Exploring the Link Between Power Concentration and Ethnic Minorities
CEU eTD Collection
submitted to theCentral EuropeanUniversity in Exploring the Linkbetween PowerConcentration and EthnicMinorities’MobilizationinPostSoviet Department of Political Science,Central European University Georgia, Moldova,andUkraine Date ofsubmission: April30,2012 Degree ofDoctorPhilosophy Supervisor: Dr.ZsoltEnyedi A DoctoralDissertation Budapest, Hungary Stela Garaz 2012 by
partial fulfillment of therequirements for the CEU eTD Collection I her other institutions. I herebydeclarethatth April 30,2012. Budapest Stela Garaz bibliographical reference. any otherperson,exceptwhereappropriate e by de c l are tha t this is thes thes is is con containsnom t ains no m ii a
a terials previous terials acceptedforanyotherdegreesin acknowledgm e ly writtenand/orpublishedby nt ism a de inthefor m of CEU eTD Collection instab avoided inthepost-Sovietregion,itshouldbe for against thestatedidnotconsis ethnicity. H and alsotoco-optm its intrins of powerdidnottrigger,butitratherdiscoura The researchconcludes this de tended toimplem mobilize f centr the experienceofbothethnicc because sincethecollaps cleavag concentrated phenom In politic Abstract the rulingparties.Inadditi prevented theconsolidationofet threshold foraccessingpower ethnicity. S f local powerwithth elites inth character of contrary tothecomm dispersed power,andnotinperiodswithconcen mobiliza The datap com of threepost-Sovietcases–Georgia,Moldova, polic concentratio ethnic conflicts.Forthis,Iexplorethreem goal of i i nancial, nancial re m p ation ofaself-standingethn alizatio ies, ele arison technique. ility. -em this es. Thislatterconcernisaquestionof enon thaten r tion ad s’ accesstomobilization i al scienceliteratu c tendenciestoincreasethethreshol p e periods r hasized thepolitica e sources, an c p concentrationistregim r n. Thisim n withe m agains e powerarebeliev nce, thesu esented in tora ecifically, thelead sear i nistrativ l ru e ch isto nt integra e enh w t the les, cou i nority lead t ith hn on expect plied an e, d insom thatatleastinth andcentra ccess ofconcentration thisres r ages a ic m powerconcentra andpolitica stateinth determ e nced oftheSov tion re strateg i noritie e , powerconcentrationisdom on, concentrationofpowerte l t insuppressingethnicgroupsas incr control overtheregionalelitefo
d tobeparticular through electoralruleswith onflicts and ers, tostrengthencentralization im ation, thereasonforthiswa i ine whether hnic partiesanda ersh st rathe ear ic m e cases,with l resources. F portance ofmulti-ethnicity. e ization. e a ch reve i s overet e thre s i ip ofcon es ofcon sed con l et Union ’ m i af nority elite.Theref r f th e th a obilizati tion co The irs e post- con an accomm al t po re rol bycentrallevelpo hnic groupsascitizens.Instead,theincum iii echanism i thatth ged ethnicm at r frontation andcausesprotest.Theregim
st i so d e cases wer concentrationencou centra nally, a agradualde-politizationof and Ukraine–basedonthestructuredfocused greatim em regim centration foracces trated power.Theresea mbined m ly dangerousforthestateswithdeepethnic m e forotherreasonsthanfearofethnic on aga t Soviet rep gional lev thesam pirical in e ofthemulti-ethn tionist r inclu e hig s e s odat theleade s inreducingm thatm portance forthepost-Sovietregion, i ore nst thes o s topowerofpotentialch obilization agai e i i vestig norities d tim h f onist policiestowards e ublics o ,
disproportional elem ed intheanalysis, est levelof s notthepresum if e l, whichred power. Consequently,them i gim nantly viewedasanegative rm powerc a nded toaugm e of power,andtode-politicize citizens, butinhinderingthe y linkthedegreeofpower r attrac ation ship o ation andregionalaccessto e t litica ’ coop s tendedtoincr ate: identity-relateds c i cur c p isbuilton ted i r r f norities’ m l ages thees ch furthersh powerconcentratio oncentr incum o r tation in ethnicm u ed inp m nst thestate,dueto st-Soviet s ced loc i societalm nority le ed suppressive con ent territorial b ation ents overth th cen ents, which e m a o calation of rio l p centratio e analy bilization i alleng t i e istob ows that norities ates h norities, d aders to tral and a o e s with se the tential s with b u t ent a ate lti- ers s a in is n d n e e ’
CEU eTD Collection for m Budapest possibleforsom My specialgratitudegoestoGeorgeSoros,w my research. husband RenaudCuny,whogreatlyhelpedm Moldova everytim to m m most difficultm Finally yetimportantly,Iwouldliketothankmy m particularly MatteoFumagalli,CarstenSchne I wouldals m European C am Institute ofPoliticalS research. Iam lucky tohavethehelpofm The com challenging myargum potential inm experience tom wrong. Therefore,althoughattim f with excessiveam perseverant, m has beenanexperiencethatgreatlys While lookingbackattheyearsofresearchthat Acknow I am to AnnaPavlyuchenkoforhavingbeensuchawonderfulhostduringm country in Prohnitchi, NataliaTimus,andOlenaPodolyanfo thankful tomyfriendsandfor around Tbilisi,aswellallm Caucasus andparticularlytoTom a e i e e ilures, asthem ndedness, andforthepracticalsupportinm alsothankfultoOlehProtsykforhavings thodological skills,andm , aswellm valuablefeedbackonpreviouspartsofthisthesis. thankfultoAlexandraGouj y i motherEleonoraGaraz,whowasreadyto ne. p
ledgments: terviews withfor letion ofthis o toques e
liketoth ntre forMinorityIssuesinFlen e thankfultoth andwhohelpedm e y o . Fort styleofworkintheyearsto o biguity. Them m e m tion commonlyaccepted Ineededitandcouldnot e e nts ofm t ents, andbyencouragingm nts inwhichIlearn udies inParisandwhohe thesis ank thef h is, Iam m a a ny years,andwhose o er MPsandforf ny enthusiasticpeop
st i requ e employeesoftheEuropeanCe m y y interviewswith er CEUcoll research,for on whofacilitatedm m a Trierwhoar o mostlygratef c es painful,th portantly –forhavingco-authored e ired anexten st im u devel lty m h aped m portant sk e op it,bym m t th viewpoi eagues NinoKobakhidze,LelaChakhaya,Elena b upervised m acilitating m iv y e y sburg, forhavinghelped ers of ider, andNenadDim com e mostwerethoseinwhichIrealizedwas hose generositym withth attitud r wor a lead tothisthesisco e PhDjourneywasdefinitelyalife-valuable ethnicm s ul tom their patien lped m nged m ive acces travel backtom e lif collect last-m f le from ill Iacquiredisseeingthepositivesideof a tochallengeotherpeople’sargum r theirprecioushelpinarrangingm k. Forthelatter,Iam m e e s CEUPoliticalSc . Myworkonthis nts and a y ily f e king m t stayasvi e facevaliditytestin towardstheev ory e y y withthedataa supervisorZsoltEnyedi,whosaw i thethreecountriesincludedinthis tripstoAkha o y nority leadersin y s toprim c r theprec workduringmytraineeshipatthe accesstoprim m ontinues ce withm e gobe y inute piecesoffactualdataon personalbeliefs,an siting graduate ntre a y de mystayatCEUandin ho ary data,forwhichIwas itrije m iou tobeag m yond m forMino p me country,andtomy y ents happening ience Depar letion, Icansaythatit lkalaki, y thesis taughtm s y stayinKiev. m n particularlythankful m vi firstrefereedarticle. occasion alysis onU e Georgia.Iamalso ary data,aswell c o developvaluable for variousstagesof ral sup y ownlim r Ma eat in ha rity Issues s t ud vi r a port inth t n m d tocop l absent- ent a ng gi spira euli, and ents. k around e raine. I e nt and its, by tobe y t tio the in- ve in n n e e
CEU eTD Collection CH CH CH MINORITIES’ MOBILIZ CHAPTER I:THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION Table ofContents: 4. F 3. 3. 3. 3. F 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. F 1. 1. 1. 1. S M I C T R APTER APTER APTER NPUTS FR TRUCTURE INAL INAL INAL HE ASE ESEARC 4. 3. 2. 1. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 4. 3. 2. 1. 1. ETH 3 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 1. 1.4.3. 1 1. 1 1.3.3. 1 1. 1. 1 1 1. 1
. . . . P P T P P P M C E E E E P P . . . I 3. 2. 3. 4. 2. 4. 2. 4. 3. 2. 1. 3. 3. 4. 2. 1 4 4 3 2 3 2 NDE OWER OWER OWER OWER OWER OWER OWER THNIC THNIC THNIC THNIC HE S ONCEPTU ODO ...... AIN R R R 4. Ukr 4. Azeri 1. 4. Dece 2. Osset 1. 3. 2. 1. Sl 3. Arme 2. C 3. Bul 2. G 1. 1. Abk 1 3 2 4 1 2 2 ELEC ...... E E E Po Ethn
C F
II
The Electoral Systems Li Pow Rus Developi Rus Lin Electo “Mu Th H M M M PEN I II OM ORM LOG T V o o a av Q AR AR AR nki I :ETH
e O OF C C C C C C C litica HE nsoci n g TI M M M P : DEFI k
gari Per s s UE a h : D s s a O O O O O O O ing e O T i ic Min i lti-Eth
KS KS KS ON nt azi i o n s I I I I a a ni ORETIC PO u r i E S TH H n AL N N N N N N N i L CAL NORIT NORIT NORIT r a : r g c S C n ns ns OF zi NT r i i ...... IT E CENTR CENTR CENTR CENTR CENTR CENTR CENTR al S a : : : n i T a
a ...... Tra : g l p a ans a a Hori Vertica ...... ans
n s once IO o i ns: E WER S ns an n F ...... ICAL in et Op l tio t AND : s: i i n g theC G TA RAMEW A NIN T z u o NI N ...... u s n o y C : at : t n na n OV IES IES IES HE ...... PPROAC a stems and po i : r o A s ...... z TE c” S s a ities ...... n t i C i
r A A A A A A A f o L M i o dni TH d Ru d Electo l lism and“Plu i t rtun SIS CO o ERNM ’ ’ ’ G nt i TI TI TI TI TI TI TI m - r n an l e C A
s A MIN n OF Po M M M at OBI m AN al ON IN ON IN ON IN ON ON AND ON AND ON AND e of t E est a PP : TION andt O a in Western a i ...... O O O usal : - ity Stru ssi r o C D NCE t R : TH wer Con ...... ROACHES L d Dem P i H es, Ethn B B B r n ...... - m ENT K EPENDE IZA O i D MEA o
ILI ILI ILI : r a a O a o
...... : E e al S ncent Eth n LINKAGES BETWE RITIES’ MOBILIZ P P P : w n h Chai -A ...... a PERATION Z Z Z s ...... T NTR OS OS OS AND d eir ...... : e
AT AT AT T E S IO o St ...... r C RT ON ctu n y o TA ERR T u T T T stem i cr N ION ION ION r ica HNIC Level ofDisproportionali t c Mi cen -S -S -S n: at ra NT Ukra s at : r once T TH S - A acy: i e e-Mi ......
OVIE OVIE OVIE d E I l i U D lly “Pl IN IN IN TOR TIO o tra V e Tr -M f s Chang S TH E o no R EFI n w
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n ...... P P P P IN tio c in I L n rities’ Po E T T T t I NORIT OWER iet I N ans OST OST OST r AL N IZ N i o
e: P at U M G t n with IT G r h O u AN ATI i OST ...... i KRAIN EORGI es” i Vert ra IONS O O R t dni o -S -S -S P y e: IT L n l E RG Rel l ON AND O Y OVIE OVIE OVIE DO S C -S : D STATE- : Mob ...... IE est ...... WE Ethn v R ON AND AN t i A OVI S a litica c VA A a E ELA r ’ al t E TION ANDPOWER
i t : : es”, CE T T T I P iliza a i Z ...... N POWER R CO : ons C
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Y : P P E : biliza : ...... OWER NTA ...... RELATIO o ...... iliza O w NTRATION ANDETHNIC CONCE e N T r: tio tio I ...... : O ...... N n n : : : ...... NTRATION N S ...... 117 102 120 106 109 120 100 113 115 107 109 100 1 23 15 20 55 20 58 36 34 28 80 69 75 31 26 39 20 91 12 62 94 92 95 88 86 60 98 50 33 26 46 45 62 42 88 64 4 1 7 1 9
CEU eTD Collection REGIO CH R CH E 6. 6. 6. F 5. 5. 5. 5. F 4. 4. 4. P APTER APTER INAL INAL 2. 1. 4. 3. 2. 1. 4. 3. 2. 3. R 6. 6.2.2. Electoral 6. 5 5 5. 5 5 5 5. 5 5 5 5. 4 4 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4 4 4 4 4. 4. 4. 4. 4 4 4 4 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4 4 6.2.5. Power 6.2.4. FiscalDecentralizati
E T T T T T T T T T T ...... 4. 3. 2. 2. 4. 4. 3. 2. 2. 4. 3. 2. 2. 4. 3. 2. 4. 3. 2. 4 3 2 4 3 3 2 2 4 3 2 3 2 4 4 3 2 4 3 2 N S HE HE HE HE HE HE HE HE YPES OF HE ...... R R 3. C 3. C 3. C 1. Deci 1. 7. Bure 4. C 6. Bure 7. Bure 4. C 1. 1. 3. Ap 6. St 5. St 6. St 5. Ed 4. Ed 5. Ed 9 8 9 3 3 2 3 2 8 7 8 2 2 2 2 4 4 1 1 1 EN S ...... E E In In In
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CEU eTD Collection CO R I A S A T A A A A A A A A F 6. AND SUBSEQ NCL NDICATORS INAL URVEY EXTS EFER NNEX NNEX NNEX NNEX NNEX NNEX NNEX NNEX NNEX NNEX 4. Ma Map Ma Ma Ma 6.4.5. Power 6.4.4. FiscalDecentralizati 6. 6.4.2. Electoral 6. 6.3.5. Power 6.3.4. FiscalDecentralizati 6. 6.3.2. Electoral 6.
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VA
CEU eTD Collection Table V.16.Determ Table V.15.Determ Table V.14.MoldovanP Table V.13.Thepercentageofextra-seatsresu Table V.12.TheThresholdEffectonthePropor Table V.11.TheThresholdEffectontheProportion of“ Table V.10.ElectoralSystem Table V.9.PartyAffiliationofEthnicMinority Table V.8.EthnicMinorities’Descri Table V.7.GeorgianPresidentialElec Table V.6.GeorgianParliam Table V.5.GeorgianDistrictswithEthni Table V.4.Extra-SeatsR Table V.3.ElectoralFormulasandthe Table V.2.TheThresholdEffectontheProporti Table V.1.ElectoralSystem Table IV.3.TheEthnicCom Table IV.2.ReligionofCom Table IV.1.ModelsofSt Table III.1.EthnicMinorities’M Table II.7.ThePeriodswithConcentratedPoli Table II.6.TheLevelofParliam Table II.5.FluctuationsinForm Table II.4.TheLevelofParliam Table II.3.FluctuationsinForm Table II.2.TheParliam Table II.1.FluctuationsinForm Table 0.1:L List ofTables: Figure V.I.EthnicMinorities' Figure II.I.T Figure I. List ofFigu I. TheCausalM Fragm e res: he MainIndicatorsforDete Years withFragm Moldova. L Elections inMoldova winners andtheir%ofvotes) Moldova (1991-2008) Candidates, Moldova(1991-2008) Moldova (1991-2008) 2008). 2008) Elections, Georgia(1991-2008) (%) (1991-2008) vel ofDemocracyinMo ...... e ntation ...... inants fortheVotingResu inants fortheSupport the e ntary Num a echanism ogistic RegressionResults ate-Minority Relations e ...... rliam sulting fromthePR ofGeorgi positio p e ofMol Political ntary Elect actly Se e e al Pr al Pr al Pr nted Power:AveragesCom ntary Electi e e obilization intheYear ntar ntar betweenPo e ...... n rical ...... esidential PowersinUkraine(1991-2008) esidential Powersin esidential Powersin ptive RepresentationinG dova of MinorityPopulatedRegions y Fragm y Fragm ldova, Ukraine,andGeorgia(1991-2008) tions RegionalVotingResults,1991-2008 ttled MinoritiesinGeorgia(%) a -Developm Degree ofParliam Representation -TypesandEffectiveness F rm c Minorities’Territ ions RegionalVotingResults,1991-2008. -Developm r ...... ining PowerConcentrationand agm ons RegionalVotingResults,1991-2008(first ...... viii e e -Generated “Wasted”Votes,Georgia(1991- lts inthe1996Presidential E wer Concentrationand lting from tical PowerinGeorgia,MoldovaandUkraine ntation inMoldova(1990-2008) ntation inUkraine(1990-2008) e Deputies inth ...... tion ofW on ofW ntation inG Party ofCommunistspr ...... ents sinceIndependence ents sinceIndependence s withConcentratedPowerandinthe a W thePR-generated“wasted”votes, Moldova(2001-2008) Georgia(2001-2008) e sted VotesinthePRpartof a ntary Fragm sted VotesfortheIndependent asted Votes”forPartiesandBlocs, p orial Concentration. e ared orgia (1990-2008) e GeorgianParliam e orgia...... and ...... Ethn e ntation DistrictsinGeorgia ior toParliam ic Mobiliz l ections of ...... e nt (1991- ...... ation e ntary .. 124 117 174 207 205 204 202 201 200 195 193 187 185 184 183 182 180 179 175 137 129 60 87 82 81 77 76 71 70 10 65 CEU eTD Collection Graph VI.1.ShareofLocal RevenuesandLocal Graph V.3.DescriptiveRepresentation ofEthni Graph V.2.DescriptiveRepresentationofEthni Graph V.1.DescriptiveRepresentationofEthni Graph IV.7.State-MinorityRe Graph IV.6.SecondaryE Graph IV.5.SecondaryE Graph IV.4.State-MinorityRe Graph IV.3.SecondaryE Graph IV.2.State-MinorityRe Graph IV.1.SecondaryE Graph III.14.EthnicMinoriti Graph III.13.EthnicMinorities’Mobilizat Graph III.12.EthnicMinoriti Graph III.11.PoliticalMob Graph III.10.PoliticalMobilizat Graph III.9.PoliticalMobilizat Graph III.8.MobilizationofUkrainians Graph III.7.PoliticalM Graph III.6.PoliticalMob Graph III.5.PoliticalMobilizati Graph III.4.PoliticalMo Graph III.3.PoliticalMob Graph III.2.PoliticalMo Graph III.1.PoliticalMob List ofGraphs: Table VI.1.StructureofLocalGove Table V.24.EthnicMinorities’Descriptiv Table V.23.UkrainianP Table V.22.UkraineParliam Table V.21.ElectoralForm Table V.20.TheThresholdEffectontheProportion Table V.19.ElectoralSystem Table V.18.PartyAffiliationof Table V.17.EthnicMinorities’Descriptiv
and TaxesinGeorgia(1997-2008) (1991-2002) (1991-2008) (1991-2008) winners %ofvotes) winners’ %of (1991-2008) Ukraine (1991-2008) 2008) Com Minorities’ PresenceinParliam p ...... aring Minorities’Pres obilization ofBulgarians r bilization ofAzeris bilization ofOssetians ducation inUk ducation inUk ducation inMoldova ducation inGeorgi esidential E ...... ilization ofGagauzians ilization ofAr ilization ofAbkhazians votes,inmultim ilization ofEthnicMinoriti ulas andtheDegr e es es ofUkrain ntary Elections lations inMoldova(1998-2008) lations inGeorgia(1991-2008) lations inUkraine(1991-2008) ion ofRussiansinCrim ’ Mob ’ Mob EthnicMinorityDeputiesin on ofSlavsinTransdniestria ion ofRussiansoutsideCrimea ...... rnm l ilization and ilization and ections andRussiansoutsideTransdniestria e -Developm raine –L raine –L e m ence inParliam nt RevenuesinMoldova,1995-1998(%) e RepresentationinUkraine(1991-2002). e RepresentationinMoldova.Com e ion andPowerConcentrationinMoldova nians a –L em ...... e -RegionalVotingResults,1991-2008(first ee ofParliam - RegionalVotingResults,1991-2008(first nt withPopulationCensusData –LanguageofInstruction(%Pupils) ix ber constituen c MinoritiesintheParliam c MinoritiesintheParliam c MinoritiesintheGeorgianParliam ...... TaxesoutofTotalGovernm ...... a a a ...... Power PowerConcentr nguage ofInstruction(I) nguage ofInstruction(II) nguage ofInstruction(%Pupils) of “ ents sinceIndependence es inWesternUkraine ea W e Concentration inGeorgia ...... nt with e asted Votes”forPoliticalP ntary Fragm ...... the MoldovanParliam cies) ...... Population CensusData...... ation in e ntation, Ukraine Ukraine e e ...... nt ofMol nt ofUkr ...... p ...... e ...... aring nt Revenues ...... e ...... e nt (1991- a dova nt ine a rties, 232 261 229 228 226 225 221 218 208 249 233 209 188 165 160 159 152 144 138 131 119 119 118 116 114 110 108 106 103 101 93 99 96 94 CEU eTD Collection Graph VI.7.Evolutionof Graph VI.6.StructureofLocalB Graph VI.5.Evolutionof Graph VI.4.Com Graph VI.3.StructureofLocal Graph VI.2.Evolutionof the CountryAverage(2005-2008) p aring theShareofOwnBudget DecentralizationinUkraine(1991 Decentr Decentr Budget Revenues,Moldova(1998-2008) udget RevenuesinUkraine(1992-2000) alization inMoldova(1991-2008) alization inGeorgia(1991 x ...... a ry RevenuesinGagauziaandTaracliawith -2 -2 008) 008) ...... 280 276 266 264 263 251 CEU eTD Collection encourages theescalation ofethnicconflicts should beavoided. in whichthisnegativeeffectshouldbeobser negativ m im as welltheexperiencewith com in generalexperiencedethnic concentrated the SovietUnion,m ethnic statesisaquestionofgreatimportancefo representation oftheirinte regim states. This with deepethniccleavages,asthey The regim practices an phenom
a portant to rginal one–oninter-ethn b ination betweenpo Hence, the In politicalscienc Whether theconcentrationofpowerindeed e Research Question: s withconcentratedpowerreducesethn e rolef enon, asregim e belief s withconcentratedpowerarebeliev d arealsoco dete power.Atthesam o r inter- m rm ises a ine whetherthe in goalo a e e s ny post-Sovietrepublics s withconcentratedpow e lite e t nsidered toencourages hnic stabilityinm wer concen ntia rests (L lly r ic stabilityinth a f ture thisrese base e conflicts sincethebeginning ethnic conflictssincethecollaps time,m ijphart, 2004;96-97). powerconcentrationisdom powercon tration and d onthe m Introd a y represen ar o st pos ch is u lti- ex e region.Ifpowerconcen ved andtheonewhereconcentrationofpower ic 1 . Becausethemobiliza uction mu e
t p centr t-Soviet s er r thepost-Sovietregion.Sincecollapseof t rategies ofconfrontationandtocauseprotest. m ed to hnic sta ectation thatthewinn repr i determinewhetherpower concentration are associatedwithco experienced atleastsom tobeparticularlydangerousforthestates norities’ chancestoha lti-e t ariskf ation esents apotentia t
hnic t es, thepost-Sovietregionisone t h ate a ity intheco o d anega s r thepoliticalstab arem of transition.Consideringthe inantly viewedasanegative e oftheSovietUnion,iti u tion lti-e tiv er l dange tration plays untries of e -take-all characterof nstrained democratic ofethnicminoritie ve effectivepolitica t hnic andth im pact –evenifa e r f periodswith ility o th r them indeeda ofthese e reg e regio u i on, lti- n s s l
CEU eTD Collection (Lijphart, 1999;3-4) should befederal,andth should bep concentration ofpower:theelect in “plu confrontational strategiesth political channelsforeffectivelytransm institutional configurationen that linkedethnicconflictswithcer consociationalism com focused comparisontechnique. of threepost-Sovietcases–Georgia,Moldova, polic degree ofpowerconcentrationwithethnicm mobiliza to determ is anecessarycondition inter-ethnic peace,becaus Therefore, thistheorysuggeststhatpowerconcen theory ofpoliticalopportunity s not addressthisquestion directl m i norities. e ies, ele s toitspossibleim In politicals However, inpoliticalsciencel ral so tion ine whetherpowerconcentratio a c cieties” againsts rliam tora l ru andparticularlytoArendL e c ntary, thepartys ience theinstitu les, . Thesupportersofthistheorybelieve t ate authorities andcentra forethn liter plica e decision e itredu a at leadtoconflict(Lij tions f courages powerconcentratio ture theneg tion y, im t ructure forsoci ic oral system a l conflictstoo -m ces thelik l conf ization. tain characteristicsofpolitical o iterature thereisanotherfield y plies anopp r m . stem aking pr Forthis u igurat lti-ethnic st itting theirdem a should The tive shouldbeproportional,thefor obiliza n elihood foreff oc 2 , Iexploreth io m attitud ijphart’s work.Consocia em al m ess shouldincludevetopowersform n shallbeb ccur, thesp osite an and Ukraine–onthebasisofstructured tration representsaninherentdangerforthe be m a pirical in tion again y beconducive obilization. Itsuggeststhat socialgroup ates -isof e phart, 1977,1984;Nordlinger,1972) towardsp u swer lti-p a nds andasaresult,th n, re that inthose“plural”stateswhere vestig u ecifi a ectiv toit.Thisf ilt inaway s e m rty, thestate t thes ethnic m ten attr c aim o echanis e politicalrepresen institutions.Itsuggeststhat ation of studythat,evenifitdoes wer concen t ate: ofthisinvestigationis isbuilton ibu to ethnic i norities donothave tiona thatwouldavoidthe m i identity-related state eld isth t s ed totheth territorial structure thatm m lism tra ofgovernm tion -whenit th e oneonthe is m a ey choose y linkthe e analy ath i tation of norities’ i norities eory of eory e s nt is s
CEU eTD Collection
1 withdrawn, localelitescanm (Tarrow, 1996).Otherscholarsarguedthatwhen central powerischaracterizedbydividedlead opportunity structures”suggested is enhancedwhenthestate“cen generally m construc contrary, scholarswhodevelopedthepolitic inte ethnic seldom f mobilization occur whencentralpow local adm encouraged Finally, (Dalton protesters’ accesstorelevantresou and 2002,inwhichtheauthorsco Sickle, andStevenW supported bystatisticalresearch,suchas to be p Prim o a rticu r them rests an m o When viewedtogether, l a a ar k r de” (Hale,2004; analyzedaschangeablephenom lly d eta otherssuggested i tiv alis the“divid i “ i n nistrative reso is d bythelowereconom d clea d m isth obilize whentheyhavebargainingpo l o . t approach . ivided societie Consociationalis , 2009).Hence,accord f
group e th r politica ”, ed” eo 458). while co e ry th ldon (2009)onthewave er isd 1 or“plu urces (Treism thatet : theyviewedethnicmobilization l at s s” hav pr n thetwotheoretica
i s ts seemtofound ffused, ees et tru eferences, which obilize onthebasisofregio hnic mobilization tre” isweak.So ral” ic dependenceo c e tiv that socialm easilyid hni ncluded th i ing tothisliterature socie r s ces than m and notwhenitisconcentrated. ci a
n, 1997).Poli t is th y as“anem ena. theoneconductedbyRusselDalton,AlexVan ties e th enti 3 a Forconsociationalists eo at m o b t m al opportunitystructuretheoryfolloweda fiable g h aregiv ry thatseesethnicityas“asocial construct bilization isen y ership andbyunstablepoliticalalignm s ofprotestaroundtheworldbetween1999 r n –particu central authorityisweakened,challenged,or eir argum l modelshaveadivergingviewonethnic e assum e wer vis theirdissatisfactionwiththegovernm the“cen scholarswhoanalyzedthesetof“political ot obilizatio i o tical opportunitystruct n - l r ethn a e oup - de n factors à-v e l e d tobes n se tre” andby arly th n stru n forprotes i ic m ts ontheprim s n asadynam nse o al iden couraged whereandwhenthe t cture, wellform ate au obilization ism e territo tobeconsidered. f bel t atic chara , theethnicgroupsin th tities (Hechter, th o n t isratherd e increasedaccessto orities, g rially b i ng ordialist approach ure theoryisalso i or at c phenom powerwhich c a te ulated s o sed one–is t achm re likelyto ristics or a r Onthe iven by 2000). e choice nt e and e t ents non t of e o nt a :
CEU eTD Collection ethnic instabilityinperiodsw was characterizedbywhatconsociationalis unfavorable tothem sufficient accessto power” becauseitassu rela politica an expectationresultingfrom united andmobilize ethnic groupsreacttostatepolicie by variouscircum identification ofindividualsandgroupsis m within th non-m opposite. C circum then engageinpoliticalactiontosecurea about nation provoked ordiscouragedbyspecificenvironmenta a in assumptiontha tion Political powercanbegene Although thetheoreticalm When appliedtothepost-Soviet The IndependentandtheDependentVariable: a stances andthetumultofevents.”(Beissinger,2002). l jority coalitionsinparliam betweensta sys e p onsociationalism a a t rty sys em l m : horizo obilization, “itisno stances, andnotastaticattr t politicaldecisio t topursuecom em . Atth e a t guidedthisr . u m n thoritie e tal and s thatwhenpowerco e sam predicts thea ith dispersedpower.Incondition s a odel ofthisthesis ve e e s u ssum tim t m nt, non-m centr rally concentrated e rtical. Thehorizon on goalsisan n n inter-ethnicinstab t thecaseth sear region,theinferencesofth m favorable tothem e e , politi d ethnicidentity. al leve a ch istheconstruc king a dynam ts a a jor 4 cal opportunitystru l ofpower(m institu s ibute. Thisimpliestha dvocated underthelabe t ncentrates theethnic ity government,andlack ate. Rather,identiti at coheren em is ic phenom l conditions.AsMarkBeissingerwrote builtaroun tion piric ordisp andthe tal d ility incountries s an a l ques t tivist be nationsass ainly betweenth i m d hence,cannotblock s oftransition,dispersedpower e ersed ontwodim e non enha exte nsion isdeterm d boththeseinferences,the tion ese twoliteraturefieldsare ctu lief nt towhichthey r tobeexp es arealteredbynew e minorities donothave t thatthee theexten model pred e nced ordiscouraged l ofpowersharing rt theiriden of dom with “concentrated e legis l ore i ined nant parties e t t towhich d, andno nsions of h l icts inter- ative an policies n becom bythe tity and ic self d e - t :
CEU eTD Collection several em winner-take-all sys exclusively tohorizontalconc and itsim knowledge thereisnostudythatwouldfocusexclus im consociation the execu parliam defined as“m First, theh linked bysh which thedecision-m legislative power(Lijphart,1999;3).Horizonta the parliam the system on thebasisofsom power atcentrallev thesis a Therefore, theuseofth subunits and dim the ex portant p e nsion referstotherelationbetweence The f The indepen ecutiv e r e alwaysinrela ntary m tive branchbyam witham pirical s o pact onethnicm e o a e ared policyposition cus onthispa isdeterm a nt, andwhichinsom rt oftheinstitu rizon bran lis ajority winner-take-allsystem t unders a jority, thedom d t ches) andbythed ally concentrated t ent variableofthisres e t udies thatanaly e oft em a l), a jority ex ined bythedegreeofterr king processisconcentrated unlesssp com tanding, thehorizon h e term tion toitshorizon e char rtic tion p ular d obilization. Theco rised thedegreeof ecutive branch,inwhichtheexecutiv s “concentrated acteristics ofLijphart’s“m s entration ofpower,astheir inance oftheexec , in a ecified otherw a l determ jo i e m zed theco stitu casesisal rity partyorcoalition.Th powerco e e gree inwhic nsion of tion earch is inan tal a tal d l ties,andloya 5 mbination offactorswith t fortheinter-ethnicstability.Seco politic power”and“concentrationofinthe dim itorial decen ”: ise. Theterm“concen n so characterizedbytheconcentrationof s thehorizon nsociationalism titu i lly concentratedpower h thelegislatureisfragm utive overthelegislature,andcontrolof ntra m it im decentralizationaswell. Moreover,the e in theh nsion (i.e.relationsbetweenbranchesof ively onthisdim e tes animportantpa nsion ofpoliticalp a l s l powerisr plies t ate author ajor a tralization ofthestate. lty. nds of theex tal d itarian winner-take-allsystem understanding ofm scholarshavenotreferred i f erefore, accordingtothe m e e levan e ities andsta w politica e branchdom e nsi is trated power”isdefined nsi te on ofpoliticalpower. greatestex nce of on ofpoliticalpower t o rt of f wer constitutesan is thesituationin e o nted. Thevertical r s l whatLijphar e ac anabsolute vera t tor e inates over te nd, tom a l rea planato joritarian s thatare rritor s o n i r ”: a s. y y t l
CEU eTD Collection structures areorganizations the existen a particularidentitywithinthegroupdefine feature ofth addressed toactorsandpublics structures andpreparingcar mobiliza sim Chapter 2.Besides,theseem which does power forethnicconflictshavesimplyused “positive” m obviously nottargetedagainstgovernm legitim also bef in his1 opposite typ ethnic m influence, stateauthorities”(Gurr,1993;168). “initiated bym protest actionsarewhatTeddGurrdefinedas ilar toth In thisresearch,theethni In thisresearchthedefinitionsm Hence, eth ating 978 bookthatso tion obilization, wh acilitated byit,par c notcoin e ofm andpropagandapurposes(Tilly, e oneIdeve e e ethn . obilization. Generally,socia ofethnicmobilization e m n b ic m ic m ovement structu ers ofagroupon cid o obilization asso lop inth bilization cial m e ich isneces with“con that aggregateandrepresent pirical studieshav l obiliz m ticu ing outprotestactionswhichar is th outside them obilization is su r l c m es andthe a -thepositiv ation canberepressedo btype liesin esis. r centrated s behalf ofitsinterestanddir ly intotalita arily target e o cial ph ntioned a bilization isunderstoodasasubtypeofsocial e ntal polic d bythepresenceofcerta -dispersed po 6 carrying outofprotestactions.Themovem o “presidentialism enom de
vem thefactthatclaim e e “comm 1978; 111).Thiskindofm ed again f bove areapplicableto notrevealedadetailedcausalm one –isalsopossible.CharlesTillyargued i rian reg ned as“th e e ies; thereforeitcan nt” (Rucht non contain unal politicalaction s t thestate.Th the ethnicgroups’dem wer” dicho i m r tolera e e processof e visiblemove s whereitcanbeusedf -parliam , 1996;186).Theidentifying ected against,ordesignedto s two s ted b arem in ethnicm t om e neces y ntarism the negativetypeof creatingmovem thes e exis a y, asexplained be classifiedasa de onthebasisof m s s ary indicators: t ”: th a e obilization is ate, butitcan ” rkers. nt ‘products’ tence ofthe dichotom a e actions e nds. The chanism e e in o nt nt y, r
CEU eTD Collection Ukraine froma different degreesofeth experienced the post-So post-Soviet republicsalsoexperi countries ex post-Soviet regionasgeographical declared th Moldova, andUkraine.Theanalysisstarts action againstcentralgovernm mobilization elections Kyrgyzstan duringthe1990’swhogreatlysuppor m been f agains party party orcandidateforelections.W mobilize inapositivew governm i norities inordertowinelections. is There areseveralfurtherreasonsforthe This res The caseso Case Selection: r t thes eque the e (F ntal policiesarewellknownandeasily eir ind viet regionisgenerallyknownas incum nt insom inte perien um t –is ate power,butissuppo earch isbas m agalli, rna e ong the15post-S definedonlyby f ced transitionpro pendence, andfollowsthe b ethnicm l ent presiden co e 2 post-Sovie n nf 007). Formyresearch ic m a e licts p y aswe d o obilization o n bilization targetedag e theem nt. e tial p enced state-buildingprocessesduringtheseyears. Moreover, rc t states,inwhic ll, insupportforacertain(e e itsnegative oviet republics. i Forinstan cesses du h m rtiv ved as en thisca a pirical an rty, a with e forit. in f the in in thecountriesofthisreg o whole trans rin cus isjustif ter
with 1991,theyearinw 7 a regionwithmulti-ethni typ ce, thiswasthecaseofUzbekethnicgroupin nd alys This typeofpro-stateethnicm purposes - g dim particular focusonGe ethnic. Thisexplainsth h theincumbentpres thestud idate e detectable. However,ethnicm of ted incumbentpresidentAskarAkaevin is ofthreepost-Soviet ain First, allthreecountr e nsion, i.e.theonethatim m is s t thes ition obiliz an ie ied periodan thedepen d f incum period ation t i ate poweroragainstsp rstly be thnic ornon-ethnic)politica is b un ent presiden obv d i ide o til 2008.Thechoiceof ent variab d becausemajorityof cause allpost-Sovie n. c republicsthathave orgia, Moldova,and e expectationtofind h n ies arem c ich thesecountries iously nottargeted ts m o unt obilize obilization has r ie plies protest i t o le –ethnic norities can s u : lti-ethnic, Ge r whena d ethnic orgi ecific a t l ,
CEU eTD Collection ti Except forAr instances of of expecta in thes selection process.Thefactthattherehaveb does notaddressalltheabove-m mobilization 2 absolute num countries’ ethnicm as reflected Abkhazia andSouthOssetia–hadalsoaterr Finally, Georgiafacedthreecivilwarswithet peninsula. Theconflictwassettledthroughth governm culm Transdniestria, whichculm with ethniccharacter. criteria. However, asdiscussedbelow,therem population, withbothnum of suchinstancesm the country–Adjara.A Arm m transition e o inated withtheform e f Second, duringtheperiodoftransitionallthr th n e cou i tion thatth a is e last e nt ofUkrainealsofacedde th inthe1989andm ethnicm Sov inthethreerepublicsd n . e o According erical powerwhichissufficientfor tries andthattheys m n i et Un l y p e nia e gen i a o norities arenum kes thesecas s ion 2 i t Moldovaexperiencedinternalconf norities’ , allotherform - Sov
e s p l ral leve dem opu y, ah ation i et repu inated e latio rically
onstrated inChap o m of aterritorialautonom st recentpopu n i l of b gh levelof
o es relevan censu lic in with the1992war,andalsow bilization againstthecentr t significantandnum ill haveid ethnic entioned conflicts,theyarest u erically insignificant,therear ring thepe wh s i a m er SovietUnionrepublicshavealsom ining 11 n
a ich 1 nds for ity 989 t een inter-ethnicclashes th fortheresearchgoalof this thesis. eth saliencyhasbeenhigh la en
8 e titu (Sak tion censu hnic characterintworegionsth ter 3,thesewerenotth tity-b riod underinvestig n initiating processesof republics donotsatisfyothercaseselection e establish ito icity sa wa, lar ethn secession ee countriesexperienced ria ased te 1 998 l y in au erically ic g lien ses (Annex1).Whilesom ; 242 licts withitsEa to r 1994 -GagauzYeri.Thecentral m from nom rritor ou al governm c -25 ent ofa y jus p ith itsSouthernregion,which co 0 y insignificant ethnicgroups. ). i e somegroupsthathavean inS thee al au n ation tif s ill relevantforthecase at thebeginningof1990s titu during thewholeperiod ies theexpe outh-Eastern regionof territo ted e onlycasesofethnic politica tonom . e Althoughthisthes lites ofitsCrim nts. Theoccurrence m stern regioncalled internalconflicts o re th i rial autonom es jus l m an obiliza cta 9 u e North– e tif lti-ethnic 0 ofthese t % b ion f ies the tion. y ean th o y. is e r
CEU eTD Collection has been Ukraine, an below illus level ofdemocraticdevelopm do notsatisfythelastcasese periods withconcentratedpowerunderAskarAk Vladim instance, Russiahaddispersedpowerduringthe Latvia, andLithuania).However,ithasbeenexpe power dynam relevant, whichisofsignificantrelevanceforthe preceded analyze closertheprocessesof periods ofd period, whichm each ofth Georgia, andduringViktorYush Snegur’s andPetruLucinski’spresidencies Vladim in Ukraine,duringsom power. Politicalpowerwasconcen republics revealsthattheyexperiencedbothpe Fourth, Georgia,Moldova,andUkrainehave The existenceofrelativelyenduringperiod Third, a ir Voronin’spresidencyinMoldova. ir Putinbecam am b es t d Georgiapredom y rates, th e th i period spers i i simpleanaly ni cs hasnotbeenexperiencedbyth ree coun m a e u kes intra-countryover-tim d and m e tim s withdisp levelof“po e presiden e ofEduardShevardnad tries, thed ofconcentratedpower e -series dataelab lection criterionrelevantfor s inantly underthe is of ent duringalm power concentrationinlightofthem t an chenko’s andLeonidKravchuk’spr ersed power litical” and thepost-ind trated e d graduallyc gree ofpow during o o e co
r 9 , st “civil” rights ated byFreedom P in Moldova,beforetheRoseRevolution m “partly free”catego ze’s presidencyyearsinGeorgia,andduring o
1990s andconcentratedpowerin2000swhen ineachofthesestatesm er con the entireperiodoftransition.AsTable0.1 e riods withconcentratedanddispersed som ayev’s presidency.However,theserepublics litical powerwasdispersedduringMircea research questionofthisthesis.Thistype onsolid rienced byotherpost-S pe m e threepost-SovietBalticStates(Estonia, a beenassessedashavinghadam kes intra-coun s withconcentratedpow p ndence po e arison possible.T ofLeonidKuchma’sp centration v ated this thesis. inthes it.Kyrgyzstanalsoexperienced litica House try r a e cou y, whichm a l ried duringthetransition esidencies inUkraine.In h in researchquestion. over-tim i h classifiedMoldova, sto n e existenceofboth oviet republics.For tries between199 a r y kes itpossibleto of er, followedor r esid e e com ans thatthere these en cy years i p nimum thre arison 1 e
CEU eTD Collection dem d dem num Vanha com “non-free” b and Georgia.Them have perform ethnic coun author m does haveam m ethnic g to beincludedinthis study. coincided withtheperiodspowerconcentr 4 3 predom and 2008.Inaddition, categorized a +1 Becauset Becausem a eans thanordina i ta p 0 ni t o p o ber ofcas M o Geo Uk m cracy, I arative analysisof cracy Table 0.1 r n th
The caseselection W ov o ities. Thisis en s i l rai ze theethnicm d inantly dem e ob
h id r r o gi oup l ile itishighlyprob n ed v h ubt e a e a e s o v
t b
tries from a es, orarefoc st ofthe e “dem use t s ineachofthesecoun racted t Polity IV y in l y e i theFreed Freed ed i d significantlyworseinterm : n ni M Level ofDemocracyinMoldova,Ukraine,andGeorgia(1991-2008)
ocracies”, the h n m e m u o th h u m l o existing Not Free o d e democratization ry r m levelofdem cratic since1991. m b o investigation.A 1 e r data e e values for e v CentralAsia,whichacco 9 Ho o thod ntioned-above Russiaan r. a, - - u 9
bilization againststateau processis eason f om
sed onatim 1 Th Uk e set authors according
u press s e coun e and rai of calculatingthe Housea quan rest we able tha n
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1 19 19 n n o casesarenotincludedinthis ce (M es” (Vanha a f to 9 ic m ex 1).Nevertheless,on o l scorewas t 9 9 9 e h r ent eithercove 5 1 1 “Dem m thec e gr o clude thepos - - - cracy 2 2 2 on censuses,thenum u a 00 00 00 n k o obiliz bet k e up o 7 7 7 & ag ( ocrac
e u oncen 199 w ethnic m Po nen, 2003; sc V e f TatuVa e “non-free”periods b e ope lity IV e
s ation again e 1- “dem on, inaregim n e n dem e ofm rk y tween e 200 ” vari ral assessm ui trated powercan of thisres Non-dem r aspeci l e ocrat e 7) 4 t-Sov 19 ntioned above n, o i 15 nority groups
69-70). cracy a 2 o 9 nhanen i b 1 re com i and 0 l c - e - - 02; 1
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CEU eTD Collection (Oct governm f Abkhazia, S reasons. the typeandintensityof politic concentratio and onRussophonesinUkraine.Thesegroupsdiffer in Transdniestrian UkrainiansandRussiansinMo in MoldovaandGeorgia. within thes the internalaffairsoftheseregion 1993 inGeorgiaand1992Moldova)therespec 5 1991. political stabilityworsened,theirshareinth em to beanalyzedinthisstudy,RussiansandGr territorially concentrated a credib total population,orboth. to bee characteristics thatm of them Sou i rst ye igrated massivelyatthebeginn o r b ce: au Hence, thisresearchm Furtherm 5 e ThegroupofJewishm ithe r 2 ars of le threattothecentre arerelevantforthisstudy.Thegroup e 008 nts andtheseregions.Afterthecivilwa t r h e territor or’s i , outh Ossetia(Georgia),andTransd terr n (Annex2illus Tb transitio ore, theprocessesofethnicm ilisi) n itor terv i ally c i iew es c a ke theirev with n, prior ould notbeinf atthefrontierwithakinstate. Iassum oncentr Mikh t r
a in casetheym al dem tes i to ated, eil entu nority inMoldova a e in th inly focuse thatethni s. Aid thepe g of1990s Therefor e la ornum al “th a i nds expressedinvariou nov l uenced tte , t r r) and eat h riod c m eric e ch 11 o e totalpopulationdecrease eeks from ” towardsthec e, thelevelofconsequentethnicm bilize againststateau s onGagauzians,Bulgarians,andnon- when theeconom bythedegreeofcentralpowerconcentration niestria (Moldova)arestudiedonlyduringthe i of“frozenconflict” ldova; onArm airm a norities cons - s tobeinv i lly r norities’ m rs withthesesecessionistterritories(1991- tive centralpower as an is excludedfrom desc e o lev theirrelativesize,degreeofterritorial f Also, from Georgiaare th a rib e Ru nt interm e e e titu s m obilization intheregionsof stig d inChap ntra ssian e nians andAzerisinGeorgia; i ting c con o ated sh l power ments oftransitionperiod. -sp thelistofm s of upto1%cannotim thorities, unles s lostanyau e excluded. Becausethey akin thisstudyforsim d betweenth itions percentageoutofthe ters 3and4-alsoin all h d significantlyafter g credib
jo urn and a ve de i a nority groups lists o le: th thelev thority over o s theyare e central bilization scrip f ey have
Geo pose e tive l of ilar r g i a
CEU eTD Collection region thatwouldhaveanalyzed classified. S to determ Soviet statesbytakingasbasisthepresidenti there hasbeensom m ethnic in Chapter4ofthisthesis,scholarspost-S of ethnicmobilizationagainstst com party tendstogaincontrolw m actions” whichm because inpresiden presidentialism perfor included countriesofthepost-Sovietregion, discussed inChapter1. political rep took therelationbetween thetw power separ 2, parliam i i nority relationsm nority groupsiftheycannotge p rehensive answertothequestionofhow The acade In theiranalysisofethnicconflict Inputs fromtheState-of-the-Art ity -re ine thecategoryunderwhichseparatere e ntarism lated po c r a esentation, aswellitsim holars ofpost-comm tion m / a powerconcentrationdichoto ic literatu / kes ethnicgroupsfeelsafer,w presidentialism lic e tialism “therearem odel thattheserepublicsfollo researchconductedonth ies ms betterthanparliam inthef ith noneedforcoalitions”(2002 re onthepost-Sovie ate authorities.Tom thisquestionastheprim o t significantrepresentationand u rmer Sovie o forgranted.Thisisprobably thereasonforwhich nist region dichotom onthePost-SovietRegion: portan s aroundtheworldbetw o re poi t y alsoanaly 12 alism
re oviet regionanalyzedextensivelythetypesof e ce forthem does notnecessarilygohandinwiththe power concentrationinfluencedtheprocesses e dynam nt Stephen Saidem publics m nts withinthesystem ar h publics inseparateperi wed. Inaddition,asdiscussedinChapter2, y. Still,in - ile parliamentarism t ism parliam regiondo y knowledge inreducingethn andattem zed the i cs offor ary fo o e deration ofm ntarism ; 110-111).AsshowninChapter theirr cus ofinvestigation.Asshown es notpro scop an et.al.hypothesizedthat especially thre , thereisnoresearchonthe m p een 1985and1998which ted to dichotom s ofgovernm e e an sea “canbethreateningto t d form r o dete ods oftim ch Saidem i ic conf blockunfavorabl norities’ protes v ide acle rm y andbytrying
atening ifone of minorities’ ine thesta lic e nt inpost- e couldbe t. Thisis an et.al. a r and t, as t e e -
CEU eTD Collection the leadersofethnically defined them opportunity structure,whichisal insignificant aswell”(2007;242). presidents andinsignificantparliam legis regim region, parliam the newdemocracieso political representation.SoniaAl regim However, th are be in linewiththisexpectation. cooperate inordertoelectajo powerful presidencycanacttoprovideanin ethnic protest.Inhisstudyofethno-political branches thantheparliam defined: first,presidentialregim this effectofstrongpresidenciesthroughthech conflict escalationandsuggestedthatthei authors havefoundnorelationbetweentheform l , DanielTreism ative comm There arealsostudiesthatconnecttheethnic There arestudiesthatreachedtheopposite John Ishiyam e e tte s donot”.Thisis s thatdonottend r s u e coreofth ited toacc e ntary system ittees, whiles a alsoarguedthatrelativelypow an’s analy f toconcentr EasternEuropeandthe eir argum omm becauseparliam e ntar odate m s allowforeffec int candidate”(2000;54).Theau s y regim e is regions andrepublicsto estab onso andRubenRuizDufino’sanalysisofethnicconflictin s areless e ofethnicpoli so relevantfortheresearch ent iss m ate thepow i -presidentia i e norities inth nts, “s e s; second,“theexisten i e ssue shouldbefurtherexplored(2002;122). m likely tom ntary ila conflicts inpost-comm 13 r: them o representationofmi er andtha tics in aracteristics ofpresidentialism centive inanethnicallydividedsocietyto regim l regim tive representationwhilesem conclusion, i.e.thatparliamentaryregim for m ofgover obilization againstthe e reg erful presidentsareas m onopolize bothlegislativeandexecutive Russiaexplainsth e u er SovietUnionarguedthat“forthis s oftheregionh lti-ethnic states e s tendtohave t i givem o n n thanthepresiden m question of lish thescopeoftheirregional thor’s empiricalfindingswere e ce ofadirectlyelectedand nt andthedegreeofethnic o re chancesf uni st regionheexplained s noritie a hould havepolitical e strategiesusedby thisthesis.Am ve relativelystrong relativelystrong state withpolitical sociated withless s in thatHorowitz o i tial regim r m -presidential them i norities’ ong is e e s. s
CEU eTD Collection institutional structurestypical m (2002; 275).TarasKuzioandDa institutions andenhancedfactorssuchasl in theCau offered byt particula prism (2007; 220). were triggered–besidesotherthingsbythe concluded thattheethnicconflictsinCa power gotf words, theethniclead experienced deepcleavagesa the Russian-speakingregionofDonbassem mobiliza while exp was alsoassociatedwithm separatist dem separatist claim more thelo authority atthebeginningof1990svis-à-visth i norities intheUkrain When theescalationof Graham ofpoliticalopportunitys r tion ly l aining the m h casus, becausetheyempoweredth cal leadersowedtheirseatstoth r inUkraineatthebegin e autonomousstructuresplayedacruc agm Smithand a e nds than ntioned. Forins s . Bycontrast,thepopularly-ele e nted. Anotherscholarofpos eth ership inam ian pen the leadersappointedbycentre. n AndrewW ic m o re ethnicconflictsin separatism for territorialautonom obiliza nd periodicshiftsinrulingalignm i t t nsula ofCrim ru ance ctu vid Mayeralsoattributed n ilson alsopo tion inUkra , Svante r ing of i e app nority-spe (Treism eadership, econom 1990s r oach
14 ea at ucasus sincethecollapseofSovi Cornell a e internal fragm e centralpower.Theauthorconcludedthatthe erge aking reg t-Soviet region–ChristophZurcheralso presid , ine and post-Soviet regionis inted e ethnic a theim , theym th n, 1997). ial roleintheescalationofethnicconflicts cted leadersweremo d whentheelitesin i es left e begin toth ent, thelesslik r Esto gued portance ofins e i o ntioned th as aSovietlegacy(1999; 299). e cha The presenceoflocalparliam n n lites withc e i consolid tha c viabil ing of1990stoth nia. W ntation the m r t acte th ents (1997;849).Inother h ity, andexternalsupport e in at thepolitic of ile a r o ely theywere is ated whenth explained throughthe newnationa bilization ofRussian t tics itutional reso s ontrol of titu n thecapitalKiev re likelytohave alyzing o tiona f nationalelite e ex al partiesin l re the state- istence of e central list elite et Union tohave urces is sources ethni e lik nts c e s s
CEU eTD Collection d effect; th analysis ofcausal models. superiority ofaproposedexplanatorym 6 are correlationalinnatu or statis specific co favor ethnicm on ethnicmobilizationandco questions b usually them m investigatin causal m fragm approach onthecaseofpost-Sovietregion ethnic m research thatwouldhavedeterm the preferen concentration augm com On i scu i norities’ mobiliza e p ssi rehensive answerb o When scholarsbuildcausalargum Hence, theresearchconductedon MethodologicalApproach: e on f ntation overethnicm t e latterrefersto tical analysesbasedonalargenum h
obilization. Ontheotherhan echanism o e f t mparative researchdesigns(“m wid e g thecausallinksand y ce forregim longing tothecatego p a e e jor focusisonthedependentvari s obilization orthe sp m o echanis read f cau s . Thisthesisa ents orattenuatesethnic tion typo s theco ali ms orproc agains t re. e y, seeJohn a lo s thatwouldlesslikely sed onextensiveem g 6 y Thecontributionofsuchtype nn
obili o
ecting f t thestate. causalityin e ined e sses. occ zation againstthestate,buttip r i
G ms atbring y “whatcauses
e nf p r u Thefo a r d, theschol rrenc i licts, rese thways b ng’ m ents thr pirica so s ar o e of rm odel cial sci st si ticle (2 b m er referstoco 15 er i e m piri lly theactualeffectofpowerconcentrationon n obilization. Althoughsomeauthorsm t inter- w ofcases)withcausalargum a pointed totheaugm g echanism ough largeorsmall-Ncom m able. Specifically, r een t acontribu leadtocon vis-à-vis thealready chers ars whousedpoliticalo e cal research ilar-” o 005 region doesnotgiveaunanim the outco n ce ). h ethn e caus d spec e fi va s r n ic conf betweenpowerconcentrationand “m e ria s “co m if e tion tother andthee t ically centration o e studiesconsists i tothequestionwhetherpower ost dif onal Y? r ically withoutspecif relatio lict” pat researchers ” Inthescholarly ask“whatfactorscauseor f ? T t enting effectofpower e e n ffe r re a n l” ct. Foram s bet h nt” researchdesigns, existing explanatory e f levan is approac pportunity s cau power,thereisn p w e sal an arative research, ee seek nts tha inprovingthe t n acau liter alysis and o toanswer re elaborate literature h a t e y im usually se andan ture, by t ntioned o ing the ructure us or plies th o e
CEU eTD Collection mobilization m has itssha singularly explainethnicm mobiliza ethnic m variables exploredbefore.Inm variab f in thisth variable acrosscases”(George& ways, oneofwhichconsistson“explainingthe im assum strong explanatorym “covering law”thatwouldcom Bennett called“building central pow concentrated powerattenuateorbycontrary, effect oftheconcen exploring thequestion:“whatwaseffectof focus isnotonthedependentvariable,butth actors tha echanis prove This projectisdrivenby Therefore, thisth As theresearchquestionofthisprojectim e le –i. s thattheanalyzedcausalfactorfillsa m tion esis. Specifically,Iassum obiliza m throughwhichtheconcentrated e r t e nt ofabroadertheory. togethe er intrans e. natureof of . inthosecas Moreover,thenum im tion can pact ontheef r trated pow m i o tion states del foralargepartof horizon a esis beovertur block”.Thisim es when y explaina d obilization, asthereis o er onethnicm es nothav b f tal p ? a ect. Theref ine severalrelevant erous academ it is ny casesthe a researchobjectivethatAl Bennett, 2005;79).Thisispreciselytheapproach thatIuse The “buildingblock” e o thatconcen ned bytheef certa am wer –bette ong therelevan plies th in le e ore, them as obilization? 16 relevant cases.The“buildingblock”objective ic st effects ofhorizontallycon encourage th s v e independentone.Namely,Iam plies, Ifollowanoppositeapproach:themain thecaus p ultim e at theprojectisnotfocusedondevelopinga r expla tra ace with l of power influencesthedegreeofethnic alwaysacom causal roleofoneparticularindependent udies onthetopicpro f tion of factorsandwouldresu ects of a ethnic a in goalof te goaltoprove i t objective canbeachi ns ethnicm caus More e in-, andtheref powerisa“block”within asetof X?”Inotherwords,whatwasthe otherf e ethn m e s. exander GeorgeandAndrew obiliza specifically, doeshorizontally this b ination offactorsandeach ic m actor obiliz thes tio o ore contribu bilization ag s inf n. Inotherwords,I is v that itsindependent ation th centrated po e thatnofactorca lt inaparticularly tod eved i l uencin interestedin an a e te n r di te to-the ainst th m g ethnic ny other wer o ine the fferent n n e
CEU eTD Collection o consists onc val would bedifficulttofindevenasmallnum and thatwouldbeatthesa sm mobiliza an outcom probabilistic approachimpliesthat the twom 7 “m thesis arebu determ determ 1965; 345-347).Therefore,determ that wouldexplaintheobserva He the th causal m effects (George&Bennett,2005 is definedasasetofindependents linking theindependentand occurr assum The“m t h u e all num m ethod ofdifference”,norbythe“m r es sim p As alre The resear eoretical dom el explained,“eachlinkwithinacausal o e ence of ining descriptiveinferencesbasedonem ining genericinferencesbasedontheoretical n neitherneces ethod i t lar tion echanism h iti e b e e o t
m er ofcasesthatwouldd , ratherthandeterm es b hods arenotcom ilt accord st points of di ady m p certainle udy aring “case e c t ffe
w h vari s designof een th rence” e identifyshall toso ain oftheprop ntioned, thecom a ing b sity, norsufficiencyof l vel of e e s , withdiff consists oncom tothislogic cases […]”(Van […] m m a thisprojec ny possibleexp ethnic l e
p ti o atible withthepr oki tion asagen dependent variable.Generally, ine it(Liebe erent characte m ). Therelationshipbetween be applicabletoothercontex ng e explanatoryfactorsincrease sim m osed theo t
i p able facto . ffer inre fo ining ac
p arative e ob ethod ofa Ev r aring “cases t isbuiltaroun ilar ot iliza er her a, ber of in thedegreeofethnicm r l di istics andsim tio 1 e ana rson, 1994).Moreover,th 17 re 997; 2 ralized and sp chain shouldbesuppor l r f em tical m n inallcase pirical study,butm s f my particu g a ect toall–exceptone t e thatundercertaincond obabilistic approachinsocialsciences.The i r usal m reem with sim ons th ences cases thatwouldbesim ent of reflection.TheChapters4,5,and6ofthis 3 ) .
d theanalys ent”. odel (Geddes,2003).AsCarlGustav bet at itwouldbedif thisp ilar values ilar echanism gene w s 7 l ee AsarguedbyStanleyLieberson, background ch ata ar independ n cases”; r ralizable regularity”(He oje causes andoutcom ts, whichshouldberelatedto the term ll tim or decreasethelikelihoodof on c is of does t isin o the studyva re i t obilization. Similarly,it e ted bya‘coveringlaw’ h s. thecausalm –explanatoryfactors e ofcausalmechanism m e literatureonethnic aracteristics anddiffere ent variableforthe notsim spir itions linkcausesto “m f portantly, itim ilar inres i cult tof et e hod d riable, neith of e p i ag p n s thatthe ly im echanism l er by o ect toa d oking for reem evena m plies the pel, ent” ply n l l t
CEU eTD Collection the res chapters bystandardizedquesti Moldova, andUkraineareindepe design ofmyproject.W Bennett, 2005;70). focused comparisoniswhatdifferentiatesitfr connected tothespec collected insupportto cases, relevant literature.Inotherwords,itcanbe theoretical focusofthestructuredfocused com collected isthenusedtoansw standard on aseto parallel casestudies,bu Although itcontainsthecom (2005; 67-72)isthem sets ofcausesandeffects when theaimofaresearchistoestablish explanations –exceptoneanddifferinrespec p arison isundertakenwitha Accordingly Consequently, the“structuredfocusedcom onlyspecificpre-estab earch. ized f
evidencef pre-determ , thelogicofstructu o if st appropriatem t structured thespecificquestionsaskedacro ic ques r , ined andstandardized thecom om h ile th eachofthecas lishe er apre-established p ons thataredeterm tions arison elem e effectsofpowerconcentra p specific objectivein d in arative el aspects ndently analyzed,theanalysis islef asp e thod of ecifi r ed-foc t specific causalmechanism ofthecas theoreticallyjustifie ou ent, em 18 comparison h c manner:each om es underinvestigation.T ent m t. t tothedegreeofet investigation forthepur Thisla the m questions,whichisaim used com p theclassicalcasestudym theoretical enquiry.Th arison” developedbyGeorgeandBennett ined through u st bedriven es areanal e m thod isprim i tte nd thatistheoreticallydriven.The p ss thecases,whiledatanot r arison drivestheg a charac s aplaceinthem individu tion inpost-SovietGeorgia, the theoreticalfram d. W y by adifferentlogic. zed andeviden hnic mobilization.Finally, isdriveninindividual ter arily basedonasetof h linkingpre-determ al i ile studyingindividual stic of casestudyisfocused pose ofthisresearch. e structuredfocused h e evidencehence e e thod (George& d atcollecting thestructur e neral research o ce is re general ework of being ined ed
CEU eTD Collection analysis ofeachcaseiso of eachlink causal paths republics. T concentratio investigatio periods withethnicm em mobilization define theconceptof and th system policies thatdefinethestat reflection. Ifocusspecifically horizon described above.Inthefirstchapter,Idete
pirical g
The structureofthethesisresultsfrom Structure o ird ch s; third,theonegoingthro tally n. Thecentralaim o concentratedpowerwithethn h discuss n correlated apters , withinthecausalch al isto aswelltodeterm e fourth,fifth,andsixthchapters f haveeachatheo theThesis e determ d inthetheoreticalchapte o horizontallyconcentr bilizati withcerta r ganized accordi e-m ine theperiod : on threecausalpaths: on inGeorgia,Moldova,and istodeterm i nority relations;second,the ine them u ain gh theterr in levelof retical anda inthecas ng tothestructured o s st th ine thedegree rm appropriatem 19 with concen ic itoria e applicationofthem ated powerandresp ethnicm r. m focus ontheelaborationofeachthree i Specifically n es ofUkraine,Moldova, n e thecausalm em obilization, onthebasisoftheoretical l organ first,theonegoingthroughgovernm pirical goal.Theth obilization inth trated power i zati inwhichcerta e -focused comparison. Ukraine duringtheperiodunder thods forope , Iexp one goingthroughtheelectoral on ofstatepower.T echanism l e ore theem thodological approaches ect andrespectivelythe ively thatofethnic e threepost-Sovie rationalization. The andGeorgia.The eoretical go s i thatconnectthe n leve pirical valid l of h e second power al isto e ntal ity t
CEU eTD Collection particula ref m way inwhichthesetwosetsof of centralpoweraffectthe the co consociationalism between ce initial stepintoth whether itm intr chains assummarizedinFigureI.1. power concentrationand of thisthesis.Second,basedon analys estab concentratio
Chapter I i norities’ mobiliza e insically contain rs toth lish the The term In politica The m 1.1.1. PoliticalOpportu 1.1. MainTheoreticalApproaches: re oftheories is oftheexistingtheoreticalapproachesth r th ntra e charac a at c n andethnicm causalm a in goalof : TheoreticalLinkagesbet y beconducivetoethnicm “politicalopportunitystructure”, l power a l s n inf andthesecondispoliticalopport c is in ience th s tion ter e l at explain ue e l thisthesisistod e i chanism andethnic vestig stics of , m nce, in lite Iproce ethnic m Ethnic M ents thatm i ra ethnic mobilization norities ation nity StructureforSocialMobilization: ture a betweenthetwova politicalsys theor thewayinwh e these approaches,I pos d withthe
i istode there aretwocon norities’ m m ’ itiv m a i i y bef es help no i norities’ obilization. Th e or e term i rities’ Mobiliza norities’ i r de term a
nega vo t 20 atconnectingpowerconcentrationwithethnic em ingeneralandthos ine whetherthep o ich certain bilization, by tailed ana rable fortheescalationof m initially introducedby . ine thetheoreticallin Foracomprehensiv at arerelev w tive m obiliza unity structure.Thesetwoconceptsareat een PowerConcentrationand riables. Forthis,If c establish thecausal way,th obilization agains epts thatcan erefore, th l form tio ys is. a n againstth e proc nt toth developing threedistinctcausal t al andinform ion r ocess ofpowerconcentratio e task beasso ess of
e mainres e understand e ofcentralpowerin Peter Eisingerin1973, t stateautho k ofthischapteristo i ages betw m rst pres e state.The socia ethnicconflicts,i.e. cia echanis al characteristics t e d l earch m ent a withthe obilization. m between een power ing ofthe r ities. Th question detailed f i rst is link n e
CEU eTD Collection power, noritsabsence encouragesthegr som this featureofpoliticalopportunitystructurean facilitates th mobiliza the poweris m concentrated inthehandsofaunifiedm conditions ofconcentratedpower.Thisisbe com political eliteshavetheincentivetom The waysinwhichthesedim elite (Tarrow,1994),dim more dim the presenceorabsenceofeliteallies,andth institutionalized politicalsystem opportunity structureastobethem given pointintim (institutional) andinform various listsofpoliticalopportunity action andtothechang “features of In CharlesTillyandSidneyTarro a jority isdividedo e p authors’opin ensate forapossiblyresource-poorstatus The openne W h tion en therearem e nsion thatTarrowspecificallyanalyzed regim fragm e accessofpoliticalm incre ss of a e. DougMcAdam(1996;27) e e ses. nted in“indepen i s andinstitution on, itcon r o the u e pposition s intho ltiple r e al stru nsion whichisparticul e g e i nsions m independen m s titutes acu e ctures ofpower , thestability s to tonewactors e features obi structurefeatu itgrows(T w’s words,po d s lizers to ent centers thatfaci a a y influe a jority in one obilize t centers rvilin ” (T e s 21 eatest am necessary resou orunderastrongleader cause astateis“strong”whenthepower or a t nce socialm litate o d thesocialmobilization illy &Tarro s: therelativeopennessorclosureof ate cap arrow, 1998 of power”,them ear relation relationss m (Tarrow,1996),incentiveswhichlackin l instab lis so f arly relevantforthepurposeofthisthesis. r is th a es. litical opportunitystructurereferstothe ted thefollowingdim of ss supportersonthei acilita powerwithinapolitic Each oftheselistsco e degr r acity orincap inhibitapolit ount ofprotest(Beissinger, 2002). ility of tes o ; 83).This w p : ee of bilization areanalyzedb neith r ecific top , 2007;49).Scholarsproposed ces. However,thelinkb so existingpolitica cial m divis o re thepossibilityforsocial er acity forrepress , and“weak”whenthat full accesstopolitical i impliesthatthem ic obiliz o ism o n al acto litical regim e withinthepolitica r side,inorderto nsions ofpolitical ntains bothform ation, al system o re complex.In r’s c l alignm becau i o e on. One llec e e low. , som s ata tween ents, se it tive o re al e l
CEU eTD Collection high. Onthecontrary,politicalopportunitystru politica division opportunity forsocialmobiliza costs oforganizingandmobilizingo mobiliza (Tarrow, 1996).Finally,ahighcapacityofrepressiondecreasesthechancesforsocial chances mobilizers withinthep to seeksupportoutsidethepoliticalclass.Also, signals fornewpossibilitiesof m and openedpoliticalsystem like Moreover, itisbelievedthatademocratic m leade concentrated powersystem reduced po to represspotentialm rela f o eans aspetitioning a llowing c nage topreserv tive l y toind r Therefore, theform Additiona The system , the l l thatsocialm withinthe y op a tion lig r ef litical opportunitystru u i nm becauseitim ened, whenpolitica rcum ce conf ore ther lly ents ar s withconcentratedpow stance , whenthere elite, e thepowerconcentrated rontationa obilization. (Kitschelt, 1986). e isnom e r obilizers o s: whenp whenthein e litical elitefacilitates latively al andinform plies th s politicalpoweris inwhichsocial areunstab coalitionem ’ l soc dem tion l a u s ltiplic at thecen lig t o a i inthefollowingcircu p a cture fors b stitu litica a inion (T nm l le, and nds will m ity of ents ar al stru obiliza tion l l e alignm er m e erging, whichm system tra whenstate a m lite isf 22 illy powercente li during m a obilization willm l e unstable,an z be includedonpolitical tion (m ct nifest s controlledbyam powerhasthe the exis e o , 1978). o u d politicalsystem cial m cture facilitatessocial cial m r ents withreducedpoliticalopennessism e o characteristicswhicharespecificfora r atthelev agm ass demonstration f statepowerdecreases tenc ’ o obilization, becauseinthiscasethe s c obilization. First,inhorizontally- re thanoneconsecutive legislative e a m e of r nted, whe a p s d whenstatehas y encouragepoliticalopponents stances: whenthereis . Moreove acity inf necess e a l ofcentralpower,thereare nifest throughconventional f l isre a uential a o jo r a rity grouporastrong n ry e politica lative m r pression s agenda is , ) than whenincum m obilizatio l eans toraisethe lies f l alowcapacity y c thepolitical ade l is l system o ose increas r potentia r reduced mocratic e n inthe d, when latively b ents is o ed r e l
CEU eTD Collection collapsing S political opportunitystru features isapplicableforet Therefore, thesam to struc dispersed powerincreasesit. horizontally concentratedpowerreducesthe 1996). Theconsociational dem governm representation. Consociationalismwasofte governm in 1967(Steiner,1981),theterm political opp institutions, specifically,bysigni in th dom resources forrepressiontendtobeledbypr control overthem m challengers, there m a a king processes.Finally,inaregim ndate, politicalalliancessupportingtheincu i is regio isap nant, majorityparty.Hence,overallpolitic As atypeofsocialm Originally introduced 1.1.2. Consociationalism: t e e ura ntal stabilityandform nt inwhich e becausetheparliam n oviet Union.Oneofhisconclusions l ortunities th rpetu , f andpe i nancial, a ting e eans logicthatlinkssocialm riod m theins forrepression,astheCa at activists loyalty,a wastha cture th a jority inpower,the in obilization, th hnic mobilizationaswell.MarkBeissing theacad eory inhisexpl e titu t o th ntary opposition cracy f a and populatio i tional arran naging com e waves cant div nd elite consociati e withcon emic comm isspecifically e et r hnic m i of sio 23 obilization withpolitical mobiliza e n suggestedasasolutionforensuring s al opportunitystructureth centrated cen an esidential ap abouttheoccurrenceof m sources f g y n mbent powe onalism ns faced(Beissinger,199 probability forsocialm em stem s withinp
atory schem una has reduced unity byLijphartandGerhardLehm binet m obilization isco ents arebelieved l conflictinplural becom tion designatesadem associated withet o r i m werep nistries that o tral powerthereis pointees r e litica e tendtobestable.Also,when politicallev s relativ ofnationalm a king mobilizationpossible. l elite r ndition ovo or bym ely clo toguaran opportunitystructure nationalm ked bych er usedelem s societies(Lijphart, eory im coordinate thestate , andshif 6). e e obilization, while hnically “divided d upontheacces rage fordecision obilizatio o s cratic form aconcentrated ed to e m plies thatthe an b o t ers ofthe ee group potential ge with bilization ts within n inthe ents of bruch of in s -
CEU eTD Collection chan legis society proportionality, andtheim the ex political stability(Deschouwer,2002). Koole &D often quotedasexam stabiliz political partythatcontrolstheCabinetand Lijphart def ethnic m based com electoral system population share.Interm of ethnicgroupswith reduce it”(Lijphart,1996;261).Thepracticeof that m 8 societies” inwhichthepower-sharingprincipleof to ruletogether.Thepracticeofm im policies unfavorabletothem ethnic group In plies aninclusivecabinetcoal t gea l h atu Lijphar The oppositeofconsociationaldemocracy e literatu i isten b norities caneffectivelyp 8 er f ly , eachofthesefourelem r i e. Also,ina“m norities’ cu (a o m c u r in aalder, 2002),although i e ofgrandcoaliti s. Thispa t ned asthesystem unity laws,duetofederalarrangem t ho spe re r’s ter . Finally,segm on o c - if ethn con b se ied f ltural institu rvat in rticipation isb ples ofconsociationali s ic re o stateins c our m ion iatio ajoritarian” dem s offor lations. Thecase ) . ple (Lijphart,1977).Th
n
a on governm a ental autonom
lis r in whichpo m in elem otect theirau tions (Lijphart,1977). ition ofethnicrepresentatives, m titu ent ents is u , th m Belgium tual veto tions a e al practic tion ofsegm liev e term ents that believed shall e d to e o litica s “p nts, thepracticeof s cr y i of t didnotprovetobe im st regim 24 onomy byblockinganyatte acy theone- es, thisimpliestheuseofpr m m lu b Nether plies thatthereisan proportion issupportedbyam s l e e a ral so t plies thatethnicgroups powerten e existenceofgrandcoalitiongovernm ay nts and/orculturalau governmentisbelieved propo ke itpossib to en ental autonom is the“m atthecoreofconsociationaldem e ciety” an s (Arm land courage th rtion a p lity im s, Belgium d arty m s tob a l ajoritarian” democracy,which d ingeon, 2002;E.Jones, e f l withtheethnicgrou “d in whichtheelitescooperate m o plies thattherep r ethn y. Inanethnicallyplural i u e politic anexam v e a tual veto,thepracticeof id “inform con jority cabine a ed jori , andSwitze society”areu tonom ic canenjoyculturally- centr ty ofdeputiesinthe mpts toe m to havetheroleof al participationof i ple ofpersistent a norities toblock ated l understanding y toadm t withinon dom r liminate r oportional esentation land wer p’s tota s ed o i cracy: i in nister nates e nts ter- or e e l
CEU eTD Collection interests, norarethey neithe as thesesys polic Second, insuchsystem for ethnicm Hence, inco process, system political systemishighlyinadvi over thelegislature(Lijphart, dem the ethnicgroupsm are fewinstitutionalchannelstobringethnic reduced incentivestoattractnewsupportersorallies.Mo dem mobiliza mobiliza theory sugg mobiliza above, allpoliticalopportunitystructuredim the inf that theinte answers totheresea onstrations orevenrebellions. a ies. Th nds isreduced,b In conclusion,politicaloppor r s bytheirveryn abletoreac o whichleadstotheiral rm tion tion tion al andf nsity of ese incentiv ests thatinsystem t nsocia isreduc . areatthes em Consociationalism i norities’ mobilization s reducetheprobabilityforethn tiona socialm t tolegislativ o r rm ch questionof ed e i able toeffectivelyadva ght useconfrontationa al politica cause thein lists’ v e s thepr a a , becausethesystem s m m ture b e obilization (andbyextension-of tim a y resu i ienation andwhichincreasesthechanceform s withconcentratedpowertheprobabilityfornegative social ew politica 2008; 114-115).Consociationalistssuggestthatthistypeof sab l essure onpoliticalelitestof e ock theaccess e in alsoim def l e l thisthe e forpluralso cum lt f tunity structureandcons itiativ nvironm agains i ning com r om b ent elit l es plies sy twoim s e is. t ce and policiesthatm ent inwhichsocialm dem nsions 25 stem nce policyproposalsthat reducesthe l m Politicalop p es havingdom that theocc of ethnicminoritiesto ic politicalrepresen onents of ntral powerand/orsp a cieties, becau s withconcentrated nds p thatareconsidered eans ofexpressingde lications onlegislativeorgovernm concentr portunity str of accesstoeffectivemeans for ethnicm u a ociationalism reover, asin vorably respondtom rrenc se m i “m nant co i ght notbefavorabletotheir ajoritarian ated p a e of jorita obiliz tatio po obiliza ntrol overpowerhave unfavorable forsocial thedecision-m ethnicm u wer createincentiv ecific governm n, ethnicgroupsare are intheirinterest. cture th o rian winne suchsystem ers ac wer. Allin suggestopposing m i tion ” norities’ protest. a sys nds, asm e t. Asshown ) eor ntal agenda, dep t obiliza e m y r- i norities’ im all,the e s. First, take- s there nds on aking e plies t ntal io a a es ss ll n
CEU eTD Collection country willbefrom can bedeterm different th agains causal chainandhypothesislinkingpowerconcentr m not haveincentivestoabstainfromthei for m structure, intheperiodswithhorizontallyc unfavorable policiestowardsm political representation,thelikelihoodthat ethnic m inte “m have reasonsforgettinginvolved the e Consociatio protes communities live.Butasshownabove,consocia depends onthecha i norities. Thissection ajoritarian” dem rests. Ac t The term Both theoriesofconsociationalism obilization againstthestatearereduced. hnic 1.2.1. “Multi-Ethnic”States,Ethnically“P 1.2. Pow t actionsaremorelike t thes i norities tendtobele mobiliza ings. Multi-ethnicity n t cording toc ate. alis ined bycalculatingtheprobability er Concentrationand s “m t theo o r tion cracies thereisahighchance ac ulti-ethnic state differentethnicgroups (F ry te isinc analysesth onsocia im ristics of plies tha r ease ss representedin refersto tiona l f i in anti-governm y inpolitic norities is o d is presum r t becaus ” lists, inth m insys andethnica State-Minority Relations al and thedes andofpo oncentrated powerethnic t m e em in 26 ed ef increased. Accordingtopoliticalopportunity inform plem thecentralgovernm e periodswithhorizonta al system From earon, 2003;208).Itisalso determ s withconce c suchsy power.Becauseofthereduced rip forunfavorablepoliciestowardsm e lura that twoind tionalists ntal protest. litical opportunitystructuresuggestthatin entation ofunfavorablepoliciestowards lly f tive co ation withethnicm ect inmoredeta here,onecaninfe al politicalenv “plurals l States”,and stem s basedon“m mposition suggestthatethniccon n tra s m i vidua t t ed powerthep a i t norities are e” concep EthnicMobiliza i ls ran ofastatepopu ron ils a m e lly i r thatgovernmentsdo i nt wouldimplem norities’ opportunities m norities’ m nd elabora concentratedpower d ent inwhichethnic ajoritarian” logic. om tually des m ly selec r o oba ch r ined bythe e o lation and t likely f bilization e i bility f tion licts and ance for norities’ s t ed ina af i g : n
i e to ate rst o nt r
CEU eTD Collection autom negativ approach th conflict rem the countryis,correlationbetweenitsethn research on127“civilwars”,theauthorsf between the corre (1982) arguedthatthelevelofpoliticalinstab because ofthehighprobabilityethno-cu [1861]) claim more pronetoethnicconflict a greaterdegreeofethnicdiversitybyitself-wi to beapersistentcommonview “m 1999; p.241). their over salience ofethnicboundariesin„p in whichthelevelofantipathybetw identities haveahighdegreeof “m in thelanguagestheyspeak(Fea cultural distancebetweentheethn ulti-ethnicity” ispoliticiz ulti-ethnicity” late. However, morerecents Because ofthisd a tically im e eth l a at alsod pping withsocia levelof n a e ic m ins weak(2003;82).Also,ther d thatdemocracywasincom ply politizationoftheethnic or“p obilization (Reilly,2000). This e m monstrate th luralism u i fferen lti-ethn ed andtheref t l udies revealthatth , econ (Fearon &Laitin,2003).Forinstan ce, itisim ” –ism i am city andethni salience, exceedingthes ron, 2003).Ethnic“plurality”re at thedegree ic groups,m lural societies”isstrengthen ong politicalpracti een ethnic o m o i c, and/o re prone ore cha portan ound thatnomatterhoweconom ltu p atible boundaries,whicharene 27 ral conflictinthem groupsarehigh(Horowit e c conflict.InJam ofm ility andthedegreeof e arecasestudiesbase a thout presuming“plural ic diversityandtheoccurrenceofa r t s r ere isnoindependentanddirectrelationship to acterizes th ured -forinstancethroughthedifferences to leadinte politicalc withth m u u lti-eth a y bebecausem nderstand tioners, academ a e structureof lience n icity byits e socie l eavage ed -besidesotherthingsby r-e whichofthetwofactors e of . Si s FearonandDavidLatin’s fers tothedegreeinwhich ce, JohnStuartMill(1991 thnic conf alter tie m s s inwhicheth ( ics, andjou ethnic fractionalization ilarly, BinghamPowel u elf isnotco m ity” -m cessary conditionsfor M lti-ethn d onprocess-tracing z, 2000;p.327).The n ative u ozaf lti-ethnic societies licts. i cally developed f iden a a i city doesnot kes acountry r &Scarr Thereus r nalists th nducive to tities, n n ic grou ethnic an itt, – e at d d p
CEU eTD Collection segm segm identification ofdifferents consocia a system dif dangerous f prone toexp relatively lo identities, th ethnically “plural”societiesinwhichethni the ethn segm society isdivided(Lijphart, 1981), Lijphartelaboratedam “too vague”distinctionbetweenwh and politicalcleavag societies inwhichcommunalgroupsareshar which theydefinedtheseconcepts. f e rent seg entation”, Steinerspecified ental boundariesand betweeneconom ent. - Inaco - Inapluralsociety,itm Consociatio - In In hisfirstarticleaboutconsociationalism 1.2.2. Consociationalismand“PluralSocieties” ic m tion basedontheprincipleofproportiona acom o w levelofmulti-ethnicity,butwith e obilization againstthes e ethn a m r pluralsocieties. rien lis ental inter ts im p mpletely p ce ethn letely n alis ic gro es (Lijphart, ply by“plur t theo plu ic m e ups m sts in ubcultures (Steiner,1981). r al societyitm l r ural society obilization thanagr y o arguesth Consocia a“pluralso a re detailedse y engageincon 1981). Referringearliertoth a u 1969). InalaterresponsetoJu l” st that itsdegreedependsfirstl at a“plural”andwhat“non-plural”societywas(Steiner, or“deep bealwayspossibletoiden t ate andfor tiona , at m ther u cie st be t ofcriteria.Hespecifiedthefollowing: c boundariesareenfor ly d 28 lis ply polarizedbyoverlappingsocial,econom a t y e m jority “winner- highlypoliticizedethn ts be ” f the actu eatly m i possible toid andhence, lict. From vided” societies,Ian lity. Inordertounderstandwhatexactly , Lijphhartdefined“p u liev st beperfectcorrespondence between ic, social,andpoliticalorganizations. u a e lti- l ethnicconflict.Onthecon th this e at th toguaran t hnic s tak entif pointofview,astatewith rgen Steiner’scritiqueofthe e on e “strengthofsubcultural y on e tif -all” politicalsys y t y theex thesegm ate. ced byothernon-ethnic ly waytoac th alyze belowthewayin t ic boundaries,ism e e e in politica lural societies”as act sizeofeach tens ents into l ity ofself- co s t mmodate t ability is em t rary, which s are o in ic, re
CEU eTD Collection or co Neve measu an electionisasegm voting supportofthedifferentpartiesfrom f in a“dividedsociety”(Andeweg,2000). - conditionthatacco conditions L ethnically basedpartieswithi organizational, econom when hewroteaboutconsociationali plural society.However,heusedadifferentte 9 inconsistency betweenthisdefini In suchasociety,cleavagescum linguistic, religious,orcu and theircr to becap In i nal te ga m a p ni rt lex zat r In “severelydividedsocieties “In aseverelydividedsociet - Politica agenda ofethnicallydividedso the categoryofroutineadm business policy,taxpolicy.Characteristicall developm Horowitz –oneofthecriticsconsocia These definitionsrevealthat hel em 19 in st f i e onal en 81 tured byoneoranothereth ss d t o o , i
i cato di article, Stein r n ijphart formulatedin itics hadin a“com f l
ffe a l rs cu ent plans,educationalcontrovers t partiescons e re r ltural d for th nt w i o a rdin en r t p k i on of letely plu s e tal census(Lijphart,1981). e i Li r criticized ic, andpoliticalstructur v g toLijphartfacilitate m co e jp ltural diversity.According rsity, an
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i i y, ethnicityfindsitsway bey n n late. Som nistration as o criterionof st m cieties.” (Horowitz,1985;8). soci ic cons ties with ciety ” t fo h o thesaliency a n rt for odel anditsim et d r sub-cu si e y ” of f , isth m
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d de l s thedevelop organizations coveredbythethirdcriterion.A a e
rm –theoneof“severelydividedsocieties” ency (Horowitz,1985;8 “sub-cultural segm v m critiques ofconsociationalism “plural”, tion toelection.Inaperf “pluralsociet i l sume acentralplaceinthepolitical at the s tionalism n t pt ies, tradeunionaffairs,landpolicy, u 9 easurem , aswell e. Moreover,insuch g
y, issuesthatwouldberelegatedto r h o h al seg ofethnicityisalsoreflectedin to theexam a f d u di r plications: e sho lura vi ent m s “semi-plural” si ed –furtherclarifiedtheconceptof en l soc s m o of
tatio n u d ent ofconsociationald bet a tendencyofnon-ethnicparties nce of“crosscuttingcleavages” ld belittle a cul in y” and ta th i n to am eties” both w ples that
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se on di were on and “non-pl tion”, andnotsim l gm v - y u 1 e ornochan riad of ralis societiesthereare e ofthe“favorable” rsi 0 ectly pluralsociety, ent served foraninitial ). con t y m s and ly relevan
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CEU eTD Collection represen Belg according tot t disposal threeattribu and institutionalized.T “plura distinguishable leadersh 10 Belgium countries wasattribu “plura em 2002). Inan Cornell also and organizationalresourcesasthem state) iden resources duetotheiror political partysystem ethnicity isreflectedinthe have org because eth countries (1984)andlaterin36(1999 system therefore, areableto ethnic groupsdohaveattheir
h Ho e “success” pirical illustrationofthism iu wev m Scholars whostudiednegativesocialm However, Lijphartdidnotlim l” so l” so s tothe“pluralsocieties”.Inhisanalys t th was e since1918andinSwitzer r, sc a e nization tif c Fle c h n ofc a co i ethnically“plural”society,theal i m e criteriaestablished h ied thetyp icity constitutesastron eties ace eties. The o m l a e ish n rs ntioned leade s ons o an do a c iational syste l res oci d not m t W a t es: loyaltyofgroupm rtain deg s. Furtherm ed tothe“consociationa t existenceof o e i re a ganizational structures. h onal ources bilize alsonegatively. ip. Insuchsocietiestheethnicm s of llo e positiv cog o i n resourc s n seg m existing politicalandeconom
r i odel, Switzer by cons m ze u . ship a beca B r disposal organizational,loyalt , b ee o m r en n e i e ethnicm ore, in“plura a a c ts it hisrecomm n B g n a e politic f use byd ociationalist sc land since1943(Andeweg,2000;514). s u i (Barry, elem positive s neededf m anec s e th ousl a rry a e in ent y ar land andBelgiu al t p 1 e a h 975 obilizat ssa g 30 ready existingpositiv m e obi rties in et e re e es ofgovernm of self-iden u s mb f t e o o i ability ince ). ry resourcef d hnic m ) thescholarsuggested l” statestheethnicgroupshaveleadership nition bilization resources(O r it.SusanOlzakidentif lization im hola list” ins levance t e ers, organ ndat h vo at r ion (i.e.m s. Swi lv in i Neither did ed obiliz ons forproportionality-basedpolitical of t in titu “p tification. t z m h i e th norities areloyaltotheirgroups i i plies th e casesofSw r rta c e tional arrang zation were l ation isagivenf lura o a y, andlead or nt for e con n r ethnicm obilization i d n per was ganizations andalso,inthe l” so he a consideredtobeethnically s a e m m o at ethnicgroupshave l stru In ad g c s i iation ree od not cie o and performancein21 itzerland b that regardlessofthe s of deepl t lzak, 2004).Svante ership resou ied loyalty, dition, ethnicgroups ilization impliesthat t obilization (Cornell, h ctures inplace,and ies the em targ a at the“ l arrang tim ents, presentin 10 eted ag y eatur and Therefore,in di d e inthetwo saliencyof eeply em vi Belg e, d f e e exis r n ains d soci i divide ces and t d nancial iu i m t the d ten
for n et d” o y t t
CEU eTD Collection whether theethnicd periods andfortrans ethnic identitiesisfluid.Ialsoassum theorists ofpoliticalopportunityst transposed intothepartysystem ethnic groups’boundariescum circum political sys countries thataredesigningtheirfirst reasons, heconcludedthattheconsensusoptionis elections, andcloseproxim dem strongly andsignificantlycorrelatedwiththedemo concentration ofpower.InLijphart’sanalys “m based ontheprincipleofproportionality central bank(Lijphart,1999).Bo federalism proportional (electoral)repres elem dem level ofplurality,“consensual”dem ajoritarian” dem o o ents: broadcoalitioncabinets, cratic virtuesaswom cracy isascloseto As m Therefore, consociationalistsspecificallysugge 1.2.3. PowerConcentrationand stances: whentheethnicidentityisasa anddecen e t ntioned inthethesis em s thereisanincreas o cracy thatisb i i tio versity ofstatepopulation traliz n the“consensus”type process ation, ity betweengovernment e n’s representation u entation, corporatistinterest andpartycom late withother en th typesofde e ructure, Iassum s, a ed riskforethnicm troduction, contrarytoconsoc horizonta trench becauseitis sed onthepr e o dem thatthis cracies ar State-Minority Relations: o ed cratic constitutions(Lijphart,1999). and-bye 31 is of36dem co p l fluidity isparticularlytypicalforstatebuilding cleavages, andwhentheethnicboundariesare lient elem mocracies (conso
etition. e a nstitu
separa stillbette s , politicalequality, will betransposedinthe stateins inth m inciple of itspolitica e policyandvoters’preferences.Forthese inthisres o cratic qualityandparticularlywithsuch re attr st thatincountrieswith“m tion, obilization forprotestinthefollowing tion of ese conditions ent forself-i judicia o r thanthe“major activ m x cracies, con tension -areopposedtothe groupsystem l system powers, a earch thatthem jority andischaracterizedby e thanthem ciational andconsensus)are iationalists andinlinewith l review,andind th containsthef dentification, whenthe high participationin at itis s multi-pa ensus democracyis a ita , bicam joritar bein a rian” ones.A nifestation of rty system ajoritarian” i g decided an onein e t o itutional e pendent llowing ralism, s,
CEU eTD Collection can followa“nationalizing”or link s literature thatattem preserv encourage integra governm accord have twosetsofpublic policychoices.Thefi policy choicesthatthesetwopathsim 1996a, 105). of of thefor identity commonforever blurring theboundariesbetweenethniccategori social categ can expectthatpoliticalincum horizontally concentratedpowerisbasedonacent of ethnicityinconditio ethnic state.Specifically, state buildingprocess. can transformthesaliencyofethnicidentity,part struc thelatter, t ure o The ethnicity-relatedpo The conceptualtoolselaboratedbyJohnMc A consequentquestionishowinstitutionscan t a ing towhichthestate prom a t e-m tion e m ntal policiesthatwoulddecreas r er, thes m ories ofvotersaspossible.Thisim i thestateisbuilt ofm nority i rrored inpolitica i noritie tion o re t p ate is ted tocap lations withthe ns oftransitionandstatebuilding s’ specif f howth built“ofandforapa m ybody regardlessofethnic i norities „of licies ofastatecan ture thesedifferences.TheonesproposedbyRogersBrubaker b a “multi-ethn l org ents wouldbein e existenceofpowerconcentrat andf i c identity.Th otes “equ a intoaco gener niza o ply. They r twoorm e ethnicidentity tions. a l sta i c” pathduringthe 32 a rticular n lity ofindividualcitizen ere arem Finally, Ias plies th mmon identity,orthey t terested inattractingthesupportof e-building p icula rst setform es, orinconstructin set up o rip have twotypesofi re ethno Garry et.al.(2008)spelloutfurtherthe transf ity. Inpracticalterm e ta r ly intrans a at in tha l -ra tion a saliency. ny conceptua orm sum processes? -cultura t cum ” states ther th (Brubaker, r ocess s the“integration”repertoire, ethnicitysalie e state-building process.Incase ion cantransformthesaliency b thatin i ents wouldbeinte tion with l cor an ce : acco K l periods andof g aunifyingnational toolsinthea m stitu s beforethelawand e communaldivers 1995),whileincas ntrifugal -logic,one canencouragethe eeping inm nation plications: theycan rding tohim,states s, thisw tion n cy inam s s an ” ( ould bring B d polic asm rested in c rubaker i nd that adem u a lti- ie ity ny ic e s ,
CEU eTD Collection specifically areaim to blurtheboundaries existing differencesatpublicle to whichth within publicinstitu representation. below, Ianalyzeinm dem repres concentratio resources fo tend tode-p encouraging theintegrationofminoritiesinto first hypothesisofthis mobilize ethnic boun differences ininstitutionalpatte polic words, despitethepoliticaldiscoursestheym a ies th nds outsidestateinstitu The incum As discussedinthesectionsabove,cons Hypothesis 1: 1.3. Pow entation, becauseofwhic r s toloyaltyre e incum r potentialminorities daries, n reduces oliticize theethnicd e statepro er ConcentrationandEthnicMino b ents of b onalongrun ents of e tion Bydiscouragingtheinstitutionalizat d atcreati thesisresults: betweendif o thech sources, loy m re deta s horiz ”. Theseco otes “dualorm horizonta ontally conc tion vel (McGarryetal.,2008,41). ils th ng anationalizingpathofstat rns. Whileim an h m i ’ mobilization versity o s ces ofeth p andthrough f erent ethnic a is ef nd setf lly conc i lty com o norities arem litical elites f ect entra f u th ltiple o en i 33 rm of powerconcentration ng f a acommonpubl e stateandhence,hindertheaccesstoloyalt plem y useduringtheelectoralcam againstthestate. n tr t ed po ic s the“accommodation”reperto ated powerwillavoidtr groups, w publicid ociationalism r m confrontatio om enting governm rities’ PoliticalRepresentation: will lim o wer inm re pro theethniccomm i norities tohav ill seektoimplem n it theaccessofpotentialethn entities e to ion ofmulti-ethnicityandby ic identity,powerconcentration nal m u impliesthatp lti-ethn e-m exp e ” i ntal policiesthatblurthe nority relations.Inother eans. Inthesubs an r over ethnicm i ess theirinterests c s e unity. From d institution ef ansposing th t ate f paigns, inactual e ective s nt policiesthat , whiles o i litica re, accordin politica here,th a i norities’ l e ethni lize the power ection e e and k ing ic g y e c s l
CEU eTD Collection secu p th such asinclusioninthetopofapr their supportbysupplyingthem specified th possible. legitim even in even whenpresidentscanru for Moldova duringVoronin’spresidency,poli president. InGeorgiaduringShevarnadze’sa Sov stab in 11 presidential parliam fragm Ukraine duringKuchm influential o power can for concentrated m o Thec power.Theyco e am e litical elite, m m thods thatpoliticalincum i ility, th rity to et tran ation ofpro-presidentialpa ation ofapro-presidentialparliam Pro-pres The basic Concentration ofpowercanbealsoachie b 1.3.1. ThePerpetuationofPowerConcentration: e o i nted parliam acy reasonsth g unte crease th u
sition po an ity ab b r-a litician to at inordertogetaparliam as wellth e pposition. Asshowni . W ach self-in rgum co iden ou as u un t h l s eir politicalinflue d h ieved b en presidents in ent tothisassum sum tries th tia rat o t w e erested
p nt. l par e h o d ntary m ey p e usu er g wer th e tion inthischapte a m e in preferbein ’s presidencythehorizon y o liam preserv i fragm cratic in v a terest lly co e an
priority t b t
e a haveconsiderab le throughdecreesandhencedi o ents m ntary m fo jority that tho p rrup wit a rliam e stit ti tion n r preserv on is ting theparliam s t ch u n e h nce byseekingtostayinpower.
