the border, leading to reciprocal measures by Pakistan. This led to one million soldiers facing each other across the Indo-Pakistan border, with the grim prospect of conventional war escalating into a nuclear conflict. Director of the CIA George Tenet declared the chances of war in the region to be the highest since 1971. Following the visit of British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to the region towards the end of May 2002, there was a series of high-level visits by American officials, including Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. These visits as well as backdoor ‘coercive’ diplomacy resulted in Pakistan announcing the adoption of strict measures against the extremist groups within its borders, while India reciprocated by withdrawing its troops from the border. The resumption of the official negotiations between India and Pakistan since the January 2004 SAARC Summit has also been attributed to American efforts to prevent the outbreak of war between the South Asian rivals as it would be detrimental to the US-led war on terrorism.140 It is obvious that even with divergence of opinion prevailing between India and Pakistan over the involvement of third parties acting as mediators, the US has been able to play a critical role in either preventing a war between the two countries, or stopping it from turning into a full-fledged war. In addition, a critical source of conflict resolution in the region is bilateral diplomacy. From the early days of Partition in which Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met for negotiations over critical issues such as Kashmir and the water dispute, there has been a tradition of bilateral diplomacy in the region. The most obvious success stories of this approach are found in the 1972 Simla Agreement and the 1999 Lahore Declarations. Since 2004, a process of official dialogue has been underway between India and Pakistan Conflict and Conflict Resolution in South Asia 81 known as the Composite Dialogue Process. As part of the present enquiry into conflict resolution, we shall explore this dimension of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan in detail, focusing on multi-track diplomacy operating at various levels. In this section, we have attempted to study the multiple channels of conflict resolution in South Asia with specific emphasis on India and Pakistan. Both countries have turned to a variety of channels in an effort to resolve their disputes. The territorial dispute over the Rann of Kutch was settled by an international arbitration tribunal, being one of the few examples of dispute settlement by application of international law in recent history. The World Bank offered its expertise and services in helping to resolve the critical issue of distribution of water resources between India and Pakistan. The UN attempted, at various levels, to mediate between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute. The UN ceasefire monitors have been present in the region for half a century. The Commonwealth and SAARC have not directly mediated between India and Pakistan, but have, at times, provided a forum to their leaders to engage in informal talks in search of solutions to their disputes. Extra-regional powers such as Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the US often mediated between India and Pakistan and facilitated dialogue between the two governments. The Tashkent Agreement and resolution of the Kargil crisis are noteworthy examples in this regard.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we discussed the theoretical and practical aspects of peace, peace building, and peace research. We observed that the end of the Cold War brought a shift in the study of IR, as new theories and concepts of regional systems and regional integration began to be explored in detail. However, it did not bring significant changes to South Asia as Indo-Pakistan relations have continued to be characterized by conflict, hostility, and mistrust. Kashmir is the key source of conflict between these two South Asian rivals. Contrasting and conflicting world views and struggle for power and 82 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in status are some of the hallmarks of this rivalry. After briefly dwelling upon the conflicts in South Asia, we analysed the numerous channels of conflict resolution in the region. An international arbitration tribunal and the World Bank have been two of the sources of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. The international and regional organizations such as the UN, Commonwealth and SAARC have also attempted to facilitate conflict resolution between the two countries. Extra-regional powers such as Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the US often mediated between the two nuclear states. Lately, the US has been the most effective mediator in the region. In the next chapter, we shall study another channel of conflict resolution, viz., bilateral diplomacy and dialogue between India and Pakistan. We shall attempt to take a broader view of these processes and look at multi-track diplomacy in detail. Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 83

chapter IV Dialogue between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice

Introduction

This chapter deals with the theory and practice of negotiation in the context of South Asia. India and Pakistan have been engaged in multiple rounds of official dialogues since Partition. We shall take a brief overview of official Indo-Pakistan dialogues and evaluate the successes and failures of official diplomacy. In this regard, we shall develop a perspective on the so-called Track One diplomacy between India and Pakistan by using the concepts and approaches developed by negotiation theorists. We shall look at the impact of asymmetry and the efficacy of external mediation in the Indo- Pakistan negotiations, and explore the origins of the Composite Dialogue Process between India and Pakistan. The inability of official processes for effective conflict resolution in South Asia has generated a host of Track Two initiatives. We shall take stock of some of the instances where Track Two diplomacy has resulted in conflict resolution, and focus on the rise of unofficial dialogues in South Asia. What are the factors behind the proliferation of unofficial dialogues in South Asia during the last two decades? How have the unofficial dialogues benefited from external involvement? What are the official and popular perceptions about Track Two diplomacy in the region? We shall conduct a survey of the Track Two activities in South Asia at bilateral and regional levels. In this context, we shall analyse the contribution of Track Two diplomacy in resolving the conflicts between India and Pakistan. We shall also look at the obstacles faced by participants of Track Two negotiations. 84 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

An Overview of Official Dialogues

In this section, we shall attempt to analyse the official negotiations between India and Pakistan since 1947. In this context, we shall address some of the key questions which directly impinge upon the situation on the ground. For example, what have been the major rounds of negotiations between the two states? Why have these dialogues not led to a solution of major irritants between the two entities? What has been the role of external mediation in Indo- Pakistan official diplomacy? Throughout history, negotiations and dialogues have formed the essence of diplomacy between different politico-administrative entities. Negotiations are defined as ‘the process of combining conflicting positions into a joint decision’.141 Negotiations are not just about shaping an outcome or making a decision. It is a process whereby previously incompatible positions are brought together in order to produce an outcome agreeable to all the actors. There are different ways in which this outcome can be produced. For example, the parties make concessions to each other to reach a compromise over certain issues. Compensations are made in one area to attain agreement in another. It may also involve reframing an issue so as to make it acceptable to all parties. Hence, negotiation is, in essence, a process of giving something to gain something in return.142 For the purpose of our present enquiry, we plan to focus on the dynamics of concessions, compensations, and bargaining in numerous rounds of negotiations between India and Pakistan. Negotiations between India and Pakistan are marked by the dynamics of asymmetry between them. The impact of asymmetry on negotiations between states and groups is the focus of intense speculation in the field of Negotiation Analysis. It is argued that the structural dimensions of symmetry/asymmetry of power deeply influence the process and outcome of negotiations. States differ from each other due to the diversity in their size, resources, wealth, status, and power. International negotiations are seldom dialogues between two equal entities. Negotiation analysts argue that during the negotiating process, symmetry or asymmetry can assume different Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 85 meanings. This issue has been discussed from two perspectives. One argues that the stronger entity attempts to dominate the dialogue to get a favourable outcome at the expense of the weaker entity. According to the other view, the weaker party is not necessarily at a disadvantage, as both parties are ultimately linked to each other in search of a settlement or solution. In search of equality, the weaker entity can resort to ‘borrowing of power’, while the stronger party utilizes strategies such as ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ or ‘take-it-or-suffer’. As the weaker actor attempts to attain a position of equality, the stronger actor seeks to exploit the situation of asymmetry.143 The general observation is that agreements negotiated between two asymmetric entities will not be durable. However, examining the conditions essential for conclusion of durable agreements, negotiation analysts argue that those negotiated outcomes which are achieved freely and unconditionally by all parties, and on all issues, can prove to be stable and durable in a given time frame. These outcomes are known as solutions. A stable and durable solution is based on free consent of all the parties, focusing on all the issues without any conditions attached. The life cycle of an agreement is intrinsically related to the structured relations between the negotiating parties. However, the success of a negotiated settlement also depends on involvement of all the parties and discussions on all the relevant issues. Thus, it appears that symmetry is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for successful negotiations.144 The theoretical insights on the impact of asymmetry of power between negotiating parties provide us a perspective within which to analyse the success and failure of official negotiations between India and Pakistan. India has generally enjoyed a position of advantage in Indo- Pakistan dialogues, especially in the case of Kashmir. The advantage relates to the possession of more than half of the contentious area of the disputed territory by India. Indian decision makers have not demonstrated an aspiration to make more territorial gains in Kashmir. For Pakistan, the Indian position on Kashmir is reflective of its attempts to renounce the Muslim separatism in the subcontinent.145 When the situation in Kashmir flared up after the alleged accession of the state to India by the maharaja and outbreak 86 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in of hostility between the two countries, Lord Mountbatten expressed his desire to arrange a meeting between Jinnah and Nehru, which could not materialize due to ‘sudden illness’ of the latter. The process of negotiations was subsequently started by Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru. Concerning Kashmir, Nehru agreed to hold a plebiscite in the state to resolve the dispute in a cordial manner as per the UN Security Council resolutions. The contentious point between the two prime ministers was the holding of referendum under an impartial administration.146 The Karachi Agreement of 1949 brought an end to the first Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir. Indo-Pakistan relations were further strained in the wake of heightened tensions along the border between West and East Bengal, which almost took the two sides to the brink of war in 1950. In November 1949, India proposed to Pakistan to settle all bilateral disputes through negotiations. On the other hand, Pakistan maintained that there were two kinds of disputes: those related to daily life such as trade or the growing Bengal crisis, which were later addressed through Nehru–Liaquat agreements of April 1950; and those connected with the incomplete process of Partition. Amongst the structural issues were Kashmir, Junagarh, the waters of the Indus river system, evacuee properties, and the financial assets of British India. Pakistan wanted India to agree to the mediation and intervention of external actors such as the UN for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, but India wanted a No-War Agreement. We have already discussed how international organizations such as the Commonwealth and UN made efforts to break the deadlock between India and Pakistan. At the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference in London in January 1951, Pakistan wanted the Kashmir dispute to be discussed at the Commonwealth summit but India opposed it.147 The subsequent negotiations between Nehru and Mohammed Ali Bogra are considered to be one of the best opportunities for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. American Senator Frank P. Graham, acting as the UN representative to Kashmir, had urged India and Pakistan to start bilateral negotiations on the Kashmir question. Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 87

There was a change of leadership in Pakistan, as Governor General Ghulam Muhammad had dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin and appointed Muhammad Ali Bogra in his place. Bogra wanted to pursue the seemingly irreconciliable goals of overcoming Pakistan’s defence vulnerabilities by forging an alliance with the US, while also establishing cordial relations with India.148 At that time, Nehru had showed interest in pursuing the ‘regional plebiscite’ proposal of Owen Dixon. This proposal was discussed by Nehru and Bogra in June 1953 at the Commonwealth prime minister’s meeting in London and later in Karachi at the end of July. At this time, the situation in Indian-controlled Kashmir became volatile after the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah in August 1953. Following these events, further negotiations were held between Bogra and Nehru between 17 and 20 August 1953. A joint communiquÈ was released at the end of this round of talks in which interest in the plebiscite option was shown by the two sides. It was agreed that both sides would continue to probe this option further and would take concrete steps after April 1954. Alastair Lamb argues that these negotiations were doomed after Nehru showed signs of disenchantment with the plebiscite proposal for a variety of reasons from September 1953 onwards.149 He was sceptical of the feasibility of this option, as it would involve emphasis on communal identities, which could damage the already distressed communal relations in India. Meanwhile, Pakistan had started to show great inclination to join the US-led alliance against the Communist bloc. The Pakistan–Turkish Agreement of 2 April 1954 and the Pakistan–United States Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 19 May 1954 were important milestones in this regard. In the Indian view, these steps threatened India’s security. At this stage, the ongoing regional and global situation started to impinge on the way Delhi looked at its relations with Pakistan. India became more active in the Afro-Asian community. It also showed greater interest in establishing good relations with the Soviet Union. Under the fast-changing geostrategic setting in the region, what looked like an opportunity to settle the most contentious of disputes between India and Pakistan was lost. 88 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Indo-Pakistan relations appeared to improve for a short period under President Ayub Khan. The Indus Water Treaty was concluded between the two countries with the effective intervention of the World Bank, thereby eliminating a major irritant. Prior to this, a successful agreement had been negotiated under Feroz Khan Noon between India and Pakistan to properly demarcate the boundary in East Pakistan, which had been a source of tension in the 1950s. Nehru and Ayub Khan briefly met each other at Palam Airport in Delhi, which led to a process of dialogue between Indian Minister of Steel, Mines and Fuel Sardar Swaran Singh and Interior Minister of Pakistan Lt. Gen. K. M. Sheikh. They signed an agreement in October 1959 which augmented the Noon–Nehru agreement of 1958. Ayub Khan felt encouraged by the series of agreements reached between India and Pakistan. Consequently, he envisioned the institution of a mechanism for the joint defence of the Indian subcontinent. The Nehru Government viewed the Pakistani proposal with suspicion. The 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict resulted in India being humiliated at the hands of China. Subsequently, a marathon series of talks over Kashmir were held between India and Pakistan at the ministerial level. From December 1962 to May 1963, Sardar Swaran Singh and Z. A. Bhutto led Indian and Pakistani delegations in multiple rounds of official dialogues. According to Alastair Lamb, these negotiations were far more ‘realistic’ as compared to other talks, as Pakistan was willing to accept a solution of the Kashmir question beyond the plebiscite option.150 During these talks, India offered to accept Pakistan’s control over Kashmir, while also giving it some area in Kashmir and Poonch. But Pakistan did not accept this proposal as it was interested in Kashmir Valley itself. It became clear in the middle of May 1963 that these dialogues between India and Pakistan were not going to make any progress on the Kashmir issue. It has been argued that the best opportunity for some kind of resolution of the Kashmir issue would have been in the immediate aftermath of the Sino-Indian border conflict, as Indian leaders were still traumatized by their country’s defeat in the war.151 But the Pakistani leaders failed to capitalize on this propitious moment. The failure of the Bhutto–Swaran Singh negotiations to settle Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 89 the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan led to a very turbulent period in the Indian subcontinent. Frequent conflicts broke out between India and Pakistan. In the first half of 1965, a limited war was fought over the disputed region of the Rann of Kutch which we have discussed earlier in our study. The Rann of Kutch dispute was settled through an international arbitration tribunal set up under a ceasefire agreement which was brokered by Great Britain. A few months later, a full-scale war broke out between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The Tashkent Declaration of January 1966, in which the Soviet Union provided its good offices, brought a formal end to the 1965 war. The Soviets were able to mediate between the two antagonists due to the relatively cordial relations between the Soviet Union and the two states at that juncture in history. The 1962 Sino-Indian conflict had provided the Soviet Union with a chance to improve its relations with Pakistan. The Soviets played upon Pakistan’s disenchantment with the Western bloc to develop relatively harmonious relations with Pakistan which were not necessarily at the expense of India. Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri represented Pakistan and India respectively under the watchful eyes of Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin at the Tashkent Summit from 4 to 11 January 1966. The Soviets played a central role in these dialogues. The Soviet prime minister attempted to show equal respect and cordiality to both the leaders. Two days after the start of negotiations, India and Pakistan reached a stalemate as Pakistan wanted Kashmir to be included in the consultation, which was rejected by India. At this point, the Soviets intervened. In order to prevent the collapse of these negotiations, Kosygin convinced the two leaders to maintain the status quo in Kashmir and along the international border. Of the three major and interrelated issues, i.e. Kashmir, the no-war pact between India and Pakistan, and the withdrawal of forces, only the last one was achieved. In the Tashkent Declaration, India and Pakistan vowed to establish neighbourly relations, refrain from the use of force as a means of settling their disputes, withdraw their personnel to the position prior to 6 September 1965, repatriate prisoners of war, and resume normal diplomatic exchanges. The Tashkent talks were deemed to 90 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in be a success for Indian diplomacy, as Pakistan failed to convince India to negotiate an end to the Kashmir dispute.152 Relations continued to be strained between India and Pakistan even after the Tashkent Agreement due to several crises such as the Ganga incident. In January 1971, an Indian Airlines aeroplane, Ganga, was hijacked by two Kashmiris who brought it to Pakistan while looking for asylum, which was granted by the Pakistani government. The whole incident intensified the hostility between the two sides. Furthermore, Pakistan played a critical role in the Sino-US rapprochement in May–June 1971. This provoked India to claim that an anti-India, US–China–Pakistan nexus was emerging in the region. India used these allegations to justify cementing of its relationship with the Soviet Union in the form of a 20-year Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in August 1971.153 To cap it all, Indian involvement in the East Pakistan political crisis led to outbreak of the 1971 war between the two countries and the eventual dismemberment of Pakistan. It was under these circumstances that Indira Gandhi and Z. A. Bhutto met for negotiations in Simla [now Shimla] in June 1972. After the 1971 war, there had been several low-level dialogues between the two countries prior to the Simla Summit. The Indian government considered it to be a propitious moment to finally settle the Kashmir dispute by pressurizing Pakistan to accept the existing status quo as a permanent arrangement. India considered the recognition of the new state of Bangladesh an important issue on the agenda. For Pakistan, there were matters of urgent importance such as withdrawal of the forces to pre-war locations and release of Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs) in India. Concerning Kashmir, it favoured the adoption of a gradual approach. In Simla, Indira Gandhi and Z. A. Bhutto stuck to their old positions. India insisted on turning the ceasefire line into the Line of Control (LoC) which would become the legitimate border between the two countries. This was to be followed by the withdrawal of UN observers from Kashmir. Bhutto finally accepted the Indian demand to respect the LoC resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. In the final draft, Bhutto agreed to it ‘without prejudice to the recognized Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 91 position of either side’.154 There were some general clauses which aimed to improve relations between the two countries, as well as other articles which dealt with specific issues. However, there was no permanent settlement of the Kashmir question. According to the Simla Agreement, both the countries vowed to settle their disputes through peaceful means. In this regard, they agreed to resort to bilateral negotiations or to other peaceful means mutually agreed upon. They also agreed to respect each other’s national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty. It was established that the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir would be respected by the two sides and no unilateral attempt would be made to revise it. Bhutto later on declared that he had made no compromises and had conveyed to the Indian side that only the people of Jammu and Kashmir had the right to decide their own fate. On the other hand, the Indian view was that the Simla Agreement eliminated the role of the UN in the Kashmir question as it had become a bilateral dispute.155 The Simla Agreement was, nonetheless, an important step towards peace in South Asia, concluded under exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indo-Pakistan relations became more symmetrical in the aftermath of the creation of Bangladesh and the signing of the Simla Agreement. The return of Pakistani POWs from India was delayed as India associated this issue with the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. A year after the signing of the Simla Agreement, the Delhi Agreement was reached which made the return of the stranded POWs possible. Pakistan had earlier taken this matter to the International Court of Justice from where it was withdrawn after the signing of the Delhi Agreement.156 However, the process of normalization was disrupted soon after. The May 1974 nuclear tests by India known as the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) intensified Pakistan’s sense of insecurity. Still, a general thaw settled in South Asia in the mid-1970s as a number of agreements were reached between India and Pakistan: these included the Indo-Pakistan trade agreement of 23 January 1975, the shipping protocol of 15 January 1975, the commercial agreement of 13 January 1976 and the communication agreement of 14 May 1976.157 92 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

The Soviet incursion into Afghanistan followed by the flow of military and economic aid to Pakistan once again changed the geostrategic scenario in the region. At about the same time, another source of tension emerged with the alleged interference of India and Pakistan in each other’s internal affairs in the form of assistance given to ethnic insurgent groups. The Sikh insurgents in India were alleged to have been supported by Pakistan, while India was blamed to be extending support to the Sindhi nationalists. In 1982, President Zia- ul Haq made a surprise visit to India to meet Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. As a result, a joint Indo-Pakistan Commission was established to scrutinize the different aspects of relations between the two countries. Zia’s second visit to India at the funeral of Indira Gandhi in 1984 did not achieve much. In addition to the alleged support to ethnic groups, the American aid given to Pakistan in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan aroused suspicions within India. In this context, Zia-ul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi held a number of meetings. The December 1985 meeting between the two leaders led to an agreement to refrain from launching attacks on each other’s nuclear installations. The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan engaged in negotiations at different forums such as the India–Pakistan Joint Commission and the newly established SAARC. But these dialogues failed to break the ice between the two countries as the rising tensions in Indian controlled-Kashmir and skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani forces on the Siachen Glacier soured the atmosphere. The subcontinent appeared to be on the brink of another Indo-Pakistan war in the winter of 1986–87 when the Indian rmed Forces conducted an exercise named Brasstacks in the Rajasthan desert, bringing its forces close to the Pakistan border. It raised apprehensions about an imminent Indian attack on Pakistan. The latter responded by carrying out a large-scale military exercise, Zarb-e-Momin. This crisis was eventually averted through the ‘cricket diplomacy’ of Zia-ul Haq when he made a visit to India to watch a cricket match between the two teams and held negotiations with the Indian prime minister. On the western frontier, the Geneva accords were signed in April 1988 between Pakistan and Afghanistan after six years of negotiations which laid the basis of withdrawal of Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 93

Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan sought an agreement on the establishment of an interim government of mujahideen as the key to solution of the Afghan conflict. This settlement could not be achieved in the Geneva negotiations. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988–89 reduced Pakistan’s sense of insecurity. The return of civilian elected governments in Pakistan after the death of Gen. Zia in 1988 in a plane crash did not change the dynamics of Indo-Pakistan relations. After coming to power, Benazir Bhutto hosted a SAARC summit which was also attended by Rajiv Gandhi, who was the first Indian prime minister to visit Pakistan since 1960. Along with other issues, the agreement to not attack each other’s nuclear installations was formalized in these talks. This was followed by the Benazir Bhutto–Rajiv Gandhi summit of 1989 where a whole range of issues including arms control, nuclear proliferation and the Siachen Glacier dispute were discussed but no agreement was reached.158 The end of the Afghan conflict was followed by the outbreak of insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir. While Pakistan accused India of carrying out massacres of Kashmiri Muslims, India held it responsible for training and sending terrorists to Kashmir. The relations between the two remained under the shadow of Kashmir for most of the 1990s.159 In 1997, the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers Gujral and Nawaz Sharif engaged in negotiations in an effort to normalize relations on the sidelines of the Male SAARC Summit. This meeting laid the foundations of the Composite Dialogue process between the two countries. However, both governments were constrained by domestic forces. In India, Gujral’s United Front formed a weak coalition government at the centre. At the other end, Nawaz Sharif could not engage in flexible negotiations with India for fear of antagonizing the military establishment of the country. These dialogues were quickly stalled due to the failure of thetwo governments to show flexibility as well as the complexities of the issues involved. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) marked its rise to power in India by conducting nuclear tests in May 1998, followed by Pakistan’s nuclear tests, which severely derailed the process of 94 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Indo-Pakistan negotiations. A series of events followed, including the Indo-Pakistan limited war in Kargil in May–July 1999, the failed Agra Summit of July 2001, the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 leading to the military stand-off of 2002– 03, all of which had the cumulative effect of severely damaging the already fragile dialogue process between the two rivals. In this period of heightened hostility, the only silver lining was the Lahore Declaration of February 1999. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee travelled to Lahore by bus on 20 February 1999 on the occasion of inauguration of the Lahore–Delhi bus service. The Vajpayee–Sharif negotiations led to the signing of the Lahore Declaration. In this declaration, both the countries vowed to resolve all significant issues between them, including Kashmir, through bilateral negotiations. In addition, India and Pakistan decided to initiate a whole range of confidence building measures to improve the security environment in the region. The Lahore Declaration could have proven to bea defining moment in the history of Indo-Pakistan diplomacy had the process not been derailed due to the Kargil fiasco soon after.160 A Composite Dialogue Process has been in progress between India and Pakistan since early 2004. Its roots can be traced back to the extension of a ‘hand of friendship’ by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in April 2003. This was followed by reopening of bilateral diplomatic and transportation links between the two neighbours which had been suspended after the attack on the Indian Parliament. The Musharraf Government announced a unilateral ceasefire along the LoC in November 2003 and showed an inclination to adopt a flexible approach towards resolution of the Kashmir dispute. On the sidelines of the 12th SAARC Summit in Islamabad in January 2004, the Indian and Pakistani leaders announced resumption of the bilateral Composite Dialogue Process. In February 2004, both sides agreed to resume the dialogue within what was billed as the ‘2+6’ framework. This meant that two issues were assigned a higher position on the scale of negotiations, while six others were to be dealt with piecemeal. Negotiations on the two major issues of peace and security, including confidence building measures and Kashmir, were to be held at the foreign secretary level. Negotiations on six Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 95 other issues, Siachen, the Wular Barrage/Tulbul navigation project, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation and promotion of friendly exchanges were to start from July 2004 by the relevant administrative departments.161 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, heading the Congress-led coalition government and Pakistani President Musharraf met in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in September 2004. It was with this background that Pakistan decided to consider the Indian proposal of starting a Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus service.162 The proposed gas pipeline between India and Iran passing through Pakistan was another project which had the potential to strengthen Indo-Pakistan rapprochement. The landmark visit of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leaders to Pakistan in June 2005, the proposed agreement on the Siachen issue, the World Bank’s mediation on the water disputes, expansion of economic, cultural, sporting and social exchanges, and opening up of the LoC in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake of 8 October are some of the developments which point towards a relative reduction of tension between the two countries. After India and Pakistan revived the stalled Composite Dialogue Process their negotiations have been accompanied by a series of CBMs as discussed above. The negotiation theorists discuss the concept of incentives as an important instrument for breaking the stalemate between conflicting groups.163 The presence of a better and preferable alternative motivates the parties to change their behaviour. The prospect of affluence and development in the region with the rise of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and enforcement of international trade regimes can be considered an incentive behind the present negotiations. Similarly, the role of mediation in achieving a negotiated conclusion to disputes has received considerable attention in the negotiation analysis and conflict resolution literature. We observed that the official negotiations between India and Pakistan have benefited significantly from external mediation. The Tashkent Agreement is an illustration of successful intervention by a third party between India and Pakistan. During the last two decades, the US has intervened on a number of occasions to thwart escalation of 96 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in tension in South Asia, be it the 1990 crisis, the 1999 Kargil conflict or the 2001–02 military stand-off. The negotiation analysts argue that the third party mediates in a conflict in an effort to overcome the weaknesses of the negotiating parties. In this context, the third party employs varied tactics to effectively mediate between the negotiating parties. On the one hand, there is the communication approach used by the mediator to arrange meetings or transmit messages between the disputants in order to remove misperceptions existing between them, as was the case in the Norwegian mediation of the Oslo talks between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993. A greater form of intervention is the formulation approach in which the mediator structures the agenda of negotiations and suggests possible solutions. A more dominating form of mediation is in the form of the manipulation approach which involves the use of pressure, bribes or threats by the mediator/s in order to bring about a resolution of the conflict. A case in point is the British intervention in breaking the deadlock between the whites and blacks of Zimbabwe in the Lancaster House negotiations of 1979.164 External mediation has failed to bring about a landmark peace agreement between India and Pakistan, though a slide to full-fledged war was avoided on a number of occasions. The tactics employed by third parties need to correspond to the capabilities of the disputants to reach negotiated settlements. The complexity of external mediation between India and Pakistan relates to the divergence of perceptions between the two sides on the efficacy of external mediation and is compounded by presence of structural asymmetry. Nevertheless, external mediation has played a critical role in stimulating the Indo- Pakistan negotiations and stabilizing their relations on more than one occasion. India and Pakistan have engaged in negotiations at different levels since Partition. The history of Indo-Pakistan negotiations is a saga of frequent failures with rare instances of success. Unlike so many other regions of the world, diplomatic exchanges and dialogues have failed to resolve the enormously complex disputes between the two rivals. According to the Ripeness theory, conflicts Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 97 move towards resolution and reconciliation at the existence of a ripe moment. Ripeness can be defined as:

A situation characterized by a mutually hurting stalemate, optimally reinforced by an impending or narrowly avoided catastrophe to produce a deadlock and a deadline, plus the presence of valid spokesmen for the parties, and the perception of each party that a way out is present.165

Ripe moments are not self-implementing, having the power to jump-start a negotiating process. They are mere perceptions, a likely condition necessary for negotiations. Has a ripe moment arrived for India and Pakistan with the onset of age of nuclearization and globalization in the Indian subcontinent? It probably has, but the vision and understanding required to exploit it is missing among the Indian and Pakistani decision makers. Negotiations are processes and mechanisms of bargaining. The intensity of hostility and institutionalization of enemy images between India and Pakistan is so strong that it has diminished their capacity to engage in a process of compromise on their positions. Also, Indo-Pakistan dialogues are shaped by strong structural dynamics of asymmetry, which is an important obstacle to the conclusion of stable and durable agreements. In such situations, the presumably weaker state resorts to employment of a number of resources to overcome the structural disadvantages. Pakistan’s diplomacy has not been able to manoeuvre in order to lessen the impact of asymmetry. Similarly, the external mediation of the US, strongly resisted by India, has failed to break the impasse between the two South Asian rivals. Hence, the track record of Indo-Pakistan official dialogues has not been encouraging. Negotiations are at the heart of confidence building, conflict resolution and peace building efforts. The multiple processes of official Indo-Pakistan negotiations provide an opportunity tothe students of South Asian affairs to engage in research and theorizing. However, it is observed that this phenomenon has received extremely limited attention by academics. Such an important issue demands careful and rigorous analysis which has been missing in the literature. In general, the major concepts of negotiations 98 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in employed by negotiation analysts, such as the Ripeness theory, Mutually Hurting Stalemate, mediation and tough and soft tactics have not been comprehensively employed to analyse Indo-Pakistan negotiations. It is hoped that in future new theoretical concepts and approaches will be used to examine the official and formal dialogues between India and Pakistan.166 In the preceding pages, we have attempted to provide a brief overview of the official negotiations between India and Pakistan since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The legacies of Partition, maturation of the Kashmir dispute, structural imbalance between the two rivals, and inability of the ruling elite to exploit ripe moments have all contributed to the failure of official negotiations. The possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan has added to the urgency of conflict resolution. In this context, a number of unofficial dialogues have emerged at the bilateral and regional level in South Asia in the last two decades. These so-called Track Two processes are attempts to create an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation in the region. Therefore, discussion of the origins, dynamics and efforts of Track Two processes is in order.

Track Two Diplomacy in South Asia

In this section, we shall attempt to understand the phenomenon of Track Two diplomacy. We shall endeavour to define this form of diplomacy and focus on various dialogues between India and Pakistan which fall in this category. We shall also attempt to gauge the contribution made by these processes. Historically, Track Two diplomacy between the US and Soviet Union played a critical role in reducing hostility between them. Some of the prominent Track Two initiatives were the Dartmouth Conference, the Pugwash Movement, the Soviet-American Disarmament Study Group and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Even though the term Track Two was coined in 1981, the Dartmouth Conference of 1960 can be considered as the first Track Two project taken up by private citizens and the Soviet Union. It started with the efforts of the editor of Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 99 the Saturday Review of Literature, Norman Cousins. The Dartmouth College Campus in New Hampshire was the venue for the first conference where a number of issues such as arms control, foreign policy, the nuclear relationship, and public perceptions of the conflict were discussed. The basic objective of holding these conferences was to exchange information and ideas and to listen to the opposing perspectives. The participants of these conferences were private citizens having unofficial ties with their governments, who typically shared their observations and experiences with the decision makers. The Dartmouth Conferences laid the foundations for many Track One agreements, such as the treaty which banned above-ground nuclear tests. The Dartmouth Conference grew from a forum where perceptions were shared to a joint partnership between Americans and Russians who worked for conflict resolution in different parts of the world. It also initiated the Inter-Tajik dialogue which attempted to bring about an end to the deadly civil war in Tajikistan.167 Track Two processes have also contributed to the enrichment of security dialogues in the volatile Middle East region. In the 1990s, the former and sometimes current adversaries in the Middle East often engaged in multilateral Track Two ventures in an attempt to improve regional security scenarios. The Arab, Israeli and Iranian elite have been involved in unofficial dialogues to exchange views on their threat perceptions and common security concerns. These Track Two processes have replaced the official Arab-Israeli Multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group which ceased to function in 1995. These initiatives have been supported by a variety of sponsors such as governments, NGOs, universities and research institutes.168 Dalia Kaye argues that till 2001, according to the US State Department’s figures, 750 Middle Eastern regional elite individuals have been associated with these Track Two dialogues. Around 200 military representatives, including a number of former generals, also participated in these negotiations. Almost all the countries including Syria, Iran and Iraq have been part of these processes at one point or another. The University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) has been one of the major sponsors of such activities. 100 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Other prominent sponsors of Track Two initiatives include the Search for Common Ground, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), De Paul University, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC). The prevailing security environment in the Middle East gives the impression of failure of Track Two activities. However, these activities laid the foundations of future official security dialogues. These dialogues have contributed to the development of understanding between archrivals by enabling them to know each other personally as well as understanding each other’s threat perceptions. These Track Two dialogues have acted as a ‘safety net’ in times of crisis when no official channels of communication between opponents function. Due to these unofficial dialogues, a sort of regional forum has been created where all states can interact with each other and attempt to find some common ground on different issues. Track Two processes perform a ‘visionary’ function, exploring options and ideas which have not reached the stage of official dialogue as yet. As Track Two dialogues involve influential elite from all sides who have some form of connection with the corridors of power, they often have a spillover effect, influencing the official agendas. Hence, Track Two diplomacy has made some contribution to improvement of the regional security environment in the Middle East, though its impact has been limited due to the overall political environment.169 Non-official negotiations in South Asia have flourished in the last two decades due to favourable regional and extra-regional developments. The non-governmental sector in South Asia began to show interest in the project of regional integration and conflict resolution with the initiation of efforts by President Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh to establish SAARC. Different initiatives featuring participation of former government officials, academics and technical experts have come to the surface in the last two decades. This development is the result of local as well as external factors. The US Information Agency, along with some American think tanks and universities, has actively engaged in promoting these non-official exchanges in the region. Different American foundations such as the Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 101

Ford Foundation, W. Alton Jones Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation have promoted these initiatives by providing funding for these projects. In addition to this, various Japanese, Australian and German institutions have also been engaged in efforts to promote unofficial dialogues leading to regional and bilateral conflict resolution.170 Unlike the Asia-Pacific region where Track Two dialogues are linked with official diplomacy, thereby enhancing their ability to bring about changes in the official policies, unofficial dialogues are not incorporated into the official policy-making structures in South Asia. The participants in these unofficial dialogues do not report to their governments and few government officials participate in these activities. The retired civil or military officials who partake in South Asian Track Two dialogues are informally linked with the decision makers through their personal contacts. The Indo-Pakistan Neemrana dialogue and the regional initiative of Coalition for Action on South Asian Cooperation (CASAC) are two instances of Track Two processes which have some linkage with the decision-making structures. The nuclear risk reduction talks led by the Delhi Policy Group on the Indian side also had connections with government officials, as foreign offices on both sides used to be briefed after the discussion.171 In the following pages, we shall take a brief overview of Track Two dialogues in South Asia with a focus on policy-oriented and problem-solving activities. In this context, we shall look at bilateral as well as multilateral projects. Track Two dialogues in South Asia are mostly semi-official in nature, dominated by a few retired government officials. This leads to a ‘lack of cross-fertilization of ideas’ as new and innovative approaches to problems are not generated. The movement towards an unofficial dialogue between India and Pakistan gathered steam in the aftermath of the Gates mission to the region, in response to the escalation of tensions between the two countries in 1990. The USA wanted the two old rivals, in covert possession of nuclear capabilities, to enter into negotiations with each other. The Gates mission had recommended the opening up of unofficial channels of communication between 102 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in the two countries at a time when it was not possible to negotiate with each other through official means. In 1990, the US Information Service (USIS) arranged a series of WORLDNET dialogues between Indian and Pakistani intellectuals and experts. In these dialogues, a range of issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, CBMs and regional economic cooperation were discussed. The origins of these WORLDNET dialogues and the Neemrana dialogue lie in a series of conferences, which were moderated by the renowned American diplomat Harold Saunders, modelled on the lines of the Dartmouth Conferences. The Americans felt that the involvement of former officials in the Track Two process would provide both the governments an additional channel of communication. It was believed that such individuals, having close connections with the decision-making circles, could exercise a moderating influence at a time of crisis. The inclusion of retired civil and military officials in the unofficial dialogues was in line with the ‘old boys net’ theory, according to which retired officials, with a long a history of mutual personal interaction, are better equipped to avert a crisis.172 The Neemrana process is one of the relatively important and successful Track Two initiatives between India and Pakistan. It was initiated with a view to creating an alternative forum between the two countries where they could discuss their bilateral disputes. Neemrana fort in Rajasthan, India, was the venue for the first unofficial dialogue between the two countries in October 1991. M. K. Rasgotra of India and Niaz A. Naik of Pakistan were the co-chairs of this group. The participants in the Neemrana process included former civil and military officers, journalists, academics and NGO workers. Issues such as Kashmir, nuclear proliferation, the conventional arms race and economic relations between India and Pakistan have been on the agenda of the Neemrana dialogue. In addition, other issues such as easing of visa restrictions, cultural exchanges, trade, opening of the media and industrial cooperation have also been debated. An endorsement of this process by the two governments came in the form of granting visas to the participants on a priority basis.173 Participants in the Neemrana dialogue have been carefully Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 103 chosen to include a wide range of opinion. But on the whole, they have not digressed from their official positions to a great extent. This has enhanced the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the public as well as the two governments.174 The participants operate under two fundamental principles. First, they do not discuss the meetings with the media so as to maintain the secrecy of the dialogue. Second, during the meetings, participants from both sides do not indulge in discussion based on history. An innovation was made in 1995 by including professionals into the dialogue. This added to the utility of the talks by developing linkages between professionals on the two sides who entertain the idea of cooperation in fields such as business, science and technology. A variety of opinions are expressed in the group as it does not advocate a particular point of view. The personal contacts that the participants have with the decision makers have added to the credibility and the effectiveness of this process as it has resulted in generation of new and innovative approaches which have been taken forward by the participants to their governments.175 The inclusion of retired civil and military officials inthe Neemrana process has been extensively criticized. It has been argued that the officials who have spent a lifetime in the government, staunchly advocating policies which led to the persistent stalemate between Indian and Pakistan, find it extremely difficult to outgrow that mindset. A Track Two dialogue can turn into a monologue if it is a forum merely for taking traditional official positions.176 In such a situation, Track Two fails to provide an ‘alternative view’ which can be subsequently adopted by the two governments. The repeated inclusion of the same individuals in the process was hotly debated. While it affects the potential for the process to provide creative solutions to the existing problems, it adds an element of permanence and continuity to the talks when the same individuals, who have developed a personal rapport with each other, are involved in the process. Similarly, the pros and cons of the element of secrecy attached with the Track Two dialogue have also been discussed at length.177 The Neemrana dialogue has been criticized for failing to make 104 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in any significant contribution to peace in South Asia. A process like Neemrana which simultaneously focuses on a number of issues has less chances of success than a less ambitious initiative. The members of the Neemrana process have contested these notions. They cite several examples of their contribution. One such example comes from the meetings of the Neemrana group in 1995 involving Kashmiris from both sides of the LoC. The group submitted a policy paper to the Narasimha Rao Government calling on India to grant autonomy to the troubled region. Two weeks later, Prime Minister Rao shocked the nation by showing flexibility to all options except independence. The Neemrana group considers the flexibility shown by the Indian government the result of its efforts. Relaxation in travel restrictions between India and Pakistan by the two governments has also been partly attributed to the efforts of the Neemrana process. Several useful papers have been published by this group carrying new and innovative options on different issues, which were reported to have been considered by the two governments. The Neemrana process has provided a second channel of communication to the two governments. The members of this process have often expressed their views through articles in newspapers and periodicals. In this way, the wider public not only gets to ponder over new options, but new constituencies for peace are also created.178 Thus, we can maintain that the Neemrana dialogues have been very effective in generating alternative policy options between India and Pakistan as well as setting the precedent for other unofficial processes in the region. The Balusa Group, the other Track Two project between India and Pakistan, is headed by Shirin-Tahir Kheli, who is the founding director of the South Asia Program of the Foreign Policy Institute at the John Hopkins University. The most important contribution of this process has been in the realm of energy. The Balusa Group has tried hard to bridge the gulf between India and Pakistan by developing cooperation in economics, energy and the environment. In this regard, it has focused extensively on the gas pipeline project between the two countries, which also includes Iran. A participant of this process, Maj. Gen. Mahmud Ali Durrani, developed an Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 105 argument in favour of reducing the defence budget in his book The Cost of Conflict: The Benefit of Peace. Other proposals made by the Balusa Group include establishment of effective military-to-military hotlines between India and Pakistan, increasing interaction between the intelligence agencies of India and Pakistan, nuclear confidence building and greater education of Indian and Pakistan leaders concerning the responsibility of leading nuclear weapon states. The progress made by the Balusa Group, such as publication of papers on the Pakistan–India–Iran gas pipeline, has led to some argument that a focused Track Two process such as the Balusa Group can be more useful than a general unofficial dialogue such as Neemrana.179 A number of unofficial dialogues focusing on the younger generation of South Asians have been initiated in the last two decades in South Asia. The Summer school is one such initiative which attempted to engage the younger generation of South Asia in dialogues and communications. Prior to this, unofficial dialogues had a ‘generational vacuum’.180 The post-1971 generation was left out of these dialogues. This prompted George Perkovich of the W. Alton Jones Foundation and Chris Smith of King’s College, London, to initiate an unofficial dialogue for the younger generation of South Asian scholars, scientists and policy makers. Security affairs and issues of arms control were the major themes discussed in these dialogues. It was hoped that this third generation would bring a fresh perspective to the negotiations and be able to find new and innovative approaches to conflict resolution in the region. From September 1992 to August 1997, four summer school initiatives were held, two each in India and Pakistan. In addition to the summer school, the Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS) also started a parallel process of workshops and dialogues involving the younger generation of South Asian scholars and opinion makers. The RCSS holds two workshops annually. The summer workshop focuses on traditional security challenges facing the region, while the new discourse on non-traditional challenges to security is the theme of the winter workshops. Outside South Asia, the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington and the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois 106 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in in Urbana-Champaign have also been the venues for young South Asians to engage in dialogue and research on issues relating to regional stability and security. The younger generation is supposed to be better equipped to find solutions to old problems as it does not carry ‘psychic wounds’ and has not suffered physically or emotionally from the violence of 1947, 1965 and 1971.181 There have been other Track Two processes in South Asia which could not be sustained on a long-term basis. Time magazine and the Frontier Post arranged a one-time regional conference on strategic issues coordinated by a Kolkata-based (earlier Calcutta) chartered accountant, O. P. Shah, who arranged two sessions of this dialogue, one in Islamabad and the other in New Delhi.182 Research institutes in South Asia have been interested in exploring various dimensions of regional conflicts and issues since the 1950s. The Center for Policy Research (CPR), the Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), and Research and Information System (RIS) have been the prominent institutions in India engaged in conducting research on regional issues. In Pakistan, the Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), and the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) are the major think tanks involved in conducting research and arranging dialogues on issues of regional significance. The Bangladesh Institute of Strategic Studies (BISS), the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), and the Center for South Asian Studies at Nepal’s Tribhuvan University are the major institutions of Bangladesh and Nepal occupied with conducting research on regional themes. The Marga Institute and the International Center for Ethnic Studies (ICES) of Sri Lanka have been quite active in producing research work and generating debate on regional issues. The RCSS was created in 1993 to function as a regional institution connecting different national institutions and academics. Prof. Shelton Kodikara of Sri Lanka, along with several Indian and Pakistani scholars, conceived the idea of a regional institute which would conduct joint research, arrange dialogues and link different national institutions with each other as well as with European and American universities and institutes. Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 107