tio g backedb o o-presidentia o Chapter2,a in m e id a f aracter o ntary m
ns wou that politicalle opp y usein a o e a e eo jo w ntar terial bene ntary i r isth n n log rities c ositio g
p in would supportalllegisl o i y major l cal d liti 34 f cum ev a
power. Th at m n jorities. Thom tical powerwasconcentratedthroughthe
le cal p nd Saakashvili’spres . y p order toconcentrate/orpreservethepower
o a a ved throughtheform r apar legisla incumbent politiciansse b l partylis l tal powerwasconcentratedduetoahighly eferen jority imposeshighcosts,concentrationof n befor en v e m aders’ fits suchasm e o nt, inordertopreventtheform cy wasoften inti s ity, apr ong thecasesstudiedinthisthesis, ition ces ese liam
m tive ulti s (Taag e m facto or to , th t, m e anddec ed indifferentways.Rem esiden orwithpolicybenef ntary a as e tig te lon r
e s m enh Re goalm p e oney, w h sregard theparliam g ra, i m a t g link -term t m m n h ced r 20 t i a h ee powersandwhenth ngton (2006)notedthat id a ation initiatedbythe jority when a
02 y not a
between ation ofastablepro- i by v y rewarddep encies, aswellin ve g 11 n ; ith electoralbenefits ek toperpetuateand Therearevariou terests su 2 50). Howev a i be necessarilyto v riou e n t afeelin h s e econ factors, su ch ev its ation ofan aspo er th e suchas u g r, in e o ties f
nt, for m o i ngt f ic an litical m po is ch stay o on as o st- re e d s r
CEU eTD Collection stability. Ifthechoiceof repres ethnic m far reach characterized asthem can contr how electo the electoralsystem parliam institutional m 12 appropriation ofbudgetfundsforapetproj parl d In wh an peri the parliam analys parliam can pushfortheorganizationofconcurrent order toincreasethev political resourcesintheperiodsofelectoral is m continuous loyalty,thereforetheform i Int f d 200 Uk f ile th e ods wi i a r o e m rai h re desirable(2006;12). n Electo A m When suchapartyorco e co entation constitu e is thatconcurrentelectionsd t 8. Th e 20 n r nt e e e, t eason ntary electionsatthesam ntary m ing consequencesforpartys wi t i h unt i norities’ politicalrepr b 04 an h o h e r e t u e re complexstrategytoincreasepower al sys r h ri o nt andthatthem 1 19 al sy te tothec a s t ri es st 995 n z d 94 c h ont e echanism 20 a an inG election qual udi jority. Oneof stem t al em onc 08 l ed i , ort y l electio y
s influenceth u con f s areparticularlyimportan rre i o n e r tes thekey sibility s oncentr o a t st powerfulinstrum
h gm r cent s g nt h g inanadvantage e setofspecificelect r i i el eatly s n a: th ent t s r ect h similarly i at dterm
esi alition exists e ed p theinstitu d o e 1994 i ation of apro-presiden con ons al electoral system s esentation. Consociationalisttheo , t p o t p h ri i w e stru el o solutionfo e or m of bu s so m e
e
y i U co r. ections increasethislikelihood(Shugart,1995) i ti t ation ofa stem ted i nish ga k on. horizont n I r n t a m t a ni cture of ribu Ge tion rked Presi in o In zat , incum e s a th ian the likelihoodofoppositio . M e ted or i e concen nt a nd com on o 35 Matthew Shuggartprovedthroughalarge-N
ous wayforthepotentia gi o l m par to campaigns (financialandm oral rules.Scholarshave l a, d available forconstituti disciplined pro-presiden ect. Butthesestrategi al power.Electo tial electo isdeterm r increasin thelegisla ova t lia th
f echanism elections,i.e.holdingpresidentialand fo conc con d b ent m ent e co , tration r thisth position ofparliam e no c K n u s concentration istous u t rre co n canalsous ar rre u s c o y electio nt nc h
nt lid o ral m
s f ur el ined -besidesotherthingsby el g thata
ati t a powe esis ive branch, ect thelikelihoodofinter-ethnic rent ’s cons ect com o n i i ons have in n becausetheycanalso el ons ha r s r r
p unde ect al sy
e re r e theirp ol p etitor. Inaddition,leaders ry suggeststhatpolitical e o su i i wer d o ve b n m at r Shevarna lted ns la onal engineering,with stem
e i extens es donotguarantee implicitly,h tive o b tial partyorcoalition h nts (Sartori,1994). o n i een hel ina een al a f a Presid ve e jority form r l pro e n l ivileged accessto s havebeenalso dia resources)in po y easytom e theavailable v h way ively analyzed er we i dze’s d gh en
bee - i r, al n ly fr presiden s t Saak 1 fol presidency, n 12 9 t
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CEU eTD Collection electoral system inte m specific andgeographicallydispersed(Cusack the onlyeconom electoral sys most ethnicallyheterogeneoussocieties(Rokka earliest m have alsobeenidentifiedam horizon having aroleinsh purpose ofthissectionistodeterm to thedeterm trigger changesinthe m m after aperiodofautocracy,im Elster, Claus concentratio electoral sy tim politica a a a y bealsodeterm y determinespecificelecto y bejustif e, specificelectoralsystem rnational politic The academ 1.3.2. TheOriginsofElectoralSystemsChange: The electoralsystem l tal p lea o ves towardsproportionalrepresentati o d stem n withm t Offe,andUkrichP ied bythes em litica inants ofelectoralsystem ers’ s foreconom s ofthefor s constitutean m i ic literatu l c division,whilePRm power. aping ined byexternalf o al a tivation toincr i norities electoral system.Ina y thee nd f m m re onelec s m bolic po i er ’ m i c reaso nancial organizat ong thepossibl l pl ec r colonialrulers(Golder & W a al rules.Itsi r y begenerallyde intervening obilizat s c em eus notedth tora wer itim enting th ease thede a n l system ine whether actors: c toral system n influenc s: m choice ion againstthestate(FigureI.1). a joritari i ddition, theliteratureon ght be e sy plies (Els at
s ma m 36 ountries m e determ specific forpost-Sovietst variab etal. ilarly pointstoavarietyofactorswhom w gree inpow io n, 1970).Politicalactorsm e m stem on (PR)inWesternEuropeoccurredthe h s pointstoavari ns; also,f an system y beth any ofthefactorsoractorsconsideredas en acoun term preferredwheninvestm le forthecaus i , 2007).Theshapeofelectoralsystem thatex norities’ political ter ined bythehistor inants: SteinRokkanarguedthatthe a etal. y adoptelectora eore s m try retu er concentrationand a o isted du ntchekon, 2004).Political actors tica rm , 1998).S i ght bepre er coloniesm lly link ety ofpossiblefactorsthat rns toadem post-Soviet regionpoints a ring l chainlinkin representation,then ates intransition.The o e thedem l rulesasadvisedby cietal characteristics d withth y ofacountry.Jon f erred whenclassis a e y alsoshapethe nts areactivity o a cratic system atthesam y adoptthe o e n cratic p g a power ture of a a st y e s
CEU eTD Collection studies onthesubjectsuggest actors aim governability (Dunleavy&Margetts,1995).Electoralsystem m changes intheelectoral system weakened infavorofthe newentrantsonpoli to preserveadom system consolid argued thatwhilebeing system nature ofpoliticalpowerandtheelectoralsyst instrum m 2007; 19).Therefore,thepowerconfi defined orhaveheterogeneousinterests,electo m when theconfigurationofpowermakescha Ishiyam seat sharerelativetothoseofotherpa case of interested inm a a a jority orsuper-m y choose y alsodeterm toencourageconciliationbetweenri Besides thefactorslistedabove There aresom ’ office-seek s withahighentrythreshold. s changeduringtheXXthCenturyinde parties,leader e a atin ntal purposes. , 1997).However,electoralrulesm g parties,th acertainelectoralsystem o lding th ine whetherpo inant position.Incontrast, ing in ajority vote e theoreticalinput s pref e electoralrulesinawaytom inastrongpoliticalpo e ruli teres er theelector t ng partieswerealwaysinterest s whiledeterm s bydim in thelegislature,when litical ac that politicalpartyleader Thiswas guration – , thescholarsextensivelyexpl s intheliteraturethatpoi val societalgroups(Lijphart,1994a). forsocial i nishing al ru tors w rties (Benoit,2007;Boix,1999;Colom a 37 ining theshap les y em change.Ina1999investigationof when thepopularityofrulingpartieswas because theh ral system nge possible:assuchchangesusuallyrequire ill m sition witho tical aren or degreeofhorizontalpowerconcentration- be changedforoffice- thattheybeliev the entrythreshold,in veloped countriesoftheword,Ca concernssuchasfairrepresentationo a a nage tom xi m a, therulingpartyleaders c i h ze theirownpoliticalstanding.In u i e ofanelectoralsys s andexecutiveelitesm involved politicalgroupsareill- ange m gh entrythresholdshelp t facingcompetitionfrom s canbea ed in o e ld theelec nt tothelinkbetween willm pres a ored theroleofpolitical y beheldback(Benoit, seeking purposesonly l order tosecuretheir so changedwiththe erving theelectoral a xim tora i ze theirpar l sy t em. Many e electoral rles Boix initiate stem r, 2004; ed them a other y be f o t d y r r
CEU eTD Collection multi-party previous Colom more inclusiveelectoralfor electoral sys with dom presence inpower(Boix,1999; expecting aplurality politica (2005; 17-18). theref system beginning of this explanationtotheelecto “laws thatprom perhaps categoricrather rather thanaHarequotafor besides otherthings,“electoralformulaethatte that m power anddim necessary meanstoim This isbecausewhenpowerconcentrated,po rules willmostprob While referringtothep From thetheoriesandobservationslisteda ore th a e ischangedinconditions l gnif r observedthatexclusionaryelectoral pa ly e inant partiestendtoprod system y e latterrathe rties’ m x t 1990s(1997;103-107). thatin em isting i nish therisksforopposition s, whilepluralis ote greaterproportionalityinre s alreadyexis politicalconf to an ably o ornear-p tivation tomaxim plem r im evenlarg conf than ordinalballots”.A ply m m m ent anelecto ulas (2004;3).W ula), provisionsfo o irm ral system lurality ofpopularvote[…]will st-socialis tic settings 609). JosepColom ted igu o ofhorizontalpowerconcentr e re dispropo er plura d thaninc beforethein uce choicesinfavorof r ations were t electo i choiceinHungary,Es r ze sea lity al s with r 38 eas
r y of tionality th st h litica ’ multip system r bonusseats,higherelectoralthresholds,and nd torewardlargerparties(suchasd’Hondt s powerconsolidation.T dom seats r t ile analyzingactualelec ed theexis em s determ al sy presen troduction of t bove, onecaninferthatwhentheelectoral thesam e thatwouldconsolid r alsoargued l le inated byfewparties.Atthesam inthelegislatur stem s havebeeninrealityadoptedwhere le parties ader tatio an incond ined thee choice,Ishiyam e rather te s havebothth n tim nce of ”. Theauthorfurtherattributed m tend e ation, theresult o tend to , s that politicalconfigurations restrictiveorexclusionary tonia, andBulgariaatthe re inclus m ition m to l aller partieswillprefer e”. Thiswouldinclude u ec producesy lti-party conf s favorelectorallaws tora toral systemchange, h ate the of e incen e followingsectio ive electo a dispe alsoarguedth l rules. i ing electoral r po tives r se stem “Parties iguratio ral rules, d power sition in andthe e s with ti m at e n n , , .
CEU eTD Collection 13 designates thepercenta percen An electo between parties’percentagevotesinelectionsan the post-Soviettransitionc explores whatweretheelectoralsystem m votes. percen is greaterthanthepercentage negat votes fortheleadingpartiesat that th much greaterextentthanthem the single-m system revealed thepsychologicaleffect for therefore g produces adistributionofseatspro that pluralitysystem Thet a m jority electoralsystem i ation ofasingle-partygovernm v The degreeofelectoralsystem In theacad Besides them 1.3.3. ElectoralSystemsandtheir e tage ofextra-s tage ofseatsissm e plu s voterstendtorefrainfrom o di t a ffe l r am al system e r nerally expectedth r e e ality electo nces. ou m nt b e er pluralitye of m ic litera isperfectlyp wast eats thatm echanical effectofdispr s tendtoexaggeratethe ge of“wastedvotes”. r e al form s. Thisviewstarted d aller thanthepercen v ountries. ture, theinc o t
e l ec s t the expenseofm at un ofvotes,thedifferenceispos u a ulas havethe tion h instream lti-m at s ofelectoralsystem r
o anel der m e giving theirvotestosm s portion nt portion tendtoco e s’ dispropor mber pr r than underPR(Blais&Carty,1987). ea s i Level ofDisproportionality: ect partie a sed ratioofwastedvote jority m oral a a p l w 13 with MauriceDuverger’s l to 39 lied thegreatestdegreeofdisproportionalityin sy tage ofvotes,thedifferenceisnegativeandit Onthecontrary,whenpercentageofseats oportion m s gainedfrom oportionality, Duvergerandotherscholars power ofthestrongestparties,whereasPR
h nstra electoral sy d theirpe st thevotesreceived(Lijphart,1994 echanical effecttoexaggeratethe en thisd em tionality isdeterm i nor ones( prod i n the a s. They l electoralsys uces i rce f f aller stem e u n theredistributionofwasted rence equa i 1965; 226).Lijphartalsostated m s tage of cal b thereis dete parties forfearof“wasting” er of itive s wasoftenattributedto cul rm a sea a ined bythedifference t partiesinapo t fam e em d by ined thatinm nd itdes ls toz m t s. Duvergerargued s inthep ous o su re chanceforthe hypothesisthat m e m ro. W i ng up i g a n shareof rliam ates a). Itis lity a h a al en the jority th l the e
t nt. t h a e e
CEU eTD Collection chance of do nothavetheirdom m them continuity betweenelections,andinfactnoes have nopreviousdem trans several post-communistcountries(B disproportionality andhenceledto Conversely, theproportionalsy system Eastern Europeitwasthesinglem 1992; Moser,1997;Sedelius,2001).SarahBirch, system com different from Their autho (Blais &Massicotte,1996). the sam believ the votesandinstead,choose“lessevil”of difficult forsm Norris, 1997;299).Sim a jority electoralsystem p i from arative analy tion to There areseveralreasonsforthiseffect However, severalstudieschal e s didnothaveaseffect s thatledtoth d toencourage e extent.Instead,s lo applyingthestrate r dem sing the s statethatDuverger’s theonescharacteristicfo all partiesto o cracy partiesareweaklyins s es revealed elec thef inance establishedyetin i o e parliam larly, elites tora cratic electorale s (Cox,1997;79;Mo m o all partiesareawar l com rm win seats(Blais& thedecreasein thatinth ation of gic behaviortypicalforWest stem e e p thedecreaseinnum mber distri ntary rep refrainfrom etition hypothesis lenged thiscommonviewonel irch, 2000;22). s withhighthresholdsgr m e pos tother u xperience, noaccuratepoolinginform lti-p r WesternEurope.Vario r 40 t ese cts andthesingle-m it ded seatsaccordingto t- a ser, 1999).Moreover,whenthemajorparties thetwoleadingpartie ution for communist region rty sy tablished partyidentific does notap all regionsofthecountry, theyhaveahigh . Scholarsobservedthatinconditionsof n e Carty, 1991).Conversely,PRsystem tation of num gional par m for instance,em a lized. ing newpar stem ber ofparties(Birch,2000;Jasiewicz, s, because ber of Thisim thelarges ply insocio t ies. PippaN ern eatly increased parties intheparliam ties becausethey e Euro the m plie ectoral system vo ber com their proportionofvotes pirically provedthatin s (Lijphart,1999;165; m s tha t num u tes a pean coun s casestu ation. Thisprevents - a political co o joritarian rris t voters r ponent ofm e no b explain er of the levelof t wastedto knowitis andelites s’ effects tries with ele ation, no d parties. ndition ies an e e d tha nts of c s are tor i xed a d s l t .
CEU eTD Collection consolidation ofpolitic benef developed, andhavenationalorganizationa with thisrisk,asRem the pro-p 14 not perceivethebuildingofpre-electoralcoali party lead with relativ independent candidates(Moser,1995).Convers ideological, racial,orethniccharacteristics(B especially incountrieswith a m p co el M Chapter 5. presidents useotherstrategies,asillustrated the f 25) andbecom leadership ofapartyorpartiesthathaveth to MPselectedthroughm because forpresiden transition countriesareexpected and hencedim o The ect o nfirm s l ition d oral a ova o joritarian electo it f On thecontrary,sm At thesam rm de s
r o th , an gree f u atio r b r l at p om them ers lack es e i d s pr g i e idential party,m
Uk n ofparliam r an ly high n opo w o d n i rai e duce nish thenum president’sallies.T h rtion e n a i tim c theexperien tion-wi e i h d a
thresholdsdecreases a s di jority elec ts itism up t t l el r e, theele i f h al syst ngton argu f o ere ectoral syste o de p r al parties,theycan e 44% o ntary m n u all partiesintr a t ghl a el jority rties, atth b a em o y
y alsofavorth ect er of o c re costlytom anal ce f tora wast tora producetwo-partysystems oral territorially concentratedgr ed, toincreasethenum a of thepunishingeffecthigh m system parliam l r jority loya yzed sy l syste s e pres e exp h com d u is tenden v st les. W in em o b t ) forgainingsupport,than e idents C e ansiti ined with m th s pro nse s; l andelectoralcove e h i s that e potentialtoformam ntary partiesthanto ap e presiden a n e n h o en l to 41 ke M irch, 2000).Itcansim tio through theanalysisof ter d f en m on countriesandindependentcandidateseven cy canbeobservedwhenthereispotentialfor t prefertousePR u h concession o u ce ns asoptim thepreside courage th ely, theapplicationofproportionalsystem 5 e sm favornation-widepartiesandam l ah m d . d
o Gen b a v di i er ofpartieswinn jority sys g al a – sp h l o e tial oppositionin thresh ro rally, in ber ofparl u n p p e o t s. rt o s toallkindo al str e form
i n old 28 o t. W oups ofvoterswithspecific nal po t only whenpartiesarealread rage (Norris,1999). em %, a can system o a st-Sov us thresholds andtherefore,do te s areintroducedbef h u b nd i iam ation ofregionalparties, t en suchpotentialisweak, a e m gy (S c ilarly favorthesuccessof e todealdirectlywiththe jority (Rem om effectiv n iet the caseofUkrainein e U ing elections a es i s withhighthresholds ntary parties.Thisis theparliament.Even jority Georg edelius, 2001;14). k f rai localin n
e in post n e - system i a th streng - up t ington, 2006; S ovi e terests (i.e. ong them- o p , because et then
r 34 o s thatin
portio Geo o %. T re th ing r gi th n h 14 a a, i y e s e s
l
CEU eTD Collection transition countriestheP confirm should facilitatetheentryintoth debated inthelite political representationof ethnicm ethnic m m 237). Am for m influence ofethnically electorates inethnicterm parties. Inhis1985bookonethnicgroupsinconflic encouraging thefor 179). with aweaknationalism when com communist stateshasb 1994). Anincreasedscopeofm to increasepoliticalrepresentationofm a i rroring ethnicdivisionshelptodeepenandextendthem m joritarian ulas inincreasingthechancefo The ef The scholars However, notallscho 1.3.4. ElectoralSystemsand e i d inthetran nority parties.However,asdiscussedin ong thefrequentlystat b ined withth ones,facilitatetheen f ect of inth ratu elector m re ation andparliam chauvinistelem s e firs . Thedom ition e exis een associatedwith ofthem R s, al s system bym t catego lars agreeth countries.Inth y tence ofasingl stem e parliam i a no s withhighthresholdshouldnotbe a king ethnicdem try i i instream Ethnic Minorities’PoliticalRepresentation nant viewis norities. s onpolitica ed reasonsisthatPRsyst rities’ politicalrepresentati r m r ofsm y arg i ents norities e at thebes e i u ntary nority groups(Lijphart,1994a;13;Zim nt ofsm alle e thatth ethnicgroups(Ishiyam within eachg 42 the m e partyrepresentingth r partiesinparliam e specificcircum ’ l repres that indiv rep representation ofs thesectionsabove,th a all, ethnica nds ongovernm e t oderation ofethni r PRf solutiontoaccomm t, Horowitzarguedthat“byappealingto esenta entation (Bird,20 ” (Horowitz,1985). o r i rm oup, partiesthatbeg tion o d e ulas arebe d societiestheelec nd/or regionalparties,inorder on intheparliam f em stances e m nt anda a e s, incontrastwiththe &Breuning,1998;173- expectedtofacilitatethe i nt, andbybolsteringthe m norities hasbeenhig e ethnicm all regionalorethnic c dem 03; Taagepera,1994; tte ofpost-co is expectationnot odat r th m ong them,ofthe a nds, especially an them e : m i e i n bym tora norities and nts ofpost- i norities m mmunist l system e a r jor e m rely h an, is i ly ty
CEU eTD Collection
15 centripetal system m the ones“de “centrifugal” types,whichisrelev p that th the grouplines(Horowitz,2002). powerful” forthed electoral system characterized by“thedevelopm and f thus encouragingcandidatestom electoral in salience ofethnicityrath cooperation andaccommodationbetw centr encouraging ethnichostilitiesandpercepti and “thestrategicincen rather thanthecentre”andwhenasresult,pol contrary, politicsbecom com or r Th eferen a coal king politiciansdo p e ipetalis lex anddiverserangeofpolicyoptionsto In theacad Regarding thepreciseelectoral The electoralsys Altern o e alternativevote ces rcing them it i o are in ns ofpar ati centives “to m s v igned tof orcentrif e Vo itially co havingthiseffectareconsid em te system tobroadenthe s theelectora i vided societiesb t ic literature,politica i e un s t morethan reachout o tives foroffice-seekingp t e cus com 15 em er thanfosteritsrepresentation ted s centrifugalwhen“compet h ugalism hasthehig
is th at . isoneofth In ar
caset e o e capabl ent of p toandattractv n l rulesaredesignedinsuch . oderate theirpo etition atthemoderatece e Incentr inwh a justshopfo h i nt forthis r policypo ecause ey fo formulathatinducescentri een rivalgroups,andthereforew h centrist, aggregative, est poten ich e rm
e elem ons ofgroupinsecurity”(Reilly,2001;10). l elector of m system am it pro ipe 43 d itical processbecom a t a j i al system ered bysom o sition o o theelectorate”(Reilly,2002;159).On tial forencouragingcro scussion. Centripetalsy m s rankt king cross-ethnicappealsandpresentinga ents ofpoliticalsystem r votesin litica tes from rity, th liticians oftenpushtheminthedirectionof otes bargainingandaccommodationacros s arecatego ition forvotestakesplaceatth s l .” Also,thecen rhe h e coun in parliam e ca et s theelectoralrules t ntre ra ndidates inth oric onpotentia theirown andmu hnic groupsotherthanth tin e scholars g isstopp r a waythatpoliticianshave iz ther thanatthee e petalism e nt” (Reilly,2001;21).The ed into“ce s “increas ltiethnic politicalparties e o comm ed asbeingthe“m order ofpre rk tobreak stem trip s . s thatm s , scholarsconsider If th - lly d ethn eta ingly p s ared ere is unity”. Inth l ntrip system ic barg i “encourage visive is f x e extrem erence. a downthe no trem e y induce e o ta eir own, fined as larized” m l” a ainin a s are es by j sues o First ost rity n es d g e s
CEU eTD Collection ab p af and coalitions(Reilly&Reynol for leade regional alliancesforin thresho the form Soviet states leaders. Thecom concentratio politica interests ofethnicm that favorsthepreservationof parliam is discouraged. analysis abovesuggeststhatin when theirfor This typeofethnicm their ownethnicpartiesor-in (Rucht, 199 mobiliza party organizationscanbeaparticularly in ordertogetm r ter eferen so m th lu cross-ethnicalliances. r te m According toOlzak,am Therefore, whenapoliticalforcecaptures e f s of ces l l e ds, theleadersofethnicm par i nt, itwillprom tion rst pr a ation andexistenceofs nation j in o rity isach h 6). W t n inducesmayencourag , intrans ies. Atth caseinwhichtherewillbea“party- ef i s/h er m en e - ation andconsolidationisen wide partiesm r b ith thistypeofmovem b obiliz ce count,th inatio iev a i llo i norities, tio e s o e ts are d bilization ispossibleon ed. AccordingtoDiete n, the ote anelectoralsystem a (Blais &Massi n betweenthetwoeff creas m e e can coun tim ong otherth such asystem ing thechancesto PR withhighth incu conditions ofconcentr case ofconcentratedm a ted ds, 1999;19).Inthepolitical e d y alsoseektoa i , theincen d and m mbents’ po a t i e e incum norities are all and co w tran tte, 199 ith e ings ethn
nt st sfer to sm tives leadstotheirweakerrepresentationthroughown b al one-issue partiesarediscouragedbythehigh 6 44 ents wer. W ructure, ethn lest res ; usefulorganizationa 56). c r ly whensuchpartiesarelegallyallowed,and theo withhighthresholdfo ects –weakeningtheeth ouraged bytheexis Rucht’sc ttr tosecu nu hold hasasim presidencyandhas encouraged toseekcros wininelections.Forsim o act thevotesof to usestrategiesof ic rien
m m t h b ated powertheform h e er ile notnec ted” ty i i r con norities norities n of re m
ic m l f t a i est r a ssif s pe of t p joritie a circum n i ilar ef - byregionalpoliticalparties. r norities i t ef s. Th ca eed organ e ethnicm er ssa ethnicmovem tion o s inpa en ting e countin r stances typicalforpost- f ces iseli l ily d co-optation ofm ect: duetothef resourceforet a solidsupportinthe r accesstoparliam canm elec f ation ofsuchparties m n rliam s-ethn e i i ic partiesandco- zational structures norities a signed obilizing g ilar reas m tora con obilize through
in e ated ic and nt thatpower e l r tinu again nt struc and u nd hence e les. The ons, th agents, s act tha cross- i u secon nority n s t the til an hni t ur e nt c e e d t
CEU eTD Collection Dickovick, 2004;94). autonom defined as“aseriesofcha society andeconom governm state. Decentralization concentratio states. This with whatconsociationalistss below, concentrationofpower local leaderswouldhaveextensiv system adm m minorities’ mobilization optation intomainstreamparties,andas concentration compromisesthesuccessofet resea resources form m opting m i i norities s norities’ i nistration. Inp r Consociatio Hypothesis 2 1.4. Pow ch r , orinaunitarysystem y andtherebylim e i e nts andawayfromcentralgovernment nority leade s mobiliza u sectionan hould bestructuredinawaytogua n alienateethnicm lts: er ConcentrationandTer obilization wouldbereduced. n alis : Byinducingdisproporti y i r tion actical term ts argu r m s intom isgenerallyviewed againstthestate alyses again agined asfixed”(Rodden, nges designedtoreversepriorre ited theprerogatives e thatm whetherbyv s withautonom t thestate,bec tend todiscou i uggest asoptim a norities andhen s, thism instr e c ontrol ov eam u lti-ethn . partie eans r itoria onal elementsintotheel 45 y arrangem a er theloca i rag a resultdecreasesthelikelihoodforethnic ic sta rt
us hnic partiesandencouragesminorities’co- a highdeg s –m
ue ofdiscouragingdecentralization,power as the“shiftofauthoritytowardslocal l Organi ce encou al te e the e From here,thesecon rantee tom decentraliza ofthenationalgovernm 2004; 482 s, withtotalgovernm t e rritorial arrangem acc s a withterr y havealsoadiscouragingeffecton l af ents (Lijphart,2004;105),inwhich z r ess toorg r ag a ee ofdecentralization f tion ofStatePow a for ). Bycontrary,recen es th i irs. Asexp norities thepossibilityofself- tion, whichisincontradiction m itoria s thatexpandedsubnational eir m a niza lly conc ectoral systems,power o e d bilization ag l tional and n a hypothesisofthis i ts form e ned inthes nt authorityover e e entra r: nt” (Eaton& in tralization le u t afederal ed eth l ainst th a ti-ethnic d e ership ction n is ic e s
CEU eTD Collection Socialist Eu model toreplacetheo play aro international lenders(Seely, m 2004; 40). centr local autonomy[…]couldsodestabilizeagovernm “pressure from goods byde governm tim long term strong fractionalization (Arzaghi& dem forces thatp dependent variablesuggestthatthereseem (Arzaghi &Henderson,2005).Nevert and m socia a y leadtoincreased e. Otherauthorssuggestedth o alized power[ l cracy, econom Finally, theinfluenceofexternalfactorsm Som The lite -econo 1.4.1. LinkingHorizontalConcentrationwith evidencein i cro-d e le, especiallyin , andnotthev nts perceiveitasa e studiessuggestthatdecentralization ropean coun r volving ittosub-nationalgovernm e m om ratu term i c andpolitica below”alsoseem ote orhinderdecen r inants ofdecentralizationhave e supp onterritor … ic growth,urbanization, ] l couldbeou d structu ort ofthesedeterm tran tries atthebeginning decentralization,part a riation inthedegree l s 2001; 502;W conseq ition countrieswherelocalelitesattem i Henderson, 2005;Panizza,1999). cheap waytoshrinktheirres al organ r es. at fiscalcrisism s toplay tralization. Decentraliz tweighed by uences ofd heless, thefewstudiesthat i za tion of inan oodward, 2002;18).Th s to a role:“popularm 46 o e ts, they ation reform o f nt ecentralizatio country size,populati a
icularly whenthispressurecom f 1990sfollowingtheinstitu statepowerhasfocusedexte be certaine beeninvestigatedatamuchlesserextent the ben decentralizationwithin y m s (Bresser-Pereira,1993;Seely,2001).The a increases particularlywiththelevelof V e y leadto nt thatthecostofgivingupsomeits a e can tte rtical ConcentrationofPower: e r aswell.Theinter f onlyexp i s havebeenim t of m ponsibility forpr n. Atthesa decentralization,whencentral pirical reg keeping ove exp e diffusioneffectcanalso W m l l p ain ore decentralizationasa h e t tofindaninstitu nts ile thereseem decen on size,andethnic thepe m u dem ashorterp larities con plem e ti n tion ational pr tralization m oviding public a nsively onthe ace” ented inpost- nding greater e a , them l modelsof (O' e e s tobe s from cerning riod of essu tional N ona acro- eill, re
CEU eTD Collection degree ofdecentralizatio When thecontrolovernationalpo would stillm believ Venezuela, decentralizationcan are linkedtothenatureofhorizont incum decentralization revealssom giving uppowerm politicians. Assum of centralgovernm governm contro research questionofthisthesis. As discussedbelow,thisapproachofdecentral avenue forprogressinthecross-nationalre argum respective regions(Eaton,2001;Montero,2004; determ EU m the neighborsonW
The politicalexplanatio Som e e
b ents focusedonpolitica l overthelocalp
inants havethestrongestexplanatorypo m tha According tosom ent c e b nts becom e er resear t theywould ship fortheir e ntra a nage togains l po chers of i e ng thatanypo e nt wouldeverbeinterested a liticians s e y appearas e v st. Thenewm n tobeexpected. o losetheirdom decen dec ident (O' wer. Insu e studiesonterritorial e asop ns of e possiblecircum ubstantial electoralsupportincer ntra l tralizing institu ins beattractivetothoseholdingcentralpowerwhenthey decentralizationdepartfrom N liz al power,itr wer cannotbetakenforgranted, aparadox. tim litician wouldpreferm titu ch cases,th eill, 2004;43). ation a e tions an l solu mbers ofEU i nant inLatin search ondecen tion 47 p tio st Th d electo e wer fordecentralizationinthecontextof ances inwhichdecentralizationisviewedby o ei s organizationofstate tom nal choices(Grabbe,2001;1014). ingivinguptheirpowertothelocal-level ization analysisisthemostrelevanttoth sition u Seely, 2001).Thesescholarsclaim r in A lts tha e literatureonpoliticaldeterminantsof m W m ter a erica andAfricaarguethatth s h a xim r inupcom en apoliticalpartyinpower facesa y haveinspiredthecandidatesfor al- e t th st inincrea p i o ze power.As e latt artisan dyn tralization re thequestionwhyincum power to er canb tain regionsofthecountry. ing nationa politicians seektosecure si ” ng thepoweroflocal (Montero,2004;28). power am e thes less, associatedwithth ics “off e circu inBoliviaand l e the choiceof l ec er thebes e political tions, but m thatthe stances b ents e e t
CEU eTD Collection national elections,butstillhave central gov factions. leadership power byitsadversaries oppositio authority tothecen they haveweakincen governm for am central governm when politicalpartiesinpowerha “delegates” torepresentsub-natio leadership o with theinternalorganization in oppositio adopting ad successful whensuchapartym influence of an influentialoppositionparty Becerra, 2004). legitim Hence, theliteratu Finally, otherstudieslinkthecentralgovern Other s acy andpopularitycrisis,sub-nationaloffi o re decentralized e n m nts havesm isconcen ernm n andsupportedrevenuedecentralization(Eaton,2001). adom f ecentralizin thesepartiesiso t a udies revealthatthepressu nages topassdecentralizinglegis e ent inthreecases:whenincu nt com inant partyandhenceavoidc tral level trated atreg al tives to g reform re quo ; l capacitytoim i countryishigher(W whenpartiesinpower ng from of governm ted abovesu r ganized atsub im . Thiswasthecase in centralgovernm of thegoverningpoli partylocalfacti substantialelectoralsupport i on a plem ve adecentral n nages toaccum al level. al interes e ent su ple nt, accom re to ggests th m
ent - 48 I arguethatnoneofth illis &Haggard,1999).Incontras increas na t ch reform s l are internallydecentralize mb , ati tiona oncentration ofpower.T decentralizationisencouraged.Sim such m ons isincreasedandth ized internalorganization,thepressureon ces m on in p inArgentina,whenth ents feelthatthey at d anied b u ment’s incentivestodecentralizepower ent, asa late enoughparliam l lev e decen ecentralization m tical parties.Specifically,w ord a a s becausethis y becom jor reform e l andthena y e the r to tralization m at locallevel;whenastrong prev eans toreducethepolitical need e moreattractive(P s as todivideitamongrival en es risklosingupcom tional leg m e threesituationsare t theconcen erefore thelikelihood centralization.Also, wouldbringextra- a e Peronis y beinitiatedbythe d, and/orwhentheir h e a is pressurem ntary supportfor y alsocom i t slators ac , fragm t Partywas tration o h enfold- e en the ilarly, from a e y be nted t a i ng s f
CEU eTD Collection in CarstenSchneider’s study ofLatinAm both executiveandlegislative branches(Eat fiscal decentralizationwhilein Also, KentEaton’sstudyonArge with theirassum be m politically powerfulintermso increase fiscalandadm Gonzales’ empiricalan that horizontalpowerconcentrationgoeshand incre However, partyin have guaranteedm because ifth state ofconcentratedpo parties a pass legislationthatwouldweakenincum conditions o second casewouldnotbepossib level offices incum to secu period withde-concentrationof likely inconditionsofhorizontallyconcentrated a o Instead, incum se con b re lik ents faceahighenoughriskoflosingupc re p r e n ely tocen o f t e governing(pro-p instead,thisisasignofdecay o rol ove concentratedpower,theoppositio litica t lik e tern ely tolead d desireto l poweratloc a r the b jority parliam ents ofregim al discip tralize resourcesand alysis revealedthatin wer thepresidents i regiona nistrative centralizati line ishard increase thepowerthatthey f resi opposition,butwhichre-centraliz powerconcen bot power, whentheincum l po a e d l l levelthan e e incond ntary support ntina illust h institutionalcapabilitiesandpartisanpowers,theywill e s withconcen ntial) partiesarenotdiscip litics. The to guaranteewithd ad need on, 2001;106-112).Sim eri b 49 iti ents’ power.Finally,decentralizedgoverning forthehorizo m LatinAm rates anexampleofapartywhichsupported tr on. Theauthorarguedthatifpresidentsare r can andEuropeandem ons ofconcentratedpo i topre e a power.Thefirstcasew in handwithter n doesnothaveas ni
fortheinitiativesof
tion inthef to re is som om strativ trated powerwouldseektopreserve/and ing nationalelectio ly ontheirpar s b e e erv erica powerf ents perceive empiricalev f unctions, e alreadyhave(Gonzalez,2008). ecentralized parties. itatthe n i rst place.Inordertoreachthe tally conce lin r itorial centr ed thep ed itwhileincontrolover asth t ilarly, theem ron tie u asm theexecutivebranch. iden l presiden centr o wer bydefinition s g ould bepossibleina cracies confirm ns toconsid ’ enoughp interna n r is wouldbeinline esiden ce inthelitera trated power.Th o re ad alizatio al lev ts wouldnot ts tendedto l discipline, pirical dat vantageou e o n. Luca l. W er local- sition that ture : h in to en a e s s
CEU eTD Collection of decentralization:asgovernm decentralization reducesethnicconflict.Thereas 16 s countries withhorizontallyconcen prefer centralization Annex 2). mobiliza could controltheregionsinthesethreecountriesisrelevantforstudyofethnic concentrated Moldova, andUkrainethelevelofcentralizati also inlinewiththea countries w 1991 studyofthedegreeconsociationalism vertically dispersedandhorizontallyconcentrat agains organization thatism m concentration ofpower,itisnecessaryto incum politics and p n a o a Acco i tio me litical system norities’ mobiliza n t a Scholars whostudyethnicallydiverseso The prev As theem 1.4.2. LinkingVerticalPowerConc l b t thes rd i me and ents’ perpe ing tion . su t 16 e o t im Schneider’sdatashowthatonlyinth becaus powerthan re characterizedbythedom b-n ate.
. (C.Q. th iou e au a tio plicitly pirical datapresentedin s t section t n uatio h Schneid a tod or’s e l tion r th units, wh o gum st overelec n d ecentralization, because ese coun . likelytoencouragete e intheperiodswith Thissec inpowe fin su er, 200 e nt presentedhere. itio ggests thatregim ile th
n, th 9) e nts arebroug trie e r e v trated powerrarelyhavevert morelik toral re t h ion attem o s have e rizon rtical d i nance entration wi t Chapte al on sour te ely. i m 50 determ e p e in e referst rri s w dispersed power.Thedegreeinwhichelites ht n ces thanth ts rritorially con
of theexecutivebranch(1991;117),whichis s If on tendedtobehigherintheperiodswith on ed sim the form io closerto torially 21dem cen to dete ree outof32countries ith horizontallyconcentr r 6dem n for thisis referstoth th EthnicM ine itspotentialinfluenceonethnic tra o cieties oftenstat th u -conc liz ltaneously (2009;85).InL er allowsm o e rm cracies, alm thepeople, po ation onstrate, inpost-SovietGeorgia, e latter,w ine thetyp intrin wer centrated e entra d e is ically dispersedpow d gree i i asso sp t sic tothem norities’ M ed eth ersion o o re contro f m o powerd theopportunitiesfor h ciated with st noneofthefederal e ich m politicalpo i of atth norities tomobiliz n e thatincreased at ic m ed power statete e natio i a obiliza l overregio sp a in im i kes political norities (s ersion horizon nal lev plication er atthe wer was ijphart’s tion rritor t
between e nd t : e
n l of i ta e al al o e e l
CEU eTD Collection organizing ethnicm politica that politicaldecentralizationrein opportunities topar concentrated mobilizing f can betterp reduce ethnicconflict,bu the m that m treatm by thepoliticalm tool forinter-ethn 137). opposing groupsaredemographicallyseparated why, theonlyeffectiveandstab im Kaufm situation Lijphart, 1977,1996;Lustick more contro territorially concentrat possible becausethewaritselfdestroysth oderate intentionsofthem David LakeandDonaldRothchildalsoargue There arealsoscho On theotherhand,therearesc ent inthefuture.”However,scholarssp itigates conf a l n arguestha de on centr l overtheirownpolitical,social,an ly iftheyaredem o r m otec r protes i norities havetheop alizatio t the i c con a lict, [ ticipate ingovernm obilization, ethnic jority and,whenoffered,can t. Accordingtothislogic, t “ i ed ethnicm r variousinte f n supplie r … lict reso esto t ratherintensif lars ] , butthe etal. ring civilpo whoconsiderth ographically a lution because jority” (2005;2). le resolutionstoethnicwars s elitesa , i 2004;Stepan,1999).Throughdecen norities toparticipate forces re posite eff holars whoarguethatpoliti rests at offer ofd conflict, andpossiblysecession. ent (Lijphart,1977). ies it.Generallytheyi litics t
51 s gionally regional lev e ect, becausecentralizati e regional levelwithre ecentra
d p inm at centra “it canserv possib econom a into defensibleenclaves”(Kaufm eth rated in ecified th help allaym d thatde n -based lized system u liza i ic m lities forethniccooperatio lti-e ic affairs,arein self-governing t e in governm ion l, whichw t e asacostlysignalofm at “ i h ethnicidentities;second,that norities can centra n ic s that revealsinform arepossible“onlywhenthe it isnot i cal decentralizationdoesnot nority fe nvoke twoargum s instate liza t ate tion s e so on reducesm ill preventthe s nt andhencetohave decentralization itself tralization, m coex urces neces creas hutte comm ars aboutitslikely m s withte a y bea ed (Gurr,2000; ist inpos red by unities. Eric ation about n”. Thisis a ents: first, nn, 1996; rritor o valuab i sary for norities deration i waris m norities f t- i r war ally om le ’
CEU eTD Collection federal state,thedecentralizingreform Yugoslav state”.Hearguedthat“althoughcomm conflicts infor 1950s and1960s(1993;59). this ef this accessm perm regionalism sam encourag Brancati arg (Cornell, 2002). alienate ethnicgroupsandisolat there arein territo particularly decentralization m the beginningof90s”(Snyder,2000;209). of ethnicrepublics.Thisisbelievedtohavebe diversity andm Hardgrave statedthat“India e itted people“m ti Jack Snyder,whostudiedethnicconflictsin In astudyofIndianfederalism Based onastatisticalanalysisofthirtydem In hisstudyofCaucasian rial autonom f m ect thesplitof ing e , theauthorarguedthat toterritorialautonom andstim u thegrowthofregi stitu a ed that“decentrali y alltoooftenrefl m a er Yugoslaviawith tion naging ethnicc a ies canprom y induce,rath a ore effectiveac l andfinancialresou ul severa ated dem l initiallyb has beenrem onal parties.”Th zatio ect theparochialism e m ote a onf nds foreven “thecreationofli er thanre ies asfo the“rad i ethnicm cess togovernm n increasesethnicconflict ethnic conflicts, lict throughdem norities from s in duringth i gge the 1960sand1970ssharpl r ic ces duce, ethnicm rm ofdecentralization.H 52 a ally decentralizedethno-federalstructu r o rkably successf en oneofthecausesforethnicco b neededforit.Moreover,au is effectoccu states in m ilization becauseinautonom participationinthelargesphereof unist Yugoslaviahadal o e secondhalfofXXthCentury,Robert post-comm o re increasedstateautonom oflanguageandregion”.Heattributed e cracies between1985and2000,Dawn SvanteC nguistic states[inI nt –withth o cratic inst to bifurcated obilization. Hisargum rs becau ul inaccomm unist region,linkedtheethnic and secessionism itutions” (1993; o e rn drawback th ell state s se regionalpartiesm y increasedthepower m e ndia] hasreinforced aller entitiesin ways hadanethno- wrotethatethnic d odating cultural thatpolitica tonom ous structures at theiruseof y” becauseit indirectlyby 55). Atthe e thestate nflicts at n r i e e ofthe t refers s m the to a a y y l
CEU eTD Collection secess regiona and FrankCohenaream incre m governm coercion form “local bosses”m of centralization[…]m power, devolutionm bosses” tothelocalresourcesofcoercion.“W trans Rothchild explainedwhyitcannotbe 651). others, andmobilizinggroupstoengageinet reinforce ethnicandregionaliden a joritarian i a tion to Paul Hutchcroftalso There arealsoscholarswhoinspiteofha “The verys Referring particularlytodecentr ongoing orrenewedviolencepersists.”(2005;110) centralization, m Alternatively, thepolitical politica encourage nationalm their politica affir succeeds in sing i “Peace con on: l id e nt. m p
entities, s thesenseofnationalidentity standing o dem l tential tend s t r obilizin e m u o s a ngth to l ccess offederalism olidates m cracy, becauseitincreases y resistdem conf ref eeting th a y enduppromotingforces d a y continue a e g thelocalpopulation idence i encies y actuallyprom rring d acknowledgethat ce ong them.Kym claim ntra i e desireforself- par a norities toseek . W f jority pow o o lize e r se cratic reform tities, “producinglegislationth d that h t m to pushforfullindependence, icular ere nationa stateauth cession a viablesolutiononlongrun: alization assolutionforinte inaccomm i nority group,fearingtheconsequencesof ote de ly to er and,overtim ecentral licka ar a m in 53 ongst them federalism m l m govern secession.Them ority andresourcesintoitsownhands. th s hnic conflictandsecess d the accesso o to , here localbosseswieldsubstantialcoercive ving ageneralpro ecentralization m hostile todemocracy,whilecertainm theycanalsouseth cracy” (2001;42).Inasim e ethn i ization m gued thatdecentraliza odat norities becom assertcertaind m i ng self-gov e ica nt, themoreitrecog i andtopotentialtendenciesfor nority group,andstrengthens lly e, thisgroup[…]usesits a y bedanger f plura potentially at favorscertaingroupsover a e r-ethnic conflicts,Lakean politica a nd thepossibilityf ernm - l y entailcertainrisksof o decen soc re thefederalism e mands to ion” (Bran ent m i e localreso eties. W ous inconditionsof tion m - tralization andan paternalistic “local lly mobilize ilar wayinwhich a n y sim izes and a thecentral y strengthen ill Ky c ati, 2006 p urces of o ly easures d m r
licka ti- d ;
CEU eTD Collection
loyalty towardsthestate: protes loyalty. In resources, n m protest. Atthesam likelihood o ethnic conflictm status quo.”Theauthorconcluded “discourages theirengagem frequent butm conflict m im “rem further increaseth access tone i plicit rightsunsatisfiedby thecentralgovern norities’ mobilization ind” tothelocalpopulation Moreover, In oneofhi On theotherhand,presenceorabsence “Multi-national federalismdividesthe“pe institutions.” (Kym in th derivative”. (Kym community asprim therefore withitsownpolit its ownhistoricalrigh t, whileincen Hence, theacadem o a is way, nagem o f cessary m t m tably toin her theautho i oderate for words,indec norities a s e seces nage e e co nt” solution“encouragesdisc e tralized system time,it m eans form ment pirical article,Cohenargued s ntrol ov licka, 1998;140) sion b ’ titu m licka, 1998;139) bydim ary andthevalueth r v ic literatu m tional an obilization agains strategy” (1997;624,628). e i ewed inethn nt inthelessfreq also suggeststhatcen ts s ofresistanceto ecom , territories e er localresour ntr about theirspecific obiliza ical community.Theym i s theyar a nishing th e that “institutionallyreinforcin lized sys d financia s m re suggeststh tion a o r ically d e
e unlikelytohav lik and powersofself-governm t 54 t th em r e l resources e co m ely, eve ces ofpower,thesem ue ople” intoseveral“peoples thestatusquo”,butatsam e s m access r e statebyreducingth ontented ethnicgroupstoengageinm of m nt. AsHa iv e au nt butm m tralization m en regional orethnicid that federalis i b at decentralizationm norities federalism thority ined withalo eans mayshapethereasons.W n ofm withth an u rdgrave (quotedabove)suggested, a e d also,toin ch m y areun of thenece i view theirow nority groupstom the a e b aposs y decreasethelikelihoodof o g ethnicdivisi m re severeresistancetothe larg e asa“m like st designed cal leadersh ssary m eans m tra-group l i e possiblereasonsto er entities andaboutthe y ble th ent, andeach toh f ”, eachwith e a aj der y decreasethe n political eans forit. oritarian eth reat tocitizens’ a a y beusedto a federal ons isarisky ve rea ip willingto tion su e pport and obilizing a tim h s s ons to e
n e it the o n r ic e
CEU eTD Collection governm financial resourcesforthe poten power. already astrongintra-grouporganizationandst which wouldbeinherenttom mobiliza dem for m determ coheren resources, nam action mobilization more likely more likelytoowetheirjobsthecentralel likely tobeincreased.Asthecentreincreasesitscontrolov power overlocalautho m territo preserv decentralization streng a y finditdifficulttoexpressdem a nds. o Hence, cen First, theterritorialo As arguedabove,whenhorizontalpoweris 1.4.3. DevelopingtheCausalChain: s ria re decentralizatio ined, besidesotherthings,bycertaindi . In e t the leadership.Forterrito lly concentrated tion e nt aresignificantlydependent onthefi o tobecon r , againstcentralgove i butalsod r dem der e ly loyalty,financial,andorgani tom tralized a nds evenwhentheacc obilize th n andau i r t m en th m rolled bythecentral sys ities –im i nished possibilityto r i g noritie e a t e territorialethnic t ni em hnic rially obilization. Inpost-conflicts zation ofstatepowerm ton tial ethnicm s donotonly s whowereno rn a plic m o nds wit concentr m m i norities a y e itly ove nt aretheorganizationalstru andco hout thenecessary ess tom obilizers. W 55 ated m ites. Also,theiraccesstof r lo ns power.Thetwom p z g m a boundaries andthism ainst the equently, leadtothe t recen nancial transfersandredistribution oftaxes rong self-identificatio o tiona e cal au liticize e imply dim nsions ofterritorial i concentrated, thecontrolofcentral norities obiliza l reso tly inconflictwiththecen thor a s h y i en th t t ate, m h urces, aswe , theacces t ities inm m n er theregio ion resourc ituations whenm m i icity at pose alim nis ean e budgetsofregionaltiers of h obiliz ed access s formobilization a advancem in elem loc ctu i organizationofstate s totheseres n, ethnicgroupsm a norities ers n y stim ll asid i e n a r nancial res ited accesstolocal s es andtheprotest s, localleadersare l lev isredu eed m tom ents ofethnic ulate dem e ’ regions–is i entif l, politization ent offurther norities have obilization tral powe ce i eans for ources is ources is able an .
d. Still, a nds a y d r
CEU eTD Collection executive appointm leadership resourcesfor local power theregionalleaderswouldhavesuchincentives. leaders haveweakincentivesto the parliam particular regions.W oppositio concentrated power.Thisisbecauseincondi ethnic m the loyaltyofregion’spopulationcanbe particularly effectivewhentherearedirectlyel through this,dem local leaderstodiscourageethnicm potential onfinancialresources more financialresources.Thisisbecause is determ other things,onthesuccessoftheiradm regional budgets,orexplicitcriteria by thecentralgovernm so thattocontainform particularly intransitionperiods,which non-loyal localleaderswithre Second, theterritorialorgani The weakeningeffectofaneventuallyincr Because theloyaltyofregions’populati ined bytheamountoffi n h o bilization canbeaugmentedbythe e a nt throughaloyal-to-the-president s littleinfluenceon onstrate theirl e nts andthroughaweak e h e n e alized quotasofannua nt, central astrongpresident ethnic m allywiththeoppositionatcent redistribution.In nancial resourcesatlocalleader oyalty tothecentralpower,is deciding howstatebudgetresource duced transfers.Such“puni authoritieshaveim f zation ofstatepowerm o r thecalculationofthesequotas. i obilizers, throughanev nistrativ the budgetarysystem m insuchsystem who leadsoverthegovernm ob 56 o ilization againstthecentralgovernmentand tivated bysubsequentlocalelections. e m l financialtransfersfr e perform c l tions ofconcentrated ect eased leveloffiscalcentralizationoverthe ted loc on towardslocalleadersdepends,besid a jority parliam oral decentralization(i.e. reducedlocal existen situa portant a tio l le a nce, andbecausethisperf c ns withhor e of aders: thei s theoppositionh a m ral levelinordertolo y im entual controloverthe local shm s’ disposal,them increased.Thisstimulusis is eans toeventually“punish” acentra e ntary faction,theregional not wellinstitutionalized e s aretob pose lim nts” canbepracticed om r inte powerthepolitical izonta e thecentralto nt hascontrolover l author rest inattrac lly f e i t dis ed accessto a s nolobby o r t tivation of ributed to a ity with orm g bby for m e a nted ting nce e s
CEU eTD Collection adm extent towhichloca hypothesized thatthelikelihoodforethnicm elections). Ina1997 ethnic mino level, theincumbentsofhorizontallyconcen accord reduced over localprocessesofethnic authoritative positionwithallrelatedadvantag supporting to keepin Soviet Unioncooptationoflocalindigenouselites practiced the incum particularly their lead potential eth local adm local adm any changeintheloyaltyof to gainorpreservetheloyaltytowards i nistrative functionsdependonthecentralau Hypothesis 3 Central au ingly. electoraland inSovietUnio ter-ethn i b ership resou nistrative app / i ents oftheco oreven nistrative leadership,theym efficient,because r
n ities’ ic m th ic peaceinplace.T obilizers andhence,“decapitat mobilization against orities : Byincreasingthecontroloverfiscal allo l le ap r a ces. Incon o n. Philip ncentrated p ’ pointm r wing localethnicm d controloverreg intees. Moreover,when ticle aboutsecession ers oweth central power’sapp the appointm e nt decentralizati Roederexp m o bilization canalsooccurin o d h eir job wer. itions ese local thes a i of s e onal t y to ate. central leadership(Treism nt oflocaladm l 57 a ob trated powercandecr grant im i concentrated thepresid leaders wereputinfrontofthechoicebetween is n obilization againstthestatedependson es (Roeder,1991).Asim ilization e on. Hence,theth m inpost-SovietRussia,DanielTreism e” territoriallyconcentratedethnicgroupsof proc
o thorities, localleader d the centralauthoritiesh topoweratlocallevelwasfrequentlyused intees m in h es ses of i portant adm s ana andleadershipresourcesatregional againstth ent. W a i y nist power,this“decap l ethnicm ysis be followedbyacirculationof rative cadresiscontrolledby h dem of en themostim ird thesishypo e Cen Sovietf i nistr ease thelikelihoodfor s havestrongincentive a o obiliza n, 1997).Eventually, cratizing s a t a re andlosingtheir ilar centralcontrol ve contro tive po e der t ion wasm thesis resu portant local a lis rtf itation” is t l overthe ates with m o lios to thatin u lts an ch
CEU eTD Collection provinces, towhichdecentralization Instead, theym necessarily beinterestedinencouragingpopul networks of not seesuchalink. som dem streng m with authoritarianism there isaco m against thestateduetodecreaseddecentra bosses” and m (Crook &Manor,1998;Kulipossa,2004). the introductionofdecent encourage it.Moreover,som decentraliza citizens, butonlyundercert citizens’ participationandem echanism a eaningful participation king processclosertothepeople,encour e o theoristsarguethatdecentralizationa cratization. 1.4.4. DecentralizationandDemocracy: then theaccoun However, theresearchonsubjectrem If concentrationofpowerdim W h en localpoliticsis intrinsictothiscau t canalso patronage”(Hadiz,2004;699). mmon tendencytoassociatedecentr ion tofoste a y seektoincreasetheir co be“ins Them . Asdem tability ofpoliticians, r , decen citiz ralization reform trum a e in argum m ens’ p elite-b se-effect relation o ain conditionsthat powerm tr cratization echanism alization m ental inth m a rticipa a a e e sed i y contri nishes nt ofth nt, as ofaccountabilityshall , s, uponwhichthe dom e is believedtobringgovernm nd dem ti a 58 y resultinthecons on, developm ercive andsocio-econom age popularparticipation ar particip T lization, do bute. Thiswasthecas isundem well aspoliticians’accountabilitytowards the lik decentralization isbe h thelocalle e latteristhatdecen alization withde in ese localnetworks a ins inconclusive(De ated byspecialintere o cracy arecausallyconnected,othersdo shall notbetakenforgranted.For e ent ofnewlyde lihood form ation andstrengthenacco o c es itnecessarilym r atic adership latter wouldconti ? Inth olid m be alreadyinplacebefore o atio cracy andcentralization sh e i of tr norities’ m ce lieved toen e academ ic powerwithinthe with decentralization patronagem alization n inpowerof“local in publiclife,andto all b Vries, 2000).W nt e sts andclosedto nts anddecision- r a l e i comm z e e nue tobuild mayfoster d, pr an thatth ic literatu obilization untability courage e itted to a d y not a t h or re, ile y e .