Some foreign research centres have also invited South Asian scholars to conduct research on regional issues. These include the Asia Society of New York and the Indian Ocean Center for Peace Studies in Australia.183 At the regional level, there have been various efforts to arrange unofficial dialogues. In January 1992, a conference was organized in Kathmandu to explore the scope of strategic studies in South Asia in the 1990s. CPR of New Delhi organized a South Asia Dialogue with the financial support of the Ford Foundation, which had three rounds. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the US Institute of Peace have all organized regional dialogues.184 In this way, South Asian research centres have been consistently engaged in policy-oriented dialogues across the region, facilitated by extra-regional sponsors helping to generate debate on issues of great significance. Most Track Two processes of South Asia have aimed at lessening of tension and conflict resolution in the region. It is difficult to quantify the success and failure of the relatively young Track Two initiatives. The impact created by these dialogues is not as dramatic as that of official dialogues, which can prevent a war from breaking out or stop one that has been going on. There are two major strands of opinion apparent in India and Pakistan about the utility of Track Two dialogues. One view considers these unofficial dialogues a useful process which can make headway in reducing tensions between the two countries. In contrast, right-wing elements consider these processes to be a ‘foreign-inspired conspiracy’ which only favours the other side or is meant to further American foreign- policy objectives in the region.185 For some, Track Two processes are a Western phenomenon which is not equipped to function in the South Asian region. The failure of these dialogues to lead to a landmark peace treaty between India and Pakistan fuels the suspicion of extremists, who consider these processes a smokescreen for the protection or furtherance of Western interests. There are no institutionalized linkages between Track One and Track Two in India and Pakistan. The establishments in the two countries have a vested interest in maintaining their monopoly over foreign policy. That indirectly tends to delegitimizing Track Two interactions. 108 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

The biggest contribution of Track Two diplomacy can be through generation of new and fresh approaches to conflict resolution and developing an understanding of the ‘other’. In the Indo-Pakistan conflict, the subjective and hostile enemy images of the ‘other’ dominate the mainstream view. Track Two processes can induce incremental changes in perceptions and explore fresh approaches to settle contentious issues. It is observed that the performance of these dialogues in South Asia has been encouraging. These processes have broadened the regional thinking and developed new channels of communication for the elite of the region. These initiatives have led to an open debate about Indo-Pakistan relations which used to be anathema till a few years back. Sandeep Waslekar observes that there has been a remarkable psychological change concerning popular perceptions of Track Two diplomacy.186 Till the mid-1980s, these dialogues were considered to be a Western conspiracy. Now, getting involved in Track Two dialogues has become prestigious. Track Two dialogues in South Asia can become more meaningful if they are spread horizontally in these societies. More elements and constituencies can be brought into this process. In addition, there is the need to get the vernacular press involved in these projects. The bitter historical memories, enemy images and the overwhelming dominance of India in the region create obstacles in the way of successful dialogues. Also, the question of funding the Track Two process is critical. So far, the American government and German, Japanese, Canadian and Australian foundations or organizations have provided the funding for these initiatives. This points to the need for more indigenous sources of funding for these dialogues. It is true that in South Asia, the success and failure of Track Two dialogues depends on the nature of official ties between the two states. Still, the former can assist in understanding each other’s positions, finding new approaches to different issues, and providing new channels of communication when others have been closed.187 South Asia continues to be home to many protracted and intractable conflicts but Track Two negotiations are a relatively new arrival in the region. Unofficial and informal diplomacy has been used extensively as part of conflict resolution projects, whether in Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Theory and Practice 109 the Cold War, the Middle East or the Asia-Pacific region. It is only in the last one and a half decades that some form of institutionalization of unofficial diplomacy has taken place in South Asia. Similarly, there has been little research done on different forms and shades of unofficial dialogues in the region. In general, academic studies conducted on the unofficial and informal diplomacy in South Asia are marked by a lack of conceptual clarity.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we endeavoured to understand the theory and practice of negotiations and dialogues in South Asia. In this context, we took an overview of the official dialogues between India and Pakistan. Since independence, these states have engaged in negotiations at different levels which succeeded in very few cases, such as the: Rann of Kutch arbitration award; Indus Water treaty; Simla Agreement; and the Lahore Declaration of 1999. The intensification of hostility, incessant fallout of the Kashmir dispute and the dynamics of asymmetry have all stymied the process of successful negotiations between the two countries. We also discussed the involvement of external mediation in Indo-Pakistan diplomacy. In this context, we attempted to conceptualize the official dialogues through the conceptions and approaches laid out by negotiation theorists. It is argued that the official bureaucracies in the two countries have typically demonstrated rigidity in negotiations as they persistently took conservative positions instead of adapting to the changing circumstances and espousing pragmatic approaches. A relevant factor in this context has been the fear of reprisal from the societies, inhibiting the governments from adopting radical and flexible positions. In Pakistan, the civilian governments also feared the response of the Army, which always expressed overt or covert disapproval of any possible peace settlement with India. For instance, the Liaquat–Nehru negotiations leading to ceasefire in 1948–49 were followed by a backlash from the Army in the form of the aborted coup attempt against the government known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case. Similarly, the military in Pakistan 110 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in expressed strong opposition to the 1999 Lahore Declaration signed by Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee. Thus, due to various factors, official negotiations between India and Pakistan have a history of failure with occasional instances of success. Following the failure of official dialogues, a number of unofficial or Track Two dialogues were initiated during the last two decades. Unofficial policy-oriented dialogues between specialists had been critical in bringing about an end of the Cold War. In South Asia, after the 1990 Indo-Pakistan crisis, numerous Track Two dialogues were organized at bilateral and regional levels. These processes generally failed to bring a durable peace agreement between India and Pakistan. They suffered from inability to involve new constituencies in these processes because the participants were mostly retired civilian or military officers. The factor of inbreeding within these initiatives severely hindered their ability to find innovative solutions. Track Two dialogues have often been stigmatized as a foreign conspiracy to impose a peace settlement on India and Pakistan. The credibility of these dialogues has been damaged in the eyes of the wider public due to the foreign financial support, specially from various US institutions. Track Two dialogues have faced a dual disadvantage: they lacked legitimacy in the society, and they were alienated from official circles. Further, Track Two processes suffered from a lack of institutionalization as they were a spasmodic phenomenon, without a proper and regular mechanism to support them. There has been a visible lack of dynamism in unofficial dialogues because they often boiled down to mere academic discussions, rationalizing the official positions instead of providing fresh and alternative perspectives. chapter V Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we explored various dimensions of conflict and conflict resolution through negotiation between India and Pakistan. Now, we shall explore the phenomenon of citizen diplomacy between the two countries. Both the official and semi-official dialogues did not resolve the contentious disputes between them. On the other hand, South Asia has witnessed an unprecedented level of cross-border citizen dialogues in the last two decades. It is only relevant that we examine the societal input into the efforts at conflict resolution between India and Pakistan and thus develop an understanding of the numerous Track Three initiatives. In this regard, we shall explore the nature of popular interaction in the region. Furthermore, we shall analyse the origins, patterns of mobilization, and efficacy of citizen peace initiatives in the context of peace building between India and Pakistan.

People-to-People Contact in South Asia: Problems and Prospects

Before moving on to the study of citizen initiatives for conflict resolution in South Asia, it is pertinent that we explore the level of popular exchanges in this region. In the following pages, we shall look at the people-to-people contact in South Asia since Independence. In this regard, we shall discuss various factors which rendered the process of popular communication extremely difficult and thus operated as roadblocks on the way to conflict resolution. 112 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

We shall also analyse the pattern of individual and group contacts across the border and the way these contacts have contributed to the prospects of peace and harmony in future. British India represented a relatively integrated social, economic and foreign-policy system. After Independence, the immediate challenge for managers of the state was the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity by securing the national boundaries. In this regard, strict visa regimes were enacted. On the eve of Independence, the Congress and the Muslim League leadership had emphasized the necessity and desire to develop friendly relations between India and Pakistan in future. But various schemes and proposals regarding open borders and exemption of visas and passports remained pending for consideration. The peoples of India and Pakistan turned into ‘alien nationals’ for each other. With passage of time, the Indian and Pakistani governments hardened the visa regimes, making it difficult for people to visit each other across the border. As opposed to India and Pakistan, various South Asian states enacted laws and regulations to facilitate popular interaction across national boundaries. These included the provision of issuing of special passports such as the India–Bangladesh Passport. The citizens of the Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan do not need a special visa or passport to enter India. Instead, the citizens of India and Pakistan have found it extremely difficult to interact with each other after Partition.188 The limited level of popular interaction between India and Pakistan is the result of a whole range of factors. Indo-Pakistan rivalry has severely curtailed the movement of citizens across national boundaries. Indeed, other states of South Asia have also been negatively affected by the dynamics of Indo-Pakistan relations. Thus, it becomes extremely difficult for Sri Lanka, Nepalor Bangladesh to develop close social, cultural or economic linkages with Pakistan, as it will be viewed with suspicion by India. Similarly, close relations between the smaller states of the region and India do not go down well with Pakistan. Shahid Kardar argues that the biggest factor standing in the way of people-to-people contact in South Asia is the negative perceptions about each other rooted in history. Partition was accompanied by bloody massacres and violence Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 113 which deepened this hostility. The rise of conflict between the two states over the status of Junagarh, Hyderabad, Jammu & Kashmir and distribution of assets further strained relations. These enemy images and perceptions deepened with passage of time, making it extremely difficult for people on the two sides of the border to develop friendly relations with each other. Various stereotypical images were cultivated in the last six decades through the use of the media and textbooks. The official policy-making processes were affected by these hostile perceptions. It has been argued that there are special-interest groups on both sides of the divide which are interested in continuation of the present morass due to their personal or institutional interests. The ‘otherization processes’ resulting in the persistence of enemy images and perceptions put hurdles in the way of popular interaction in South Asia.189 The psychological factor is not the sole obstacle to free interaction between citizens of India and Pakistan. Various legislative and administrative procedures in South Asia hinder people-to-people contact in the region. Through the 1974 Bilateral Visa Agreement between India and Pakistan as amended in 1984 and 1985, strict conditions were imposed on travel between the two countries. These include:

a single-entry visa valid for a period not exceeding three months; a city visa as distinct from a country visa, limiting a visitor to three or four places; restricted number of entry or exit points specified in the visa; and, last but not least, provisions of police reporting which required a visitor to register himself/ herself at a police station within twenty-four hours of arrival and intended departure.190

India and Pakistan do not issue tourist visas to each other’s citizens. In Pakistan, it is the Interior Ministry which deals with different aspects of visa applications. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a limited role to play in this matter. Although ambassadors or high commissioners have some discretionary powers in the matter of issuing visas, visa procedures are controlled by the Ministry of Interior at home. In Pakistan, the laws governing the entry of foreigners in the country include: The Foreigners Act, 1946; The 114 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Pakistan Control of Entry Act, 1952; and the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939. Among these laws, the Pakistan Control of Entry Act, 1952, was specifically drafted to restrict the entry of Indian citizens into Pakistan.191 In 1984–85, the Indian and Pakistani governments took some steps to ease the travel procedures between the two countries, which were further enhanced in 1989. These steps included an increased number of places which could be visited by Indian and Pakistani citizens, granting multi-entry visas to businessmen for longer duration, and relaxed conditions relating to police reporting. However, these measures were not implemented allegedly due to political considerations or the hurdles created by the bureaucracies. Apart from visas, there are numerous infrastructural limitations which negatively affected the processes of popular interaction in South Asia. One major reason behind the limited level of popular interaction is the inadequate infrastructure and poor standards of services. In South Asia, air connections are extremely limited and difficult. Due to restricted competition and promotion of national airlines, air travel is very costly in this region. There is a serious shortage of trained and educated manpower in the informal and subsidiary sectors. The intricate currency conversion rules and scarcity of hotel rooms discourage middle-class tourists.192 The Samjhauta Express is the only train between India and Pakistan, operating between New Delhi and Lahore twice a week. Very few cities of South Asia are directly connected to each other, even as new road and rail links between India and Pakistan are currently being established.193 During the last two years, the governments of India and Pakistan have launched new initiatives to facilitate travel between the two countries, such as the Muzaffarabad–Srinagar bus service and the reopening of the Khokhrapar–Munnabao rail link. On the whole, in such a constrained environment when travelling across the border remains a Herculean task, the people of India and Pakistan know very little about each other. One of the primary objectives of SAARC is to promote people- to-people contact in South Asia. According to the 1985 Dhaka Declaration of SAARC, ‘the strengthening of regional cooperation Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 115 in South Asia required greater involvement of their people’.194 In this regard, SAARC devised several schemes and initiatives, such as: audio-visual exchange programmes; and the establishment of a regional documentation centre on technical, scientific and development matters. SAARC chairs, fellowships and scholarships attempt to increase interaction between scholars, academics and students in this region. The Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians, SAARC Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the SAARC Law and SAARC Labour Organizations are also illustrations of efforts to promote popular interaction in South Asia. An extremely crucial proposal in this regard is the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme. This initiative was introduced in 1988 and has been in operation since 1 March 1992. According to this, judges of the Supreme Courts, members of national legislatures, heads of national academic institutions, secretaries of foreign affairs, the SAARC secretary general, directors of the SAARC Secretariat, the presidents of the respective chambers of commerce and industry and their spouses and children under 18 years of age were given exemption from regular visa procedures. Since the inception of this initiative, around two thousand visas have been issued. The SAARC Male Summit of 1997 enlarged the list of people benefiting from this initiative. In the aftermath of the Simla Agreement, 14 other accords were concluded between India and Pakistan to enhance popular interaction between the two countries. In March 1983, an India–Pakistan Joint Commission was established to look at the ways to increase people-to-people contact between the two countries. But all these regional and bilateral processes failed to bring about a significant change in the situation as the government and state institutions have not implemented these schemes.195 Navnita Behera argues that the most ironic fact is the inability of people to influence the policy-making agenda. The nature, level and scope of popular interaction are dominated by governments which operate on a ‘state- centric approach’. It is the ordinary citizens of India and Pakistan who pay the heaviest price of state policies. In this regard, Behera calls for the exploration of a ‘post-modernist agenda’, ‘a bottom-up approach’ in which civil society plays a more significant role in the 116 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in making and shaping of the official policy-making agenda.196 We can observe that, as compared to other regions of the world such as South-East Asia and Europe, people-to-people contact is an extremely limited phenomenon in this region. There is a whole set of reasons behind this sorry state of affairs. The psychological, infrastructural, administrative and legislative factors have all cumulatively hindered free movement of people across national boundaries. In this constrained environment where popular interaction is extremely limited, the last two decades have seen the emergence of citizen peace initiatives aiming at improvement of relations between India and Pakistan. This is an amazing and fresh development inasmuch as the broad policy structures have stayed intact and citizen diplomacy has yet to come to itself as a formidable actor on the chessboard of regional politics.