CEU eTD Collection is notnecessarilyinherenttodem in situ Stoner-W incum consolid beginning oftransitiondidnot in Russiathe1990s,whereamountofaut of these coun state (Thoenig,2005;685).These centralizatio affairs duringthe1980s(Hutchcroft,2001; tendenc 42). CountriessuchasGreatBritainandFran dem centralizing m transform particularly im scarce resourcesbetweentheregions(Illner, institutions, tocorrectinequa centralization inordertostrengthenthena In certain centra o cratization reform b ation On theotherhand,cen Therefore, whethercen ents createdbarrierstoanyopponentse ies: inthe atio liz eiss, 1998)Fin a circum tr tions andbyageneralatm s a ies. whenauthorityisdevolvedtoautho n of“anethnicallyexclusiveautocr n until1981 tion and easures mayattim portant inperi f stances, dem o rm in er the s howm aresabotagedbylocal m a lly, d a de the centra ods oftransitioncharacterized litie tralization leadstoau tralization isnotnecessa o ecentralization a cratic/ ord ny spheresonerefersto. Neve e o s beaneffec s betweenreg leadtothe cr centralizing tendenciesdidnot country tobeconsideredaqua l atic regim powerstre o sphere e 1998; 26;Kulipossa,2004;770).Thesegoalsare m 59 m tive forceofdemocratization,particularlywhen e tional unity, ce haveexperiencedperi o s (Hutchcroft,2001;41). eking toenter n cratizing s a onom consolidati i r 40), whileinthelatter–degreeof g ons, and authoritarian leaders(H y be itarian enclavesatlocal atic sys thened its of societalfragm tho acho y gainedbythefederalrepublicsat r rily intrinsictoau itarianism t also em” atlo t ates m toestab interven by politicalandeconomicintense i ce ofautocraticregim on ofdemocracy,buttothe the politicals rtheless, acausalrelationship to controlthedistributionof com isa a si-ideal caseofcentralized y i cal level,inwhichloca tion lis e m nt question ofhowmuch p h unif ods withcentralizing rom plem inr ation. Also,certain level,andtherefore, utchcroft, 2001;33, tho cene (Hale,1998; i e se de r ent elementsof itarian regim gions o rm m lawsan e ’ f s aswell, o c i nancia r acy in e s. d l l
CEU eTD Collection regim mobiliza through whichincountrieswithpo concentration andethnicm for granted,butdem between cen Financial Lim and electoraldecen Weak leveloffiscal,appointm Increased polic Vertical concentrationof ited accessto:Limiteda The schemeinFigu The schem e ies Figure I.I.TheCausalMechanismbetw s withpowerconcentr
tion Final Remarks: tralization m a
Leadership y bered e representsinagraphical waytheth (LOW LE tralization onstrated ifthecase. /
d u ecentralization andauth HORIZ ced. power obilizat VE re I.1sum
e ation L OF)NEGATIVEETHNIC ONTALLY CONCENTRATEDPOWER nt, threshold
ion discussedinthesections mobiliza thestate wer concen
Mobiliz m ccess to: for a tion rizes thecausalmechanism
60 Organizational “Nationalizing”governm getting parliam
- m tr
ation een Pow oritarianism resourc ation th i
nority relationsarebuilt inlin
Weakenedethnicboundaries; ree hypothesisofthisthesis: first,thatin e er ConcentrationandEthnic s e accesstores MOBILIZ
/ dem e ntary m above. Itrevealsthreepaths therefore lim o Loyalty A cracy shouldnotb TION a ndates ources fortheethn betweenpo ited access e ntal e witha e taken to: wer ic
CEU eTD Collection Soviet Georgia,Moldova,andUkraine. The followingChapterselaborateandtestem power concentrationdecreasesthelikelihoodforet resources th concentratio and organizationalresourcesthat concentration favorsdisproportiona nationalizing statewhichonalongrunde- n alsofavorscentralizationwhichre at arealsoneededformobiliza ethnicm l electoralsystem Chapter II i norities needform tion 61 pirically thesehypothese . duces theaccesstoleadershipandfinancial Thethreehypothesesoverallsugg politicize ethnicity;second,thatpower hnic m s whichreducestheaccesstoleadership o bilization agains obilization; third,thatpower s onthecasesofpost- t stateauthorities. est that CEU eTD Collection (Lijphart, 1984).InGeorgeTs the parliam existence of system political arena(Tsebelis,1995).Hence,inregi characterized bytheexistence existence offew,congruent,andcohesiveveto
shared polic decision m cabinet responsibletothe legi which therearebotha popularlyelectedfixed- of legitim and executivepowershavetheirownfixedelector presiden and inwhichtheex must besupportedbyalegislativem was generallydefinedasthesystem its coretheseparationvs.fu parliam The powerconfigurationim Most post-Sovietcountrieshavebeencategoriz In th 2.1. TheFormsofGovernmentan ”, whichinth e tialism wasdefi ntary for acy” (Stepan&Skach,19 e acade a e king processisconcentratedintheha y position am nt, andbytheconcentrationof : Defi ono-party executivebranch, m m ofgovernm ic literatu is thesiscalled“concen ni s , institutionalties,andloy ecutive h ned asthes ng andMeasuringPowerConcentra sion ofpowers(Cheibub&Lim re, theconce slature (Elgie,2007;Elgie &Mo e of m nt, asthedi a ebelis’ term plied bywhatLijp s thecap 94; 120). y of“ a a stem jority andcan ny incongruentandnon-c m n d thePow of tra ut acity chotom ual dependence”,inwhichtheexecutivepower „mutual ind tion of 62 by thedom s, powerconcentr m players, ascomparedtothediffusionofpower trated power”,istheon a e legislative powerwithinonem nds offewpolitica lty. al m s withhorizontallyco term to disso fallifitreceiv powerhasbeenoftenassociatedwith e y presidentialism hart called“m ed as“sem r Concentration: a presidentandaprim ndates thatconstitutetheirownsource inance ofthe e pendence”, in lve thelegisl ongi, 2002;1).Parliam estrup, 2008;4).Som i-presiden ation isdeterm ohesive vetoplayersonthe e ajoritarian winner-take-all s av l acto / parliam e characterizedbythe executive branchover whichthele ncentrated powerthe o r te ofnoconfidence, t tial”, ature. Incontrast, s thatarelin ion e i.e.regim e- ntarism
m ined bythe a jority par i nister and e gislative e ntarism hadat k ofthe ed by e the s in t y
CEU eTD Collection presidentialism separation o observe insom cabinets, an due toth concentrated which inWesterndem (Lijphart, 1994b). encourage twopartys presidentialism tendstoconcen genera m argued ina1994articlethatpresidentialis separation/fusion ofpowersisoftenconfusingand strong executivepowers,butrelativelyweak “presid presidents. Thepost-S further categorizedas“super-pre post-Soviet republics(Russia,Belarus,Kazak or dispersepower.Cheibub andLim presiden Jose CheibubwithFernandoLimongi(2002) a joritarian Various scholarsandamongthem On theotherhand,Tho However, theassociationbetween l ass e nt-p tial system e gr (andim arliam d increas o f adual pe inawaythatistypicalforthepr executiveandlegislativebranches ciation of (Poguntke&W e parliam entary” reg s concealag rson plicitly, conc ing oviet republicsanalyzedin o y presiden independen cracies withlongtradit aliz stem e ntary system ation m i s andtoim m as Pogunt e trate theexecutivepowerinone r bb, 2005;9-11). e eat dealofvari of s duringthe19 sidential”, duetothepartic tialism e n elec tra ce ofcabinet ongi ar tionist) BertRo tora s apers ke andPa with presid pose l arbiter authorities(Beliaev,2006;385). 63 m esidential reg pro
gued hstan, Armenia,andA separationofpowers.Hearguedthat than parliam hasgreatertendencytom ation intheextenttowhich theycon ckman (1997),George ion ofparliam 90s, becau cesses, dom unidim , onalized typeofpolit explainedthatbothparliam entialism therefore, criticized. vis-à-vispartiesinparliam ul W charac thisthesishavebeenalsolabeledas that despitetheform e e bb illus nsionality inpolitica ter / i parliamentarism m s i e e inance of s e ntarism theirpres tics b ularly strongpowersoftheir s. Theauthorsdeterminedthat e t ntarism partyorinoneperson,to rated thep e lieve , whichcontradictsthe prim
zerbaijan Lijphart, forinstance, Tsebelis (1995),and , idents h thepowercanget ical leadersh d tobetyp e m al “separationof dichotom r ocesses thro a ke democracy i l nisters within co e a ) nt, onecan h d relatively e ntary and mpetition a ve been centrate i ip and cal f y and ugh o r
CEU eTD Collection parliam concentrated presidents needastable whether th whether th results thatform state lacksapersistentsupportinparliam presidential governm type inwhichthereisanabsolutem degree ofpresidents’parliam been suggestedbyAndresMalam concentration. Additional certain formofgovernm in thehandsofonepe legis models ofdem (Rockm dif 6). Sim m powers” inthepres a f kes thisseparation“notascom u l ses powerinm ative andexecutiv To theaboveitcanbeaddedthatweaker The m 2.2. Pow e ilarly, Rockm an, 1997).EvenLijphartpointedtoboth nt canblockpresidential decisions.Pres at m e r a power.Thisisbecau e wasap in indicatorsform er Concentration-Operationaliz a o jority wa cracy inpresiden easuring thedegreeofpower u iden ltiple vetopoints,hencemodif e a nt, and“sep n arguedthatthecoal r e branchesandtothela rson (Lijphart,1984;67). o-pres parliam s chara tia e indicato nt toacaseinorderdeterm l regim e ntary support.He idential, per c easuring thedegree te e p r tial system ntary m se thestronger riz s areneed arationist presidenci u lete as[it] e d, whodefi s, thelegi e d byinte a jority e a nt s jority is ed. (Malam s, a is consideredtobe”(Cheibub&Lim 64 ten inparliam rn s ition governmentinaparliam tter, theconcentrationofexecutivepower l ned twotypesofpresidencies,basedonthe defined “concentrationist ttributing totheform idents withparticularlystrong for t ative powers concentr al dis , andabso ation andMeasurement: elem support inordertoarri th Therefore,itisnotenoughtoattributea the for y e form ofhorizontalpowerconcentrationhave ud, 2001;10).Fromthisclassification,it ing its“f ents of“consensus”and“m c es” asthetypein ipline. m e ine itsdegreeofhorizontalpow ation itisim al presidentialpowers,thelessth nt persistentlysupportingapro- al powersofpresidents,themore lute m usion of
thatthepresiden a jority powers”char er theindependenceof portan presidencies”asthe inpar ve toasituationof which theheadof t e tode ntary regim ts m liam m ongi, 2002; a j acte al powers oritarian” e a term nt, and y have r is tic ine er e e s
CEU eTD Collection Ukraine. determ support forthepresident.These legislation andfor indicators in concentration andtheperiodswithpowerfragm advantage, aslongth can usethesituationofahighlyfragm
Figure II.I.
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CEU eTD Collection m elaborated byMatthewShugartandJohnCare presidential powers(Bunce, Europe (Frye,1999).Amongalltheexistingsetsof a m powers (Annex3).Astheinitialschem supports thepresident. horizontally concentratedregard to censu dissolving theCabinetandinpar judicial reviewoflaws.Insuchregim with significantvetopower, practice, suchapoliticalregim signif parliam concentrated the degreeinwhichapresidentn im branch. Agreaterscoreforpresidentialpower presiden concentrated Carey’s s easuring legislativ plies asmalle odified versionofitproposedbyTi In ordertodeterm As ShugartandCarey’sschem i can e tial powersarem ntary m re theCabine t thatthepar c h e orfragm : the m e r sco a f gre jority. Onecanestablishath its be e p r a e f te l e iam nted. Thisis r o r t orind ine theform thep st tothep esiden r the easured incom e nt becom budgetarypowers,powertoor 1997; Frye,Mainwaring power ofthelegislature. r e tial powersand es hasapresiden less eeds parliam i ide vid of e n becauseth u e u hasthispartic al presiden tia e s oflittle al m rposes of thedegreeinwhicha e thepr wasnot l power, m p o i aris thy niste e 66 esident hasalsofewrestrictionsinform ntary supportf y in1993,whichcontainssevenindicatorsfor relevanc reshold abovewhichpresidentialpowerisso on withth t s obtainedthroughthism
liam Frye, whoa determ theless tial p with extensiverighttointroduceleg eir sch r four indicatorsfor designed forEasternEuropeancontext,Iuse s. Insu indicatorsthatwereelaboratedtom ular advantage,itispossibletodeterm e nt, whiletheparliam o wers, Ius e e f ining the m e f ch e o isdesign r thedecis pres d o areg o & Shugart,1997),Shugartand whetherh possible parliam apted ittoCentralandEastern r hisinitiativesforpow rm ganize referenda,andcallfor al powersof ident n e them i m measuring appointm ed insuchawaythat i e on-m , politica eeds th e easure o e asurem rizon nt haslittlepower a king process.In e theleg ntary m e sup m t al p l ent schem ent schem p port of o er toget o i ing and slation, i wer is wer is a sla easure jority tiv e ine nt a e e e
CEU eTD Collection them parliam & Caulier,2006).Theissuewith index toals 2008). Afterthat,CoulierandDum frequently usedbyscholarswhoneededto Taagepera proposedthem system kind wasdevelopedbyDouglasRae(1967),w parliam m hence, cou possibly strongoppositionm absolute m determ parties orcoalitions.W that wouldhaveenoughseatsforpassinglaws disciplined m parliam legislative initiativesandhavehis/hercandida power, thepresidentneedssupport actors (2006;9-10).But thereali have beendifferent:as parties andpartysystem a jority. selves, theuseoftheseform The academicliteratureoffersavarietyof However, ifthepresid atical weightingofpar ine thenum e e e ntary partiesarediscip ntary fragm ntary fragm a n o jority parliam ter-b captureth a jority partyor alan erical strength e e ntation isalsoadeterm ce thepositionof ntation throughm e coalitionp h ile analyzingthestruct e ntary party.Thisis o re intuitiveform coalition thatwouldbeapotentia entia ties thatwonseatsafterelect a y enterintoallian lined whenitcomestovoting. of theopposition,especi ties ofpost-Sovietcountries dur these form ul l institutionis o o as ispos from tential of nt elaborated a the aparliam m ulas isthattheyar inan sible onlywhenpartym 67 atical ula tes fortheCabinetseatsapproved.Thelevelof parliam m parliam b without negotiationswithotherparliam ecause whenthereisn ure of hos s easure parliam t factor,becauseitrevealswhetherth
havebeeninprocessof for of “effectivenum the“effectivenum not grantedwithsuchsig ce withotherparliam for form e “fractionalizationindex”wasbasedon e m ntary m e th e alized m ntary partiesinthecounting(Dum ntary partywithnum ulas. Oneofthefirstform e parliam ally inthecases ions. Laterin1979Laaksoand a l supporterofthepresidentand e basedontheassum As Dum jority e e ntary fragm asurem ing theperiodoftransition e nt, itisa inordertopasshis/her b er ofparties”thatwas ber of e ont o mbers voteasunitary ents forthelevelof absolutem e andCoulierstated ntary factionsand whichthereisno relevantparties” l e so im n ntation (Kline, m erical relative if ation, notall icant f ulas ofthe portan p a tion that jority, a ere isa e o ntary r m t ont to al
CEU eTD Collection on thequalitativedescriptionof parliam m the 1990spartym parliam presidential initiatives. In thiscase,the not haveanabsolutemajority ofmandatesto and throughthestudyofavai through theanalysisoflocalpre parliam power isdispersed.Ideterm constan m establish thedegreeinwhichanexistingm inte inf m parliam m estab unanim inform a e a e o ndate. Thisiswhy jority has mbers’ behaviorandeventually,punishsp mbers insideparliam rnal d rm lished that“pa In som A nextstepindeterm The partydisciplinegenerallyreferstoth ation f ation providedininterviewswithform ously intheparliam e e e e t bas ntary partiesweredisciplinedenough nt isconductedopenly,becauseitm ntary fragm ntary m i sc iplin i are e s, politicalpower r particularcases,theparliamentar om a e of la interviewswithf jority invariousstagesofth tive e m r e m ty discip ntation cannotbeusedinthe b l a e y discip theuseo jority p r e s couldalsochangethei nt” (Tsebelis,1995;311) ining whetherpolitical e lable secondarysources. line re nt. Tsebelisgave is concentrated.Ifthesupporthasanad-hoccharacter, lined ine thedegree a rlia ss m parliam m o votingbeh f f rm af e a e rs tothe terials, interviewswith ntary parties. er par o e rm parliam a nts inthesecond jority er MPs. a 68 liam alized m kes e tim secureapersistentparliam a y party/coalitionsuppor e degreeinwhichm for itsm in whichthepresidentfoundsupporta aslightlydifferentunderstand ability of vior and ecific defectors.Theref r partyaffiliationduringtheparliam inparliamentsupportsthepresident.If e possible forthepartyelitetom . Suchcontrolispossibleonlyifvotingin cases e ntary deputiesIalsocheckfortheactual po e f ntary supportforthepresident canbe wer isconcentratedo r e am analy e thod f sup m apartytocon ework consid b ers tovoteunanim ports p zed in for ary sourcesandalsoonthe o r deter m er parliam r th e es mbers ofonepartyvote is thesis.Instead,Irely id ting thepresidentmay m ered inth entia t ining thelevelof rol th ore, byusingthe e r ntary supportfor fragm l initiativesona e ntary deputies, ously. During e votesof ing onitor party is resea e ofit:he nted isto political e ntary r its ch ,
CEU eTD Collection is characterizedbypowerfragm coalition thatcontrolsoveram disregard theparliam concentration ifthepresidenthasenoughform one needstodeterm Therefore, foreachcaseinwhichthereisnoabso priva of theparliam level ofparliam increase ofpresiden presence ofaconsiderablenum com the Cabinetswerealwa Cabinet form for except fortheperiodbetween1992and1995, the of statehadprovision Constitu Georgia ob powers betweenexecu legal actsandnorm m p al powers.Becau t leted duetothesupportfromindependent In ordertodeterm To summarize,apoliticalreg e ben 2.3. Pow tion e f in1995. tained its th ation andtheparliam e er ConcentrationinPost-S nt. Also,presid e ntary fragm an a Constitu ine thenum tial power s Between1991and1995,allform al character.T e ofGeorgiasinceIndepend t nt, ORif tive and tr ys pro-presidential. s e acting ine specif thep tion e ntation, inwhich
. Abignum leg en groups ofMPsbyoffe ber andlegi a e thepresidenthasconstants r a jority ofparlia es ntation. ts m l legitim ber ofinde i i idents had slative b e c pre i h m nt could e m a e y finditeasiertoattract inagiven s easurem identia oviet Georgia: acy ber ofindependentMP slative behaviorofindependentMPs. r an pendent MPsisafavorableconditionforthe only reactthro 69 al ch m there isnounifiedforcetodefendthepowers only withtheadop l pow ways therighttono ent resultspresentedinTableII.1revealthat es (Annex4).Form e candidates.Tim lute m ence thatregulatedthedivisionof al legislativeandappointm ntary seats.Otherwis mo presidents inGeorgi ring collectiv me ers inGeorgia,Ianalyzedallrelevant al a n rulesregu jority partytosupportthep t o ugh accepting f upport ofaparliam t i independentMPsbyoffering me e ben s isusuallya o i lating thero thy s al pr c tio m h e, thepoliticalregim e Frye arguedthatthe aracterized bypower n of i f a alwayshadstrong esiden nate can its or rejectingthem (Frye,2002;93). theGeorgian e tial powersin le ofthehead nt powersto e sign ofhigh ntary party didate r for esiden s for m al t, e / ,
CEU eTD Collection introduce legislation,excep non-over-rideable veto.Third,they consent oftheparliam unlim could block The secondcaseoccurredinNovember2007 could notam four m The firstcaseoccurredbetween1993and1994wh 19 18 17 degree ofparliam parliam f
o 4 3 2 1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Ge Th Sou r incum O
n e Con or Table II.1.Fluctuation line: r As m However, thefor ce: Tab ited p gi Parl Excl onths, duringwhichtherewerenoparlia e a ntary support,ananalysis h un s i b ttp titu Di usi a ent pres m der Max o e l ssol ://n presiden e P v tio e wers toap ntioned before,inordertodete end presidentiallegislativeandap nt e i r St B C co C o J ews.bb n i ary u u a u p a n mum po a m P at bi t d d bi o t P l C i a T r g i o sal p e o net a m o ci net c C et n D iled o e r idents k duct o e al o t t ntary num
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99 pointm mentary sessionsandthereforetheparliam , rm for th o . Hence,thedegreeofparliam e leg e accessed on19January,2009. veral m w 2 n, ino m ers (m ine howm b en astateofe i er e slativ j 2 ll p u e (m 19 d 007 nt decisions(W ax= i r eans throughwhichtheparliam cial rev e pro 9 e der ax=4) 2 n . r 4 ers inGeorgia(2001-2008) ited pow 4 8 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 - i / 0 a 1 ods pre )
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CEU eTD Collection num 20 parliam m fragm Georgia hadtenyearswithone-dom potential parliam G of party leaderstocountonm generally theinternaldiscipli disciplined andifitsm power concentration.T the presenceofasignificantnum relatively powerfulparliam significant proportionofindepende power toad El So e a particular org 2 20 19 19 1992 19 year jority toadoptorganicandordinarylaws. ect Table II.2.TheParliamentaryN 008 urce: e 0 9 9 9 i i rical fragm The datainthetableabove The dataIcollectedthroughinterviewswith The dataalsorevealarelativelysm 4 0 5 9 a, atth e on
nted parliam e Ta ntary electionsin2008 Uni Nat bl e au opt sole ly lowinter e C C R t com i Fi e i i o onal thor t t d i i u rst zens’ U zens’ Nat Vi entation invariousperiodsoftran n e d Peace Coalition p wi ’ ntary m M ct Ta s i ly co e l r i ori e o nni o nt, andthreeyearswitha e U d by bl na ve q ous n n u e e-F ng l i i m h e M mbers cons o o nstitu st in t n is potentialcanm Ge n n of e p r a h nt al disc ovem ee of a e a jority e Dem rt o
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Geo O ntary party,togeth Ge r y u gi
tion / ne ofm c bl t e tob h a or or nt r oc or o gi gi gi iplin Georgia hadone-dom e crat – that couldsupportthepresiden e a ber ofindepe mbers’ voti a a a on r reveal thatsincethedeclar l changesand tantly supportthepresident.
fo 20 nts inm s t r u e h 08 a merica of e b jority parliam . inant-part Seats all num a thef 80 46 65 56 62 16 % si a s o nife o 71 ng behavior.N l FragmentationinGeorgia(1990-2008) st ofparliam f highly fragm
er witharelativelyweakoppositio o dat ndents aresignsofasignificantpotentialfor extra st erical strengthoftheopposition,aswella rm October 11C Natio sition inG Str y parliam Co Georgian form a The dataalsorevealthatsincethelast R Co only ifthegreatestpa pr C al m e ong alitio o vi alitio e O O o m - n val ntary v ord ppo ppo inant-party m est opp a i d a Party l Dem n uni ofGe e jority inthepar n “Th i sitio sitio d "Righ n e by e st a ntary m e nted parliam e e parties washighenoughforthe Part o ry laws. ositio nt, fouryearswithaslightly orgia ispresentedinTableII.2. o e n n vertheless, thereweretwocases
alition o ation ofindepe Jo t cratic ” ” h r
tist gi e C t. Thelevelofparliam y er MPs(Annex7)revealthat i n a
n t parliam
e nt a ndates. Thepresenceof ral El Seats e 1 1 1 25 26 % rliam 8 nt, withnoconstant liam ect 1 0 5 e
nt, withsufficient i ons C ndence in1991 e e nt: dur ntary partyis In de o n toitand m pen 1 27 % m 0 9 7 4 3
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of
CEU eTD Collection secure asta to easilypassordinaryandorganiclaws. “Citiz parliam Table II.2revealthatthewinni behavior, thealliancesbeing 2001. Between2001and2003,therewasnom 23 22 21 rem April 1991,whentheinstitu fragm presidencies, canleadbothtohighdegree presiden which theparliam elections. Bythebeginningof1992,therewasnot “Round Ta 1990-1992 andduringthe1999-2003m 1 K independent MPsalliedwiththewinningpa af dem seats afterthe1995elections.However,acloser 999 Th Th Th i ter th k a oved fr b Georg e au onstrate e au e au i The 1995-1999parliamentarym The firstGeorgianpresidentZviadGam An ultim d e ens’ U ze ntation, dependingontheactual t e e election tho h t. T t ntary factioninwhichtheyform ( or’s in h M i or’s in a Parliam r ’s P du ble–Free Georgia”splitinseveral om h b s n thatinre e exis le m in ion” withtheirvote,an terv ate powerthroughacoupd’état terv r i terv n g dete iews i a e s e iew in 199 tence jority . Thism ntary for n iews inTb t
fo 2- rm n r th a Tb B 19 of . lity th 21 inant f e u 95) ilisi (Octob Inthelatte aparliam d p m a tion ofpresidencywascreated,an a a . p created onanad-ho ilisi (Octob rliam al orinfor jority wasf
e e winningpartym st (Ap o ng partydidnotwinanabsolu r power e n t er, 20 ary r e il, 2 d hencegua ntary m r relationbetweenthetwoforces. er, 20 co a case,them m 23 009 ndate requires 08) concentratio mm al m i a rstly wit ) ndates. Intheform ally 08) i with rty duringthewhole1995- ttee a 72 a h jor . Althoughthe“RoundTa jority (whenthecase)sup wi
obtaineddu joinedafterelections Dem c s ofpowerconcentrationand “Lo
s factions soonafterthe1990parliam Ko ity, whenco a rante basis. akhurdia wasofficiallypresiden th naged tosecureana ZuraSan cal Gov asingleparliam b a analysis oftheparliam u a a jority par r Gio jor
n consis e Kikh d asta 22 ity andnostablepatternofvoting additional explanations.Thedatain r
k e ab e rnmen lid id i e toth kid mbined with d Dece b ze (MP ze, sen t ts inestab y of le par ze (MPdurin t er case,them te
an m f d i i o du e f cially e m Reg liam a r ntar sp jority ri b constantlysupported b act tha n er 1991,whenhewas 1999 legislature.The i ported thein l o solute m eci g e ishing thed y factionthatcou n 19 rela splitinSep ntary m a ble-Free Georgia” alist with e g l Po of 99-200 nt inthisperiod
19 tive par litics”. t m 90 a jority group a -19 l a 3). jority soon y p l o in jority able t between iam st of the1 92); Kob cum e
o gr t werf e e em ntary ntary ee in the b 995 ber ent l ul d a -
CEU eTD Collection power. First,hewonthepresid on Georgianpoliticalscene. Party wascom for secured asupportingabsolutem Shevardnadze’s initiatives(Nodia,1998).Henc and toformthepartycalled“Citizens’Un state ofemergency,Shevarnadz parliam his form em the M Shevarnadze startedtoconcentratepoweronly 1992, withlim There wasaheadofstate–EduardShevarna 2005; 53-56). the creation supported byanationalistpara for functions (Wheatley,2005;53-56).Moreover,ther the prim elections, m move m m ergency (Nodia,1998).Duringthestateofem ed in1990–the“NationalCongress”th ed around/andchairedby Shevardnadzewo m The 1995parliam
Between 1992and1995,therewasnoofficial i nis e e e-minister andthechiefoft nt thathechairedsecuredanabsolute nt becauseth er-KGB loyalists,whosecandidaciesat t r y ofseparatistparam a of ny ofhissupporterswithinthem ited form posed byseparategroups of“r Inte rn ere werenoparliam al Af e al powerandnopersistent ntary andpres f a irs u m ential elections.Second,theCi e m a ilitary groups ilitary groupnam jority inparliam nder h a h naged toestablishasuppor e Nationa idential electionresultsst e i ntar s co 73 dze –whohadextrem y sessionsheld
e, bythebeginningof1994“headstate” by theendof1993,whenhem m o in OssetiaandAbkhaziaregion ntrol andto l Guard,whomhehi efor vem at wasopposingthepr thatm n theparliam ion” thathadasm ergency period,heappoi e a e nt andby jority ofm d “Mkhedrioni”,form m m e wasanalternativelegislativebranch e nt graduallyabandonedhim e rs” and“nom a institution ofpresidencyinGeorgia. jority inparliam o ment couldnotberejectedbythe ins ( 1995 hewasthestrongestactor a e W ndates ntary elections.Although the tizens’ UnionPa titu heatley, 2005;88).Afterthe ting m rengthened Shevarnadzein te ely weakpowerbaseby m enclature”, theirvoting a in the1990legislative s a f elf appointedintheir esident andthatwas a in goaltosupport e jority inparliam our-m ed asaresponseto nted intheCabinet nt tosupporthim a naged tobring onth sta s (Wheatley, rty thatwas , i n cluding t e of e nt .
CEU eTD Collection chairing t prem power fragm constitution withoutth (Table II.2)andtheGeorgianpresident Af “m presiden parliam as theincumbentpre the verticalofpowerand 25 24 in 2002,whentheparliam 128). Thefactthatthepresiden Union” had119m presiden presidential partyintensifiedandfinally,sp Union” startedtolosetrustinthepresiden covered almosttwoparl president enjoyedaconsta Shevarnadze behavior inparliam
th Th Betw e Citizen ter the any were e au iership After the“RoseRevolution”in Hence, duringthetransitionperiodGeorgia The process een 1992 e thor’s i h tial “UnitedNationalMov t lo ntary seatsinthenewparliam e Ca 20 s’ Un st thesecu 24 08 ele handpickedbyhim binet. ’ e , becauseM s pos ion n ntation andlongperiodsofpowerc an terv ) . d 200 ofpowerdiffusionstartedin2000, iew i c ition a tion ndates, butbytheendof20 s e ide n e needfo red m nt wasunanimous 4 therewas Tbilisi(Octo s wasalso iam , the n the ro t Mikhe P e nt parliam s consideredthatsuch e a nt rejectedthepres pro-p ntary mandates. jority s
le oftheexecu t lostthesuppor r theagreem onthepartyli str n il S b r o e e e institu e r, s upport in ngthened 2003,thehorizontalpower aakashvili o m idential co e 2 008 ntary supportbe e nt”. Thes e tio ) onm nt, with ent from had enoughpowerandsupporttochangethe n t. Gradually,thisintern
74 tiv b lit thepartyin2001,as o which wereoccupiedbyMPsfrom p st beforethe2004elec
t o f Dem a alition securedevenm
y e”. idential initiativetoin 01 itwasleftwithonly41(W rliam pr b “Citizens oncentration. Theform f a e MPswereloya constitu ta parliam e 25 ny m m u ined controloverm theopposition. r Gio
experienced relativelyshortperiodsof iersh e nt. Afterthe1999 whentherefor tween 1995and2001,periodwhich r a i p k tters (W
e e ’ tio lidze (MP in G nt after2001becam Union”a nal changes e org becam heatley, 2005;103-136). i a. l to d al o u tions” (Mitchell,2006). l Th o ring lies in troduce thesystem m re parliam o thepreside e concentratedagain, er e p pposition w elections“Citizen re result ofw ists from
would“strengthen 1 were characteristic 999 r than twothirdsof esi par d -20 heatley, 2005; en e m lia 0 t w e 3 “Citizen ntary seats m o , m thepro- a s n ithin th h e s t t, since e ich the visib nt. The m d i b rectly er o of s’ l s e e ’ f
CEU eTD Collection parliam constitute thepresidentialfo analys the for parliam 2004). However,thedatainTableII.3revealth becam as parliam into parliam constitution, withthegoalto and changes Between 1991and1994,theseparationofpowers Constitu division offor post-Soviet period,Ianalyzed parliam strong formalpowersm the periodswithconcen high degreeofparliam for theGeorgianpoliticalregim In 2000,am In ordertodeterm 2.4. Pow is oftheconten e m m e e e tion ntary for ntary deputies. ntary country al powersoft e o ntary (W re autho e intheSovietMoldovaC ofMoldovaadoptedin ntarism er ConcentrationinPost-S m al powersbetweenthelegisl m a ofgovernm r ay, 2003;456).S . jor reformwasinitiatedbythe itarian afterim Som afterthecons e t ofthisreform ntary frag h ine theextentof trated power(1995-2000,2004-2008)th e presiden a naged tosecurethec e scholarscategori transform rm the legislationof e al powerhavenotchanged. m e of nt hasbeen e t arereduced plem ntation andthelackofstable 1994establis onstitu titu o 1991-1994 and2001-2003,period reveals m theform tional e enting for res oviet Moldova: tion. ze theMoldovanfor m earch evenfocusedonexplainingwhyMoldova 75 ative andexecutivebranches(Annex4).The reform al that after20 Moldovaa a parliam at infactMoldovadidnotbecom only reflectedinthe presidentialpow
onstant supportofanabsolutem ofgovernm hed m to sym was regulatedbyseveralprovisorylaws in2000.Inth parliam o bolic attributes.However,acloser e st clearlythes ntary form dopted sinceIndependenceonthe 00 thep e nt ofMoldovatom e nt fromsem alliances.Incontrast,during Therefore, inMoldovathe m e presidentswithrelatively ers inMoldovaduringthe ofgovernm r e parliam esid ofgovernm mode ofpresidential e s characterizedbya entia paration ofpowers. i -presidentialism l a e e ntary regim nt since2000 t tributes tha e e agenuine nt (Mazo, a odify the jority of e s t
CEU eTD Collection 27 26 presiden had tobeapprovedbytheparliam enough todisregardthelegislativ reform elections: whileuntil2000thepresidentswere 2008 inMoldova(Table II.4)revealsthatth necessary. parliam presidential powersbetween1990and1994induced also, heco Constitu for Th Sou 4 3 2 1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 m e Con Table II.3.Fluctuation al presidentialpowersinMoldovawas r The analys A generalexam ce: Tab Excl thepresiden e tial legis tion Parl ntary structureandof s Disso usi titu Max uld is l i Pro v . e a tio Thepres e i C B m C Judi co l i u a u mum po n p a e n Packa bi tio d bi a o m nt t Part T r g l C sal is oftherelevant l net o ci net C p ary o sue d et n of ative initiativ D duct iled t e al of o ary a e ts wereelectedby i f nsu di a m u g c re l
o l r r e vet
vet b th ination onthelevelofpa po i e re rm t sm ssible a id vi o r e o y e assem ndat e ecrees. Nev n f
e f theau e ati
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27 l e rs s d e
ldo s gi a inFormalPresidentialPow b thor,
sl ly v es. Therefore,inordertoch at a thedegreeofparliam th i non-legislative powers i on on e branch.Allpresidentialnom gn at i l e e theb legislation reve rtheless, ificant attrib gi theparliam e s resp nt. Moreover,theparliam sl ati a sis v on 19 e p si of th 9
ere wasonlyoneparliam 76 b o 1 n/ the scopeofthesepow 4 2 0 4 3 1 2 3 1 3 3 2 l w - 0 2 e fo a 1 the periodbeforeadoptionof1994
rliam
e leg ers (m
99 utes in e electedindirectelections,afterthe2000 nt. r th 4 als tha i slativ (m e e power concentration,theanalysisof ax= ntary fragm ju thef ax=4) d e 4 e pro i ntary cial rev ) t
ers inMoldova(2001-2008) th ec o v 19 rm k whethertherelativelystrong isio e 9 i support forthepresidentis ew acti only periodwithsignificant 4 ation ofthegovernm i 4 n e 1 8 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 nees toexecutivefunctions - e 4 s nt hadtheforcetoreject 2
listedin ntation between1990and
00 0 v e ers wasnotextensive ates sin ntary m
Ann ce e x a 19
20 ndate (1998- 4 . 95
0 0 4 . 1 8 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 - 4 2
e 00 nt and 26 8 CEU eTD Collection A in 1991 liners” (Crowther&Roper,1996). W two groups 30 29 28 rem reveal thatoutofthe380 representing theCommunistPart alliances. Immediatelyafterth that itsstructurewascharac m that wouldhavebeensufficienttoadoptordi 2001) inwhichnopartyorcoalitionm based onthefor ever m 1991 rem ( El www.e-dem Deci So ugu De a 2 2001 1 19 19 ect year ithin thef ndates, atleas 005 998 a ur 9 9 put Table II.4.TheLevelofParliamen i st, 19 ining MPsrepresentedtheCommunistParty. ons 4 0 si Nevertheless, acloseranalysisofthe ce:
o i a e 30 n Tabl naged tosecu s’ of 91 theMPsreorganizedinseveralgroups.Th a G ined withonly30parliam ocracy.m Dem . M splitinseveralpart r Fi e i i evance
rst per Party ofC Par Party ofC o com rst l C o d m wi cratic Ag t ova o y of t righ p m ation ofad-hocalliances. d i nni , pu m l n ), att e i C P d by uni od, ng o o o bl t a a re anabsolu mm mm mm st p rl i h rarian theCommunistPar t s f Part e a a i hed h ter thee a rt u u unists e aut me y u n n elected MPsin1990,130represen
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terized byfrequentchangesin
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request inSe y andtheotherrepresentingth ul base ec T Later, aftertheComm te m d tions the e iu Seats a ntary seats d 5 4 70 65 56 % ri m “On o 5 0 i a
, n a t naged to o
jority dat ary FragmentationinMoldova(1990-2008) n Janu Allian ptember 2007. a
Dem t p t first Moldovanparliam level ofparliam y 77 “B h r inparliam e Co nary laws.Inthecaseofotherparliam ovi ary 3 divided betweenthe“hardliners”and“soft- Dem raghis Alliance” o (Roper, 2008;110).Noneofthesegroupings Str ce oft cratic Mo d Dem secure anabsolutem 29 mmun e ong o 0 Po d Howeve e PopularFrontalso cratic Con , by ted thef Co 1 pul h o est opp 993 e Popu cratic Front t ist alitio a h r ldo e . unist Pa F e Party” Ass nt andtheadoptionoflawswas r v n ositio o lar C e v a
r, shortlyaftertheelections n theparliam C ntary fragm Co e o t oundation ofpoliticalparties. ted thePopularF n o
ci tion alition o groupsinparliam , pub at h n alitio e PopularFront.S rty wasofficiallyf rist
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r
Pa a e d jority afterelections disintegrated andby e Seats in rt e ntation waslow. 2 35 3 19 % 9 i ntary groupsand 6 4 c
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d ntary data cracy e n t s
CEU eTD Collection 19 left itandform of them But asin absolute m absolute m Agrarian De frequently, andallianceswe Between 1999and2001thelevelof disintegrated inlessthanone opposing P with anabsolutem parliam coalition m reached faction m
with acertainpotentialfor m parliam 1994 parliam 32 31 consolidate itsforcesbyattr o f Au Au Mo a 9 ndate. 0 t - tho h 1 ldov or’s In thethirdpost-IndependenceMoldovanpa The secondparliam At thebeginningof1993,onefacti 99 r e e anabsolutem ’s 4 a ntary factions ntary groupsleadtoahighlevelof a). the In Par jority party.Oneyearaftertheelec In a a naged tosecureastableanddiscip a terv a terv a jority, thesecondMoldovanparliame jority ofseats,strongenoughtoadop l naged tosecureanabsolutem previou mocratic Pa i rty ofCommunists. a e m iew in iew i nt wasform ed aseparateparliam e nt ofM n a C Ch jority ofvotesthatallo s h pa form isinau a o isinau jority ne l d rliam rty gaineda e o ntary m v
a re m ed acoalitioncall (Octob (Oct ed withanabsolute ) acting moreandMPsonits . power concentration.Inthe1
e nt, politicalpowe o year,afterw a cessary fortheadoptionoflaws. b de onad-hocbasis. e a er, r, ndate inthepos Nevertheless, thisAlliancewasratherfragile andhas 20 relativem e 20 factions’disciplinewasvery ntary fac 09) wit 09) with a wed counter-balancingthere jor h tions, 11MPsoftheAgrarianDe
78 ed „TheAllianceforDem Vitalia Pav ity ofseats.Rightafte parliam
lined re tion. Hence,despitethein Ale h r a ich theparlia
ntary m jority of t ordinarylawsandto m got f x rliam t-Soviet Moldova(1994-1998)alsostarted ons andru BurianandVictor 32 a jority, thefragmentationofm
e r –„TheVillageLife”m la agm ntary fragm licen e tive a nt (1998-2001)nopartyorelectoral ndate quicklyfragm votesthatwere co e m nted duetoth 994 parliam
(MP du a side.However,althoughthis m jority in e 31 nt re-becam e Hence,evenifthe1990- low,defectionsoccurred r the1998elections,three ri nt n ation duringitsoverall g th o destitute theCabinet. lative m Puscas(MPs parliam cracy an e e e f itial presenceofan ntary electionsthe transf 1 998 a st disin e nted aswell. -20 m e fragm a o orm e d Refor jority ofthe 0 cratic Party nt, itnev 1 a
Parlia naged to t during the e e d inan g e ration nted. m m a e s”, n in e t r
CEU eTD Collection parliam Life” parliam varied. m characteristics securedahigh 33 constituted the„leftistg Party andwiththeSocialists-Edin president madean“allianceofconvenience”with the m num Moldovan presidentenjoyedlessth defected inordertoformanewpro-presidentia collapsed whenthepartydisintegratedoneyear kept thea a genuineconcentrationofpower.Afterthe hierarchical structurean or alliances Cabinet, an parliam position 2005-2009). Inbothcases,thePartyofCommunist
Mircea Snegur’sSpe a ndates. b The degreeofparliam Petru Lucinski,thesecondMoldovanpresiden The situationchangedwiththefourtha er ofMPs. a Atth jority e e oftheParty ntary m nt andhadtonegotiate l liance withthem d toso withm party e beginn e ntary group,butbecauseth a ndate, whenithadenoughseatsto in le ech ly c ing of1990’spresiden pa a , pu jority sea ofCommunists h d ahighlev overnance”. rliam bl ange th i s e he ntary supportforthepr e
a d nt wasalready jority Agrarian i with potentialparliam level ofpowerconcentration n t e C s inparlia
Ta s tv r e 33 onstitu a an oneyearofparliam l of o Bloc,wh Butthisa on
inte 1 was 3 Jan tion. t Mi m rna 79 is 1994 parliam u e disintegrated. However, nd fifthparliam P a rcea Snegurh nt, thePartyofCo In r l ich intheviewofoppositionthattime l aftertheelection a l f y particularly strong group neverhadanabsolutemajorityin disc liance alsola rty, butthisallianceg , 19 contras the rem action in esident inMoldovaduringtransitionalso 98 t, waselectedattheendof1996,when ipline ( e s hadabsolutemajorityofseats.The ntary alli . electtheheadofstate,toform a t withth ining relativem e thepar ntary elections,presidentSnegur e P a ntar d acons rotsyk st during thetwoparliam e es, thissupportdi ed onlyforoneyear,because nts ofMoldova(2001-2005, y supportfrom s e pr , when11ofitsm liam d et mmunists hadastrong tan e al u af v e ring the2001-2005 r ious ca t nt. Overa ter the . adually ero supportin , 2008;137).These a jority ofAgrarian ele ses of anabsolute d notleadto ll, c „Villag thef tions th d parties e ed and e mbers ntary the i rst e e
CEU eTD Collection elections thepresidentlost new parliamentary around theseparationof powersbe five yearsafterUkraine’sdeclarationof f president couldrelyontheparl this partygainedam was theleaderofh of stateshallbeelected circum m of MPs. Moldovan presidenthadalsoonlyoneyearof tim Table II.5reveal,duringthetransitionperiod th constitution building support duringtheirm Although thefirsttwoMoldovanpresidentshad power fragm party init. r agm a naged tosecureadurablem es. Oneofthereaso The thirdpresidentVladim The presidentialpowersinUkrainehavecons To sum 2.5. Pow e stanc ntatio e n inthe19 e s of up,Moldovanpoliticalregim ntation andduring er ConcentrationinPost-S the electionswerescheduledfo pro 20 a a ndates, thesemom n jority ofm i 00 Constitu 90s wasdu by2/3 ghly hierarchicala s forwhichtheUkrain cess of constant parliam a Ukra ofMPsafte jority supportin the 2000’s-bypower iam ir Voroninwa a tional chang e tothe e ndates tween thelegislativeand ex ine s ntary supportduetothem e i nts did nce its oviet Ukraine: nd disciplinedPartyofCommunistsandbecause after the2001and2005elections, independence wasthel lo e r eachparliamentary dur 80 parliam w e r thebeg ian post-Sovietconsti e ntary m theparliament.Thiswasduetospecific s in
ing the1990swasm degree ofparliam s theonlyMoldovanheadofstatewho declaration ofindepend not lastlongenoughtom e presiden short m Moldo tituted agr e ntary supportfrom concentration. T a i nnin jority o v m tial powerswerem a, whichp g e of1998andbecauseafterthe support. T nts ofmajorityparliam ea a ecutive branches(Wolczuk, election.BecauseVoronin jority presenceofhisown t m e ong negotiationprocess ntar tution wasadoptedonly a o h tter of r stly characterizedby e y par ovided tha h anabsolutenum ence. Asth high levelofpower erefore, thesecond a ke adifference. t dispute ies’ odified four d t theh i e scip datain inthe e ntary line. e ber ad
CEU eTD Collection 34 only afteroneyearofgovernm without parliam parliam prim legis and thepresidentcouldnotdissolve sim lim activity oftheCabinetandals right toelaboratedecree based onseveralprovisory 2001). Beforetheadop 4 3 2 1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Sou
its tothesepowershavebeenestablished,asthepresident’svetocouldbeoverriddenbya p Table II.5.Fluctuation excl e m l le m r ative p The 1996C The 1992am ce: Tab e parl usi di i ntary approval.Thepresidentcouldal nister withtheparliam Max a ssol v jority of pr i a e i l bu cabi r o m cabi e u esiden i j posal n mum po co u e packa t d t i part nt di r g o T n o m n e C et n ary ci D o et duct et ntary agreem o p e t ary onstitu
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CEU eTD Collection 35 rather frag (Christensen appoint them prim for negotiations, whichenteredintoeffectin2006a proposed aconstitutio President LeonidKuchmabeforeViktorYushch overrid tem Uk less fragm although initiallyelectedwithanabsolutem oppositio So El raine m 20 20 2 19 19 19 ect porarily (until1999)adopt year urce: 002 e- al powers.Accordingtotherefor Table II.6.TheLevelofParliamen 9 0 0 9 9 As datainTableII.6reveal The finalrefor i ons 0 7 6 8 4 m ( e
h . Presiden t i ttp nister andthem n andwithahighnum a bl e ://www.cv m nted thanthelegis e V etal. e com i i nted, withlack k nisters ofdefense First wi t or p C C C
tial form , 2005). Part Part Yu i o o o l k e m m m d by .gov sh n Ukraine” y y m m m m n o o chen i uni uni uni n f f regulatingthelegisl nal reforminDecember2004duringtheOrangeRevolution .u t R R g party/b a/ h st st st e ko e e al powersrem e aut ). Part Part Part mbers oftheCabinet. gi gi Bl o o
n n ofabsolutema o s s h y y y l econom c atu o
lo “O ber ofindependent and foreignaffairs,butonly r , c , m r bas ur es thatfollowedafterthat.Thisis
o e d o st ofUkrainianparliam m Seats a i t , itwa 75 2 32 24 25 25 in n % c decrees,andvetopa ar 4 t ed inthisform
h a y FragmentationinUkraine(1990-2008) e da jori 82 ative-executive relationswasproposedby Yul Yul enko tookoverthepres s theparliam nd whichdrasticallyreducedthepresidential jor ta ty ofseatsfortheCommunistParty,wasnot Str Thep Peo Peo collectedbyt i i C Dem ity p y y ong MPs.Thefirstlegislatu a Ty a Ty o p p m l l e e m o est opp ’s M ’s M m m crat uni a r o o rty/coalition, es at untillate20 shen shen st i o o ident rem c ve ve
B ositio Part e with theparliam m m k k h l nt toappointanddism e oc o o e Cent e e nts sinceindependencewere y B B nt nt
n rliam l l
oc oc ral ElectoralComm a withlack ined with e idential seat.Kuchm Seats becausemanyMPs 05. ntary billswith2/3 n/ 2 30 23 % 9 8 0 a
r e (199 e In ntary consent the de of pen n/ 34 2 % righ 0 0 7 0-1994), 2 a stron is
d iss the 35 e sion n t t to s
of g a
CEU eTD Collection president Kravchukwas form these powerswerenotguaranteed withinanewc their usewashinderedbythepr power, situationthatisanalyzedbelow. fragm fragm discip presidency ofLeonidKravchuk(1991-1994)was greatly disintegrated(W rely onastrongparliam integral (D'Anieri,2007b;174-186). dom provided simplifiedconditionsforthecreationof parties tod internal parliam parliam enough incentivestosmallpolitical regula electoral system attributed theundisciplinedch highly undisciplinedandtheref shifted alliancesduringtheparliam i nance ofsecreteparliam Although thefirstUkrainianpresidencywas Due tothelackofdisciplinedparliam The m e e lined tions intheUkrain ntation duringVictorYu nted parliam e nts werecom pro-pre i a vide intos jority andm throughwhichm e ntary regulationsduringthe e s iden nt didnotpreventPres p osed ofmultiplesm olczuk, 2001). e tia ian leg para i nority partiesduringthe e l gr ntary support.Th te sm e ally powerful,but ntary voting,thepa oup inparliam i ore, weak.InhisbookonUkrain shchenko’s presidency(2004- aracter ofparliam slatu esident’s lackofsupportinpa o all pa st partiestom r parliam e es. Hear ntary rliam e ident LeonidKuchm ntary a ll parties(D' m 83 e e gued thatm nts is whythehorizont a e 1990s providedhighincentivesforpolitical ntary f “withoutanewConstit ndate andtheinitial nt alsoexpl e onstitution. AsKataryna W m rge andhence,consolidate.Asaresult,the parliam were electedandtosom rty leaderscouldhardlykeeptheirparties e a ntary part dispersed. Thelackofadom other parliamentarym j granted withim o rity, theUkrainianpresidentscouldnot a c tion A e i xed electoralsystem ntary factions.Addingtothisthe ni s eri, 2007b;148-163).Also,the ains thehighlevelof , whilea 2010). Nevertheless,thehighly ies inU rliam a ( ian politics,PaulD’Anieri 1994-2004) toconcentrate e portant for parliam nt andbythef t al powerduringthe k thesam ution [thesepowers] raine tothem a e o ndates werealso specificinternal lczuk explained, e s didnotgive ntary groups m e tim al powers, i nant and power a e ct that they i xed CEU eTD Collection core ofahorizon in favoroftheexecutivebranch. were fluid,illdefinedandulti much intra-parliam could attractonhisside.Finall Also, therewerem could opposepresidentialappointmentdecisions legis balance therelativelystrongpresidentialpower after 1996hispositionstrengthenedalotdue pressing foraconstitu 1996. Forthis,hem undisciplined factionsinordertopushforth power arou econom for sixm m had agreatchallengerwithinth proposed bythepresident(Ryabchuk,1994; defected becauseoftheirunwillingnesstocarry was supportedbyform interpret [them]”( a naged toconvincetheparliam l atu During thef After Kuchm The 1998parliam ic decreesandwhichledtoanintra- r e therewas o nths, whichcontradi nd theexecutiveb ourth Ukrainianlegislature (2002 W a tally e a gainedthepresidentialseat ntary struggle,whichcontri olczuk, 2001; ny independentMPsinthe a n tio naged toattractnationalist concentratedpolitical o e e m n withstron r ntary electionscreatedalegi nom a jority coalition m y, duringthethirdUkrainianle enklatura inthe a tely dependedonparliam e executiv cted Kravchuk’spreviouslyes r e an nt togranth 115). Atthebeginningofhi ch. Heused g presidentialpowers(Wolczuk,2001;205-209).Hence, e br executive authoritycris th tothenewlyadoptedConstitution. 84 e adoptionofapro-pres im therighttolegislateoneconom 145). Moreover,by1992 at powerstartedtoweaken, duetothenew anch inprime-m parliam buted evenmoretoth couldoverridepresid o s andnationaldem newly electedparliam thehighlyfragm in 1994,hestartedtoconcentratepolitical u s. Thisisbecausein for theC -2006) presidentKuchm t anyoftheeconom slature withlittlepot e nt, butsoonm e nt, wh a gislature (1998-2002)therewas binet form s m i tablished authoritytoissue nister L ich hadanexclusiverightto a is (Bach,1996;219). ndate, presidentKravchuk o e crats tosupporthim idential cons e powerconcentration nted parliam ic orpoliticalrefor entia a e ny ofthesedeputies e ation anddism nt thatth thenewlyelected president K onid Kuchm a ential tocounter- l de ’ s positionatthe cr i c questions e presiden ees or titution in e r nt with avchuk a , who issal. tha m in s t t
CEU eTD Collection reform Yushchenko, thewinnerof“OrangeRevolu (D' the graduallossofhispolitical m m Bloc” –wonanim opposing thepresident–Viktor configuration offorces power hasnotchanged. This isbecause-the“P as prim authority ofpresidentYushchenkowasfurther m m the UnitedUkraineBlo supposed toconfrontaparliam at theendof2004. of thebargainingprocessduri weak (Christensenetal changes in Kuchm Yushchenko lostm e a a a jority. Also,afterthe“OrangeRevolution” ndate, theirpowerincreas in allyYuliyaTymoshenko,becauseofso mbers inanallian A nieri, 2005). Horizontal powergotfragm Af Moreover, untiltheparliam in2004thatwassupposedtoredu a e m ter the felthisweakeningpopularityinfavor thebalanceb i nister bytheUkrainianparliam 20 06 par u ch oftheappointm ce agains por c ., 2005).Thisinitiativeha intheparliam liam e , andtheUnitedSocialis tant num tween theexecutiv e ntary ng the“OrangeRevolution”betweenKuchm ed ev t presidentKuch Yushchenko’sBloc“OurUk e influence,withthepeakin2004“OrangeRevolution” nt inwhich ber ofm ele en m e e ntary elec nted inUk c tio e e nt. Inthe2002parliam o nt pow n re as e s the nt in2006. a e and ndate his politicalopponents 85 weakened afterhisdirectopponentwaselected of hism ma’s “m
situ president Yushchenkolost tions in2006presidentYushchenkowas arty ofRegions”thathas beenYushchenko’s ers thathispredecessorhad.Oncepresiden t Dem they ce presidentialfor
m s beensettledintoapoliticalreform legislative branchesthatm s (31%).Later,durin raine during tion”. Duetotheinitiatedconstitutional e ation withthehorizontal fragm “corruptionalleg m o a achin cratic Party-co a in opponentYushchenko,heinitiated naged to e politics”,whichcontributedto raine” and“YuliyaT thepresidencyofVictor e attra ntary electionstw – theCommunistParty, m a al c nstitu tions”. Thepolitical t theSoc g theparliam powers,president thesupportofhis a andYushchenko a ted anim de hisadversary y i e a m ntation of list Par o o blocs aspar portant shenko e ntary t y t t
CEU eTD Collection the in 1995). periods characterizedby supported bym with concentratedpower,inwhichpresidents Ukraine sincethedeclarationofindependencein hand withahighlyfragm Accordingly, itisinthese part supported thepresidentialinitia existence of and Moldova,theconcentratedpowerinUkra power wasconcentratedaroundthepresidencyof these adoption oftheConstitution political power. parliam strongest opponentsincethe“OrangeRevolution” fragm and the party form twoev According totheconsociationalisttheory, Table II.7illustratesthegene To sum ter-eth e ntation provokedapolitical Socialis e nt (April2007)andcall e Final Remarks: d n ahighlydisciplinedparliam ents intheUkrainian abig“CoalitionofNationalUnit ic peacebecauseitten up,thehorizontal a t pa jority ofMPsinparliam rties that e the existenceoffew,congruentand nt ed legislativebranch. together had53%ofparliam in 1996andsincethe“Orange icular periodsthatmore pronoun tives. InUkraine,theconcen for newelections,whichdidnot p ral dynam po o d crisisthatdeterm st-ind s tore litic e al powerin nt ona epen e du ntary 86 i cs ofpoliticalpow ce ethnicm ine aroundthepresident dence politicalhistory, with strongerorweakerfor y” againstthepresiden concentration ofpowerim Kuchm constant basis,orusingTsebelis’term thesecou party orblocthatwouldhaveconstantly wonasignificantm Ukraine ined th a e i . Com nt norities n ary m Revolution”in2004.B cohesive vetoplayers(T tries. Item tration ofpowerwenthandin ced signsforethnicminoritie p e presidentto w er inGeorgia,Moldovaand ared to resultinalessfragm ’ a a
ndates (Hesli,2007).This s fragm access topoliticalpower. the horizontalpolitical t withtheComm occurred withoutthe a phasizes theperiod the casesofGeorgia jo poses adangerfor rity ofseats.The m e nted beforethe al powerswere dissolve the sebelis, e tween e s, the unist nted s’ s
CEU eTD Collection Ukraine. determ mobilization
ine whetherthiswasind
1991 Table II.7.ThePeriodsw
C F agains r o 1992 a n
g c m en
e 1993 n tr M t th t a e t d ed
1994 e stateshoul
1995 Moldova andUkraine(1991-2008)
1996 GEORGIA M e d ed the
1997 i beobserv th Conc UK 1998 RAI cas 1999 NE entr 87 e e
2000 d. in thepost-SovietGe ated PoliticalPow Them 2001
2002 a in taskof 2003 MOL
2004 thefollowingchapteris D er inGeorgia, O GEORGIA
VA 2005
orgia, Moldova,and 2006
2007
2008 to CEU eTD Collection boundaries takes som ethnic politics.Thebroadestdefi unavoidably m For otherscholarsthe term used thetermincontextofanalyzingth scholars “ethnicm narrower andm engagem political organizationsm events cou m
power concentrationintheth analysis ofthedegreeinwhichethnicm mobilization m of powerconcentrationdescribedinChapter Georgia, MoldovaandUkrainebetween19912008tocom e easurem mbership.” (Olzak,1 The m The m The concep 3.1. EthnicPoliticalMobiliz e Chapter III e nt ofethnicgroupsinpr ent too a l inastate.From setofethnicm d becatego in goalofthischapteristodete agains eaning ofethnicm eans theengagem o t ofethn l re definedim s u obilization” n t s s ed t r ate au ized as“ethnicm 983; 357).Accordingto : EthnicMinori intheempiricalanal ic m eant a thispers rkers (skincolor,langu ree post-Sovietstates. doesnotnecessa thor obilization h eces to preserveorincreasetheethnicconsciousness, e plications than nitions ofethnicm obilizatio nt otest actionsandcivilconflicts. ities ineacho ation -Definitions ofethnicgroupsinsom sarily includ pectiv Concentr obili n inso e, et a s been e ethnicconflict,warandgenocide(1981;390). ti 88 rm ob zation”, rangingfrom h e thedefinitionm n ed thecom s ysis; then ine thedynam ilization can II. Forthis,Idiscussthedefinitionsand ation ic m rily im f this com ’ MobilizationandPower m theth
age, ter obilization refe wid e
academ obilization is“th andMeasurements e ly us ply high-scale
ree c r p Im ito e ponent ofconflict.Anthon rehensiv fo ed inthea beassociat r ic workshas ia r ountries. Iconcludewithan i m l identif easure thedegreeofethnic cs ofethnicm s ofclaim e r totheactivationofethnic ntioned above.Forsome p e d t ar h e e itwiththedyna e e form collectiv i cadem c finition, avarietyof civil unrest,butit ed em a tion : - beenused m a ation ofsocio- ic lite ) ascr king a pirically with obilizatio e actionth ratu iteria f c y Sm tivities with re on m n in i ith cs o at r
CEU eTD Collection studies thataim type of move which arevisiblem “the processofcreatingmove and thebehavioralcomponentsareim exclusive controlofanethnicgroup”(1999;298) construction im actions (2006;36). organizations orengagingingroupm in whichgroupm catego representation inpolitics.Inor policies oragainstthedom 36 2002). an ethnicm conflict (Gurr,1993;169). pursuit ofethnicgroup Finally, forotherscholars“ethn or hostilitydirectedagainst territorial s Th portant e e term m All thes For som Ethnic m 36 r res ized thelatteras e Inaddition,theethnicgroupscanm nt” (1996;186). o ve “n e arch que reig i l andactivationofpo nority group.Thefor em atio e generalandsp obilization canrefereith e nty e ent. ForTarasKuz scholar n d atexplain a (Hec list m stio e mbers arewillingtoengage ht o o n thatis vem er, s’ interes “ethnic solidarity”andspecifieditasbeingdeterm b s th ilizatio 2 0 e i 0 i ng eth nt ‘products’addr e organiza
nant groups,orin 0 s m der todistinguishthesetwot ecific ) t n . ate authoritiesoragains ic mobilization”m beingasked.T
” e litical organizationsand/orinstitu wasalso nt structuresandpreparinga t s, m n whichm ic m er isoften i definitions canbeanalytic o andDav portant. Diet er tothem onitoring tional com obiliza
u s ed 89 a to y orm h ti c o e broade on withf ordertoformanaggregateandcoherent a designates essed toactorsandpublicsoutsidethe i bili d Meye obilization ofa . Forotherscholarsboththeorganizational lled “n eans theform behaviors, butnotnecessarilyinprotest er Ruchtdefined“socialm p inethnicactivities,suchasjoining ze inordertoprotestagainststate-led onent of a y notbeaccompaniedbyprotes t an atio st def a r theethn c ypes ofm o t c nalis ors tha other group(Olzak,2006;36). i al nd carryingoutprotestactions i mobiliza nition ally usefuldependingonthe ation ofethnicm m t m m tion ovem t a ar jority eth obilization” (Be o s ic mobiliza s weregene bilization, SusanOlzak e thatare[…]underthe e rela nts tion thatm ined bythedegree tive constitu n obilization” as ic group,o l y co a ra tion ovem ke claim lly us is“ nstant in i ssinge tes e nts in ed in s an t or r for t of h r, e
CEU eTD Collection mobiliza research isabouttheimpact of mobilization grievan dem that ethn group” (200 claim which “ethn to politicizedem varies. W struc vary in because them that itsdefiningcom enough. Moreover,th structures m should directlyim virtue ofitsinnerlogic.Therefore,thedefi of thisthesisistodeterm definition groups’ identitystrengthandpoliticalawaren organizational structurecom tim e, suchasm a t nds forexpandedrights,and“reactivem s ures c Therefore, inthisthes -m acco ces agains ic mobilization tion aki h th at canvary,h a 6; 36).Thisdefinitionin ng, conflict, ic politicalmobiliza at Ichoos rdance withchangesinp eant tostrengthen canbetarg agains n beresis a in enquirythis a nds. t stateauthorities(2004;667 odernization o t thestateareana ply aconflictelem e definitionof e form p t ant intim onent iseas can o orhostilitydirected eted agains wever, ism ine whetherpower include “proactivemove ponent is y IuseOlzak’sdefi thesis the “ethnicsolidarity”,suchas tion statepoweronethnic m thesisassum r e, nom g were usedinsociologicalresear ethnicm ily changeab im t thestat l l corporates resu yzed. i obalization o norities’ abil wer conc plies thatan[ethnic]groupengagesinsom ent, wh a lts tte nition of“ethnicm fr concentrationisconduc r howm e o 90 o e om bilization relevantforthis s thatthed o ). entration. On the conflictelem agains ess (Kuzio&Meyer,1999).Sim (Olzak,1 ich im vem r Olzak’s le intim agains theenquiryofth nitio ity tore m e u nts”, inwhichgroupm t astateautho n e ch t ofethnicmobiliza nts”, inwhichgroupm plies thathavingonlym t ano definitionalso act tos e e h o g . Thislas 983). Definitionsb e degreeo bili r ce form ee of“ethn t her ethnicgroup.Becausemy culturalorganizations,isnot obilization” onwhichIfocus zation, onlytheinstances of ent. Olzakfurtherelaborated t ate po is research. ch, suchastheanalysisof ed, theethn ive toethnictensionby r t ity oragains elem f powerconcentration lic i thesisshou im c m ies, ortheirab tion ent isnecessary plies thatethn obilization” can e e Them m , m accordingto ic m a b b sed ers express er obi ilarly, the e t another s express for onthe ovem ld im a lization in goal m ility ply e of nt ic
CEU eTD Collection the otherwithregio 1993 Georgiaexperiencedtwoseces half ofthe1 Abkhazians intheNorth concentration indifferentpartsofthecoun of ethnicm Georgians constitu officially recognizedandthat the higheststandsforcivilwar(Annex5). from organization oflarge-scalem m to 5:thesmallest(1)is which Ius schem retain thein com protes “communal politicalaction”:thefi 169). Hem mobilization a nifested throughactionssuchaspetitioningan b 0to7:thesm ines scalingwithc By thetim For thepu t”, an e reduceditto e intheem 3.2. EthnicMinorities d thethird-for“rebellion”.The i for 990s theeth isth norities (5-8 easured thelevelofethnicm m e SovietUnioncollapsed,therewe ation onthenatureofet rposes ofthisthes e oneelaboratedb ted 7 allest (1)standsforsporad two pirical analy attributedto 0 n a n %, whileArm scales,onem east, andOs of % each tegor ic com Ossetians. Sinceth a constituted m iza ss de position of ). T tio s ’ Mobiliz is instances monstrations n, whichallowstoaggr rst isfor“non-violentacti sionist conflicts–onewith h below.Th y setians in ere weref TeddGu e is them easuri nians, Ru hnic mobilization.Theupdated o Georgia chang atio re than1%out ng “protes ofdeclara 91 o theNorth(Annex2Map1).Duringfirst bili ic e scoresformeasuring en, Georgiangovernm advantage o n inPost-So try: Arm . Thescoresform our ethn o rr fortheM politica ssians, andAzerisformedthebiggestgroups st suitab d agitations;thehighestisattributedto zation byusingthreeparallelscalesof re eightethnicgroupsin t tive oppositio ” and ic g l e ba e nians andA l d considerably egate da e m of thetotalpopulation(Annex1). f v theo r nditry Gurr’sm i oups with iet Georgia: norities atRiskproject(1993 on”, thesecond-for“violent the region easurem t ta easurin her measuring ta a n againstthestatethatis rgeted again “protest”rang e nd atth nt neversucceededin significan easurem Gurr’sm zeris ent toolforethn . Between1 ofAbkhaziansand g “rebellion Georgiathatw in e sa ent isthatit th “rebellion”, s easurem t territorial m t thesta e South, e e from 990 and tim ” range e ent e to t 0 re ic e ; ;
CEU eTD Collection m population protestedthroughsym organized before1991(Toft,2003;94). violent m jurisdiction ofGeorgiaandsake Before 1991,Abkhazianleadershiphadalr greater culturalopenness,Abkh By 1985,whenMikhailGorbachevinitiatedth The ethn the NorthwesternpartofGeorgia.Theregion guerillas andcivilwars. The expressionofde reactions to specific foreachm author towards thepoliticalprocessesatbeginn groups constitutingm conditions. Therefore,bythetim part ofRussian,Greek,andUkrainianm its effortstocontrolthetwo a ss demonstra The datainMinoritiesatRisk(MAR) The Abkhazianethnicgroupism The ethnicm 3.2.1. Abkhazians: ities’ positionv ic mobilization a s wards perceiveddisc s dem tions and onstrations ofAbkhazians i norities inGeorgiareacteddiffe i nority grou o i mands alsotookdifferent re than1%of s- ofAbkh à-vis e riots.Atth territories. Inaddition,atthebeginningof1990saconsiderable t azians startedtoclaim hnic m azians s rim p anditslead e ofthe2002p th b olic resistan thetotalpopulat i e e statu nation, toclaim sam a i inly concentr norities. t arted p i norities e tim s of 92 had autonom eady lobbiedMoscowforrem e ce, whichevolvedin1992and1993s asepara r ership, th with dem Dependingonam ing oftransition,and , thedatarev ior to opulation censustherewereonlyfourethni database indicatethatby1991Abkhazian e reform for left thecountryduetoworsenedliving s ion (Annex1). ated intheregionof rently towardsGeorgia’sindepende forterrito Georgia’ m m s, rangingfromli te r o e dem a ous statusdur re s foreconom nds forindependencew e cultural andpoliticalautonom eal theoccu public withinUSSR.Thef s a declarationofindependence. rial auto nds rangedfrom u ltitu ing theSovietUnion. also towardscentral nom Abkhazialocatedin i de of rrence ofacivilwar c restructuringand m y ited proteststo andsecession charac oval from collectiv e ter re also i m stic the nce, i all rst y. c e s .
CEU eTD Collection the ethnicmobilization the processofm population (MAR,2008).Nevertheless,thelocal adm most im Aydgylara lasted foralmosttwoyears. it, theAbkh Soviet SocialistRepubliconthebasisofasp This ConstitutiondescribedAbkhaziaasindepe claim im Abkhazian andGeorgianleadershipcouldnotagreeontheconstitutionalreform
mobiliza between 19 ple s In 1991,thesituationinAbkhaziawascalm The m m
forindependencebyadoptingaresolutiontoresto degree of protest ented intheautonom portant organizationsth 0 1 2 3 4 5 tion form 92 and1993,whichconstitu a azian e m ss mobilization easurem ed in1989and obilization, duetothedirect acc 19 lite’s Graph III.1 91 ent schem inAbkhazianregion conf ous region.InJuly was f lict withtheGeor at managedtosecureahigh Union ofAbkhazianPeople . e PoliticalMobiliz (GraphIII.1 acilit ated bythee 19 92 tes thehi 93 ecial UnionTreaty”(Cornell,2002).Soonafter ) 1992theAbkhazianleadershipreinforcedits
. ndent republic,but“unitedwiththeGeorgian g ess tolocalcoerciveforces. Them
was toob i e an centralpowerescalatedin r than ation ofAbkhaz x ghest levelofrebellionintheethnic isten i nistrative elitehadth inthepreviousyears,butstilltense. r e th ce of f tain indepen level ofsupportam 19 o e 1925AbkhazianConstitu rm 93 localpolitica ed in1991wereamongthe ians d ence v 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 e greatestrolein l organizatio degree of rebellion to awarthat ong thelocal i s-à-vis the a R Pr in goalof e o b s t e e tobe l s lio t tion n n s. .
CEU eTD Collection which theyvoiceddem independence vis-à-visGeorgia.Os reform more culturalandpoliticalau Soviet Unio in theNorthernpartofcountry.Theregi war endedwithanofficialceas Georgian governm responded totheSouthOssetia’s 2008). Theeruptionofanarm paralleled b protested atarelativelyhighlevel,through
The Ossetia The MinoritiesatRisk(MAR)databasein degree of protest 3.2.2. Ossetians: . Between1988and1989,theOssetian 0 1 2 3 4 5 y n. Sim rebe n m llion a ilarly withth e nt, whichwas i nority ism Graph III.2 a 1991 nds forte c tions tha tonomy in1985,whenGorbachev efire. e e Ab d c o declarationofsovereignty rritorial independence. t stly concentr . e de facto PoliticalMobiliz onflict took v khazian setian popul entually achievedinDecember m ons hadterritorialautonomousstatusduringthe 94 evolved inlarge-scalegu ated organized demonstrations i
no dicates thatbetwee place aftertheGeorgiancentralgovernm ation alsomobilizedf rity, inthereg leaders lobbiedMoscowforterritorial 1992 ation ofOsse Ossetiansstarted in August1990byabolishing the i on c a tia 1993, whentheA n 1991and1992Ossetians lled SouthOssetia,loc initiated theliberalization n s 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 erilla to voicedemandsfor o , ralliesandstrikes, r m
activitie degree of rebellion a ss protests, Pr R e o b t e e bkhazian s lli s (MAR, t o n a in e te nt d
CEU eTD Collection the po mom considered tobethethirdregionofcountry Arm 38 37 explains toacertainextentthefact In 1990s,asignificantpartofArm population inGeorgiaandthereforefor terr cease-fire signedinJun im adm organization whichhadahighlevelofpopularity organizations. By1988the alm status of population inGeorgiaisspreadseveralpart (Akhalkalaki andNinotsm in theSou and intheregionofAbkhazia.Nevertheless,th Issue po Po A p portant roleinthee u ito n o l s i pul o e a st 2years(GraphIII.2). nistrative elitewhohadcontroloverthe inGe e t The SouthernregionofGeor According tothe1989populationcensus, The politic t nians of 3.2.3. Armenians: ry. h nts oftransition,thelocal i lic on co at e r i se ies ex o or n C t u p of parate adm hern reg gia. l l d an e thisreg centra ns n atio o us Dat t be al m n ist c i o l on i au a u o obilization inSouthOssetia h , i n c e f n s of nistr t cala e m e thoritie o d du a 1992,theGeorgiance m ct th thecou obilized politica inda) wherem p a tion of i tive en ri l
e at aco n d and g s. An Ademon Nykhas
t population andlocalleadersm h e 2 e that by2002theyconstituted5.7%(A theconf n nsid tity th nian populat p try, where gia whereArmeniansareterrito 0 analy r 0 o 2 v er m ge i d ab ed the e at the neral d le p o lly s at re is lict withGeorgiancentralauthor 95 a ofAr than90%ofpopulationisArm aut af
e mostim r there ce s ofthecountry,notablyinbiggestcities t terr greatest ethnicm ofA with potentialforethnic ter Georgia’sdeclarationofindependence. ion em nsu (OssetianPopularFront)wasfor local reso h ntral governm o intheregion.Howe r’s s m itory ha r . Ar are m was alsofacilitatedby
re e e nians’ political m igrated toAr n que port i e twoterr an nians constituted8.1%ofthetotal st popu urces andwhoplayedthem d. Theviole by a nt geograp t latio a e h i nifested discontentvis-à-vis nt lostitscontrolo nority groupinthecountry. e E itor n m liv u m r i e o al-adm rially nia andRussia,which es i pe hical con conflict.Indifferent n obilization dynam ver, itwasthelocal nnex 1). an C t conf n A concentrated inistr bkh localpo e ities. Af nt lict lastedf re f e azia, 37 cen nian. ative Arm o r tration is w M v h 38 ter th er th units er litical i e The nori m nian e th ed, is o i c o st t e e y s e r
CEU eTD Collection central pow representative ofcentralauth Javakh region, becausetheproposedcandidatesdidnot haveArm leadership refusedtoacceptGeorgianpresident’ sym for protestsagainstcen autonom local “natio as m 40 39 Octob actions, notablyatthebeginningof between 1991and2008revealsthatthegroupwas Au Au bolic resistan tho t a h e Arm During thef
in goa degree of protest r 200 or’s i thathadlocaladm r ’s i y fortheregion.(Guretski,1998). 0 1 2 3 4 5 e 8, n n nians’ politica terv terv nal” ins l thepreservationofArm Akh er. Thelocalleadershipcreate 1991 iew iew a
lk 1992 ce. So with with i alak rst year titu 1993 Graph III.3 Mi i MihailKo tions, thelearningofAr tral authorities,whichw m 1994 hail Ko l e m i s of spor nistra 1995 obilizat
orities, theregionwasvirtua
lik 1996 Georgia’sindependenc lik adic violentincidentsalsoo tive leadersam id y id . e 1997 PoliticalMobiliz i i, chairm a . 1990s andaftertheRoseRevolution.
r ion s s 1998 - e d nian culturalheritageandde
yna 1999 t arted an
m 2000 o i c 96 f s d aself-governingbody with Fo
me 2001 ong itsm a s representatives(pref ru s m nian his 2002 m th ation ofArmenians involved bothinprotes forC a 2003 e creation nife e, theArm
e 2004 i t vi sted throughverbaloppositionand m ory inlocalschools,andterritorial lly beyondthejurisdictionof c I
b 2005 ccurred. Mostnotably,thelocal ers. n e t e nian nationality. 2006 grat of 39 e alocalorganizationcalled Theorg
nian lead 2007 i m o n i
a 2008 ects) appointedforthe nded theprotectionof n
–theCouncilof Ak 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a hal t andinrebellion nization d ers degree of rebellion k al h 40 aki ip m W , Ge R Pr i obilized e thout o e o b t clared r e e gi llio s t a, i
n a n
CEU eTD Collection within afederalorconf concentration ofAr Virk re-appeared theregion.Thisoccurr
with Arm alre signatu terr autonom with aregio adm 1995 therewereprotestsm ethnic issu into relativelylargem h 42 41 proposed anewprefectfrom Representatives –thatgovernedtheregion Shevarnadze m of verbalo rem Octob However, inrelationtothesedem population opposedbecausethem ttp Ge In ://www.cacian ito terv ady-es a i –addressedthecentralgovernm or ined virtuallyindependentfrom nistrative reform e After severalyearsofrelative In thesecircum r 200 ria gi iew res andaddressedapetition a’s y werevoicedagain.In1997thesedema l ad e ta 8, with nians’ dem es, butbyth A n blished pposition andsym Akh m withm r m Rafik i nistrativ a e a a lyst.o ni naged toestablishsom lk an com alak te Melkumian m rg a stances, politic e a i. t jority of rr a / nians eitherafor nds. ? ss e h itorial- e closu q=n unitf m ederal Georgia. at aim de uni o d m t e y ,
fo ethnicGeorgian onstrations. Thesedem /174 a a adm p o r e nifested within e of boli r the m rm d atunifying r o 0 o ong thelocalelite. p i er ad
ed whentheleaderofalocal nstra nistrative divisionofGeor o c theRussian silence,in2003s a se thecentre. tothecentr resistan region, l ilitary bas m s t e m nt withtherequesttogran m e tions th i o 42 a n degree al stat l bilization of i k In2005,politicalm strato s f on until Nove 97 ce o s. Duringtheseprotests, the regionw us ofautonomy,orthestatusfederativeunit r ov e leadersofonelocalleadingorganizations r whichlocaleliteso until1997 e st m the localparliam
at of controloverthere al governm er was an nds werereducedtoaskingforaseparate us ( ilitary baseinthe Akh onstrations werenotprim 41 Arm i b gns ofethn However,even y a m
lk 12/ importantemploym b alak e er 1991,whe ith m , evenafterGeorgianpresiden nians wasm 09/ e i Electro gia wasneverchangedinline nt (Gurets 20 obilization processesevolved unregisteredpoliticalparty– 0 a 3 jority ofethnicAr t theregionwith ic politicalm e i nt s en r s region, which ganized acollectiono u dem erg against theGeorgian e gion. Forinstance,in afterthattheregio a n k of intained atthele y thecentralpower i, 1998).Still,the Serv t a nds forterritorial h e C arily causedby ice, con e obilization nt provid A C territorial thelocal I
m d A u e n c nians al ted y vel in s e i t r. n ), n f t
CEU eTD Collection the landdistribution,but not territorial concentrati Shevardnad were expressedonlythroughs and abouttheGeorgiannationalism independence, duringwhichpeoplewerevoici authorities. Massdem trans of AzeripopulationinG extent duringthetransitionperiod.The2002populat is Azeri.C with Azerbaijan–Marneu country inaruralregion,wher organized by2006asw central authorities population, butalsom - the secondlargestm mobiliza representation inthestateinst autonom United Javakh i tion (G The Azerim By 1989,theGeorgiaAzerisconstituted6% 3.2.4. Azeris: y, t tion o ze’s p h intheregio raph III.4 m e useofAr p ared tootherm -claim r i es (Lohm, 2007;40).Som norities mobilizedle i idency, therew on, exceptsm nority groupinthecountry.Mo ) onstrations . Attheendo o e re self-governingrights e n ll. Inthes orgia ch graduallydecrea li, BolnisiandDm m e d moreculturalandlinguis e nian inlocalpublic m about ethnicityrelated issues e therearethreeadm itutions (ICG,2006;3).Nevert i nority groups all-group m anged verylittle(Annex1). with an e dem all-group occasionalgather . However, e f re noim 1980s,Azeris ss thanthe onstrations participants ethn sed. e s anisi –inwhic eeti 98 m port between1991and1992Azer ic characterwere in Georgia,theAzerisem aller scale fortheregion,duringnegotiationswith ng concernsabouttheethnicdiscrim ngs supportingdifferentlocalelites.During an adm Arm of thetotalpopulati engaged t pro ion censusdatarevelthatthepercentage st Azerisliveinthe i nistrative i e nistration, aswellm nian comm t tic rightsforGeor est actionsinthereg dem h morethan65%ofthepopulation inp . Neitherafterthe2003 Rose ings expressingconcernsabout onstrations intheregionwere voiced dem organizedpriortoGeorgian territorial unitsattheborder heless, afterthattheethnic r otest actions unity duringthepe on andhencefor Southern partofthe igrated atalesse a is’ protestactions nds for gia’s Ar again i on withAzeri o re political territorial s t central m i riod of nation e nian m ed r
CEU eTD Collection nationalist organizations cultural rightsandthecommunityfrom ethnic organization,called organization washighlyfragm its m security forAzericitizensfrom 44 43 17). existed upuntil2008focusedonGeorgianlangu of com concentratio Revolution wasthereanyethnicall M leaders. A Au u peopletoprotec st u p afae
t degree of protest t h h act settlem At thebeginningof1990s,Azerisha a or or’s in in leadershavebeenco-optedbyth 0 1 2 3 4 5 44 v ( ’s i After2000,severalorganizationshaveb v n i t c e terv
1991 n. e-m r v 43 i e iews in 1992 a ws e y nt, butnoneofthemdeveloped o wi r of 1993 t the t
h M Oct
Fai 1994 Graph III.4 a localin . Between1992and1994, rne o
t 1995 M b e u Geyrat r, l a i
m 1996 )
20 ; Iz m e localcrim 08 nt edov,
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ed andcontainedthreediffere . Theorganizationhadasprim re y-driven p with ru 1998 . sts orth PoliticalMobiliz d Fi Qu : FaitMa
zul 1999 rb i M inal groups.By1995 bei
an 2000 u e o 99 r st v
2001 o e centralpower.Bytheendof1990s comm (c mmed afa ng forcedoutofthecountrybyGeorgian t d ahighlypopularand est a ag a capabilitytom o-
e 2002 v a e training, fo o u een registeredinth c unity’s interests.T n v Geyrat 2003 nde tion inthereg d
ation ofAz (professor in Iz
r 2004 um of G rud hadtheroleofprovidinglocal 2005 civicandeducation(ICG,2006; e y Qu r 2006 at Geyrat or rb nt factionswithco obilize
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an 2007 ga i on i o ni v
v 2008 ersit . zat withAzeriterr startedtod h well supportedlocal al topro e regionwithAzeri 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 m e organizationsthat i o y o n o re thanahandful ) .
f degree of rebellion Marn t ect Azeris’ eu R Pr eclin e o mpeting li); Fizu b t e e ito l s lio t e, as n ria li l
CEU eTD Collection concentration intheNorth,Sout were alsospreadthroughoutthecountry,a the urbanareasofcountry,bu ethnic m Moldovans constituted65%,whileUkrainians in Moldova, mobilize thelocalpopulation, Transdniestrian status oftheonlyofficial la reaction ofnon-m ethnic groupsm Gagauzia intheSouthernpartofMoldova between 199 ethnic m succeeded initsattem and escalatedinacivilwa Ukrainian of Moldova,whereaccordingtothe1989census beginning of1990s.Themostnotablewastheconf com two significantlysm p act settlem By thetim The conflictwithTransd Sim 3.3.EthnicMinorities 3.3.1. SlavsinTransdniestria: i obilization againstcen norities (14%and13% ilar toGeorgia,Moldovaexperiencedinte andRussian.Theconflictwasm eachconstitutingm 0 and1994,whichended obilized atalesserextent. e e SovietUnioncollapsedtherewere nt intheSouth(Annex2Map2). a jority groups aller ethnicgroupsin p ts toestablishcont ’ Mobiliz nguage intheMoldovan SovietRepublic.Intheirattem r in1992,afterwhichMoldova niestria hadanethni tral governm h, andintheregionofTransdni to the1989languagelegislation t werenotconcentratedina respectively; Annex1).Most o re than1% intheform ation inPost-So a ro inly 100 Moldova –GagauziansandBulgarianswith (A e l overtheregion.Anothernoteworthy nt wastheoneledbyGagauzianleadersh nnex 2Map3).Asshownbelow,theother of thetotalpopulation.Them leaders claim and Russiansform lthough theyfor driven a c d tion oftheAutonom lict withT rnal conflictswithet m fiveofficiallyr i m o bylocalelites v re thanhalfoflocalpopulationwas e iet Mo nsion becauseits r ny particularregion.Ukrainians e ansdniestria, theEasternregion d toactinthenameof non- ldov n centralgovernmentnever Russians havebeenlivingin estria. Therehavebeenalso that grantedRom m ed thebiggestgroupsof a: ed oasesofterritorial ecognized ethnicgroups ’ dem o us Terrtito hnic characteratthe t a r a ted asanegative nd for a jority ethnic rial Unitof secess a caseof nian the p t to i on ip
CEU eTD Collection 427-464). that thelocalleadership in declared thatth 1991, priortoMoldova’sdeclar the organizationofSovietMoldovanparliam paralleled Moldova’sdeclarationofsovereignt 1990, theTransdniestrianleaders in Transdniestriawhereitwa have asm
continued duringthefirsttr mobiliza by thelocalgroupof authors ofMinoritiesatRiskpr one singleethnicm Moldovan ethnicgroupslivingthere.Them
degree of protest As inthecaseofothersecessionistconfli 0 1 2 3 4 5 tion a in goaltheprotectionofRussians of Graph III.5 SlavsinTransdnies e en terp i nority, butbylocalUkrain Slavs 1 rises intheregionwoul 991 (MAR,2008). . ansition years.In1989the PoliticalMobiliz tended tocreatetheirown st s veryactiveinm oject describedthiscaseofet declared thecreationof ation ofindependence,the tr ia sta r ted be 101 e ation ofSlavsinTransdniestria living inMoldova,organi ntar y. Laterinthesam d nolongercontribute ians, RussiansandrussifiedMoldovans.The obilizing thelocalpopu f o y electionsontheterrito cts inf obilization re Moldov Edinstvo 19 92 ate bankingsystem o rm hnic m inthisregio Dniester So a decla er SovietUnion m ove Transdniestrian parliam e obilization asbeingdriven ye r m ed itsindepende ar, theyalsoboycotted to thes e zed regionalbranches nt, whichdeclaredto lation. InSeptem viet Repub n ry oftheregion.In 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 wasnotdrivenb (Snegur,2008; t ate bu ,
thepo degree of rebellion R Pr lic e dget and o be nce and , which t e litic l s l i t on ber e nt al y
CEU eTD Collection authorities acceptedto security (Snegur,2008;342-353).In1993,the conflictstartedtoattenuateandGagauzian public dem seeking with thecentralgovern independence oftheterritoryvis-à-viscentral situation withMoldovancentralau and theintensiontorem declared thesecessionofGagauzianterrito with com beyond thecontrolofcentral (MAR, 2008). 45 (Graph III.5 Transdniestrian Slavs’highlevelofrebellionwa Movement their control,whilethef 1992. Aftertheceasefire,Moldova activ resis rioting (Snegur,2008;428,460,466).By1991,thepr DatainGrap t ity andlater,toagenuine anc During thefirstyearsofMo During the Gagauzian m 3.3.2. Gagauzians: sup e p . Atthesametim wasform a o c port f ) nstrations andalsowithseveralvi h III.5 t Gagauziansettlem . 45 Thelocalpopulationmobili f are r om i nority startedtomob ed andwhenitsleadershipdecl i rst two b Transdnie a sed on o m negotia rm e a nt, bytryingtocreateani in withinSoviet al status Mino e, the yearsaf
m e ilitary cam s rities nt. Moretens te aterritorialautonom governm tr levelof n authoritiesneverm ia oftheregionrem ldova’s independence,Gagauz thor n autho at Risk ter Moldov ities, whonullified paign, whichendedw e ilize politicallyin re zed s’ nt. Thelocalelites r 102 Union.TheDeclarationprovokedaconflict itie scores. olent clashesbetweenlocalpopulationandstate authorities, bybreaking ions arosein1990,when b forfrequen ri e s. These es fromthethenMoldo llion wasincreas s paralleledwitham ared theautonom a’s declarationofindependencethe a ins unresolved. a ndependent bankingsystem,andby otest levelwasreducedtosym naged to ac t ous m itand tions wer a 1989whenthe ss de attem status withtheMoldovan ith aceasefires bringbacktheregionunder ed to outlawedthe ian regionwasvirtually m ous statusfortheregion p e o the econom i p ted toconsolidatethe nstrations, ddle levelofprotests Gagauzian leadership sm v a an SovietRepublic ralleled withlo all scaleguerilla i gned strikesan ic relations Gagauzian Movement inJuly bolic cal d
CEU eTD Collection (MAR, 2008).In1998 popular regim Communists andGagauziaPeople’sParty character ofcertainprovisions One ofthereasonsforperpetualpolitical dem adoption inDecem governm 2007). Bytheendof sporadic pu from consequence, underlyingtensionsbetweentheGa of decision-m Law didnotspecifythedetailsontaxationand
a ti nds towardscentr
degree of protest
m
After this e 0 1 2 3 4 5 e nt. Afterm totim blic actions, a
e 1991 king authoritiesbetw " whichim legals
e, throughoccasionalnon-co 1992 ber 1994oftheLawonth
1993 o som re thanoneyearofne al author Graph III.6 1997agroupof politicals e 1994 ttlem e posed toughcensorshi
tensionsalso 1995 inthe1994LawonSpecialLe e itie nt, theGagauz 1996
s inthena 1997 . t een central PoliticalMobiliz atem 1998 ents, aros 1999 –arguedthattheregi e SpecialLegalStatusofGagauzia. 103 opposition m me oftheGa 2000 gotiations theconflictwassettledthrough ian leadershipnev e whentheMoldovanS andregionalpowers(Järve,2008;317).Asa or sym on otherfinancialm mpliance withnationallegislation, obilization intheregionwasambiguous 2001 gauzian andthecentralauthoritiessurfaced p lawstopreventany ethnic dissidence 2002 bolic gestures(Protsyk&Rigam ation ofGagauz partiesintheautonom 2003
gauzian community(GraphIII.6). 2004 2005 e gal StatusofGagauzia.The r ceas 2006 on wasrunbyan"anti- a tte
uprem 2007 i ans ed en rs, oronthedivision 2008 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 e Courtnu tirely toexp
y – degree of rebellion Pr R through e o Vatan be llified t e onti, l s r l i t es on
s ,
CEU eTD Collection Novem custom national holidays,toappointanam governm budget fornotallocatingenoughresourcestoth greater f 47 46 power wascriticized. region, arguingthatitwasnotinlinewith the decis candidate throughapublicre recen Moldovan centralpoweroccurred. After thesedeclarationsanddecis in caseofhisparty’svictoryFebruary to theunsatisfiedprom own statestructures.Later, the Gagauzianauthor if Moldovan 2001. Duringalocalpubliccelebration,thespeake control overtheborderservicesinregion Gagauzians com Mol Ga Gaga d ov gauzi tly electedcen Gagauzian leaderscontinuedtom In 2000,Gagauzianleadersalsom In 2002them b a Azi uzi er 2000.Online: s alongtheterritorialborde i e a nan i a on i nt: tostopthevalidityofMoldovan re , s 16 i ofGagauzianlegislativ authoritiesfailto do c v N e ial autono ndi rest o v p ca e lained onthereducedcontro e p m aut b o r h itie er tral governm st pronouncedinstanceoftens op ttp o 20 Them is my f n ri ://www.azi.m s willr o es ofMoldovanpresidentthattim ul 00 m ser i . e r On fi om
v adju the localauthoritiestookseve ferendum i nanci lin eac c a thecentr i in subjectofcr u e: i va on tivate th r oftheautonom st thenationallegislation e bassador in T http://www a d nt toreplace ra / s, m h e bodyto n e conflictualsituationwas m e a central authorities’reactionfollow ws l
. Thisprovokedanegativereactionfrom a a [G al au ? xim ke political Moldo a I e 199 a D=979 de public gau 2001 parliam a .azi. 104
th [ T zia wa holdareferendum G l overthelocalrevenuesandaskedform 0 decla orities m 46 r laws intheautonom aga 1 v ansdniestria, andtoestablishGagauzianown e regionandinlinewiththis,dem d/news . Theyalsocriticizedthe2000Moldovan thegovernorofGagauziawithaloyal , accesse an Constitu itique y. Theseactio r oftheautonom uzi n statem statem ions betweenGagauzianleadershipand t s itso 47 a r asks ? wastheloca . atio I d D= e on 30Ja ntary elections(Botan,2007;13). w n of 98 ents withconf to accomm ents inwhichMoldovancentral n Bo f o tion. (J 7 e r 8 tosupportGagauzianleaders independenceandse ral decisionsagainstcentral , accessedon Maxi a resultoftheattemptby rd nuary, ns wereallege er Service onaConstitu ärve, 2008;319). mal y’s legi y, toignoreMoldova’s 2010. odate Gagauzianlaws, l Fi e financial resources. d. na lic ] 30 Ja slature statedthat , i nci
tual cha n a
nua Mo l dly areaction Aut tion ldo ry, 2010. thelocal o t upthe v r n a forthe a A ac o nded a my ter in z i ] , 1 o , in re i 6 r
CEU eTD Collection leadership tochangeth pointed tothelackofpoliticalrepresenta enough theGagauzianleadersh being assimilatedasatthebe ethnic m an appealaddressedtoMoldova h 49 h 48 and notthroughpopularelections accord Gagauzia” faction inthelocallegisl state au authorities (Järve,2008). through the2002anticipatedelections.Thisaliena held, thecentralgovernm adm more politicalrepresentation,fortheallowance “United Gagauzia” Mo com co Moldovan authorities’initiativ interests. In2005themove leaders consideredthatMoldovancentralau ttp ttp Apel Miscarea"E m vemen ://www.azi ://www.azi m u i n uni nistration andthescissionoflocal In 2008Gag The 2002tensionspushedthem i ul sti in ing to st thorities t m t i s nority, inwhichitwasnotedthatGagauz i ' mi scarii "EdinaiaGa au o . Since2003thism th .m .m whichthegovernorofautono dinaia Ga ton d d e Au sdee / / o ’ n n “interferenceinthelocal m e e ws ws a ie ds uzian po tho ? ? [ i organized intheregionsam I I gauzia" achem T D=4 D=3 r he Uni it e attit n ies o ative branchandbyconsolid t gauzia" catrec 848 571 e nt managedtoreplac litical m t h 1 4 m e f e , accesse , accesse
ude towardtheethnicm d Repu ove ginning of1990sandthatthecen e ip to e tomodifythe1994Lawonth Ga nt aut 48 n centralauthoritie m g at com appealed tothehelpofinternationalcommunitystop . a preserveth e blic o on obilization in u nt tooktherole d d z o i o o on 1Fe on 31J a nducerea Re m st influentiallo Move y unitatea inte f ] Mo , in au tion withincentralpow a bruary, 2010. parliam me 105 nuary, 2010. ton l d thorities actedagainstGagauziaautonom e
nt my ova of regionalpoliticalpa e theGagauziangovernorwithitscandidate o community’s ethn ap publicii Moldova creased further. Mol m ] rn was tobeelectedb pe , y in ted partoflocallead e of raisingpublicawarenesseverytim ians continuedtofacethesam ation ’s affairs”,bysupp s inthenam dov nt. Althoughthereferendum al ating theoppositionm cal forcesofGagauziatouniteagainst i ed t
e norities a
Mol a Azi year, protestersvoiceddemandsfor la sapu o t d h ova Azi e i , 25Au 49 [ n T . Duringam e LegalStatusofGagauzia, t n “ tral authoritiesdidnothelp e he Appe a rnat e U ic identity.Theap cap ofthewholeGagauzian nited Gagauzia” , 11Mar er andurgedMoldovan i o at rties’ creation,andfor y n al a thelocalparliam orting farad l gu ership from
com of st "E ove e c a m theo leg h di ss protestthat uni m 2 n 005 ilo 2 a e 008. On t wasnever i nt y a r co t e .
ppositio G
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CEU eTD Collection were toberegroupedinnine reorganization oftheexistingte were m h 50 Tran clearer divisionbetweenth transition periodBulgarianshaveneverbeen in an Communists one yearbeforeMoldovanparliam described below. population andaddressde the adm ttp Man ://www.azi fo
degree of protest adm In 1998theMoldovanparliam The Bulgar rma i 3.3.3. Bulgarians: festan 0 1 2 3 4 5 eant toputinplaceaprocessofterrito i nistrative eliteo tio i nistra n o tii d .m 1991 lostitsab d f i th n / n tive Gag 1992 ians in e ws e Territo
1993 unitcalled ? a Graph III.7 I u D=5 z so ia certran
1994 Mold lute m f 024 the ria
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new 1996 a sform Tarac jority inthelegislatu rritorial units.The37unitscr tonom .
1997 PoliticalMobiliz regionswithm e a com d rea UTAin nt adoptednew 1998 lia y in on 31J e 1999 ntary elec (Annex 2Map3 to p actly a
a 2000 106 nuary, 2010. Rep politically m repu
2001 se rial decentralization.Th wers horities occurredin1 ian m u tions, asresultofwhichtheParty ttle b b 2002 lic ation ofBulgarians lica o r 50 e. laws onlocalpublicadm re deci d ] . Thisprocessofmobilizationoccurred
2003 intheSou a , in [ jority attem T ) he De 2004 . G
o Mol bilized. Thes sion-m
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nst 2006 t a Azi hern reg a p r at king andfinanciallocal 2007 ted to 7 ors i sh , 2 999. Thesituationis
ese lawsimpliedth 2008 i ows thatduringth n 1 ngle caseinwhich m i Ga Ju 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 on obilize th of ga ly 2008 i nistration that uzi
degree of rebellion thecoun a R Pr
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CEU eTD Collection notably RussiansandU “Unity” Mo adm state au 51 m of politicalm unit. Thisco powers. Thisprocessrequi country organiz Moldovan Ukrainiansasadist outweighed bythatofnum num Moldova (R transf Electo Moldovan localelections local authoritiescontinuedto authorities reactedbyd for elite’sinitiatedpro adm which peoplewereaskedwhethertheyfor Mitu a nifested throughtheorganizationby i i e nistrative unit.Eightypercentoflocal nistrative unit,bytheend rically thebiggestethnicm The UkrainiansofMoldovawerethel orm 3.3.4. UkrainiansandRussiansoutsideTransdniestria: l u ] r , in al Comm a thorities tion n thef u
Tara i no adu, 2000). vement s nstitu . Atthesam u , C obilization ag con o ’ h ission forestab initia rm isin ted the f thatclaim lict etnicin er territor au , 3Au l position k t eclaring th est provedtobecons rainians. reasonf e ontheterritoryof tim red theunificationof gu e ainst thecentralgovernm rically sm sud i e
st m al un inct ethnicgrouphavebeenre d torepresentseveral e, theywerepoliticallyrepr 19 a lish wa u of 1999theymodifiedtheexis nifest theirprotestwhenth o 99 l r whichthelo tarii i e refere nority. As it of . i
ng s to
aller [Th voting s Tara ref Taraclia ndum illeg e myth u 107 groups asGagauzians(2000;170).Since1990 population participated se cl id C Taraclia, ia in toBulga cal adm ofa ites erable (92%from east politicallymob h th
Taraclia ’s adm arles Kingnoted,th e preservation inth Russian-speaking m to th n a e l (Radu,2000).Laterduring w ethn i e byrefusingtocooperatewiththe nistrative e i nt e tenthn nistration ofalocalreferendum r e region’svillages withaneighboringadm ia es ns’ dem (Radu, 2000).Theprotestwas ey boycottedtheorganizationof presented onlybyethnic-cultural ented bythe ic co n ofth ting legislationinorderto lfict in votes).Moldovan e lite o andthepopularsupport w adm a nds to ilized g e eir i thesou i r old bordersfortheir norities ofMoldova,
ganiz Socialis i n nistr keepa 51 fl r . Althoughthe uence wasfar oup, altho t e h d ac a e tiv rn t Party pa i theyear, e unitof nistrative sepa a central m rt o p and aign f ugh rate th in e
CEU eTD Collection which wasannulledin1994 attestation ofstateagencies’em oppositio oppositio beginning of1990sRus (MAR, 2008).However,since1991therewasno language. Duringtheproteststheydem between 1989and1990,asareactionagainstthe attem during theperiodoftran 53 52 p ( an O o Atestarea Aut d Galin s ct t p o o b h p n The ethnicmobiliza e degree of protest o e r t tointroduceRom r’s i , d 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 a Rog . Graph III.8 Th n andpublicd n wasvoiced lingvisticase n 09) t e op e r . 1991 v o i v e po a w
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s 1994 or eclarations inandoutsidetheparliam o ects th m ians andUkrainians’mob a f Pi tion “Pro ana. nian asmainlanguageof sition wasgenerallylow. 1995 vo 53
is d of va ation ofUkrainiansandRussiansouts Opozitia se
sv 1996 . Ukrainiansand t th r (c ployees for ita -Taras ecisi RussiansandUkra 1997 hai e attem o r
n 1998 oft ] , in a
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instructionintheeducationinstitutions 2002 , Ch other attem Int ” aceasta inians inthe 52 declaration ofRom e So 2003 Theym isin ret ciety o h au
ni 2004 c R , ovan authoritiestoimposethe decizie 1
7 2005 f
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n au p i a s ’ s t )
CEU eTD Collection la had theg Ruthenian identity(Stroschein,1996).Duringthepost-Sovietperiod,RussiansinCri Rom in theW language (A population intheregion Russian astheirfirstlanguage(W peninsula, wherethen concentration intheEasternregioncalled constituting lessthan1%(Annex1).The 27% werecom However, after1994therewasnootherm most during have alsoattem with Russians’com for separationfrom 54 which teachingusedtobe consolidation ofRussianlanguage mobilized
ng Гражданам uag a In 1989,theethnicUkrainians The RussiansandrussifiedUkrainiansinCr 3.4.1.RussiansinCrimea: 3.4. EthnicMinorities nians areterrito e o f r
p e eatest levelofet instru s t
o thepost-So nnex 2,Map4).Inaddition,severalsm ern regionofTranscarpathya(Annex2,Map5),inwhichHungariansand Мо litically ctio p лдо posed byethnicRussians(22% ted tomobilize,but n в ! ы p ] Ukraine.TheRussianpopul , in indifferentm act settlem - rially con
своб u Nezavisimaya Moldov of Donbassandabout90%inC viet period.Theirm m b hno-po оду er ofRussiansis ’ Mobiliz
conducted inRussianlanguag
выбора e nt. Otherm cen litical m ilson, 2002). intheUkrainiansocietyand o constituted73%ofUkrain trated and at asignificantlysm m
ation inPost-So языка e nts of a a obilization. Atth nifestati , C
о Donbass (Annex2Map5) i 109 nority б obili h transition учения isin c o According tothe2001census,about70%of in whichapartof m im ) andseveralotherm au Russians haveaconsiderab zation startedprio on ofprotestbyUkrainiansandRussians. p groupsintheW ation intheotherpa , 20 ea all m leted b ! [To aretheethn
v Ju r iet Ukrain and aller extent. im ly Mo i nority groupsarecom 19 e b ea y ld theethn asshownb 94 declared Russian o e duringtheSovietUnion. e v . e’s population.Therem ginning of1990s,theyfought an citizen ic groupwhom particularly intheregions e: e r totheindepend loca stern ic Ukrainians andintheCri s – i nority groups,each rts ofUkrainealso e l Ukrain low foughtforthe part ofthecountry freed as theirnative om o p le terr actly settled obilized the ian whouse f ch s ence of cla a ito o m ining i ce i m ean ria i ea m 54 n l
CEU eTD Collection 1990s, periodinwhichseveral localpr
between cen put anendtoCrim Crim Treaty" (MAR,2008).Shortlyafterthisreferend Autonom place in199 questions relatedtom which wasthefirsttorecommendin1989orga language. T adoption in1989ofthelanguagelawthattran claim dem for thepeninsula.Between1988and1990,thisdem Ukraine, whenin1988Crim
degree of protest onstrations organizedinthebiggestciti ea asanautonom i Crim ng anautonom 0 1 2 3 4 5 o us SovietSocialistRepublicasasu ean Russians h
1991 1 andresultedin93%o tral autho e m 1992 Graph III.9 obilization wasm 1993 ean Russians’m r ous statuswerethealle u 1994 ities andCrim ous republicwithinthebord ltilingualism ’ high 1995 ean localauthoritie .
1996 PoliticalMobiliz est leve 1997 a
f inly dr
1998 ean lead localvoter and aut obilization, l of
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2000 iven b ono ersh 110 2001 es ation ofRussiansinCrime ged raiseofUkrainiannationalism ofCrim s dem my (Sasse,2007;130).Thereferen bject ofUSSRandasapartytotheUnion s’ supportforthe"resto ip continued y um l because ab m thelocalbranchofth 2002 nization ofalocalreferendum sform ers ofUkraine.Nevertheless,thisdidno , theUkrainianSuprem o a
bilization occurredatthe beginningof 2003 nded thestatusofterritorialautonom e 2004 ea. Am d a Ukrainian intothesinglestate . 2005 nd wasalsovoicedinm
a ttle forth 2006 ong thevoicedreasonsfor 2007 2008 ration oftheCrim e divisionofpower e Russian Community 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Communist Party a e Sovietrestored
degree of rebellion todecideon R Pr d andthe um e o b t e e llio s took t
ea n a ss y n t ,
CEU eTD Collection voiced dem Sevastopol andSimferopol(thetw above-m beginning of1990swa were ledb idea ofseparatism organization parallel institutionsin Ukrainian centralpowerrespondedwithother d decrees withforceoflaw.Af constitution thatprovidedwideregionalpowers, a m The electedpresiden presiden 1993, Crim Soviet Ukrai th 55 of Crimea during whichbothpartsadopted independence vis-à-visU rallies transfer oftheFleettoRussia(MA Russian navalensignsontheshipsandorganizedde Black SeaFleetlocatedinCrim Thisdem e So a jority ofseatsinthe v At eliteleveltheprotestofCri werealsoorg i et leadersh tial elec entioned m a , n nd ean parliam e y a Russian SocietyofCrim s . people
nds forthetransferofCrim had a werehighlya i tions, in p tran historical expla , Russiannationalism a ove t YuriMeshko withs sformed niz Crim e s alsotheperiodofla m nt created e spite k d. Intheserallies, e raine (MAR,2008). nts. In1993,anti-Ukrai ea (Sasse,2007). m itfro local parliam t ter 1994theCrimeanpresidentalsostartedtoissue decrees.The rong orphous conglom
of n ati the m ea protested on: it laws andregulationsunaccep p the postofpresidentCrim an o ofthebiggestcitiesCr v, theleaderof R m o ea latter ad , 2008).In1994and1995lowm sition ean Russian wasonlyin1954thatthe , , andre m Russian i e ea backtoRussia. n nt. In1994,Crim
i in
stra being unrecognizedbythe protesters insistedontheirdem 111 agai theloc tiv er rgest m in Movemen at notablythe e un tegra s wasm ecrees, whichresultedintheform es ofpoliticiansandactivis nst Ukrainianau m it ofSov nian m onstrations inwhichtheydemandedthe tion Russian MovementofCrimea a a l ad ss dem a withRussia.A nifested througha“battleoflaws”, t ofCrimea i pe a m et Ru powerf 55 ss protestswereorganizedin ean nins i im Inaddition,thepersonnelof nistration onstrations, organizedbythe ea, whilein1994itorganized table bytheoppositeside.In ssia in leadersdraftedaCrim ea), duringwhichprotesters ula thor becam o t r thepresid o ) wereforme Ukrain ities. an (Sasse, e ll these ad part ofUkrai e a Theyr dium nds forCrim m ts, unitedbythe ian au i n i 20 strativ m scalem ent toissu o a 07). The thathad d. These thorities. vem ation of ised the n e un e, whe e it of ea ean a nts s n e n s
CEU eTD Collection This wasmanifestedthroughoccasionalpro conditions acceptedbyb establishm m following aninterventionoftheUkrainianpa parliam Gradually, Crim parliam granting toRussianthestatus his PartyofRegions.Duringthesedem organized massdem occasion Russian c mobilization declarations againsttheprocesse Russian organizationscontinue called forthereturnofpeninsulatoRussia. Crim the latterweresupposedtoaffectCrim This m signif a naged toincre ean pr After 1995acertaindegreeofCrim During andafterthe2004OrangeRevolut However, Crim i can a e e de possibleam ntary elections,inwhichthePa nt andintheregion.InMarch1995, a a lly t m ent ofthelegalst n o-Russian organizationsorganizedse d withinthetwoyears increasedagain.Thistim a idate jority of ean presidentMeshkovstartedto a in se theirinf onst the ean elitefragm m o o Ukrain a r re effectiveinterventi ations indifferent ndates, theleve th parts(K l atus fortheAutonom uence overth ofsecondstatelanguage(M d untiltheOrangeRevolution ian presiden s of“Ukrainization”(MAR,2008). thatfollowe uzio &Mey e nted shortl e the onstratio l of ean Russian ean e Crim rty ofRegionsled t ti Crim cities ai 112 ests educationsystem al elec m on ofthegovernm S rliam d, theCrimeanpro wastosupportVikto e ns, participantsem o r, 1999;31 y af against thelanguagep ofCri he wasremovedtogetherwithhisoffice, ean Russians’m m veral m ean leadershi e ous RepublicofC tions. lose hisinfluencebothwithintheloca e for ter theCr nt. By1995,theUkrainianauthorities ion theCrim s’ politicalm m m Duringthe a ea, insupportforYanukovichand s ofprotestscom s 3). s atsuzato, 2009).Afterthe2006 riots,dur (2004), withoccasionalpublic p, whicheventua imean pr andm e by Yanukovichobtaineda nt of obiliz obilization waspres phasized theirsupportfor - ean Russians’levelof Russian po Orange Revolutionand r Ukraineintheregion. Yanukovich,thepro- r ation de o ing whichprotesters im a lic eside ss m ea in1998,under i ies ofUkraine,as ng from n e dia. In1997, tia crea litical partie lly ledtoth l e sed. Crim l ec erved. tio ean ns. e s l
CEU eTD Collection language andanofficial local (Solchanyk, 1994).Allthese partiespleadedforgr them ( within afederalUkraine(Kuzio&Meyer, the Russianlanguage,dualcitizenshipwith greater degreeoflocalautonom federalization ofUkraine.In Ukrainian Interfron the elitelevel,whenpro-Russianpoliticalm region wasamongthemostlyvoiceddem em the respectivepoliticalm them close econo poorer regionsofthecountry.Moreover,m industrialized. Thisim the EasternregionofUkrainewasm the EasternpartofUkrainewasm m mobiliza Rebirth ofDonbass a phasized, whilethepreservati jority (Annex2,Map5).Them (Birch&Zinko,1996).Atthesam
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m , Liberal P notab i c relation dependence ofUkraine,Russians n ing of ly in t ) dem an plied that a s with d rty the 1990s,thepoliticalm Rebirth ofDonbassMovement a , nded thefor obilization: the Eastern addition, thelocaladm Labor Party Russia,thereforelo y (Solchanyk,1994;59). underanindependentUkraine, status oflanguageadm on ofadom o o bilization of s reg tly econom m e i a ation ofafreeec on of ti , and nds. m 113 o “Russianness” oflocal e 1999; 319).Otherm vem i , th nant positionf l politicalpartiesformedin Russia, andregionalautonom
o Russiansan i Donbass obiliz i st developedeconom ning industryin cally driven.W Civic CongressPartyofSlavonicUnity cal entrepreneurs e ethnicquestionhadanim e anting toRussianthest nts withstrongsupportintheregion(i.e. i outside Crim nistratio ation of wheretheyc ) dem onom i nist d Russian-s n ofDonbas Russiansin o r a thisregionha ration inDonbass.They also nded loc i h the Russianlanguagein c zoneintheregionand Donbas e en SovietUnioncollapsed, a were o alsoengagedinpolitical re populationwasoften m onstitu ically andthem peaking populationin inte s s a oderate move regiondem atus ofsecondstate benefitedfromthe l officialstatusfor Donbass Donbass. rested in d tosupportthe portant placein ted y forDonbass a n startedat absolu keepin Among a nded a m e nts o te st g .
CEU eTD Collection community leaderscontinued to year, sim to prom Eastern cityDonetsk,duringwhichresident Ukraine Eastern partofitrestartedtoprot
official status(MAR,2008). referendum refused toimplem cam groups ofteachersinth degrading conditionsofm voiced duringthem pleaded forthestatusoflocalautonom
degree of protest paign forukrainizationoflo After arelativelyshortperiod 0 1 2 3 4 5 ote thedevelopm and ilar protestswereorganizedin intheregion,whic
theregiona 1991 Graph III.1 1992 e
1993 nt. In1994,themobilization i 1994 ner strikesthatwerepr e EasterncityofDonet l comm 0. PoliticalMobiliz ent anduseoftheUk 1995 i 1996 ning industryinE
ittee 1997 h 90%ofparticipants protestagainstukrainization, est againstcentralpower.In1998,the cal schools,cam of
ofpassivity,R 1998 the
1999 y fo
thecapitalKiev.In1999and2000,Russian 2000 Socialist Party r theregion.In1993,thesedem 114 2001 atio im wa s s a rainian languageinth k riotedag picketedag st n ofRussiansoutsideCrimea
2002 arily organizedforprotestingagainstthe ern s m paign that u
2003 Ukraine.In a ssians in polledinfavorof 2004 nife organizedapublicprotestinthe sted th 2005 ainst th ainst thego 2006 local schooladm Ukraine an rough notablythroughofficial parallelto 2007 e MinistryofEducation 2008 e region.Inthesam theorgan vernm 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 givingRussianan Civic Con d notably degree of rebellion a e thes nds werealso ntal m i i zation ofa nistrations e strikes, R Pr g easures inth e ress of o b t e e ll s io t
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CEU eTD Collection a Febr was latero Eastern andSouthernpartsofUkrainedeclared notably intheEasternregionof dem opened. Thede led byViktorYanukovich,inwhichthequestion 58 57 h 56 mobiliza to Russianthestatusofsec declarations, m when thesegroupscooperatedpolitically sm by Ukrainia in theregionclaim the leg protes accom Hungarians (13%),Russians census, them Transcarpathya alsoattem Ru O llo ttp So d Ха В ssian essa all duringthepost-Sovietperiod.Therewe w to ://o
u vi onstrations organizedaftertheOrangeRe рьковский Одессе a The m During the2004electoralcam et r 3.4.3.EthnicMinoritiesinWestern b ters co
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brua a i запр 115 zed by ewsru against centralpower. 56 nia Russianlanguagewasvoicedduringthem oups’ politicalm оста re onlytwoinstances–in1991and1999 pport o ag region wasUkraininan(78%),followedby . Thisdecisionoflocaladm of ukrainizationandde volution indifferentre ry, 2010. Russianasofficial entity, whichwasnever етить n e a ] s (2%). . s due вить , in co e W of thestatusRussianlanguagewasre- m pro-Ru f
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Party ofRegions a ssi рег tm i a nd was nistrations was t nds. a of l и , accessed n он l Ukr un a альн ngua inwhich cil 6. togrant ca a ог On d inian g i e о d on ] lled lin
a , in no [I ss e: 8 n s t
CEU eTD Collection Ukraine (Solchanyk,1994;62-63).In1991thelocal econom sam which theregionlostwhenit educational organization,declaredthereturn discrim m Western Ukraine.Thesegroupsfo mobiliza mobilize thepopulationonan autonom responses (Stroschein,1996;165).However,s of autonomywithinanindependentunitary which thepopulationwasquestionedwhetherT
i norities’ inf e tim In 1990the In 1999,theethnicgroupsinTranscarpat degree of protest Graph III.1 i ic zoneandintoaself- 0 1 2 3 4 5 nation, includingtheprevention ofethn y wastakenoutofthelocalpoliticalage tion e theloc
again, 1991 l uence ov 1992 a 1. PoliticalMobiliz l ad
th 1993 Society ofCarpathianRuthenians is tim m 1994 er loc i nistration 1995 e incoo
a 1996 ethnic basisagain. was annexedin1946,totheU l au governing adm
ye 1997 th also a r orities. Th rm p s 1998 - eration w ation of dy ed aConfederation,with dem 1999 na
m 2000 a i c 116 nded the s e Conf of theAutonomousStatusforTranscarpathya, 2001 i Ethnic MinoritiesinWesternUkraine ith the Ukraine, whichyielded78%ofaffir nistrative territory r ic m nda andthelocalelite an hortly afterthisreferendum 2002 scarpathya shouldhaveaterritorialstatus hya m ederation citedcas
i 2003 tran m authoritiesorganizedareferendum nority representativesto holdofficein i , cre 2004 norities sf a
orm 2005 nife k a ra
ted 2006 a inian SovietRe sted som re tion of aspartoftheindependent orig
a viewtoincreaseethnic 2007 siding 2008 e inally ther have notattemptedto s of 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ino e signsofethnic ethnica e asa degree of rebellion gio t , theissueof her public. Atthe n r into cultural- lly-d Pr R e gions of e o b m t a e e llio s riven ative f t
, n r in ee
CEU eTD Collection Crim and 2000,ofMoldovan Gagauzians horizontal powergotconcentrated.Thiswas periods withconcentratedpower. ethnic m with powerfragm for rebellion-intheyearswithpowerconcentr findings bycom mobiliza com power concentrationandethnicm em is em mobiliza 2008). Buttheactivityofthisconfederation local adm Table III.1.EthnicMin M a pirical e xi b ean Ukrainiansbetween 1996and2002.Howeve m ine thedataonpowerconcentrationdiscu In thecaseofsom The m pirically correlatedwith Final Remarks: u M m Uk Geo tion tion obiliza o val i l rai nistration andthereductionofsc d
x r a o gi andm againstth u ercis n in goalof v e p a e a
in theYearsw tion was o p ssi e aring theaveragesofethnicm con e o bl ntation. Thecomparisonreveal re insisten e th s e titu overallhig statediscu o is c rities’ Mo e tes thef Fra m h powerconcentrationinGeorgi Power apter i t exp g th FragmentedPow 0. 1. 1 i m nority groups,the 5 . A 7 4 4 e obilization ag
nted v wastodete r er , RussiansandUkrainians be e i ssed inthis biliz h rst s ag ssion of er inthe e s f ation in t o ep in r
Pr Co 117 demands. the caseofGeorgian o hooling inethnicm ation, withtherespective n t rm ainst thestate. Power ssed inChapterIwiththedataonm e to theanaly c periods withf i s chapter,w 0 0 0. en norities’ m never evolvedintomoreintensepolitica theYearsw t 5 ine thedeg . . 5 5 8 tr
s thatinthethree er: AveragesCompared a level ofm t ed r, therewerecasesofm
o s h r is of bilization –bothforprotestand GraphsIII. ile TableI ee inwhiche a, Moldova,andUkraine.This i Fra th Conce r agm tween 1993and1995, of o Power g bilization decreasedw thec 0 1 m A 0 7 . . i Arm 5 0 e nority languages(MAR,
e v
nted er nted powerth ag studied countriesthe e n a averages intheyears e II.1 summ 12, III.13,andIII.1 nians between1995 usal ch s trated Po f t o h r n
Re ic m i Co nority groups b ain e n llio Power obiliza c arizes the w en an inth betwee i 0 0 0 7 n norities er and
tr
a t ed tion h
en 4 n e ’ l
CEU eTD Collection to howm resources, inrespecttohowm to howm rebellion. groups thatmobilized,b fragm mobilization also showsthatinthepost-SovietGeorgia, in Ukrainebetween2003and2008,Bulgar fragm 2001 and2008. case ofGeorgianArm whose levelofm Graph III.1 These findin Finally, so e e nted power,afterperiods nted power,whenthem u u ch theirconcentratedregim ch politica occurredduringthe 2. EthnicMinorities m obilizat g e s alsosugg m l e e i nority groupsintensifiedth nians between2004a y ion intensifiedwhenhorizontalpow lite incum thelev est th u ch theyres obilization was ofconcentratedpower:Cr e l o b at th ’ M first yearsoftransitio ents m f m e s guara e casesof o i norities biliz pond toethnicm a na 118 nd 2008andofMoldovanGagauziansbetween atio nteed politicalrepres Moldova,andUkrainethehighestlevelof ge ians between1998and2000.Thecomparison intensified bythenum ’ protes powerconcen n andPow to contro eir lev t, and l m e im i n norities’ demands,andinrespect l ofm er er ConcentrationinGeorg andinperiodswith also,byth ean andnon-Crim gotconcentrated.Thiswasthe i norities’ accesstomobilizing tration cand entation form obilizatio ber ofethnicm e levelofm i n inperiod ffer withresp ean Russians i norities. strongly i norities i nority i s of a ect ’
CEU eTD Collection
Graph III.1 Graph III.1
3. EthnicMinorities 4. EthnicMinorities ’ M ’ M Chapter IV o o biliz biliz 119 at atio ion andPow n andPow er ConcentrationinMoldova er ConcentrationinUkraine
CEU eTD Collection
institutionalization ofmulti-ethnicityandbyen provisions andtherefore letagr states to international standardsthates of Europe,andOrganizationSecurity respected enough.Severalinternationaldocum in ordertolegitim frequently usedinpoliticaldiscourses.Bothstat m polic less inline of necessary. T towards m the periodswithm Georgia, Moldova,andUkraine.Specifically,Ide mobilization state andinthiswayhindertheaccessto common publicidentity,powerconc i internatio norities’ interes ies tow As discussedinChapter1,thefirst In orde The f 4.1. ConceptualFramew implem withth i : PowerConcentr i norities rst ref nal standa . Inth w a r todeterm rds m o possiblecriteriacan t e e o is cha em i s. ’ rence ze theneedformorem nt them i st unfavorablestate interests,ref norities: withtim . rd The second ine th s ofm p cr ter, this ite . However,th r e lev i i tablish ethnicm nority rights:thepoliciesof on –in ork: eat am hy e isth r e ation and e l inw pothesis be usedinthecontex nce cr entration tendstodepoliticize e, thesepolic te e na ount ofdiscretiontothe position towardsethnicm rn hypothesis ofthis h ationa iteria ich th e in i ture nority is 120 Cooperation inEuropeconstitu ents e ofchangeovertim lo couraging theintegration i es andm terna fortheass nority rightsandthegeneralobligationsof State-Minority Relations l s m e gov term rights,ortoarguethatm elaboratedbytheUnitedNations,Council yalty resourcesforpotentialminorities’ pi t an ies m rica tiona ine theperiodswithm dards of ernm lly testedon i norities canrefertothesestandards, t o l standard a y changeinf specific countriesm ental p thesis isthat f e thisres ssm m states inthewaytheyapply i ent ofspecificpo i nority groups. nority o the e lic ofspecificgovernm s the earch. Thefirstistheset ies h e contain rathervague righ t
hnic d cases ofpost-Soviet by discouragingthe a of minoritiesintoa vor of a ve o i nority rightsare ts st favorableand te currentlyth beens –isthem i a vers y be - oragainst
licies are ity ofthe m e nsitive o ental re or o st e
CEU eTD Collection “accomm (Brubaker, 1995,1996a),whileMcGarry Rogers Brub integ useful. polic catego specific institutions(McGarryet citizens into own politicalsystem at alesse the m suitab abandoned bym 59 recognition of them (Alfred ele o min “n territo Conference onSecurityandCo-operationin on howtheseprinciplesshallbeapplied(H the principlesofnon-discrim b Neith atio j m ectiv o en r (Henrard,2000,158).Theyleaveatthedi r ities” are,in ies tow n As discussedinChapter1,theethnicity-rela Hence, theinterna i ation of i t ( rial au sson, 20 a nim r lity to er th e ch l m ized asdiscrim m r e in odation” i aracteristics (su u e n o m o x r a Un sharednationalinstitutions socia tonom rity” is.In aker catego ities 05). Howev tent f rds ethnicm -required non-discrim m ited m conn i i m i noritie ddle of1990sandreplacedwithm nority groups Nation andspecified l o u y asa“bestpractice”form -political pecu st h r determ ectio s. Statescanapplythepr ternatio i a e natory bytheinternational c ve lo r, s n with tiona h asn rized the s into , th i n norities th ei o ng n ining howstatesinte r th r app l standa i a a th aco term nation andbasiccu
l org tio 59 e Coun e m n licatio th . Moreover,while a lia two policy p a l o al., 2008).Noneofthetwochoi o mmon identit n i r n rities of e policych nation principles i esen r e over- zatio rds canbeusefulfordeterm ito
cil o eth n iscase-sensitiv ring ce in n n , orbyaccomm f i s c orig Euro activ app thepost-comm tim th direc adden, 2005,173).Atthebeginningof1990s et. al. 121 e t l p inciple ofnon-discrim in, e anal y so ities o i Europe andtheCouncilofe e oi nority rightsprotection, e y, orthepreservationof
rpret theses ltural autonomy,thereis rritory co h lan ces fa tions into standards. Therefore,inordertoassessstate a m catego thein ted s form g e. f e o scretion ofstates m ys u g in theirlegislation,buttheycanbeused re a statepoliciescanen g e i is of n generalstandard lling n e o u and e n r tern l odat ral criteriato c ity rig ated r ern u “n ethnic ized them nist region(Kym into / or relig t e ati aco andards an a i d), an ng diversitythroughm tiona h onal standardsexplicitlystat t in s pro each m ity- ing whetherstatesinclud ion d ces isexplicitlydeniedor p liz t reh
i t h r ) na ectio d into“integ , self-id ele e nu ing e ofthetwocatego e the identificationand termin tion byintegratingall nsive d d adjustthe s, becauseo but thispositionwas m v toom ” n m ant policie . and“m Th b co i er o noritie e e who licka, 2008). n urage eitherthe ese criteri e tificatio fin u f
ch ambiguity g ition r ration” and t ulti-ethn oup s h ’ id m e f s n ofwh itslittle m ism totheir , ndorsed a “n i th nority- entity. m e atio e ti m a y b r b o at a i ie me n ers ed c” re a e s e l
CEU eTD Collection for individu integ more dem (McGarry etal.,2008,71-72).Supportersof divisions betweencommunitiesandpreventthere integ are m stability ismorelik policies promotedbytheoppositeside.Suppor the policiestheyadvocateprovide directions. ethnicity-related policiesovertim depending onthenatu constitute (McGarry etal.,2008,45-67).Thisiswhyin accomm (Choudhry, 2008,32-34).Moreover,specificpublic repertoires. Instead, (McGarry etal.,2008;28).Statesrarelychoos (McGarry etal.,2008;78-79). m recognition andpublicpowerof distributive justiceisreinforcedbyextens e mbers, ortoprivilegetheidentityof r r Supporters ofbothintegrationandaccomm ationis ationis o re satisfiedandhence,m odat s acontinuu o cratic bec als (McGarryetal.,200 t t i s be s argueth onist atdifferentdeg liev theyadoptam ely underth a e us thattheirp at theirpolic m, with re ofeachim e theyb co e p e i e c r tte norities donot morestability,dem am ees, i.e.there ie untries app o o r 8; 82-84) a licies they i s arem lic guar xture of n im plem ies c i nority groupm som ply enha a ented po ntee o 122 ond ive grouprights,whilefo re e integration . Finally,forsupporters accommodation alsobelievetheirpoliciesare groups’m advocatebecauseethnicm e allpoliciesfrom r dem m oaching on is variationwithineach ition haveincen practicethe“integration/accommodation” inf oda i ters ofaccommodationalsobelievethat nced supportforoneoranotherofthetwo norities’ licy. o o m cratic as t rcem o i on havesubstantiatedargum cracy, and o Sim policiescanbeintegrationistor a i re stabilitybe y determ e st andaccom ent of mbers overthoseofothergroups r e or e tives toreb ilarly, any theyguaran presen anotherofthetwoends, loyaltytowardsethn exclusivelyoneofthetwo distributive justicethanthe ine ittorepressitsown tatio ofaccomm m of thetworeperto changesin cause they r integrationiststhe e n odationist elem t l. Onthecontrary, ; atthe ee m i norities o re protection sa odation th ’ blurthe interests specific m ents that ic elite e tim ents i res e e s ,
CEU eTD Collection groups. Statelanguage,church-staterelations, a identity preservation.Tothes political processesof bureaucracy, andinternal relevant forthecountriesstudiedinthisrese actual integration policies shouldbeim im as being“m changes and
60 the accommodation particular ethnicity-relatedpolicyw loosing form previous reg discrim perce could bein processes oftransitionthatim This isb and Ukrain co in discourse isaddedtotheconstitutional prea Ed Georg nstitu plied as ucat i Integration andaccom My assum ved a tio i i i a, M nation. Moreov o n n e s . cause afterthecollapseofSoviet has e haveb o s i officialdis stitu t er privileges.Therefore,Iassum m inority-friendly”. S ldo givingmoreguaran ep c bee e v p andintheirpersp a tion n tion inthis i , and st andaccomm a l ose i een generallysu st characterofs hi a thestate.Thebillof liz Uk g r pl h towardsin l c er, som e em y ourse s rai d ineach
rel politicalboundariesrefertom n ented. M thesisisthatethnic e e, and e policies,Ialsoaddeducat m va
plied mucha odation reperto nt t e i p odat atem milarly, m ofthesem b e o c e l t te pportiv ofthesestate a i t cau m tive, theim ate c c ees toethn s in i gration as y Garry et ents th b onist po fo le se itd - m because r st minorities i rights refertostateoffi nority rela e fo at m i o at impliedastepclosertowardsaccom 123 norit e-m e e bi licies Unionthethreecoun
s n i arch. Thepoliciesrelated r thepo i that m al. (2008)describedthedifferencesbetween thelatterhave res plem norities had guity regardingthedegreeofdem being“m
i n o m ic m ies o t im nd civicassociations cov rity relatio i . TableIV.1liststhose ’ norities inpost-Sovi s in tende entation of . Theaccomm tions o i norities tended ply differen e licies thaten i teres r th noritie ion andofficialdiscourse. e t d top inority-unfri t v n i privileged if not cha r nor s er tim an i s thatth itcontrib n sition integratio th ities’ involvem cial recognitionofm e threestud e n t e rce couraged accom views ge p . odat to d duringthetransit e i tries haveex ri ve thos perceivethosepolicy ey positiond od endly”. Therefore,a et Georgia,Moldova, u i onist po nist policie refer tominorities’ ted tos b werenotrisking to politicalparties, differences thatare on e ied fore th cou whatspecifi e po ent insocial- t ren n 60 licies were e ad o t lic ries; o m c
u perien m s im r g ring the i odation. acy that on pe op ies tha odation thenin i nority tion plied f ficial ced riod o g c t f
CEU eTD Collection group andindividualrightsallowsseveralo prioritizes the“m accomm associations, andnon-ethnicinternalterrito official religion,commonschoolsforeverybody, prioritizes exclusivelyindividualrightsand process, whilethebillofrightspromotesexclus 61 official dis Eastern Europe ad N Sou d 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 o ition
.
r The policydescriptionsinTableIV.1reveal
ce: P a Bill o Ch o B l domain associations Bo M odat Lan licy E Disco Relatio u Po Po Inter Official urch-State d Parties r und Civ c e State ucat c Ga gua litical litical a / f Do ourse exp u Righ i ). onist statetheofficial n u c i ar rry c i r ges al rs ma n o a s ies s n ; also e c et
y
ts i
n . al ulti-ethnic” state
Table IV.1.ModelsofS , . (2 defin Excl part l Direct tran icitly prio 00 Favo So Favors A u in co Prescrib 8, 7 usi i On itio m Meritocracy. Professionalism e ter scen Em m Bu s t n r e v o s p n e official(pu Inte itary ti n fo 0 Statewid o e em state- p ild r
o al bo “bridgi ) mes favo d n i ha h , s wi n C itio a ing relig ed d gration Repertoire r ch sis on ve o a state with phasi i ti undar m t ritize th rect recogn one n n
w h fede
d on a n st a relig - m a iou a p i urch building pa l ru ng” e d at i tio a , et u on scho pe
scourse recognizesthestat a e rs ru s dif rties. b t ration e-wi tio s an i h n ill o on es, o les. g ion ass b h o o -state rel a f lic) lang n-state, with n p r’s m r e l d pro i n les th ou i l r de . curricu c, ling n f e o e
e Im o . r righ . di itio n
ciations that ol ps.
non o sign ce-b p vi 124 nation-state and“nationa odi s. g r t a at n ofastate ga r ate-Minority Relations dual rtiality. ts. prom a a - u u fi ifi req l rial boundaries.Incontrast,inanideal mma ively indiv e lind ni tio th; thein a istic, o u t fficial languages,supportsm cat ge. h m can zat
n n u ri
. s s i
i i g state-wide non-ethnic . ons (i i tic c re
otes oneofficiallanguage,(sem t on. h d that inanid t r o s
m . ain .e. e ternal leg i m I d Vari St base n d Bu o u tern Accepta u sev resses o o f Em State an al righ Sep
cat More t d ild co self-g Accommodati ous i d No officialors Accepta e’s m e fied al phasi i mm ing ral p on on an a relig religi rate schoolsform b eal in su oun to am ov nce u n h i ts; th d reg e slation accentu s o n des an one an u gr iou b o ern
d o itie associations. dar 61 fit - lti-ethn p nce ofgroup-ba l o u d su of n o s lizing” statebuilding a l ns t lti-n s c
a ups es ng ffi i s at tegrationist statethe faith b co i on ri n m e intern party system es org o in e nat c fo uage pt ci ppo or n parties, “bridging” o t official (public) e to ri al b on Reper h mm k a re to al rm i t i s. tio v ate religion. ght e di ndi r e re a i y p i i m ills ally t s. c characterand a n u onal tio nority schools, ed. n s. scour a n th vi i i u l pres ities. al le n n i zed to o recog n b state, with d o a , e situ f o lic p et u lities r
t rights. ities. r sed al thatis oire ent se adde a ities. hni gisla t
and es both allow o n a atio s or c t ized ts. i on
o tion r n
d as
i-) of
CEU eTD Collection 62 indicating them m an intern Table IV.1,foreachcou periods oftransition.Forthis,Ianalyzethech Soviet Georgia,Moldov religion, association,andbureaucracy. policy im and billofrightshav m concentrated the religiousgroupones.Intern Church-state relationsdom establishes ethnicallybasedinte associations, andreligions,allowsthedeve as on An Kartli second isco border withAr Ar Th i i ne norities if ni m e em
x 6 e m v The policiesanddom There aretworelativelybig nians, 46%ofwhom a 4.2. TheDynamicsofS ,
u atth r In thes , i
m amountofaccommodationandresp o on i p u al degreescaleforeachofthetwo i plications. Thisiswhytheyarele rical an s seco n e borde nstitu t thelegisla m e rvi ections thatf nd m i a e alysis inth norities. ws ar xi e ted byAzeris,79%ofwhom nia andTurkey,wherethey y sour m wi r withArm u t m am h e t e mostlysymbolica ces. a, andUkraineapproach ion res n Politica t i hni try be s ch a ount ofa live o ains listedinTableIV c m in isrelevant llow, Ideter ap
t ate-Minority t i ter is e rnal territorialboundaries. tween 1991and2008.Forth ra nori nia andAzerba ins thef l al politicalboundariesarere in theSouthernregioncalled p t y b cco l ethnic groupsinGeorgia.Th a a eaders, sed rties are mmodation andrespectively,integration.
on m o l only whenethnicgroupbounda rm ch th ine thedegreeinwhichspecif j o 125 Relations inPost-SovietGeorgia: ur e ati ss significantthaneduc lopm liveinanotherSouthernregioncalled aracte r legal actsrelated na r ijan, wher constitute 55%ofthelocalpopulation.The ectiv on of e anges ineachoftheni ed accomm e l perto i levan s t .1 havedifferentdegr ent ofregionalandethnicparties, s r , and ely, integration;an becaus regiona i res, with0.1and-0.1indicatingth t on resea e theycons odation orintegrationindifferent ly f e sakeofco e r l par to che theydonotnecessa state-m o levant onlyforterritorially r s as r te Samts tie e firstisconstitutedby s. Th rr titu p i ation, statelanguages, n eci itoria khe-Java o ne dom d with3.0and-3.0 mparison, Iestab r te 45 fi ees ofsignificance. i e of t i y relatio ed i c polic ries coincidewith lly conc n f % of A i cial d a 62 kheti n ins listedin n nex ies inp
s as theloc rily have
i entra 7, as , atthe Kvemo- scours listed o lish wel t st- e in a d e e l l
CEU eTD Collection contained aseparatesectiononethnicm rights multi-e the existenceofethnicm Georgia” orto“thepeo 1 G So constituent nation Georgia recognizedtheexistenceof 66 65 64 63 dispersed. InthefollowingsubsectionsIanalyz population. Theotherm exception wasthegrou rights andnon-discrim “m Georgian id Geo Co state explicitlystatedin rights establishedinthefunda a particularethnicgroup.Therewasnohe m 991 TheSpeech See,forinsta SeeC See e i vi org n nority groupsinpost-Soviet ulti-natio r s et gi . titu
i o Neverthe None oftheconstitutionspost-independent again a o a Zv 4.2.1. OfficialDiscourse: Article h tion f t R ap hnic n
iad G ter XIV 7 J e
o p entity asth f ubl nal” character.Theethn une ity intheirp of FirstGeorgianPresid s Geo 2 in t dis n i a les ce, t c , m
19 t r (Articles 129 of s g s h ak withintheGeo c i 9 , thisr Ge h e C a (19 rim 1 e h . u Sv Speec or o r d i e basisf n 95). o nation an g i i s p ofAbkhazians a b i nation principles,than p ti the constitutionalpreambles. ublic discou a on ecog to o le”. Allco tu i h i d nority nority groupsaresignifi nay w tio -13 of First 7 a n oft n
rd 7 a Gr J m o ition Georgia evolvedsince1991. ) inth s allp une r the e e d theiriden n ntal texts.Neitherwasthere groups inthecountry,aswell r uzi t Zvia h , g Ge neve e 19 m e C i ic groupswere nstitu
j opu rses. an s Georgian statebuilding(Nodia,1996). a, 13 Sov orgia 9 i o d Gam 1 nority groups latio n . i
: r s t et Socia
65 S the1 wentso Ju ate. n titu tion v Pr ZviadGa o n ne 1 bod tion
i s 126 66 o norities. tity esid akhurdia totheSession s f validinGeorgiaduringtransitionrecognized Atthesam
9 e howthe na 995 constitu o G list Rep 9 preservatio ent Zv in thecontextofstatebuilding.Theonly 1 f e gem ya Gru Rep org f .
ratherm Georgiaascribed a andthehistoricalch r i cantly sm m 64 63 a, 12 astoof ony attributedtoth u iad G u b s Allthreepresidentsofpost-Soviet Referenceswerem z b lic akhurdia evendeclaredAbkhaziansa ija, lic statepo Jun of Geo e a o 13 tion gran tim e m f n. The1921Constitu ntioned inthecontexto e
s Ju f 199 Georg ak the buildingof i aller and cially attribu r e n hur g ofSuprem , presidentsem lic e i 1. a 199 d i theneedtoprotecttheir
(19 ies a (19 i Sv a t ted thestatesov 1; ob 21).
o and discoursetowards
t them od 78) an Th e generalorspecific h aracter ofGeorgian e m
n e Sessionof e a a Soviet ofRepublic o de to“citizensof t ya Gr Call o e toGeo stly territorially d Article5 rightsthatare a nationalizing phasized th uzi f Presid e tion even reign j a f Su , 14 r hum gia inth pr en t y to J the em t o u a n n e e e e f
CEU eTD Collection th 1978 Constitutionthatprovidedau exclusive emphasisontheindividual,without present thes
the m rights, whic a separatesectionontherightsof for access articles referring develop theirownculture. ethnic m 72 71 70 69 68 67 typica of transition. im the buildingofanationalizingstate.Forthese state language–Georgianandforbadedouble discrim ( the S Sov Cr 199 SeeArticles16 See SeeArticle12 Seeth SeeArticle129intheCons See e So i plied softintegrationandthispositionwasne m m i et So 5) in oviet ulated asindividualrights. v Article 8in Articles 79 . At thesametim All constitutionsofpost-SovietGeorgi a al Co 4.2.2. BillofRights: lly i to et So in Georgianlaws e Lawon i cialist Rep nation onethnic,reli attributedto i inform Socialist Republi norities therighttousetheirownlanguageinprivateandpublic,aswell d ci e h isspec e statu of alist Rep 9 Geor -84 -45 “Citizen th i n ation th totherightofeducation, u e Con inth in th b s lic of g es as th u e Con i if a b e C e Con ic to s lic sh (1 c titu e, theconstitutionpartslistinghum Georg 99 beinginrelationto ip” (19 c adoptedduringthe1990s. o at arerelevantforethni o onstitu s of n t f titution ofRepublic titu i 9) Geo s o s the accommodationistperspective titu 70 titu n ; ofGeorg tio A Georgia i Hence,theConstitutionsdidm gious, orlinguisticbasis. a (1
9 tio r tio r n 3 g ticles 3,6 72 ent n ofth ) i n oft n a 978 ; th Theonlyexcep m
(197 o f e Lawon tonom ); Artic t i (1978); Aa i h norities thatalsostatesth e a h a (199 e So 8); e Rep tions. Rep , 919 Article v u ous statusestoAbkhaziaandS le 38 i 5). b u et So Po
67 theethnicm , and lic of b cultu lic Mor 127 Ge litical Un i r s 14 reasons, Georgianofficialdiscoursesince1991 ticles 12-37a n cialist Rep o orgia (1921);Arti
t Geo 33 c m ver fundam f any referencetothegrouprights.Even a explicitly h tion isthe19
r citizenship, elem an Georg al d e C
e o over, the 69 f d 38 i r th norities o g Moreover,allconstitutionsprovidedto ion n e i 68 e Law a (19 i s velop a (192 titu i u Thisprinc s i b n
norities thatweresettledth o lic of th tion ofGeorg n f 2 Citizen d 39-47in
e e Con 1 on asgroups m 1); Articles37 c statedthep ntally revis ) of state-m e rightsforself-governm ; 21 Constitu “C ent, politicalparticip Georg cles 32an a onstitu Article 34 ke som s u titu s (1 an rightsm ltu ents whichgenerallyim i i ple r a (1 tio 997 e” i tion the a n h was i d 34intheConstitution (19 e 978 in (1
nority relations. ); Articles7 ited duringtheperiod of Georg Constitution reference -6 a outh Ossetiadidnot 99 s tion, whichcontain ve been t 97) 7 provid ). h 5). i r e Con also n . inciple of th a i de alwaysan e Con a em 2 s (1 in titu e an s d a 995 ation, an togrou ere. bodied in allcases of Ge s d tion titu
75 ). e sing non- 71 nt and ofthe tio ofth The orgia n ply of le of p d s e
CEU eTD Collection
73 cultu to territo territorial criterion,thestatefo could refertotheethnicm the population.Theim were differencesinculture,language,andethnic for alongtim “national m “ethnic m Minorities. W Georgian parliam independence periodim uncertain. T 1978 oneatthebeginningof1990s,relevan Soviet Georgia. process, ascom of „billrights”,by2 m particularly thecaseof theArm som registered andactivatedduri SeeC a jority in e ral au oftheseorganizationsweresubstitute This The form 4.2.3. CivicAssociations: h apter XIVi rially disp i nority”. Accordingtoth to Georgia(i.e. i h nority” ifs/hehadGeorgiancitizen nom tendency is whythebillofrightsincl e, ifhis/herethnicgroupwasliving ith thisratifica ation ofethnicgroup-basedassociatio p ared totheperiodbefore. y n In practice, e t . 73 ersed nt ratifiedtheF h e Const However,becaus to plied asoft plications ofthesecriteria Russians,U 005 Georgiastreng m sup itution i norities i nority rightsstated tion, theParliam ng the1990sand2000s.Infirs port integrationwasstrengthene m
rm of a ny civicorgan ally deniedm e th e Resolution,anindividualcould form andtosm nian organization e R k r am rain e the1921Constitu e p ofintegration. ewor u ians, b lic of uded thened 128 k ConventionfortheP e all m an nt adoptedaRe
e s G f inthecon mbership with ship andresidedontheterritoryofGeorgia identity ascom d Greeks). i in com e in thef zation or thein o restrictedthecatego i ce ofthisexceptionforpoliticallifeis r localpolitica g nority groupsthatco i a ns wasalwayslegallyallowedinpost- Ja ( 192 s p vakh withethn undam tegration p act territorialse tio 1) s T titutions . n andoftheAzerio h d evenm functionedinpa erefore, fr in a„nationalm solution thatdefinedtheterm ental law.Byinclu p ared tothedom t yearsafterindependence, be consideredaspartofa l ically r movem inci in f o r otection ofNational re in2005,whenthe o om ple ofstatebuilding ttlem ries ofcitizensthat nstitu based rce duringthepost- thepointofview e ent, andifthere nts. Thiswas ted i rallel withthe nority” group focuswere inant partof no r g a d where a nization ing the
CEU eTD Collection state-building process. 76 75 74 religion. Itstatedthat“thepe part ofMuslim church worshippersliveinthedi two greatestm IV.2. Accordingtothecensus, Ar m relations. period Geyrat (Am the im state-church relations.Although history. constitution recognizedtheexclusiveroleof prohibited, asisthecompulsion 3 2 1 See See Sou
a
m jority population.TheAzerisarepredom o e S r Article 19in Article 9in The Georgian1995co Two ofthegreatestm nian-Gregorian church.Thisisconfirm ce: Repub r, 2004).Therefore,state- a 4.2.4. Church-StateRelations: portance oftheOrthodoxChurchatall oftransitionhav m (NITG,2008;15).Hence,theGeorgian T K 76 s o v t Before2002,th t Table IV.2.ReligionofCompactlySe R em khe-Java a l e - g Ge o i - on K lic of o th believersliveinthedi i a s r nority religiousgroupsinGeor th gi r
e Con t khet l a e Con i
G e i
or s titu s g Eth titutio i e a Popu t been ese twocon i n o i n i c n ofGeorg nority gr 16 5 56 nstitu M
rsecution ofanindividualforhis
o 5 latio , ,3 , f i in 2 6 Geo n the Ar
s o church relationssupportedthein they alloweddiversityofre t r n to expressopinionsaboutthem rict withArm linewith i tion Cen t r i e g i a (199 oups ofGeorgiadonotshare s i str s a (1
m wasthefirs s titu us i e c Ort 995 nian-Gregorian andMusl t D tion 5). withAzeris’compactse 83 4 40 a h 8 ). inantly Muslim ta, odo theaccomm 129 ,9 ,7 , levels ofsocietym 9 the GeorgianOrthodoxChurchin e a
d bythe2002censusdatapresentedinTable 2 l article g x e 004 i
ttled Min nians’ com a. Theg . policies oncivicassociationsduringthe Cat t 13 0, 0 to es h , s weretheonlylegalprovis 8 2 , o 4
l
i c r odation
o eatest part tablish , whileArm rities inGeorgia(% p act A ligious views,duringthe1990s r thoughts, beliefsorreligionis m a s e de itastatereligion e prin thestatep n ”. ttlem im ttlement. i the Orthodoxbeliefof an 42 tegrationist repertoireof 75 3 5 ofAr believersconstitutethe
, , Atthesam Greg ,3 9 7 ciple ofs
e e nt, while nians worshipinthe orian m e o nian-Gregorian
sition t ) ate-m the 74 e i Mu tim ons about tow 45 grea 2, 9, de facto sli ,4 8 9 i nority e
m , th a
test rd e s
CEU eTD Collection between 1991and2008. It secondary schoolpupils studyingin period between1991and2008.GraphIV.1below pres education thatwasadoptedsince1991.Theseco integ church relationsspecificforthe1990s legal statusputthem Tsintsadze, 2007).However,thefactthatthere there hasbeennoviolencetowardsthese the Muslim 2006). Accordingtotheinternationalobservers solution onthegroundsthattheym legal statusfornon-orthodoxchurches.However, to registerasprivatenon-comm Church as“statereligion 2007). Throughthisagreem all penitentiaries,andmoreim service, form entity of signed withthestate.AccordingtothisAgr streng r Two indicatorspointtothedegreeinwhich In 2005,theGeorgianP In 2002,thetendencytowardsintegration ation reper 4.2.5. Education: thened publiclaw”,w s andArm evenm al recognitionofm t oire o o onanunpr e re, duetothe“Constitu ni ” becauseth ith a f an-Gregorians continued state-m illustrates thattherewas nevera range ent, thestateform a rliam portantly, tax ercial entities a rriages perform ivileged position.Hen i nority rela of e e e otherre m rited higherst nt passedanam wasintensifiedinthe2000s. privileg a jority andm eement, theOrthodoxChurch 130 (NGOs),whi privileges andpropertyow ligious groupsd tio tio e was anotherreligionwithform “traditional” religions , aftertheadoptionof s e ns. Thef a nd isthem suchas d bythechurch, nal Agreem lly strengthenedtheroleofOrthodox to freelypracticetheir atus thanthatofpr education policiesinGeorgiaapproached severalchurchesprotestedagainstthis in thepoliciestowardsreligionwas i endm nority languages,foralm ce, theintegration ents statisticaldataonthenum ec c ent allo i rst isth h cam i nority schoolingstatisticsforthe cles sudden declineinthenum ent” thatth i d nothavesim iasts’ f e assolutionforthelackof wing religiousassociations the righttohavechapelsin e le the2002“Agreem ivate NGOs( (Mardirossian,2005; r e beliefs andgenerally nership (Tsintsadze, gisla edom e OrthodoxChurch obtainedthe“legal character ofstate- ilar priv tion r ally recognized f o r st eachyear om m W e ileges. lated to heatley, b b ilitary er of er of ent”
CEU eTD Collection provide tom 78 77 im Moreover, Georgian, ifthelocalgovernm education innon-Georgianlanguagesforth full instructionintheirmothertongue.The adopted bef and consequently,thenumberofpupilsbel em than withparticula declin students instructedinam Sou Au Graph IV.1.SecondaryEducationinGeorgia ple igrated abroadtofleetheharsheconom
tho % r However, th m ce: Min e, whichisrath 10, r entation ofuniformstat 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, ’s i 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 n evenif terv o i str re the2003“RoseRe i iew Mi y nority schoolsadequateteaching
o 1991 f Ed e analys
the 1992 r k sta u er linkedwith h cation
e 1993 r il e weresom t Aid 1994 e education i is o
nority o i f nov
G 1995
f legisla e . o
e-elaborated curricu 1996 languagesinceindependence. r g e volution” guaranteedtoethnic i thechange a, nt reco 1997 e policie data g subjec tion
yea 1998 i show onging tom v
r 1999 mmended so(Lohm s e ic a n s. Atthebeginningof 131 1997 LawonEducationguaranteedtherightto ts f atau 2000 s ose citizenswhosefirstlanguagewasnot inthetota nd politicalsituationofGeorgiathattim s adifferentpattern.Thelaw o 2001 r whichth t – Language h m or
a 2002 la, theMi ’ s terials. Intheregionswithcom i r nority groupsdeclinedaswell.
e 2003 qu l p
est i 2004 e e Education rcen n 2005 ofInstruction(
Ins O nistry ofEducationdidnot c , m tage 2007;W tob 2006 t i ead, 1990sm norities therighttohave e r 2008
2007 of therewasagradual m Lawim . i nority population h s a eatley, 2006). % oneducation ny m Ar Az R Pupi u m e ssi posed the r e i i n a 77 norities i n a ls) n p 78 act e
CEU eTD Collection Ar Azerbaijan governm language, accordingtothenationalcurriculum schools startedtogetenforced.Manualsforge 80 79 settlem literature, history,andgeography,aswell‘oth 2005 LawonGeneralEducationprovidedth work inm m ef education p without m accomm and literature(W accred in 2005theMinistryofEducationestablished Georgian startingwith becam im A Au e f ple m o thodology elaboratedandwithm u rts werem t tho e h After the“R The for Hence, atthebeginningof1990seducationpoliciesinGeorgiahadan m nia andrespectivelyfrom or e m ited h r e entation oftheruleselaboratedinth ’s i ’s i nt ofAr odat o i n n easures fortheiractualimplem nority schoolsintheregions t terv r e o e i i r gher educationinstitu lic andm m onist ch v i iews withm e al rulesrelated ies wasintens w a m heatley, 2006;30-36). de toim ose Revolution”,theim wi e nian and o t e h re integration nt topublishb
aracter. By1997,theform Fai the2010-201 i t n M o prove theef rity representativ a m Azeri populationthem
m if toeducatio Azerbaijan. edov. ied, bothduetonewpoliciesa i tions, am st. ooks accord 1 academ a terial incen
withcompactm f es in ective plem e n alsochan 79 nta ong
132 e 1990s.Overall,educat
Akh tion. After2004,theintegrat entati ic n .
at national entranceexam which anexam ess oflearningGeorgi ing totheG er socialsciences’sh For Azerischools,theMinistryagreedwith year (Mekh a neral subjectswerepublishedinArm tives increasedforteachersofGeorgianto lk al in alak on ofstateedu rulesencouragedintegration,although allschoolsth a nuals we ged afterth i an i nority settlem d Marn u e zla &Roche,2009).Moreover, orgian cu re broughtasdonationsfrom ination onGeorgianlanguag eu nd duetoam li, c e “RoseRevolution ation cu Octob e teaching all beconductedonlyin e ion policiessince1991 nt. rriculum inations forallstate- an, withalte e r 20 ionist characterof rricu 08 . ofGeorgian l . 80 a inm o re efficient Moreover, rnative i ” nority . Th e nian e e
CEU eTD Collection presented byaninterestedpartywasnotin Adm posts inlocalself-governm its knowledgecouldleadtodism provided thatallpublicse 85 84 83 82 81 parliam Parliam languages inregionswithm public bodies,cultural,educationalandotherin issued adecreewhichstatedthat„theuseof extensive rightstousenon-Georgianlanguages language policiesofasecondarypriority.Neve the languageuseinpublicsphe established Georgianas streng sphere wasgraduallyrestrict litt Howev and purposes duringthisperiod notarized translationofthedocum See See No Au Tem le relev Iz tho te: i um A Articles 15 Between 1991and1995,thelegislationofGeor Since thead nistrative Codeprovidedthatifan porary 4.2.6. StateLanguages: e thened r r, con r ticle 73(4 e e rud ’s i o a ntary speeches. ntary Regulationallowednon–Georgia n n l ce fo n y fo Q
terv Pa s id u thepositionofGeor r rl ering b r r state-m , iews with i a a 16 ) Ab n m
of o , option ofth e v th kh 98 th nt .
at Abk ary azia did (1 e 1999 i n ) of : Mi R o 81 rity relatio e the singlestatelanguage. Besides,Ru th gul h rvices inGeorgiaweretobeexerci h
e A azia a e Law th in thereg nt need il Ko d at m e 1995Constitu
ed. Mostlegalactsadopteddu e Con i o was b i n n i re. Thedeeppoliticalandeconom nority groups lik i n o (1 str issal, andth ent. s n id i 9 Pub ed tohavecommandofGeorgian. s a e n 9 titu tiv i, y gian languageinpubliclife.TheConstitutio Geo 1 i 85 o ons withm ssian wasstillwidely ) Nair e C nd . lic Serv tio th r n o g
Irits d i e con reco a sin e of 133 ices tion the ian, application/statem at candidatesapplyingfo the statelanguage,
concentration(ICG,2006;26).The1991 gn non-state languagesissecuredinallstateand G c t stitutions”, whichallowedtheuseofm ro e e i ize two (1 Meruj in nority com o l in publiclife.In1991
n MPstousetheirmothertonguefor r 998 o 83 d rtheless, whenrelevant,itim g f e i
Later,the1998Law a. p Georg ). use ofnon-Georgianlanguageinp e a gia wasveryvagueinwhatconcerned nd statelan n Iezu en i an ce. used inpracticeforadm p ian go sed inGeorgian,th act se
ring Shevarnadze’spresidency , v
g ent oranyotherdocum Fait Mammed e u rn a g m ttlem ic crisisofthetim e s (Ab e 84 n t party hadtopresenta Fur d r publicpostsandfor e u nt. k the Suprem r i h onPublicService t n azian he 82 ov g tran
, Fizu r m and at th or sitio plied quite li M e i , Geo n, th t nistrative e lackof e Soviet h n u e made e i itself stafaev nority 1999 is o r ublic g i an). ent f ,
CEU eTD Collection persons. m 31). DuringSaakashvili’spresid agencies andtheinm the loc 88 87 86 Georgian. sphere. Accordingtoa2003am rules was applied use graduallyencouragedintegration.However, was tobeusedforallgovernm to befluentinGeorgian.Finally,the2005Se m p was noreferencetotheneedforminorities’de had elem was basedontheprincipleofm 1995 and2008thelangu r Au Fo Th esi i e nistries mbership intheCentralElectionComm d e Electio tho r wereh en Since 2003,thestatelegislationstrengthenedev During bothSaakashvili’sandShevarnadze’s All re 4.2.7. Bureaucracy: d a cies, I r e ’s i l au 88 term ents typ started 86 Overall,itisonlyatthebeginningof n terv levan n Anotheram thorities d differedco in in a Co rdly evera in terv iew g d th e t iewed m of i to legis with cal fortheaccom e
G ref d e
i e Nair Iritsian,th sc orgia, asam l gree o ation o nsiderab endm u i age policiesbecam ouraged it.Mostadm pplied n se docum o rity representativ f inform ent totheElectionCode
e n ntal sessions(IC and theuseofRussianwascommon.