Citizen Peace Initiatives Between India and Pakistan

The failure of the Track One and Two processes to bring about a resolution of the Indo-Pakistan conflict in the last six decades has led to emergence of citizen activism for peace in South Asia, opening up the Track Three channel of diplomacy. In this context, we need to ask what the different Track Three citizen peace initiatives between India and Pakistan have been. To what extent have the citizen peace groups altered the nature of relations between the two countries? Citizen diplomacy between India and Pakistan as a channel of conflict resolution in South Asia has generally received scant attention in the academic literature. Track Two processes benefited from input of huge intellectual, human, financial and diplomatic resources, but Track Three has not been treated with the same respect. These processes were considered to be insignificant as they revolved around the activities of ordinary citizens who did not have any personal or institutional linkages with their respective establishments. However, as the Track One and Two processes broke down in the aftermath of the Kargil crisis and the 2002–03 military stand-off, citizen diplomacy gained significance. At this juncture, people-to-people Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 117 contact was the only channel of reducing tensions between India and Pakistan, which laid the foundations of the present Composite Dialogue Process.197 These citizen exchanges between India and Pakistan involve different groups, such as social and human rights activists, women’s groups, youth, lawyers, environmentalists, labour activists, professionals, scientists, academics, journalists, retired bureaucrats and Armed Forces personnel. A majority of them is not usually part of political and security dialogues between the two elite. The objective behind these activities is to ‘foster new, broad-based coalitions capable of democratically reordering national and regional priorities’.198 This democratization of Indo-Pakistan exchanges can gradually lead to transformation of interstate relations.199 There were few small-scale citizen peace initiatives between India and Pakistan before the last decade. We can outline the pioneering efforts in this regard. An early and prominent Track Three initiative with an agenda to promote reconciliation between India and Pakistan was the India–Pakistan Friendship Society. This forum was inaugurated by a former foreign secretary of India, Kewal Singh, in 1987. It was an effort to establish a people-level forum where citizens of India and Pakistan could interact with each other. The activities of this society included arranging visits to India by Pakistani cultural groups, organizing discussions with Indian and Pakistani high commissioners, and holding annual lectures in memory of Kewal Singh since his death. There are a number of prominent personalities in the governing body of this forum such as Soli Sorabjee, a former attorney general of India, Khushwant Singh, a famous literary figure, Bhai Mohan Singh, who is a leading industrialist of India, and I. K. Gujral, former prime minister of India and the president of this society. The activities of this group have been funded by donations from private business groups as well as personal funds of its members.200 In the early 1990s, there was a series of meetings known as the South Asian Dialogue held in different cities across the region. These meetings sought to promote interaction among policy makers and academics of the region. Amongst the issues discussed were economic and political reforms, human rights, cultural cooperation, and CBMs. 118 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

But these conferences were limited in terms of participation as only the civilian and military elite were able to participate.201 In this way, the initiators, participants and financiers of these early attempts at citizen diplomacy actually came from those who typically would have been part of Track Two diplomacy. These were only a few early instances of Track Three diplomacy between India and Pakistan. In terms of outreach, these meetings were limited as they involved only the elite of India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, these processes prepared the ground for the launching of bigger and more effective popular initiatives for peace between India and Pakistan. The largest and most prominent citizen peace forum between India and Pakistan is the Pakistan India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD). It was formed at a meeting in Lahore on 2 September 1994. A delegation of well-known citizens of India, such as Nirmal Mukerji, Rajni Kothari, Dinesh Mohan, Tapan Bose, Kamal Mitra Chenoy, Teesta Setalvad, Gautam Navlakha and Amrita Chachi met a number of eminent personalities from Pakistan including I. A. Rehman, Dr Mubashir Hasan, Karamat Ali, Dr Haroon Ahmad, Dr Mubarak Ali, Anees Haroon, Shahid Kardar, Khaled Ahmed and Mehdi Hasan on 2 September 1994. It was at this meeting that these well-known citizens of India and Pakistan laid the foundations of the PIPFPD. According to the founders of the PIPFPD, this initiative was formed to bring an end to hostility between India and Pakistan and to campaign for denuclearization and an end to the arms race between the two countries. The organizers of this initiative laid down policy guidelines in the beginning concerning its future mode of activities. It was determined that the PIPFPD would not accept foreign funding; that the number of delegates travelling to the other side would be reasonably limited; and that the PIPFPD would attempt to gain popular legitimacy by establishing linkages with other organizations which had a mass appeal. The founders also agreed that this forum would focus on all the contentious issues between India and Pakistan, including the arms race, governance, fundamentalism, and Kashmir.202 The PIPFPD strives to promote the values of peace and democracy in India and Pakistan. It seeks to bridge the gulf of Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 119 misunderstandings between the two peoples. Concerning the various disputes between India and Pakistan, it endeavours to facilitate their resolution through peaceful means. In pursuit of these goals, PIPFPD has exchanged delegations with like-minded organizations and has arranged lectures, seminars and meetings on a regular basis. In addition, it has also tried to use publications and all other means of communication to get its message across to wider sections of the society. Each of the two national chapters is further organized at three levels, viz., federal, provincial, and district levels. By providing an opportunity to thousands of concerned citizens of India and Pakistan to develop a basic understanding of each other, PIPFPD has been involved in efforts to stop the official policies of demonization of the ‘other’. The joint conventions and declarations of the forum provide instances of Indians and Pakistanis reaching agreements on most the contentious of issues, such as Kashmir. In the words of I. A. Rehman, the former chairperson of PIPFPD, ‘we have to make the governments admit to the possibility of an alternative to the politics’ of hate and confrontation, ‘the possibility of other possibilities’.203 The PIPFPD has held seven joint conventions since its inception. The initial plan of holding annual conventions alternatively in India and Pakistan has not been possible due to the frequently hostile relations between the two states and the recalcitrant posture of the ruling establishments. The first convention of the PIPFPD was held during 24–25 February 1995 in New Delhi under extremely difficult conditions when Indo-Pakistan relations were very strained. This was the first ever people’s dialogue in the history of the subcontinent. In the presence of over two hundred delegates from both countries, the convention adopted resolutions which called for a peaceful solution of disputes between India and Pakistan.204 The second joint convention of PIPFPD was held in Lahore during 10–11 November 1995. This was the concluding part of the forum’s launch in which 79 delegates travelled from India to join 102 Pakistani participants. The Lahore Convention brought together peace activists including politicians, human rights activists, lawyers, environmentalists, women’s rights activists, trade unionists, journalists, social workers, 120 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in scientists, writers and artists. At that time, there had not been any official contact between the Indian and Pakistani governments for the previous 28 months. Before the holding of this convention, there were apprehensions whether the Pakistani government would allow such an activity to take place on its soil, and about the support that this initiative would have amongst the Pakistani citizens. But this convention turned out to be a success.205 In other words, the first two joint conventions of the PIPFPD aimed at launching the forum proved very successful under extremely adverse circumstances. These meetings were held at a time of breakdown of official dialogues between the two countries. PIPFPD was the only forum among a handful of forums where the people of India and Pakistan were able to discuss issues of mutual concern such as Kashmir, opposition to conventional and nuclear build-up, and demands to provide better governance to their citizens. The PIPFPD held its third joint convention at Kolkata during 28–31 December 1996. The members of the forum had been pressing the two governments to review the ‘closed road border policy’ due to which ordinary people could not communicate with each other.206 In order to register their protest against the official policies regarding travel restrictions, 145 of the Pakistani delegates reached India by crossing the no man’s land between Wagah and Attari. Around 500 citizens of India and Pakistan marched on the streets of Kolkata on 31 December, which brought the forum out of the confines of seminar halls onto the streets. As the two countries were on the verge of celebrating 50 years of peace, the Kolkata Convention raised a demand for the two governments to sign a peace treaty to bring an end to the conflict in the region.207 The Peshawar convention of the PIPFPD during 21–22 November 1998 was held in the wake of the May nuclear tests which had raised the level of tensions in the subcontinent. Holding this convention in Peshawar was considered to be a risky venture due to the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the general ascendancy of religious extremism in that country.208 Whilst the governments of India and Pakistan pursued the confrontationist path, the PIPFPD continued to mobilize the citizens of India and Pakistan in the name of Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 121 peace. The forum often adopted bold positions, such as vehement opposition to the 1998 nuclear tests and challenging the official Kashmir policies. The fifth convention of the PIPFPD held at Bangalore during 6–8 April 2000 was organized in an atmosphere of heightened tensions between India and Pakistan in the wake of the Kargil conflict. This was preceded by the hijacking of an Indian aircraft, the October 1999 military coup in Pakistan, enhanced level of violence in Indian-controlled Jammu & Kashmir, and a rise in war hysteria on both sides. Two hundred Pakistanis were issued non- reporting and multiple city visas by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to participate in the convention. At the behest of Indian intelligence agencies, the PIPFPD members who had participated in the past two conventions by crossing the no man’s land between Wagah and Attari were prohibited from doing so on this occasion. Anti-Pakistan emotions were running high in India in the wake of massacre of dozens of Sikhs in Chattisingpura, in Anantnag district of Indian-controlled Kashmir. While several potential patrons of the Bangalore Convention refused to extend financial support, a court case was filed against the convener of the Karnataka Chapter of the PIPFPD India for being involved in activities which threatened India’s security. Later, this case was thrown out. However, an unprecedented level of security pushed the Bangalore Convention back to four-walled seminar rooms while severe restrictions were placed on the movements of the Pakistani delegates.209 At Bangalore, the PIPFPD continued to pursue its agenda of peace by condemning the two governments for their policies of confrontation and militarization. The people-to-people contact between India and Pakistan was deeply affected by the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, which led to a military stand-off between the two countries. Under these conditions, PIPFPD’s activities were severely curtailed as it failed to hold regular meetings. However, the forum benefited from the resumption of communication between the two governments in 2003. The sixth joint Convention of PIPFPD held during 12–14 December 2003 in Karachi included 265 delegates from India. It was held at a time when the Indian and 122 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Pakistani governments were initiating official dialogues after years of deadlock.210 Subsequently, during 4–5 September 2004, 70 citizens from India joined 300 Pakistanis to attend the 10th anniversary celebrations of the PIPFPD in Lahore. Following this, the seventh joint convention of PIPFPD held in Delhi during 25–28 February 2005 hailed the resumption of official dialogues between the two countries, welcomed the participation of Kashmiris in the forum, and announced the establishment of a Youth Forum to engage the Indo-Pakistani youth in the processes of peace building and reconciliation. In this way, in the last decade, the PIPFPD has emerged as the largest and most effective of citizen peace initiatives between India and Pakistan, gradually expanding its roots among the people and providing support for official dialogues. The citizen peace activists from India and Pakistan organized a Peace March from New Delhi to Multan in spring 2005 in order to reach out to the general masses with a message of peace based on the works and teaching of great Sufi saints. It was intended to retrace the thirteenth-century journey of the great Sufi saint Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya from Delhi to Multan to meet another great saint, Baba Farid. The idea was to highlight the Sufi cultural heritage of the subcontinent as a source of inspiration.211 The peace march from 23 March (Pakistan’s Republic Day) to 11 May (the anniversary of India’s 1998 nuclear tests) provided a unique moment in the history of people-to-people contact in the region, where the citizens of India and Pakistan were able to walk and freely interact with each other. In this regard, Karamat Ali, Sandeep Pandey, Admiral Ramdas and Lalita Ramdas played critical roles. Only nine Pakistanis of the 70 who had applied were eventually granted visas by the Indian government. Initiatives like the Peace March are providing new opportunities to the citizens of India and Pakistan to overcome the ‘knowledge deficit’ about each other.212 At first glance, such initiatives might appear insignificant in the context of Indo-Pakistan dichotomy. But these activities create opportunities for citizens to interact with the ‘other’ and look beyond the enemy images. Expatriate Indians and Pakistanis have also been actively Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 123 engaged in demonstrations and joint actions in favour of peace and reconciliation between the two countries, specially in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. One of the early examples was the May 1998 mass demonstration organized by the New York Taxi Driver’s Alliance which opposed the overt nuclearization by India and Pakistan. Similarly, at the height of Indo-Pakistan tensions following the attack on the Indian Parliament, a large number of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Americans rallied in Boston in January 2002 in support of peace. On 7 January 2002, a group known as Friends of South Asia which included students, scientists and engineers protested outside the Indian consulate in San Francisco and called upon the two countries to refrain from war and initiate a process of dialogue and negotiations.213 Given the context of typically heightened nationalist fervour among expatriates, such initiatives could be considered path-breaking. It was a good omen of things to come that the expatriate Indian and Pakistani communities got involved in mobilization in favour of peace between their respective countries. It is interesting to see that some former Indian and Pakistani soldiers established a forum, The India-Pakistan Soldier’s Initiative for Peace (IPSI) in 2000. IPSI is essentially an effort of retired soldiers from India and Pakistan to promote peace and mobilize larger segments of ex-Armed Forces personnel in pursuit of this objective in the region. IPSI has also campaigned for the rights of vulnerable prisoners languishing in Indian and Pakistani jails. Navnita Behera and Manjrika Sevak consider IPSI a Track Two initiative, but in essence, it is a forum of retired military officers engaged in citizen dialogues, which qualifies it to be categorized as a bilateral Track Three initiative between India and Pakistan.214 Initially, the membership of IPSI was very small but with passage of time, it has been able to attract a number of retired soldiers. According to one estimate, close to 60 Indian and 15 Pakistani retired soldiers are members of this dialogue.215 Nirmala Deshpande, a peace activist and member of India’s Rajya Sabha is the president of the India Chapter of IPSI while the Pakistan Chapter is currently headed by Lt. Gen. Nasir Akhter (retd). Lately, a few senior ex-officers have 124 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in also joined this dialogue. On the Indian side, former Naval Chief Admiral Ramdas (retd) and a former Vice Chief of the Army are members of IPSI. On the Pakistani side, former Chief of the Air Force Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhary (retd), a couple of former Corp Commanders and other senior military officers have joined this initiative. IPSI has arranged visits between the two countries. In 2000, a team of Indian members of IPSI had a meeting with Gen. Musharraf. In this visit, a number of high-ranking government officials and different civil society organizations interacted with the delegation. The return visit of 22 Pakistani members of IPSI to India in December 2004 received a lot of publicity. However, the IPSI initiative has not been able to attract retired soldiers in very large number. One of the factors cited in this regard is the seclusion and institutional socialization of military personnel. When visas are issued, both governments make it a point to exclude the cantonment areas. Also, a majority of the ex-soldiers find it difficult to overcome decades of institutional and ideological influences based on demonization of the other.216 Nonetheless, IPSI is contributing to citizen peace diplomacy by including ex-soldiers in mobilization for reconciliation between India and Pakistan. In the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests, a large number of anti- nuclear citizen peace initiatives sprang up. These groups are a significant component of the citizen peace diplomacy in the region. They have been at the vanguard of efforts to mobilize public opinion in favour of peace and reconciliation between India and Pakistan. In this regard, anti-nuclear peace activists fervently criticized the policies of militarization adopted by the two governments. The development of missile systems and nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in the 1990s stimulated these groups into action. Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC) is a forum of several peace groups working in Pakistan which opposed and vehemently protested against the 1998 nuclear tests. These included the Citizen’s Peace Committee of Islamabad, the Karachi-based Action Committee against Arms Race (ACAAR), Lahore’s Joint Action Committee for People’s Rights, and Peshawar’s Citizen’s Peace Forum. In January 1999, all these peace groups with a mutually shared opposition to nuclear Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 125 weapons got together in Karachi and formed the Pakistan Peace Coalition. Since 1999, the PPC has endeavoured to bring coherence to the disparate movements and efforts of different peace groups of Pakistan. PPC has also attempted to link this anti-nuclear activism with other forms of peace movements fighting against extremism and lawlessness. The PPC, with Dr A. H. Nayyar as president and B. M. Kutty as secretary general, and India’s Committee on Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) are sister organizations working for identical objectives. Both are also affiliated with international peace movements. PPC has campaigned against different forms of discrimination and intolerance, while opposition to nuclear weapons continues to form the core of its agenda. PCC engages in numerous activities such as publishing literature, holding seminars and arranging demonstrations and processions. However, the process is by no means devoid of difficulties. Over the years, the PPC members and other peace activists have faced numerous problems. Thus, when a procession was carried out by anti-nuclear peace groups in 1996 to mark the anniversary of dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima, the Urdu press falsely accused the protesters of taking out a funeral procession of A. Q. Khan, the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, and a campaign of vilification was started against these protestors. However, with passage of time, there appears to be greater tolerance for the campaigning and activities of the PPC and its affiliate organizations.217 Across the border, India witnessed the rise of numerous citizen peace groups which fervently opposed the weaponization of India’s nuclear capability. These include the well-known anti-nuclear initiatives of Movement Against Nuclear Weapons (MANW) and the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND). Like Pakistan, over 200 civil society organizations from India, all sharing an opposition to the weaponization of nuclear capability, joined hands under the banner of the Committee on Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP). Amongst the prominent members of CNDP are Prof. Achin Vanaik; the well-known journalist, and peace activist Praful Bidwai; J. Sri Raman, who is the convener of MANW; and a prominent scientist, M. V. Ramana. Like the PPC, the CNDP 126 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in frequently organizes seminars and lectures and carries out processions in pursuit of its objectives of building a movement against nuclear weapons. The CNDP held its national convention in Lucknow during 26–27 November 2005. The Lucknow Declaration called for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia including India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.218 As Kashmir has often been declared a nuclear flashpoint, CNDP has also proposed the idea of a NWFZ in Kashmir. To date, CNDP and PPC have made only modest progress in pursuit of their specific objectives to eliminate nuclear weapons from South Asia. For any such movement to succeed, it has to pass through two stages of development. In the beginning, its objective should be to erode the legitimacy that certain policies enjoy amongst the general public. Once such a movement gains public endorsement and legitimacy, then as a second step, it will become possible to pressurize the governments into changing their policies. In order for the anti-nuclear movement to achieve these goals, it needs to develop ‘appropriate political perspectives’ and ‘necessary organizational skills’.219 In spite of their modest gains, PCC and CNDP are vital components of the citizen peace movement, working to bring about elimination of nuclear weapons from the region. As mentioned earlier, the anti-nuclear movement in South Asia has global partners. One of the foremost global anti-nuclear peace groups, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), involving 58 countries, has actively lobbied for peace and opposition to nuclearization of South Asia. It is a federation of national medical associations which engages in ‘research, education and advocacy relevant to the prevention of nuclear war’.220 It is the only international medical organization which is working around the world to eliminate nuclear weapons and bring about global universal disarmament. According to its mission statement, the IPPNW strives to achieve obliteration of all nuclear weapons, demilitarization of the global economy, and diversion of national capital and resources towards human development and prosperity.221 Various Pakistani individuals and groups from the medical profession have joined this movement. The Indian Doctors for Peace and Development Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 127

(IDPD) and the Pakistani Doctors for Peace and Development (PDPD) are in the vanguard of IPPNW’s efforts in South Asia. As part of its activities, IPPNW has conducted a number of studies on the deadly consequences of persistent hostility between nuclear- armed India and Pakistan. In 1999, IPPNW published a study by M. V. Ramana on the impact of a nuclear explosion on the city of Mumbai. IPPNW, in collaboration with a large number of grass- roots citizen peace and disarmament groups, wants to raise awareness about the medical and physical consequences of a nuclear war in South Asia.222 In addition to research, IPPNW has held a number of regional meetings involving medical professionals, peace activists and concerned citizens to advocate eradication of nuclear weapons from the South Asian region. It has written letters to Indian and Pakistani political leaders and held a ‘Dialogue with the Decision Makers’ in 2004. The IPPNW doctors and medical students from India and Pakistan also operating from the platforms of IDPD and PDPD and held a regional meeting in Karachi on 12 December 2004. The Karachi Declaration called on the two governments to sign a no-war pact; to make South Asia a NWFZ; to settle all the contentious issues through bilateral negotiations; and to use massive their defence budgets for the welfare of ordinary people.223 ‘Dialogues with the Decision Makers’ sessions were subsequently held in Hyderabad and Islamabad in March and July 2005 respectively. IPPNW and its associate groups provide a rare perspective on the potentially devastating consequences of nuclearization of South Asia as they try to highlight the medical and physical costs of a nuclear attack. In this section, we have endeavoured to understand the phenomenon of citizen diplomacy in South Asia through a survey of relevant organizations and activities. We attempted to explore the citizen peace diplomacy in South Asia which has risen to prominence in the last two decades. There are a number of citizen groups who have been campaigning in favour of conflict resolution and reconciliation between India and Pakistan. In this regard, we viewed the evolution and activities of groups like PIPFPD, IPSI, PPC, CNDP and IPPNW. We have outlined the diplomatic 128 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in infrastructure outside the state system with the purpose of developing a comprehensive picture of societal input in the process of peace building and conflict resolution.