en ly b bureau endm ency, therelevantlawswere e d e mayo ritocracy, ents in e i al m nority di d at14 e u tween the odation repe ent tothe cratic recru s e ofnon r es in au o Ru f e m ission Akh gu reg stricts wereconductedinRussian(Lohm 134 professionalism, andnon- i ssian com st nistrative contactsbetweenstategovernm o lf-Governance LawestablishedthatGeorgian a i G, 2006;26). r scrip -Georg 20 two presid on lkalak Election Code,MPswere e the degreeinwhichth 1990s thatthelanguagepoliciesinGeorgia andm and theDis 03 s itm rto p with . r tive i i d esidencies theform ent ever (2005)providedthatallcandidatesfor re ofs ian en m m i i strict. langu o rep ng from i re integration n en o o r re theroleofGeorgianinpublic r t ity territo cies. ate-m
esentation t
ag rict Elec adopted inGeorgiasince1991 m es in localagenciesan During o i re strictlyenforced.Most nor rial con pub 87 tion Comm ity relations.Between Neithe i discrim st. e relev in theadministrative lic lifed al rulesonlangu Shevarnad cen requiredtospeak t r r atio i a th nation. There nt le u r n. e s issions had i n g d d natu gisla t z ate, no e these , 2007; i fferen ental tio age ral n r t
CEU eTD Collection terr for between 2005and2006. bureaucracy 23). Hence,sinceindependenceGeorgia com to poorknowledgeofGeorgian(theexam these exam the law, 90 89 apparatus atdifferentlevels. qualification exam years aftertheRoseRevolution,whenpres significant percentageofAzeris key bureaucraticposthavebeenm occupied predom Akhakalaki (Lohm argue thatsinceind m bureaucratic integration. See See i norities inthebu m ito p ation ofpoliticalpartieson Article 2in Art laints, laterthetestingstar The f The tendencytowardsintegration There wasanattem 4.2.8. PoliticalParties: ria , 2007;Popjanevski,2006;Wheatley,2006) i lly basedpar c l e 2 , inations rules i whereArm -related rst I i n th t h e Law e wereslightly ndependent GeorgiaL inantly byArm La inations fortheholdersof wastodeterm leg e reaucratic apparatus bo pen tie o ur n i s. Neverthe C d slation and Po e p ence m nians constitu ode t tostrength litical Asso 89 o
Therefore,therelev loos f
(Popjanevski,2006;47). Ge ted tobeconsistentlyperfor ethnic and/orterritorialbasis. i e norities hav ine theleve nians. Inth or e o less, even practices gi n ci stly heldbyethnicGeorgians, ed, asth a ( atio e wh 2 n evenf sinc te 95 0 a n 0 s w onPolitic en wasalsoreflectedin 6 ini
o ). f 135 e 1991.Thes Georg e various publicposts.Alth an ng language)werereported.Duetom % of l of ey im e regionswithethnica after thes be ident Saakashvili’sgovernm tended tosupportinte u d professionalexpertise, rther en always a i this posed restrictions nt legal a (19 popul thebureauc . Onlyintheadm tende e amendm 9 a 1 l Associations(199 ) ation, havekeypublicpostsbeen . c fram u holars m ncy waspa 90 nder-repres e W d withtranslators(ICG,2006; e w ents theethnicpartieswere theactu ith the1997a andinternationalreporters r ork inGeorgiaencouraged atic integ even lly mixedpopulationthe only ontheformationof ough them casesoffailuresdu gration throughits e inth rticula nted inbureaucracy a i l representation nistrative district e r a nt i 1) f tion inthef e dis r m ly in m endments to o a plem t rbade the in goalof ricts with i tensif norities ented i ied of rst e ’
CEU eTD Collection Therefore, byvirtueofitsunitary However, becausere Javakheti to theSovietprincipleof“de integration. 91 two separatistregionsAbkhaziaandSouthOsse constitution leftopenedtheques there werenoregionsw Adjara region,whichbetween1991and2004func these effects population. Thisdeterm organizational basisandprogramm Although thelegislationslight polic party, whichwasdeniedregistrationin1999 refused reg nine regionswerefor state ter Georgia weregroupedinninebigregions,whic these d of thesedistricts,Arm See ies on Article 2in
Since itsdeclarationofindependence,Geor 4.2.9. Intern Georgia isorganizedin i r stricts ( itor , knownforitspredom politica i stration by ial structu streng th Akhalkalaki e Con al PoliticalBoundaries: thened thein l pa s r m theMin titu in e. r e ties ined m ed thedistrictspopul nian andAzerim Asthe2002censusda ith specialself-govern tegra t i o sin n and ofGeorg m tion n 65adm
i ce th i norities’ leadersto ocratic centrali tegrati stry ofJustice. ly liberalizedin1997,partie
tion ch inantly Arm Ninotsminda a e beginn aracter, stateterritorialstruct e i tic focusbeyond a (199 of ver happe i on repertoireofstate-minorityrelations. nistrative state 5). i norit ing 136 te ated predom T e zation” (Khaindravaet ing statusesinpost-S ) for nian ta presentedinTableIV.3illus ned, thisp of r ies constitu districts thatwerecreatedin1 h h addedonem r (ICG, 2006;17).Therefore,theGeorgian jointhem is wasthecaseofth tia wouldbereintegratedinthecountry. ito trans gia wasalwaysaunitarystate.Excep population.In1995,the65districtsof tioned asadefactoterritorialautonom m ria thehistorical-g the interestsofaparticularcategory l ition org inantly byAzerisandArm te anabsolu a strong a r nization f ovision is instream o ure ofGeorgiaisinlinewith s stillneededastatewide re tierofgovernmenttothe ly en oviet Georgia.T parties.W al., 2004;24).Inseven e pro-Arm eographical regionof o oflittlerelevanc r couraged te m thetim a 921, according t jority. ra e ith nodoubt, es whenthe te, whenthe integration. nian “Virk” Twoof h e 1995 e nians t for y, e. 91
CEU eTD Collection 92 percen Georgian districts.Thenewlyform population. were groupedwithdistricts Azeri d character ofthestateterritori for autonom ethnic regionsin1995thegovernm not in and 2008,in changes intheseboundaries,theirintegr Regions a Sou Table IV.3.TheEthnicCompositionofMinori
m districts districts Sams ation ofthe9regions,theirboundariesst r The predominantlyArmenian Graph IV.2illus ce: Repub m Kvem tage o i stricts tkhe a ies atdistrictlevel(CIP n jority. Itis d di o-Kar Ni -Javakhe Ru Tet Ak accord f Ak Gar Ar stricts Aspi M lic of Dm B Adi n B Boln stav Tsal hal hal r o o a i o d t Tsqa rne r m s t l ani j g a n nd k t li region m om i s
b eni k e i al G Et i u s City i ani isi a k z nians than s ance withthenin n i a l e ti re
i i believedth
a h hni i
d r
k
or
e o , t
a i rates th
g D c gr gion i a Popu m o anisi u
p al structure.Asbetween1995a s
e dynam latio
Ja , and at by with vakh n Geo Cen DD, 2002).Re Marneuli ethn e Ja eti m r ed i 3 5 1 74 policyarea gians s
8 Georgia (%) 4 8 4 2 8 9 6 8 cs ofstate-m 1 3 2 1 5 us vakheti ative logicwaspreserved. e
5 8 3 7 4 6 2 2 regiontakensepa e
nt wa rging th Samstkhe-Javakheti D ically- a ta, 137 w 2 regionwasunitedwithfourpredom rengthened evenm nted 002 e e ethn m re fusedwithdistrict Arm s discu . ty PopulatedRegionsandDistrictsin gardless ofthereasonsthatledto ixed orwithpr topreventthetrendstowardsethnic i 92 nority relatio e 5 1 9 1 9 3 5 10
6 2 6 8 3 1 1 nians 5 0 6 7 4 7 5 ic m
ssed rate i nority above.Itsh regionhadconsiderablyless ly. Sim nd 2008therewerenorelevant ns inGeorgiabetween1 dis o Azeris re thealready-integrative ilarly 4 6 8 6 4 1 edo
0 4 0 t 0 0 0 0 0 6 s inwhichAzeriswere 5 6 3 7 4 0 r
i
cts into m ows thatdu , thep inantly Georgia large r edominantly Othe 2 10
4 2 6 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 ring the 3 r
inantly m
r u 991 lti- n
CEU eTD Collection com the friendliestpoliciestowardsethn highest degreesofm m 93 eight policyareas. integrationist, butstill integrationist overtim m accomm accomm civic associations,alldom consequently, the“nationalizing”pathofst transition periodGeorgiafollowedtheintegrati Graph i i norities’ identityp norities’ mobiliza p arison revealsthatbym When thedynam co odat odat m p il i i ed on/in onist atthebeginningof Graph IV.2.State-Min
b y th tegration continuu e au tion i norities’ re r i e eservation su t cs oftheseninepolicyareas preserved thehighestdegreeofinte h . Thepoliticalparties’ againstthe or, b a i sed
ddle of1990s,when ains eventually
o bellion andprotestinGeorgiaoccurredtheperiods with n th ic m stated ch ase e m. TheGra trans o q rity Re u i a nor litativ i tion th ities i ate buildingp ducation, religion,andlan scu 138 e lations inGeorgia(1991-2008) approached d d , ssed inCha on repertoireofstate- a i.e.between1991and1994.Inaddition,th ta an o an ph alsorevealsthatGeorgiawasm im m iscom twentyy a portant ethnicity-relat alyzed in wastheonly r i p o n theinteg p g ared withthedynam cess. Exceptforthepolicieson sectio ter 3,onecanobserve ears later.Importantpo r ation ifco n s
4 . 2 on minority relationsand . 1 r guage becam . mpared totheother ation end -4.2 e tha ed policiessuchas .9 93 .
t bec ics ofethnic onth a lic thatth m e more ies fo e less o re e e e r
CEU eTD Collection data showthatm unfavorable policies polic opportunity structuretheoriesthatin“m im satisfied whenaccommodation unf fragm policy dom step closertowardsintegrati during Saak more integrationistthantheywerebe presiden more integrationistthantheywerebe above), onecanrev the powerconcentratio language. protested againstunfavorable the stateoccurredbetw unf integrationist, m education, language,church-state plies tha avorable- avorable polic ies unf Overall, in Moreover, whenthedynam e nted powerbetween2001and2003. cy, thepoliciesonlanguage,educatio t ains -languageandreligionbecam thecase ashvili’s pr avorable tothem f o r-m i caseofGeorgiatheconcentr i ies tow norities protes norities’ levelofprotest inorities policych eal thatinperio to of e wards m Georgia een 2003and2008,whenArm n discussed s a idency thebillof rds m on, ascom . Atthesam i i policy changesinthefields ted norities’ in st (ratherthanin i nor co i cs ofthesenine relations,andinternalpolit whensta inChapte ities n nf anges were d tween 1991and1994.Sim s with irm fore. Between1995and2000duringShevarnadze’s p ared totheprevious s rights e ecess the ter ti ajor t po e 139 e was insignificant.The m policie sts implications ofconsocia r 2(com a e wer concentrationim f itarian” dem n , rily raisetheirp , thecaseofGeorgiadoesnotconfirmthat bureaucra , tegration o , if ation ofpower andintern dom llowed bym e oneassum m s did a o ins iscomparedwiththedynam e re integra parison representedinGraphIV.2 nians in i notm st) policies c y, andeducationdom o period.Atthesam al politicalboundariesbecam of education,bureaucracyand cracies m e ical boundariesbecam i ilarly, between2004and2008 s thatm norities ove towardsm r wenthandinwith otest agains Sams tion portant po o i are im st inth ’ n t i tionalist andpolitical mobiliza khe-Javakh i norities ly pe norities riskfacing plem t thestate.The riod inwhic o e per licies becam ’ re inte inte ains m tion e ented. This tim eti i rests a od with agains region e gration e m i , two a cs in de a o re r h e e e t
CEU eTD Collection integrationist. and thatin boundaries isrelevant.Inthefollow existence of determ Orthodox. Therefore,forthecaseofMoldova linguistic ones.Accordingtothe2004populati Taraclia Bulgarian territorial autonom South, andinTransdniestria.Incontrast,m spread throughoutthecountry,w different degreesofterritorialconcentrati while exclusivem throughout theconstitutionaltext,referencesare people” iscom when theyf areas evolvedinMoldova The boundariesbetweenreligiousgroupsinMo In post-SovietMoldovatherearefourrela The authorsofthe1994Moldovanconstituti 4.3. TheDynamicsofS 4.3.1. OfficialDiscourse: ining thepathchosenforstate-build , w s havesom h som o ter ere th rm posed bothbyMoldovansandc r ulated thetextoffundam itorially e ey co instancesm e y called ntioning ofparticularnation e territor nstitu concentrate between 1991and2008. Gagauzia te 65 i t al co ate-Minority i norities didnot % ofthelocalpopulation. ith som ncentr i d ng sub-sect inwhichtheycons m i ation e on. Amongthe norities pocketsofterritoria 140 Relations inPost-SovietMoldova: o e st t nt ing process.Ontheotherhand,becauseof oo: 43%ofthem Gagauzians(87%)liveintheSouth ions, Ianalyzehowthe al law.ThePream al groupsareonlym tively sizeableethni , protestwhenpolicies on census,93%ofMoldovancitizensare m thelegis on didnotrefertoonenationexclusively a itizens ofotherethnicorigin.Moreover, de mostlytothe“citizensofMoldova”, church-state relation ldova donotcoincidewiththeethnicor m titute , theUkrainiansandRussiansare l a tion onpa 82% ofthelocal l concentrationintheNorth, liveintheSoutherndistrict ble statedthat“Moldovan c m a de inthestipulations rties andon eight relevantpolicy didbecomem i nority groupswith is notrelevantfor population. inte rnal o re
CEU eTD Collection population integ people”. Incontrast,theoffici status atthelevelofsecondstatelanguage. prom linguistic characterofthecountr Politics ofMoldovaad encouraged integration. Moldova, thegeneralpoliticalm 1990s wereinlinewithintegr speeches inRussian. Ju 2 S used within Moldovan –andguaranteestheri Moldova andoftenreferredtoit.T accomm attem in linewiththelanguag dem 98 97 96 95 94 about grouprightsprotection. S integ 000 u u Seeth MirceaSne Sn See Seeth n v v e erana erana o 199 egu . cracy r r ote theuseofRuss Article 13in p At thelevelofofficialdi Theref ation. Althoughth ate in ted am e Preamb r 2;
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i Pre scour 96 No d to asingle,unitary, thestate. ore, thecons g / , theyprom s i el ur’s Speech i on than d vemb ect se “Popo b l ent e and er 19 th u i ons/ f L lti-national d e Con Co e u r 1 t 92 ci p h in nksi arl e ru mm ; Lu 996 95 s Art . S l tr titutio opted in20 i tegration. Heputastron ot Therefore,sinceitsadoption e usedintheconstitution.Inc am ey generally ian languageinsociety u di . MirceaSne cink titu f ebuie intre i ed theformationofacivi n at cles 2 ent ists Man sa ul n grees tional pream si d a
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o ry al politicaldiscoursebetween f an i Repu i / 94 nd decentralizedMoldovancomm sco sag y. Moreover,thethirdpresident 2 scourse, thefirsttw e wi d 10 0 ation: despiterec Theconstitutionprovides ssage accentuatedthegoaltoin i , b 0 ght topreserveanddevel i
r fest u 03 that at siascultat” 1 t ees with g 12 h h b / rse inh acknowled ur: Fede i op th l is part Febr i n o c po
fo e id ofMo th ne e Con ble and r t ea of th uary nt stro 98 ralizati 141 h s/ e i l Mostim d e 200 pcr s i icularly visibleinth ov d federalizatio titu s m [ ngly em 1 ea o t g he Peopl and hispartyevensupportedtheraiseofits 9 a m g th on m ed them 9 t (1 i er accentonthem / 4 o p 1 f ; e 994 n ro c stateinwhichal
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u u (accessed on7August, Mo u st s lti-ethnic characterofM 2001and2008wasinlinewith op Russianandotherlanguages . c lic ofMo beaske i l nski Av dov n . only onestatelanguage–
r Mol often referredtotheneed ailab a Suve atization. tegrate allgroupsinto“one ’ unity. s el e ConceptionofNational presidents alsoprom d a dov l u l d e ect u lti-eth ov n l ethnicgroupswould r lti-ethnic characterof e, encourag a Suve u d a 97 on or a lti-ethn l n Thisdiscoursewas (1 al i a lin Mol s , 1 c a t
994 e nic characterof ou e at: ny ofhisofficial m ned t r 4 d a a Sept ov 2010). rse du ). n ni e a i ntal lawhas a S fest c andm , 14S o h ] e , ttp m u
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CEU eTD Collection and to contributethepreservationanddeve politics, theaccess m 2001. TheLawstipulatedarangeofgrouprightsfo Another suchstepwastheadoptionofLa must beadjustedaccordingly) during the1990scontaine languages, aswelltherighttochoose constitutional provisionsthat these principleswereratherform Article 3in Convention fortheProtectionofNationalMinorities. 102 101 100 99 discrim the state. accomm line withintegration,asthea based territorialautonom in 2003theparliam are onlyafirststepforprovidinggrouprightsto SeeArticle4 i See No See nority lan rat te: Mo However, attheendof1996Moldovanpa The legislationadoptedduri Hence, atth i 4.3.2. BillofRights: Articles 13 Articles 1-25 f i i e nation onethnicbasisandcitizens’ri odat d i t h t ldo o e Electo guages in i n i on, astheg v
n 13 a sig th an N i e e beginningof1990sthefor d 35 n r o Law n toinform al C th vem e e d nt introduced e Law i t p n o on h b th de; Article4in e Eu er ublic lif Po y ( e e Con d ethnic-basedgrouprights. 19 neral politicalm o litical Ţ rop n 9 ation inm Mino dopted legislationm veatcov, 2009;70). 6
, itsratificationsign . T s ean guaranteedtheprotectionof titu Parties(199 e, th h ulated asi C e C rities (2 tio ng the1990sinMoldovaguara in theconstitutions o t n o n h e par
nve v of Mo e Law en i nority lan 001 nt tio lopm i tic o n fo 1); Articles10 l ndividual thanasgrouprights.Exceptforthe1994 e ). d on n e ssage ov ipation andr 142 So m n ght todeveloptheirownethnicidentity. r th ent of a t w ontheProtectionofNationalMinoritiesin language ofeducation,no e (1 ulatio cial Asso r guages, andthes e e ethnic m a 99 d i ified astepcloser accen inly guarant Pro rliam 4). r Moldovanm m n t 100 n t tipulations aboutGagauziaasanethnic- o ection 101 i and ofthebillo
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th 997 e Con nteed theprinciplesofnon- t i b ate’s o n norities, suchastheuseof f tion r ). a rightsinM ua ic id towards accommodation. u l Mi lti-n s ry titu inadm 1 n entity. b e 9 o tion a legaltextadopted 9 inte ligation ofthes rities o tional characterof 8 . ofM
rnal leg 102 i o nistra n ldova wasin o 13 Inaddition ldo July1 v tion and a i 99 i slation
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CEU eTD Collection th b is u researc p languages. accomm All thesefactsindicatethatcivi provided inMoldovan their m Soviet UnioninMoldovadidguaranteetheright education intheirm 106 105 104 103 the state’sobligationtosupportthem. civic associations.Bes com while in2001theadoptionof and thenon-discrim the statehasgivensom benefited ofbuildingsthatthestateputat officially registered.Theybenefitedoftotalor own social,cultural,orscient y o e au See In A Article th litically sen s ed u p e Mo t t lete shifttowardsaccommodation. h The legalprovisionsrelatedtoeducationthat Moldovan legislationhasneverim h to h fact th 4.3.4. Education: 4.3.3. CivicAssociations: Article 18in or’s or
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’s i odat ther tongue.The1989LanguageLawstipulat d d 1 ov e intheLawon p si 106 n at o a si g s t sitio e itiv in i n The1995LawonEducationalsog on reperto r a v n te t th i e issu ce th e n th ws
e Con h o e langu n e Law wi th e b e an i o nation princip t e issu
s h e So ther tongueandtheoblig i titu g Gal e des allowin i d th 105 re duringth i o ci financialsupportfor ag nnin n tio al Asso
e. andRussian(w e ofM i th e fo na R n ofM e Fu g oftran
cus o o ific associations.By2000,forty- d n ciatio o g c associationpolicies
a sp c ldov ovai of Do o tion ldo g f sition nu e wholetransitionperiod. l theirform e. In1996 n a a’s titu i v ecial lawforethn a s ng n a (1 m 103 n a th
l e d posed anyre , o d 997 th ro I Since1991,m f e Lero Langu g lar ethn u their disposal(C e co n or s ); a d 143 m Articles 18 Pi y e the im rrect n e partialtaxexem a b v “Mo Dyer (1 ag tion andactivity,therele a ova a stepclosertoaccommodationwasm ic t ation ofthestatetoprovidenecessary e es (1 u here needed group s. Foran aranteed r. f w l a o do ple striction inthefor m e r m 989 999 ed thateducationat re everelaborateds e in Moldovahavebeenlinewiththe v -22 o . a m ic m n Th ). o f i ). In inth ” entation oftheirculturalprojects. titu norities tobe st ethnicm ex isin is u th OE, 2000).Moreover,since1991
ten i lar eth th e Lawon nor s e rightofminoritiestoreceive ) alsoin d e is is th s i ption andsom iv cated ities’ protectionindicateda e d six suchassociationswere on n esis, i c group ly in i as scu Minorities(2 i nority groupshadtheir on m nef well. Th ssi stru theoth ation ofethnic-based ly th vant lawsstipulated on i ’s lan all levelswouldbe it of nce thecollaps m o e n e n f th e is t instructionin g a al an oft m u d 001 e issu a e o e g “Mo e r m e d s ). h
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CEU eTD Collection available at:
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wers 1999 144 r 8) ag ( s 2 , tage ofRussian-language 0 m 2000 es inspecialclasseswithinRussian-speaking M ”, pu 0 presents thepercentageofsecondaryschool i educationavailab 1 Russian,orinMoldovan.Onlyabout0.8% nt_stiin o -
ld 2001 2 bl 00 ov p/invata i parallelwiththe s 8) 2002 a he n educationpolicieshaveencouraged ta/invatam , M Dep
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CEU eTD Collection com 2009). non-Russian m since independencetheeducationinRussianhasb was thatnon-Russianminoritieswerebeinginte funda the issuebyMoldovangovernm the lackof when non-Russianm language teaching.Boththese language schoolsduringthefirs m even whenitcom than thedoubleofRussiangr groups. ConsideringthatUkrainians,Bulgarians other m parents tooptforsecondaryschoolinstruction 110 becam education wasconductedpredom explained atleastthroughtwof Moldova. T a “Problem ny schoolsthatwerebilingualduringtheS e s totheRussianm Hence, Moldovaneducationpolicieshavebeeninlinewithaccomm The absenceofinstructioninotherm m e them e i nority languages(Chinn ntal righttonon-RussianSlavicm s oftheR e h ducation e decreaseofRussian-languagein a i in languageofinstructionh nority languagespersistedduring u e ssians s toRussianm in i norities ofSovietMoldovawe Ukrainian, in i nority andinlinewith Moldova”
factors constitutedastep actor & Roper,1998;91;CREDO,2008). oup, thisintegrationeffe t yearsafterindependence, inantly inRu Gagauzian e , i in nority, at nt, ratherth s. Thef Kishinevskie N i norities i i nority 145 rs and Bulgarianm the beginningof1990s t istha ovi ssian. Atthebeginningof1990sMoldovan integra grated in i struction atthebeginningof1990scanbe gher edu an from in Moldovanlanguage. , andGagauziansconstitutetogetherm een usedas et Unionwerere-organizedasMoldovan- thewholeperiodoftransition(P o . Nevertheless,theeff languages isinherite vosti re m t dur closer towardsintegration. , Decem tion whenitco a to theRussianethnicgroup inly educatedinRussian.T itsunwillingnesstoguaranteea c ing ct ha ation, theSov asubstitutefortheeducationin ber 4 a y result s beensignificant.Moreover, which reducedtheRussian- 110 th whichdeterm , 199 The lackofeducationin i et Uniontheu the educationpolicies m from 3, d fromSoviettim ect ofthisignorance e p. 2. The secondisthat s tootherm theignoranceof odation whenit ined m , because h n erefore, ivers ivovar, i nority a o es, i ny re ty
CEU eTD Collection (199 speaking citizens,becau fluent inbothlanguages.Atthebeginningof em According totherelevantlaws,Moldovancitize elem Union andtherefore,couldnotus
accomm Therefore, atafirstglance,languagelegislation through aprocessofcadreattestation. year term elected Moldovanparliam political participation.However,theattest im 114 113 112 111 with ter relevant lawsguaranteedtheuseofm free useinpublicsphereofm Moldovan languageteaching. m bilingu ( 200 a See Dec SeeArticle3 See posed theknowledgeofMoldovanlanguage ployees eitherinRussian,orMoldovan,whichim de asteptowardsin 4); Article7 1) ent wassignificantlystrengthenedin1992, . However, Moldovanlanguagelegi The legislationeveradoptedinMoldova r 4.3.5. StateLanguages: Article 2in Art ee alism, becauseRussianhadthestatusof
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(198
ecree m (1 ges inpubliclife,esp 114
a 9 (17 thenabandonedtheideaaltogether. 8 9); Article8 9 plies thatpublicemployeesneedtobe Jun ) age teach ;
Art eant m e , i f c 199 inter-ethniccommunication. l e 3 ey, 1994).Thisintegrationis 4). in i ing wasreducedinfavorof n o th t re integ it integrationistelem h e Lawon e cree establishedatwo- Law m ecia atic fortheRussian evaluatedby1994 unicate withpublic o s beeninlinewith r n lly inth Nation ation becauseit i St norities’ social- at us a of l Mino e regions e Soviet G ent and a gauzi rities ent. 112 a t
CEU eTD Collection On l Natio Moldovan andinRussian, resided hasbeenacceptedinbothlanguages. communication betweenthecentr com bilingualism. Between2001and2002thegoverning beginning of1990stoencourageintegration, the statusofRussianbygrantingitth 118 h 117 116 115 sphere. Accordingtothelegi party continueditsattemptsto However, becauseth im respective nativelanguages(Chinn&Roper, significan language hasbeenextensivelyus negligible. NGOreportsonlanguage concentrated legis extensive useinofficialdiscourses. a ttp ng “TheR “Th See SeeA lin portant integrationistelem ://www.azi uage” pulsory itsstudyinMoldovanschools, n l e av ation g Generally, since1991theRussianlanguageha As farasnon-Russianm a e Article 3in l Mi Faction r ailab , t u pu i c t Bulgarian,Gagauzian, ssi n l o e an s 9and rities (200 l .m u m e at: aranteed th o bl d l a th / i f i ng n nority p th s h e he e Law ttp ws uage e Partyo 1 d 1 ://www.azi.m ? 1). ese attem i I D=1 –i n o t b n opulation, inreality h y s eir freed th e 714 i
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sts l Azi Gag e e s voked si d lopm I u D=17 on 7August policiesinMoldovareveal e nct a a rvi e statusofsecond u u n i z ce , 28Decem oni ent a ia 118 c 238 h thei of i e (1 147 ng gnif andalsobyopeningastateS d
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p 2010). Art ted toincreaseevenm thatinpracticeRussian
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CEU eTD Collection Bu 42 o in theparliam it rem 120 119 single statelanguageandbyignor accomm accomm languages inprivatecommunication. m the ethnicminoritieshavebeenre and legalorgans provided fortheproportionalrepresentationofet posts. Theonlyexceptionwasthe2001Lawon stipulation toguaranteethedescriptiverepres principle forpersonnelrecruitm they wereth language policiesweretheclos language inpubliclife.Overall,theperi between 1992and1994whenthegovernm languages inpublicsphere,Moldovanlanguagepo n a See Accord % of 7Aug lg jority ofBulgarian, arian There havebeennospecialm Therefore, Moldovanlanguagepoliciessince The Moldovanlegislationsinceindependen a 4.3.6. Bureaucracy: Article 24in ined importantatdeclarativelevelonly. Uk u ing . odat odat
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n, h est tointegration, o odat ttp pu t 69% ection in the2001-20 p lation Cen ent inthebu ://www.statistica.m bilingu echanism r andUkrainianm ing therightofthreelarge e i 119 ofGa on. s ented inth
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Data z a e entation ofethniccommunitiesinkeypublic i a l Min localpublicadm nt attem n 02 e loc whileintheperiodbetween2001and2002 the P Moldovan s reaucratic apparatus.Therehasbeenno ce wasgenerallybasedonthem hnic groupsinstatepolitical,bureaucratic, speak d on sure therepresentationofethnicm 1991 hadbothelem /p o period. licies havebeenintegrationist,aboveall “lan ag rities (2 a r i l coun otection ofNationalMinorities,which ev norities haveb gu p iew.ph Gaga n ted toreducetheuseofRussian ag e Atthesam 001 ver beenim es cils languagepolicieshavebeen uzi p ). usu ? a l=ro&id m of n, a a i nistra i lly spo nority groupstousetheir the nd een usingtheirnative e re ents ofintegrationand c 55 plem tion. Tosomeextent, =2 tim k en % ofB gions in 95 b e, byprovidinga &i ented inpractice, y ethn d = u 223 l ic m whichthey g ari e 4 ritocracy (accesse a i i n ns spea norities o r ities”, h d k
CEU eTD Collection 2 m exception hasbeentheGagauzianrepresen respective d am A 1998amendm m for the representation ofm 124 123 122 121 repres Moldova, theParliam such asthe constitute asignif the Law.T Minorities E least halfofMoldovanadm because them hindered thefor groups inMoldovacontainsignificantlym gradually liquidated,withoutanequi
007 e i See SeeArticle5in See Au ni endm mber, whichwasguaranteedbythe ). m tho The firstpost-SovietMoldovanLawonPolitical Before 2001som On theotherhand,legislationim 4.3.7. PoliticalParties: Article 17in Article 5in entation inthestateRadio- u r m ’s i ent 300m m n decreaseditto4000. w terv Comm ducation withintheMinistryofEducation ation ofpartiesonethnicbasis. e o ofthefourbiggestethnicm m i ni iews withIg th ographic predom m th e th m ent totheLawincreasedthis e Law mbers, whichallowedeventosm i ation ofethnicparties. can e Law e u ission f m num i Law on norit t m e o e ntary Comm o n consultativebodiesform a n Po or Pi ies inthebureaucraticapparatus. jority.
th Po ber ofmem litical Parties( i o e Statu nistrative units. r Inter v
litical Parties(ado o v 121 a inance than r and s T However,this of 123 V - valent replacem E ittee forHu
Gag However,consider com Galin thnic Rela 1994 LawontheStatusofGagauzia. b 199 ers required a u a R z 1, an p o ia 124 tative intheMoldovangovernm any Board,aswellthe re 149 peded th o For theregistrationofapartylawrequired p (1 i gov Thisprovisionwaskept nority groupsinMoldov t from than 5000people,theseam d alsom ed 994 tions bythePresidentofRepublic num localrepr i aya. m n ). all ethnicgroupstof i specificpolicym
nor a ent (Pivovar,2009). 1 n RightsandNationalMino for partyregis 991 b o e creationofregionalparties.Thisis . Thesebodiescouldprovideam er to5000andla d ity-related issuesex Partiesdidnotintr i an ficatio ing es d Butafter2001theyhavebeen al entation re thatthemajor n so s
o th f 199 e m t ratio 8 and o d o e s Division ofNational in allam i a –Gagauziansand chanism rm ficatio u n hadtores ter in2007another
lted rathe endments havenot 200 122 isted inMoldova, theirownparties. oduce restrictions e 7). ity of n nt as s
fro s endments to . Theonly m r rities, th m ex-offic f 1 i de in r 9 om i i nority 9 ni 8 and m the io a at e l
CEU eTD Collection of federalism elem claim speaking m parties. Atthebeginningof1990s, they have sam legislative provisionim Bulgarians –havesignificantte principle ofterritorialstructur fra the conflictwithTransd closer towardstheaccommodationist repe the Statusof autonom country. Itwasforthesethree constituted anabsolute During theSovietUnionandin Transdnies inherited from governance oftheterritoriallyconcentrated m e ework ofafederal ents ofinteg tim s Since thecollapseofSovietUnion,Moldova During thefirstyearsofindependence,Mo 4.3.8. Intern . Therefore,intheperiodoftransition y atthebeginningof1990s.In1994, e n , thisprov tr o i norities ia andover Gagauzia,whichcreatedtheGaga ter appearedonpolitic theSovietperiod,exceptthat r itor r ation andelem al PoliticalBoundaries: ’ isio ial concentratio interests.Later n wasnotre m state, posed restrictionsforth theSouthe niestria. a jority in the ideawaseventuallyaband e, therehavebeeninternalboun thefirstpost-inde ents ofaccommodation. However, al agendaatthebeginningof rritorial concentration.Itispa units thatthelocalGagauzia n. Theleg strictive threeadm theparties rn regi Unitate-Ed rtoire ofstate-m GagauzianandBulgarianm on whereGagauzianshadcom f because thep 150 o i the polic slation p r theRussianandUkrainianm uzian territorialautonom i nistrative unitsintheSouthernpartof e form Ravnopravie i itlos nstvo Party pendence years,the Moldovan Parliam has alwaysbeenaunitarystate.Theidea ldova preservedthete e ies onpolitica ation ofownpoliticalparties.Atthe rm t its i nority relations. itted th a rts reach oned. DespiteMoldova’sunitary author claim and 2000sasasolutionforsolving daries organizedtoallowself- n elitesdem rticularly forth em Patria-Rodina e tof ed n ity overtheregionof d torepresen l e par nt i Gagauzian population nority groups. y. Thisim o o adopted theLawon rm ties com agreem rritorial structure ethnica i a p noritie nded territorial act settlem em hadsim plied astep b ent onth t Russian- ined both thatthis s becau lly ba e ilar se nt. s d e e
CEU eTD Collection Bulgarian regions. However,bytheendof1999, adm central governm governance toBulgarian have anyspecialadm unit locatedintheSouthhadapredom (notably throughlinguistic and The Graphalsoshowsthat theshortattem boundaries wereontheaccommodation m elem this dynam 1991 and2008,inaccordancewiththeeightpolic established in1994werepreserved attem to thecreationofanethnicallybasedterr boundaries in1994im Bulgarians, noethnicallydriven encouraged country. Sincethen,therehasbeennoothera i norities. Im i ents of nistrative reform p Am Graph IV.4illustratesthedynam Hence, theinternalpoliticalboundaries t tore-approachintegrationwasm ong the40Moldovanadm T i integration cs revealsthatduringthetransiti a integ raclia portant dom ent attem r was ation t i plied asignif nistrative , h declaredas becausethecountry m withe at aim p a i norities. Asdescri ted tofusetheun ins suchaseducati education policiesandthrough theinternalboundaries)failed. e territorial boundaries.However,therestructuringofinterna d atregr l status, itsethnicprofileallo ements of through theentiretransitionperiod. i icant stepclosertothea nistrative units the10 inantly i i cs ofstat st sid p ouping the40Moldovanunitsintoninebigger itorial autonom t to a th accomm 151 ttempt tom Bulgarianpopulation.A on periodtheMoldovangovernm de andthesm b e approach integrationat e idea wasabandonedandthepredom alm , theaccommodationist hadaunitarycharacterandexceptfor d inChapter3,attheen on, language,politicalparties,an ofMoldovaatthebeginning1990s it withaneighboringone,aspartofan y areasdiscussedabove.Agenerallookat e-minority relations createdduring o st duringtheentireperiodoftransition. odation inits odi allest adm y. Exceptfor1999,whenafailed fy itsadm ccommodationist repertoire,du wed acertaindegreeofself- the SovietUnion, i i nistrative regionofthe thebeginningof1990s lthough theunitdidnot nistrative boundaries. relations withethnic in Moldovabetween d of1998Moldovan internal boundaries e nt com d intern Taraclia inantly b ined al e l
CEU eTD Collection 125 tim Overall, theGraphprovesthatpost-Soviet protest eveniftherewerenom decreased. Ontheotherhand,Gagauziansdu and in m policies atthebeginningof1990s,onecan a transition period.Consideringtheapproachtowa the greatestam m m i i i Graph norities’ mobiliza norities’ mobiliza norities’ protes e. When thedynam ternal boundaries–approachedaccomm co m p il Graph IV.4.State-Min ed ount ofintegr
b y ts. Atthesam th tion e au tion i t f cs ofthesepolicyareas h againstth or, o r protestandrebellio b a ationist policiesattem
sed oves ofgovernm e
tim o n th e statedisc o e e rity RelationsinMold , they q u a litativ ear inwhichtwoi 152 Moldova becam odation, e ring thelate1990sand2000sm e n d ussed inChapter3,o nt a ssum at thebeginningof rds integrationoflinguisticandeducation ta an is comparedwiththedynam towardsmoreintegra p ted by alyzed thed e thattheycausedatleastsom i e Moldovan governm n gree ofeth ova (1998-2008) e sectio m m portant dom o re ac n s 1990sdidcoin
4 . 3 n . commodationist over n tion attitudes.Hence, 1 ic m e canobservetha . -4.3 i .8 ains –language norities’ p 125 .
e i nt duringits cs ofethnic obi cide with lized for r otest e of t
CEU eTD Collection 65% ofRussiansp According tothelatter,by2001Easternregion m parts ofthecountry.Therefore,inasse ethnic UkrainiansuseR rela towards politicalpartiesandinternalboundaries Rom with ce from f conclusion, theperiodswith of rightsandattem 2008 thecentralgovern boundaries policieswitham with concentratedpower,thegovernm m observes thatthecentralgovern concentratio unfavorable governm the com a i i vorable p norities, Idonotconsideronlyth nority friendlythanintheperiodswithdisp tions. a theaccomm In UkrainetheRussiansareonlyethnic When thed 4.4.TheDynamicsofState-Min nians, andHungariansareal rta p T arison showsthatnotina i n degreeof o h n discussed lic e ethno ies towa odation repertoire. ynam eakers, while -po e ter p ntal policies t i rds m litica m cs oftheseeigh e u inChapter d toim r ssian astheirm e ito nt i ria l com i o m norities, if l re ac power concentrationinMol con plem the Crim ments intheperiodswithconcentratedpowerwerem pl position l towards them so territoriallyconcentrated. l casesm e ethnic-bas c em commodati 2(thecomparisonis ented moreacco entra ent m t dom oneas ea peninsula–byapproxim o o e tion. ther of nt i ri i ty RelationsinPost-SovietUkraine: 153 nor Ukraine o ersed power.Duringthefirstpost-Sovietperiod ssm a Othersm tongue, especiallyinth r m ins onist character.Sim e e sum . iti accomm plem d statistics, arerelevantfordeterminingstate-m m e es m nt ofthe is i Donbass nority groupwithaconsiderablesizeand e com s thatm mmodation ented languageandinternalpolitical is obiliz aller m co p odation ared withthedyn illus butalsothelanguage-b waspopulatedbyapproxim mplicated governm ed agains dova wenthandinwith i norities tendtopref i nority gr i Therefore, thestatepolicies t st officialdiscou ra i st linguisticpo ted inGraphIV.4),one ilarly, between2001and a tely 80%ofthem e EasternandSouthern b t th e ntal policiestowards y oups, suchasTatars, thef e sta a t m e as a c ics inpo t rse andbill thatm ar e licies. In r ased one. policie e . Inthe i sult of nority ately wer a o ny re s
CEU eTD Collection historical consciousness”a sam ethnic RussiansinUkraine,thusdenyingthem continuing toe in Ukraine(Duncan,1998;199).Nevertheless,by 1995) andclaim constitutional principleswith 127 126 ethnic, lingu was attributedtocitizenship.Inaddition, being com in Ukrainebetween1991and2008. following subsectionsIanalyzehow a partisanofthenationalizi in Crim im little sym em his speeches,hewasusingthete civic statewithnodivisionof varied. Atthebeginningofhism Law establis See SeePream portance oftheuseUkrainianinpubliclif phasized the“Russian e tim The f At thesam 4.4.1. OfficialDiscourse: Articles 10 ea. Bythetim e p , theconstitu p athy forthedem i b rst po osed by“citizensofUkrainea l istic, andculturalidentity hed asof e an m an d Article11 e e phasize “civicness”,hestartedto d thatm d 11 tim st-Sovie , Con tly integ e ofthe e, theofficialdiscou tion alsose s’ chauvin s e t
titu U in mbership intheUkrain nd establishedUkrainianas ng state(W th a tio clearintegrationistcharacter k nds tohavingtwo r 1994 presidential
e C ationis rain population onethniclines n of rm o a n ian con t a ndate, thefi Uk i s
s titutio “people ofUkraine”ins then m t s
rain m of allindigenouspeopleandethnicm goalth ilson, 1997;110-114).In ” andhistor e e (19 n ssage, whichneverchangedsincethen. s
rse of i o titu ne po f Uk th 154 9 e ll nationalities”,theref 6 tion e constitu rst presidentKravchukprom ) rai election, Leonid . developm e andthelackofUkra theU licy areasofst state languages,andoftenstrengthenedthe n the statusofaconstit m pointfrequentlytothe“ ian statewasopentoallnationalitiesliving
ical ethnocideofUkrainianpeople,showed e (1 (19 i d 1992histonestartedtochange.W 996 96) def k the onlystatelanguage, rain tio ). andwithall-inclusiveprinciples.In ent ofthe“Ukrainiannationandits . Therefore,the1996Fundam n guaranteedthedevelopm ian p t ead i ned the1994electi ate-m Kravchuk waswide r of “Ukrainianpeople”(Arel, e the“Ukr s iden ore noethnichegem i nority relationsevolved inian languageschools ts sinceindependence uent nation.Healso m i oted theideaofa ainian people”as norities. inority” statusof ons, thesecond 127 whichwere ly seenas 126 Atthe ent of e ony h ntal ile
CEU eTD Collection there weretwodeviationsfrom has beengenerallyinlinewithintegration. increase theroleofUkrainia m recognizing them president Yushchenkoexpressedasim and supportedtheconsolidation than thecollectivegrou of nationalidentityinfavorthecivicone, 128 mother tongue,todeveloptheirculture, except forthestipulatio cam accomm nationalist elem Kravchuk prom 143). However,laterduringhispresidentialm Moreover, h and prom streng presiden sam i See norities, hestr e paign. ti Hence, duetothepromotionofall-inclusive The 1996constitu 4.4.2. BillofRights: Articles 10 thened m odat t K e ised tograntRussianthestatus , the1991Declarationon theRights u e thatUkra i chm onist disco prom , 11 oted amoreintensifiedintegra ents; second, a e u ranonanexp , and ngthe lti-ethnic characterofUkrainea oted theim
5 in 3 p rights.Moreover,heprom u ns thatguaranteedm tion alm ned thec in e wasm rse, m th n insociety(Korduban,2007). e Con
plem a between 1994and1995presidentKuchm thisgenera l inly throughth o icitly an of u s st entirelyattribu titu i ltinationa v aunitarystate(D' e i n c pr t i tation ofadecentralizedfederalsy o n
andtousede of ti-n incip ilar at Ukrain l course:first,betw of“official”langua l. 155 a At thesam i tio a He alsopointedtoth by nor l ndate hede-emphasized e e of NationalMinorities of titude ashispredecessorKuchm n tion repertoire,through streng e ities therig alis pro-Russian elem (199 civicness th nd theneedtoprotectrigh state t ed thehum oted t p 6). A thening theind r nieri ogra e - tim bu the useofUkrainianlanguage ilding p velop theirlanguages. m et h e, duringthetransitionperiod e officialdiscourseinUkrain t toreceiv . Inhis een 1992and1994president al a ge (Wolczuk,2000;678). n . rightstotheindiv , 1999;59-64).T ents inhis1994electoral e prevailingbilingualism r oce e i theethniccomponent and the1992Lawon v l e stem i hisdiscoursewith ss andth e dual libe c educationintheir tora a ( prom l d W ilson, 1997; i ts ofethnic sco r e needto ties rath 128 a oted an h u : while Atthe e third rse, h i du al, er e e
CEU eTD Collection Natio are notofUkrainiannationalit broad definitionofnationalm m boundaries. Unlikem always legallyguaranteed. in lin 1991 theUkrainianlegislationem also, oftheEuropeanCharterforRegional ratification oftheEuropeanC The recognitionofthegrouprightsinUkra 130 129 right tohavenational-cultura National Minoritiesgu policies inU governm had theirownassociations,unions,and/orcomm regional and sphere. Bytheendof2008therew ethnically basedcivicassociati dem i SeeArticle6 See norities, tousem o n e withtheaccomm cratic developm To acertaindegree,thereligiousdivisions The for a 4.4.4. Church-StateRelations: 4.4.3. CivicAssociations: Article 3in l Mi e nt hadeverhindered n o rities (199 all-Ukrainianstatus(COE,2009;24 k m raine h
in th ation andactivityofethn th e Law e Declarat i 2). a nor ve been ent ofthecountry o aranteed a o s odation p n ity langu t
UkrainiansandRussi Natio io 130 n
onvention fortheProtectionof in linewithaccom i y, butshowfeelingsofnationa n Thestategenerally on ons nority wasinclude l autonom a l Mi th r ages inpublicsphere.Moreover,th phasized bothi full rangeofethnicallyreleva inciple ofstate-m their activity(COE,2002).Ther wereop e Ri n o e rities (199 re m gh ts of y (COE, 1999,2006).Since1991,m ic civ o ened, activ andinregionsw and MinorityLanguagesin2005.Therefore,since re than1400associationsofthekind,w 156 Nation 2). inian legislationwasfurtherconfirm m i ans whoworshipintheOrthodoxChurch, ndividual and(ethnic)grouprights,whichis unities. Thereisnoev d, whichattr c ). Virtually odation. a inUkrainedocoincide i associations inpost-SovietUkrainew l Min nority relations. welcom ating o r ities (19 n o allethn l se National Minoritiesin1998and ed theiractiv tably ibuted this ith significantproportionof nt grouprights,includingthe lf 91) and -awar inthe efore, civicassociation ic m id
e Article 1 e 1992Lawarathe ness andaf cultura status to“thosewho ence thatth i norities inUkrain ity as withthee o 3 l re andm in -edu as theLaw f e i e central d bythe nity”. ith both cation i gn of t hnic o 129 a o re a e n s r l
CEU eTD Collection and since2008,theywereneverre-taken. 162). Nevertheless,theseattem on thebranchsubordinatedtoMoscowPa favoring theAutocephalo the firstUkrainianpresident potential toenforcethe speaking regionsofthecountry(BDHRL,2006;CO subordinated totheMoscowPatriarchatean Church itselfwasdividedinth adepts oftheRom plurality an religious affairsinUkra accomm 133 132 131 m East werepredom and the the 1992L the accommodation state orofficialreligion.The between stateandreligion app d e a no See See Fo r ny s oxi m r The churc From theperspectiveoflegislation,pos i Article 35in Article 6in n m a Uk i m a tio r odat t eq e all ethnicgroupsworship rain est n a s d im w onNationalMinoritiesform uality. . Th i i e, th onist principlealsoinp m a th e partiality (B t th e h 20 ere are e Law s base inantly non-believers(Krindatch,2003). -sta a 132 e Con 01 no-Catholic church,while i st p More
Uk te r d o s ethno-linguistic divisions, ine, th r n on titutio rain incip n
us branchoftheUkrainianOrthodoxChurchandbyputtingpressure Natio o va e statistica im ian la DHRL, 2006;COE,2002).Atthesa ri n tions inUkrainese
l o
e governm
n e. The1991LawonFreedomofConscienceandReligionan Kravchuk attem portantly p o did notdeclareanyreligionas 1996 constitutionexplic u p a ree rivalbranchesattheend opu f s l Mi Uk ts endedwhen su latio r rai l n v d o r ey in otherreligiousinstitutions. n actice. rities (200 a n cen e (1 s are ta o , nore ent hasgenerallyrespected 996 avai su ally rec n Acco th s d 157 ). triarchate (Mitrokhin, most HungariansareReform lig 1). d waspredom l p Kuchm e i a d ted toestablis bl
ion t-Soviet Ukrainiangovernm p n e ( rding toth even iftheRussian-sp r o ognized theexistenceofdifferentreligions op t K hasev co E, 2009).Thisi em ortion ri llect d ndat a tohavegener itly statedtheprincipleofseparation replacedKravch ofb c h, er a e variousinternationalre t dom 2 of 1980s.One a inantly locatedintheRussian- beengrantedwith on 0 h astatereligionbystrongly e 0 liev 3 citizen m ) i . nant orprivileged. e e theprinciplesofreligious 2001; 183;Tataryn, 131 rs in m ti plies thatreligionhada me, scholarsn s’ relig Polishm eaking citizensofthe
uk inpower1994 d a i ists. TheOrthodox lly f fferen io e nt hasfollowed sity. Neverth these branches t relig thestatusof o i llowed th norities ar 133 o ports on i ted tha o
ns an e less, d e e d t
CEU eTD Collection ci in GraphIV.5revealthat thesepo linguistic policiesthatsaketostrengthenthero as em language secondaryschoolingcannotbeprim 134 Graph IV.5com as threaten im schools (Arel,1995;175).Althoug conducted inUkrainianandthatRussianlanguag decrees oftheMinistrystipulated the nationalcom proportion of‘first-graders’with directive of proportion oflanguagesusedin “nationalizing practices”ofgovernm only 45%ofsecondaryeducationpupilswere the 65%ofUkrainiancitizens Russian asprim the Russian-languageeducation.C data revealthatsincethebegi the proportionofthosestudyinginRussian t Acc i pact wasconsiderablebecausem zens spea A clear By thetim 4.4.5. Education: igration. Instead,itcanbeexplained o r d i n ki g t in theMinistryofEducationinstru ng g and im o R t h u age oneduca e SovietUnio p e p position ofthepopulationin ary languagedecreasedonlylittlesince1989, ssi ares theproportio assim a o n pul as at
pri ilato i o m n ce ary ry. t
ion policie n collap nsu nning oftransitiontherewasagr l with Ukrainianasnativelan a ng s RussianandUkrainianaslangua es ua education tothat n ofsecondaryeducationpupils licies were thatall a h thesedecreeswerenever ge, onsidering of e ny Russian nt underKra s Uk ed, theeduca w s inUkrain h rai i l e n i duringtheperiodbetween1991and2008.The 158 e n by thedeliberategovernm eachregion(Janm , entrance exam ar
cted thelocaleducationalbodiestobring i 20 le ofUkrainianlanguage n also enforcedduringapparently pro-Russian ily explainedbydem that theproportionofpopulationspeaking 01
speakers inEasternUkraineperceiv 1 e shouldbelearntoptionallyinUkrainian vhcuk’s presidencyhadasaim taughtinUkrainian.Thisiswhythe t 9 e r h 8 tio e 9 of languagesusedinsociety.A1992 r i t e ses f n inUkraine h were a ere r om wer guage atthebeginningof1990s, s p inhighereducationshallbe p theanaly e r adua ap oxi aat, 1999;482).Other1993 im 134 m pr ge ofinstruc waslarge plemented, theirpolitical studyinginUkrainianto thede a oxi l and o t e graphic processessuch ly m 27, s insociety.Thedata a e is of constan t ntal educationand e l 5% cline inRussian- y 30% l statis y of russif tion closerto t tobringthe h t em of de tica U . e i cline ed. F d them k l rai d n a in i ta. o a n r
CEU eTD Collection society andhenceenteredtheintegrationrepe school leveldroppedevenbelowtheproportion president K available at: 1 education intheirm instruction wasUkrainian(B 2005 outofthe571Crim 135 too: itwaso Crim degree andataslowerpacethanin the predom
06), Jan Sour
ea Aut % At thesametim School instructioninRussiandecreasedfavor ces: Councilo 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Graph IV.5.SecondaryEducationinUkraine–Language 0 m aat h ttp inantly Russian-speakingEastern u onom n (199 1991 chm ly in1997 ://www.igp
9), Arel(1 1992 a y f . After2001,theproportionof thestateuk
Eur 1993 o ther tongue.Theavailabl o e, thesm i.ru
p 1994 that e 995
/info State Rep 1995 ), Dataofth ilaniuk &Melnyk,2008;354). ean schools,onlyin the firstschoolwith
/ p 1996 rain eop all m o
l 1997 e/ r ization po t of malin theen
i 1998 nority groups
U e In (% k y k r ear 1999 / a stitu 1 Pupils) in 111 tire country(Bilaniuk&Melnyk,2008;353).In s e (2 159 licies wereim 2000 rtoire ofstate-minorityrelations. te ofHu 152 region Donbass,althoughatam e datarepresentedinGraphIV.6demonstrate 009)
teach 2001 776 Russian-language instructionatsecondary 135 , Bilan seven schoolstheprim inUkrainehavebenefitedofaccessto 2002 of Russian-languagenativespeakersin .h m oftheinstructionin tml a ing in n 2003 ities a i (dat uk andMeln
plem 2004 Ukrainian e ofaccess: n
d 2005 Po ented atam
litical Stu 2006 ofInstruction(I) yk
( 4 2007 wasopened,whilein 200 August 2010). 8; 3 Ukrainianevenin 2008 d i ary languageof es, Uk u 53) ch slowerpace , u Ku rai ch sm U R lyk n k u
e, o r ssi a (2 in a ia n n 002 aller l n i n e ;
CEU eTD Collection instruction. m with theircompactsettlem Tatar languagesincreased.All that since1998theproportionofschooling citizens consideringUkrainianastheirm starting with Soviet Ukrainianpresidents. m 136 their m integration. Althoughsince1991mostethnicgr i easures forukrainizationofeducation,which Sou norities wereencouragedtoachieveagoodlevelofUkrainianbyth % Overall, edu r ces: Councilo Graph IV.6.SecondaryEducationinUkrain 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, o 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 ther tongue,duringthewholeperiod thatyearth cation po f Eur 1 9 9 o 8 p e e proportion
State Rep e nt. However,inorde lic After 2001,theeduca
ies inUkrainesin these m o r t of ofUkrain
U (% i k 20 o nority groupshadthei r ther tongue. a 05 in Pupils) in Hungarian,Rom e (2 160 ian-languag ye 006 r tohaveaccesshi oftransitionthegove were openlyortacitlysupportedbyallpost- ce independencehavegraduallyapproached oups hadtheopportunitytobeschooledin a , 20 r tion policiesfollowedintegration,because 136 s e –Language 09) , Bilan e teachingou 200 i uk r ownschoolsintheregions a an 8 nian, Moldovan,Polish,and d Meln ofInstruction(II) gher education,allsm tran thepropo rnm e endoftheirschoo yk (2 e nt im 008 ; 353 Hu Rom Mo Po Ta plem ). ta l ng l i d rtion of s r o a h ar ented v nian a i a n all n l
CEU eTD Collection where accordingtoitsf Ukrainian language(Bilaniuk&Melnyk,2008;359). changed: thefor 138 137 m use ofotherlanguagesforoffici Socialist Re ukrainization. Thispathstarte state affairs,andeducation(Kulyk,2002; through “m (COE, 2009;33).By2000,thegovernm Ukraine inexercisingtheirpowersbythebodies path, asitdefinedthe m entire te com The 1996constitutionrecognizedonlyUkrain 1995; 172). Russian continuedtobewidelyusedinadm im Ukrainian. However,becausetherewasnomechanis i i See See ply anyl nority languages”. norities. p rehensive developm The ukrainizationlanguagepolicieshavenot In Ukraine, Ukrainiz 4.4.6. StateLanguages: Article 10in A r ticle 2in rr ito 137 e e public” tha a ry of Theoretically,thislawim gal responsibility.Moreover,inth sures topopularizethe[state]languag atio th th m Ukraine”,anddo e Law n continu thelangu e Con al interacti 138 Uk
o In1999,adecisionoftheConstitu s t o estab n titutio rm rain Lan ent andfunctioning“in e al statusthreelangu d ian as g n
evendur u ons inpublicinstitutionswere lished
d withthe1989Law“OnLanguage age polic o a f g Uk e s “theoblig ( al purposesinregionswith rai wngraded th 1989 Ukrainianas n e (1 in ). plied thata ie g thea 996
s sin e nt prom i 161 ). atory m ni 112-113). Theactualus stration, despitetheexis ages wererecognizedfor publicuse:Russian, e statu ce independenceincreasinglyencouraged e EasternandSouthernregionsofUkraine, llegedly pro-RussianKuchma’spresidency. theon of statepowerandlocalself-governm e” thatencourageditsroleinm all spheresofsociallifethroughoutthe ian asstatelanguage,guaranteedits ll publicem eans ofc m been appliedintheCrim oted evenm ofcontrol,thefailu s ofRussiantothecatego ly statelangu tion o m a mm l Courtfurtherreinforcedthis o ployees hadtobefluentin territorial concentrationof re andm o unication onallterritoryof s of re theuseofUkrainian, a theUkrainianSoviet ting legislation(Arel, g e oflanguagesalso e, alsoa re todosodidnot o re conductedin ea Autonomy, r llo y of“other a s wing the s m e ent” dia,
CEU eTD Collection available at: laws, m relations. role of policies thatdem population theuseofR accomm 141 140 139 to giveRussiananofficialstatus,inline Ukraine rem use (Belitser,2000).Moreover,theofficialof Ukrainian, andTatar,althoughinpracticeonly been m guarantee bureaucraticrepres groups toparticipateingovernm quotas (S special norm be representedinbureaucracy. 2007, Languages thatUkraineratifiedin1999.Thed nom 1 inth e See See C ritocracy i o nate candidatesforlocalan 140 e t u However, thesefacts The Ukrainianlegislationsinceindepe 139 4.4.7. Bureaucracy: Article 24in Article in r Ukra t h atleastform a
althou e Law odat up nifested throughtheac tepanenko, 2000;325-330).The1992Lawon ht h principle.Asthep o t inian ass a i p s l onist. d forrepresentationofethnicm ined im :
o / th s R gh accord / n www e Law Nation th onstrates thatonalongrunth u e Con ssi Altho .cdi a portant, som i o n a ng n as . l s o al levelm Natio u Min titutio rg/ in le s ugh intheregionswith ssian inpu g toUkraine’sleg regi r ussi o t r arenots n ate language,whichwasinlinew n ities (199
onal a entation. Theonlyguaranteedbur
o l Mino a/ f Atthesam j Uk tivity ofrepresentativebodies o l i hn e r norities hade u d centralelection in a nt throughtheirassociations, rai ng s ch thatin rities (1 blic liferemainedtolerated,it on/ ciple of 2). n u e (1 a 20 ge i u 0 996 7 fficient forcatego 992 with theEuropea n - i 4 i e East norities 162 ); slatio 2- tim ). 2006 sixregionalandcitycouncilsevenvoted non-discrim Artic 38 e stateofUkraineaim ecision wasapprovedbya qual opportunitieswithth ndence hasbeengene Russian wasidentifiedaslanguageofactual .cfm considerable proportion
RussianinEasternandSouthernregionsof e U n thesedecis , theUkrainian le 10 k intheb rai (accessed s 141 n inth e, National Minoritiesallowedtoethnic . However,thisstipulationdidnot p i ubl nation wasst e C u n reaucratic s on 7August Char i ode of s ith in r i hed izing Ukrainianpolicies ons hadnolegaleffect. within thelocalandcentral eaucratic representationhas as theseassociationscould by leg is thefor ter forRegionalMinority Ad tegr
e i RIA N m d towardsanincreased slation n 2010). ationist state i n y rally basedonthe of Russian-speakin i stem ipulated inseveral e ethnicm strativ Court ofAppealin o m vosti , suchasethnic al sideofstate e Ju e ver provided , 200 stice; - a m 7. jority to i Article nority O n as lin g e
CEU eTD Collection m state-m until 2001theUkrainianpartyle Autonom as Central Ukraine(W most m nationa 1990’s, therewasa possibility tom for m required forregistrationwas300(W ethnic-based parties.Them representation, asitleftonlythe 142 Soviet Ukrainethebureaucraticpoliciesha but onlyasadvisorybody(COE,2009;47; part inth National Minoritiesactivatedduringthewhole governm the possibilitytom e i See nority groupstocreatetheiro m mbers com Russian PartyofCrimea ation ofregionalparties, The 2001LawonPoliticalPartiesestablished The Ukrainianlegislationonpartieshasne 4.4.8. PoliticalParties: Article 10in i lis e nority relations. m e y e elabora t Ukrainianp ntal agencies.Am b . 142 ers ofthemaincentre- Thislegislationhadanunbalancinge i ng from obilize politica th e Law tion o ilson &Bilous,1993;2).Also, obilize intoownethnic pa Subcarpathian RepublicanParty a a rties hadmostof o f t f leasttwothirdsofterr legislative
Ukrain ong them,theCouncilof i and ni
lly. Regionalpartieswereform m e on whichgav u territorially dispersedRussians gislation wasinlinewith m Communist PartyofCrimea left, pro-Russianpartieswere w
num Po initiativ n parties. l ilson &B itical Parties(20 their b er ofpartym ve b 163 es andintheimplem e Stepanenko, 2000;330).Therefore,inthepost- Until2001, toterr e rties. However,thenon-Russian m m e itorial administrative e n period oftransition. ilous, 1993;693),whichallowedtosm mbers intheW inlin there wereregionalpartiesinCrim the requirem ve 01). ffect forthepotentialofethnicgroups’ Representatives of (Solchanyk,1994;17).Thetwom r explicitly ito
e withinteg e m ria therewas b lly concen ers the accom ed ( andrussifiedm ent oftenthousandm established in1991thatwas indeed.Atthebeginningof concen W e f entation ofstateprogram stern ilson, 1995;370).Hence, r o ation rbi units, includingCrim T nores modation principleof trated CivicAssociationsof regionGalicia,while h dden thecreation trated intheEastand e Councilhastaken .
m t rictio i i norities with norities the i norities of n forth ea, such i nimum of a all ea in s, e
CEU eTD Collection in the1996constitution. it wastheu beginning of Ukraine hasalwaysfunctionedasaunitaryand various regionalpoliticalci sm granted sincetheverybeginningoftransitio of theCrimeanAutonomywerenegotiateduntil had lostin1945(Sasse,2007; Autonom First andmostim accomm native Ukrainians. these territo part ofUkrainethereisas and Lugansk–withatleast65%ofRussian-s ethnically relevantboundari Ukraine into24regions,whichhasbeeni 143 Ukraine couldnotdeveloptheirow Between 1991and2008,thecentral See all num Although atthebeginnin Therefore, since1991Ukraine’sinternal Nevertheless, Ukrainedoeshavesom 4.4.9. Intern Article 2in odat o e us Republic rical proportions. n ries 1990sthepro-federalistswereveryw i ita on with ry prin th thatwo e Con al PoliticalBoundaries: portant, in1991theSuprem elem ciple of s f titu 143 uld ha o r the t i
ents ofintegration.Th ub-region –Berehovoinwhich o es. IntheEasternpart n rcles andm
stateterritor of
predo g of1990stheideatohaveafe ve modifiedth 133). Althoughtheprocessofesta Ukrain n viablepolitical governm m e inantly Ru (199 i nority groups(W i 7). al-a e ethni 164 eir ethno-lingu e peaking population.Inad d nherited fromSovietperiod,containssome nt neverinitiated n. Moreover,theadm m e ssian-speaking Crim political boundariescom 1998, thestatusofterritorialautonom e form at tim inistrativ Council ofUkrainerenewedthestatus cally relevantinternalpoliticalboundaries. of Ukrainetherearetwo eakly representedinpoweratcentrallevel, partiesevenbeforeth es, highlycentralizedstate.Asatthe er havebeenm e organiz ol istic com 76% ofpopulationisH czuk, 2002;72-73),post-Soviet deral Ukrainewasvoicedwithin changes intheboundariesof blishing thescopeandlim a tion ea, whichthepeninsul position i nistrative divisionof d a thatwases ition, intheWestern nifested throughth is law,du b oblasts ined elem in favorofth –Donetsk ungarian. e totheir tablish ents of y was its e d e a e
CEU eTD Collection 144 m Graph dem im integration duringthetransitionperiod,byfollowing integration. Atthesam and 2008.Itshowsthatduringthetransiti 2008 periodasfarinternalpo with the m unitary characterofthecount existence of a i Graph portant dom norities’ mobiliza jor ref
When thedynam Graph IV.7illus
co oblasts o m rm o p ethnicallyreleva nstrates thatUkrainewas il Graph IV.7.State-Min of ed a
establishedin1954,ther ins forethnicid itsterr b y th tion e au t rates th e i itor t cs oftheseninedom tim againstthe h or, i al-adm b e, thec a nt politicalboundaries,whilethe
e dynam ry. BecausetheU sed litical boundariesareconcerned.
entity preservation-language o n inistr th ountry m stated o e m i rity Re cs ofstate-m q o ative s u re acco a e hasbeennorelevantfluctuationduringthe1991- litativ i scu 165 a lations inUk a de t e ins on Ukrainecom r mmodationist in1991th ssed inCha u k d som a cture rainian gover ta an is com i nority relatio e an integ alyzed ande significantattem p ared withthedynam raine (1991-2008) i p n x r ter 3,onecanobserve sectio cept f ation nm latter –throughthegenerally b and education.Overall,the ns inUkrain ent neverim ined accommodationwith n i st pa o s
r Cr 4 . 2 . p an in2008. 1 th ts toapproachm im . -4.2 intwoof ea, stillf .9 144 e between1 plem .
ics ofethnic ented any them thatth unctio 991 o o n re st e s
CEU eTD Collection common publicidentity institutionalization ofmulti-ethnicityandbyen integrationist pathofstate-m concentrated largest ethnicm gradual processofukrainization,w the 1994electoralcam linguistic andeducationpolicies,despitepr power becam the s fragm power (1991-1995)andinperiods can noticethatintegrationistpolicieshaveb power concentrationdiscussedinChapter2(com rela authorities tookplaceaf “ukrain greatly diminished,inspiteofthefact groups’ protests.Atthesam im ple ted polic t ate-ch The goalofthischapterwastotestthe hypothesis thatbydiscouragingthe In conclusion,theUkrainianperiodofcon Moreover, whenthedynam m Final Remarks: e nted atthebeginningof1990s,prefer i entation ofunfa zing urch r ies. ”. Inaddition,there-intensifica powerm e concentratedby1996,thecentral i e nority group- la tio paign. ns, ineduca , powercon ter 2003,inaperiodnotm i vorable policiesto norities m i e nority relations. tim i the Russians.Atsam cs e, between withconcentratedpower tion po centr obilized th h of thesepolicyareasiscomp ich wasnot ation lic that by2000languagelawsbecam een im wards m esident Kuchm 166 ies te tio 2000 and2003,theintensity e leas , couraging th ences formoreinteg nds andinpresidentialofficialdiscourse.W governm n ofm parison illustratedinGraphIV.7above),one the social-politicalco ple centrated powerwenthandinwith a todepoliticizetheet rked by i m norities werefollowedbytheethnic t ag ented bothinperiodswithfragm i norities e nt im ainst s a e integ particularly worseningethnicity- e ’s pro-Russianm (1996-2002). W
ti ple m ’ m t e m ared withthedynam ate’s r , duringtheperiodwith ation r ented m obilization againststat ation werem preferenceforthe urse preferredbythe of hnic diversityofthe oftheseprotests m o re integrationist h e i en powerwas norities intoa ssages during e evenm a nifested in i ented cs of h o en re e
CEU eTD Collection conditions ofpowerconcentra attem mobilization state andinthisway,tohinderth attem presidency thatthestrongeststepstowardsli even withoutleadingtom im Georgia, itwasduringShevarnadze’sandrespec intense processesofintegrationwouldoccurin sm approached started asth accomm integrationist policiesovertim path ofstate-buildingprocess.Alm show thatpost-Sovietcountries of integrationistpoliciesandstate-m nationalizing pathin attem but lesssuccessfully.T the threestudiedcountriesonly portant integra all andgradualpace.By2008,Ge p p p The dataforUkraineandGeorgiaconfirm In a1996articleBrubakeranticipatedthat ted todeterm ted to ted to odat theinteg e m determ im . i Inlinewiththishypothesis,theem onist durin o plem st accommodationistam tion ine whetherthis ine whethergov ent integ thestate-buildingproce r i ationist repe st ethn h g the2000sthantheywereatbeginningo erefore, th i norities’ protes ic- r ationis r differ inthedegree Geo ela tion e. Moldova’s rtoire duringthetransitionpe o t tendencyprovokedethnicprotest. e casesof ernm ed polic st twenty orgia wasst thaninconditions r t e accessto policies, gia followedaclearn i nority re ong the ents te ts ag nguistic ukrainizationwerem ies wereim 167 ss, whichwouldbeexpr years afterthecollap ainst them inaperiodwithhoriz Ukraine and nd toim lations (Brubaker,1996b) the ill m ethnicity-related policie loyaltyres three coun theperio tive post-Soviet countrieswillm pirical analysisinth expectation thatinth in whichtheyfollowedthenationalizing o l re integrationistthanUkraine. y Saak pose m . InUkraine,itwasduringKuchm plem o tries and,althoughitgen Georgiaco a f d tiona ources forpotentialm
ashvili’s presidenciesth s withcon ented, incaseofShevarnadze power dispersion. o riod, itdidsoatarelatively re “nationaliz lizing path,withintensified s e ontally dispersedpower, of SovietUnion,a essed through nfirm e sectionsabo f centrated p e m s havebeenm transition. . Overall,thedata a de. Kravchukalso o s thet ing” p st effectiv a inly followa S h e econd, it apalette o Ukraine i o eoretica rally has norities lic wer. In at m v e first m ies in e and ong o o a re ’s st ’ l
CEU eTD Collection concentration ofpowerwasnotcoup extent thantheym initiated underthepres polic agains of integrationistpolicieswere m necessarily leadstos them However, theseattem im the periodswithhorizontallyconcentratedpo repertoire ofstate-m attitudes unf expecta i plem norities a . There ies. In
The degreeinwhich“nationalizing”govern In contrast,inMoldova,whichisthecountry t thes ent integra tion thatinper Ukraine,m l avorable totheirinterests. f so dif t ore, thecaseofMoldovacontradi ate. Atth f tion e obilized in i rs f t nority relations,them p ate policiesan i ts usuallyfailed,besides i e sam idency ofKuchm st policiesoc o r om i d norities d s withcon casetocase.In e tim coupled withadecreaseinthele theperiodswithdispersed e , m i d attitudesunfavorabletothem d m led withna centr curred in i norities d Chapter V obilize toprotestagains a ated whenpowerwas o Georgiadu st 168 po m periodswithhorizontallydispersedpower. other thingsduetom tiona wer. Inaddition,thestrongestattem i i cts theexpectationthatconcentratedpower nority wer ethnicm d prote m thatfollowedrather e liz ntal policiesprovokedprotestofethnic -f ing p ring Shevarnadze s riend t ag o concentrated, althoughatalesser power. Finally,inMoldovathe ainst Saak lic l y polic i vel ofm norities risksta ies. t thenationa . i ies wereim norities’ protestsagainst i as anaccommodationist norities’ m theim hvili’s natio t liz e policiesan plementatio plem in o g policie bilization n ented in aliz p ts to ing d n s
CEU eTD Collection the levelofeffectivenesseachtype,aswe em mobiliza resourc success ofethnicpartiesandhen targeted againstm prom the state. parties, success ofethnicpartiesandthereforeencourages disproportional elementsinto further useintheem
thoroughly.” Inthelatter, itis sam their judgmentasfairs population. Itisbasedontheidea the deg not im who identif pirical data,Idescribethepossibletypesof e thatthepublicitself would for ote electoraldisproportiona This chapterteststhesecondhypothesis One oftheearliestanalysesconcep 5.1. TypesofEthnicMinorities’ portant whatalegislature e and r s. Thedegreeto tion ee ofresem : PowerConcentr As explain ied the“stan asar agains i e norities, suchsystem t thestateis sult, pirical investigation. e b d lance to a inChapter d decreas whichthispresentsaf m ing-f p le ofthepeople, o the electoralsystems,powerconcentrationcompromises r” an
whatalegislat ana notim does, buthowitiscom e ation andEthnicMinori s thelikeli that “inademocracypublicoffi lity thatfavorstheincumb ce lim l 1,apolitic Representation yzed inthes d “acting m Political Representation: portant howthelegisl s weaken , if it the hoo 169 on itspentenoughtim - f ethnicm o t ofrepresentationbel ll astheresp thesuppositionthattheiropin al system actor f of thisthesis,whichstatesthat r” typesof d forethnicminorities access ofethnicm ection ure repres thechancefor minorities’co-optat o s posed. It belo r dis i norities’ politicalrepresentationand withconcen
represen ents, as c w. Bef ectiv ouraging e ature iscom ents. Whilenotnecessarily is thetypem e m tie cials m o comparedtoth e toexam tatio i re thepres onged toHannahPitkin, norities tom s easurem ’ Politic ’ tr mobilization t n. Inthef m hnic m ated powertendsto ion intomainstream a y beselectedtouse ation andelectoral posed, butwhat easured through ent toolsthatI ine them i enta on willbethe i norities f al by inducing o obilization tio rm against e entire n of er, itis a r the tter om
CEU eTD Collection while beinginparliam supported p while beinginparliam parties orindividualMPsappealtopro-m quota system parliam reflection o 2004). Appliedtoethnicm the “actingfor”representation–as to furthertheobjectivesofthos parliam particular mem representation isnotsim parties sup not necessarilyim elec success ofthoseparties representation as“ researcher ofpost-SovietUk and leaderssupportedbyethnic their m or individualMPsseektodefendm representation. Theelectoralrepr tora The “standingf Additionally a e e l typ ndates. nt. Inpractice,descrip nt representsadescri ported are a f e theentirepopulat rties areno s. Thesubstantiverepresentationis of b represe ers ofparliam , thereisathird ply thattheleaderssupportedin m o inorities’ em r” representa e com e nt. t necessarily nt; also,itcanbede n and lead tation isdif ilar posed i ptive sam e norities, thedescri e theyrepresent(Pitkin,1967). with thesubstantiv nt do.Thetest tiv ion’s ethnicco ers r a esentation isdeterm m e represen powerm in tion is whoweresu “substantive”(Bird,2003;Cam typeofpoliti i of i norities inelectionsarere pursuingan ian politics f nority inte erent f ethnicm p le ofthe of ent” i ten labele r nor tatio te om 170 of “acting-for” rmined bythe andm rests ortoexpressm ity discourseduringelectoralcam t mposition o explicitp i determ pported by PaulD’ n h norities. Atthesametim population, buthowwell ptive representationisdeterm canbeensu cal repres e descriptiverepresentationbecauseitdoes electionsareethn e representation,becau d inthelite ined byth easured itbyl ined bythedegreeinwhichpolitical r o
Anieri iden m n entation, whic degreein - repres theethn m i norities (D'Anieri,20 presented ingovernm red throughtheapplicationof i nority discourseand e degreeinwhichtheparties r a ture as“de enta i e norities’ dem ron ic minoritiesorthatth ooking attheelectoral whichpolitica ic com tion isnotwhetherth etal. tif ied this h Ilabelelectoral representatives act se theelectorally s e, the position ofthe crip , 1996;Powell, ined bythe a tive paigns and nds during typeof ele 07a). The behavior e l par ” nt. The , while c tor tie a e e s l
CEU eTD Collection group ones,ifthisstrategyincreasesthe interests. Insuch pressure torepresentsimultaneouslydifferent representation resultsfrom Rufino, 2007;Pande,2003).Atthesam preferences andvotingbehaviorwithvoters’ inf analyzing theelectoralresultsatregionalle is analternativem available. In m ethnicity as (ethnicity included)andontheir survey datathatcontaininfor m representation cannotbe disregarded. attributed withth with m increase thelevelofm presenc to th i e norities’ votingbeha o thod isnotalwayspossibletoapply,becau rm e subs Various an Electoral representationisgenerallyde However, descrip ation onm a e jority elec of m tantive typeofrepres afactorfordeterm countrieswhereethn i norities in alyses ofpoliticalrep i situations theym noritie e sam tor e thod fordeterm a l system i tiv norities’ vior. Theb s’ ele parliam e e re i thefac m presentation c to portance as m s (Banducci electoralturnout,especially ining votingbehaviorinpartic ral pref electoral preferences.Suchd e ation both ic m nt isbe entation, a e y choose t st waytode that ining voti r i esen norities h erence likelihood fortheir lieved stillhasso ethnic m becau the e tation a etal. ti to representpartyinterest 171 on de vel. Althoughthism s, itcan me, ng behaviorofm term preferencesandinterests(Alonso&Ruiz-
to str a inte substan term ve significantterritorialconcentration,there se itisthetypethat , 2004).Therefore,althoughitcannotbe se reliab ttrib m ined throughtheexam scholars’ skepticismtowardsdescriptive i rests, notablypar nority MPsm ographic characteristicsofrespondents m e ine votingbehav im ngthen ute th e merits:mostim tiv ply som e rep le m reelection (Bird,2003). e greatestdeg legitim when m a ta ular elections.However,this canrevealtheim a r e i ss sur esen norities, whichconsistson riskofecologicalf a y findthem e acy of i thod cangivevaluable nority MP’sareelected s atthedetrim tation, t i y interestsandgroup or istoanalyzem linksparties v portantly, th eys arenotalways r ee o powerandalsoto ina the tion ofethnic f effectiveness selves under descrip portance of ent ofthe e simple ’ a policy llacy. tiv a ss e
CEU eTD Collection ethnic m discourse, policypreferences, andvotingbehavior em what ap parliam equally havethenumericala parliam legislative bargainingpowerofpro-m indica of proportion ofMPsbelongingtoethnicm electoral rep obtained seatsbypoliticalpar by ethnicminoritiesinelections indicators. T representation. of m ethnic m available (Powell,2000).Howeve party systemandtherefore,theirvotem situa m i m norities’ pirically determ tions i i nority MPs,theg The pro-m Therefore, intheanaly The ele norities’ apathy.F tor ta e e i ntary agendaandtoin nt isnotsufficientforguaranteeingef i r norities votedform in norities’ dem o- votesa kes intoco m whichm r h esentation ofethnicm i c e fistconsistsindeterm nority partyisandhowthepro- tor i nority partiesaretheonesthat a ined. l r l one e i norities a pres r nsidera canbe nds oraregenerallyin li eate o r entation isals this reason,inch r a is y alsoincreasethe s ’ tion thepercen electoralchoice is ofethnicm the f ties electorallysupportedbym m nd strategicadvantagetobr l uen are rep r, thepresenceinparliam descrip i i slead norities. Th ce th ining i nority par i ght i r ing as nority esen e votin o tiv the degreeinwhichpartiesandleaderssupported lim represent achoiceoftheleastundesirableoption 172 e r ted inpower. tage ofobtainedparliamentaryseatsandthe i nor
m islim fectiv e second groups. Thehigheristh ited inits e ties. level oftrustinpoweranddecreasethe indic g resu ne withthe i presen nority position apter Ialsoexplorethelevelofelectoral ities through theirelectoralappeals,political inparliam Thes e substantiverepre a ited b ’ politica tor lts. tatio in s Further f imple pres dicato ef The y n o ethnicm thea of e r theirpr nt f e ectiveness. ing relevantissuesonthe l nt positivelyrespondto the ethnic i r s r norities, thegreateris higher isthepercentageof of par of con itre e l presen tern politica en s i m norities ists m ef ative ce ofthes e num ties andleadersthat s enta a erences. Therea i tatio Thisisbec ins tobe norities. Thethird incalcu s l tion: th of partiescanbe e ’ n rical presence inte Iu f e e partiesin red bythe lating th cla r s ey e e thr sts. As r m if a u ied u ee s r st e e e
CEU eTD Collection the rank repres assum parties, andsubstantiverepres representation, descriptives continuum guarantee substantiverepresentationtoo. substantive representationata not necess m position can havecomprehensivepolicypreferences,wi includ be m groups (Chandra,2004;3;Cott,2007;Horo cultural nature,andwhosesupport ethnic m defined inthelite at publiclevel. the dua m attitudes thatenhanceth established inChapter4,ethni a i nority relations.Hence,pro-m y haverepresentativesofethnicm The pro-m a entation throughethnicm e ing ethnicm instream d tobringam l or Hence, inthisthesistheef s ing of i asonlyoneasp norities, whoseelecto , onwhichfourconventionaltypesar multiple a rily inoverwhelm politic parties,withelectorals i nority partiesarenotnecessarily rature asthepoliticalgroupsw i eth norities. Pro al r i nimum n e e accomm ic id ect of presen entitie levelofethnicm anall- entation throughethnicparties.Th ing m i ral platform tatio nor - hig c m m i nority partiesar odation i is derivedoverwhelm s ity parties-them nority p n h andth types. inclus est deg i a noritie i f jority. Wh norities amongtheirm ectiv i st (as upport from ive po e s arecentrallyfocusedonprogram a eness s’ in r rtie 173 ubstantive representationthroughpro-m ins ee ofefficien witz, 1985;291).Thepro-m i th them norities’ representation, titu s arenotnecessarilyone-issueparties.They hose m opposed tointeg litica teres ile theethnicp e thosepartiesthatsupportand/orprom e rankedinthefollowingorder:electoral of tiona ethnicm politica a xi t l s a platf a variouspopulationcategories,but i m lization of jority leadersandm nority-friendly discoursesandpolicy i ngly from u r e m c o y, thepro-m leve rm defined bythosepoliciesand l e rep i mbers andtopleadership,bu nority parties.Thelatterare . Finally,pro-m r e electoralrepresentationis l ofit.FigureV.1illus ationist exis a r particularethnicm rties canindeedprovid esenta ting ethnicdif while thesubstantive ) princip tion isseena i nority partiescan i nority partiescan e m s ofa b i nority ers belongto l es ofstate- n f e ethno- partie i i rences nority nority t rates s ote a e s t
CEU eTD Collection use t been m 145 Janda (1995 using th m issues of declarations, interviews,questionnaires,ora m position analys m determ presented in position scaleelaboratedfordeterm “righ value attr and “neutral”positionsoneachis h
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t of t & G n m e i y l platf el andKenneth tis n t -rel a o 145 odel ofstate- rity p n t”, “righ ffec policies a al a r
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CEU eTD Collection 146 through PRandseatselectedth specific electoralruleshaveb m effectivenes the levelofdisproportionality discuss thelinkbetweenconcentrationofpower im year includ incum figure PresidentEduardShevarnadze.Thes with concen
summarized inTableV.1below. modified severaltim nationwide constituencyandnatio in allpost-independenceelectionsthePR a So parl pact oftheconcentrationpoweronethnic joritarian votingappliedin elections Year of ur i 20 20 19 19 19 Since 1991,Georgiaalwayshadam As discusse 5.2.1. TheImpactofPowerConcentrationonE 5.2. TheCaseofGeorgia: a Table V.1.ElectoralSystemofGeorgi b ce: m ent Presiden 0 0 9 9 9 e 8 4 9 5 2 dat nt
ary e a s ofethnicm d trated power.Thefirstlasted c inthef
o l l ect d inChapter To ed parl t Mik tal nu r es. Them by a i m seats a t 1 2 2 2 2 m h 5 3 3 3 2 i ework of h m e norities’ politic 0 5 5 5 5 e eil Saakash nt
b aut er ary h
2,af o or een oftenchanged.First,the
th f parallel,onthew a
rough m f in changes r thisth n at electorals om w ter thecollap C maj ide par com v e % seats ili, s nt o a esis. al rep pone 5 3 3 3 3 ritarian ral joritarian votingcha 0 6 6 7 3
t El arted in2004andcontinuedth from t y lists.Third,th nt 175 T voting wasconductedonthebasisofsingle ect a -DevelopmentssinceIndependence i r
xed esentation between199 h the Georgianelectoralsystem econd period,whichhadasm y m i e m 1995until2000andhadasm o s stem ns e ofSovietUnionGeorgiahadtwoperiods i and electoralsystem norities’ politicalrep hole territoryofthecountry.However, electoral system,withproportionaland C a in goalof o s im El PR com l m ectoral SystemChange: ect m % seats i oral pl ssi 5 6 6 6 6 0 4 4 3 7 ied. Ialsoanalyzethetypeand e th on o proportion betweenseatselected
p sy nged severaltim onent th st reshold forthePRvotingwas f Ge e is s m
– or ection is gi m 1 and2008. inGeorgia,aswell a, i r xed esentation. Forthis,I Oct rough 2008,thelas o to ber PR since1991are es. Second,not % votes determ 2 t h a 0 a re 0 in political 5 7 7 5 0 in political 8
sh .