Other Voices of Peace: Women, Youth, Writers and Artists

In contrast to the previous section, we shall examine the activities of those elements of society which are by and large alienated from the decision-making process in the context of peace building between India and Pakistan. In this regard, we shall analyse the peace initiatives launched by women, youth, writers and artists of South Asia. We shall look at the origins of their involvement in Track Three processes and explore various peace initiatives launched by them. The question as to how these groups bring fresh and alternative perspectives into the dynamics of Indo-Pakistan relations is at the heart of our enquiry. There has been an intrinsic link between women’s movements and peace activism in different conflict-prone regions of the world. Instances of women leading peace movements can be found in countries like Chile, Brazil, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Thailand, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and South Africa. ‘Women in Black’ of Israel and ‘Mothers of the Disappeared’ in Argentina represent women leading movements for peace and reconciliation.224 This trend has also been visible in South Asia. Even as they have not always participated from a gendered perspective, gender ‘informs their actions, differentiating them from their male colleagues’.225 The South Asian women’s association with the peace movement has enriched the latter by providing a broader vision of peace. Indeed, with a mutually shared view of peace, conflict and security, women on both sides of the divide have campaigned against all forms of violence. They sought to project the ‘connection between direct violence, militarization, misogyny, poverty and underdevelopment in the correct belief that this complex relationship impacts any formulation of sustainable security’.226 The idea is that women have suffered due to the imposition of narrow definitions of religion, Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 129 culture, civilization and nationalism, and their efforts to profess a distinctive identity of their own through dress and public behaviour has often landed them in controversy. Under Zia-ul Haq, Pakistani women were discouraged from wearing saris and bindis as these were considered symbols of Hindu culture. Several renowned Pakistani classical dancers such as Sheema Kirmani and Nahid Siddiqui were barred from performing in public as their loyalty to their nation and religion was questioned. In spite of these difficulties, the women activists in the Indian subcontinent have continued to challenge such taboos and build links across the border. Over the years, irrespective of political upheavals, women have persistently engaged in dialogue and communication across the border.227 The women’s peace movement in the Indian subcontinent moved forward in the wake of Indo-Pakistan tensions in Kargil, as numerous groups joined together to form the Women’s Initiative for Peace in South Asia (WIPSA). A prominent peace initiative undertaken by WIPSA was the ‘women’s peace bus’. The Indian peace activist Nirmala Deshpande led an Indian women’s peace delegation to Pakistan on a ‘peace bus’ in March 2000. Pakistani peace activists led by Asma Jehangir extended a very warm reception to this delegation. This bus was a high-profile event, labelled ‘un- Islamic’ and ‘anti-Pakistan’ by the hawks in Pakistan. In May 2000, Pakistani women staged the return leg of the peace bus to India. Asma Jehangir, leading the Pakistani delegation, declared it to be a true people-to-people movement. Sonia Gandhi, the Leader of the Opposition in the Indian Parliament at the time, invited her to a meeting. New Delhi’s Chief Minister Sheela Dikshit and Rajasthan’s Minister of Tourism Bina Agarwal were also engaged in consultations with the Pakistani women. The women’s peace bus was a significant event at a time when relations were extremely tense in the wake of the Kargil crisis. By engaging in these activities, women activists attempted to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiation between the two states as well as to carve out a place for them. Regarding the objective of peace building, two significant contributions of women can be discerned. On the one hand, an attempt was made to de-demonize the ‘other’ 130 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in by engaging in personal interaction in addition to becoming involved in multi-track negotiations and exchanges, such as their meetings with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, the business community, the NGO sector, the media and community leaders. Imtiaz Alam, Secretary General of SAFMA, arranged a special open forum for Indian women who had come to Pakistan as part of the Bus-for-Peace initiative with the Pakistani newspaper the News. The fact that the delegation was hosted by one of the media tsars in Pakistan lent a semblance of credibility to this initiative. The establishment of the Women’s Action Forum in 1981 by leading feminists led to the establishment of numerous women’s NGOs. These NGOs have been active in establishing linkages with their counterparts across the border, leading to greater understanding, softening of attitudes, humanization of the other, and laying the ground for peace. Some of the Pakistani NGOs vigorously engaged in citizen diplomacy include ASR, Simorgh, Shirkat Gah, and Aurat Foundation. Women environmentalists from India and Pakistan have also been interacting with each other over a wide range of environmental issues. In 1988, the Pakistani NGO Shirkat Gah sent a delegation to India to study the Chipko movement. Following this, the first ever joint Indo-Pakistan conference on the environment was organized with the participation of the two governments, NGOs and the media. However, these exchanges were marred by frequent crises between the two countries. In August 1989, a video training workshop was arranged in Bangalore which trained the women from the two countries who were working on various community issues in the NGO sector. A similar workshop was subsequently held in Lahore.228 Indeed, Lahore’s Institute of Women’s Studies, founded by Pakistani feminist and peace activist Nighat Saeed Khan, is another illustration of women of South Asia interacting with each other to further the goals of women’s empowerment and peace. At this institute, women from across the region undergo courses on gender, development and peace studies. This institute forms linkages with a large number of women’s NGOs, human rights initiatives, peace groups and cultural and literary forums, thereby Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 131 enriching the debate on issues relating to gender, peace and conflict. Another significant initiative concerning women and conflict is the annual workshops organized by the Delhi-based Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace (WISCOMP). These workshops bring together students, young researchers, practitioners and journalists from India and Pakistan, providing an opportunity for trust-building, imparting skills in conflict transformation and peace building.229 Feminist writers from India and Pakistan have enriched the debate on Partition and the history of Indo-Pakistan relations by providing an alternative perspective which focuses on the plight and affliction of ordinary people caught in the maze of conflict and violence. The alternative discourse on Partition provided by joint and collaborative studies between Indian and Pakistani feminist writers looks at the suffering of ordinary people as families were divided and lives were destroyed. In this regard, Veena Das, Urvashi Butalia, Kamla Bhasin and Ritu Menon stand out as writers who look into the impact of Partition and political upheavals on the lives of ordinary people, especially women. From the Pakistani side, Nighat Saeed Khan among others conducted research on the predicament of women belonging to Punjab and Sindh. There are some liberal, progressive and alternative publishing houses as well as several NGOs who are publishing these alternative accounts of Partition. These include ASR, Shirkat Gah, and Simorgh.230 At times when relations between the two states reached a breaking point, the women’s initiatives provided a platform where the process of dialogue could be continued. The lessons from negotiations in conflicts as diverse as the ones in Northern Ireland, South Africa and Somalia show that women can play a vital part in negotiations through their ability to draft inclusive and accommodating agreements. But Indian and Pakistani women have been excluded so far from official negotiations between the two countries. Still, the women’s peace initiatives offer a rare example of blending theory and activism which can contribute to reaching a better understanding of the notions of conflict, war, peace and justice. Writers from India and Pakistan are a significant component of 132 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in citizen peace diplomacy. Indian and Pakistani writers have arranged conferences and meetings to try to promote understanding and reconciliation on both sides. In September 1987, well-known Indian writer and peace activist Ajeet Cour organized the first ever conference of Indian and Pakistani writers at the Triveni Kala Sangam, New Delhi. The Pakistani government issued visas to the writers to attend this one-week-long dialogue. In the next 12 years, the Academy of Fine Arts and Literature, which had been founded by Ajeet Cour, arranged similar dialogues often attended by writers from various South Asian countries. In April 2000, the Foundation of SAARC Writers and Literature (FOSWAL) was established in New Delhi. This association of South Asian writers has regularly held dialogues to bring about peace and reconciliation in the region. As a ‘brotherhood and sisterhood’ and a ‘fraternity’ of South Asian writers, it attempts to stand up to the politics of hatred, intolerance and extremism in the region.231 The last dialogue of this group was held at Aligarh, India, during 21–24 March 2005. Amongst the Pakistani writers who have been in the vanguard of efforts to connect the South Asian writers in the name of peace are Kishwar Naheed, Ahmad Faraz, Fahmida Riaz, Zaheda Hina, Jameeluddin Ali, Intezar Hussein and Fakhar Zaman. In addition to arranging dialogues and meetings, FOSWAL offers awards to writers, and has come up with a journal, Beyond Borders. In 2000, a website looking at the activities of this initiative was launched.232 The governments of South Asia have also recognized the efforts of writers to promote reconciliation in the region. In January 2000, FOSWAL was officially recognized as a SAARC body. Indian and Pakistani writers participated in a Pen and Peace Conference held in Lahore and Islamabad in October 2003 under the auspices of Hawwa Associates in collaboration with FOSWAL and with funding by Action Aid Pakistan. At this conference, the Indian and Pakistani writers called upon the two governments to sign a peace treaty, to give up their arsenals of nuclear and other deadly weapons, and to devote their energies to bring about an improvement in the lives of the ordinary people. The declaration of the Pen and Peace Conference vowed to uphold and promote a Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 133 culture of tolerance and peace in the region through literature and writing. The participants of this conference also pressed upon the governments of India and Pakistan to renounce the use of force and to revise the textbooks and curricula in these countries in order to remove propaganda, hatred and misinformation, and expressed a need for greater interaction between writers and intellectuals in the region.233 This initiative was soon followed by the holding of the 10th SAARC Writer’s Conference, ‘Understanding and Synergy through Literature in Islamabad’ during 11–15 March, 2004. Writers from SAARC countries vowed to enhance their efforts to bring the peoples of the region closer to each other through their writings. They called upon the governments to protect human rights, grant visa exemptions and issue multiple visas to writers to allow them to frequently interact with their fellow writers across borders.234 Writers, poets and intellectuals of India and Pakistan have been struggling to affect the process to promote peace and harmony in the region through their writings and activities. Artists have followed writers closely in the peace movement. In a way, the artist community of India and Pakistan has been in the vanguard of citizen peace diplomacy. As in other regions of the world, music, dance, the visual and performing arts have been able to reach out across the region. Through their performances, artists are able to communicate with their audiences at a deeper level and influence the outlook of the society. The decade of the 1980s has seen the rise of a number of cultural and artists’ groups, which vigorously pursued the agenda of peace. Through their performances, these groups have attempted to highlight various injustices and discriminations existing in the society and emphasized the need to resolve conflicts so as to divert energies towards the welfare of the people. One of the major cultural groups in Pakistan which has been part of the citizen peace dialogues is Tehrik-e-Niswan. It was established in 1980 with the objective of integrating art with politics, with special emphasis on women’s rights. Through art, the members of Tehrik-e-Niswan set out to ‘create awareness and change moral attitudes about relations between India and PakistanÖto fightÖreligious fundamentalismÖto create an atmosphere of peace 134 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in and harmony between the peoples of the two countries’.235 In 1980, Tehrik’s production of an adaptation of Safdar Hashmi’s play Aurat was the first instance of a shared cultural experience between Indian and Pakistani artists. This was followed by more productions based on the writings of Indian authors such as Amrita Pritam, Vijay Tendulkar and Surendra Verma. In 1989, Tehrik-e-Niswan became the first Pakistani theatre group to perform in India, and was highly appreciated by the Indian audiences. The artists faced many obstacles as they could not travel to India without getting a No Objection Certificate, which depended on the prior approval of the script by the Ministry of Information. With passage of time, Tehrik has enhanced the level of its activities and has attempted to promote the message of peace and harmony through its productions.236 Yet another group of artists from Pakistan engaged in efforts to spread the message of peace and tolerance through art is the Ajoka Theatre Group. Led by Madeeha Gauhar, Ajoka produced its first play in the confines of a private house. Since then, ithas relentlessly produced ‘thought-provoking, socially relevant theatre’ in and outside Pakistan. With passage of time, Ajoka has emerged as a major group of artists. It has established strong relations with theatre groups of India.237 In 1992, leading Pakistani artists established the South Asian Theatre Company. Madeeha Gauhar was a central figure in this initiative. Ajoka and the South Asian Theatre Company have performed regularly in South Asian Peoples Theater Festivals.238 These cultural initiatives have inspired a large number of new groups which have surfaced in the last decade, all attempting to promote a culture of peace and tolerance at the grass-roots level. In this way, the artists of India and Pakistan have vigorously engaged in peace building efforts through their art. Indian and Pakistani youth have lately joined the citizen peace dialogues. Youth participation in the citizen peace diplomacy is a new and rather limited phenomenon. Pakistani youth participated in social movements against the military dictatorships of Ayub and Zia. But of late, a large segment of the student community has become somewhat indifferent to the developments in the larger society. The few existing youth political initiatives have been marred Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 135 by violence and intolerance. Recognizing the importance of youth in the peace movement, PIPFPD decided to establish a Youth Forum which would provide a platform to Indian and Pakistani youth in peace mobilization in February 2005 at New Delhi. To date, there has been no joint convention of the Youth Forum, as the Indian and Pakistani chapters have been occupied with the task of institutionalizing and expanding their support base within their respective countries. Different city chapters have been established in India and Pakistan. The first national convention of the Pakistan Chapter of the Youth Forum was supposed to be held in December 2005 but it was postponed due to the 8 October earthquake. In September 2005, the Youth Forum arranged a visit to Pakistan by the students of the History Department from St. Stephen’s College, New Delhi.239 The Youth Forum is in an early phase of development and requires the investment of energy, resources and commitment to make inroads into the youth community. The Indo-Pak Youth Forum For Peace (IPYFP) is another group of concerned youth from India and Pakistan striving for improvement of relations between their countries. This initiative came into existence in January 2004 after the Inter-Continental Youth Camp in Mumbai. It wants to activate the youth of India and Pakistan to devote their energies to the cause of peace and understanding in the subcontinent. Since its founding, the forum has established chapters in various cities of India and Pakistan. The founders of the forum identify its objectives as ‘bring[ing] together young Indians and PakistanisÖto initiate dialogue and to promote peace’, ‘to develop constructive networks and inter-generational partnerships involving young people along with the elders of the society’, and to ‘exchange peace delegations of youth and to hold joint conferences, workshops, seminars, literary and cultural events with them, with a view to promote solidarity between youth of both sides’.240 In the two years since its inception, IPYFP has attempted to promote dialogue between Indian and Pakistani youth through various activities. A Youth Interaction Programme between Indian and Pakistani youth was scheduled to be held at the end of December 136 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

2004. However, due to the failure of Pakistani participants in getting visas to travel to India, only the students from various colleges of Mumbai attended the programme. In February 2005, a Youth Peace Delegation of 11 Pakistani youth visited India. The Pakistani delegation attended the Youth Peace Summit in Delhi and later visited Mumbai and Pune. The forum has occasionally organized a few talks and seminars.241 Indian and Pakistani youth have only recently begun to participate in the wider peace initiatives emerging from the two societies. It can be argued that the participation of youth in peace initiatives is intrinsic to the success of citizen diplomacy in changing the dynamics of Indo-Pakistan relations. However, more energy, attention and resources are required to enable the youth to play a vigorous role in promoting reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Here, we looked into the participation of women, youth, writers and artists in Track Three diplomacy between India and Pakistan. These are the sections of society which are generally excluded from decision-making processes. However, with Indo- Pakistan relations being at an impasse, these groups have joined the larger peace movement. In the last two decades, women, writers, artists and youth of India and Pakistan have succeeded in forging cross-border linkages, promoting a culture of tolerance, respect and harmony. They might be alienated from the echelons of power, but the activities of these groups are helping the peoples to grow out of the ‘enemy images’.

Civil Society and the Quest for Peace

In this section, we aim to understand the activities of NGOs, the media and business sectors in the realm of citizen diplomacy. We intend to focus on those groups which play an extremely significant part in matters of war and peace such as the media and the business community. Our objective is to briefly examine the participation of these groups in the people-to-people initiatives. In this regard, we shall explore the activities of journalists, labour and trade unions, the business community and NGOs. We want to address the question Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 137 as to how they have enriched the citizen peace dialogues and what their contribution to citizen peace diplomacy between India and Pakistan has been. The media have played a critical role in shaping public opinion in the context of Indo-Pakistan relations. Looking at the contribution and growth of the media in Pakistan, it has been argued that there were three phases of the media’s involvement in shaping the dynamics of Indo-Pakistan relations. In the initial phase of Pakistan’s history, the press was in tune with political developments as the communal carnage of Partition, followed by subsequent tensions over Kashmir, led to the rise of anti-India sentiments. The dismemberment of Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh changed the balance of power in South Asia, leading to a shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war which opened up the petrodollar-based market in the Gulf, the 1974 nuclear explosion by India and the 1974 Islamic summit were all important events which contributed to Pakistan turning its back to South Asia and carving out a place and identity of its own in south-west Asia and the Middle East region. Further, the insurgency in Indian-controlled Kashmir in the 1990s, Pakistan’s military involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s as well as efforts to open up the Central Asian markets further aggravated the tensions between the two South Asian rivals. All these developments were adequately reflected in the Pakistani press which went along with the national current and de- emphasized Pakistan’s South Asian identity. During the last decade, while several Track One and Two negotiations were held, people- to-people contact gained momentum, seeking to de-demonize the other. The press gave coverage to these initiatives, but it was not sufficiently engaging in style nor decisive in impact. After abrief impasse, the civil society assertively pursued the agenda of Indo- Pakistan rapprochement since 2003. With the deepening of popular linkages, the role of the media has taken a leap forward in a big way. The electronic media in India and Pakistan have come a long way since the days of Amritsar and Lahore TV channels which had limited outreach across the border. These days, there are dozens of 138 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Indian and Pakistani channels, making the two countries much more accessible to each other through the media. However, the print media still has to go a long way before reaching out to the other side and representing the other’s viewpoint. The last few years have seen the surfacing of a few media-related joint institutional and professional initiatives. The most prominent among these is the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA).242 SAFMA was formed at the First South Asian Free Media Conference, ‘Towards Free and Vibrant Media’, held at Islamabad in July 2000 at the initiative of the daily News and the Paragon Governance Program of the UNDP. The inspiration for the SAFMA initiative was derived from the notion that the media should play a role to reduce the gulf of misperceptions as well as to act as an ‘honest broker’.243 Thus, SAFMA strives to achieve two objectives: first, ‘freedom and independence of media, right to know, freedom of expression, access to and free flow of information within and across the South Asian region’.244 The other major objective of SAFMA is ‘engaging mainstream media to promote conflict reduction and resolution, confidence building, regional cooperation and involving major stakeholders in the public domain to promote peace in the region’.245 It has tried to engage all those who have struggled for freedom of the press, free flow of information, and conflict resolution through dialogue. Every group that believes in the utility of dialogues has been included in the SAFMA dialogues. Hence, SAFMA meetings often see the involvement of a wide array of opinions, such as the religious right of India and Pakistan. In pursuit of these goals, a three-pronged strategy has been adopted. This includes mobilizing the national media for media rights and peace building; putting together a broad-based coalition of mainstream media across all ideological schools to campaign for free flow of information and free movement of journalists across frontiers and building public opinion to resolve inter- and intrastate conflicts through peaceful means. SAFMA has attempted to form mainstream coalitions of experts, policy-makers, parliamentarians and important stakeholders to enhance understanding and facilitate regional cooperation. Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 139