146 ol ine th d e t
CEU eTD Collection
and withanelectoralthreshol was tob m faction (whichcom parliam decrees havebeenadopted,Shevarnadzeconso thresho and acces Shevarnadze andtheStateCounciltriedtom fragm secess faced de regiona sam elec were conductedonsinglenation-wideconstituen only decreasedto5%forthe2008elections.Mo PR thresholdwasrem fragm the m This m except forthe2008electionswhentwoparts a naged topasselectoralruleswith e tora party. The 1992electionswereheldinacontext The PRshareoftheelectoralsys By 1994,followingfourm e e i a onis ntation. Inaddition,forthefirstpost-i nted, withnopotentialm eans thatinm l liz e jority voteandhenceplayedagreaterroleforthedegreeofparliam l la d an m nt whichwasthebasisofeventual e s theparliam ation of o a m ws allowedthef nds forincreasedautonomyfrom r d wasbasedonm Therefore, fromAbkhaziaandS ganiz politic e d in p o eted inthe1995elections oved, butinconsequentel st casesth e asing nt. Therefore,thePRpart al par itwaso o rm u tie le n d of5%.Theseruleshave not ltiple ation of s. e PRvotehad onths ofs a jo a outh Ossetia. tion-wide n - rity s ahigher ly in eat cons par dif t em wasal 199 t ate of t f the y. I e ndependence parliam 176 power concentration(Nodia,1998).Duetothis rent titu con a threshold foraccessingth a greaterinf ke astheCitizens’Union 2 thatth n Moreover, thecentralp ection leadersh lidated asupportivem encies (Allis cy, withnation-widepartylists.In1992the these reover, exceptfor1992,PR-basedelections electo ofthem s em of deepfragm titu it easyforpartiestoregisterelections of theelectoralsystemhadequalweight. ways greaterthanthem ergency inwhichm ency, b s itw con r ip ofAdjararegion,andde al listsfordifferentreg e electorallawsencouragedth i l xed electoralsystem a d uence onth s gradu itions a on sed on encountered particularprotest etal. e e ntation. Thecentralpower , theheadofstateEduard ntary electionsin1992the a nation-widepa lly , 1993;175). o e electionresultsthan increased a Party),Shevarnadze e parliam wer itselfwashighly a jo ny oftheim rity factioninthe a joritarian share, containedno i on to7%,an e nt: thePR mands for s, forthe r t portant y lists, e ntary d e
CEU eTD Collection 147 held in1999.However,afterth and laterpreserveitsdom accum 5% thresholdandthenitsincreaseto7%induc the critiqu m Citizens’ U and howextensivetheir not seem from econom He alsos expectations, therepresentativesofCouncil country andwillcreatethenecessary expecta country. Thechangeofgovernm repeated in2004,threem the parliam 7% thresholdforthe2004repeat virtually one-partyparliam the electoralthresholdfrom On a NewLead lin naged toincreasetheelectoralthreshold e: sm The 2003parliam For the1999parliam u h tion thatthene late thenecessaryratioof“wastedvotes” ttp ic fa aller andregion tohaveaclearunderstand ://www.ci e t ated th e ersh oftheoppositionparties. n vours, thereforetheiraccessto nt “wouldb ion Partyandthe ip
Down v at smallp il.g e p /en l w politica ay e al-bas e electorate actuallywas(Allison,199 ntary electionsw g anin s PACE’sCriticis i nant position. / e e _ onths ntary elections,havi p nt (S.Jones,2005; 7%to4-5%,warn rin a
ed parties, rliam centive fortheo t .ph All-Georgian RevivalUnionPa ed elections,arguingthatthelo e l after MikheilSaakashviliwasel e “RoseRevolution”thePRpa elitewouldc p nt resulti e ? ing ofhow i ntary fac d Asshown condition = 634 besid m , 6 parliam in e , ng fromthe2003“RoseRe re heldun access
177 C tions oftentradetheirvotesforpoliticaland e i otherthings s access theparliam ppos these ruleswouldaffecttheirelecto 310). However,PresidentS in vi ed adisproportionality ng thesupportofparliam fo of Europestronglysugg i onsolid l n g tha e for thepro-pres Geor d on thesectio e r anenhan nt shouldnotbeencouraged. ition, t gi der sim Marc a ate thedem a D too andpartiesin h 23,2012 a becausetherespectivep i 6; 278). l ns below,theintroductionof highth y ced pluralis N ilar electoral e wer w idential partytoconsolidate e rty, s nt from5%to7%,despite Onl rt ofelectionshadtobe ected aspresidentofthe o i resho ng of cratic ins p effectlargeenoughto i ge n volution” broughtthe r ested thedecreaseof e esiden m. Inlinewiththese , l neral, nottounite”. thebar 2 a d m March akashvili keptthe rules astheones e ntary dom t i t Sh itutio ght re 147 20 r ie r evarnadze al success a ns of 04 r toente s rties d u , Tb lt ina inant the ilisi. i d r
CEU eTD Collection On 2 March “Labor Pa 2 position. Beforethe1995electi the electo parties, andeventuallyimplem m the electo recomm criticism 151 150 149 148 effect ofahighthresh parliam of areducedelectoralthresholdwouldbeove electoral sys other im community, Saakashviliproposedthe Scholtbach, 2006;55). im and the salient issu 1 2 Geo 007 007 477 007 a Three Saak PAC Op lin posing anartificialbarrierforoppositio jority votesoftheNationalMov r gi (200 , Tb , Tb , Tb e: po
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CEU eTD Collection Step 152 degree ofdisproportionality. counting th from Georgia hasgenerallyimpliedahi great advantageofkeepingva com parliam politica Only in1992,anelectoralyearcharacterized increased forthe1999electionsandwhenitwa produced bytheelectoralthreshold.Asi Union Party)m below, duetothisincr for thein sm the m ef f Sou Table V.2.TheThresholdEffectonthePropor ects of allest amountofwastedvoteswasinthe199 Wasted Votes h p e Election year itsPRpart.Asdiscussedabove,thede Thre are theeffectsoft The percen Because Georgiahadam n r 5.2.2. TheLevelo a ce: W in componentofthePRsystem l e f nt. shold % aut h crease oftheelectoral theele o eat r e percen ce, did h ley’ o r’s cal % a s tages ofwastedvotespresentedinT naged toconsolidateitsparl c d tor a ta ( the cul tag a 2005 l s a t elec e e i h o f y a of Disp n, e proportionalpartofth se ther stem 1 ; ont 3. 992 231 0 wastedvotes.TableV.2illustr 6 tora
Elections
) roportionality oftheElectoralSystem: . Asillustr h
barriertoaccessparl rious confoundingvariablessim e basi l sy i e xed electoralsystem sp gh degreeofdisproportionalit stem s o ectiv f , dat that 1 Georgia (1991-2008) cont 44 a m e f 995 ted 5 a . ilar ef
1 del ac
179 inthetab iamentary dom gree ofdisproportionality ain ahighlyreducedba led totheaccum tio i by highlyfragm v 2 elections,whennothresholdwasapplied.In ere fect occurredwhenthethresholdwasfurther s keptatahighlevelforthe2004elections. n (tran e system d tion ofWastedVotesinthePRpart by iam a ble V.2aretheresultofm C sinceinde 1 l 2 s e, th 999 e 5 e 7 f nt . o ntary seats.
withthem 4 rmed eventua ral
inance, duetothe“wastedvotes” a e El tes Georgianelec introdu 152 e ect ulation ofwastedvotes.The nted powerandnodom y, whichresultedparticularly ila i pendence, itispossibleto ons C r. Theelectoralsystem Ass a ctio 2 26 joritarian part,withthe rrier foracc 004 7 o canbecalculated .
m l 2 n of ly intotheC
hown inthesection m i ssi athres on o tora f Ge l system e echanical ssing the 2 hold was 1 008 or 1 5 itizens’ .
3 gi
i
a and nant b in s’ y
CEU eTD Collection 153 led tom obtained bythegreatestwinnerparty,itispossi this, acomparisonwiththeam system inexperienced thresholdcanproducea in TableV.2dem threshold ledtotwicelesswastedvotes,ifcom over-tim experience wasted. Thishappenedbecauseby 1995, whenthethresholdof5%w
Second, bycom possible parties thatenteredtheparliam not possible.Nevertheless,therearealternat com for learnt, astheam So m Num ponent ofGeorgianparliam ur ula is Table V.3.Electora Num However, thesedatabythem
ce: Num withitsthresholdspr Num % M o toa b e learningeffectisalsovisibleinca aut er re parliam b % b er withth needed.However,becausetheco of er h a b ssess which PR of o j er pa o of r pa ri ’s cal
of pa r seat t t y i ount ofwastedvotesdecreased r pa p e sea t r onstrate th i PR aring thepercentageofPR s t resho t e s o cul i r e Electio s t e t h ntary fragm t i s t
s of f e at Th h a great s com t h at w i res at o l of w g ds. I n o w n l r n hol o Formulasan b
eat est thetwoa s year p o n a et eat sed n p d at theP wi est n s i
oduced m
a ng % th eat
s t rl w n o i
e ount ofwasted e n n h a i s t e f ntary elections i ntation. Therespectiv n m e er t r nne o el nt through h Georgia (1991-2008) h 1995political e
u selves arenotsufficienttopro pa e o r nt g ect l el o R r llowing ele a lowed tom h ary rt u part s introduced, system M ect g great degreeofdisproportionality. i y ons h o
seat d the a P re disproportionalityth oral y jo
R ri
s
t dat 180 y se ofthe2008elections,w co
Degree ofParlia ive ways.First,bycom p m se a ared withthe2004elections.Overall,data c del votes producedbythem o are notavailable,m despitethethreshold a ble tode tions, thethreshold“le mbined witharelativelyhighorpreviously re com m joritarian andthroughPRfor ats withthepercentage leaders andregularv i vere p 1 alm 12 lete electoralresultson 992 24 24 36 0 8 8 .9 e dataareillustratedinTableV
d o 153 p
by st halfoftheP etito ter
Geo m 1 61 19 rs to 995 10 10 54 5 ine whichof 3 r mentary Fragmentatio .6 .8 gi
an them a C
obta v e a e thatthePRpartoft nt ki 1 56 56 ral 999 45 i increasing to7%.The ng suchcomparisonis p 7 4 4 3 o n parliam sson” haspartlybeen .7 .6 h
a El ters h en a2%dropinthe a r
a R ing thenumberof joritarian part.For ofm ect joritarian electoral thetwof voteshavebeen i ons C 2 a 90 13 th 004 20 d no 7 5 5 2 .0 .3
a e m jority seats ntary seats. e m
o ulas, itis m previou m o .3. rm i a 2 n 65 94 ssi 008 12 jority
5 3 5 3 .3 .7 ulas on
h
e s
CEU eTD Collection by thegreatestopposition partyin Table show which thiswasthecasewithGeorgianpro-pr electoral sy interested in can favorb m elections hadnothreshold,thatthePRfor electoral system num V.3 alsorevealsthatexceptfor2008,them this num parliam parliam well. There position 2004. In1999and2008,whentheincum the m The PRfor to obtainam years whentheirelectoralpopular a jority formula.In1995,1999,and2004there b Table V.3showsthatitwasonlyin1992,el Generally, theelectoralsystem The dataals a er ofparliam jority for e e s nt throughthem ntary electionsgenerally ber wasequal,whichconf , th m s thepercen stem f o havingaconsolidatedoppositio ey m ore, thed ula workedparticularlybetterin a th pro-p jority ofseatsth m s irrelevant. s m ula atthebeginningofpe a o e naged toob showthatinGeorgiatheel ntary partiesaspredictedin i ght im r es tages ofextra-seatsg a idential and ta inTab a jority partofelectio pose cer tain rough thePRpartofelections ity wasnothighenoughtorende benefited ofthem a irm l tain risk. e V.3pr b eachparlia s thatfavorth anti-pres solute s thatth m m a ula 181 b jori T n in a esidential partiesand ents of oves thatthegreatestw a in riods withconcentratedpower,i.e.in1995and ere hasbeenalearn ns thanthroughtheproportionalpart.In2008 i f th ectorally successfulpart jorities throu h dential parties.Aspresidentswouldnotbe produced moreparliam o ed bythegreatestp ty partofthesystem e data rm e litera m the legis e b e ing absolutepa ntary electionsinceindependence. The echanical eff ectoral yearinwhichthePRpartof i have beenm concentrated powerwereinstronger g parties inTableV.4illustr ture o l ature, theim gh m n than throughthem elec attheexpen ects ofPR,especiallyinth a i r them jority ng effectovertim rliamentary m tora strongest opposition.The o r neverproducedasm o re - e pres l a ies hadmorechances plem ntary partiesthanthe elec pa i nners ofGeorgian nd partysys echanical effectsof rties enteringthe idential partyand ate s entatio tor e ofsm the a l f a a jority part. jority than degreeto o n ofsuc rm e all o t . Table em ula as s. n all es h e
CEU eTD Collection Geo used greatlyfavoredth than votes.Thisdem for oppositio winning partiesineach potential alternativefactors th inform preferences areneeded. power. Hence, theelectoralsy effect oftheelecto consolidated theoppositiontoth 154 and thepercentageofPR figures arecalculatedasthedifferen El So 1 1 1 2 2 Table V.4. m year ect r 008 004 999 995 992 gia. ula hadnothreshold,theg ur i Overall, For determ 5.2.3. PoliticalRepresentationofE on ation forrevealin
ce: n parties,asaresu aut Thre h
the or Extra-Seats Resultingfromth PR ’s cal sh 5 7 7 5 0
ining theelectoral ol datareve r d% al sy c u o l nstrates thatthespeci a e first-winning/pro-presidentialpar g specificgroups’electo t i stem Them stem on votes attributedtoit. election, obtainedconsiderablymo al thatthep base % Nat lt ofP ofGeorgiacon ataconsiderab
at m Un extra r i d eatest pro onal a e president.Thelatterhasbe ited Nation on ss surveysrep p - a Citizen Citizen seats gainedby r R t M y alsoinfl “Peace” Bloc esi ce between typeofrepresentation,da h for o e el d (1991-2008) ve en r 23 14 37 -4 6. o- s’ Un s’ Un m m t tial p - .8 ect .8 .6 .9 2 a hnic Minorities: pres presiden e l Mo ula’s nt oral fic contextandconditionsunderwhichPRwas 182 ly Dem ion ion a e PR-Generated“Wasted”Votes uence onanindividual’s t id rty v ri
lesser extentthanthepro e ral preferences.Surveysallowcontro
ential ando dat the percentageofPR the buted totheconsolidat r m m esent themostcommonlyusedsourceof o e crat tial parties,whichhave a echanical effect.Onlyin1992, pro- 154 n del t
s i v e r ed ties andatthesam pposition by % re extra-seatsthanthegreatest nefited ofthedisproportionality Blo extra C Blo Natio ta onm c e “Th nt c - “Th R seats gainedby “October 11” ral part o e n ppo se vi e a El Righ l Dem e val electoral preferences, ats gainedbyaparty Jo ion ofconcentrated - sitio ect ies gainedlesss pres 13 -2 b ofGe i 2. 8. 2. int Oppo norities’ electoral i tist Op .3 .3 4 6 3 ons e o n p cratic en alsothefirs idential parties. e C tim a o Bloc , rty r the gi po Georgia o sitio Party m a whenPR e, hasnot sition greatest m lling for n i ssi ”
” on
eats o t f
CEU eTD Collection
as inMarneuli.Nevertheless,thetwodi higher than50%,althoughtheshar was Azeribothin1989and significant Azeriterritori 157 156 155 by GreeksandAzeris. Ar Nevertheless, other66%inthedistrictwere population. InTsalkaregionArm the levelofthesetworegionscanbeconsid overwhelm concentration ofAr the Southerndistrictsofcount m m surveys areunavailable.ThisiswhyIusean other thanhis/heraffiliation th cens is th i i Data Thetablei Sou Reg norities’ elec nority communities– m 20 19 Table V.5.GeorgianD e u esis an i As thetableshows,therearefouradm nians constitutedonly55%ofTsalka 0 8 r ses on ce: d 2 9 d
e s/ 156 liv a al ered b ing m ta n yses th Akh clude deliv Districts with tora a y 9 9 lk a s both th ered b e en 4 1 jority duringtheentireperiod alak . . e Nation 3 3 l pre m
tire i e 157 y
1989 and nian population.Intwoof t The 1989and2002PopulationCensuses. AzerisandArm f p h TheTableals erences –theregiona al concentration.InMarneulian o e Nation a s Arm A l StatisticsOffi t Arm i - stricts w co k
h to acertainethnicgroup.Howeve e mm a 36 42 20 e n ltsikh ni i a . . an 02 ce 2002. InBolnisiandDmanisith ry, asillustratedinTableV.5. 6 8 l StatisticsOffice u an po e
n s’ territo e ofAzerisinthe nians cons % i e st p
i nsus data,beca th p e u o ce of Ethnic ri Nino l revealsth a e o t rial co nians –ha d i on . populationby2002,other32%wereconstitu Ge 95 89 tsm 183 stricts thereareother
Greek andAzerim tituted only28.5%ofthepopulationby1989. . . org l vo 8 6 n i i
n c of Min nist d en i of transition,thereforethevotingresultsat indirectindicator a, at ered asrepresentativefortheArm a use Georg thesedistricts,Arm ting resu
t at there r rative unitsinGeorgiawithsignificant atio ve signif o total populationis dem au rities’ TerritorialCon Tsalk 55 28 n - i tho a, atau ogra . . 0 5 r overwhelm a
’s requ a
lts. InGeorg r p e threed i hy isadynam cant te th Bo co ors 66 66 Districts with ln es n r, inGeorgiareliablem i . . c i 155 0 0 t norities. Sim req s e percentageofAzerisis en
(Octob i m
rr tration u for determ i i ito e i nority groupstooand stric Dm st (Octob ng partofpopulation e not asoverwhelm i nians constitutedan ria 66 63 er 2 a thebigg i an c – t varia . . Azeris’ territo l s inGeorgia 8 9 % Azeripo i concen 008 s
centration. i
er ilarly, evenif , Tb b ining ethnic le and 200 Marn ilisi). e pu tr 8, Tb 83 78 s ation in t ethn latio . . because eu 1 7 rial e
with ilisi). l nian i n
ing a ted
ss ic
CEU eTD Collection M Georg as indicatorform 160 159 158 districts thefirstwinningpa party obtainedanabsolutem rather d between 1995and2001( pro-presidential partyC Georgians arebelow30%. the politicalinfluenceth concentrated concentration ofm post-comm parliam To El ovem The So Id Table V.6.GeorgianP ect
tal % Azeris Armenians em i ur The datain In the1995electionsm i r a. Abbrev ons e e a Marn Dm Bo Tsalka Ni Akh Akh
ce: nt e i g ntary seats spersed intheirvoting n r De ln 160 a aut e a an o in a a isi t / Reg unist parliam eu lk ltsikh s isi ed v m m m alak h ailable dataat li o i or iatio nda crat i i ’s cal e norities o i
n TableV.6illustr i s; n s norities’ el s UNM
i : CU norities. Th c u l a c “So “So t at pa – i itizens’ Union,partyw – di on e oncerning s Citizen ntary elections,atth ee Chapter1).Atthesam U strict leve lid 158 (first w CU: 4 CU: 7 CU: 5 CU: 5 CU: 2 CU: 4 CU: 46 lid a 1 rty wastheonethatfor n rliamentary Electio base 995 arity”:1 ecto i rties su arity”: 0 a Thereforethevoting i t
norities whopopulated e jor d beh 3 0 5 6 6 7
d ese datareflectthedegreeofunanim Nat s’ Unio
ity ofelectoralsupport.Neverthe ral preferences. on i l for a nners andtheir% 8 th i
t te thepercen pported bym
onal a vior, h eir vo e el all elections,e n M ; “So becau ect o vem ting CU: CU: 4 CU: 9 CU: 8 CU: 6 CU: 7 CU: 7 CU: oral lid 184 1 999 e arity” – pr nt
67 5 se dat ns RegionalVotingResults,1991-2008. h . 6 1 4 0 9 8 6 ta
i e levelof
norities h ef
ich hadam x resultsforth in
m ge ofvotesgrantedto a cep e erences. T del ed tim Po fouro the sevendistrictste ofvotes) t fo i a parliam v litical e, thedatashowthatm r e
r t ed h a NMD: 8 NM NM NM NM NM NM NM e 19 d thesevendistrictswithhigh f by
2 thesev Un in theelectedparliament. h 004 D: 65 D: D: D: D: D: D: a 92 e data C 159 ese districtscanalsob jority ofparliam i o e 75 79 63 80 71 85
on n ntary m e less, insixoutoftheseven 8 “So nt
es. ral in e n m El lid ity am th arity”; NMD– thef a ect nded tosupportthe e Table jority. i nority dis i ons ong territorially UNM: 9 UNM UNM UNM UNM UNM UNM UNM i C rst winn i 2 norities were 008 e o also ntary seats m : 79 : : : : : : 83 90 85 83 83 74
m 1 t Natio ricts i
e ref ssi tak ers on l no ec in n e o a n f t l
CEU eTD Collection Saak Abb for 199 161 presidential elections presiden data alsorevealthosecasesinw populated districtsunanimouslysupportedthesa between 1995and1999theyenjoyedpa seven d gained absolutem party. Inallthes elections, of votesweregrantedtothesam seven districtsactedm
Gain Sou Azeris Armenians Electio r ashv ev Table V.7.GeorgianP ed en Table V.7showsthatexceptforthe1995 The datainTableV.7illustr In the1999,2004,and2008parliam r Akh Akh Marn Dm Bo T Ni iation 1 ce -fo s :
tire co ili. v “Svo n a i tial office. ln stricts h l o an o n whenin a k a i t t s eu lk ltsikh a s es (%)inth s s i / i m
s : ZG–
r 2 alak Reg i l un
bod i i
n 0 d try e 0 i i a
n o 0
Zv a n a - e th j 2 a s d sig each a
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dat u Ga z n ofthesevendis ch m ij ificant a”, 8 m a (first w del s 1 ak ZG Z Z Z Z Z Z Z ection residential Elect 991 97 58 52 70 74 52 86 86 o G G G G G G G
Ju hu i re likecoherentgr v
ere rd ly 199 ele ia; DP-Dju i d s nners andtheir% a by thepartiesquasi-una c e a h e te thedegr tora ys supportedbym ntary seat party.Th ich can C 1, Tb rtial electoralrepresentation. e l repre nt t 80 80 80 80 65 80 65 1 ricts DP DP DP DP DP DP DP DP ral 995 19 ilisi; for19 ------95 95 95 95 80 95 80 m El didates supportedbym 185 b ions R
at s. Thism e ect ee inwhichthe r Patiash s is wasparticularlythecasewith2008 enta least73 oups, asinmostofthecasesm i m e ons C ntar e e tion in candidateinpresidentialelections.The 95 gional VotingResults,1991-2008 ofvotes) elections, thewinningcandidatesin : “Sv y electionstheethnicminoritiesin v o a 2 99 96 97 97 82 79 94 eans thatsince1999m ili; ES– m jori ES ES ES ES ES ES ES ES 80 000 % ofvoteswereg m .1 .6 .6 .4 .1 .9 .0 n i obo imously supportedbym ty ofvotersinthesevenm
the ssi on of dn Ed votersinthes 161
aj leg u a Gru a Geo rd i sla Sh 2 i 84 88 97 97 97 97 97 MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS norities tookoverthe r 96 004 z gi tive ij .9 .8 .6 .7 .5 .3 .7 ev a a”, 16
arn t branch t i a h ven tothes d e aut Nov e ze; MS– i norities inthe ven m o re thanhalf hor e andthat 2 m 90 82 84 71 90 81 84 MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS 54 008 ’s r b i .0 .2 .5 .6 .2 .2 .0 i i norities Mikh er 19 nority- nority- e
que a m 95 eil st e ; .
CEU eTD Collection with theethniccom efficiency. Theform characteristics specificfordescriptivepolitical ethnic com consolid concentrated support fortheincumbentpolit m been sufficientisillustrated inTableV.8.Th be num should besufficientinordertogivem percentage ofethnicminority representation duringtheperiodof appealed tom through presidentialelectionshasbeensign voting patte higher thanthepercentageofvot elec seven regionswasparticularly m populated districts.Therefore,allthreepost-Sovi that te i i norities increas norities’ e tions the For determ The degreetowhichm Overall, thepresiden rr erically efficientsothatm ito ate theirpo rially conc position of r percentag l , whichim ns leadto ecto i norities’ e ining thedescriptiv r al sup ed withthecons litica position ofthepopulationin er isdeterm entrated e e plies tha Georgianparliam of port. Thepe twoconclusions.Firs l l position ecto tial andparliam votesgrantedtoShevarnadzeandrespec r i al sup norities’ descriptive t t hnic incu dep hig ined bycom i s norities’ repr es thattheyob transition.Moreover,theelec . ical actorswasin h port f u rcentage of olidation of m e typeofm during ties mbents need i norities a i norities in o e r win ntary el e the th 186 nt between1991and2008.Therearetwo p ificantly high.Second, ar es
inGeorgiahadatle e las n repres votes gran t, theelec e tablecontraststhepercentage ofspecific par powerconcentration. ing theethniccom thecountry.Thelatter entatives inparliam ing ele sense offairness;atthesam tained inth et presidentsofGeorgi i ed toappea nor representation inpost-Soviet Georgiahas ection resultsatdistri t liam thre ities’ repres entation: suffici strum c tio e te nt. Thedes e toral rep ns. pres d tothewin e e entirecou l ntal inpreservingthepower tom identia toral representationofethnic entation, Iusedataonthe i position oftheparliam r tive noritie e ese nt as presidential candidates c ency andproportional canhaveavoice. l l riptive n t significantelectoral n isdeterm e y, Minorities’ electoral a hadatleastpartial ing candid n tation of ct leveldem toSaakashviliwas try. Theseregiona l s’ votesino ections. Forthes e rep ti m m ined bythe e r a , i es tes inthe i t entatio onstrate norities should r der to e nt n e l
CEU eTD Collection 6% intheparliam most im specific m non-Georgian ethnicidentity,aswellth efficient isillustratedinGra sufficient. descrip in m 162 groups hadsufficientparliam data onspecificm was aboutthreetim deputie the Georgianparliam which thatm deputies belongingtothesam m auth represen i 20 19 So th norities in M or 0 8 e p Min Comparing Minorities a urce: au 2 9 ’s req o
The data x C
The degree a st casessm C i tiv s we mu rliam o
e e portant f tatio r nsu nsu ities e repres u m % i es nority groups,duringallparliam thor’s calcu TableV.8.EthnicMinorities’Descri e s s n re pre
theentirep t. n a % % in t
xi sh
m act illus ow thatover e u inwhichm s i enta 19 nt. Therefore,asasepara Min nority groupsshowasim m percentagew ent inthele aller thantheirproportio es lowerthanthepercenta to 9 16 29 lation 9 6. tal % e o tion ofethnicm /
nt. Between1999and 0 .3 . 2 r 9 ities 00 t opulation ofGeorgiawi
ra , 4 b ted intheGraphis ’ Presencein a ph V.1.Itshowsthepercentageof sed a e
ll m nt Arm e 19
gis m i o ary representation,astheirpr norities’ descrip n 9 i th 9 3. 5. 8. a l e i noritie ature, / n s reached. nority groups
0 7 1 2 i e
00 a n d s 4 a
ta p thep i Parliamentw s have norities inpost- e perc r te grouptheparliam ov ila 19 187 e n inthecountrypopulation.Therefore, id th ntary m 9 r pattern.Virtuallynoneoftheethnicm A ge ofm 2004, whenthegreatestnum e 9 2. 6. 5. ed alwa entage ofparliam a z rcen th them /
1 5 7 2 e t . Thetablealsoindicatestheyearsduring b m tiv r
00 ptive RepresentationinGeorgia. i
y 4 Eu i e repres tage of ys been noritie a i rop ndates between1991and2008.The nority populati i a th Popul 19 xi ean Russian S 9 s werenever mum
5 1. 1. 6 oviet Georgiahasneverbeen numeric m C enta / .
3 6 3 1 oportion intheparliam parliam i e
99 nority parliam e n percentageofparliam ntary ethnicm s t 9 e tion hasbeennum re fo
ation CensusData. ntary deputiesbelongingto ally r MinorityIssu 19 on inthecountry.The e O ntary deputieshaving presentatm 9 s und s 5 0. 0. 3 e / .
9 4 0 1 t i
99 a n b errep e 9 s er ofm
ntary deputies i norities could A es (Tbilisi)a 19 r b esen k 9 h o 9 0. 0. 1. e 162 e a re than / i nt was i
rically 1 9 8 2 z e nority nority te i
00 ntary a n d in 4 s
t
CEU eTD Collection voting outcom never haveasufficientnum an
parliam the ethnicminorityparliam 164 163 the degreeofm in parliam parties thatwereeverp determ developed byHarm or ethnicm declarations andinterv Graph V.1.DescriptiveRepresenta alysis w Theanalyzed Sou parliamentary seats % The substantiverepresentationthroughpro-m r 0, 3, 6, ce: Euro ined throughthecontentanalysisofpa 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 nt, i.e.whethertheirvotingbehaviorha a s do e 2,4 nt ofpartiesanddeputiesbelonging 1991/ i 0,41 nority parties.Forthis,Iapply n 4 pean e e 0,81 texts arelistedinAnne ar s. i 1992 norities’ substa e pr Cen 0, 4 esen 1 el andJanda t re 1,78 1992 iews ofpartyleaders. r 0,89 for ted esent inp 0,00 inAnn Min - 1 e e 9 ntary deputiesactedas rical strengthtoin 0,44 9
o 5 5,63 r ntive representa ity pa e x 8. a 1995- x 9.T Issu r rliam onpartymanifestosandpr 1, lia 7 3 tion ofEthn m es (Tb 199 h (1991-2008) e e 0,43 e speci n nt, as 9 5,96 t a ilisi); d r y m 1 188 164 2, the pledgepositionm 999- fi 9 2,1 w rty program fluence parliam 8 c et Inaddition,Ideterm tion, Iproceedinidenti a to ethnicm e 3 n a 2004 s beeninlinewithth d ll asthroug ta d ic Minorities hni a 0,85 i representativesofmi 163 nority/ andethnicm t e e ci s liv t 3,39 y 2004- ered atth 2, -rel 1 0, 2 8 a s andelectoral 5 t i 2008 e norities. Therefore,todeterm h the d i e 0,00 ntary agendaorparliam e au ssues in theGeorgianParliament ogram 4,00 anal s thor’s req i e n 2,00 on t c thod ofcontentanalysis ine thedegreein e 2008 ysis ofvotingbehavior e inte fying thepro-m s, aswellpublic h i 0, nority partiescanbe e nority groupsinthe platform 0 b 0 u a est in si rests of s ofw
Octob Tot Ar Az R O Ab u sse h me s ofthose e ssi k m a i r h c i l t n a h a i e a z which i n i i r a n e i cont nority nority s a n 2 s ntary n s 008 s ine e n . t
CEU eTD Collection go b reg Ab ex
165 since 1991isequallyconfirm ethno-cultural character. analyzed partieshadprogram that itsplatform m there has parliam legislature. Forthis,Irelyontheinterviews groups, and/orwhethertheyhavebeenactiv language inpubliclife. m elections. N National Movem on ethnicbasis.Suchprom by partiesto cam m relevant policyactions.Inpost- constan m e i i i i isten g Itistru ve k norities’ politica nority party.Oneoftheelem nority groups.Thecontentanalysisofparty nority partiesaretheonesthatdonotfocu i i o h n rnm paigns forparliam n azi n s The contentanalysisofpartym Sim i ce ofterritorialau with n a pa g e e tly s nt of nt, listedinAnnex7. e n ilarly, therehavebeennopro-minoritypa th , o rt
Arm e n e at i 1 ethnicm c upport ethn ver b e ca vertheless, nopartyeverreferredto 990 ul in e arl th n nn shouldbefocu s th i y an e e 1 een aregistered ot , an nt Dem s’ l c e r rep 992 o i d or Azeris’co tono n norities wasto e 165 e s and n gio ntary electionsbetween1992and2008thegreatest“prom i r o d ic m The absenceofregisteredethnic
esentation, m t er t t n ises werem i o 19 s es with o
crats that,assh h ot e of at
95 s orotherwiseel i d inthesecondary norities’ intere t Abk her electo h sed onprogram Soviet Georgia,nopartym ents inthedefi m e in p partyinGeorgiathatcould p re au o act settle h adm gi l azia an respectth i r c a o al ca y a n terials rev n st de by s wi itary Ge ances o i m nistra m d Adj p t h e aig 189 conducted withfor m n the pro-pres s own above,m t t ectoral m ei or , n s f ti s o i s ofanethno-cult nition ofethnicpartypresentedabovestates
s literature(Nodia&Scho m a no e invoicingm throughminority-frien m t r cultu gia. Butthey ve sta eals thatsinceth th r h r a to ese rity territo w a o ere hav m inly onethnic rties inGeorgia.Asdefinedabove,pro- re specificpro-m
Sou part e a r terials revealedth e ral r t us of an e t i h e e ssages m id
s beenp parties onGeorgianpoliticalscene Ossetia. Tak yway b ri i h entia g refe a al co a h d t theirregions,oruseof nife i ts andnottodiscrim norities greatlysupportedin r m rre ul o i l partie n be categorizedas nority-related issuesinthe litical p sted aconstantsupportfor y e ural character.Noneofthe c er deputiesintheGeorgian e collap d tothe a ity yon en a inly focusedonissuesof tration pr -re i i d thecon ng nority policies,suchas o- s Citizens a lated issues, in m rties th d ltbach, 2006;66). regio i s su at inallelectoral nori ly discoursesand t o e o acco ch t f y n at p t astheSou SovietUnion ro cha s u l of of ’ n l Unionand ead r t anethn i i th a nate them A se” m c butthat
ed fo t d G at b e ja r. e their ra an org y t r th h a th e i de an ic rn d e e
CEU eTD Collection issues onpoliticalagenda.Neitherhavesuch since 1991theethnicm conducted inOctober2008Tbilisi(Annex7) they belongedto,evenwhenitwasaboutlegi Moreover, this under-representationwasrela never hadsubstantivetypeofpo elections. Also,sinceind power. Thesystem f m attem pro-presidential partiesduring However, theanalys greatly under-representedinbo the descriptiveandtosubstantivetypes represented onlyontheelec m would attractarangeof social system o a i rm nority orpopulationof a pecu jority vote,andwithitshigh ation of p On theotherhand,interviewswithform As showna In conclus As discussedinChapter1,theelectoralsyst 5.2.4. Electo ts tofindanexplanati s determ m pro-pres i norities’ ine politicalpartiestoadoptpo i o bove, them n, between1991and2008ethnicm r alsocontributedtothepres al SystemsandPolitica is resultsshowthatethni votingbeh id i entia nority deputieshavebeen e pendence m toral typeofpoliticalrepresentati on tothiselectoralsupport. i l m xed electoralsystem categories ofvoters,beyond sp threshold andnationwidepartylis a th periodsw the periodswithconcentratedpower.Thesection litical representation.Thefurthe liar region.Thishappens becau ted tothepeculiaritiesofth a jorities inp vior wasg i norities were l RepresentationofM 190 slation directlyaffec e a i nera c m of representation,m th concentrated ervation ofco rliam issues beenraisedby litical discoursesandpolicypositionsthat overallinactive.Theyrarelybroughtethnic in er Ge i lly in revealed thatintheGeorgianparliam norities g em under-representedin Georgia,withitsPRshareexceedingthe e nts andhence,totheconcentrationof s characteris orgian parliam linewiththeposition i norities inGeorgiahavebeenwell e Georgianelectoralsystem. r on. Incontrast,whenitcom ncentrated p eatly suppo ecific categories andwithfragm se thethresholdforentering i r taskistoanalyzewhether ts, greatlycontributedtothe ting m norities: tic forcentripetalpolitical i norities inGeorgiawere e non-m ntary deputieswhichI i nority groups. parliam rted inelectionsth o wer incon i nority deputies. s of such asethnic e nted power. e thepa nt andthey s below ecutive e rties e s to nts e
CEU eTD Collection 1997 therewasnoethnicpartyregist the f Law onPoliticalAssociations.Nevertheless,the1997a for electoral system hand, ethnicm the parliam by AslanAbashidze,theautonomy’sleader. Union, thethirdwinnerin discourse hadaregion-based cam regionally electoral materialsrev issues aspartoftheirelectoralcam afterwards. TheGeorgianlegisl regional parties,itdid regional supportforpartiesisanalyzed.Even attributed, besidesotherthings, m pro-m i nority partiesonthepoliticalsceneofGe m Nevertheless, inthe1995electionstherewas paigns. o ation ofethnicm In Georgiatheform The effectoftheelectoralsy rm i nority positionsinorde ation of -b e ased issues nt ishighandnece i nority partiestarget reducestheir regionalparties,an i nority partiesorev not preventthepartiesalreadyregist
eals th or onspecif ation ofregionaland 1995 elections.T at th r tomonopolizetheethnicm to th electoral support.Thisparty chance togainparliam ssitates acertaindiversityof ation neverforbadepartiesto aspecificethnicm paign. Still, stem onpolitica e restrictiv ere have i d soallowedthef c ethnic-basedissues ered inGeorgia.Neitherdi en regionalpartie 191 beennopoliticalpart e characteris orgia afterthe1997lawam theanalysisofGeorgianpartym ethnic partieswasforb h e partywascrea if thelegislationforbadeform In the1995electionsthispartyhadan a partyth l partiesin i nority group’svote;therefore,suchan o e m rm ntary se endm s isdiscouraged. tics of ered to during theparliam ation of at despiteitsinclus i electoral support.Ontheother nor was theA ents toth d partiesadoptm focus onparticularregional Georgia isvisiblewhenthe ted withinAdjaraAutonom theele ats. Insuchconditions,the ity votes.Thelackofpro- becomereg ethnicparties.Still,af idden throughthe1991 ies whichfocusedon c is Lawforbadeonly tora ll-Georgian-Revival endm l sys e i onally-focused ntary electoral a ive elector nifestos and ent t o e r m e s specific ation of . canbe te a y r l
CEU eTD Collection Geo i 166 overwhelm optation of ones thatbroughtthegreatestnumberofethnic high levelofelectoralrepresentation:thepartie parties. The m parliam 1991 and2008.Thedatashowth of presiden the periodswithconcentratedpow m m optim character ofGeorgianelectoralru parliam parliam significan parliam Union soughttoincreaseitselectorals t s i a e
Int f norities enteredtheparliam sup e instream mbership. Inconditionsinwhichthefor r r them gia). h Table V.9re As theelectoralsystem p al solutionforminoritylead e fi o e e e e rt tial ones.Byvirtueof nt confirm ntary seatsth nt. Thef ntary elec
ve di t supportoutsideAdjaraautonom at o m ing regionalsupport. cou partyleadersalsocou s st attra e datam s i t nority lea ri n ct t r act tha s ofA y veals thepar
c tions s l tiv e thatregionalizationof vel a ro y of e m d wasonl ja t d itm ugh thedo theonlyre ers withinthedom r a e f t e mberships. h r anexplanation e Al
discouragedthefo a t y y af de a their e 7%(base l 166 nt through - les Ge er inGeorgiathem l m f Butbetween1995and1999th d ers to iliation gionally-bas . or easilyco-o coalitio at m
i political nant and/ gi an d upport beyondtheAdjaraautonom a -R acces o jority ofethnicm of evi y an n inant 192
parties wasdiscouragedbythedisproportional an oppositio f ethnicm n t o m v h al r whyethnicm e in or p s theytendedtosupportinelectionswerethe a d becam s e with othe pt m dat
powerwastoacceptm tion ofone-issuepartieswasdiscouraged, d partyen Uni f party listswasbeneficialfortherespective l r m uence, pro m r a on i o-presidential party
i nority parliam a o p nority leade tion ofethnic-basedparties,them st influen r i gai ovi nority p e thesecond-winningfractionin n ded n partyorthroughnon-dom r Georgianp e tered inab d
by bet - i nor i pres a norities inGeorgiahadsucha w
tial partieshavebeenthepro- rlia C ee ity deputiesobtainedtheir r e s in idential partie n 4 nt m e ral ntary deputies.Thisco- e All-Georgian-Revival e 2 to ntary deputiesb r % El oad coalitio affiliation.Onlyfew theirpartyranks.In a and ect rties and a i instream ons 95 y. Inthe1999 % o C s cou o f v m n toget obtaine o m parties’ t es, whi i l e ssi d also twee i on o nant o st l d n e f
CEU eTD Collection auth Arm rules thatw consolid electoral ruleswithdisproportionalelem shown above,theprocessofpowerconcentra did contributeindirectlytothesubstantiv m concentrated powercontribute order toaccesspower.Therefore, regiona virtu 167 low levelof because theybecam parties becausethey Parliam i Th Table V.9.PartyAffiliationofEth 20 norities in 20 19 19 19 19 m or e 0 e n 9 9 9 0 9 e fo a ’s In conclusion,theprocess Hence, then 8 i ofits 4 9 5 2 0 ndat an (M - - - - - req l par 1 1 1 2 2 e s, and ated llowing 00 00 99 99 99 n e ay u t s ary 9 5 2 8 4 es ) e centripetalcharac ethnicm ties. Also,itgaveincentivestom theconcentration power. t. re advantageousfortheconsolid Azeris.Source:d ethn min ( ( a (o (o (o (o ture of ic min out out Num e mem ut ut ut ut attractedm o r of2 of2 of1 of2 i
ity d of of norities’ parl b 2 2 o er of 2 4 5 3 3 3 r i the e 12 16 16 a 4 7 6 ities areco b 5 6 0 5 p 5 5 m
ers ofparliam u
de de de de de de t e ethnic ies in elec a
nt p p p p put put ta p ter, u u u u
substantive politicalrepresenta of poweranditspreservation t t t t i d alsotothesubstantive i i i i nority votes,butalsoitwasbene i i of powerconcentrationin e e e e e e th r th s) s) s) s) tora s) s) ovid the sam e n e ele s i l sys n e d (1991-2008). d ered ic Mino b and/ Min e c y r ents t ntary dom to e e in em th pr factorth e under-representationof ral s or o 193 th esen ation ofconcentrated e Eu r inGeorgiacons p ities inth i (i.e. highelectoralthreshold),whichfurther rity DeputiesintheGeorgianParliament is r nority leade o tion inGeorgiafacil y tin - rop data co pres stem g thedo n/ 167 1 1 6 5 6 ean i 2 2 at con a nant factions.
i
e d hinde ent Cen p m a rliam p i m a ilat l t i t pa r ribut n Georgia between1991and2008 re fo s a i red theform under-representation ofethnic toentermainstream e o n rt titu tion throughethnic n over tim n t
y t :
r Mino Ru
ed tothepreservationof tes oneof fi ci pow ssians, Ab al represe Min ethnicm itated theadoptionof rity Issu for e er hadadiscouraging . Thesam o o ppo ation ofethnicand r t ities inparlia th n h kh ting thegreatest sitio e mi es e causesf n azians, Ossetian 1 2 0 1 0 / a
(Tb i n p
norities. As nor parties.By e partiesin a ilisi), atth electoral rty i t m y el e o n r the t
it es s e ,
CEU eTD Collection the aut
faction “VillageLife”,facti and resu periods withpowerconc concentrated power.Asdiscusse is exploredlaterinthethesis. m power. Thequestionofhowincum elections atam support ofm 168 was norm concentration werepopulatedbyasm consolid different fromtheonesanalyzedhere. under-representation ofthe16% under-representation characterist to apro-m effect onthefor power inGeorgiahadadecreasin im i Aut ple norities’ voteswitho h During thepost-Sovietperiod,Moldovaexperi Also, thedatashowthatele At thesam m h 5.3. TheCaseofMoldova: or’s re o ented forparliam r’s cal atio lted a i nority discourse. lly higherth que n of from i c norities from u st. l a m a concen t e i rgin sufficientforpreserv on, thealliancebetweenPres tim ation ofs on t e, inthissectionthere u h tra an theav t adoptingmoreexplic entration. Thefirstlastedfrom e basi e ntary elections.No thesere t m ed powe on thatlaterbecam all andone-issuepart
s o f regi d inChapter2,duringthe1990s ic forpost-independenceGeor erage percou b gions wasimportantforincreasing g effectonthistypeof r ents ofcon on ethnicm . Theregio a al ny as9% vot c i tora i ng o iden ng 194 is nolinkfoundbetweenm res evidence wasfoundthattheconcentrationof l t c i it pro-m e theAgrarian nor n t Snegurand n entrated po r
evenforconsolidatingtheconcentrationof u try. s withh of Georgia’selectorate,whosevoteturnout ype ofrepresentationcontributedtothe ies, i. l t ities m s pr enced bothhighlyfragm 168 ovi Thisiswhy,attractingtheelectoral
e. onpartiesthat i late 1993untilthe nority discou ded i i g ght havebeen wer in h by degree the representation. Thedescriptive De Geo then gia andtheelectoralrules Georgiam m therehavebeentw r gi o of cratic Party.Thesecond a’s El rse andpolicyposition m thechanceforgain m wouldhaveappealed a i norities’ descriptive jority pa causedbyfactors ec i norities’ beginning of1995 t i e ons C a nted andhighly naged toattract o rlia m territor m m i o short ssi e ntary on, at ing i a s l
CEU eTD Collection available at as theelectoralsystem representation inpost-S f internal hierarchyandvotingdiscipline.Followi parliam power wastheonebetween2001and2008,whe the AgrarianDem 169 enter thepa the independentcandidates,alt different thresholdsforsituations. f illus substantive elem calculation. Thesizeoftheparliam have beenconductedunderthePRsystem occurred in1997,afterpresidenti o o Source: cus of r alltyp parl t Table V.10.ElectoralSystemofMold elections rated in Year of The electoralsystem The firsttwopost-independenceparliam i 5.3.1. TheImpactofPowerConcentrationonE 20 20 19 19 a m e this 0 0 9 9 ntary seatswerecontrolledbyasingl e data collectedbythe 5 1 8 4 e nt www.e-dem
s of ary rliam sectionisto TableV.10.
electo ent oft e nt. Atthesam o parl To o cratic Party.Neverth cracy. r tal nu a i seats l a inGe 1 1 1 1 oviet Moldova. com m h 0 0 0 0 dete e system 1 1 1 4 e m author ofMol m nt
d b ary p accesse er rm
etitors. orgia did.Allpost-Sovi hough thisdecreaseneverhelped
ine theim from e al electionsthatbroughtto dova hasnotchangedduringth t tim d at e h nt wasre theAss However, at change fo e r in 27 Oct candi , theth de e pact les , onth 3 3 4 4 o pen dat ova -DevelopmentssinceIndep
ciation In 2001thethresholdwasslightlydecreasedfor obe 195 e party–thePartyof s latively sm e of d , d e reshold wasincreasedfrom s
r, e f severaltimeswastheelecto ng thetheoreticaldiscussioninChapter1, ntar the m n o powerconc 2010. t e basisofthed’Hondtform r th n for t bothpresidencyandabsolutem y electionscontainedthesam e oth h l et parliam o e Partic ectoral SystemChange: st significan PR all andchangedonlyonce.The e t r fo h elec re ip entra r power apresidentsupportedby sh parties ato 6 6 4 4 anyindependentcandidateto ol
tions e r ntary el ds e transitionperiodasm y D tion on Communists –withstron
% t p e the m e o riod ofconcentrated cr leg m ections inMoldova acy o 4%to6%forall i fo norities’ i e ral thre sla r electo ula ofvote-se ndence f Mo tion 9; e l 6 4 4
d threshold 1 r
provided a ov 2 al bl shold, a politica jority of
169 a, ocs o n u lin ch a g s e t l
CEU eTD Collection b concentrated regionalelectoral support,aswell eventually fixedforindepende 4% wasalsointroduced.Althoughin governm inability decision wasthathavingonesingleconstituen Agrarian Pa decision wasvotedwithaparliam 171 170 decis proportional electoralsy terr with thenu system were attributedtothem parliam deputies defectedfromthepartiesthatprom the factthatafter19 a lim parliam 9% ofvotes,whiletheelectora com types ofpartiesandblocs.In2005therule e tw See Au ito een p i ited proportionalelectoralsystem t lex: theblocscomposedof The initialelectora At thebeginningof1990sparliam on oftheparliamentestab h Article 2in ria base 1 or’s in e e of 995 nt iftheygained ntary fragm l e ad nt couldnotcontrolbythattim theMo an mber of d onm m rty (Villag terv d i nistrativ th 200 iew with e Decisi 1, ldov u e voters.Theco co ltip ntation andtheineffec ndu e units. e C an centralp o le con stem Lifeparlia 90 parliam atleast12%ofvotes. a n o l lawadoptedbytheparliam cted jority electoralsy
rn for th el withmultip on
170 Gu s e m titue lin l blocscom nt candida lis ri two partiesco e e n, o ntary m i hed a d e co o n n i m nstitu ntary elect
ficatio itially m wer torun cies, Mar e nsul orofa ntary f e c e. Alongw ntary pa le m witheachhav h, 2 encies single constitu t n a a
nt tiveness oftheparliam tes aswell.Th o jori stem appliedin1990.Partyleadersprom pose f 196 012 i eant onlyforpolitical th a action). Theexplanation s regardingthethresholdbecam n nda ions basedonm uld ente ty m t e Law oted theircandidacies
cy wouldsoftenthespeculationsaround . as som m weresupp elec d h rty leaders i e ofthreeand tes and xed system.Thesepr Legal a ith thesingleconstituency,athresholdof tions o inly co n e r th
Par ofthem De ency forthewholecountry. i withnothresho in e ng liam nt inAugust1993establisheda e pa mposed bythethen- osed tobe parliam advo severalm Transdniestria,ter e sm rt e m n a t e m ar jority i nt cated aller politica nority ethnicgroupleaders, e y o oft nt between1990and1993 parties, thisthresholdwas re par Election e nt if theim . Thehighdegreeof f a electoral sys h e ndates eferences cam given tojus o P theygain l ties co rm d. However,alater s a
rl ( ed basedonth O i a plem ctob prop m l r par e c e eve itory uld e nt ons er of entatio e 30 t ortion em m t d olida ies with thatthe tif 171 n atleas , 19 n M e ter th oted a m y this
o This from l 93) n of d tin a a o ova lly ny re . g e e t
CEU eTD Collection b com Bloc, voicedhisnon-satisfaction m agenda. PresidentLucinski,whobythattim that m the nextsection,eventually representative oftheBloc foraDem by theoppositionpartiesand the decreaseofoneforindependentcandidate deputies fromotherparties,voted Party ofComm proposal didnothaveenoughsupport.Hence, 173 172 the positionsofbiggerandbette criticized th However, theirproposalneverm proposed th – bothinparliam De initiative to parliam Edinstvo Bloc,m organized onthebasisofsa e a tw Au Au m jority co een i o ng backtoam tho t Before the1998elections,electoralsystem In 2000theelectoralsystem h cratic ConventionofMol o
or’s in 1 re consolidatedpartiesthatsu e r ’s i 995 nt. n
nstitu e im ese decis terv an changeth terv d 200 iew iew with ple unists withado ted fro a e 1, co with naged topassthroughtheelector m ntary oppositiontothedom a i entation ofamixedsystem jority sys on C ndu C s asbeingdisadvantag m o e elec rn o cted theincreasinglyunp rn el Gurin el
on
Gu t tora m em dova andtheBlocforaDemocr lin r con system ri a e . th e i naged minant positionintheparliam electoralrule or n,
with theexistenceofaPR l f wasagainasu co n e increaseoftheelectoral s pported therespectiveelectoralrules. presiden Mar olida at leastimplem o o nsul provedtobeindeeda rm cratic to getmajorityparliam c h, ul t a t ed pa nt 2 a cam 197 012 i eo and ProsperousMoldova evensentanappeal n t Lucinski.T e t opular AgrarianPartyandSocialist-Edinstv s . or wassupportedintheparliam us f inant PartyofCommunists.Thetw rties (Huffman . h Neitherth s to3%.T e e from the1998parliam aPRsystem Legal o bject ofpoliticaldebate.Thistim al thresholdtoget r theirpolitica enting am for De m twoparliam ula wasputagainonthepolitical pa e h AgrarianPa rt h is change dvantageous forthebiggerand m threshold from e presid etal. system e withm atic andProsperousMoldova i e xed system ntary support. nt e oft l nt, supportedbyseveral
positions andasfavoring , 1993;30).Asshownin . Instead,heproposed e h nt u en e was greatlycriticized e representation inthe P ltip ntary Blocs–the ary electionswere rty, northeUnitate t togeth a rl . le cons 172 i a 4%to6%,and m 173 However,the e e nt Instead,the nt bythea of er witha tituencies. o blocs M o e the l d ova o -
CEU eTD Collection
position 2001 parliam back to6%oneyearbef parties and position parliam the pres Communists obtainedanabsolute which wasgreatlycriticized parliam considered asartificiallyraised valid one. Nevertheless,thisinitiativeencountered referendum parties thatdidnotm Party ofCommuniststhatm section, theincreaseofelectoralthreshol Communists’ supportwasincreasin De surveys conductedbythattim 174 disparity withthelegalnorm agains Seet m o ity of In 2002,theSocialDemocraticAllianceof For the2005elections,PartyofCommunis cratic andProsperousMoldovahadadecr t thisdecis h e e e of s iden Deci nt, theCommunistsobtainednecessary nt m of colle p to8%f withaviewofcha dif t oftherep r si esiden a e on naged toincreasethethreshol ntary elections,thisshiftinel f o cted e i rent politica f on totheConstitu t o h t, bu signatures e C r th a nage o o ublic. Inthenegotiatio t inexchange e ele nst re the2009pa i to overcom t u a s ofthecountry. t naged tovalidateit, c
i l onal tor acto nging theelectoralsystem e, by thepartyinpower(Botan,2003). ne theDem by oppositionparties.A a C l b eded f major g (Belostecinic,2001;14).Cons r o s ontheelect u tiona l decr ocs. Ho r t e thethreshold.
rliam of ity of M o l Cour o eased r in cratic Conventionof o e l 198 d wever, th ntary elections 174 d greatlyadvantagedinthe2001elections d forelectoralblocsto9%and12%,change o itiating am se ectoral popularitym n v various adm
Itisalsonotablethatacco a s t, appealtha the electo andatthesam ats, easing electoralsupport,whilethePartyof withsom or d opt M votesforelectingth al syste but notahighenoughm o e e Communistsin d ldova attemptedtoinitiateapopular ts withanabsolutemajorityinthe
on from a r 1 al thresho f ss referendu e ter theelections,Partyof i (Marandici,2008). m 0 nistrative barriersrelatedtothe oftheopposition t
Oc wasref m apureproportionaltom MoldovaandtheBlocfora e t obe a ti tter. Asshowninthenext m idering theprospectof r, i l e ght haveexplainedthe d to 2 , disadvantagedseveral u 0 0 ted f m, whichtheexperts creased theth 0 e partylead 4%f .
r o ding tothem r notprovinga a o partiesinth jority toelect r thep er in resho o litica i th xed a ss l d e e l
CEU eTD Collection disproportionality. These m by com wasted votesresultingfrom greatest percentageofwasted vot considerable increaseof the overcom elections therewereatleast15%ofwastedvot tim of partiesandblocsthatm parliam electoral system Georgian mixedelectoralsystem hence contributedtopolitic disproportio section belowdem incre then votedfortheincreaseofentrybarri parliam existence ofdom electoral thresholds–weregreatlyconnected a naged togainparliam es sm a The dataalsoconfirm Moldovan purelyPRsystem Therefore, thechangesinth 5.3.2. TheLevelo se of p e e aring thenum ntary parties,bothwhenthethreshol nt andwitharelativelyhighleve e thethreshold. aller th theth nality andatthesam an then inMoldova reshold i nant partiesinparliam onstrate, theincreas ber ofpartiesthatcom f u wasth Disp m e data arepresentedinTableV.11 a al powerconcentration. ntary seats,itis b them naged tosecurepar thattheincreaseof er ofpartiesand percentage ofwastedvotes. roportionality oftheElectoralSystem: e did generallyhaveareduci e m e es inMoldovanelections histor tim does.Neve chanical effect e electoralrulesinMoldova a does in toolused e, consolid notgive l ofpopularityamongtheel e e of nt p 199 blo d was4%andwhenithigher.Thenum possible toassessthedegreeofsystem eted inelection to thedynam . Thosepartieswithadom es bypartiesandblocsth rtheless, bycalculating liam er forsm f theentry ated thepo c s of o thethresholdfor2001electionsledtoa s th r th e the sam ntary seatswasinallcasesatleastth theap at par is pu aller andlesspopularparties.The rp i The 2001electionsproduced the sition ofthedom plied e t cs ofhorizontalpowerandtothe e icipated ine barrie ose. Asthedatap s comparativeadvantageasthe withthen ng effectonthenumberof below. ItrevealsthatthePR y. Asdiscussedbelow, this – notablytheshiftsin l ec r in tor ectorate initiatedand a the tota u at didnotm deed ledtom l l f ection m o b i nant positionin rm i er ofpartiestha nant partiesan r ula, aswella esen s l numberof . Als ted in a o, inall nage to th b o ree er re ’s d e s t
CEU eTD Collection signatures candidates toparticipatein candidates’ accessto force. elections didnotresultinthecontroloverth wasted votes–PartyofComm lead toconcentrationofpowerbecausethepart 1998 electionsthepercentageofwastedvoteswa De wasted votesinthestudied was notduetotheappliedthreshold,whichpr 176 175 power concentration. contributed tothefor of independentcandidates particip threshold, noindependentcandidateeverm candidates inthepost-independenceelections.T Table V.12belowillus Num Num Article Source:sees m Table V.11. o b b The electoralthresholdshadaparticular The 1994electionsalsocontribut cratic Party,partywhichwassupportedbyth er er of of 4 4 176 pa pa Wast , Electo Thre , therehavebeenalwayssuchcandidates r r o t t i i urces e e ed
s and s and The ThresholdEffectontheProporti sh v ral Cod ol o in Electio d t bl e bl ( s Table p m ocs t ocs t ( ar p theparliam e ation ofanabsolutem art t
t i of rates theth n e h h i
s and V.10. year e at Mo at s a and Blocs w pa elections iftheircandidacies
n ldo period. Thiswasduetothe s o bl d rt
n bl i unists –wasnotapro-presiden v ocs) c parl a i o ating inelections,aswell as p . c at s) %
i % a ed i reshold eff e m , nt. As e Moldova (1991-2008) n ed totheconcentrationof nt el ary ect a seat nage 200 i ons e twobranchesofpowerbythesam a Moldovan legislationallowedin jority inparliam s ect ontheelectoralsuccessofindependent h d toobtainaparliam y thatgain oduced oneofthesm e ly devastatingeffectontheindependent s alsosignificant.Neve table rev e Moldovanpresidentofthattim 1 15 par 994 13 4 4 on of“WastedVotes”forParties .5 tic
ipating inpa aresupportedbyatleast2000 eals thatdue e high popularityoftheAgrarian d 175 m the percentageofwasted votes 1 e tial partyandth 998 15 18 o 4 4 nt andconsequently,tothe power.Nevertheless,this st extr
e ntary seat.Thenum rl allest percentagesof to therela a-sea iam rtheless thisdidnot 2 001 17 26 6 3 e ntary elections. t
s duetothese eref tively hig dependent e 6; political e 2 15 ore, th 9; . 005 11 Inthe 3 .5
1
2 b
er h e
CEU eTD Collection of disproportionalityassociated withtheelec Bloc facedastrongoppo not them position. In1998thepro-presidentia in m elections isapro-pres parties. Theserulescontributetotheconcentr alloc votes favorthegreatestwinners parliam gained byp 177 effects oftheelectoralrules. which politicalpartiesbenefitedthemostfrom especially whenthethreshol disproportionality andc in thenum high totalpercentageofwastedvotesforthese that theyproduced,wereparticularlyhighin Source:sees Num Num u a In post-SovietMoldovanotall Hence, thepeculiaritiesofelectoralsystem ltiple p tion th Table V.12.TheThresholdEffectonthe b b er e er ntary electionbetween1991and2008.Ge of of o ber ofindependentcandidates st popularelectoralcandidateandther i i Wast r ese wastedv n o-pres n a o d d rties andb urces e e pen pen ed v d d idential parties(b in o e e n t Independent Candidates,Moldova(1991-2008) n e t Ta t s ca ca idential partyandwhen ( Electio Thre i ble V.10 l ndi nde ndi ontributed tothedecreasein ocs. o sition from tes aretran dat dat pen sh n ol e e d wasincreasedin2001.Thefollo
The datainTableV.13contains
s t d s t year d e
h n % h in elections,becauseduetoth at t at ca
w pa locs) andby thepopularPa ndi l “ForaDemocraticandPr pro o sf rt n i
orm dat c parl - i p p participating inelectionsovertim e at r s) i esiden e a ed i d into m % 201 e the 1998elections.Thise n ation ofpowe nt elections. Thedataalsoshowagradualdecline the politicalforcesopposi thewastedvotesproducedbymechanical toral system el thegreatestoppositio ary tial p ect Proportion ofWastedVotesforthe extra- efore, notthefirstwinnerinelections.The seat inMoldovaledtoacertaindegreeof rty ofCommunists.This iswhytheeffect i ons nerally, thehighper a s rties were seats particula num didnotbringtoitthe greatest 1 2. r 994 20 whenthemostpopularpartyin 4 0 54
e d’Hondtfor the percentagesofextra-seats osperous Moldova”Blocwas
b er ofparliam in suchafav wing stepistodeterm 1 5. 998 61 n p 177 r 4 0 ly f 6
xplains therelatively
a ng itarefragm rties (b centages ofwasted e o . r thef m 2 ula ofvote-seat o 2. 001 12 e 3 0 rable ele 3
ntary parties, locs i
rst winning ) ineach 2 0. 005 10 3 c 0 94 e
toral nted
ine
CEU eTD Collection B 178 concentrated president. Inthe1994parliam of favored bytheelectoralrulesap long-lasting concentratedpow am of seatsm than itactuallydid.Thehighpopularityofthe threshold wasabouttobeintroducedandther parties toen If thethresholdwasleftat 2001, whenitgained20%ofextra-seatsduetoth Communists particularlybenefite did gainconsiderablym dem l El oc, Source:seesourcesinTa anabsoluteparliam Table V.13.Thepercentageofex 20 20 1 1 ount ofextra-seatsthatwouldhaveadva year ect 998 994 onstrates. Incontrast,thepro-presiden pr 0 0 In conclus
i 1 5 on o-
pre a s de theeffectofth PR thre i ter thepar d power,theelectoralru 3; ent
6; 3 i i % a o ; 4 4 9;
l
6 n, thedataanalyzedinthissecti shold el
12 ect lia ora e ntary m m ble V.10 l bl e o nt andtheconcentrat oc i re e electo 4% inthe2001elections,this
Ext er inMoldova–theonebe n e votes, Mold t extra-seats thantheirpoliticalopponents.ThePartyof ntary elections . a plied forthe20 r h a Par Par Ab jority anda e - d ofthem seat p 19 les didno b r Ag t t ral sys esi y of y of tra-seats res r 98 e s raria v DPM d gai pa i C C en a 10 10 20 t % 6 i o o tial p rl n ons: n t mm mm ed B i tial partiesinthe1994, ova (1991-2008) em Pa a * m 202 by l t h D e rty u u a lowed thewinningpartytoelectitsleaderas e marginal. nced itinaleading efore couldhaveproducedm chanical effectsoftheelecto rty n n nt t A P 01 elec i i a
ion ofpowercouldhavebeencom that werealsoconductedinaperiodwith h sts sts ary M ve on revealthattheonlype g e u e wastedvotes,astheTableabovereveals. rarian DemocraticPa B pr l el suchaneffect,even ting fromthePR-generated“w –“Fora o- ect tions. i ons. tween 2001and2008–wasgreatly
178 Theserules De would haveallowedtwom Extra m In o tellectu Dem crat - Par seats 2001, and2005elections position, asTableV.13 i o Bragh o c t cratic Mo andPro ppo y of a rty thatwonm gained byt ls and ledtothef if sitio C thethen rio i s Allian 10 % 2 5 6 o o mm Peasan d n p r re wastedvotes s al th ldo withrela pe a u ro rty v n h ce a i e p us M Blo sts 4 reshold in ts Bl rom grea asted” o % rm c o of a oc test
i tively l jority sed. ation d ova” PR o re
CEU eTD Collection is theSouthernadm Edinstvo ElectoralBloc had st to de The dem xl http://www.sta 179 votes tothesam elections th reflected am tended tovoteasacoherent below. Thedatashowthatinm results forthepost-independenceparliam autonom significan of electoralrepresen the advan lim are lim data forMoldovashowthevotingpreferencesof preferences, 1998. Atthesam for the1990s,becausetherearenoreliab voting resultsatregionallevelandmasssurveyda s Dataa
ited numberofparticularethn The 2004populationcensusreveal For dete term 5.3.3. PoliticalRepresentationofE ited inrevealingthevotingpreferences ous v ographic characteristicsof t t territorialco ailabl ine Bulgar ag at m becauseth statusGagauzia,inwhich82%oft tistica. es andsho a rm e onthe jority supportfor i e ining the norities inthetwo e party.Instead m ti d i tatio /publ m nistrative unitT ian we e r , votingresultscanreveal ncentration ofethnicm e otherm tcom s ic/files/ n bs ’ and ele ofethnicm ite oft ings ofeachm c
tora rong supportinthetw Recensam Gag grou , bothDem ic m h the sam i o l r e Bureau nority group st ofpar thesetwore regionsdi p, asinm e a a pres i raclia, i uzians norities in norities in i nt/Recensam l thattherehavebeentw e entation t e m hnic Minorities: partyorelectoral o of e e liamentary electionsGagauziansandBulgarians ’ cratic AgrarianPart in which66%of t ntar 203 hod, botharenecessary a Statistics ofMol vo ss surveydatafortheperiodbetween1990and d o i s nor notactasacoheren
gions allowtousingele thesurveyrespondents st ca of particularm Moldova. h y election ting p are territoriallydisp allm onlyBulgarians’andG e populationwasGaga ta. Thevotingresultsar of ethnicm i ntul_populat ities. The o regions.Inthe1998and 2001elections ses the i r nority groups.Atthesam eferences. Rele s arerep f voting d localpopulationwasB iei/vol_1/ ova, accesse i i bloc. Itwasonlyforthe1994 norities inMoldova,Iuseboth rst isth i y andS nority groupsbecauseofthe o regionsinMoldovawith res foracom r t 6_Na ers es g e r o ’ ented inTableV.14 u vant regionalvoting r c d e sam cialist Party-Unitate- e uzian. oup bycastingm lts atreg tora d. Them a e usefulparticularly tionalitati_de_baza_ro. gion withterritor on 1 gauzians’ electoral l resu p le. Considering 179 p Novem lete depiction The e lts inorder i tim a onal leve ss survey u b s lgarian. er e e , they c 2010: ond o i a st l l
CEU eTD Collection the independenceofMoldova. electoral politicalrepresentation eventua concentrated BulgariansandGagauziansalwa of Communi Communists; inthe2005elections the sam controlled 82%ofm Gagauzians andBulgarians–PDAMPSM of that in1994and2001thepartiessupportedby and Bulgarianm by Gagauziansdidnotm also gotanabsolutem got lessm 180 an overwhelm an Ab d Un Source: m Table V.14.MoldovanParliamentaryElectio br Electio (8 Gaga (6 parliam evi a 2. Hence, exceptfor2005whenGagauzians Table V.14alsoshowsthedegreetowhic To 5. itate-Edin ndates inthele a Taraclia un 1% Ga 5% B t lly wonatleas e tal % uzi i o tim n ns:
Ass e a year a ntary seats ndates thanCommunists.In2005,Pa a u PC gau sts, whileG o l e, ithadarelativem u o g f t s s/ ciation fora won a o tvo ing m R r z r nom i it e i i a M a g noritie ElectoralBlo ns) ns) i
- Pa o y n
a
a rt ndates. In t are jority of a y gisla s f jority ofm ofC a a gauzians inGagauzia nage to Participatory Dem r (first w om lative PSMUE: 45 PSMUE: 54 PSMUE: 28 o t PDAM: 53 PDAM: 39 PDAM: 54 c ure. A m
; PD thetworegionswerepresen 1 m 1998,PartyofCommunistsgain 994 uni major of thesetwoethnicgroupshasbeensignificantly highsince votes from AM overcom a i onlyBulgariansinTaraclia a nners andtheir%
st jority becau ndates; at f s; ter the –Ag B ity of E PR raria o e theelectoralthreshold. cracy in –
theseregionswere 204 m El 1994 elections,thetwo n thesam PCRM: 7 PCRM: 5 PCRM: 4 De mostlysupported“Patria-Rodina”Bloc. a se e ys supportedinelectionsthosepartiesthat ndates c 1 h partiesandblocssupportedbyGagauzian allotherpartiesthatenteredtheparliam rty ofCommunistssupportedbyBulgarians m t 998 ns RegionalVotingResults,1991-2008 o
two groupscontrolledanabsolutem Mo o ral UE –form cratic
voted foralosingparty,territorially B ldo e 0 6 0 ofvotes) in
ti l oc “ v th Party m a , t inthepar P e e par d , “Patria-Rodina”Blocsupported a a t . ri ta prov
a-R continued tosupporttheParty 180 PCRM: 8 PCRM: 7 PCRM: 7 ed acoalitionand liam ed only40%ofm o 2 grantedtothePartyof di 001
na”; e id lia nt. Thisim
ed 1 2 0 parties supportedby m P at
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CEU eTD Collection i electio d parties represen regression m auth 182 181 above. Thedatarevealthatethnicm contain arangeofsocio-dem conducted b territo m pref respondents. W influence thevotingoutcom range ofav of nde a No i ta rev Tab Sou ethnicide norities, IusedtheBarom pen or te: Em erence Table V.15.DeterminantsfortheSupport R Ed E ’s req n The regressionm For determ R C Act l rially concentrated
participating inelections. r R e d s * e V.15 t pl ce: Pub ealed - ts th onst hni si . ucat e A w sq e oym n gi d i W g
u v h t e u va e ci o s a a i en p<.0 n e odel, theirsignificance, i i es
t t n nt andvo o r t y t c h ent e ailab
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ting j of resp ion o h rity ofethn w riables thata e
Su co Baro odel andtherelevantregr intention h odd o rv nt en andnot– n ond an Parliam r ey Mar of abinarylogistic
s o Regressi p I c e m 5 l < . 1 ratio l (Cutler,2002).Ialso . . . . . 9 . . en alysis, Id e e
3 53 9 8 1 8 . 7 hose .05 e 68 17 d ter d 6 8 0 6 6 7 a ters conductedprio ts to ic m 0 9 3 5 1 2 nd al 1 f * 6 ographic data ; s fo c o *
tentions. h r. titu
s Party ofComm on res a e . vo 1 i Ino ta, prov r each n so theR-s nt c 998 Iusethe o i te ofMoldovasinceM cording norities ha te forth r ary Elect e ities in
u term lts –odds
r o der id f in th ed qua ten e Partyo ed 205 todete
to e indep regression m b if d unists forthe re ofeachm io y theacad Su e tion ofallm on respondents,alongw d significantlygreaterch theIn ratios, d survey da th for thePartyofCommunistspriorto ns inMoldo tosu rv includedam r toparliam ession dataarepresentedinTableV.15 ey Janu is su e f nd Co 1. 3. rm .8 1. significanc .5 .9 18 .9 .7 .1 stitu ppo en 78 68 33 ppo 9 7 8 7 4 mm ine the 5 t 1 8 7 1 0 7 e * * 8 odel. Thede ary 2 rt t te of *
v regression m m *
ta rt o
a u
riab n wassign ic litera del, Ide h of a i is v sts v 001 rch 1998.Thesem i ong the nority groupsofMoldova– a Pub e e les th p voting PublicOpinionBarom scores,andR 181 ntary el a
rty inthe19 s lic Po . th at pendent varia tu term odel becausecrosst ifican e in Iin m re onvotin intention licies o Su theethnicidentityof ections. Iselecteda t ined theimportance ance tovoteforthe e tro t wh rv n ith theirpolitical tio ey Febr d square 98 u n 1. c f 1. 7. en o M t , 1. 1. .5 1. ed .7 02 .2 b 37 63 o 2 04 26 88 19 le ofthe i 7 5 vo 001 4 o s a 182 5 2 5 9 u n g behavior t * 4 3 ldo * 8 of ss surveys * *
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stic h a n e n e r , t
CEU eTD Collection 183 ethnic m square scoresandthesignifican determ Communists thantheet instan Party ofCommuniststhantheethnicm
candidate andconsequentlywaspres candidacy ofPetruLucinskiinthesecond Taraclia adm the winningcandidate. general –territoriallyconcentr candidate votedforinthe1996elections,whic Moreover, the1998PublicOpinionBarom presidential candidateandal Bulgarian regional electoralresultssim universal andconcurrentpres presiden parliam m 2005 parliam i Source:As norities hadasign The electo The 1996regionalpresidentialelectionsre ce, in inant ofthepartychoiceam e tial electionsresultsand nt. i norities inMoldovatendedtosuppor a nd Gagauzia soc 1998ethnicm i e nistrative unitand93%ofpopulat i ntary elections.Inotherwo ation foraParticipatoryDem r al representationofminoritie if n ter icant leve hnic m r i itor
norities ilar totheonespresentedinTableV.14canrevealwhether so, whetherthesupportedcandi ated andnot–hadacoherent idential electionswereorga ce scoress ially concen a ong allthein jorities. Moreover,ethnic m l of ident ofMoldovabetween1996and2001. were5.53 i o norities’ electo cracy, Mo a jority t reng rds, between1998and2008Moldova’sethnic tra 206 t thefirstwinningpa e tour ofelections.Lucinskiwasthewinning t r dependent variablesinthem votingbehavior.Inpost-SovietMoldova then theseresults t in allparliam ed m al politica e ldova. Dataprovided h allowsdeterm 9 tim r containsaquestiononthepresidential s canalsobedeterm ion inG sults revealthat90%ofpopulationin i noritie es m l repres a s voted o nized onlyonce,in1996.The gauzia autonom ity seem re likely e votingbehaviorandsupported ntary electionsconcerned.For . Ove ining whetherm date gainedtheelections. at unan enta rty inthe1998,2001,and the aut r to s tobethestrongest all, thed tion atth i m voteforP ined byanalyzing h or’s request. ously f odel. ThehighR- y votedforthe 183 a ta Thesedata o e i pr norities in r thesam levelof ove tha
a rty of e t
CEU eTD Collection percen sufficient whenthepercentageofm by twoindicators:sufficiency 184 regression resultsarepresente Lucinski vs. parliam independent variablesincludedinthem predict therespondents’vote representation ofethnic electoral representation. further strengthenthefindingthatBulgarian tim generally hadahighdegreeofelectoralre constitutes anadditionalproof which otherwisehasarelativelyhighpredic the elections.Moreover,ethnicityseem than thee Not Activ Table V.16.DeterminantsfortheVotingResu Source:seeTa 1. es m 00 e : The 1998PublicOpinionBarom The oddratioscorespresentedintheTabl As m *whe i 8 t tage ofm
y e o
ntary electionsdiscussedabove.The re likelytovoteforPetruLucinskiin t h e n 1 A n ntioned above,th p . thevote 2 g ic m < 4 e ble V.15.