Since its inception, SAFMA has organized numerous conferences and workshops with the aim of bringing together professionals from different backgrounds to ponder over the issues of peace and conflict in South Asia. It has been able to chalk out a South Asian Vision, which envisages a pluralistic, stable and peaceful South Asia. Various SAFMA conferences were held, for example, on ‘Regional Cooperation in South Asia’ in Dhaka in August 2004, on ‘Interstate Conflicts in South Asia’ in October 2004 in New Delhi, and on ‘Intrastate Conflicts in South Asia’ in Colombo in November 2004. Away from the issues of war and peace, SAFMA also attempted to raise awareness about the practice of stereotyping gender in the media by organizing a regional workshop in Kathmandu in collaboration with Sancharika Samuha in June 20004. In this regard, a Pakistan–India Parliamentary Conference on ‘Understanding, Confidence Building and Conflict Resolution’ was held in Islamabad in August 2003, to attempt to develop a consensus over the declaration of ceasefire along the LoC, withdrawal of troops from the international border, and the need to take confidence building measures. Consequently, all the parties represented in the Indian and Pakistani parliaments attended this meeting. The SAFMA conference helped to create a political space for the two governments to take nascent steps by announcing CBMs. A landmark achievement of SAFMA was the arrangement of a historic visit across the LoC in Indian-controlled Kashmir in October 2004 by 17 Pakistani journalists. This was followed by a reciprocal visit of Indian journalists to Pakistani- controlled Kashmir. The visits of Indian and Pakistani journalists to Kashmir and the Northern Areas helped to de-stereotype the mindset of the media on the two sides. All these developments have led to increased contact between the citizens and civil society of India and Pakistan. Talk of peace has become ‘politically correct’.246 In addition to arranging visits and organizing seminars, SAFMA has brought out several publications and news portals on South Asian affairs to enhance understanding of the challenges facing this region. Its website ‘South Asian Media Net’ has quickly gained the reputation of being one of the major sources of news on South Asian affairs. It is updated daily. South Asian newspapers have increasingly 140 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in turned to this website to gain information. SAFMA’s South Asian Journal has gained the respect and appreciation of experts, academics and officials. It has provided a platform for debate on policy issues across South Asia for debate and deliberation on the problems facing this region. It is clear that the South Asian media are at last growing out of the nationalist mould and playing a positive role in campaigning for peace in the region. If the media relate to expression of goodwill, it is economic activity which provides substance to interaction on a routine basis. Economic cooperation, trade and commerce can play a critical role in transforming regions from conflict to peace. Track Three diplomacy is often defined as ‘peace building through commerce’. In the post-Cold War era, arguments of liberals about the efficacy of economic interdependence in generating peace have gained currency. It is argued that those states which enter into trade and economic cooperation with each other ‘would rather trade than invade’.247 Liberals argue that as long as high levels of interaction and interdependence operate between states, the chances of war or conflict remain negligible. The gains from trade entice a state to avoid risking a war with its partners. In South Asia, the level of regular trade between India and Pakistan is very low. However, with the onset of SAFTA, the level of economic interaction is expected to increase between the two states. In this constrained milieu, there have been several initiatives from the trade and commerce community to contribute to mutual interdependence between India and Pakistan. The Punjab, Haryana and Delhi (PHD) Chamber of Commerce and Industry India-Pakistan Desk have attempted to promote bilateral trade between the two countries since its inception in 1982. It remains in close contact with the Indian and Pakistani High Commissions and trade ministries, and often arranges exchange programmes with various chambers of commerce in Pakistan. It arranges seminars and discussions frequently on the prospects of trade and extends recommendations to the India–Pakistan Joint Commission on Trade. For example, in April 2001 it arranged a visit of women entrepreneurs from Peshawar to India.248 Later, after the Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 141 conclusion of a visit by an Indian delegation to Pakistan in 2003, their Tea Associations signed a memorandum of understanding to increase the import of Indian tea from 3 million kg to 10 million kg for the next year. An extremely important initiative in this context is the formation of the India–Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry announced by Indian and Pakistani business leaders in May 2005. This joint forum of Indian and Pakistani businessmen intends to bring the two countries closer by enhancing the level of trade, which at present stands at $500 million.249 There is now greater recognition of the ability of the business community to increase economic cooperation and thus create a constituency for peace. Even the governments on the two sides have recognized the importance of trade in conflict resolution and peace building, and have given trade issues importance in the Composite Dialogues. Various civil society organizations involved in conflict-resolution activities between India and Pakistan have started to engage business leaders to enlighten them about their peace building capabilities.250 There have been other initiatives from the business community which are more in the nature of institutionalization, such as formation of Joint Business Councils (JBC) composed of representatives of South Asia’s business federations. Initially, it was only an agreement of cooperation between the Indian, Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan chambers of commerce. With passage of time, other business associations from South Asian countries joined in. Its main objective is to investigate and suggest solutions to cross- border difficulties in the realm of trade and investment. In 1995, business leaders from South Asia held a meeting in Colombo to discuss ways of improving economic cooperation. It resulted in the formation of the South Asian Business Leader’s Forum, composed of distinguished businessmen from each country. This forum came out with the ‘Colombo Declaration’ which agreed to establish a Confederation of South Asian Rim Business, also professing a desire to develop close economic relations with South-East Asian countries. Another regional initiative, the South Asia Network of Economic Research Institutes (SANEI), was formed in June 1998 with the support of the World Bank. SANEI has attempted 142 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in to develop linkages between the economic research institutes in South Asia. It seeks to generate knowledge and information about various economic issues and challenges facing the South Asian states.251 By all accounts, South Asia is witnessing the rise of the business community as the vanguard of regional cooperation and interdependence. In fact, it can ultimately prove to be the biggest catalyst for peace in the region.252 There are a number of national and international NGOs in South Asia which are sponsoring and supporting the citizen peace initiatives. In Pakistan, a major organization at the forefront of efforts to enhance people-to-people dialogue is Action Aid Pakistan. Action Aid has supported numerous citizen peace initiatives. For instance, it was one of the sponsors of the Pen and Peace Conference held between Indian and Pakistani writers during 17–23 October 2003. Subsequently, the 10th SAARC Writers’ Conference held in Lahore during 11–14 March 2004 was supported by Action Aid. In December 2003, the Indian and Pakistani branches of Action Aid funded a distinctive peace endeavour, the Farmers for Peace initiative. An 18-member delegation including farmers, agricultural and peace activists from Pakistan took a message of peace to Rajasthan. They called upon the Indian and Pakistani governments to invest their resources in improving the lives of ordinary people. According to the participants, peace between India and Pakistan is essential, as farmers are the worst victims of conflict and hostility.253 The two countries being agricultural economies, the majority of the people live below the poverty line. They have expressed their support for greater trade between the two countries as it would significantly benefit their agriculture.254 Another citizen peace initiative supported by Action Aid was the Cricket for Peace venture, in which a 31-member team of young Indian cricketers visited Pakistan for two weeks. They interacted with Pakistani youth and played matches in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Larkana, Karachi and Kasur. In February–March 2005, a team of young Pakistani cricketers made a return visit to India.255 In other words, the Action Aid is making a valuable contribution to the peace movement by sponsoring numerous people-to-people dialogues which would result in greater understanding between the Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 143 citizens of India and Pakistan. There are several institutions operating in the civil society serving their special circumstances but operating in the peace movement at the same time. The Pakistan Institute of Labor Education and Research (PILER) promotes reconciliation between India and Pakistan by expanding dialogues between non-state actors. PILER is fundamentally associated with the struggle to improve the condition of the labour and working classes in Pakistan. It is also involved in forging linkages with labour unions across the region. PILER has consistently aligned itself with the peace movement, with the message that the working classes pay a heavy cost for Indo- Pakistan hostility. It has held conferences, seminars and lectures regularly across the region, such as the Karachi Peace Conference, anti-nuclear lecture visit of Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in December 2000, and an anti-nuclear conference in New Delhi which led to the founding of CNDP. A South Asian Peace Coalition was established due to the efforts of PILER. This organization was in the forefront of efforts to promote linkages with the labour unions across the region leading to the establishment of the South Asian Labor Forum (SALF). PILER is closely aligned with PIPFPD in promoting people-to-people contact between India and Pakistan, having supported a number of citizen peace initiatives. In 1996, it funded the visit of pro-peace writers, journalists and doctors to India on the invitation of the Peoples of Asia Association. On the 50th anniversary of India’s and Pakistan’s Independence, PILER arranged peace seminars and meetings in Karachi.256 Thus, it is observed that with the rise in the number and scope of activities of NGOs in the region, the peace movement has gained tremendously. These civil society organizations have actively engaged in efforts to promote people-to-people contact in the region, which is essential to overcome the trust deficit between the two peoples.257 The labour and trade union community in India and Pakistan has participated vigorously in the citizen peace initiatives: the underlying idea is that the working classes of South Asia have been adversely affected by the official policies of incessant militarization. In a region where more than half the population lives below 144 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in the poverty line and the states spend heavily on building their conventional and nuclear weapons leaving scarce resources for the social sectors like education, health and civic facilities, workers have a direct interest in campaigning for peace and reconciliation. The workers argue that their social and political rights have constantly been suppressed in the name of national security by the ruling elite. It is widely perceived that the founding of SAARC did not pave the way for greater cooperation and contact between the peoples of South Asia. They contend that the militarization of the market through intervention of the Armed Forces in the administration of public infrastructure and the rise of market forces in the form of globalization and regionalization present grave challenges to the working classes. In this context, the labour community of South Asia endeavours to undertake cooperative national and regional initiatives to improve its social, economic and political life.258 However, the labour movement in South Asia remains extremely weak and fragmented. The ethnic diversity of this region is also reflected through the labour movement, as labour unions are divided along ethnic lines. Indeed, the labour market also operates along sectoral lines. The rural labour is ‘segmented and dispersed’, while the urban workers are further divided into small, formal or organized sectors and a large informal and unorganized sector. Hence, only 5– 10 percent of the workers are actually part of the labour movement in South Asia. Further, trade unions are divided along political, ideological and personal lines. At the same time, the South Asian trade unions have institutional linkages with the international trade union confederations. But there is hardly any cooperation between South Asian labour groups at the regional level even when they are part of the same international labour confederation. There have been a few attempts by different labour groups and organizations to develop regional linkages and cooperation. These include the initiatives taken by international trade union confederations and their associates, international trade secretariats, and independent trade union and labour support centres. One such initiative came from the labour and trade unions in the South Asian Labor Forum (SALF) in 1996, meant to enhance Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 145 solidarity and cooperation between the working classes across South Asia for peace and labour rights. Since its inception, it has made only modest progress. However, it has been able to form linkages with labour organizations existing across the divide, even during the periods of tensions between India and Pakistan. Like other people-to-people initiatives, SALF’s activities have contributed to softening the enemy images.259 One of the initiatives taken by SALF is to campaign for the release and humane treatment of Indian and Pakistani fishermen, who frequently drift into the territorial waters of the other side leading to lengthy prison terms, often without getting their basic human rights. According to the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, there are hundreds of Indian and Pakistani fishermen languishing in jails across the border for years. It was due to the efforts of these trade unions and labour groups that the Indian and Pakistani governments announced the release of 268 Indian and 93 Pakistani fishermen in January and March 2005.260 In this way, the working classes of South Asia are ‘waging peace’ through citizen activism, mobilization and formation of cross-border linkages.261 Human rights activism has recently moved to the mainstream peace movement. In this regard, a leading initiative which works for the promotion of respect for human rights, peace and democracy in South Asia is the South Asian Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR). As a regional public forum established in 1990, SAFHR is a human rights organization taking peace as a cornerstone value. In this regard, SAFHR organizes different courses involving participants from across South Asia, i.e. Human Rights and Peace Studies Orientation Courses. Through its regional dialogues, it has encouraged the development of new and fresh perceptions on refugee and minority issues. It has paid special attention to women and the media, as constituencies which can effectively work towards the promotion of ideals of peace in the region. SAFHR has been in the forefront of efforts to promote people-to-people contact. It supported the foundation of PIPFPD in the mid-1990s. Its activities include regional dialogues, peace audits, courses in Human Rights and Peace Studies, training workshops and advocacy campaigns. It works in 146 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in partnership with an association of 40 civil society organizations, all of which share its ideals of peace, human rights and democracy. Funding for SAFHR is mostly provided by German and Dutch donor organizations.262 Research and lobbying relating to human rights, refugees, media freedom, torture and other forms of oppression is represented by the South Asia Human-Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC). Established in 1989, it maintains an informal network of individual and partner organizations in various countries of South Asia attempting to develop common approaches and perspectives to human rights. It holds meetings with its partner organizations on a biannual basis. It has come out with a number of publications, often publishing investigative reports on different conflicts and issues in South Asian countries. The principal source of funding for the activities of SAHRDC is the fees that it charges for its research and investigative work, though it also benefits from small donations made by concerned individuals and organizations.263 Such organizations are primarily focused on improving the human rights standards in the region. But their efforts result in growth and development of greater linkages between individuals and associations across the borders, laying the turf for improvement of relations in the region. In this section, we endeavoured to take a bird’s eye view of civil society’s participation in citizen peace dialogues. The numbers and activities of NGOs and civil society have flourished in the last two decades in South Asia. The citizen peace initiatives have greatly benefited from the input of these organizations. In this context, we have looked at the contributions to Track Three diplomacy made by the media, the business and labour communities. We have studied the efforts made by national and regional NGOs to support and sponsor these dialogues. Our observations amply point to the fact that there is a dynamic civil society initiative for peace in Pakistan which came to its own during the 1990s and the early 2000s. It is expected that this initiative will continue to be in place with an expanding commitment to engage an increasing number of activists from the larger society. Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 147

Citizen Diplomacy: An Appraisal

In the final section of this chapter, we shall attempt to evaluate the accomplishments of Track Three diplomacy in South Asia. We have analysed the origins, evolution and progress of some of the citizen peace initiatives. We shall now attempt to develop a perspective on their contribution to their professed cause. What kinds of pressures and obstacles have been faced by citizen peace activists? How can Track Three dialogues expand into a larger peace movement? What is the popular perception about Track Three dialogues? Having looked into the theory and practice of citizen diplomacy in South Asia, our objective is to examine its contribution to Indo-Pakistan relations. In recent years, the citizens of India and Pakistan have taken various initiatives to ‘defy the divide’, and to promote reconciliation between the two neighbours. In South Asia, the leading lights of peace activism have been intellectuals who conceived the ideas of peace and began to influence others. Peace activism has mostly been a middle-class phenomenon involving intellectuals, teachers, small traders, journalists, businessmen, feminists, writers and artists. To some extent, the peace movement in Pakistan can be considered to be an urban phenomenon. But the overwhelming majority of its participants are not necessarily English-speaking.264 Track Three diplomacy is a relatively novel phenomenon in South Asia. It has often been criticized for not being able to produce path-breaking treaties and settlements between India and Pakistan. What needs to be remembered is the fact that Track Two or Three processes can never substitute Track One diplomacy. The ultimate power to take decisions on matters of war and peace rests with the national leaders. The significance of societal initiatives lies in their ability to create a lobby and carve out a space for peace. The activities of such groups contribute to the creation of conditions of justice, equality and fairness within these societies. All these efforts will ultimately contribute towards the establishment of a just and sustainable peace within and between societies. The peace activists argue that Track Three processes have led to opening of new windows. They 148 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in have presented the people with the possibility of existence of an alternative future. Due to their efforts, a realization is setting in that the two countries can not continue in a mode of confrontation forever.265 These noble sentiments notwithstanding, it might be difficult to accurately measure the impact of Track Three processes. It can be reasonably argued that South Asians have begun to overcome some of the old stereotypes. Citizen peace activism has facilitated humanization of the ‘other’. New connections and linkages have been established between citizens, research institutes and professional organizations. There have been some practical changes due to the efforts of citizen diplomats. The PIPFPD members convinced the two governments to allow the crossing of Wagah– Attari border on foot. This land link between India and Pakistan sees the highest level of two-way traffic since the 1965 war. The process of granting visas has become relatively more flexible as large numbers of students, academics, journalists, politicians, lawyers and businessmen are benefiting from it. Additionally, peace activists attribute the resumption of official dialogues between India and Pakistan partly due to their efforts to mobilize public opinion and pressurize the two governments. A long-held demand of peace activists has been accepted in the form of suspension of hostilities across the LoC. The Indian and Pakistani governments have picked up the slogans of religious tolerance raised by citizen diplomats, and have vowed to work towards reduction of the influence of religious fundamentalism.266 Official resistance has been one of the major obstacles tothe success and flourishing of citizen diplomacy in South Asia. This is especially true for Pakistan. In the beginning, it used to be very difficult for Pakistani peace activists to be openly critical of their government’s policies. In contrast, Indian peace activists enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom. In Pakistan, under official pressure, publishers frequently refused to publish books or articles penned by peace activists. Cases were often filed against them and their names put on the Exit Control Lists (ECL). In 1996, members of PIPFPD who had demanded a solution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 149 with the aspirations of the Kashmiri people and who protested against continuation of hostility between India and Pakistan faced severe harassment from the intelligence agencies. A public campaign of defamation was waged against PIPFPD members. Demands were made in the vernacular press that they be imprisoned or hanged.267 Another incident quoted by peace activists was the holding of a seminar, ‘Prithvi Missile: Pakistan’s Response’ on 10 February 1996. Extremely negative press coverage was given to this seminar. Peace activists were declared to be traitors and Indian agents. However, the citizen peace groups acknowledge that in the last three years, the situation has improved to a great extent because the governments are themselves engaged in diplomacy and negotiations about the resolution of contentious disputes.268 The strict visa regime imposed by the two governments has been a huge obstacle. Citizen diplomats often failed to attend meetings across the border due to their failure to obtain visas. Even after arriving in the other country, the peace activists faced other problems, such as reporting to police stations, as well ‘obtrusive surveillance’ by the intelligence agencies of the host country.269 However, with the apparent softening in official rhetoric since 2003, these restrictions seem to been relaxed for peace activists. Peace activists are conscious that strenuous work lies ahead for peace to prevail in South Asia. Peace building is a hard and long process. It is not an end in itself, but a means to a better future for South Asian people so that they can live decent lives and contribute to the growth and development of humanity. For peace to triumph in South Asia, the general population needs to be convinced about the peace dividends. An important goal should be to continue with these people-to-people dialogues. More studies need to be carried out about the benefits of peace between India and Pakistan. Bringing about a mindset focused on conflict resolution is a necessary prerequisite in this context. It is true that Track Three has generated a momentum for peace, but the decisions ultimately lie in the hands of the governments. Therefore, a definite move forward in official negotiations is required.270 Track Three participants proudly claim that, after two decades, the governments of India and Pakistan have 150 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in finally acceded to their vision and that citizen diplomacy has paved the way for future state-level negotiations. Not surprisingly, Track Three participants demand representation in official negotiations. It has been suggested that new mechanisms for interaction and communication between the governments and civil society need to be created in both the countries. However, the concept of civil society needs to be redefined. In order to be more effective, civil society needs to make connections ‘with the enormous potential of a vast network of social movements at the grassroots level’.271 The peace activists contend that just and sustainable peace cannot be achieved in the absence of democracy, and that peace will only prevail if there is justice within and between the states and societies.272 The agenda to transform citizen peace activism into a large-scale popular movement needs stronger and more organized initiatives. For example, the PIPFPD, as the largest peace initiative between India and Pakistan does not have a secretariat of its own, though it has offices in Lahore and Karachi. More resources need tobe put into existing peace initiatives. Citizen peace diplomacy needs to reach out to different sections of society. Pakistan is demographically a young country with around 56 per cent of the population below 20. Obviously, the path to peace lies through the youth, which must be engaged in these processes to a greater extent.273 The majority of the peace activists interviewed by the author strongly emphasized the need to change textbooks and curricula in India and Pakistan. The South Asian children are ‘brought up as nationalists or communalists, tutored to fall in love only with the nation, they have come to share’.274 Rewriting of history is a basic prerequisite to peace in the region. With the Internet, we find a new platform to establish linkages across national borders. Although it still remains inaccessible to a large number of people in the region, it provides a unique forum to exchange views and build bridges amongst the South Asian people. South Asian Citizens Web is an independent group on the Internet where South Asian citizens are able to freely exchange views and develop an understanding of each other. The rise of satellite channels is yet another positive development for popular interaction in South Asia. The print media need to be mobilized Citizen Diplomacy: Case of India and Pakistan 151 to provide an alternative view to the two peoples. In this regard, a suggestion has been made that the circulation of newspapers across the border should be increased, which would go a long way in toning down their hawkish rhetoric. However, all these suggestions and criticism cannot belie the fact that the support base of the citizen peace initiatives has widened in the last decade. Of late, the vision of citizen diplomats appears to have been taken up by the official decision-making circles. Citizen diplomacy seems to have a bright future in South Asia. Our observations in this section have aimed at evaluating the successes and failures of Track Three diplomacy in South Asia. Citizen peace initiatives have persuaded people and governments to ‘think out of the box’.275 The ruling establishments have often viewed these activities with suspicion. But partly due to the efforts of citizen peace initiatives, the governments have gradually adopted a more accommodative attitude. In order to become a popular peace movement, the citizen peace groups need to convert the large alienated sections of the society to their own cause.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have attempted to explore the theory and practice of citizen diplomacy between India and Pakistan. With the onset of globalization and the information revolution, various regions of the world are moving towards cooperation and integration. Diplomacy and statecraft are being redefined in the light of these changes. These developments have facilitated the rise of non-state actors and transnational citizen groups, and enabled them to intervene in matters of wars and peace. In South Asia, popular interaction is very limited due to the interplay of psychological, infrastructural, administrative and legislative factors. The citizens of South Asia find it hard to travel across national borders. Citizen peace diplomacy between India and Pakistan has finally emerged in this enormously constrained setting. Small-scale and personalized citizen initiatives between India and Pakistan had sporadically existed. But in the last two decades, there has been 152 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in the emergence of organized, well-connected and large citizen peace initiatives in South Asia. PIPFPD is a primary illustration of this phenomenon. We have also attempted to explore the origin, growth, working and contribution of citizen peace processes which have resulted in breaking old stereotypes, presenting alternative views of the past and future, and pressurizing the two governments into toning down their hawkish rhetoric. India and Pakistan have begun to deal with multiple contentious issues and obstacles during the last two decades. With the rise in the popularity and legitimacy of citizen peace initiatives, and the willingness of the governments to initiate the processes of conflict resolution through dialogue, the prospects of peace and reconciliation returning to South Asia look bright. chapter VI Conclusion

This study was an effort to examine the phenomenon of citizen diplomacy between India and Pakistan. In order to understand the momentous challenge of peace building in the region, we attempted to contextualize the conflict in South Asia in conceptual and comparative terms. The focal point of our inquiry was the phenomenon of multi-track diplomacy. We examined the successes and failures of Track One and Two dialogues to break the ice between the two countries and then developed a perspective on citizen peace diplomacy in South Asia with special emphasis on Pakistan. We observed that, having originated at the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, the ‘peace’ and ‘research’ agendas of Peace Studies have immensely expanded in the last five decades. Since the end of the Cold War, new dimensions of the theory and practice of peace have emerged. However, this discipline is still at an early stage of development in South Asia. Our study of peace building in three different continents demonstrated the significance of external intervention and citizen peace movements in generating the momentum for peace. We observed that the regional analysis gained ground after the end of the Cold War and various regions of the world moved to cooperation in the domain of security and commerce. However, South Asia was largely unaffected due to the persistence of hostility between India and Pakistan. Our enquiry into the process of conflict resolution between the two countries revealed that the Rann of Katch and Indus Water Treaty are the only instances of successful resolution of disputes between them. A number of channels were used by India and Pakistan to settle their disputes, such as resort to external intervention by international organizations or world powers. In the category of Track One negotiations, the Tashkent Declaration, the Simla Agreement and 154 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Lahore Declaration are the only successful agreements. Even these agreements failed to pave the way for a permanent settlement of Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Since 1990, numerous rounds of Track Two negotiations were held between the two countries. However, like Track One, these dialogues did not make progress. Conditions of asymmetry and divergence over the role of external mediation were critical factors in the failure of Indo-Pakistan negotiations under Track One and Two diplomacy. In the context of emergence of citizen diplomacy for peace- making between India and Pakistan, we analysed the nature of people-to-people contact in the region. Numerous psychological, infrastructural, administrative and legislative factors obstructed popular interaction in the region. However, in the backdrop of inability of Track One and Two processes to resolve Indo-Pakistan disputes, citizen peace activism gained prominence during the last two decades. In this context, we attempted to analyse various Track Three peace initiatives. One of the largest, most prominent and effective initiatives is PIPFPD, which has gained strength and legitimacy. The citizen peace movement in the Indian subcontinent has enormously expanded due to participation of a variety of sections of the society such as women, youth, writers, artists, former soldiers, physicians, farmers, the media, big business and NGOs. We observed that Track Three diplomacy has generated a positive response in the region in favour of peace. Initially, the citizen peace activists had to operate in an extremely tense environment. However, the ruling establishments have gradually softened their attitude to citizen dialogues. While the ultimate power lies in the hands of governments, citizen peace diplomacy has contributed to reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan. The limited success achieved by the citizen dialogues reflects the conservative dynamics of policy making in the region. The policy-making community outside the government is very small, and an ‘iron curtain’ divides those ‘inside’ the establishment from those ‘outside’ it. Nevertheless, the biggest contribution of citizen peace dialogue is the gradual humanization of the ‘other’. The Indo-Pakistan conflict has received fresh academic and Conclusion 155 practical evaluation in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests. It has been argued that the IR theory does not necessarily explain all the dynamics of Indo-Pakistan dichotomy. For instance, the deterrence theory was traditionally used to analyse the uneasy balance of power between India and Pakistan since 1998. However, it fails to explain certain aspects of the nuclear behaviour of the two countries, a case in point being the pattern of nuclearization of India and Pakistan as well as their lack of enthusiasm to develop underground nuclear facilities notwithstanding the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike.276 Another criticism of the traditional IR theory is that its paradigms fail to analyse the situation in the Third World. Emphasis is placed on the key concepts of anarchy, the state and the international system. It was argued that the international system was more a case of hierarchy than anarchy for the countries of the Third World. Due to the attributes of power differentiation, the Third World states often felt constrained under the pressures of powerful states. The Third World states, most of which got independence after the end of the Second World War, continued to face tremendous internal political strife. Thus, anarchic conditions prevail within their political systems rather than outside them. They are still in the process of state-formation, leading to conflict, specially in situations where boundaries of states were drawn by the colonial powers cutting across ethnic, tribal, linguistic, and cultural identities. The mainstream IR theory ignores domestic variables affecting conflict and order. This leaves the conflicts in the Third World, as is the case with the Indo-Pakistan rivalry, partially unexplained. In developing states, international conflicts are often an extension of internal conflicts, and can only be analysed keeping in view the process of state-formation, nation-building, and its interplay with the dynamics of regional balance and superpower rivalries. In this way, the internal conflicts are transported to the international system.277 In other words, new theories and paradigms need to be explored to develop a better understanding of the conflicts in the Third World, including South Asia. Attaining peace is more difficult than desiring it. Sustaining 156 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in peace once it has been attained is even more demanding. South Asia stands at the initial stage of desiring and striving to attain peace in the region. In this regard, it is argued that the governments of India and Pakistan should take steps to remove the impediments to interaction between their citizens. For example, the visa process should be relaxed for citizens intending to travel across the border. The number of visas issued should be increased. Both governments should take steps to remove the condition of police-reporting for the citizens. The normal practices of country visas instead of city visas should be invoked between the two countries. By taking these small steps, the governments of India and Pakistan can go a long way in creating conditions of peace in the region. It is time that the decision makers of the two countries adapt themselves to the alternative vision of South Asia espoused by citizen diplomats. To some extent, it has taken place in the last two years, when peace appears to have become ‘politically correct’. The governments are showing signs of flexibility as Composite Dialogues have been underway since 2004. Our discussions with a number of participants of Track Three dialogues revealed a crucial demand regarding the inclusion of citizen diplomats in official negotiations. These people are extremely alienated from the decision makers, as the real power lies in the hands of government officials. On its part, the governments can benefit from the experience and wisdom of citizen diplomats who have campaigned for dialogue during the last two decades. The first step could be in the direction of creating and institutionalizing new mechanisms of interaction between the government and the civil society. Another extremely important step in this regard is the need for rewriting the history of the Indian subcontinent. As observed earlier, the historical impediments to peace are grave. Since Partition, the South Asian governments focused on strengthening the enemy images through writing of biased history in textbooks to prepare future generations to adapt to the world-view of their governments. Peace cannot come to South Asia unless and until textbooks are revised so as to give an objective account of the past. This step can go a long way in reversing the tide of hatred in the region. Conclusion 157

The human cost of the Indo-Pakistan conflict is dreadful. The two governments have initiated a number of CBMs inthe last two years. This process needs to be expanded. For example, there are many Indian and Pakistani prisoners including fishermen languishing in each other’s prisons. The governments should exchange lists of prisoners and make arrangements to release them. The plight of these vulnerable prisoners of India and Pakistan needs urgent attention by the ruling elite.278 Similarly, the media play a critical role in changing popular perceptions. The electronic media in South Asia have gone a long way in promoting the cause of peace and reconciliation during the last few years. However, sections of the print media are still very hawkish. There is a case for the owners of newspaper houses to be engaged in Track Three processes. Furthermore, newspapers should have circulation across the border. The readership of the newspapers across the border can sensitize journalists to the need for covering broader news and views. It is argued that the participants of Track Three dialogues need to increase their outreach. Citizen peace activism has come a long way in the last two decades. There are few substantive youth peace initiatives in India and Pakistan. Being the future policy makers, the youth needs to be attuned to the vision of peace activists. Similarly, women should be given greater opportunities to participate in Track Three processes. Citizen peace activism has to move beyond the major cities of the region, reaching out to the people living in small cities and the countryside. In order for peace to become irreversible, people have to own this process and develop stakes in it. This can happen once regional economic cooperation increases interdependence between the two countries. It also needs to be recognized that the non-official dialogues between India and Pakistan are at a nascent stage. It is premature to expect quick results when formal diplomatic efforts have failed to make any headway for almost six decades. The official resistance to non-official dialogues on policy-related issues is a major obstacle. Still, one can see that a process of maturation of a community of like-minded people in India and Pakistan believing in the idea of South Asia is well underway.

Endnotes

1 Chadwick F. Alger, ‘Reflections on Peace Research Traditions’, International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1996, http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ ijps/vol1_1/Alger.htm 2 Herman Schmid, ‘Peace Research and Politics’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 5, no. 3, 1968, p. 217. 3 Peter Wallensteen, The Growing Peace Research Agenda, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #21:OP4, December 2001, pp. 2–3. 4 Alger, op. cit., n. 1 above. 5 Wallensteen, op. cit., n. 3 above, p. 7. 6 Ibid., pp. 8–10. 7 Moonis Ahmar and Farhan H. Siddiqi, ‘Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies’, in Social Sciences in Pakistan: A Profile, ed. Inayatullah, Rubina Saigol and Pervez Tahir, Islamabad: Council of Social Sciences, 2005, pp. 390–95. 8 Wallensteen, op. cit., n. 3 above, pp. 12–17. 9 Schmid, op. cit., n. 2 above, pp. 229–30. 10 Juergen Dedring, ‘On Peace in Times of War: Resolving Violent Conflicts by Peaceful Means’, International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, July 1999, http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol4_2/dedring.htm 11 Johan Galtung, ‘Peace and Conflict Research in the Age of the Cholera: Ten Pointers to the Future of Peace Studies’, International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1996, http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol1_1/Galtung.htm 12 Dedring, op. cit., n. 10 above. 13 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization, PRIO, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 1996, p. 2. 14 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts. From Escalation to Resolution, Lanham, Boulder (CO), New York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 2–3. 15 Kelman and Burton are quoted by Dedring, op. cit., n. 10 above. 16 Alger, op. cit., n. 1 above. 17 Ibid.; and Wallensteen, op. cit., n. 3 above, pp. 25–26. 18 William Eckhardt, ‘Bridging the Gap between Peace Action, Education and Research’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 25, no. 2, June 1988, pp. 183–85. 19 Gray Cox, The Ways of Peace: A Philosophy of Peace as Action, Mahwah (NJ): Paulist Press, 1986, p. 16. 20 Milton Rinehart, ‘Understanding the Concept of Peace: Search for Common Ground’, Peace and Change, vol. 20, no. 3, July 1995, p. 382. 21 Ibid., pp. 382–83. 22 Ibid., p. 382. 23 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 18, no. 3, 1969, p. 168. 160 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

24 Rinehart, op. cit., n. 20 above, pp. 384–85. 25 Cox, op. cit., n. 19 above, p. 94. 26 Rinehart, op. cit., n. 20 above, pp. 385–91. 27 John Burton, ‘Where do We Go from Here?’, International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, January 2001, http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol6_1/ Burton4.htm 28 Ronald J. Fisher, ‘The Potential for Peace Building’, Peace & Change, vol. 18, issue 3, July 1993, pp. 248–49. 29 Ibid., pp. 253–63. 30 Chadwick F. Alger, ‘The Quest for Peace: What are We Learning?’, International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, January 1999, http://www.gmu. edu/academic/ijps/vol4_1/alger.htm 31 Chadwick F. Alger, ‘The Emerging Tool Chest for Peace Builders’, International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, July 1996, http://www. gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol1_2/Alger.htm 32 Ibid. 33 Alger, op. cit., n. 30 above. 34 For a detailed discussion on various aspects of preventive diplomacy, see ibid. 35 Alice Ackerman, ‘Reconciliation as a Peace Building Process in Post-War Europe’, Peace and Change, vol. 19, issue 3, July 1994, pp. 229–51. 36 Charles Lerche, ‘Peace Building through Reconciliation’, International Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, Autumn/Winter 2000, http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol5_2/lerche.htm 37 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington, d.c.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p. 194. 38 Lerche, op. cit., n. 36 above. 39 For a detailed discussion on the effectiveness and contributions of reconciliation, see ibid. 40 Bjorn Moller, ‘Privatization of Conflict, Security and War’, DIIS Working Paper no. 2, 2005, p. 5. 41 Herman Joseph S. Kraft, ‘Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Asia Pacific Coalition in East Timor’, Global Networks, vol. 2, no. 1, 2002, pp. 50–51. 42 John McDonald, ‘The Track Not Taken’, Harvard International Review, vol. 22, issue 3, 2000, p. 68. 43 Ibid. 44 Harold H. Saunders, ‘Officials and Citizens in International Relationships: The Dartmouth Conference’, in The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Volume II, Unofficial Diplomacy at Work, ed. V. D. Volkan, J. V. Montville and D. A. Julius, Lexington (MA): Lexington Books, 1991, p. 49. 45 Navnita Chadha Behera, ‘Forging New Solidarities: Nonofficial Dialogues’, in Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, ed. Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen, Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 212. End Notes 161

46 Sheldon W. Simon, ‘Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: The CSCAP Experience’, Pacific Review, vol. 15, no. 2, 2002, pp. 171–72. 47 Kraft, op. cit., n. 41 above, p. 52. 48 Ibid. 49 M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca (NY) and London: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 8–12. 50 Kraft, op. cit., n. 41 above, pp. 52–53. 51 Ibid. 52 Ronald J. Diebert, ‘International Plug’n Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet, and Global Public Policy’, International Studies Perspective, vol. 1, 2000, p. 255. 53 Ibid., p. 256. 54 For a detailed discussion, see Michael W. Doyle, ‘War and Peace in Cambodia’, Working Paper, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, January 1997, pp. 6–8. 55 For an in-depth discussion, see ibid., pp. 9–17. 56 Rupert Taylor, Jacklyn Cock and Adam Habib, ‘Projecting Peace in Apartheid South Africa’, Peace and Change, vol. 24, no. 1, January 1999, pp. 1–2. 57 Ibid., pp. 3–10. 58 Charles A. Reilly, Peace-Building and Development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #25:OP:2, Notre Dame, Indiana: Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, October 2004, pp. 15–18. 59 Ibid., pp. 20–21. 60 Shibley Telhami, ‘The Camp David Accords: A Case of International Bargaining’, Columbia International Affairs Online Case Study, pp. 1–4, at http:// www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/tes01/tes01c.html 61 Ibid., pp. 4–10. 62 Ibid., pp. 10–31. 63 Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, 1993, p. 440. 64 Joseph Nye, International Regionalism, Readings, Part Two, Boston (MA): Little, Brown & Co., 1968, p. v. 65 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983, p. 106. 66 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 201. 67 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 378. 68 Barry Buzan, ‘Security Architecture in Asia’, The Pacific Review, vol. 16, no. 2, 2003, pp. 145–46. 69 For a discussion on RSCs, see Johan Ahlner and Magnus Grubbe, ‘European Security: Turkey’s Role in the New Global Context’, Masters 162 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in dissertation, University of Lund, Sweden, 2005, pp. 15–20, http://theses.lub.lu.se/ archive/2005/01/10/1105336708-8847-393/2ndtermapaperpdf.pdf 70 For detailed discussion on the different features and dynamics of Asian RSCs, see Buzan, op. cit, n. 6 above, pp. 146–51. 71 Robert E. Kuenne, ‘Conflict Management in Mature Rivalry’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 33, no. 3, 1989, pp. 554–66. 72 Jean Clermont, ‘Regional Rivalries in Northeast Asia’, paper for the 43rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 24–27 March 2002, http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/clermont.html 73 John A. Vasquez, ‘Distinguishing Rivals that Go to War from those that do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 4, 1996, p. 532. 74 D. Scott Bennett, ‘Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 2, 1996, p. 160. 75 Michael d. McGinnis, ‘A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 1, p. 111. 76 Clermont, op. cit., n. 10 above. 77 Ibid. 78 Alagappa, op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 443. 79 See Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, pp. 203–6. 80 Ibid., pp. 203–10. 81 Alagappa, op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 442. 82 The strategy of socialization is employed to develop security regimes. Integration can help to overcome the security dilemmas of states and accelerate the development of a security community. Reassurance and deterrence can help in preventing the outbreak of war. See ibid. 83 For a detailed discussion on the typology of regional conflicts and the different dimensions of contribution of the regional security organizations, see ibid., pp. 442–47. 84 For a general discussion of these points, see P. R. Chari, ‘National Security and Regional Cooperation: The Case of South Asia’, in Regional Economic Trends and South Asian Security, ed. Iftekharuzzaman, Colombo: RCSS Publications, 1997, pp. 189–91. 85 For a comprehensive discussion on various dimensions of ethnic conflict in South Asia, see P. Sahadevan, ‘Ethnic Conflict in South Asia’, Working Paper, Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, June 1999. 86 Subrata K. Mitra, ‘War and Peace in South Asia: A Revisionist View of India–Pakistan Relations’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 10, no. 3, 2001, pp. 365–77. 87 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Re-Conceptualizing Regional Dynamics: Case of India and Pakistan’, paper for the Regional Workshop on South Asian Conceptions on International Relations: Search for Alternative Paradigms, Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA), Universiti Kebangsaan Selangor End Notes 163

(Malaysia), Goa, India, 20–21 October 2003, p. 3. 88 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 89 Ibid., pp. 2–7. 90 For details, see Subrata K. Mitra, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon: India’s Self- Perception and the South Asian Strategic Environment’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 12, no. 3, 2003, pp. 399–417. 91 Jean Luc-Racine, ‘Living With India: Relations Between Pakistan and India’, in A History of Pakistan and its Origins, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot, London: Anthem Press, 2002, p. 112. 92 Peter T. Coleman, ‘Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Towards the Development of a Metaframework-I’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, vol. 9, no. 1, 2003, p. 4. 93 Ibid., p. 5. 94 Ibid., pp. 5–7. 95 Stephen Cohen, ‘India, Pakistan and Kashmir’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 25, issue 4, December 2002, pp. 33–34. 96 For details, see ibid., pp. 34–39. 97 Raju G. C. Thomas, ‘Reflections on the Kashmir Problem’, in Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas, Boulder (CO), San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 3–4. 98 See Gowher Rizvi, ‘India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Problem, 1947–1972’, ibid., pp. 49–76. 99 For details, see Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan, India and Kashmir: A Historical Review’, in Thomas, op. cit., n. 35 above, pp. 108–10. 100 George Fernandes links the outbreak of insurgency in Kashmir with the political failure of the Indian governments. For details, see George Fernandes, ‘India’s Policies in Kashmir: An Assessment and Discourse’, in Thomas, op. cit., n. 35 above, pp. 286–89. 101 For a critique of Pakistan’s involvement in the Kashmir uprising, see Luc- Racine, op. cit., n. 29 above, pp. 127–28. 102 See Gowher Rizvi, ‘India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Problem, 1947–1972’, in Thomas, op. cit., n. 35 above, pp. 49–76. 103 Kuldip Nayar is quoted by Smruti Pattanaik: Elite Perceptions of Foreign Policy: Role of Print Media in Influencing India–Pakistan Relations, 1989–1999, Colombo: RCSS Publications, 2004, p. 29. 104 Ibid., pp. 29–33. 105 For a detailed study of the opinions held by the Pakistani elite concerning the Kashmir issue, see ibid., pp. 33–47. 106 Feroz Hassan Khan and Christopher Clary, ‘Dissuasion and Regional Allies: The Case of Pakistan’, Strategic Insights, vol. III, issue 10, October 2004, http:// www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/oct/khanoct04.pdf 107 Mitra, op. cit., n. 24 above, 2001, p. 71. 108 For more details, see Robert G. Wirsing, ‘Pakistan and the United States 2004–2005: Deepening the Entente’, Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Special Assessment, February 2005, pp. 1–8, http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/ 164 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

APandtheUS/WirsingPakistan2.pdf 109 Mitra, op. cit., n. 28 above, p. 399. 110 Ramesh Thakur, ‘India in the World: Neither Rich, Powerful, nor Principled’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 4, July/August 1997, p. 15. 111 For elaboration, see Farzana Shaikh, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime’, International Affairs, vol. 78, no. 1, 2002, pp. 44–46. 112 Waseem, op. cit., n. 25 above, pp. 7–8. 113 Lawrence Ziring, ‘The Rann of Kutch Arbitration’, in Pakistan in a Changing World, ed. Masuma Hasan, Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978, pp. 140–41. 114 Denise Wright, India–Pakistan Relations 1962–1969, Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi: Vanguard, 1989, p. 59. 115 Ibid., p. 60. 116 Ziring, op. cit., n. 51 above, pp. 141–45. 117 For details, see Wright, op. cit., n. 52 above, pp. 62–65. 118 For a detailed analysis of the decision of the Rann of Kutch arbitration tribunal, see Ziring, op. cit., n. 51 above, pp. 148–55. 119 Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri People, Boulder (CO) and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, pp. 169–70. 120 Ibid., pp. 170–76. 121 For details, see ibid., pp. 171–76. 122 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: The Disputed Legacy 1846–1990, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 164. 123 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996, p. 159. 124 Lamb, op. cit., n. 60 above, p. 168. 125 Rahman, op. cit., n. 57 above, p. 89. 126 For detailed discussion of the regional plebiscite proposal, see Lamb, op. cit., n. 60 above, pp. 171–75. 127 For a critical account of the UN’s role in resolving the Indo-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir, see ibid., pp. 168–79; also see Rahman, op. cit., n. 57 above, pp. 85–103. 128 Krishnan Srinivasan, ‘The Commonwealth, India and Lost Opportunities in South Asia’, Asian Affairs, vol. 32, issue 2, June 2001, pp. 133–36. 129 Lamb, op. cit., n. 60 above, pp. 220–25. 130 For a discussion on the role played by SAARC in conflict resolution in South Asia, see Ross Mallick, ‘Cooperation among Antagonists: Regional Integration and Security in South Asia’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 2, issue 1, 1993, p. 41. 131 For an account of British mediation in the Rann of Kutch crisis, see Ziring, op. cit., n. 51 above, pp. 144–46. 132 Wright, op. cit., n. 52 above, pp. 68–73. 133 For details, see Rahman, op. cit., n. 57 above, pp. 112–15. 134 Wright, op. cit., n. 52 above, p. 78. End Notes 165