.0 01 i a norities inthelegislature; th E , ** jorities. Inothe d u .8 catio
7 s w grantedtoSnegur,th 6 h
m e n Moldova. LogisticRegressionResu n
i p<. norities. Basedonthesedata,I Em e degreeofm
d inT 0 5 and proportionalefficiency.The . that Moldova’sethnicm p 1.
in thesecondtourof1996 l o 17 r words, y a m 0 ble V.16below.
en i t norities in s
tobe e presentation duringthetransitionperiod. ter results odel ar Ethnicity ethnic m i 1 norities’ 207 0 .868 e thesecondtourof1996 tive power(astheR-sq twom the strongestindependentvariableinamode and Gagauziancomm e proportio dependent variableis e sim e revealthatethnic
theentirepopulation lts inthe1996PresidentialElectionsof
i norities descrip com R ilar withtheones a .9 e in com gi 9 i p 1 norities o lete thesetofda
n constructed aregressionmodelto n votedf
tiv al efficien lts e represen R p etitors e 184 descriptive representationis presidential elections.The si 1 as distinctivesocialgroup . d 20 o e n r th 4 m c
unities hadsignifican inthee e thevotegrantedto cy isashighthe i
presidential election uare is0.223).This norities were10.868 e candida isreflectedinthe tatio f C o onst r them .8 n ta onelectoral 4 isdeterm 0 a l
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CEU eTD Collection 185 in theleg during the2 Moreover, m between 1998and2001wascharacterizedbyth descriptive representa parliam represented duringcertain entire countrypopulatio least with16%ofparliam leas the parliam 1989 and2004censusesarecontrast two indicators. proportional shareofm auth represen i Sou 20 19 norities, whiletheo Table V.17. M or t. Overall,theTablerevea parl Min 8 0 i 9 4 ’s req n Neverthe r
ce ce ce: au i In TableV.17thepercentagesofm mu i o e a tatio r ns ns m nt duringtran ities m % u i e thecontras us % us % slature dur es Minorities nt e thor’s calcu n 001-2005 parliam nt, inthoseparliam t.
in
les
Ethnic Min s Min , m 19 latio o ing 9 t ’ PresenceinParliamentw tion between1991and2008.Itshows 16 35 24 r betweenthe2004census i 8 ities to noritie % n i sition /
n by2004.Individualm .2 .5 .2 2 norities intheparliam therespec n, b e between 00 parliam e o 1 ntary seats.This a rities’ DescriptiveRep tal sed per
s havenotalwaysh l e s tha ntary term
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s wh 1 i nor ed 208 s. , is lessthantheproportio b e specifically d V.2 illus ities intheentirepopulationaccordingto en therespectivegroupswererepresented y nt. BelowIpresentthedatam
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i thatm Eu nority groups ve alwaysbeenpresen i th Popul 19 U rop e sm resentation inMoldova.Comparing k 9 1 r a 8 5. 8. a 3 ean d insuf / i
. 1 4 2 n tages ofthesam 8 t 00 ian i
th ra allest d norities havebeenover-rep Cen 1 tes thedyn s e dataon h ation CensusData
u aracterized t e totheover-repres re forMinorityIssu f i have alsobeeninsufficiently cient rep that theparliam e scriptive rep Gag 20 0 proportion 5 3. 4. 3. a / u
4 4 5 2 n ofm am z bythehighestone.
00 t inthepar e i a m r n 9 ics of es s
i e nority groupsin n i es (Tb easuring these norities inth 185 r tation inthe ofm esen m 20 Bu e e ntary term 0 n l lg ilisi), atth iam 5 1. tation of i t 0 2 norities r i / arian ation of
9 2 norities esented
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e e ’
CEU eTD Collection during the1994-1998term Russians andUkrainians.Sim have influencedthevotingresult m parliam 186 efficiency wasalsorelatively m particularly thecase descriptive representationha req i i
nority groups.Inthe1994-1998and1991-1994 nority deputies.W u Source: dataprovide est. parliamentary seats % Graph V.2.DescriptiveRepresentationofEt Graph V.2alsorevealsthat 40 20 0, e , , 0 0 0 ntary term 28,5 1990 16 ,9 - 8, 1994 7 s betweenoneandthree 0, d inthe2001-2005term 3 ith suchapre bytheEuropean 26 1994- . ,9 13,1 d arelativelyhighdegreeofpr
ilarly, m high, asitconstitutedabove25% 5,4 1998 s intheparliam 3,8 Moldova (1991-2008) pa s Ce ence inth in certainparliam r 16 1998- l i ntre f i norities ha ,2 a 4,3 m e o 5,1 2 nt r M 209 001 0,9 , when36% a committee chairm e e r i parliam n y nt andthepa o m ve beeno r 36,3 hn ity 2001- a IssuesinFl nda 8, ic MinoritiesintheParliamentof parliam 9 17 e 186 2005 e ntary term t ,7 nt, onecanas e 0, s v of deputiesbelongedtovarious 8 er-repres rliam oportional efficiency.Thisw e ntary term 21 ens 200 of m anships belongedtoethnic ,6 b e 9,5 urg ntary politicalagenda. 5- s theethnicm 6, 2009 e a 9 (Ge n ndates. Besides,inall 0,0 t sum ed inthep r s theproportional many), attheauthor’s e thatm To Mi Ru Uk Bu n t s r l a g a a o s i l a i rliam norities’ ri i i n a r noritie ti i i n a a e s n n s s s e a nt s s
CEU eTD Collection to trad m content analysisofMoldovanparty through theanalysisofvotingbehaviorin Bloc intheparliam 1994-1998 parliam representatives ofdiffe f ethnic pathofstate-building governm public use,forseparateeducationinstitutions interests. TheBlocpleadedfo participa 188 187 parties canbedeterm political rep degree of while thehighestdegreeofdescriptiverepresen m proportionally efficientdescriptiv the 1998 r wh om e i Dat Ian norities’ thod. itio ich th the28seatsinth a Hence, thedataonethniccom During the1994parliam The substantiverepresentationthroughpro- n
alyze th pr a l et 187 o t e -20 e ed c v nt ofterrito
h i con descrip d oncentr n incam r e 01 parliam ic esentation decreaseon d e p t by en m t an i o t n s o h ition tiv ation r e e e alysis ity p E nt. ntary term p e r ined throughthecontentan u rially concen aign withanelector s r of ope a rent m of e e rties. Th wa e parliam ntary presen an C p power.Thesef s m a rliam process andstronglyem
a term e i de arel r therecognitionofRussianla theethnicm nt e an nority groups,notablytoRussians. tatio e re e ntary electionsthe n e representation.Itis e fo alyzed t ce trated ary nt tha theethnic n r i m occurr st M power getsconcentrated. ed i p position of i a nori a
p et nifest rties and n t a th rty m
i A t hn ndings y al ed inaper i nne 210 Is noritie e B m ic groups.Th os IuseHarm sue a x tation o form n of m alysis ofpartyprogra i parliam 8. a l festo s oc gain contradictth nif Moldovan parliam (Fl i th norities h s wererepresentedbyanethnicm m e phasized e s i o sto explic nsb Socialist Party-Unitate-EdinstvoBloc nority partiesand/orethnicm arelisted i s ccur i od withhor e norities, andalsoforregionalself- e notablethatthelowestdegreeof u p nt. AsincaseofGeorgia,forthe ed afterel r a g rties th r e Blocalso , e
Germ a d inthep el andJa nguage assecondlanguagefor ve always on thegrouprights.Moreover, in e expe itly f
An any at wereperceiv izon 188 n ) e ections, 20belongedto e , at nt re x o Therefore,duringthe c m
e nda’s pledg tally d cused onm t 9 supportedthem t ation th r s ; h hadsufficientand i
andm od with th e a veal thatexceptf e qu u t i h spe estion or e at m d a ’s in the nifestos and r se req e society s positio i i d power, acco grea norities’ norities u est i i nority nority . rd
u
tes lti- i o n a n g r s ’ t
CEU eTD Collection R tim Gagauzian m adopted in1994theLawonStatusofGagauz absolute parliam notice support oftheSocialistParty-Unitate-Edinstvo the Agrarian of itspoliticaldiscourseand,asshownbelow, 191 190 189 the 56Agrarianparliamentaryde because itsm in publicsphere.Atthesam peace, th which theAgrariansparticipated Dem had agreatdegreeofsubstant ethnic m im em Moldovan, andnotRom factions ins 1 994 e Article Th Peasan pu plied aclearm ployees ontheirknowledgeofMoldovan(Rom e. , C bl o 189 e Parlia During the1994-1998parliam There wasanotherpartyduringthe Therefore, duringthe1994-1998parliam i cratic a h c bly inlinewithethnicm o Inaddition,thetwof isin i ts and 1 e rightofm f norities opposedvehem M 3 au, Repub , Con m Party– i o sted thatinthenewlyadopted Dem e l i d a
norities, Lawthatwa n In ova in policyfocuswasnotofan t s
titu h tellectu e a . ntary m e o s ssage againsttheunification tio lic o cratic Part tha Abo i n ofM norities to a f t
lished ls’ Mo alsohad a a nian. Parliam jority (54%),alongw ldo o ldo t y wasapro-m v h
e a v e 191 tim . a p ive representation,partlyth Attestatio (19 e s e actions annulledtheattest Thiswasinlin inthe1994electionscontained n i puties belongedtom r ntly. norities i eserve anddeveloptheirculturetouselanguag t s grea g ary e, theAgra 9 n 4 if e ) . Factio ntary term icant pr
n Ex tly cr ’ inte i n nority party. am Pro 211 Constitu ethno-cultural nature.Mo itic o-m s in re rian Partywasnotan e by virtueofitsvotingbehaviorinparliam 1994-1998 parliam of MoldovawithRom ith theSocialistParty-U ntary t Bloc tookarangeofmeasureswhichwere e with est, in sts. Mostimportantly,Agrariansw iz , the t i ed byth h nority stances.Theelectoralplatf ia, whichgrantedterritorialautonom e tion th Official Lan
term i anian) language. Mol nority gr Agrarian De t hnic m dov theethnicm e othe e titleofstatelanguageshallbe rough anethnicm ation ofnon-Moldovanpublic a Suve g oups. Nevertheless,byvirtue i r pa a noritie ug pleads forthe r e a e, in m ntary term rliam n a o a ethnic m , J reover, only nia, unificationwhich cratic Partywiththe
s 190 n Sa i ’ norities inMoldova u itate EdinstvoBloc, in e l pta Finally,th y ntary f 30 tere m a , 1 na Nr. –Agrarian i i sts nority party, nority party, 9 o inter-ethnic 9 b rces of 4 15outof , Chisin o e ith their rm cause it 14, Ap e two with y th e to nt, au e ril e s ,
CEU eTD Collection not winanyparliam m interests wasm representation duringthe 1994-1998 parliam position in the1990-1994parliam attract by19 “Concilliation” –laterfor constituted thebasisforform cases bas parties thatparticipa was stillcon of m im in fullprocessofconcentration Agrarian DemocraticPartyandPresidentSneg power in influence onlegislationandpolicym The twopa partly throughapro-m m i i portant pro-m nority partiesandblocs that hadagreatinfl nority politicaldiscourse,bu i norities’ attestatio During the1998-2001parliam The 1994parliam It isnotab s sim M e d rties con ondifferentparliam centrated. 93 as o ilar totheonesof ldova was a le thatby inly undertakenbythePartyof i nority parliam i m e e t p s ntary seat. ntary term ed inthem tituted th le m i n nority pa e concen onlanguag ntary electionsw 1991-1994 parliam e thebeginningof a nt (Crowther&Roper, m jority of ed the theAgrarianDe e twobiggestparliam e t alsothroughapro-m Minorities them werem trated becaus rty. Thisrepresentationwasnot ntary decisions, . Thisim ation ofth e deputie Socialis e ntary group power.Af e a knowledge,weretaken ntary term king. o stly f e re thefi s an plies e t Party.The“VillageLife”groupm 212 e D ntary term the 1994/1998parliam e o o Communists.Inthe1998 ur. Infact,the1994electionswereorganized d uence inthepreviousparliam ter thep selves haveno rm suchasGagauzianautonom s. Oneofthesegroups mocratic Pa th , thero hence, f e theexp 1996).Thetwogroupsexpressedpolitical m ed withinthep rst post-independenceones.Thepolitical at m o cratic A e i ntary f nority aswell. cons le ofsupporterforethnicm a i rliam norities licitly stated rty andSocialis inthosem titu g actions andhencehadagreat t grantedtheir parliam rarian Party.Anothergroup– e m ted the ntary election hads a r nifested onlythroughpro- eviou e ntary term e mostinf ntary votingbehavior. alliancebetw onths whenthepower elections,thosepro- s –“VillageLife”– ubstantive political 2-3y t Partyd y electoral support e andannulm s ntary term , so l ears, thepolitical uential g m a u naged to i insom e norities’ ring th een the of r the did ou e nt p e e
CEU eTD Collection Communists andbytheCo adm m adm m representatives, itattrac Adding thefactthatamongparty’stop Generally, thePartygreatly m language assecondstatelanguage,forstreng Nevertheless, the1998Communists’m protest provesthateven had tofaceanopposing The PartyofCommunistsdidnothaveanabsolute did nothavethesam in theparliam a sm parliam allowing Taracliatofunctionasaseparate addressing arangeofpolitical-e Communists hadnotasm Tables V.14andV.15,m of to theseparties.Agrariansgainedonly3.6%of i e i Socialis norities atalllevels, norities’ interestsin rge Taracliaadm i i aller de nistrative unit.Bulgarians’protestwas nistration refor During the1998-2001parliam e ntary term ts –le gree as e nt, buttherewasapro-m ss than2%,wh , theethnicm inth m i e nistrative unitwithcom . AsdescribedinChapter3, influenceasthepro-m ted anoverwhelm thisparliamentarypres m the e prev andfortheconso i a norities s jority co mmunists inparliam a em in policyfocus case ofBulgarians’protestagainstth ious term ich wasbelowtheestablishedel i norities have phasized conom upported th alition ofpa e ntary term i . Forthistim c issuesandtargeted i ing s nority onth a nifest i p 213 m nor act lid upport from adm also hadsubstantiverepresentation,althoughat ence wasnotignorable. votes,whileUnitate-Edi e e Pa supported bythelocal , Party the ethno-culturalissues.Itsprogramwas mbers therewereoutspokenethnicm rties. Nevertheless,th ation ity forcesinthepreviousparliam parliam e e m o statedtheparty’ssupportforRussian settlem one of nt (Radu,2 thened accesstoseparateeducationfor i m nistrative unit.Hence,inthe1998-2001 rty ofCommunists a u ofGagauzian e, there jority of lti-national ch of Communistsactedasadefender e theim e ntary party.Nevertheless,thisparty nt ofBulgarianswithaneighboring m i nority groups. werenoe 000; 6).Theprotestresultedin seatsandinm plicatio ectoral threshold.A a diversityofsocialgroups. s aracter oftherepublic. ’ territo e casewithBulgarians’ ns of instead.Th e 1998localpublic t nstvo Partyand h branch ofParty n ic m thereformwasto a rial autonom ny situationsi i nority e ntary term s e Partyof shownin parties i nority y. t .
CEU eTD Collection com two ethnicm Communists illus m an electoraldiscours votes andnoparliam the autonom politica with sim Comm Comm governm reorganizations oftheparliam further lim language ofinter-et recognized them The Comm However, becauseth 2005 parliam status ofRussianlanguagetothelevel a jority ofm p t rated inTablesV.14andV.15,theethni eted withstrongpro-m During the2001-2005parliam In linew Moreover, duringthe2001-2005termComm Ethnic m ission forInter-E ittee forHum l elitesgradually ilar bodies.Noneoftheethn e ntal departmentsando itations. Afterthe2001elections, unists alsoadoptedtheLawon inthe2001elections,d y’s internalpoliticalprocesses. Th e ntary term.ThePartyalsoinitiate i ith itspro-m a i nority parties-“Edinstvo”a norities’ substantiverepresen ndates (70%),which,ledto u lti-national characterofMo hnic communication. e e a ese initiativesp which,asinth ntary m n Rightsand worsened,duetotheattem thnic RelationsbythePr i nority a i nority ndates. Instead,Pa e nt andgovern positions,PartyofCommuni f discourses;nevertheless,th e National Minoritieswereabolishedandnever replaced r certain ic m e ovoked sig e 1998 elections,wasexplicitlyp spite theex ntary term i noritie second statelanguageatthebeginningof2001- 214 m tation duringthe2001-2005term nd “Ravnopravie”.Theselattertwoparties p Conception ofNationalPolicyin2003,which is ledtothelossby partyofGagauzians ld a greatdegreeofpowerconcentration.As e s a n d theopeningofaSlavonicstateuniversity. Communists initiatedara c m nt, whichimpliedthe intheparliam rty ofCommunistsgained rliam ova ificant m esident ofMoldovaan isten , Pa p i t of andth norities e rty ofCommunistshadanabsolute ce amongtheelectoralcom unists’ relationswiththeGagauzians’ ntary comm thepartytoinc a ss protests,theywereab e statusofRussianlang continuedtosupportPartyof e sts attem nt expressedanyprotest. ey gainedlessthan1%of ittees. Am r o-m liquidation ofcertain r ease itscon d theParliam p i nge ofinstitutional ted toupgradethe nority. theelectionswith ong all,th hads p e andoned. t tito rol over uage as e ntary rs of o m e e ’
CEU eTD Collection were Russians. all ethnicminoritydeputiesweremem Particularly theRussianm Communists preserveditspro- electoral supportinthe2005elections.Inspite between 2001and2005, whenpowerwasconcentr periods withfragm represented descriptively parliam m 1994-1998 parliam 1991 and2008m m addition, thepercentageofm parliam m of representationdefinedatthebeginningth 55% between2005and2009. Communists, whichcontrolled70%ofpa representation wasguaranteedthro representation duringthe2001-2005and2005- representation duringthepost-Soviet i i i norities te norities inthecountrypopulatio nority partiesand Hence, theethnicm The datapresentedab In conclusio e e ntary seats,whichrevealsahighdegr ntary m nded tosup a ndates. n, theethn i e norities hadsubstantiverepres e ntary term nted power.Thegreatest b port wereus
l and substantivelyintheperiodswith ocs. Inm i norities s i norities didhaveasi ic m i nor ove revealthatet m m i i ity deputieswasneverm i nority positionsduringthe2005-2009parliam norities norities were ugh thepresenceinparliam n. Mostimporta upported the ually pr period,fromthepointofview o st cases, b ers of inMoldova rliam esen 215 e
the Party.A shareofm ee ofm represented bothbypro-m ntary m is chapter.Asshowna t inthep these of losingGagauzians’support,theParty party. Mo hn entation throughpro-m n ic m gnificant levelofs tly, in par hadarelativelyh 2009 parliam ated. Inaddition, a i norities’ electo ndates between2001and2005, i a noritie u tie r allparliamentaryterm reover, inth ch belo l m iam i s also nority pa ong them concentratedpowerth e nt e s inMoldo nt withsignif of thepro-m w theactualpercentageof ofthreeoutfourtypes con e ntary m rliam , thebiggestm bove, thepartiesthat is r i al representation.In t gh levelofpolitical parliam ubs rolled m a greatnumberof i i nority parties.In e nority andethnic tantive po ntary seatswas v i a werebette a i nority Partyof can ndates. This e e ntary term t s ntary term a s between jority an inth h ares of a litica jority of e r l .
CEU eTD Collection power, m for electoralblocs.Thedataabovealsoreve electoral thresholdfrom consolidated theconcentrationofpower.Thise more disproportionalityintotheelectoralru analyzed inthenextsub-section. in whichm periods withconcentratedpowerthanduringth concentratio m m with thelef “Unitate-Edinstvo” m “Patria-Rodina”, neverm since 1991wasunsuccessful.Thepartiesperceived for least halfofMoldovanadm regiona would beattractiveformorecategoriesofvot issue parties.Therelativelyhighthresholddete fragm i i norities entered nority sta m ation ofethnicpartieswasnotforbiddenby As showninthesectionsabove,process This lacko In Moldovathelawsonelecti 5.3.4. Electo e nted power. l pa i norities inMoldovawere r t i ist Socia ties was norities’ politicalre n n. Sim ces werewellincorp f successfo r theparliam ilarly, al SystemsandPolitica hin lis a t Party. naged togetparliam d 4% to6%f thesubstan ered bythe a naged toovercom i nistrative unitsfor r ethn presentation inMoldovawasm e nt in1994,wh orated inth betterrepresentedpolitically ons andpoliticalpartiesdisc ic m o LawonPolitical tive r r individualpartiesan i nority e l RepresentationofM pres e 216 e th ntar e politicalp al thatduringtheperiodswithconcentrated par e periodswithfragm e a partytoberegistered(seeChapter4).The ers. Moreover,since1991theform e electoralthresholds.Onlytheethnicparty y seatsin1994,duetoitselectoralalliance f n rm ich wasdu f of powerconcentrationinMoldovainduced tation of ect wasduetothesud law, buttheconsolidationofsuchpartie les. Thisdispropor tie as being ined partiestoadoptpolicystancesthat Pa s wasf rties r m ogram d blocsandlater,to9%12% ethnic,such thatrequ i ring ashortperiodofpower i norities washigherduringthe rs o tly dueto ouraged thecr ld i than duringtheperiodswith norities: s ofm ed bytheelectoralrulesis e nted power.Thedegree ire as“Ravnopravie”or tionality eventually a instream d d th m en incre e f e mbership ina eation ofone- act thatpro- andlef a se a tion of inthe tist s t
CEU eTD Collection accessed at d pro-m elections; thereforeseat given theh 192 groups. Theincreaseinelector nevertheless noneofthesevotes m elections ethnicm introduced in2004m threshold forsingleparties parties. Th with thedo data reve which containsdataonpartyaffiliationof m concentration ofpower,butalsodeterm parties m 1998, noneofthosewhoparticipatedinconseque 2001 parliam Allianc elected in2001asrepresentingPartyofCo “Socialist P losing elections. with ethnicpartiestha a i e ta fro Au nority “PatriaRodina”Blocgained5%of mbership ofpartieswithsolidprospects t For instance,am h i m nority m or’s co e”. ThePartyof th a al thatinMold 20 naged towinparliam e Asso is lack m i a gh electoralthresho Decem m e rty-Unitate-Edinstvo” Blocin i nant and/orpro-p p ntary elections.Am ariso a instream parties. ciatio ofs ber 2010. i n nority partiesgainedabout
of MPlistsan n a t
duetotheirexclus ong the28parliam for Particip de ithardforethnicpar Communists u -motivated ethnicm ccess was ovan parlia introduced in2000andthe9%a
r e l es d ntary seats. at d, s ong thesam th The resultoftheseincentives ory w idential party al thresholdin2000didnot alsolinked m eir and“Braghis m Dem e e re transform all andone-issu p nt allethnicm a ined m rty affilia o ive ethnicm cracy, Moldova e the1994-1998parliam 192 i ntary deputiesrepresentingtheethnicm vot 217 nority leadersha mmunists and2-asre focus onareducedsegm e Thesefiguressupportth e re
overcom
mb es, whilethe“Ravnopravie”Movem ties togainparliam to the or coalition tio 1% ofvotes.In2005 spective 28m nt electionsasm n Allianc e ers of i fo d intoseat nority MPsbetween1991and2008.The i r high nority MPshavebeenaf e partiesfacedtoo d , avai ing thethreshold, i ethnicm fferen e” werethef , elec orwith lable onlineat d strongincentivestoallywith t nd 12%ofthresholdforblocs p e s fortherespectivepolitical isillustratedinTableV.18, a mbers ofparliam rliam tor i nority partiestog e onlycontributetothe a e m e thestrongesto l nt presenting the“Braghis e ntary term b n e threshold. The6%of i ary seats.Inthe2001 t ers ofethnicm e argum n rs ary term t ofelectoraterisked elections theethnic
t twowinnersinthe higharisk www.e ra ther th s, o e f - , 8werere- dem iliated eithe nt thatbeing e n nt in1994- th an tos ppositio o e o cracy.m e nt -3%, tolose f i i basis o nority nority o r the t ay d n r f ,
CEU eTD Collection parties whosoughttoat their tope most inelections,onecanconcludethatthes 193 other typesof m power also thresho disproportional elem system representation throughethnicparties,thedisp political power.Theref their ranksandbyincorporatingpr ethnic m ethnic grou party orcoalition.Consideringthatthesewereal Parliam i So norities’ represen 20 20 19 19 m ur 0 0 9 9 a In conclusion,theconsolida Assum 5 1 8 4 ndat ce: didnothavethesam - - - - Table V.18.PartyAffiliationofEth l 2 2 2 1 d. T e 00 00 00 99 dat i n nority voters.Thiscons e t l s ary e 9 5 1 8 discourag ps inMoldo c a h i
tora ng thatthereisnodifferencein p e sam r o m v l listso i min i d norities’ repr (o (o (o (o e e d Num ut ut ut ut tatio o electoralelem
ents oftheelectoralsyst by r ed of1 of1 of1 of1 ity d parl t b theform f v h n tract thiselectorate ethnicm ore, whilehavinga er of a, accordin e 0 0 0 0 throughethnicparties. i e 22 36 16 27
a 1 1 1 4 p Eur m
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o nt p p p p pean u u u u esentation. Minority
t t t t i i i i Parliament (1991-2008) e e e e ation ofethnicm th i s) s) s) s) titutes agreatpercentageof tion ofconcentratedpowerin nority leade C ents th e g tothe2001populatio e o-m nt re f t i parl h nority o at cont e d presi r M Min i n both byco-optingitspr o 218 a m e partiesalsohadbenefitedofthepresenceon ic MinorityDeputiesintheMold i m r n d s em, notablybytheincreaseinelectoral co i o e o ent nant the othertypeofm the agegroupsdistri roportional elem , so partiesthatethnic nt negative effectonm rity r asthisp politica
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rom
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CEU eTD Collection head ofstate,theincum authority. Asthe1996constitu when Kuchm that wouldh forces. This inte for parliam fragm parliam concentrated power concentrationinMoldova concentration inUkrainebetween Ukrainian but relativelylong-lastingperiod possible. which seem sam inf parties. Therefore,inpost-SovietMoldova and also,pro-m l m uenced onlyoneof rested in e apowe ti This im In thepost-independenceyears 5.4. TheCaseofUkraine: e nted thatnom m e e ntary m nts. IncaseofUkrain e Constitu , itdidnothaveanegativeinflue tohavebeeninstrum isbecaus m a r whenpresidentshadstablea ful opposition,thepowerrem ve alsohad a plie waselectedpresident, the p o i lding theele a nority policyposi jority. Therefore,aslongth s tha tion e a in1996andlasteduntil t therewasn jority wa thef b them ahighchan ent presidentKuchm c our ty tor e, po tion a a in political s possibletobeform with powerconcentration.Itst l r e 1996and2002wasofadifferent tions attractedsignificantam ntally used and inGeorgia.Inthelatter attributed largelegis pes of u wer gotcon o ce forgettin les inawa stable, an alyzed inth ethn a ined 219 a a d nce ontheotherthreetypesofrepresentation, form rtie nd discip
i the politicalpowerc could governwithoutthe ic m s cum y toadvan centrated w e parliam c the 2002parliam concentrated withintheexecutivebranch. g am iplined, an s inUkrainehadterritorially con b a i is noritie ent and king theprocess thesis,inUkrainether a ed inor jority l lined absolutemajor ativ e t nt wasinato a s h d coheren ’ g e en thep politicalr his ofparliam e pro-p and appointm der toopposethepresident’s arted withtheadoptionof ount ofextra-votesforthese cases,politicalpowergot execu e ntary elections.Th naturethanthecasesof r a oncentration negatively es t of powerconcentration rliam pro-presiden identia e e o fragm tive constant supportofa presen ntary seats.In1994, e e team nt wassohighly nt powerstothe e l pa ity sup wasonlyone, tatio e nted stateto rliam werenot n. Atthe tial party centrated e power port in e ntary
CEU eTD Collection period. addition, Iexplorethedegreeofethnicm is usefultoanalyzehow Because Ukraineexperiencedconsecutivelym as thelevelofdisproportionalitythat parliam favored theconsolidationofsuch parliam (W af Inter-Region Refor the country.Theelectoralblocco-ledbyKu accordan elected throughm parliam The 1998and2002electionswerebasedon a were basedonapurelym table, Ukraineexperiencedthreetypesofel The m and Moldova,thesizeofpa elem electorates andnoneoftheexis f iliated d olczuk, 2001;132).W ents thatchang The electoralsystem In thissection,Iexplorethedeterm 5.4.1. TheImpactofPowerConcentrationontheElectoralSystemChange: a in changestheelecto e e e ntary deputieselectedthroughPRsyst ntary force,therewerenoincentives nt. ce withapurelyPRfor e putie s cou m a e joritarian system.The d w s Bloc–gainedonly6 l d cla eachofthesesystem e a re theelectoralform inUkra joritarian for ithout arealisticprosp i ral rulesaresummarizedinTabl m rliament r ting partieshadahighlevelof m maxim aforce,orthatwouldhave ul ine changedtwiceduringthe a, with3%threshold. m inants of e u ula, wh i m m 27seats,or6%of norities a ectoral form 220 ined thes 2006 and2007elections wereorganizedin electoral rulesbroughtin seats andtogetherwiththesym s ul a chm jori to “im influenced th a ich wasacontinuationof em witha4%thresholdandtheotherhalf Ukrainianelectoralsystem andthethreshold.In ’ politicalrepresentati tarian, m a forthe1994parliam ect tofor m pose” electoralrulesthatwouldhave a i m xed electoralsystem ulas since1991.The1994elections e duri i xed, andPRelec reduced thefragm e structureo e V.19below.Asshowninthe popularity inalltheregionsof ng theen m post-Soviet period.Them aviablepro-presidential parliam contrast withGeorgia on withinthestudied tire tran differentelections. theSovietpractice. f theparlia e ntary elections– e s change,aswell ntary m toral sy , withhalfof p e athizing non- ntation ofthe sition period. m stem a e ndates nt. In s, it a i n
CEU eTD Collection factions. features oftheelectoralsystem candidates b independent candidatestocom Communist partiespleadedforkeepingam nom for factions. Thecontroversieswerem 194 adopted inNove expected theadoption elections (B pleaded f com electoral law(Bogasheva&Klyuc parliam Deputies, adoptedinNove So parl m posed bydem i elections ur ula, thetypesofcandida Table V.19.ElectoralSystemofUkrain nation (IFES,1995).Theleftist Year of The 1994parliam i 20 20 20 19 19 a ce: m e 9 0 0 0 9 ntary debatesanddisagreementsbetwee C e o 4 7 6 2 8 nt
r aPRsystemandf e ary nt irch, 1995).Althoughtheinternational y r workcollectivesandsocialorg a
l El m ect o To b parl cratic andreform i er 1993containedtheprovisi tal nu ons C i seats a of am 4 4 4 4 4 m e 5 5 5 5 5 m ntary electionswerebase o 0 0 0 0 0 e nt m
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ting 221
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n thecentre-rightandth a parties,andforallowingthenom itsadoption,theL ons advocatedbythele jo three points:thechoi d ontheLawElectionsofPeople’s ritarian p El experts onelectoralsy rom ect l partiesinnom oral i s PR com h e elec sy PartyandtheNewUkraineBlo solution(IFES,1995),theLaw s , andtherulesf st 10 10 e 5 5 % 0 plied preservingm m 0 0 tora p 0 0
– onent
, thecentre-rightfactions m ons, basedonthe1988 l system i xed
inating cand a e lef w wassubjectof ce oftheelectoral ftist parliam stem , f t PR com parlia ofthattim o t h o r candidate res r allowing a % i 3 3 4 4 i - ny ofthe nation of hol d
p
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CEU eTD Collection fragm Ukraine between1996 and 2002wasbasedonthe their even elem candidates thanforpoliticalpa a m for the1994electionsandallowedindependent tim presidential partieswe law drafts, electoral sys parliam the parliamenthaddebatedelectoral that in oppositio rela 1997). The1994electionsresu 94; Kuzio,1995;341).Instead,they for theconsolidationofnewly deputies withnopartyaffiliati m encouraged m for candidateregistration(Bogasheva& e mbers ofpoliticalparties.Asaresult,af e suggestedthatthepresidentandhisal tive u ent intotheelecto Consequently, the1993ElectoralLawestablishe For the199 ch simplerm e trodu nted andnostablem m e ntary partiespleadedfortheintroductionofapr n toit. tu a theparliam ced them al pos jority f t em a ny candidatestorunandwinel . Thein 8 parli ition in o echanism r th i xed electo re them a e ral syst cum m ntary d e Comm parliam e ntary ele b a forworkcollectiv ent presidentLe jor rties, interm on (D'Anieri,200 lted inaparliam em a em e in opponentstoPR(Lozow r ity couldbeform e puties with al system unist Par erging pro-ref nt (Hadzewycz becauseitwouldhavecons c t were advantageousforthepoliticalincum i ons , anewElec . Befo Klyuchkovskiy, 2006;Meleshevych,2006).This s ofrequirednum t ter the1994elections48% y (2 no 222 lies opposedthe onid Kuchm rules duringseveralmonths.Majorityof e candidates torun.More o nt withnom 5% seats),andwith 7b; 155).T party affiliation,aswell re theadoptionofLaw,mem etal. rm es ed tocounte ections asindependents,ratherthan andpro-de ands d afullym tora , 1997).Theconcentr fact thattheparliam l Lawwasadoptedi a o y, 1997).Politicalexpertsofthat , whovetoed h cial organ ber ofsignaturesanddocum a oportional com ese ru jo introduction ofaproportional m r-balance presid olidated politicalpartiesand rity partyorcoalition,witha o a cratic parties(Birch,1995; joritarian electoralformula les weredisadv over, thelawprovided i of seatswerewonby a highlyfragm zation m ation ofpowerin a thesmall,p ponent intothe ny of e s n nt washighly to autum ential power, b ents (Prizel, nom thein antageou b n ers of 1997 e i nted nate ents itia r o- s l
CEU eTD Collection c am after num legislature. Asreportedin therefore th the concen blocs ev part. parties perform electoral system 2007; 65-66).Asaresult,the2002parliam increased from law proposedam system were votedwithanabsolute country-wid support throughoutthecountryandwouldhaveth polls conductedin2000revealth parties anditwouldnotguara parliam generally pleadedfortheim parliam o mp endm r Between 1998and2002theelec As explainedinChapter2,afterthe2002el In 2001,therehavebeentwoelectorallaws o witha4%thresholdandbasedonsi e e mi entu ents ntary debates.Politicalparties ntary alliesopposedit,arg erous am s e tration ofpowerwithin e presiden e singlecon . ally m suggestedbythepresident,
50%to74%.Presid e virtuallysim d poorlyinthePRpartofelec i endments toth a xed system nage t m s d tojo titu i ght ha Eurasia DailyMonitor("Ukrain ency (C ple ntee equaltreatm si ilar totheone parliam in aquasi-sta m m at so ve beenuninterestedintheconsolidationofparties e lawdraf entation ofa ilar tothe arson, 2005;97;Ferguss theexecu u ent Kuchm ing thata m e toral system ntary m e ofthe opposing thepresidentandhisadm ts an e ntary 223 ngle countrywideconstituency,whilethesecond one adoptedin1997,butwithaPRcom adopted in1997,whic ble allian ent purely PRsystem tive branchgraduall a tions, buthadrelativesuccessinthem opposition p a m d the PR for
jority. Thefi vetoed thelawsinboth i elections wereorganizedonthebasisofan xed electoralform of citizens(Herron, that passedthroughthe ofUkraineha ections severalparliam erefore benefitedof im m ce ag plem ula wouldgranttoom e ChangesElectoralLaw",1997), a on, 2005;96). rties hadaco entation b ainst thepre rst lawproposedapurelyPR , whilethepresidentandhis s beensubjectofnum y decreased.T ula wasacceptedasa 2007; 65).Theopinion y h thepro-presidential the occasions.(Herron, a PRsystemwith s nsolidated elector ident, e final readingsand par ntary partiesand lia duetowhich u ch powerto m i h e nistration e public nt of ponent a jority erous the a l
CEU eTD Collection 1990s, althoughinadifferentwaythanMoldova andGeorgia. in Ukrainetheconcentrationofpowerdidaffect position the m im candidates towinelections.Thism system highly fragm of thepresident.Theconcentration of of electoralruleschange.Asth Ukraine rev m accepted withaparliam thresho proposed theim the presidentialpowersa a purelyPRsystem presidential elections. president K fading away(Carson,2005;Sharma&Dusen,2005).Due opinion pollsconductedbetween2000and2004rev a statusqu ple jority of67%votesintheparliam Hence, thecircum m a jor partiespleadedfortheintroductionof andcataly l entation ofaPRsystem d an we akened, on o inthee eal th u d basedonasinglecoun chm e nted parliam plem at politicalacto a couldnotcandidateforath decreasedaswell.Atthebeginningof2004,heproposedlim zed byam l ent ec In thesecircum ly m stances inwhichtheelector tora a nd inordertogetthesupportofth tion ofapurelyPRsy e ntary m a e l systemshavebeen naged toim nt, fragm e datapresentedaboveshow,allm duringhiselec r a s’ officeseeki jority electo a jority, thef ofpower e trywide con nt (Herron,2007). i e stances, hisincentivestoopposetheim ght expl ntation plem 224 ent am which wascausedbyagenerallyweakparty inUkrainewasbasedontheexistenceofa ain whyKuchm ng interestshavebeenim r ird presidentialm al system drivenbyth toral m o stem the s a PRsystem rm titu al lawshavebeenadoptedinpost-Soviet er failedtoob shape i ency. Whilethelatterproposalh forparliam xed ele eal thatKuchm a ndates. Thism allowingnum e CommunistandSocialistparties, of c e positionsof tothetwo-m theele tora andbefor a (successfully)opposedthe a e l sy a jor changesorpreservation ntary elections,witha3% ndate tain c ste a toral sy ’s popularitywasalso i m therequ ght alsoexplainwhy portant intheprocess intheautum e Kuchm instead.T erous independen politic a ndate lim ple stem m al partiesor a ired super- duringth entation of ’s political itation of h eref a n itation, s been 2004 ore, e t
CEU eTD Collection accessed on23 Processes i Co com 195 the ratioofseatsgainedbygreatestwinner pa and blocsthatentereditthrough parties andblocsthatenteredth PR electionsin2006and2007. was applied,thepercentageof m elections wasconsiderablyhigherthanthe for trans disproportionality orparlia parts ofelecto com system elections Wast a So Table V.20.TheThresholdEffectontheProp Wast mmissio m joritarian partofit. p ponents separately.Thisallowscom i ula. Thedatashow urce: arison withthepercentageofwastedvotes tion co Table V.21furtherexploresthisquestion. The resultsforthe1998and2002electionsoffe Table V.20presentsdataonthepercentage 5.4.2. TheLevelo ed ed s, thetablealsopresentsratiosof v v in aut n o o ofUk t n e t Post e s Ukrainesinceind untries theP h s March, 2011. b o b y r’s cal y part part rai -Com r Electio Thre al sy n i e e i e s a cul s a website; fro sh m Moreover,inthe1994 n a n unist E n ol d f t stem d
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g partie i h M ons h PR a seat 226 joritarian elections. common expe o ions. Thedifferencebetw form it producedm Degree ofParlia a rm j. dates; in1998–26%;
s d PRelectionsillus electoral system thePRones.Thedataalso dem Soviet countriesintransitionwithunder- s g ulas hadm nt (i.e.non-partyaff togetherwithathresholdthanthepurely ula broughtinparliam d inparliam 1 25 a 994 14 14 32 ined greaterpercen - - - .4
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CEU eTD Collection t position throughthesam Regions, whichrepeatedlygained the 2007electionsbetween61%and74%ofvote Communist Partyand gained arelativem 72% ofethnicRussians. excluded from Russian astheirm 2001 populationcensus.IntheAutonom 76% andrespectively70%oflocalpopulationdecl 74% ofvotersintheseregionssupportedthe respective regionsactedascoherentelector units. Thed presidential electionsduringthetransitionpe h 198 197 m post-Soviet Ukrainewithconsiderableterrito use bothm within th catalyzed theparliam the e o ttp n i Ukrain Ru norities. gue ://www.u sso Tables V.22andV.23containinform For determ l . 5.4.3. PoliticalRepresentationofE ec phon tora e e 197 Popu krcen a x e a ss surveydataandregionalvotingre l sys ecutiv ta showtha IntheEasternpartofU min thesurroundingAutonom latio su o ining theele s.g t r em o ities grou n e bra a ther tongue.SevastopolCity, Cen o jority of v implem . e Social u ntary fragm a n 198 s / e t us 20 r ch itwasonly eg allianceasin2006. p isco
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o k f m raine, in ous Rep ethn on tive m t StateSta ous Re hnic Minorities: 12 Dece e m the al group.Inthe2006elect d a 227 ic Ukrain liam ati st twoparliam rial concentrationofRussianandRussophone i noritie riod intheabovem a n
on votingresultsforparliam jority inpar pro-Russian Partyof absolu ublic ofCrim public ofCrim to whichhorizontalconcentrationof a porttownontheCrim sults. The e period ofconcentrat m D tistics Co ared Russianastheirnativelanguageinthe nt andduetothesubsequentalliancewith rs intheseregionssupportedthePartyof b onetsk andLuhanskadm er 2010. ian s’ politic s te m who mmit r e arethr e
a l hav ntary e iam jority of ea 90%ofpopulationindicated al r t ee o e ea, hasam R e e nt andsecuredad u presen f ssian lan ee a
l e ec Ukraine, av nti parliam ions between58%and tio ion ofpowerindeed Regions, partywhich oned threeterritorial d ean penins m tatio ns thatvo ong itspopulation g i nistr u a i n e g nistrative units e ntary seats.I ailab inUkrain asth a tiv e l ter ntary and ula thatis e e unitsin ei o on s r m power m inth lin i nant o e, I e at th er n e
CEU eTD Collection Tran elections forwhichsuchdatawereav two candida Table containsdataonregionalvotingresultsfo electorate intheregionswithterritorial relative m cases ofelectoralfragm electorate inthem through them electoral system various leftistandpro-Russianparties,notably Par 20 h 199 voters weredividedbetween unanim ttp So Tot 1 t Table V.22.UkraineParliamentaryElections 1 ://www2.essex y of sf ;
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l rep t v ntary electionstheethnicm op o El t es (%)inth e with n position forceinthep ect r Pet c t Sevast esentation of tia ral Electio ialized inUkrainianp Lu Do rev i Cr ous votein1994and2008,elections ons/ r l elec Sy hans i i net nistrative unitsdiscussedabove; m thereg eal thatthe m
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ns -RegionalVoti o . ese surveysareusedherefirstlytorevealth conductedaroundthetim e ofvotes) v significant roleinth re usedforem s withm ktor Yushenkoandeventuallybecam voting behavioroftheUkrainianelectorate, term i e electorateinthese a So second, theseresultsrevealthedegreeof inwhichbetween79%and94%oflocal cho ine th r (1 i 200 norities 995; 2 e f LK: LK: LK: PS: PS: Kuchm 1 9 dem actors th 9
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e at: of th At thesametim Therefore, electoralre Available surveydataalsode e, to h e ective elections http://www.um tial elections e mo testforth 19 201 9 e Comm 8 d a e parl Inthe2002electionsRu e ss surveysdem ntary elections.Fortheotherelec ls ethn a inthesecondroundof i a e m relevan icity i e uni ch.edu/~cses/ theregion nt ary e, thestatisticalanalys . According was st Party(35 inant ofthevotechoi
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d byRobert i f c ofvoterswasastrongdeterm i et onstrate. Inthes ons Iuse download/m factors hadasignificantimp h alism ifican n i m c factorin tothese o %), whileth mm onstrate thatinthe1994pres t fact , i d ssians andRusophoneswereal ethnici w t unist Part h , 2005; e C i odule o nor r or “YuliyaTimoshenko”Bloc(Clem Kravchuk andVictorChudowsky(2005;137)
i 230 t o data, Russianspeakersan h n m ities andRussianspeakerstendedtosupport ce, e v
elko, 2002). 1 ty, andlanguageappeartobeinsignificant determin is ofsurveysavailablefor2006and2007 e elections, p 1994elections.Incontrast,inthe1999 /m e othershad ara whilein1999itwasnot.Them o 221). Thesefindingsareinlinewiththe tions, theethnicm odule1.htm ting y andatthesam idential electionsandincaseof2006 tive StudiesofElectoral ou in g tco t h m arelativem , e vo e theirvotes accessed on3Decem in e with act (Kravchuk&Chudowsky, nsion ofm ant fort te cho in idential electionsethnicity v e i tim ce. a i so dividedintheirvote riou norities didnotacta The h d Russianstendedto Syste e votingbehaviorin p e a s lit b , theywerehighly jority ofRussians i regression norities’ political CSES dat m e ber s surveyda tween &Craum 2010. u m a ltivariate
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CEU eTD Collection close totheonein popul 1994 and19 parliam in theentirepopulati contras descriptive representationin candidate, asdiscussedabove. coherent electoralgroupsw been com post-ind agenda. parliam is proportionallyefficientwhentheproporti the percentageofm ethnic m Hence, whenrelev group withsignificantnum Regions favoredbyRussianandR only foralittlem in whichethnicm and respectively,thepresidentialseat.Theonl was alm The degreeof However, inthecases There areavailab t e e s th e o i nt ishighenoughtoinfluencelegisl ntary term pendence parliam norities inpow st alwaysgrantedtothosecandidates p iled. Theavailabledatad e 98. Still,ev sm allest pe o i a norities supportedthecandidate duringwhichminoritieswere re thanoneyear, nt, theelectoralrepres m i norities in on ofthecountry.Thedatare i l noritie en inthatterm e d er. Asm rcentage of a e ta onUkrain ntary mandates. e allthreeparliam rical ho wouldcastthevotesunanim whichm s’ desc the p ation ofthecountry.Russian m e ntioned before, strength) securedadom becausein m e u a rip m ssophone m rliam thetotal i onstrate th i norities intheparlia tiv norities di ian parlia enta e repr e nt reflectstheon For 231 tion ofethnicm y exceptionwasthe2004presidentialelections, e that wonadom ntary m the2006parliam p onal shareofethnicm ative votingoutcom esen e descrip i at ethnicminoritiesha m rcen rep d actascoherentelec norities (whoconstitutetheon m that lostelections.Butthis“defeat”lasted o e re recen ta nt ethniccompositionf r tage of veal thatbetw esen tion isdeter a ndates duringthe1990s.TableV.24 tiv ted theleastwasonebetween e repres inant m m e intheentirepopulatio t m i e norities in i nant positionintheparliam nt withm i norities ous a e ndates, suchda position intheparliam ntary electionsthePartyof entation issufficientwhen m i ly tothesam norities hadasufficient e ined bythepresen een 1991and2002the s and/orparliam toral groupstheirvote inthep Ukrainewashigh. d i i asufficientlevelof nority seatsinthe norities’ percen o r thefirstthree a rliam ta havenot ly e elec m n, andit e i nt was e nority ce of ntary tora tag e e nt. nt e l
CEU eTD Collection 202 and proportionallyefficientdescri legislative votingprocessandagendasetting. conditions, the23%-32%ofseatsthatm the parliam for advance alegislativeproposal.Moreover,durin controlling absolutem During the 2002 parliam constituted atleast23%oftheUkrainianpa Graph V.3below.Theg parliam representation evenduringthatm hinder theaccessofethnic m parliam did notdim Min So Table V.24.EthnicMin m Comparing Minorities ur ed onlyby3%ofd i m Therefore, between1991and2002theethnicmi The proportionalefficiencyof ce: u e e m nt thanintheentirepopul ntary electionsconductedinaperiod dat %rep firstthree e a 20 19
ntary presidium i p e nish onc Min r 0 8 ntary m o r 1 9 esen v ce ce i d o e r ns ns ities tatio d
us % us % by p a e thepowergotconcentrated.AsGraphV.3 illustrate,the1998 n inp t a ndate. Mostoftheseparl h jority ofseats,soany e r o
e aph dem puties andaccord st-ind
Eur o a ’ Presencein rlia i thatdecidedthe rities’ Descriptive norities intheparliam
o pean m ependence parliam e a n o ation inthe1990-1994parliam ptive representationintheparl C ndate. Sm t nstrates
e nt m re f i Min norities’ presenceinthepa Parliamentw i o norities 19 r M ing to o that between19 r all 9 232 ities to rliam 22 22 27 4 i n - .9 .2 .8 1 o agenda (D' m g the1990saparliam Representation inUkrain party neededtoform 99 rity th with politicalpowerconcentrationdidnot iam i controlledallowedthem e nority groupshadlessrepresentationinthe 8 tal % e e nt, withthehighestrateduring1998- Iss e rules, ntary term nt. e u ntary ethnicm norities inUkrainehadbothsufficient es i th Popul (Fle eachfactio A 91 and2002theethnicm nieri, 2007b;179-181).Insuch nsb 19 s, therewasnopartyorbloc Ru u 9 r 18 17 22 e ssian 4 g nt. iam ation CensusData. - ) .6 .3 .1 1 , atthe 99 rliam s i e norities wereRussians. 8 e c n hadrep nt. Thisrepresentation ntary factioncouldbe o aut e alitions inorderto nt isillustratedin e (1991-2002). toinfluenceboth h o Oth r’s 19 re r e esentation in r m 9 q 0 3. 4. 5. u - est. 9 7 0 i 1 n i 99 202 o norities r 4 ities
CEU eTD Collection An However, consideringthatthe sim been noprom 203 authors referredtobothparties’officialde secondary sourcesonpartysystem Annex 8.Todeterm Ukrainian partym of partiesintheparliam content analysisofpartyprogram situa influence intheparliamentevenafter2002,ther The ne ilar assessm
x 9. parliamentary seats % tion withm W The conten The substantiverepresentati anal 17, 34, 0, Graph V.3.DescriptiveRepresentationofEt ithout relevantdatafortheparliam 0 0 0 y zed inent ethnicm U 23,5 ent forthesituat i k norities t analys rai 19 a n nifestos IusedH 90- ine specificparties’position i 20 a n ,5 1 994 pa ’ e is firstlyd desc nt. As r 3,0 t y
i m nority partiesinUk
r a pa i ni lef ptive incaseofGeorgiaandMoldova ion withm fest s andm rl t ist pa on ofethnicm i andelectoral e os t a Ukraine (1991-2002) repres a m m 22,9 rm onstrate th h e r 19 rties withpro el and nt o a ug 94- clarations andtotheir nifestos 18,6 a enta h e i r norities’ descript 1 233 ntar y m Harm 998 Janda’s pledgeposition tion af 4,4 e isnocompellingreasontobelievethatth y m raine thatwouldhavefocused theirprogram on ethnicity-relatedissu a at duringthepost-Sovi andth processes inpost-SovietUkraine,which el nda i and norities canbedeterm a ter th - ndates after2002,itishardtom hn Russian t Ja e rou ic MinoritiesintheParliamentof s nda is 31 gh thean yearchang ’s ive representationinthe2000s. ,6 19 policystancespreservedtheir pl 98- parliam ed 26,4 , forthecontentanalysisof ge 2 002 aly po 5,2 si m e e s t es, Ialsousevarious ntary behavior. is ofvotingbehavior et periodtherehave d considerab i e on m thod, asdetailedin ined throughthe e t hod M R O i u t arel no her s s r i ians ly. M t i es i i nor 203 st a T ke a ed i o it
t ies a l e n
CEU eTD Collection parliam nationalist viewwereinm m factions thatsupportedRussianandRussophone parliam significant roleforRussianlanguage. of aSovietUnion-likesocietalorder,they parties werea im h 205 h 204 that couldb exclusively onethnicity-related am three sm 0.05%. Inthe2002electionstherewasanelecto both m the politicalprogram Ukraine wasthatRussians’andRussophones’inte on ethnicity-relatedpolicieswere m preservation ofRussian focused onthepropagationofethno-cultural ttp ttp a a Source:informatio Source:Sl portant r ong Slavicpeople. jority, whilethosef ndates, asitobtainedonly0.7%ofvotes.The ://w ://u Nevertheless, ethnicminoritieshavealways One ofthereasonsforwhichethnicm sers.ip ww e e e ntioned parliam nt –AccordCentre,Ind nt throughvariouspro-m all partieshavingascommonfeatur .cvk t o eleco e le: inth .g categorizedas m ov avic Pa ong thestrongestinparliam m .u . a/p n n abou e t.u l s/ e Ukrainian s ofm rty a vd 205 a /~lu t ctions tha e 200 language roleinsociety. Ru However,thisblocwasunsucce ntary elections:in zan of Ukrai i ssia Blo nor 2 a / w /
inst , ethnic –theSlavicPartybe e ity. Specifically,in1991-1994there access bproc1 u issues. Inthe1994and1998el unsuccessfulinlaterparlia ream parties.Thesuccess strial W t c i p nority partie availab n l ections e e l Program eaded f d on 2 v ? kodv o Decem l e on rker e during the1990s,CommunistandSocialist ib o 1994 itgained0.06%of i 234 nt. th nority r culturalukrainizationandhadgenerallym implicitlypr =4 , s, andNewUk e theem
s. Inthe1991-1994parliam ber 14,2010. e 00 As thesepartiespleadedforthepreservation Cen available 204 unity betweenSlavicpeopleandonthe &pf717 ral bloccalled“Russi sm rests anddem However,thepartywasunsuccessfulin parties couldnotsucc beensubstantivelyrepresentedinthe m t ral Election all, single-issuepartiesfocusingm i pha norities’ interest 1 =
on the 1 sis onRussiancultureandunity ofle 9 m om ssful insecuringparliam 0 raine –th e , cause itsp s accesse ntary electionsaswell. oted the C ections therewasoneparty a o ftist partiesalsoplayedan nds wereincorporatedinto mmissio we were threefactionsinthe d on bsite oft votes, whilein1998- at openlypleadedfora preserv an Bloc”thatunited 14 Decem r n s wereinrelative ogram essf
o e f ntary term,those Ukrain ully d wasm a h ber 2010. tio e e e n of web party, at velop e s ntary a o ite, at the inly stly
o in re
CEU eTD Collection R the electo Ukrainian parliam citizenship withRussianfederation. bilingualism, forraisingthelegalstatusof parties’ m and Socialis 1994-1998 and1998-2002parliamentaryterm Party, SocialistandComm parliam perceived assupportingRussianm De of According toBohdanHarasym 206 Russophone regionsof federal system 42% ofm m repres twice, Rus parliam from e a The parliam gi m jority of41%seatsin2006 andrespectively o parties o n Between 2002and2006Russianm The lef Finally, between2006and2008,periodinwhic B s cratic RebirthofUkraine,AgrarianPa enta a e e l n oc “ ntary seats(Harasym ntary term d r a tion wasm a Wo e al bloc“ForaUnitedUkraine” ndates andcouldtheo in politicalfocuswasrathereconom ntary s F t Party trad ian m o tist partieswith r r k a oflocalself- i n sea U g Uk ition e n werethegreatestdefenders Russianm nt bythreepoliticalforces: i i t norities t e rai s. Atthe d a a inly due lly perceived Uk n DonetskandLuhans e –had r a i n ’ in e” w iw, 2002).
generalpr i governm sam
noritie ex y to w’s count(2002;248) retically beopposedbyonly26% ter pl a uni s c thepro-RussianPartyof i c e e i tim o asUkrain t sts were st Par
s hadsignif m pr i e pos nority inte o-R nt, whichwasinline e, the o-Russi ed 206 t u y of ssi Russian language,forfederalization,andf o i norities’ inte . Allthreeparliam 235 f an r
rty, andNarodnaRada–thatweregenerally e fi s as Crim ian nation the Comm st k (Kuzio,1994;126; ve of Russianminorityinte a i were threeotherfactions ic l an s 38% in2007,butwhich duetothealliance cant subs ances. so rep rests. Theycontrolledtogether36%of part thanethno-cultural,theyalsopleadedfor well. Amongthem ea) hadar t i , thesefactionscontrolledtogether17% e ances (i.e.Comm s, h parliamentaryelec r am a rests werealsorep ese unist Pa tan lists. Therefore,inthe2 ong Regi n tive repre ted inth w e e ntary with elites’dem la h i rty, th tive ons thatsecuredarelative of parliam c h at major forces countedtogether , theCommunistParty l W s e east e Socialis rests. Althoughthese n unist Party,Peasant e parliam in tation asw ilson, 1991;591). t w ity of e the tions wereheld ntarians com o r esented inth pa pa rt a s t Party i nds inthe e e rliam e 002-2006 s - ats inth e nt. The ll.
o Part r dual ; e an nt - y i ng o d e e f
CEU eTD Collection tends togohandin withelectoralsystem section andexploredthoughthecasestudyparts is post-Soviet Georgia,Moldova,an ethnic m lead toadim fragm elec concentrated politicalpower(1996-2002)ethn absolute dom between 1991and2008thepartiesorblocswith com for thewinners.Also,ethniccompositionof dem Ukraine hadsignificantparliam were dim leader ViktorYanukovych,whichwasakeypositionaftertheformalpres dom Revolution”, theparty rights ofethnicRussiansandRussianspeaker Regions, withtheleadershiprepresenting with otherleftistp tora position ofthepopulationinentirec onstrate i nance intheparliam The m Hence, inth Final Remarks: e nted power(1991-1995and2003-2008).Hence, lly, descrip i i norities nished in2006. , a whenthesem i in goalofthischapterwastoe nishing politicalrepresenta inance inthelegislature.Asdatasuggest,duringperiodwith ’ e post-Sov politicalrep r tiv o-R ely, orsubstan u wasthem ssian e nt since2006itm i norities i et periodinUkraineth parties becam r esen e d Ukraine.Them ntary represen votedcohe tive a tation, andethnicm jor opposition l y inthe tion ofethnicm the RussophoneregionofDonetsk,defended e thedom a 236 nage s xplore thelinkbetweenpowerconcentration, rent that putsinanadvant Ukrainian le ountry. Finally,inallparliam tation. Asdatapresen s inUkraine.Duri d tosecuretheprim ic m Ukrainian parliam ly inele a
thattheprocessofpowerconcentration pro-m e Russianan in argum to th inant parliam i i norities werenotlessrepresented theconcentrationofpowe norities inUkraine. i e “revo i norities nority positionshadarelativeor c gisla tions, theyalm e nt t developed inthetheoretical d Russophonem ure tha l ’ utio politicalm e ntary force.ThePartyof e ageous positionthepro- e-m nt alwaysreflectedthe ng the2004“Orange nary” forces.Dueits n ted inthissection i intheper nisterial seatforits o st alwaysvoted idential powers obilization in e ntary term i norities in i r ods with didnot s
CEU eTD Collection representation throughethni ef indispens electoral supportforcertainpo and substantivethroughpr negativ attitudes inpoliticaldiscourse. of the sam for accessin concentratio parliam sim presidential parliam political representation, i.e. thesubstantivere was notadvantageousforpowerconcentration. m m was oftenaninstrum This suggeststhatinthesepost-Sovietcountrie concentrated does not,however,affect negativelytheother i i f thef norities’ leaders,byincludingm nority politicaldiscou ect only u ltaneously a The dataalsoshowthatinGeorgia,Mo The em Hence, ifatall,theco e effectontheo e e o nt. tim a rmation ble fortheirsuccess ononety g n wasindeedaccom , this theparliam e pirical analysisinthischapterre , thedatareveal nega of occu e small, e ntary partiesorbloc tive ef nt toconcentratepower, rred asaresultof pe of t her th rse and e nt, duetothesignificant o-m one- c parties.Thisnegativeeffectre f ethnicm ncentration of ect on i ree ed thatthesedisproportionalel nority parties. At thesam policystances. p anied byelecto in elections.Inm i ssu types ofm litical parties,blocsor cer i norities e par tain i noritie election e tie time,the typ ’ s. 237 power ca re i presentation throughethnic s norities’ Thei s theattraction s
and from e p ’ ral sys Adopting a veals thatinMoldovaandGeorgiapow be itbyestablishingclientelisticlinkswith s inwhichm s of politicalr ldova, andUkrainetheethnicm r levelofdisproportio esentatives types ofrepresentation discussed inthis re o ethn st of m n hinderonlyonetypeofm t repr spec em plem theencouragem ic s thatim es stra tive m th e entation ofsuchsystem entation –d inpower,orbyadoptingpro- sulted fromthediscouragem i presen ectoral system e casesinwhichpowerwas of m nor i presidential candidates,was norities ele tegy of ities s posed highentrythreshold i c norities’ tor tatio nali ’ a m rep upported thewinners. l ru n, nam e parties andblocs.It i scrip ty they norities’ ent ofcentripetal les d r esen s hadanegative electoral support tiv i e tation inth d n entailed.At ly ontheir e, e exclus o i i norities’ norities’ l t have ecto s has ral, ion e nt er a e
CEU eTD Collection ethnic m opt m chapter. Bycontrary,incertaincircu i norities inordertoconsolidatetheirpo i nor ities tom obiliza tion reso urces. m stances 238 sitions. Thisco-optationhinderstheaccessof politica l incu mbents m a y beinteres t e d toco -
CEU eTD Collection organization ofstatepower. W at the“anatomy”ofterritorialorgani of causaluncertainty(A.Schneider,2003).Inorde associated exercised in governm governm expanded subnationalautonom recen society andeconom the likelihoo resources atregionallevel,th hypothesis ofthisthesis,whichstatesthatbyin through theem f repres f ethnic m
C o actor -the cused ontheinf h a tralization is Decentralization isap Decentralization isg The m p 6.1. TheVe enta t e i e e norities’ m nt” (Eaton&Dickovic nts andawayfromcentralgovernment r tion inna withdifferentm
differentways,in relationbe V a d f in goalof I o pirical analysisofth : r ethnicm
P rtical ConcentrationofPow defin o obilization ag tion w l ue y e th i nce tha a e tween thec r l politics.Thischap d as
m i is thesistod C norities’ eanings andcertain agined asfixe e o nerally v e in r n h th ocess andam “a s t et c k, 2004;94).Astheauthority c y andthereby e e academ ain her acountryism cum n oncentr e mobiliza e threecasesstudiedinthisth zation ofstatepowerisnecessary. ries s t e t thestate.To r b ntra ation andtheCo ents ofhorizon i ofchan ewed as Regions l andthelocalpo e ated ic li term d” (Rodden,2004;482).Onthecontrary, tion 239 ter isfocusedonanothe
powerha a er –Operationalization: terature theterm norm creasing thecontroloverfiscalandleadership ine whether tter agains ges des lim answerthisquestion, r toavoidsim s, withtotalgovernm th o a of degreech
re decentra ited theprerogativesofnational e “shiftofauthority tive v tally t thestate. i gned toreverseprio s onethn concentratedpowercan a conce lues. litica ntro over localgovernm “decen lized thananotherorwhether Thisledto ilar confusion,acloserlook aracterizing esis Iseekto n l autho tra l ove ic m ti r tralization on ofpowerleadsto possiblein thepreviou r e r i ities. Spec noritie nt authorityover the acer towards theterrito r reform test thethird Co e ” s’ politica ta nts m w decre terven in deg s a chapte untr if s often local ically, s that a y be r a ing r ial ee se y r l
CEU eTD Collection purposes ofthisresearch Adjara territorialautonom central governm arrangem useful dependingonthe purposesofaresear decentralization ofastate (2001;34 politics” andsuggested dim and governm being form 2003). DanielTreism Schneider, 2003).PaulSmokealsoproposedthree: dim political systemoftendonotcorrelate.Jona “decentralization” andp autonom control thatregionalgovernm with acertaindegreeofdecentr than incertainfederalstat researchers specifythatthedegreeo Although bydefinition power canalsotakesom and com a countryatpresen e e nsions ofdecentralization nsions of“thecharacterlocalpolitics” Several r p y, a ent m aring thevario e d n bydecisionm adm e nt personnel(Treism a e y i e cent stud nt andalim i nistrative com m t ismoredecentralizedthan ply adefactohighcontro an elabo u r thefederationsim Idonotass thatthecom oved thatthedim s dim e es (McGarry&O' y specificfor ie a inGeorgiasi king authority,appo s clar ents ited sc r : e fiscal,polic ated alization. Instead, nsions ofdecen ponent ofauni have,regardlessofwhetherlo am ope ofadm -37). Eachof if f o decentraliz a ied ciate acer n, 2002) m o b them re sophi s, such ination between e nce 2004(Khutsidze,2004).Therefore,forthe nsions than RoddenandAaronSchneiderproposedthree y/ad 240 ply a Leary, 2002).Si and sixdim tr i l overautonom inth tary state,oraunitoffederation. m nistrative power, . Fi tain f alization. T ch. Form intm ation m asautonomy,federation,orunitarystate. Ideterm thesesetso ofdecentralizationch sticated set:hedefine i u nistrativ political,institutional,andfiscal(Sm lti-dim nally, PaulHutchcroftproposedfour high extentofdecentralization e pastcanbedeterm ent authority,elections,fiscalresources, o rm a e of y belargerincertainunitarystates e ine theactualp ns e, nsion y h andpolitical(Rodden,2004;A. the twodefinedegreeof terr ions of“thecharacternational specificpurposes,T e territorial f m indicato y cal governm ilarly, aterritorialautonom ’s financialresourcesbythe ito a as ithasbeenthecasewith lity of ria l organizationofpower r aracterizing thesam d decentralization organ s canbeanalytically theconceptof o ined bymeasuring wers andscopeof e nt isaterritorial i zatio r n ofstate eism , som oke, an’s as y e e
CEU eTD Collection personnel employedatlower levels,thegr resources aredistributedacrosslevelsofgovern budgets. Finally,perso increases togetherwiththe the shareof tax rev officeholders areelected executive officeholdersorthelocallegisl appointers. Electoraldecentrali elected (ratherthanap centralized. Forthisdim appointm different levelsofgovernm house ofparliam authority tosub-nationallegisl decision-m is m the authoritytodecideallquest authority tom concentration ofpowerandethnicm dim e a nsions arethem The fiscald The appointm First Treism xi e m nues andpublicexpenditu e a nts arem lly centralizedonthisdim a totaltaxrevenuesth king decentralizationthroughthedegr a ke politicaldeci e ecentralization isdeterminedby nt (whenexistent)w an’s dim e a nt decentralizationisdeterm de byactorsat o st usefulbecausetheycan pointed nnel decentralizationis in e nsion localpopularelections. e nsion –decision-m share oftotalpublicexpend e atures andthroughtheexisten ) zation isdefinedbytheproportio ions isconcen nt areselect it isnotrelevanthow sions at eachtier.What at sub-nationa res. Taxreven i anabovelevelofgovernm noritie isdistributedam ith therighttoblocklegislation. e nsion. Tr eater thepersonneldecentralization. s’ m ators e 241 ed anddism tra a o l levelsreceive.Expe t determ m ed within king decentralization–focusesonhowthe eism bilization atregionallevel. bepotentiallyrelevantf u the sub-nationalgovernm ee inwhichtheConstitutionallowsresidual e es decen ined bythedegreeinwhichofficialsat m nt. Thegreatertheshareofadm powered tochoosethelocalexecutive an proposedtodeterm m m ong differentlevelsofgovernm a a ined byhowadm tters is ny ex th tralization increasestog i itures fundedfrom ssed. Themoretheexecutive e centralgo ce ofaregionallychosenupper ecutive functionsarepopularly the hierarchicallocationof n oftiersatwhichthelocal en t, them nditure d vernm o e r thelinkb i o nt nistrativ re thesystem ine thelevelof s’ shareintotal e ecentralization nt, thesystem sub-national e i nistrative e hum th er with e e tween nt. If is a n
CEU eTD Collection
around theseperiods. fragm power concentration(1995-2000 post-Soviet Georgiabetween1991 whether th central governm likelihood forethnicminorities’ autonom case inRussiaduringthe1990s,whendifferentfe the levelofdecentralizationwa chapter. Id concentrated the generallevelofdecentralizat Therefore, whenthedegreeof arrang Ukraine, Moldova,andGeorgia,asallthre the m m data. Inordertom easure i Out ofthefiveindicato The levelof The m 6.2. TheCaseofGeorgia: e ni em ntation (1991-1994and2001-2003).Theem m m y vis-à-visthecentralgove ents with u ent scaleforeachofthefourindicato e latterwasinfluencedb m degreeofdecentralizationandwith o
a notuseth m in goalof i norities, becausethisisinli e nt overfiscal,electoral,and decentralizationinacou cer a ke intra- ta in reg e personneldecentralizat this r andinter-countrycom sectionistode s elabo i ons withdif dec s negotiatedwith ion mobilization decreasedbyvirtue and 2008experienced2relatively e rnm y and 2004-2008)2period n inthecountry,butalso r thenature ated byTreism tra e liza nt (Hale,1998).Thiswas f n e ne withthegeneralgoalofthis tion try m rent 242 rs, asdescribed term dif appointm ofcentralpower.Chapter2establishedthat scopeoflocalpowers 1indicating e countrieshaveesta ion becauseoftheunava a thelocalelites.Forex y f piri ine deral “republics”haddifferentdegreeof e p an differ from r inte arisons po Iusefourintheem whetherin cal dataanalyzedbelowareorganized e nt resourcesatregionallevel,and r-r itsm egionally, Idonotpresentonly intheregionswithterrito inAnnex10,with0indicatin regiontoregio ssible, Iuseconventionallya also thecasein a pos xim ofincreasedcontrol s withpoliticalpower longperiodsofpolitical than theotherregions. u t-Soviet Georgiathe blished autonom m. am research. ilab pirical partsofthis ple, thiswasthe i n, especially lity ofreliable post-Soviet rially ous if g
CEU eTD Collection governm oversight overtheregion’s m of theregio Georgian Parliam a territorialautonom 1990s. Moreover,before2004theS were beyondthecontrolofGeorgianjurisdicti centralizatio the lowes more appointm developm the president.In1997,OrganicLawonLo established afourthtierofgove laws andpresidentialdecree illegal param country’s regionsandtheregiona sections below,between1992and1994thecentr authorities weretransf them headed byn – centra selves. Afterthe1991coupd’état,offi These legalstipulationsdidnotapplytoA
The territorialorganizationof The localadm l e go ent ofGeorgianterritorialorganizatio nt hadlittlecontrolov t tie n o n. vernm wasannulledbecau ilitary gro m r of i e nees ofprefects(p nt andelectoral e e nt definedtheform ter nt, distr i nistration inGeorgiabetw y, although ups (W erred tod r itorial o i c a t heatley, 2005;69 leve in institu s. In1995presidentShevarnadzeissuedadecreewhich rnment –the9regionstobeledbygovernorsappointed decentralization, r se itguaranteed er itspoliticalaffairs(W gan i residential representativeinth s l affairswerem l, without aform t statepowerinGeorgiawa outh-W rict heads andtownship/villag i zation al status tions (ICG,2004;26;Kh e stern re 243 and ofAdjarathroughwhichtheactualautonomy -82). of localadm een 1990and1991functi bkhazia andSouthOssetia,astheseterritories n ce oftheprefectwas on afterthecivilwars ledtom theGeorg . cal Governm Som while otheram al governm ally defined o gion ofGeorgia–Ad stly underthe e 2002am e –withloca heatley, 2005;115).In2004the i o an presiden i nistration. Asdescribedinthe re f e e nt providedthebasisfor aindrava etal.,2004). s establishedthroughorganic nt hadlittlecontroloverthe e districts),orbytheprefects endm status, whiletheGeorgian i endm sc control oflocalelitesor al anddecision-m abolished andregional en l a ents tothela t exten atthebeginningof ts in2005abolished oned onthreelevels d jara –functionedas m i nistr s ive powersto a tio w ledto n eithe a king r
CEU eTD Collection m decision-m governm belonged tothetwolevelsof tiers, butinfavorofthecen estab experts (CL reasons forwhichthed
governm services, andgeneraladm political im culture, leisure,sport, The onlydom concerning regionalpoliticsweresharedbetween representatives. Beforethe2005adm Neither hastherebeenaseco Constitu Georgian localbranchesofpowerwasfor illegal param the country’sregionsandregionalaffairs little relev a king centralizationafter the 2005refor lish By thebeginningof1990sform The existenceofalargeproportionshar The constitutionofGeorgiadoesnotleavea 6.2.1. Decision-Making tion i e e ng aclearerdiv nts andthecentralgovernm nt” (Losaberidze,2006;4).Therefore, a a n portance. Otherdecision-m king centralizationdur R wasadopted. ce, becausebetween1992and1994th A, 2004;5).The2005adm ilitary gro a ins thatwereentire environm ecentralization system ups (W i sion am local selfgovernm i tral governm nistration were Decentralization: ent, publicsanitation,andpub heat ong com ing the1990sandtendencies nd cham l ley, 2005; y lef e nt (Rekhashvili,2000). aking area m t al decisio i i p tobe nist nistrativ . e etences nt, as“agooddealofthecom 244 the firsttim ber in rative reformm e were underthecontrolofregionalelitesor shared b nt 69-82). Thedecision sharedbetweendifferentlowertierswere Georgiawascriticized thelowertiersandcentralgovernm s suchaseducation,so e centralg Georgiahadarelativelyhighlevelof ed decision-m ny r e reform of parliam earlier havebeentake n of differenttiersnot m e a sidua king decentralizatio e e tween vario definedin1995,whenthenew respondedtothesecritiques,by overnm l auth lic utilities,dom e nt with towards evenm o a st decision-m king ar ority to e nt hadlittlecon -making autho u regionallychosen in bythein n overbythecentral s lowerlevelsof eas wasoneofthe cial welfare,health f sub-nationaltiers. a n inGeorg p vor of etencies which ai a o ns withlittle king rights re decision- ternationa the t rol over r lowe ity of i a had e nt. r l
CEU eTD Collection of executivebodies.Inpractice,ithadpurelysupe right toam im could issuethedism dism branches w different. Thelegislativebrancheswereelecte criticized fornotim were directlyaccountableto leas chairperson whowasalsothech villages) werepopularly m 1998. Therefore,therepresentativeselecte 1990s andtheslowprocessofadoptinglegisla a m financial dependencyonthelocalexecutives(Bolas legis executive wasconside regions –hadnoelecte at thislevelofgovernm a possible (Wheatley,2005;162).Form ndates. a t f l ndate until1994.H issed bythepresidentofGeorgi atu At thesecondlowestlevelof Before 2002thelocallegislativ The firstlocalelectionsinpost-SovietGeor 6.2.2. Electo o rm r e. Addingtothisthe ally boththeexecutivea e e nd thebudget,toa re chairedandfor r al Decentralization: plying aclear issal ofthelocalgovernor d bodiesatall. r a o b elected. wever, becauseofthepolit e ly m nt wasinsignificant. voters(W lim pprove long-term o m re inf airman ofthelocal ed byagovernor separation ofpowers(CLRA,1998). At thelevelo ited f nd legisla governm a. Inca l e bodiesofthetwolowest uentia heatley, 2005;161),a i nancia ally, the l inthedecis se of 245 e tiv d in1991governedduringtwoconsecutive nt –rayonsandciti d inlocalpopularelections,buttheexecutive Thethird-lowestlevel of governm l resourceso e tion, nootherlocalelectionswerehelduntil developm gia wereheldin1991,electionsthatim f branch conf rvisory authorityandth villages,th legislature hadsignificantpowers,i.e.the (m , althoughinreality hvili, 2002),theroleof ical instabilityinth executive branch.Thr lict, thelegis ayor incities)directlyappointedand es atth i ent plan on f thelocallegislaturesandtheir -m lthough thesystem e locally e lowes aking processthanth es –thearrangem s, andtoevaluatethework levels ofgovernm l a tiv e countrybym electedbodieshada t levelofgovernm e brancha e (non-elected)local ough thissystem this provedtobe theelectedbranch waswidely t thislevel e e nts were nt –t e i ddle of e loca nt (i.e. plied , at e h nt e l
CEU eTD Collection popularly-elected locallegislatur At be, asbefore,thechairm would beelectedthroughpopularvote.Insm the case.Inallothercitiesandtownsw presiden decentralization inGeorgia.Theyp regions andtheirrolewasto system after theseam towns andvillages)had therighttoappoint 1998). Asexplainedinthe sectionabove,onlythesm representatives, butappointedanddism the headsof Governance, insecondary-lowest abolished altogether. institution (Popjanevski,2006).Aft when alocalleaderof country andinsom state legis im plem rayon In 2001and2002,som At thebeginningof1991firstG During the1990sandpriorto2002am 6.2.3. AppointmentDecentralization: oflocalprefects.The ented, theelecto ts intheb leveltheheadsofexecutiveswoul l ation. Theins executiveorganswerenotelecte endments therewe i e gges cas r t es itwasevensabotaged. cities,only Ar al decentralizationof titu en ofthelocalpopula tion m supe e prefects wererepresentativesof nians
re nopopularlyelectedbodies. es (Losaberidze,2006).Atthele of p rvis e levels ofgovernm adm intwociti wasnom e r e thewayin r efecture wasm r theD ovided issed dir e i orgian nistrative am ith apopulationabove5000inhabitantsthem 246 Georgiahasnotbeenfurtherm ecember 1991coupd’étattheinstitutionwas alle d directlybythepeople that insteadofhavingm rly-elected legislatures e i organs answerabletothem ectly by nated asp s whichloca (cap president ZviadGa r settlem In theregionofJavakheti,forinstance,only e d bealsoelectedbythem e endments totheLawonLocal nt andinthe7biggestcitiesofGeorgia allest territorialentities(i.e. councilsof ita t withhos thepresiden endments increasedtheelectoral l Tb e r nts theheadsofexecutiveswould efect didth l adm ilis thecentralgovernm Since theseam i and tility vel ofthenineregions,even i nistration im m t Poti)this in (Wheatley,2005;162). of therepublic(CLRA, s a or appointedbylocal m e regionacceptth khurdia institutedthe a yors appoin a . Consideringthe ny regionsofthe odified. endm wouldstillbe ple m e e mbers of e e nt inth n n ts were t ted the Self- ed by a yors is e
CEU eTD Collection Code ofGeorgiadefined sixtype taxes, oftransfersandloansfrom size oflocalownrevenues,based (Rekhashvili, 2000).Theactualdegr expenditu authorities, anddirecttr distributed tothebudgetsofdistricts,ow revenues: sharedrevenuesbasedontaxesaccum 207 appointm still appointedbythepresiden bodies ofthesam other c m the m more appoin governm prosecuto m appointm significant authorityoftheseappointees,thefa a a Au jor executivepostsinthesecondary-lowestlevelsofgovernm yor hadt tho The localrevenuesinG In Georgiab Along withtheelecto a 6.2.4. FiscalDecentralization: yors ofonlythetwom ities andinthed r ’s i e e e r, andheado res thatcouldnotbecoveredbylo nt (W nt decentralizationat nts determ n terv o t m beoneofthem iew i e heatley, 2004). nt decen e e tier(Losab n fore the20
Octob ined alowdegreeofdecen ansfers fromthecentralbudgetwidely tralization i f str e theTaxInspecto r 2 i r c 008 al decen e
t 05 adm eridze, 2006).Althoughthegovernors s thee orgia ar a e thislevellessrelevant. jor cities-Tbi wit mbers ofthepopul t, theirundefinedstatusandfunctionsm s o on taxescollectedloca aswell, central h f
ee offiscaldecentralizationisd Nair Iritsian localtaxes i x tralization nistrative reform e com ecutiv as budget, andofnon-taxrevenues.The1997Tax posed oflocaltaxes, n revenuesbasedontaxescollectedbylocal e of 247 r cal budgetsbecauseoflocalbudgetary , at lisi andPoti.Moreover, since th m im ct ofhavingas e tr ficials weretobeelected the 2002legislativeam a wereapp alization o y o posed attheloca arly electedlocallegi u r of lated onthenationalbudgetandthen 207 therewerethreem en th Akh lly andkeptwithinthelocalbudget. a e presidento lk n o al thisdim inted d ak used asatooltofinancelocal m i d all degreeoflocallym i redistributedstate/shared e strict. l lev e nt suchaspolicechief of thenineregionswere term i re e in Potitheappointed nsion. Also,alloth e ctly bythe f slative organ.Inall l. Besidesthese,th endm Georgiaappointed a ined bytherelative bythelegislative in s a kes thelackof ources oflo ents provided centr deficit a cal de e a e r l ,
CEU eTD Collection the shareof and 2008isrepresented in GraphVI.1below. municipalities (Losaberidze,2006;5). considered ascreatingconditionsforpoliti after theref governm 2007; 5).B significant taxonthelocallevelhasbeen local taxesandtariffs in awaytha central governm budget was21%(Losaberidze governm budget. In1997thesharedtaxrevenuecon increasing eachyear,attheexpens the shared (Bolashvili, 2002;68-69).Astudy most im authorities couldnotincr transfer tax. land, consumptionofnaturalresources,enviro local budgetscontainedrevenues The 2005legislationonthebudge The relativeshareoflocalta Besides thelocaltaxes,loca portant sharedtaxesinGeorgia e e nts, theownlocaltaxesconstituted nt enjoyedabouthalfoftheincom revenuescon TheCodedefinedupp localtaxesincreasedas com o t e af rm sides, thesharedtaxeshavebe f e . Instead,thepracticeofstate ected th nt toexerciseagreatdegreeof s e loca and hencereducedth ease th titu ted l f etal. thehighestpart em i nan xes intothetotallocalgove from generaltaxesassignedtolocalgovernm ontheirown. made byGeorgianexpertsrevealsthatattheendof1990s er lim e oflocal c , 2001;295).Thisdistributi l rev ial resou tary system its for p e nues ar ared 248 the 1990swereincom e TheGraphrevealsthat between 2001and2003 r ownrevenuesandtransf taxandVAT,thiswasnotthecaseanym property tax(Losaberidze,2006;4;N c nm en annulled.Ifbefo transfers hav totheperiodbetween 1997 and2001;also, e localtaxrevenues.S only 5.9%,whilethetransfersfrom control overthelocalfi of thelo e each cally m s titu s. Thenew ental pollution,prop e co ofGeorgiam ted 60 ofthesetaxes,wh mposed byapartofsharedtaxes.T cal budgetsan o tivated discrim % ofthetotalbudgetlocal legis e beenstren rnment revenuesbetween1997 on m l odified thetaxationsystem a tion cancelledm re 2005thelocalself- a d erty tax,andproperty nancial resources. ich im de itpossibleforthe thatgenerallyitwas e ers from i g nce then,theonly andtheprofittax i thened, wh nation ofcertain plied thatlocal e thecentral nts, i.e.for o a st of central ich was rm ania, the ore h e
CEU eTD Collection effectiveness incontrollinglocal weak (Bolashvili, sources suggestthatbefore1995thecentralgov Yearly StatisticalData200 together). A observed in between 2004and2008theshareoflocaltaxesdr There wasnouniversalm system Shevarnadze m that fis 208 Sou % local reven ues a nd taxes The datapresentedabo 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 r ce: wascreatedinw 0 5 cal d Graph VI.1.ShareofLocalRevenuesandTaxesoutTotalGovernment IM thesha lthough thereareno F Go ecentralization inpost-SovietGe 1997 a naged tore-est ve
1998 2002 rnm r e of e 2-2 Revenues andTaxesinGeorgia(1997-2008)
nt 1999 Fi ; 62;Rekhashvili,200 010 h totalloc ich agreatratio nance St echanism todecide
. 2000 v
e areinlin ablish controlovertheregions financeswasequallyunderm
2001 sim at a i l rev s ilar dataavailableforth t i c ye 2002 s Year a e r e nues withth
of localbudgetw 2003 bo 249 orgia hasb
o (from k how fundsshouldbea ernm 2 2004 0; astically decreased.Asim 0 2), e g 0 2 ent’s controloverGeorgianregionswas taxandfrom ( 2005 e thereforeonecanassum f nera o r 1 e
en generallylow.Oncepresiden 2006 9 l viewinthesecon 9 e periodbefore1997,secondary 7 a ined. ofthecountryin1994-1995,a - s depe 2
0 2007 0 2 ); non-taxresourcestaken Ge 208
ndant oncentralpower. 2008 or llocated tothelower gi a M ilar patterncanbe i lo lo ni d c c ary liter st a a ry l r l t e ofFi thatth e a v x e e n s u % a nance e tu % re e t
CEU eTD Collection when thecentralpower wasfragm decision-m increased s of centralgovernm central level.Between1991and1995whenpoliti post-independence periodswasoverallinline 1991 and2008.Itrev was inef 2000). W could becoveredbylocalfundsbecauseofth financed eitherdirectlyfrom services (ashealthandsocialcare,educati financial res governm while assigningvarioussharedandnon-shared between dif higher th from This financialdependencywasalsoincreasedby financial dependenceof bargaining betweentheleaders levels ofgovernm non-statefinancialinstit Graph VI.2belowsumm In contrast,thedecentralizationofexpenditu 6.2.5.PowerConcentration,Decentraliza f e an thedecen ective andtog ithout respectivedecentr nts, thecentralgovernm a i f king, andappointm gnificantly com ources necessarytofulfillthem erent levels e nt. Thisgenerallydepended e nt overtheregions tralization ofrevenues.Du e e als thatth localgovernm ther withit,the ofgovern p thecentralbudget, utions (Losaberidze,2006). ared totheprev of varioustiers(Wheatley,2 arizes thedyna e nt dim e degreeofform alization ofrevenues,thedecentralizationexpe m e nt hasnotc e e nted the nt was e e fiscal decentralizatio nts vis-à- nsions was weak.Between1995and2000thiscontrol on, andm 250
a balancedo appropriately. Mostim ious ofdecentralization.Between 2001and2003 m control ofcentralgovernm on face-to-f orthroughtransfers.V ring the199 tion, a with thed i e lackoffinancialresources(Rekhashvili, thebanningoflocalself-governm responsibilities toloca vis thecentralpower overed thedelegatedre cs cal powerwasgreatly res inpost-SovietGeorgiahasbeenalway period, al decentralizationofGeorgiaindifferent of decentralizationinGeorgiabetween a n intenance ofpub d EthnicMobilizatio notablyin n ace contacts,i.e.oninter-personal 005; 163).After2005reform e e (Rekhash 0s thedivisionofresponsibilities n rem gree ofpowerconcentrationat a ined low. portant reg rela vili, e increased evenm dispersed thecontro lic order)havebeen ry fewsuchservices l andregionallevel sponsibilities with tion to 2000).However, e nt overregional n : i onal public thef e nditures nt loans i s the sca o re. l s l ,
CEU eTD Collection Georgia wasdeterm centralizing m were definedbypresidentialdecrees,supported by of power,becausem sam country’s politicalstabilization
supported byanabsolute m decision-m general degreeofcentralizationincreasedagain, when politicalpowerwascontro electoral decentrali affairs dim De e ti The territorialcentraliz c m e Fi n e t , theprocesso s r i a a c nished asw king partsofit. a l i l z
Graph VI.2.EvolutionofDecentra a easures after2004werealsoin ti o n zation. Between2004and2008duringthepost-RoseRevolutionregime ined, besidesotherthings, o st i e ll, oncethenewlegal f m centralizationwent portant featuresof a ation inGeorgiathem jority inthelegisl after aperiodofcivilwarsand lled by De De D e ci c c El 0, e e Pres s n n i e 1 0 5 o t t c r r n 251 t a a o M by thenatureofce hand inwiththehorizontalconcentration the relationbetweencentreandperipheries l l stipulations allowedformoreappointm ident Saakashviliand r i i ature. Therefore,centra z z a a a a with anincreasedcontro l ki
ti ti itiated bytheform president’s m o o n liz n n g ation inGeorgia(19 i ddle of 1990swasfirstlyaresultof a ntral politicalpower. jority intheparliam deep politicalcrisis.Atthe h lization inpost-Soviet a i D s politicalparty, lly strongpresident e Ap l overthefiscalan c 91-2008) e p nt o i r 20 20 19 19 n a tm l 05- 02- 96- 91- i z e a 2 2 2 1 n t i 008 005 002 995 t on e e nt. The nt and the d
CEU eTD Collection lim organizational structures andth overwhelm ensured arelativelypeaceful local execu Georgia (Wheatley,2005;120).Theywerethe“pat governors oftheseregionswereamongthemo Javakheti, inwhichethnicm behavior (Wheatley,2005;115-119) exchange fo and whoenjoyedvariousdegreesofautonom recomm brokers whohavebeenappointedorco degree ofcentralized local andcentralelitesinthe1990s,W circ “feudalization ofpower”inwhichpowerwas described theactualstate-peripheryrelations often lackthecapacitytom dynam nature ofinfor in post-SovietGeorgiawere
ited theaccesstofinancia les withaconsider As m This typeofrelationswasalsothecaseforregionsKvem On theotherhand,in1990s i cs ofpoliticallife,asform endation ofloyal-to-the-presidentregi ing supportinelections(see tives inth e r loyalty ntioned above, m al relations co to e tworegi a ntrol intheregions,powerwasve thepresid b le l eeway overloca thetwom l reso i in atransitionperiodisvery onitor theirim not exclusivelydeterm norities wereterr attitu ons. TheirloyaltytoShevarnad e pro al rulesareno en urces forpotenti . Therefore,thisregionalautonom de ofm t t, whoco est actions. the actualrelations Tables V.6andV.7inChapter5). h eatley de a in elem i 252 l af nority group plem y. Ne u onal governorsorpresidentialadm in Georgiathe1990sascharacterizedby -opted byPresidentShevarnadzeatthe itorially concentrated.D l f d replace InGeorg t fullyinstitutionalizedandtransitionstates a dispersed in“sem term irs. W entation. JonathanWheatley(2005;110) st powerfulandinfluentialgovernorsin rons” ofmost(appointedbythepresident) al eth vertheless, thisautonom ents ofethnicm ined by ined thatalthoughtherewasacertain h n ile lo s to between centralandregionalelites ic m i a thes cal leadersincaseofd analyzing therelation sted inthehandsoflocalpower im wards centralpowerandalso the form obilizers ze and portant fordeterm t ate territo i-independent” infor y wasconditional. influencein o-Kartli andSa al arrang . Thefactthatbefore obilization arethe u ring the1990s y rial o wasgrantedin em r theregion ga s i ents. Th i nistration between n e nizatio m ing the fecting s tkhe- m al n e
CEU eTD Collection appointm position with Azer mobiliza governm much ofthesharedrevenueswerecollected governm financial dependencyoftheregionaladm governm 2005 thelocalbudgetsdependedsom electoral decentralization,this districts. Afterthe2002legislativea position redistribution, thelocalleadersh organization m to leadership,financial, of ethnicmobilization.Onthecontrary,bylim representative asm several localnon-governm one from internal resourcesforsupportof them leaders’ adm . Dece The stateterritorialo Hence, theweaklevelofdecen s s tion e e e w . Theincum e theArm nt andbecausethenew nt increasedevenm nt im is nt/ andelectoraldecen ntralization onthesetw ’ and e bylim i re filled nistrative positionsdependedm a plied thatthecentrehadstrongm de itpossiblefortheconcentrat Arm a e iting thea yor in nia b b e ents of n nians’ y andloyaltyresources the rather communityconcentr appoin local elections(ICG,2006). e ntal o r ccess gani te concentra m o ip’s loyaltytowardsthecentral re withthe2005 e their candidaciesinlocalelecti rr thod ofcontrollingthelocal t zation ofGeorgiaalsolim tralization system ees ofGeorgian itoria to r g o dim legislationdi a tralization inGeorgiahadn m nizations l conc obilizing l m u t ed hor ch onthe e en nsions gaveincentives dm 253 en o mobilized ated intheSouthernregion,where2002 re i iting th e izonta nist tra
n ed centralpowertokeep undercontrolany ontheloyaltyoflocalpopulationtowards
eans topunishnon-loyallocalleaders.The and redistributeddirectlybythecentral ts, whichprovidedforappointm eade adm tion h pres d notcontainexplicit rative leadersh ofGeor redistribution oftaxesfrom l i r e accessofpoten powercoulddo nistrative reform ship. a iden ve their Mostloca beeng centralized system t orhis gia before2002.Allkeylocal politics wasweakened,aslocal governm it ons. Arelevantexam ed thepotentialforethnic o resou t aseffectthedevelop to localeliteslookfor ip v i ven representativesinthe r l leaders ces forelectingth e soduetotheweak tial ethnicmobilizers . Becausesin loca i nt alsoincreased. s-à-vis thecentral criteriaforthis l adm inthe ofterritorial the i nistr ple isthe e region centra c nt and e then m a tive ent eir s l
CEU eTD Collection following foursubsections arefocusedonth (de)centralization, andethnicm several cen this s the sam units ( adm adm in factpreservedthestatus-quoandincreased end of1994,butasanalyzedin region. Atthesam central governm the form years ledtothelossof elites’ rebelliouspositionsvi Soviet period.Theexceptionsweretheregions level of through therathercentralizedterrit hindering factorfortheriseofethnicm ethnic i i nistration wasi nistrative stru t The aim The initialattem
6.3. TheCaseofMoldova: m Before theadoptionofLawonLocal ruc ra e dec er. OncetheLawonSpecialLegalSt yon tim obiliz t ur tralizing featu e waschan s e e lef ) form ntra ofthissectionistodeterm ing pro e liz t nt m thesam e cture ofthecou tim ed duringtheSovietUnioninto10adm ation m pl p a anyef c e, theauthority t toreform naged tore-establishcer ged backin e em inMoldov r ss. Hence,thecon es e ented in1998,whenth num were re-introduced. s-à-vis thecen f ective contro the sectionsbelow i b norities er oftiers(
orial organizationofthecountry. the localpublicadm n to sm a f try rem over Transdniestriawasneverregained. o ’ llowed theprac obili m ine th aller 3 tral g l bythelatterove obili a 254 l cen zation, byvirtueofitscontrolovertheregions oc in only theelecto e linkbetweenpowercon ed unchanged.Thegenuinereform ofGagauziaandTran al, region overnm Public Adm 7 zation inpost-SovietM tration of tain degreeofstatecontroloverGagauzian e evolutionofdecision-m adm e newlawsregroupedthe40adm thelawsadoptedbyparliam atus ofGagauziawasadoptedin1994,the i i nistr e nistration tice nt al, andcentra p during thefirstpost-independence s a i i nistrative regions( established r nistration inDecem tive r o al decentralization.Thegeneral wer in the adm units( in Moldovaoccurredatthe Georgia i sd nistration processesof l ). rayons o centration, degreeof inthelastyearsof niestria, wh B ldova. Forthis,th y a theendof king, electoral constituted ). Inaddition, judets b er 1994the e nt bythen i nistrative oflocal ere local ) andat 2001 a e ,
CEU eTD Collection chain. subsection attem appointm im appointed b central governm central governm previous period.Besides,theregionalexecuti authorities, regionalaut stipulated clearerdivisionbetweentheco in m im consequently wassubordinatedtothecentr exercising thelocalpo adm repres Moreover, accordingtothe1994LawonLocal responsibilities wereinvested adm 1994 LawonLocalPublicAdm legis existing legislationneverprovid plied aconsiderablyreduceddecision-m provem i i l nistration andafewresponsibilitiesshar nistration levelII( o ation e The territo Since itsindependenceMoldova 6.3.1. Decision-Making enta st pol e e tive inthe nt, andfinancialaspectsofdecentr nts inthedelim y s icy areas.ThenewLawonLoc tablished th thePresid rial adm e e p nt anymoreandhencewerenot nt wererepresen ts toestablishthelinksbetw terr wers wasin ent (Popa,2 horities, andundertheresponsibility i rayons e delim nistrative reformin itation betweentheco itory. Thisf Decentralization: inthecentralauthorities ). In i itatio ed residualpow nistration provided chargetore ted intheregionsbystat practice,th 008; 24) n between hasalwayshadasingle-cham unc a king autonom 255 alization between1991and2008,whilethefifth tion wasgiventothechiefexecutivesof 1998 decentralizedth . Althoughthenewarrangem al governm mpetences undertheres present thes een them localandstatedecision-m ve authoritieswerenotsubordinatedtothe a ed withtherayonexecutives.Mostpolicy ers tolocal-lev is im mpetences o l PublicA responsibletothem Public Adm rather f plied th y (Popa,2008). e a andtheirofficesinthe nt. Forthesereasons,thesystem in elem e t ate powersatth d w policyres f at theloca m localpublicadm ofboth,ascom i el authorities.Before1994no nistration, therewasnostate i nistration (Nove e representatives(prefects), ents oftheexploredcausal e decisionm ber parliam . Theprerogativesof l author ponsibility oflocal ponsibilities tolocal a e king powers.The e sam nts stillrequired i a nistration and e ity whowas p king process nt. Also,the m ared tothe e b tim er 1998) rayons e, and .