135 Ibid., pp. 75–79. 136 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, ‘The United State’s Role and Influence on the India–Pakistan Conflict’, 2004, pp. 31–33, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf- art2117.pdf 137 Ibid., pp. 33–38. 138 Henry Kissinger, ‘The Vietnam Negotiations’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 47, 1969, p. 214. 139 See I. William Zartman, ‘Negotiating Identity: From Metaphor to Process’, International Negotiation, vol. 6, 2001, p. 137. 140 Frank R. Pfetsch and Alice Landau, ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Negotiations’, International Negotiation, vol. 5, 2000, p. 23. 141 Ibid., pp. 38–41. 142 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846–1990, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 214–18. 143 S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 26–28. 144 Lamb, op. cit., n. 5 above, pp. 218–23. 145 Burke and Ziring, op. cit., n. 6 above, p. 39. 146 Lamb, op. cit., n. 5 above, pp. 224–34. 147 Ibid., pp. 234–43. 148 Burke and Ziring, op. cit., n. 6 above, pp. 230–39. 149 For a detailed analysis of the regional scenario leading up to the Tashkent dialogue and the details of this summit, see Hafeez Malik, Soviet–Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, London: Macmillan, 1994, pp. 176–93. 150 Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri People, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, pp. 124–29. 151 Ibid., p. 131. 152 Niloufer Mehdi, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971–1981: The Search for Security, Karachi: Ferozesons, 1999, pp. 81–82 and 131–35. 153 Burke and Ziring, op. cit., n. 6 above, pp. 420–21. 154 Nazir A. Mughal, ‘Inching Together or a Mile Apart: India and Pakistan Towards DÈtente’, in Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971–1998, ed. Mehrunnisa Ali, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 113. 155 For details, see Burke and Ziring, op. cit., n. 6 above, pp. 440–42, 452–59 and 468–71. 156 Khaled Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Ideology and Isolation’, World Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1, January–March 1999, pp. 43–45. 157 John C. Holzman, ‘A South Asian Peace Process’, Holzman Papers, National Defense University, 2001, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2001/ holzmanpaper.htm 158 Strategic Comments, ‘Dialogues Between India and Pakistan: Major Hurdles Ahead’, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, vol. 10, issue 1, February 2004, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/ 166 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in volume-10-2004/volume-10-issue-1/Dialoguesindiapakistan 159 V. Sudarshan, ‘The Door Opens a Wee Bit’, Outlook, 11 October 2004. 160 For a discussion on the concept of incentive in negotiations, see I. William Zartman, ‘Negotiating Internal Conflicts: Incentives and Intractability’, International Negotiation, vol. 6, 2002, p. 297. 161 Dean G. Pruitt, ‘The Tactics of Third Party Intervention’, Orbis, vol. 44, issue 2, Spring 2000, p. 245. 162 I. William Zartman, ‘Explaining Oslo’, International Negotiation, vol. 2, 1997, p. 196. 163 Some of the ideas mentioned here have been taken from Zartman, ibid., pp. 195–215. 164 For a detailed discussion of the Dartmouth process, see Manjrika Sewak, Multi-Track Diplomacy Between India and Pakistan: A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Security, Colombo: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, 2005, pp. 51–57. 165 Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘Track Two Diplomacy and the Regional Security in the Middle East’, International Negotiation, vol. 6, 2001, pp. 49–50. 166 Ibid., pp. 51–68. 167 Sandeep Waslekar, ‘Track Two Diplomacy in South Asia’, ACDIS Occasional Paper, Urbana: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois, October 1995, p. 1. 168 Navnita Chadha Behera, ‘Forging New Solidarities: Nonofficial Dialogues’, in Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, ed. Monique Mekenkemp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen, Boulder (CO) and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 213. 169 Aqil S. Shah, ‘Non-Official Dialogue Between India and Pakistan: Prospects and Problems’, ACDIS Occasional Paper, Urbana: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois, August 1997, p. 2. 170 Waslekar, op. cit., n. 30 above, p. 6. 171 These observations were made by Pakistani journalist Khaled Ahmed, who himself participated in the Neemrana process. His comments are quoted by Shah, op. cit., n. 32 above, p. 2. 172 For detailed discussion on different dimensions of the Neemrana process, see Sewak, op. cit., n. 27 above, pp. 40–44. 173 Shah, op. cit., n. 32 above, p. 13. 174 Ibid., p. 4. 175 For a detailed discussion on the contribution made by the Neemrana process, see Sewak, op. cit., n. 27 above, pp. 45–51. 176 For further details, see ibid., pp. 42–47. 177 See Shah, op. cit., n. 32 above, p. 5. 178 For details of the generational dimensions of the Track Two dialogues, see ibid., pp. 5–6. 179 See Waslekar, op. cit., n. 30 above, p. 6. End Notes 167

180 For details, see ibid., pp. 2–3. 181 See Shah, op. cit., n. 32 above, pp. 6–7. 182 Ibid., p. 8. 183 See Waslekar, op. cit., n. 30 above, p. 9. 184 See ibid., pp. 8–10; and Shah, op. cit., n. 32 above, pp. 8–14. 185 Navnita Chadha Behera, ‘Popular Interactions in South Asia: A Post- Modernist Agenda’, in People-to-People Contact in South Asia, ed. Navnita Chadha Behera, Victor Gunawardena, Shahid Kardar and Raisul Awal Mahmood, Colombo: RCSS Publications, 2000, pp. 38–40. 186 Shahid Kardar, ‘People-to-People Contact in South Asia: Scope and Constraints’, in ibid., pp. 91–94. 187 Behera, op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 46. 188 Kardar, op. cit., n. 2 above, pp. 94–97. 189 Behera, op. cit., n. 1 above, pp. 47–49. 190 Kardar, op. cit., n. 2 above, p. 105. 191 Ibid., p. 98. 192 Ibid., pp. 97–105. 193 Behera, op. cit., n. 1 above, pp. 52–56. 194 Interview with Afrasiab Khattak, president of the Pakistan chapter of PIPFPD, Peshawar, 3 December 2005. 195 Rita Manchanda, ‘Overview: Beyond the Peace Mela: Rethinking Strategies’, in Proceedings, Recommendations and Declaration of the Fifth Joint Convention of Pakistan–India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy, New Delhi: PIPFPD, 2000, p. 7. 196 Ibid. 197 Navnita Chadha Behera, Paul M. Evans and Gowher Rizvi, Beyond Boundaries: A Report on the State of Non-Official Dialogues on Peace, Security and Cooperation in South Asia, North York, Ontario: University of Toronto, York University, 1997, pp. 64–65. 198 Interview with I. A. Rehman, former president and a founding member of PIPFPD, Lahore, 20 September 2005. 199 Ibid. 200 Manchanda, op. cit., n. 11 above, p. 8. 201 Mubashir Hasan, ‘Pakistan–India Peace Process’, paper presented at a conference on Assessing People-to-People Initiatives, 24–27 May 2005, Lahore, Pakistan, p. 10. 202 PIPFPD, Report on Lahore Convention on Peace and Democracy: Proceedings and Recommendations, Lahore: PIPFPD, 1995, pp. 3, 23–32. 203 PIPFPD, Report on the Third Convention, Calcutta, New Delhi: PIPFPD, 1997, p. 7. 204 Interview with Kamran Islam, National Coordinator, PIPFPD, Lahore, 19 September 2005. 205 Interview with Khwaja Waseem, President, NWFP Chapter, PIPFPD. 206 Manchanda, op. cit., n. 11 above, pp. 7–13. 207 PIPFPD, Defy the Divide-Unite for Peace: Report on the Sixth Joint 168 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in

Convention 2003, Karachi: PIPFPD, 2003, pp. 7, 35–37. 208 Praful Bidwai, ‘Marching to Peace’, News, 26 March 2005. 209 Beena Sarwar, ‘March for Peace’, News, 17 May 2005. 210 Beena Sarwar, ‘Women’s Role in Building Peace between India and Pakistan’, paper presented at a workshop at the McGill Center for Teaching and Research on Women, McGill University, Montreal, 30 July–1 August 2004, p. 10, at http://upload.mcgill.ca/mcrtw/BeenaSarwarpaper.pdf 211 See Navnita Chadha Behera, ‘Forging New Solidarities: Nonofficial Dialogues’, in Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, ed. Monique Mekenkemp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de veen, Boulder (CO) and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 216. Also see Manjrika Sewak, Multi-Track Diplomacy Between India and Pakistan: A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Security, Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 44. 212 Adm. L. Ramdas (retd), ‘Sustaining India–Pakistan Peace: Challenges for Civil Society and the Military’, paper presented at a conference on Assessing People-to-People Initiatives, 24–27 May 2005, Lahore, p. 7. 213 Interview with Brig. Rao Abid Hameed (retd), member of IPSI and PIPFPD, Lahore, 20 September 2005. 214 Interview with Dr A. H. Nayyar, President, PPC, Islamabad, 19 November 2005. 215 See the Lucknow Declaration of CNDP, http://www.nuclear-free.com/ english/lucknow.htm. For details on CNDP, the author is thankful to Dr A. H. Nayyar who shared this information with the author in an interview; ibid. 216 Achin Vanaik, ‘Nuclear Disarmament: Building a Movement in South Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly, 5 February 2005, http://www.epw.org.in/ showArticles.php?root=2005&leaf=02&filename=8231&filetype=html 217 See the mission statement and general information about IPPNW on its website, http://www.ippnw.org/IPPNWBackground.html 218 Ibid. 219 See http://www.ippnw.org/SACrisis.html 220 IPPNW, Preventing War in South Asia: Joint Symposium of Indian Doctors for Peace and Development and the Pakistani Doctors for Peace and Development, 12 December 2004, http://www.ippnw.org/KarachiDeclaration1204.html 221 Interview with Tahira Abdullah, Islamabad, 30 November 2005. 222 Sewak, op. cit., n. 27 above, p. 101. 223 Ibid. 224 Sarwar, op. cit., n. 26 above, pp. 10–11. 225 Ibid., pp. 6–7. 226 Sewak, op. cit., n. 27 above, pp. 86, 103. 227 Abdullah, op. cit., n. 37 above. 228 Ajeet Cour, ‘Unveiling Our Initiatives for Forging Indo-Pak Bonds of Friendship’, paper presented at a conference on Assessing People-to-People Initiatives, 24–27 May 2005, Lahore, p. 1. 229 The official website of the SAARC Writers’ Foundation is www. End Notes 169 foundationsaarcwriters.com 230 FOSWAL, Pen and Peace Conference: A Dialogue between Indian and Pakistani Literatures, New Delhi: FOSWAL, 2004, pp. 1–5. 231 FOSWAL, Report on Tenth SAARC Writer’s Conference Understanding and Synergy through Literature, New Delhi: FOSWAL, 2005, p. 4. 232 Sheema Karmani, ‘Crossing Borders through Performing Arts’, paper presented at a conference on Assessing People-to-People Initiatives, 24–27 May 2005, Lahore, p. 2. 233 Ibid., pp. 1–8. 234 Jim Wake, ‘Positive Vibrations: Successes Large and Small’, in Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, ed. Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen, Boulder (CO) and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 39–40. 235 Behera, Evans and Rizvi, op. cit., n. 13 above, 1997, p. 78. 236 Discussions with Nusrat Sheikh, Interim National Convener, PIPFPD Youth Forum, Islamabad, August–December 2005. 237 IPYFP, Background and Annual Report of Indo-Pak Youth Forum for Peace, New Delhi: IPYFP, 2005, p. 1. 238 Ibid., pp. 2–11. 239 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Media and Peace’, quoted in the SAFMA Report on the Fourth South Asian Free Media Conference; see SAFMA, Media and Reconciliation in South Asia, Lahore: SAFMA, 2004, pp. 23–24. 240 Interview with Imtiaz Alam, Secretary General, SAFMA, Lahore, 19 September 2005. 241 SAFMA, ‘Ice is Melting: SAFMA and its Fourth Conference’, quoted in SAFMA, op. cit., n. 55 above, p. 6. 242 Ibid. 243 Alam, op. cit., n. 56 above. 244 Dale C. Copeland, ‘Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations’, International Security, vol. 20, no. 4, Spring 1996, p. 5. 245 Behera, op. cit., n. 27 above, pp. 216–17. 246 ‘Pak India form Joint Business Body’, Tribune, 26 May 2005, http://www. tribuneindia.com/2005/20050527/biz.htm#7 247 Sewak, op. cit., n. 27 above, p. 84. 248 Behera, op. cit., n. 27 above, p. 218. 249 Comments made by Dr Rasul Baksh Rais, Professor, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), in an interview with the author, Islamabad, 19 June 2005. 250 Interview with Iqbal Malik, farmer and peace activist, Multan, 23 September 2005. 251 ‘Pak Farmers’ Team in India to Talk Peace’, Hindustan Times, 25 December 2003. 252 Discussions with Nusrat Sheikh, working on the peace portfolio at Action Aid. 253 An introduction to the activities of PILER is provided on their website, 170 India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society in http://www.piler.org.pk/regional.html 254 Interview with Dr Inayatullah, Islamabad, 18 July 2005. 255 Karamat Ali and A. Ercelan, ‘South Asian Labor for Peace and Development’, paper presented at a conference on South Asian Security, University of Texas, Austin, 29–30 April 2004, http://www.sacw.net/Labour/SouthAsianLabourforPeace.doc 256 Ibid. 257 Khurram Baig, ‘The Invisible Border’, News, 29 March 2005. 258 Interview with Mohammad Ali Bhara, labour leader and peace activist, Multan, 22 September 2005. 259 For details on SAFHR, see http://www.safhr.org/index.php. Also see Behera, op. cit., n. 27 above, p. 222. 260 Ibid., pp. 219–220; also http://www.hri.ca/partners/sahrdc/about.htm 261 Comments made by Rashid Rehman, editor of the Post, a founding member of PIPFPD, Lahore, 19 September 2005. 262 Interview with Zia Qureshi, a founding member of the PIPFPD, Multan, 21 September 2005. 263 Interview with Khadim Hussain, founding member of the PIPFPD, Islamabad, 9 August 2005. 264 Nayyar, op. cit., n. 30 above. 265 Abdullah, op. cit., n. 37 above. 266 Interview with Kamran Islam, National Convener, PIPFPD, Lahore, 19 September 2005. 267 Interview with I. A. Rehman, Lahore, 20 September 2005. 268 Behera, op. cit., n. 27 above, p. 228. 269 Interview with Dr Rais Ahmed Khan, a founding member of the PIPFPD, Islamabad, 8 August 2005. 270 Interview with Afrasiab Khattak, Peshawar, 3 December 2005. 271 Behera, op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 57. 272 Ibid. 273 E. Sridharan, ‘International Relations Theory and the India–Pakistan Conflict’, India Review, vol. 4, no. 2, April 2005, pp. 104–6. 274 Ibid., pp. 110–12. 275 Interview with Brig. Rao Abid Hameed (retd), Lahore, 20 September 2005. RCSS PUBLICATIONS

BOOKS

• Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia (1996) • Nuclear Non-proliferation in India and Pakistan: South Asian Perspectives (1996) • Diplomacy and Domestic Politics in South Asia (1996) • Regional Economic Trends and South Asian Security (1997) • Ethnicity and Constitutional Reform in South Asia (1998) • People to People Contact in South Asia (2000) • Security Studies in South Asia: Change and Challenges (2000) • The Simla Agreement 1972-Its Wasted Promise (2001) • Security and Governance in South Asia (2001) • Globalization and Non-Traditional Security in South Asia (2001) • Security in the New Millennium (2001) • Shaping the Future: A South Asian Civil Society Dialogue (2002) • Small Arms and Human Insecurity (2002) • SAARC in the Twenty-First Century: Towards a Cooperative Future (2002) • Memories of a Genocidal Partition: The Haunting Tale of Victims, Witnesses and Perpetrators (2002) • South Asia and the War on Terrorism (2003) • Terrorism in South Asia: Impact on Development and Democratic Process (2003) • Defence, Technology and Cooperative Security in South Asia: • Report on the Proceedings of the Tenth Summer Workshop (2004) • Documents on Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy: 1947 -1965 (2005) • Understanding Terrorism in South Asia: Beyond Statist Discourses (2006) • Responding to Terrorism in South Asia (2006) • Impact of Insurgencies on Women in South Asia (Forthcoming)

RCSS Newsletter A quarterly bulletin, it publishes a brief report of RCSS activities, presentations and its workshops on topics of contemporary interest and news and programmes of the RCSS and its alumnae.

POLICY STUDIES

Policy 1, Nira Wickremesinghe, Humanitarian Relief Organisations and Challenges to Sovereignty: The Case of Sri Lanka Policy 2, Steve P Cohen, The Structural Dimensions of Conflict in South Asia Policy 3, P R Chari, Newer Sources of National Insecurity: The Crisis of Governance in India Policy 4, B S Chimni, The Law and Politics of Regional Solution of the Refugee Problem: The Case of South Asia Policy 5, Sasanka Perera, New Evangelical Movements and Conflicts in South Asia: Sri Lanka and Nepal in Perspective Policy 6, Ajai, Dharshan Behera, The Politics of Violence and Development Policy 7, Neila Hussain Chowdhury, Proliferation of Small Arms and Politics in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh Policy 8, Neluka Silva, Politics and the Threatre: Comparative Study of Nationalism and Gender in the Popular Theatre of Sri Lanka Policy 9, Muhktar Ahmed Ali, Sectarian Violence in Pakistan Policy 10, Jasjit Singh& Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Defence Expenditure in South Asia: An Overview Policy 11, Frank De Silva & Abrar R Chowdhury, Defence Expenditure in South Asia: Bangladesh and Sri Lanka Policy 12, P. R Chari & Ayesha Siddiqi, Defence Expenditure in South Asia: India and Pakistan Policy 13, Anasua Ray Chowdhury, The Energy Crisis and Sub- regional Cooperation in South Asia Policy 14, Monica Bhanot, Order, Welfare and Legitimacy in the Regional Context of South Asia: An Ultima Thule? Policy 15, Aruni john, Investigation of the Potential for Militarization of the Bhutanese Refugee Youth in Nepal and Related Security Concerns for the Region Policy 16, Lailufar Yasmin, Law and Order Situation and Gender- based Violence: Bangladesh Perspective Policy 17, P. Sahadevan, Coping with Disorder: Approaches and Strategies to End Internal Wars in South Asia Policy 18, Subramanyam Raju, Third Generation Perception on Kashmir Issue Policy 19, Uttam Sen & Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, Governance in Plural Societies and Security Policy 20, Arjun Bhardwaj and Delwar Hossain, Globalisation and the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in South Asia: Towards Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development Policy 21, Lok Raj Baral, Bertram Bastiampillai & Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Governance and Defence Spending: View from South Asia Policy 22, Tanvir Anjum, Nature and Dynamics of Conflicts Over Privatization of Potable Water Policy 23, Sushil J. Aaron, Christian Evangelicals and Political Conflict in India: with Special Reference to Gujrat, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa Policy 24, Shaista Tabassum, River Water Sharing Problem Between India and Pakistan: Case Study of the Indus Basin Water Treaty Policy 25, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures and Restraint Regime in South Asia Policy 26, Smruti Pattnaik, Elite Perceptions in Foreign Policy: Role of Print Media in Influencing India-Pakistan Relations, 1989- 1999 Policy 27, Nishchal Pandey, Nepal’s Maoist Movement and Implications for India and China Policy 28, Happymon Jacob, HIV/AIDS as a Security Threat to India Policy 29, Amit Dholakia, The Role of Mediation in Resolving India- Pakistan Conflicts: Parameters and Possibilities Policy 30, Manjrika Sewak, Multi-Track Diplomacy between India and Pakistan: A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Security Policy 31, Saira Yamin, Stability through Economic Cooperation in a Nuclear Environment Policy 32, Sun Xun, New Nuclear Triangle and China’s Role in South Asia Policy 33, Salma Malik & Mallika Joseph, Small Arms and the Security Debate in South Asia Policy 34, Rizwan Zeb & Suba Chandran, Indo-Pak Conflicts: Ripe to Resolve? Policy 35, Upendra Chowdhury, Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in South Asia: Problems and Prospects Policy 36, A. Subramanyam Raju & S.I. Keethaponcalan, India and Sri Lanka: Issues in Maritime Cooperation (forthcoming) Policy 37, Amtul Hassan, Impact of Partition Refugees on Pakistan (forthcoming)