CEU eTD Collection affairs ofth areas betweenthecentralandlocalgovernm adm and thelocalauthorities’own there annulm the com occurred asaresultofsevera decentralization ofpublicservic of "indications"and"advices" com adm of com 21). Moreover,evenifthelegislationprovidedth generally assessedthenewlegislationasin communal andtheregionallevels(Chiriac those of the localad adm the controlofstateorgans,whichnulli even iflocaladm decision m i p i i nistrative assistancetoputthemintopr nistration wasalsoim nistrative levelII( wasn etences haddeclarativecharacte Starting with2001,thedecision-makingdecen Most im p e pr p nt oftheinstitu etences, atthesam etences ofthetwolocaltiers,whic a ef o e latter.Hen king processhighlycentralizedinco m clea ects, andalsobe portantly, duetothelacko i nistrativ r d i nistration i stinction b e em rayon tion ofstaterepres ce, posed bythecentral s t e ployees hadthes l reason had som arting with2002th tim ) wasinchargewithboth(Chivriga&Furdui,2009;12-13;18- twee e es ascom attributions. Th tw to e itd een the loca n theresp s. Oneofthemwasthe r (Chivriga&Furdui,2009;14). e decisionm i d notg l adm p f enta aclear state ared totheperiodb actice. W 256 etal. o tive inthereg t fied theirautonom creasing thelocalauto h createdconfusion.Inaddition,duetothe i atute ofstateem power throughstandardizedschem n e chairm u attribu e cen nistr e mparison withthepreviousyears.Moreover, sibilities b e loca arantee arespectivefinancia nt distributionofaut a , theform king power a , 2001;324),theinternationalexperts tral go tions in tr ithout respectiv l au alization wasgradua tions an of th ve e la delega i orities withrela tween lo ons (prefect)inDecem er couldi m ck of rnm e fore 1998(Radu,2000;3). s, anydecisionwasputunder the localexecutivebranchof o ployees, whichm e st dom cleard y. Thestructureoflocal nt practicedtheimposition ted e support,m hority overm ca totheloca n nom l comm terfere intheinternal ains, renderingthe e lim y tive lly reduced.This duetogreater itation b l cov l unities atth y lar a l a e ny ofthese a s. Finally, e a ny policy b u rage an g de them er 2001, thoritie e scop e tween d e e s
CEU eTD Collection elections ofrayon,city,andvill electoral decentralizat on LocalElection public adm m elected bytheircorrespondi rayon execu of localexecutives. decentralization byopeningthepossibilityforcentr As describ the principlesandspecificprovisionses 6). Allth officially responsibletowardsthestate(Chi local executivebodyand am established thresholdwasnotattained,thepr should castvalidvotesinm local gen the governm appointed aftertendaysbyth by thecoun Another pro e mberships andareconfirm Re The firstlocalelectionsin 6.3.2. Electo m ese practicesreducedsign e a ral elections(wherethecase)asbe i rkably, theLawonLocalPublicAdm cil, thech e nistration –notablythroughtheLaw v tive comm e d below,som ision ofth nt”. Moreover,theLaw s r (Decem al Decentralization: air oftherayo io ittees andm e sam n. Generally,thesela ber 1994)-whichbesidesothe e a ng localcouncilsonproposal specif e e e presidentoftheRepublic yor (Article57). a articlestipulat d intheirposition xim post-Soviet Moldovawereorga age Councilsan ificantly th a u n executive yors oftheexis m twocons onLocalElectio i c stipula vriga &Furdui,2009;22-24;Popaetal.,2004;4- 257 tablished throughthe1994 e decision-m ed esid t comm that“ifthesecondcand ing valid,atleast50% ions of s bythepresidentofth ws establ d also,forthe on LocalPublicAdm ecu ent of al govern i ting m tive electoraltours(A ni ittee orthem ns providedthatinordertoconsiderthe stration stipulatedthat“chairsofthe Mold theselawslim a ished universalsuffrageforthe u king powerof r thingsdeterm Moldovaonrecomm nicipalities (i.e m by thegovernm ova wasthe e nt tointerfereintheform m nized in1995,onthebasisof a yors ofcitiesandvillages. a yor of i nistration andtheLaw e country”(A i legislationonlocal localauthorities. of registeredvoters date isnotaccepted onetonom them ited theelec ined thedegreeof . biggercities)are rticle 56).Ifthe ent from unicipality is endation by rticle 7). inate their ation tora a l
CEU eTD Collection by theCommunistParty public adm 1999 localelectionswereorganizedinaccord territorial-adm year term executives –them shall beelectedbydirectanduniversalelections Moldova. Itprovidedthatthelegislativebodies Popular Assem with thislegislation,since1995thelocalpopula executive branches,bothtobeformedthrough because accordingtoits1994auton elections in1998(Chiri and citieswithnom respective legislationm in thefirsttourandto0% stipulations f the Law.InlinewithCourt’sdecis stipulations asunconstitutionalan decentralization. Bytheendof1995Mold population (Chiriacetal.,2001;294),whichimplie communal m The ElectoralCodeadoptedin1997m The stipulationsm As aresultofthesestipulations,afterth (Chiriacetal.,2001;304).The1998 i nistration andterrit r a om yors werenom inistrative organi b ly andthelocalGovernorev theleg a yors –werealsoelectedth i nated m ac etal.,2001;294). o withm i difications norepeated sla e ntioned abovedidnot ti in thesecond(Lycourgos on anddecreasedthelo i a nated yors; theyreta orial adm a zation ofMoldovaincorporated jority inpowerdi d gavetotheParliam by thegovernm o m ous statu i i nistrative structur on, theParliam ery fouryears(Mironova 258 ined theirp e 1995localelections10%ofc an rough directanduniversalsuffrageforafour- electionswereorgani universal anddirectel ovan Constitution ce tion ofGagauziaelectthem a s for ater d notaffecttheelectoral decen theregio xi at allnon-centralleve reform affe with them.Themodificationsin mized theelectoral ent insteadofbeingelectedbythelocal d asignificantlim cal electionsvalidationthresholdto30% &Muller,1998). ct theautonom e nt adela oflocalpublicadm e o m nt elim sition e im n offouryears.Thechieflocal haditsow ple theseprovisions,whilethe s y offourm untilthesubseq inated a m l Co ented in2002and2003 , 2011;92). zed ous unitofGagauzia, ections. Inaccordance itation totheelectoral theunconstitu urt declared n representativeand intho ls ofadministration decentralization of Nevertheless, after onths tom e ity m i m nistration and s tralization. b e co ers oflocal uent loca a thelocal thetwo yors a mmunes tional odify nd l
CEU eTD Collection executive councils,atthe appr adm enlarged appointm above -provideddirectelections governor (Mironova,2011;86;104). Justice, onInfor to appointanddism territory ascom Gagauzia, thecentralgovernm appointm been nom they affectedtheresults Presiden of theRepublic;incas appointm the appointm municipal levelandalso Parliam appointm Gagauzia, wherethecentralgovernm the lastyearsofMoldovaSovietSocial i nistrative unitscouldnom The 1998adm After theadoptionof1994LawonSpecialSt Before 1994,theappoin 6.3.3. AppointmentDecentralization: e t. AlthoughtheConstitu nt inDece e e e inated bythecentralgovernm nt decentralizationbetween1991and1998. nt authority.TheLawonLocalPu nt wastobedonebylocalauthorities, e nt ofexecutivesatotheradm p m ared tothere ation andSecurity,onIntern e m nt powerstothelocallevel iss theprosecutorinGagauzia i nistrative reform b er 1994allowedthepossibilityforappointm e ofthelatter,appointm offi , incaseofinsufficien rst localelectionsb t oval bylocallegisl st ofthecountry.N m e nt i e forvirtuallyalllo nate anddism tion nt decentralization hadalesss a , followingthe l Courtannu e nt had e ist Republic.Theexceptionwastheregionof nt. Th 259 i i g authorities. Hence,them nist i t turnoutinlo ecause 10%of a reducedcontrolandimplicitly, ss thevice-m butalsohadtobeconfirm n ative bodies(Chiriac blic Adm e if is rev , aswellGagauzia’schiefexecutiveson lled thes vertheless, al Affairs,attheproposalofGagauzian rative levels.Incaseoftheform cal executivesandlegislatures,guaranteed icant app e was basedonthepracticesestablishedin 1997 ElectoralCodethat-asdescribed nt wa atus ofAutonom eals agenerall es stipulationsbytheendof1995, i s tobeperform nistration adoptedbyMoldovan o intm cal elections the statepreservedauthority a localexecutiveau yors andthem ent powerinth et al.,2001;310). e ous TerritorialUnitof y decreasedlevelof a nt oflocalm yors ofsecond-level , thepossib e e d bythepresiden d directlybythe e m tho e r b ers ofthe e r ities had spective a i lity for yors a er, the t t
CEU eTD Collection was inch and polic supervis possible conflict(Radu,2000;5; was allowedonlyasaresultof unit ofGagauziawastheonlyonewhereno representative ofcentralpowerintheregions appointm qualified bytheexpertsascom representative intheregionswassupposedto appointm the territories),andnotwithdecentralizedones, of directinterferencein Therefore theinstitutionofpref functions ofthep annulm indirect way regarding thelocalsoci rayon chairm 2008). Despitetheofficialannulm centr com council (whoiselectedbythem p al exec rom At thesam After theadoptionofDecem e e th nt oftheinstitutionprefect.On ies, e e arg i se nt decentralization.Beforethe1998refo nt decentralizationhasb at th utive powe d theautonom , aswelltochairtheimplem e theappoin en werestillrequiredtoprovide withd e lo e r efect weretrans ti cal author eco m r theaffairsoflocalauthorities(P t ncentrated andth e m al-econom , the1998refor e y nt decentralization ofthelatter,b ities a p is whyitwa ect hadthefunctionoflocallega rom Gagauzian authorities’pressure com Ţ e ic developm m e i veatcov, 2009;58).Generally,theprefect’srolewasto en lim nd politics sing theauto nt ofthere itted offici ber e p mbers of etences 2001LawonLocalPublicAdm ited th e m ntati ce therespectiveinstitutionwascancelled, 260 ecause itim introd beassum prefect wasappointed,althoughthisexception ) appointedbythepres in Moldovahasbeenredu s annulledbytheCons
whichm f ent (Popa,2008).Therefore, evenifinan (i.e. thecompetencesof on ofstatepublicservic ally tothechairm regular reportingtoth unctioned rough specificprovisio nom spective legislation’sstipulation,inreality rayonexecutivecouncil).Thischange r m uced theinstitu y theroleofcen oflocalauthorities(Popa,2008;22). e eans thatitdidnotim d bythelocalm opa, 2000;10).Besides,theprefect plied his/hersubordinationtothe in line and lity surveillance,andnotone withth an withtheaim tral governm ident. Theautonom tion o of therayonexecutive titutional Court(Popa, e centralgovernm e ced since200 n the state s s resultingfrom e sta withintheregions a yors, arrangem f prefect(local ply adecreased t i e’ nistration exercisedin s leg toavoida e nt’s loca 1. i sla th the tion ous e e nt nt e l .
CEU eTD Collection and ofstatetransfersevolvedfrom r structure oflocalbudgets,tose authorities (Popa,2000;Popaetal.,2004). system why uptotheadoption than afterthe2001legi more onthecentralgovernm 210 209 evidence thatlocalgovernm from did notprioritizetheref local ownrevenues,theystilldem taxes andsurtaxes(TableVI.1below).Alt budgets con dem e sp (Chi Th Table VI.1.StructureofLocalGovernmentRevenuesinMoldova,1995-1998(%) ectiv onstrate thatbetween1995and1998theratioof Tran centralgovernm e lack There isnoavailablestatisticsforthe1990s Despite therela As m Loa 6.3.4. FiscalDecentralization: riac etal.,2001; keptatag ely, thestr sfe n Taxes a s
r o e fr s f ntioned above,duringthefirstyearsaf s av B om fr titu a om nk ailab t Tot n u h ted b t d S Loa ct e St
h a r u e St l eat extentcentralizedfiscal l r u e d
328) e of at rt n e s tive axes at e B e a tween 31%and39%,while slative am nt throughlo ta i co e B o ofConstitu u rm l dget n s u y h p s d o e ation ofcountry’s g a lid nts inM e
r
e i tly d t gh share nt supportthanaf
ated e howtheratiosoflocalow endm u
b e o u toth ans andtransfers),theseconda d nstrate th tion andfirs yeartoyear. o g ents. ldova in e of t, w 1 22 68 e f 10 0. 7. 995 revenue 5 9 .8 .8 0 act t e hough thesefiguresdonotrevealtheamountof
r
e 261
d at regionsand relationsbetweenthece h adm i th ffer at du ter the1998adm e secondhalfof1990sst t adm e ter independencetheMoldovanparliament i s c n 209 nistrative territorial r the restofrevenueswerecons thatwouldrevealthedynam t i state transfersandstat asco n o Nevertheless,som g 1 12 18 68 1 t m 996 i 0 - h nistrative lawsin1994theexisting .7 .9 .4 0 i e m ng f
1 p 990s th ar n re loca ed to r om taxes venues, ofsharedrevenues, t litie e system i h nistrative reform ry literaturebringssom e 1 10 28 54 10 2 7. 997 s financiallydepended 000s. 6 .1 .3 .0 0 ntral andtheregional arrangem (and
ill g o e e loansinthelocal availablefigures f pub r im eatly depended lic f e plicitly, nts. Thisis 1 i i 37 titu 55 1 , butless n cs inthe 5. 1. 998 0 a 2 .9 6 .3 0 n ted b
c
210 es and n o y e t
CEU eTD Collection autonom allocations from et al.,2001;328;Lycourgos&Muller,1998). on reallocationofsharedtaxes, cover expenditures(Popa, 2000;11). budgets ofotheradm case ofGagauzia.Instead,Gagauzia’sinternal stipulation aboutregionalfisc rela concerned. Ontheotherhand,FiscalCode local executiveshadlarge deci transfers tobeallocatedfrom to belo territory oftheautonomy,part Gagauzia’s ownrevenueswerealsocom pressure exercisedbyGagauzianauthorities taxes, from budget (Mironova,2011;89,102). providing moreresourcesto more transparentbudgetaryrela goods (Radu,2000).Beingpartoftheadm the 1999LawonLocalPatrim budgets, asitallowedform tions The autono The 1999LawonLocalFinancesincreasedth cally collected, be ous sharedrevenues,a statuswasrather tween th thecentralgovernm mous terr i e centr nistrative thereformalsoprov itoria o re typesoftaxesto the localgovernm al thecentralto nd from al revenues,whichwouldhave governm sion-m which onanexceptionalbasiswas units ofMoldova:from as thecontributionfr onies perm general asfar l tions betweendifferentlevelsofgovernm unit ofGagauziawasalso a statetransfers(Mironova king powersoverhowto di e ent andadm nt. p thelocalbudgets(Manole,2000;130-132).Also, itted local lete 262 The 1994LawwhichestablishedGagauzia’s i nistra oncentralpower,bytheendof1990s id e belocallycollectedandpreserved.Moreover, budgetwasfor d withapartofVAT nt (Popa,2000) ed aprecisem ofMoldovawhichestablishedthefisca tive reform the fiscalautonom om autho i e shareofownreve ownr nistrativ localtaxe r ities tob e venues accum , theselawsai e unitsdidnotcontainany . Besidesallowingm been m , 2011;89).Asaresultofth e m dependent onthebudgetary chanism forcalcu ed inthesam s wasin not transferredtothestate stribute thelocalfunds to e com o taxcollectedonthe y oftheregionwas re applicableforth significant (Chiriac e nues inthelocal ulated from ownersoflocal ent andalsoat m e e d atcreating wayasthe lating th o re taxes local e e e l
CEU eTD Collection 211 (CREDO, 2004;46).Moreover, sources ofspecialdestinationfromlocalC im Adm fiscal decentralizationpath. governm Although th state transfers.Thiswastheconsequenceof high ratiooflocalownrevenues, state budget.Also,ev budgets –stoppedbeingasharedrevenuesource
(D portant responsibilitiesontheelaboration % e i 10 20 30 40 50 60 The dataonlocalbudgetrevenuesin2000pr This pathwasreversedin2001,when nistration andonLocalPublicAdm M 0 Graph VI.3.StructureofLocalB e e l l nt ratherthanthefirstone(Manole, o , 2 e effectoft 0
01; 1998 2 58;
M en ifthenewlegislation
a 2000 n h o is reform l e, 2
0 0
0 2003 ; ascom 13 in 2004theVAT–animportant onfinancia 3; R y o ear
t 2005 a p ru ared tothesh udget Revenues,Moldova(1998-2008) the1998-1999adm , 20 ouncils tothelocalgovernm 263 i of localbudgetandpaym nist stipulated 14localtaxes 0 2000; 133),itstillput 9 l decentralizationfavoredthesecon ;
An 2006 ration wereadopted.Theselawsshifted the newLawsonLocalPublicFinance and insteadwastransfe esented inGraphVI.3 ne xes; ared
Veve 2007 revenues ri i t nistrative reform a ,
2 2008 0 revenuesourceforlocal 05; an the basisforagenuine 1 to becollectedasown e 0 d therevenu n - 1 rred entirelytothe e t ofthebudgetary reveal arelatively 3 nt representatives )
r % % % e v s t ow enu r inMoldova. h ans ared n r 211 es f d e e es from tierof v r s enue s
CEU eTD Collection
own revenu populated bym Taraclia, populatedbym units ofthecountry,includingthosewithterr 212 independence oflocalauthorities. types ofexpensesasdecidedbythecentral centr proportionally withtheincreaseoftransfersfrom VI.3 above,whichconfirm dependence vis-à-visthecentralau rest beingofnegligibleimpor local revenues,only4ofthe Datas
% own budg etary revenues Graph VI.4.ComparingtheShareofOw al bud The sign The above-m 10 20 30 40 50 60 o 0 urce: s get alsoha es decreased ee Graph if a ic 1998 jority ofethnicGagauzians.Gra ant de entioned stipulationsledtoan Taraclia w VI.3. d condition crea
atagreaterexten 2000 a jority thatthelocalgove se m tance (Popaetal.,2004;11).
intheloca wereactuallyus i th theCountryAverage(2005-2008) ofethnicBulgarians, 2003 a thorities. Thisdependenceis l chara
l ownreve 2005 t c in te 264 governm
r T andwereaim rnm n a ed andfor itorial concentrationofethnicm centralgovernm ph VI.4aboverevealsthat rac Budgetary RevenuesinGagauz
2006 increaseinlocalgove e nues after2001affectedalladm lia nt’s ownrevenuesdecreasedafter2000, e andGagauziath nt, whichfurtherlim and
2007 m th ed about95%oflocaltaxes,the e e autonomousunitGagauzia, d atcoveringpre reflected bythedatainGraph 2008 ents. Th 212 ye an the e transfersfrom a rnm r theratiooflocal ited thefinancial aver e Ta G c A nts’ financial ount v agauz - r erage i a d i i a c a and i e norities – g nistrative r l term i y a e f
i a n o t ined r all the h e
CEU eTD Collection the distributionofthesetran second-level governm accord increasing localgovernm state transferswithin four dim 1991 and2008.Itrevealsthatuntil2001theadm characterized asbeing“unbalanced,ri these reasons,thefiscalsitua period, m of statebud the year,fundswerealsodistributedtovariouslo constituted about7%oftotalstatetransf projects tobefinancedbythesefundswerenot for political m discretion adm relatively late:although thefi In addition,theGraph reveal more centralization,notablyinthefiscal,decisi m i ula calculation,butas“speci nistrative unitsinthecountry,whichrev Furtherm Graph VI.5belowsumm Moreover, apartofstatetransferstolocal 6.3.5. PowerConcentration,Decentr ing to e o a ns a st oftheseallotm ry uponthesecond-levelgovernm nipulation. get throughthebudgetaryyear”.Ac ions exploredinthischapter, the2003am ore, thenature therespectiveperiod. e nts ( endments totheLawonLocalPublicFinan ents’ dependencyvis- rayon ents reachedlocaliti tion attheleveloflocalgovern ofstatetr sfers from arizes thedyna s th rst relevantlaw s ) weretobecalculatedusing al allotm at th gid, andclientelistic”(IDIS,2007). e proc secondleveltoth ers tolocalgovernm while after2001theproce ansf alization andEthnicMobiliza 265 e ents”. Thecriteria eals anincreasingdepend nt (V ers constitu m on-m ess of es runbyloyaliststoth clearlyelaborated.In s cording too i cs havebeenadoptedin 1994,theyrather calities as“gifts”or budgetswerenotdist à-vis thesuperiorti i everita, 2 nistrativ of decentralizationinMoldovabetween aking, andappointm dece ted byitse e system ntra 005; 15),whichleav m pposition M e first-levelgovernm e e a sp nt nts inMoldova2000swas liza for selectinglocalitiesand s (IDIS,2007).Throughout ecial equalization tion decentralizedonallthe ss wasreversedtowards c l es thestatetransfersto 2007theseallotm f ence oftheseunitson anaddition inMo e partyinpower.For resultof“correction ers. First,although e P tion ributed asresultof nt dim s oftherespective :
ldov e ed placefor nsions ofit. e a sta form a nts was l f actor ents r ula, te d
CEU eTD Collection
the centralizingprocesses initiatedin2002, outside thefactualjurisdiction two regionsofthecountrywithsign exerc mobilized againstthecentralpowerandther at thebeginningof1990s.Theadm periphery relations. years oftransition,atleastform reform thatagenuinedecentralizationproce adm institutionalized thestatus- i nistration), exceptfortheintroductionof D i Nevertheless, therewereregionsw sing itsauthor e c e n Fi t Graph VI.5.EvolutionofDecentra r s a c liz a l
a t io n ity withinth quo (i.e.therem of thecentralpower.However, ese terr i ificant te nistrative e al leve De D De h ito e ich wereli c ci c El rie e e 0, s n n 266 i e l thecountryhadrelativelycentralizedstate- 0 1 5 rritorial concen o s t t ss actuallystarted.Therefore,duringthefirs c r r a ef n local directelections.Itwasthroughthe1998 although atasm a a t o n M liz lites ofTransdniestriaandGagauziaregions l l ore preventedthecentralgovernmentfrom ltoge i i r ants ofSovi z z a a ation inMoldova(1 a a l ki
t t ttle affectedbythearran i i o o n ther (se n n g tration e Chapter3 et practicesoflocalpublic Gagauziawasinfluencedby aller ex of ethnicm 991-2008) ) tent thantheother . Thisim D e A g c p em e p 20 19 19 19 n o i norities were t ents inplace i 02- r 99- 94- 91- n a tm liz 2 2 1 1 plies that 008 001 998 994 e a n t io t n t
CEU eTD Collection contrary, th to consolidateitspositions intheregional centralization) in1994 power haditsroleaswell.Thepreservationof system Soviet Mold concentrated horizontalpower. relatively centralizedadm independence legislationonlocalpublicadm initiated inaperiodwithconcentrated with fragm the m Chapter 2andtheevolutionof(de)centralization hierarchical PartyofCommunists. 2008, whenbothexecutiveandlegislativebranch party. Theonlylong-lastingperiodwithcon ended duetotheparliam Agrarian Partystoppedsupportingthepresident level andb that therehavebeentwoattem Gagauzia autonom adm i nistrative units.Asthesubsectionabove The linkbetweenthelevelof The contrastbetweenthedynam The analysisofthenature o st significantattempttodecentralizeth oftherepubliccouldhaveb e e decentralizationlaws initiated nted power(1998-2000), o ova wasnotacoincid th attem y towardscentralpower p was anattemptbytheAg ts f e a ntary electionswith i iled: th nistrativ p ts duringthe199 politicalpowerinMoldovapr e een caus e f n e system decen ce. W while themostim i rst (199 i cs ofhoriz tralization andnatureof increasedparticularlyafter2002. power(2002-2008).Moreover,thefirstpost- h e in 1998weresupported by ile them 267 d by centrated powerwastheonebetween2001and adm e i
status-quo (i.e.relativel ni adm 4) f was adoptedinconditionsofstill-ex 0s tocon rarian Partywhichwasinpowerbythattim and gotfragm unsuccessful resultsforthepro-presidential stration whichpreservedthestatus-quoofa i illus nistrative offices(Popa, 2000;2).Onthe a diversityoffactors, presented inthesecti es wereledbythehighlydisciplinedand i a nistrative system ontal powerconcentrationanalyzedin iled whentheinitiallypro-pr a in developm portant initiativeofcentralizationwas t rates, thefinancialdepen cen tra e t nted, whilethesecond(1997) e politica esented inC horizon ents intheadm wasinitiatedinaperiod y highdegreeoffor thenatureo acoalitionofparties ons aboverevealthat l autho tal powerinpo h apter 2reveals r ity a i f esiden d nistra political ence of t cen itin tive m tra tia st- al g e l l
CEU eTD Collection accessed onAugust24,2011). Mol country was these reg institutions wasunabletoeffec first post-independenceyears,whenthenewly- 3, theseconf Transdniestria andGagauziadeveloped mobilized them was yetrathercentralized,th adm mobilization Moldova w of decentralizationwasd generally centralizedad 215 214 213 particular adm and leaderswithdecliningpopularityinthec (m control overthecountryregions,andatsam process wasalsoim m by thePartyofCommunistswhich1998hadare req resul a Th C u inority) parliam Th ndates) andanincreasingcountry-widepopularity. d est. h t i ov s an nistration continuedtofunctio e Revising e reg at At thesam a, ges i
l o i i on Mar on on cal n t al e oflittlerelevance.Mo l agains s. Therefore,fortheseregionsth licts startedbefore h re no
e e Ma p i o vel nistrative units. opu f Lo c e , h
tim o p e larity of pr 5 ca st. Thiswastheperiodin ntary groups. t alwayscharacterizedby t thecentral of ovi plem l Re ,
e, relativelycentralizedpow Pub de 2 m pu e d 003 ented byt i lic Admin term bl p nistrative system by o i ( c litical p t of
h ined atacertain h 213 Moldovadeclaredindependen tively respondtotheinsubordinateattitudeofleadership e M ttp governm e territoriallycon 215 Ass Atthesam o ://www.e-d i l stra a ThereforeinMoldova d n accordingto h o rties in ov ci reover, th e m tio a at , pu i n on a , pu e M jority b nt. Atthebeginnin e lish ofthecountry. f mo o o bl e 268 r aPart l tim dov i ex cra e s e adm d e degreeof he
Party ofCommunistswillingtoreinforceits ountry, butwithstillacertaininfluencein form in attained theirh cy.md whichtheconf tent bythen a the sm d by thepre-in e Mol , theadoptio b er ortendenc centrated ethnicm e y i lative majorityintheparliam c 199 ti i
ed independentcountrywithitsfragile i / nistrative system pat dov Asso p rin m ory Dem 8 is allest levelsofethnicm a S e , asinthecaseof t/mo cia 214 itwasopposedbyalltheother centra H u dependence modelandtherefore, tion fo The2002-2003centralization ve reflected o a n ce andcontinuedthroughoutthe g ture ofpoliticalpower. itoring ran wever, asdescribedinChapter of1990s,whentheco n o ofthesela ie cr a i r ghest degree,d , s towardsc liz acy lict withthereg on a in /po Pa ation D t i liti ofMoldovabetween n i ecem h rticipa norities inMoldova
e Mol cs/co intheres parlia Georgia,theleve ws wasboycotte b d er m ov t o e
men 5 r a ntra m y Demo , att 19 e e n t nt (40%of s/20 t e 98 liz ary electio h spite th i e a . norities t ation i of 030 ons of untry’s cra u thor’s cy in the 305 in d e / n ’ l ,
CEU eTD Collection republic since1991.Inspite ofth municipalities in regions, 490rayons,783urbanmunicipalities rayons, m the form adm collapse ofSovietUnion,althoughtheneed the acc institutions inGagauziaduringthe1990sm not doitinthesam for estab result ofthe1994LawonSpecialStatusGa the sam because thecentralizatio Gagauzian autonom process startedattheendof incre increase inGagauzians’levelofmobili Soviet system 1991 and1994wasacentralizedone m i ation. Althoughth nistrative unitshasbeendiscuss a lished The territorialstructureofpost-SovietUk At thesam 6.4. TheCaseofUkraine: sed c ess of e ithadbytheendof levelofdependenceasitimposedin u author nicipalities andrural e possibleloc ntra ), andnotasaresultof e liz Ukraine.In tim ity o ation y vis-à-visthecentralpower, e, theconcen e degreeasintheothe e centralpo v thatth n processimplem a er th l m obilizer 2001hasgenerallyincreasedth e loc para e p settlem e lackofterritoria So tration ofpowerinMoldova wer coulds a a certa lle viet era, s tole rty inpow e l de d withva l, th bydefault(i.e.asarem e cis in featuresoftheex nts. Accordingtoth zation between2001and e ad nted e i a withits on-m 269 ership andfinancialresources. de Crim r non-autonomousunits.Thealreadyfor t the otherregionsofth rious occasio ill in th i forhavinglargerandm er im and townsofurbantype,10278rural t gauzia theGagauzianeliteshadanalready hardforthecentralgovernm a raine hasneverbeenreform influence thelatter(J Gagauzian leadersstillm ean peninsulahasbeenanautonom king processesand l-adm e countrycould unitary plem i nistrative reform ented. Evenif ns. Thesystemm
isting politicalpower. character com e 2001census,therewere24 e financialdependenceofthe after 2001didnotpreventthe n ant oftheyetunreform notim 2008, byvirtueofthe e country,becauseasa ärve, 2008), over thelo thecentr inUkraineduring pose onGagauzia posed byregions, o obilized re autonom o e stly preserv nt toprevent ed a itcou cal elite aliz . Thisis f ter the ation m ous ous e ed e l d d d
CEU eTD Collection decentralization. link throughtheanalysisofva ethnic m concentration hadanyinfluenceoverthedegree of transition,particularlyduring the tran scope ofauthorityoverthe localaffairs(B rayon, andlocalsettlem of decentralization bythattim adm tele centr not establish Zinko, 1996).Besidesrejectingthe Constitu talk tolatertransform advisory functiononlyandno Council oftheRegionscom the Constitutionwasadopted representation. However,therehavebeendisc localauthoritiesa communications. Th i nistration ofserviceslocalim al au The aim During the Post-Soviet Ukraineneverhadaseparatecham 6.4.1. Decision-Making sitio tion i norities th orities th n period,the4di adoption residua ofthisse f ’ m i rst ye l po obilization againstthestate e righttocontr t theideawas d the wer f i ars e localau f ents. Ne ctio f e e o rent leve wasli posed oftheheads Council intoanuppercham m o n istode f r regionalandlo Decentralization: transition in 1996.InSeptember1994Pres e nsions ofdecentr actual decision-m rious em the 1990s,inparallelw vertheless, theregional govern m o thorities had idea ofbicam rejectedby i l thef ls: m ted byth te theex pirical datacharacteri irch &Zinko,1996;Sherem rm o o st re ine whetherinpos 270 ofcom por ig e uncleardelim ussions aroundtheideaof c n policyaf a isti authorities. Thenextsubsectionsexplorethi l autho of(de)centralization,andthroughit–over
tance. Thedegreeofdecision-m alization variedfrequen therigh theregionalcouncils,butthatbodyhadan e aking aut m ralism ng legislationreserved o st factionsintheparliam p etences weresharedbetween ith variouspoliticalcircum r itie , theauthorsof ber f ber ofparliam a hority. Althoughtherewassom ts s inthef irs, na itation betw toexerc of parliam zing them t- ident Kuchm m Soviet Ukra tion e und nts hadrelativelylarge eta, 1994;254-255). a l secur i am s bicam theConstitutiondid tly duringth een thecompetences e e nt, bythetim ex contro e ental laweithe a nt withregional in di clusiv ity, m a ine thepo eralism before establisheda e nt (Birch& m stances. l overthe e ely to ilitia, and nsions of oblasts e period aking e of r the wer . e s ,
CEU eTD Collection decrees ofthepresident of Ukraine(COE,2010; governm executives werealsoincharg the im local affairs.Theywereinchargewithdr directly accountabletothepr centralizatio authorities havebeensubordinatedtoth the decision risk ofarisingseparatist waning (Birch&Zinko,1996;23).Facinganincr power oflo and thepresidentialrepresentatives representatives’ m regiona because thepresid presidential decreeinMarch parliam the oblastsauthorities roads, education,culture, assets inhousingandcomm (Donbass regionincluded).Severalm extended propertyandentrepreneuriallegislativ Starting withthe1995decreesofPresident The introductionofthesystem ple l af e nt votedforthecancellati e m nt, suchasupholdingthe C f cal represen a entation ofnationalandregiona -m n increased irs. Howev aking decentralization a ential representativeswere ndate, whichfueledconflict (Kravchuk,1999;165).Asduringth significan tatives e r, the fitness andsports,healthcare, sentim unal services,persona esident hadthecontroloverth pres g 1992 ledtotheincreaseof e r w ad ents inEasternUkrain tly on ofthesystem ually eroded identia ith theco of“
again. onstitu has beentemporallyin ( onths later,healsotransfe W olczuk, 2002).Between1992and1994theactual p afting andi residentia l dec This tion andthelawsofUkraine, andcarry 271 l program e centralgovernm empoweredwithcom mpetences delegatedto s betweentheheadsof r , ee didno inpa e powersto isb 17). Thelocal(popularly Kuchm l serv ofregional l repres easing discontentfrom m ecause t ra plem s (Navruzov,2001;115).Thelocal lle ice a t s e, bytheendof1993Kravchuk throughwhichthelocalexecutive l withpre enta e creased. s p other socialwelfarefunctions,to n fouroblastsinEastern , trade,pub hose localauthoritieswhowere ecify cle decision-making centralization, ting localbudgets,andensuring e m e sam tives” inther “p rred theownershipofallstate res o e st importantregionaland nt, thedecision-m s i ide p den e a periodtheUkrainian etences toov local legislativebodies them rly thescop lic r n tia t Kravchuk elected) legislative localelitesanda l r e e bythecentral stau e gions throu pres ran ing en e oflocal ersee th Ukraine t ’s powe tatives”, s, urban outthe a king gh a e r
CEU eTD Collection 1992 therewasnocleardistinctio m autonom regional businesselites(Konitzer-Sm within their presidential cam appointees inthesecondhalfof1990sorde significantly itsautonomy(Lapychak, centralizatio Crim local legislatureswerenotcl that fellundertheircom authorities’ com therefore wasdirectlyaccountab Therefore, duringthis period onlythedelibe “presid rayon andoblastlevelswasestablished,du 1998; 7). the firs However, theirpopularm m e e mbers oflocalcouncilspopu mbers oflocalcoun ean autonom During thefirstyearsoftran It istrueth Between 1992and1994,aclearerdistinctionbe 6.4.2. Electo t tran e ntial represen y between1995and2008rem jur n, sinceth sition i p paign. Forthis sdiction at presiden etence wastoapprovethedeci period r y wasalsoaf al Decentralization: tatives” intheregions,wh e 1995“Lawonthe p cils ata s theParliamentofUkrainecouldd a eten bytransf ndate didnotguara t Kuchm early defined,theirpoliticalrole ce (Kononets,2002;117).Consider , heincreasedtheirpowersove le infrontoflocalvoters (W larly electedinth ll levelswer sition, Ukrainelocalauthoritieswerem n betweenlocalexecutiveand fected byth erring va a 1995;2;Wolczuk,2002;71). a expande ined relativelylow. i rnov, 2005; 272 ntee them lu e d thedecision-m Autonom able energyassetsfromKievoligarchsto
e totheimplem rative authorityhadpopular m sions alreadytakenbytheexecutivebodies r togaintheirloyalty o werecarryingoutan also incha e generalincreaseindecision-m e 1990localelections 7).Nevertheless,theactualregional tween executiveandlegislativepowerat decision-m o us RepublicofCri i olczuk, 2002).Thissituation was s r m ge withex wasdiminishedaswell.The iss thelocalcouncils r im a ing thatthecom king pow e a legislative au ntation ofasystem king autonom portant econom andtiethemtohis . Between1990and executiv a ecutiv inly for er ofhisregional m e authorities. thorities; the ea” reduced y, asduring a p m e m ndate and etences of ed bythe ic assets (Aznar, a ndate. aking of
CEU eTD Collection presidential decreeKuch executives ofKievandSevastopol executives incaseofillegal/non posts (Matsuzato,2000;38).Subs adm dism popularly elected. (Newbury, 2002).Atvillage/city/s 1995; 9).T elected localexecutivechairm Leonid Kuchm 1995; 9).However,thepopularm 216 executive bodieshavebeenform only them executives wereelectedbypopular elections inwhichbothm decentralization withintheperiod comm executive authorityattheseadm Ukraine). T also characteristicforKiev(capitalofUk accountability: them The issed by/anddi i nistrations intheoblasts,rayons,and In thelocalelectionsthatfollowed(1998, The 1994localelectionsinUkrainereflec ci ittees, for t y p o e h h rt mbers oflocallegislativebodies erefore, in1995theelec e system
Sevast a m , thenewlyelectedpresident rectly accountable ed bythelocallegislativebodies 216 op Howe a ol of“presidentialrepres yors oflowestleveladm i s m a n a ver, thepopularm e appointedautom e x m
ce b pt en tothecentralgovernment t ers oflocallegi o -co i e o t i studied inthisthesis.This couldbedism d n a h nistrative ettlem , by/anda e preside ndate oflocalexecutiveswaselim n
equently, thepresidentcoulddism toral decen be vote, atalltheterritorialad stitu cause i ent levelthechief tion n t of t a 273 a raine) andSevastopol(secondlargestportof
entatives” wasabolishedinJune1994andthe levels wasundertakenbythelocalexecutive a has tically allregion ndate ofth thecitiesofKiev ccountable infrontof l acti have beenelectedthroughpopularvote.The i tralization d ni of therepublic,subordinatedpopularly h n e Re 2002, and2006)atobla –localcouncils(Matsuzato,2000;37). issed evenwit slative bo strative unitshaddele o m on, by public. a ted thehighestdegreeofelectoral y o r b e latterhasbeenlim virtueofajud u t ecreased. “he dies andth executives(m al executivechairm is becausetheseweretheonly a hout acourtdecision(Haegi, and reintroducedlocalstate d and S of m a i nistrative levels(Haegi, d the centralgovernm m inated in1995,when e i gated responsibilities e chairm ni vastopol. Througha i iss thelocalchief st andrayonlevels cial trial.T st r a ayors) werealso ited bytheirdual t i on” a en intotheir en oflocal p poi h nt e chief ed a e n nt d
CEU eTD Collection for reform bodies wereledbypresidentialappointeeswho im officials werechosenamongthem upwards tothehighestlevelofpower. authorities withim (popularly elected)legislativebodi territory, whichevenallowed them Crim as wellK Kuchm the executiveauthority local executivesweresubordinatedtotheUkrain im were chosenfrom elected) chiefexecutivesandapprovedbythe elections them executive comm rayons ofUkrainethelocalofficialswithexec hence representedthecentra such ascarryingoutthedecreesofPresid plied arelativelylarg plied aratherincreasedlevelofap ean autonom After the1994localelections,thereweretw Presiden Before theintroductionofsystem 6.4.3. AppointmentDecentralization: a therighttoappointanddism s from i ev andSevastopolcities. t Kuchm e ittees, andthechairpersonsof thecentreto mbers intheexecutivecommitt y. Before1995,Crim a portant decision-m m ong them a was re-established.The1995“LawonPower” grantedtoP e levelofappointm ’s attem l governm thelocallevels”(W e p mbers ofth es ofthesam ts toincreas t o e pointm establish mbers of iss thelo e ean leaders nt aswell(COE, aking of“presi e e 274 nt nt decentralization.In1992thelocalexecutiv ent andofotherrelevantexecutivebodies, e respectivecouncils(N cal chiefexecutivesatrayonandoblastlevels, decentralization.However,soonafterthatthe power overlocalaffairswereaccountable the postofpresidentCrim e the locallegislatures local councils,whileth ian Presidentandthehierarchicalstructureof e local legislativebodies(councils).Afterthe utive responsibilities levelsofgo were expectedtoact“asatransm ees havebeenappointedbythe(popularly olczuk, 2002), had largeappointm app dential representatives” o m o intm 2010; Maynzyuk&Dzhygyr,2010). a in appointedau ent ce vernm which im ntra e nt. Usuallytheappointed (Wolczuk,2002).This e were appointedbythe liza nt powerswithintheir avruzov, 2001).This e councils’chairm tion thorities: thelocal plied thatthelocal intheoblastsand ea in1993andto alsoaffected ission belt r esiden en e t
CEU eTD Collection sam Crim Minister, w the righ relatively sm Sm half of1990s,especiallyintheyearswithpa legislatures’ m appoint anddism of therepublicuponsubm adm the yearsb the capitalKievin1999,whosemandatehadb Dzhygyr, 2010).Theonlychangewastheintroduc authorities andinternationalact although severallegislativeiniti restored Franchukintohisform Franchuk. Instead,hep recognize thedism proved hisunwillingn attem Constitu centr organize presidentialelectionsatthebegi irnov, 2005;8).Th e i nistrator ofcitySevastopol,continued al auth ean presidencywasabolished in1995. levelauthoritiesinUkraine between199 p Since 1995thedegreeofappointm ted toreuniteCrim t todisagre tion h e of orities liquidatedCrimeanpreside ich hasbeenthem all, asaccordingtotheCrim fore. Otherwise,rayon e theco m b iss localchiefexecutivesc ers (Newbury,2002).Thepresiden e issal byCrim withtheCrim e l e appointm untry and ss to aced tem ea withRussia(Lap allowlarg ission er o ors todoso(COE,2010;Cowan st i porally th ean parliam post (Lapychak,1995;3). thatth atives in2000sre e ean parliam m nt decen of theCabinetMinisters. andoblastexecutiv portant po e appo ean au e in e Cr e nning of1994.However, nt decentralizationin tralizat 275 e The onlyexecutiveappointm rliam nt of to beappointedanddism c im e 5 and2008weretheones intm ychak, 1995;2).PresidentKuchm u litica tonom n een subordinatedtothecentralpowerduring ould beover-riddenonlyby2/3oflocal nt’s appo m cy, consideringthatitdisagreedwiththe ean gover b e theautonom tion ofpopularelectionsforthemayor ion inC ent powersto ent pre ntary orpresidentialelections(Konitzer- l of t exercisedoftenthisrightinthesecond ous statusthePresidentofUkrainehad vealed astrongpressurefrom f i ce inCrim intee inthepo e chairm n s r m ident abus im e nt underhisdirectcontrolan ean auto The presidentialdecisionsto y Ukrainehasnotchanged, etal. ’s PrimeMinisterAnatoli Crim en, aswellthechief ea sincethein in 1995theUkrainian ed of issed bythepresident , 2007;Maynzyuk& nom ea whenhedidno st of at thelowest-level e nts m y hiso Crim alsorem a stitution of a ean Prim de f hasalso f i bythe ce and local a ined d e t i
CEU eTD Collection
local budgetsdecreased considerab notably theratioofownandfixedrevenue VI.6 belowillus has beenasgreatwastheshareofownand shared withsubnationalgovernm subnational governm revenues, w of revenues:theownrevenues,whicharem 2008 hasbeenrelativelylow. leverage. T legislative bodiescontinuedtobelocallyap adm i
% nistrative units(i.e.village/cities/settlem The Graphrevealsthat starting with1992th The localbu 6.4.4. FiscalDecentralization: 90 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 Graph VI.6.StructureofLocalBudg h h erefore, th 1992 ich includestatetaxesandfees t rates dgets intheadm
1993 e th nts; the“regulating”reve e generald e dynam 1994 e i cs oflocalbud 1995 nts; andstatetr i e nistrative units gree of ly in1995andthenslightly y ear 1996 s am ap 276 a fixed revenuesinthelo in ong theothertypesofrevenues. 1997 pointm pointed. However,theyhadalowpolitical et RevenuesinUkraine(1992-2000) e collectedb nues, com ly com n gets’ stru ansfers. Thedegreeof ts). Inaddition,the of Ukrainearefor e ratioofownandfixed revenuesinthe 1998 e nt decentralizationbetween p leted bythelocaltaxes,th p ctu
1999 osed ofcentralgovernmenttaxes y r - andassignedexclus e inUkrain
increasedeveryyearuntil 2000 m cal yearlybudget.Graph ed byfourm f i chairpersons ofthe scal decentralization e duringthe1990s, % t r % r % e e v v ow s enues enues r har a n n a sf 1995and ed a e e n jor types ively to “f r d f s ixed” i x e d
CEU eTD Collection privatization (Lapychak,1995), author parliam and excisetax–foritsownbudget(Martinez-Vazquez one yearbefore(1993),Crim 20% of collected onitsterritory,asforthatyearthe In 1994,Crim enterprises incom governm central governm (Kravchuk, 1999;177).Duetothischangeth while in1995–alsotothetaxonprofits regulating revenues.In1994thischangewasa 1994 and1995thecentralgovernm budgetary practicesinU revenues an 2000, althoughitsgenerallevelrem central gov The percentagefrom 1990s wasalsoenhancedbytheunpredictability dependence vis-à-visthecentre. This changealsoincreasedCrimea’sfinancialdependencevis-à-v The decreaseintheow The financialdependenceofregionsvis-à-vi ities thatc this e nt ofUkrainealsoannulledanum e nt, becausestartingwith1994itsauthorit taxf ernm d statetrans ea alsohadtosharewiththecentr e ent everyyearan o nt’s decisionson e r a l taxandpersonalincom aim ll U theserevenuestobere e f d loca k ers fluctuatedyearby k raine duringthe1990s. rain ea couldretain100 n andfixedrevenuesby1995wasduetothefactthatbetw ia l ju n oblasts,andCrim which alsoledto redistribution ofresources. ris d foreachobl d e iction a nt transfor ined low. e taxtothecentralbudget(Kravchuk,1999;180). central governm 277 over Crim tained inthelocalbudgets wasdecidedbythe be e year, whichreflectsthefrequentchan pplied tothelandtaxandpersonalincom ofenterprisescommunalsubordination local budgetsbecam al governm % ofthreeimportantta r oflawsadoptedby of theregulatingrevenues’retentionrates. m s thecentralgovernm On theotherhand,ratiosofshared ea wasnotan ast separately. e d threeim ies also the increaseofpeni ean propertyandcontroloverits etal. e nt apartoftheValueAddedTax e hadtotran nt establis portant fixedrevenuesinto , 1995;299).In1995the exc Thereten e m e ptio Crim xes –VAT,profittax, hed aretentionrateof o e re dependen sfer apartofstate nt inthem n. Itisno nsula’s financial ean autonom tion i s thecentral rateswer ges inthe ta i t ble th ddle of onthe e tax, een y ’s a e t
CEU eTD Collection provided bycentralgovernm respec more expenditureresponsibilitiestolowe governm as theresp (Martinez-V of Finance.Incaseconflict,theseoffici the appo central andthesub-nationalgovernm underm revenues. sim fluctuated for et al.,1995;298).Inpractice, also transferredtopoliticalim be them regions wheretheown,fixed,andsharedrevenuescouldnotsupportabudgetdeterm crea a non-transparentcharactertoth (Martinez-V decided onthebasisofnegotiati m ilar degreeofunpredictabilityanddepende ted thep ula, buton“adhocbargainingproce The situa Finally, thefiscaldecentralizationin The officialregulationsprovided tive ined bythefactthatlocalfinancialoffi intm e i nimum nt. Startingwiththebeginningof1990s greatly f onsibility i nancia azquez etal.,1995;300).Thelackof azquez etal.,1995;283,286). o ent ofheadslocal ssibility f tio necessarybytheMinistryofFi n withthee yearb l supp o o n y r politica m ort tos year a ny of ent aut xpenditu portan andfrom the distributionofstatetransf a ons tisf financedepartm lly- e entireprocedureoffinancia im horities, suc betweenth y them t m areas e re d portant s nts. Thisdual otivated d th regiontoregion.Ther at thes i str dures” (Kononets,2002;123),whiletheam . This such astheCrim r levelsofgovernm als tendedtosidewiththecentralgovernm 278 i bution cials wereunderduals e e autho h Ukraine duringthe1990s t rvic ecis wasalso ncy forthelocalbudgetsasregulating ate transfersneed assoc nance. Nevertheless,statesubventionswere e thecentralgovernm objective rulesorprinci nts wassubject es wer responsibilityresulted i was alsoch ons. r ities i a l the s e of a ean peninsula(Martinez-Vazquez attribu f case e ers wasnotbasedonaprecise di ty netan efore, s l resourcesharingandhence aracterized bylackofclarity, fferent levelsofgovernm e ed tobedis totheapprovalofMinistry with nt, withoutprovidingthe t ed ubordination toboththe t todif e ate transfersinduceda th d welf nt assignedm ples haveattributed e se from hasalsobeen t f are. S rvice ributed toth e ren thefactthat t s lev o n m o o ined to e rm re and e local ounts ls of ally ose e e nt nt
CEU eTD Collection were undertaken. oblasts (Kon transferred bythecentralgovernm for Cri 2003, and44%in2005thetotallocalrevenues central governm did notleadtoahighdegreeoffiscalauto relations betweenthestateandregionalauthor rules, th allowed m resources amongtheregionsofcountrya 2002). the StateBudgetLawassigned m Second, statetransferstobem the fiscald State BudgetLawandCode.Som increase inf which expendituresweredistributedinUkrain governm were unpop authorities arguedthatcentralgovernm a jor citiesofUkraine(Kieva All thesepr
m
In 2001thefiscalsystem e e centralgovernm ea aswell,in2001about55%of nts (Martinez-Vazquezetal.,1995; o e ular, ino re accu i centralizatio onets, 2002 scal decen e nt fiscalassistancerem ovisions in rate localbudg r der toshif tralization. ; 128).Until2008,nooth n. Firs e c nt di r eased th nd Sevastopol)w t, t theaccountabilityforpossiblecu a theexpenditureassignm de t ofUkraine new sourcesofrevenueto minished th etary plann e nt, whichwas o thele e levelof e nt was e a ofthepr in nomy forregionalgovernm ed relativelyhigh,rating29%in2001,34% 279 vels ofoblasts,Crim has beenreform i Crim e n e duringthe1990sdidnot e decentralizing thoseex g. Mostim nd alsoim 291, 296).Therefore,theconditionsunder tr re tobecalcula e ities. Still,the2001fiscalreform possibility (Slukhai, 2008).Itrem r st an ovisions ofthisreformwerefavorablefor even higherthaninsom ean budgetcontainedequalizationgrants sparency inthedist eps towardsm ents we plied m forpolitically portan ed throughtheadoptionofnew local governm ted onafor re definedinaclearerway. tly, b ea autonom ts fro o o re fiscald re predictability,which penditu y m e a ribution offinancial nts. Therelianceon introdu centralto ined relativelyhigh contributetothe m -m e e ula basis.Third, ofthecountry y, andt nts (Kononets, otivated fiscal res wherecuts ecentralization cin inUkraine thelocal g clearer h e two
CEU eTD Collection dim decentralization hasneverattain appointm transition. Therehasbeenfre it revea dim regions. Decentralization was reduced whenpresidentKravchukattem decentralization, andthenby1992thedecision-m the decen
e e nsion ofelectorald nsions forashortperiod in1994,whenKr Graph VI.7belowsumm
6.4.5. PowerConcentration,Decentr However, onecandistinguish5periodsthat D l e s th c e e nt, andelectoraldecen tralization d F nt Graph VI.7.EvolutionofDecentra i e lack sc r a al l i z
a t i on of
coherent decentralizationpolicyin i ecentr m e nsions. Transition alization between1994and1995. arizes thedynam quent fluctuationinthedegr enlarged indecision-m ed tralization, ahighleve D D D e e e p ci c c alization, andEthnicMobiliza 0, El e ted toconsolidatehiscontroloverthecountry e si nt 1 0 5 nt e 280 o c r r n t a a o M i especially d started witharelativ liz liz cs of r liz a avchuk lostfirsthisauthority andthenthe a a a l inpos l k
t t ation inUkraine(19 ion i i differ throughachange a o n king andappointm n g decentralizationinUkraineandov aki t-Soviet Ukraine,exceptforthe this countryduringtheperiodof ng, appointm u ring the1 ee offiscal,decision-m ely largedegreeof e 19 19 19 19 20 91-2008) 990s. Nevertheless, nt dim D tion 90 92 94 95 01 e e A nt, andelectoral c p in atleas -19 -19 -19 -20 -20 e p : nt o
9 9 9 0 0 i r n 2 4 5 1 8 e a tm nsions were li z e a n t i t on t oneof aking, erall
CEU eTD Collection m appointm has beenmodified(seeChapter2)andw circum his presid 1994, inparallelwiththeprocessofcentra power. Kuchm since 2001,whenfiscalandappointm centralization onalldimensions, presidential seat.ThesecondUkrainianpres publicly sup integrity ofthecountry(W found thesupportofparliam Although hedidnothaveloyals the “publiccronyism more centralizationandinhispublicdiscourse for decentralization(Kuzio,1997),afterhebecam achieved moresuccessf the sys as atooltoconsolidatepower.Kravchukatte centralization between1992and period ofpowerfragm concentrate poweratth a intain som The tendenc Centralization hasbeengenerallyusedbyin stances: Yushenk t em of e en nt powerswithinthereg tial term porter ofdecentral e levelof “presid a graduallyconcentr ies of practicedbyanum (Maynzyuk&Dzhygyr,2010).Thisisbecause ofthethenpolitical e politica ntation (2002-2008). e centra ul results.A e centre. o ntia lostim olczuk, 2002;80). l r liza l izatio e authority. e pre ntary national- m Finally,aslig portant upporters intheparliam ti a 1994 coincidedwiththefaile i on inpost-SovietUkrainecoin s naging toinstallanextendedcontroloverregionalaffairs ons ofthec lthough in ated politicalpoweraf n, hasno enta e nt di tives ber of appointm m e 281 ”. t p nsions wereslightlydecentralized. m ident LeonidKuchm Kuchm his pre-electoralpublic he supporteditasasolutiontoputanend P p dem rayon ithout m ountry stillgrantedhim u ht inc lization. Moreover,th ted tocentralizethecountrybyintroducing r shed toward e esident ViktorYush cumbent politiciansin e presiden nt power o crats whowereconcernedaboutthe andcityheads” r eas a attem a e in e jority parliam nt, fo t hehasund ter he s in2004o s decentralizingreformsduring decen p ted th r thisparticularquestionhe b d attemptofKravchukto cide withc a eca t increasedthelevelof ra chenko, althoughalso (Wolczuk,2002;80). discourses hepleaded e sam m lization precededthe ertak ani e failedattem n centralgovernm e e ce theCon ntary supporthis presidentinJu e m e n step oncentr portant toolto str a s towards tegy and s ation titu p t of tio e of ly nt n
CEU eTD Collection a stab parliam from not resultedfrom result f to concentratepowerandstarte mobilization m having ace Russians inCrim regional-based m necessarily coincid 29). Popular DemocraticParty,whichwassupporte Kuchm popularity intheirrespective politicians. Besidestheirusualadm Ukrainian oblastgovernorsandrayonadm appointm used cooptationasstrategyforobtainingloca mobiliza during theperiodswithpowerconcentration a inly duetotheirterritory’sstatusof theexistenceofastrongpresidentwhos The ethnicm However, empiricallys The nextissueofconcernistodeterm le loya r a e om firedanum nt, inwhichnopolitical forcewasloyalto tion e nt powersintheregion thespec rta lty of . ofRussophonesfrom Duringth i n degre theexistenceofastrongpres obilization inpost-SovietUkra loca ea andRussophonesinDonba i e norities’ politica d w if icity of ber ofgovernorswhocoul l leadersthrou e ith p of e m politic a e p thecon in perio riod eaking, theethnicm d todecreasesignificantly region. Afterthe1998parliam s withpower s, hecouldinfluencetheregi al m Donbassalsoc l m gh i d centr nistrative withconc obiliza o party organizationalst bilization in political autonom atio ine i nist 282 e powerwasaugm tio n ofpowerinUkraineduringthe1990s.Ithas f the degreeinwhic ident supportedbym m d byKuchm rators werenom r n evenaf ine occurredatthebeginningof1990swhen agm entra a l elites’loyaltyinexchange.Duetohis ss m d notm were link ontinued to ndate, theyhadtosupportthepresident’s i thep nor theperiodswithconcen e t ntatio obilized. Crim ities ed po r only by1998(seeChapter3). es ter ’ o m ident so n in y grantedin1991.Thelevelof bilize votessuccessfullyforthe a centr ed withth wer inUkra bythattim persist,afterKuchm ructures. obilization tend onal elitefor ented byahighlyfragm i Ukr nated from h the e al po ntary elections,presiden m a a ean Russianscontinued ine jority inparliament,but u centralizing tendencies wer gotcon ch thatitcou e ethn . Them ine Leonid e (Matsuzato,2000; m tra a ation. Asarule, encies m t ic m ed power ong thelocal o st persis a centr manag havenot Kuchm i l noritie d attract e m ated, nted ten a e s’ y d a t t
CEU eTD Collection decentralization andbythepresenceofeffectiv Eduard Shevarnadzean one ofthedim power concentration,the concentration ofpowergoeshand terr the deg presented in regiona consolid characterized bytendenciesofcentralizatio period withconcentratedpowerduringtheC power, asaresultofincreasedcontroloverfi m power concentration. agains power incumbents.However,thisdidnotprev possibilities forcooptationoflo centr
i norities’ politica ito alizatio The casesofpost-SovietGeorgia,Moldova
Thus, inUkrainetheconcen Final Remarks: ria The m t thecentralgovernm r l lev ee o ate hisautho lly concentrated thechapterlargelyfocusedon n of e f a territorialcentralizatio l bythe in goalofthischapterwasto e nsions discussedinthechapte theco l m r ity incum o bilization d underMikheilSaakashviliwerecharacterized byreducedlevelof atcen untry. Centr
m incum i norities’ mobiliza e nt, as b ents of tr b al levelwentalsohandin cal politicalleadersinexcha ents tendedtoreducetheleve ag m in handwithcentralization.In ainst thesta n, andalso a tration ofpowerwenthand i norities stillm centra liz ation 283 l tion im g r. Theperiodswithconcentratedpowerunder ontheconn n; f e m link betweenthenatureofcentralpowerand determ scal, electoralandappoi t o overnm ent inallinstancesm e decr . plied controloverregion mm
, andUkraineconfirm eans ofcontrolover i obilized atvariou nally, unist PartyruleinMoldovawasalso ine whetherthe eases e nt. Forthis,theem LeonidKuchm intheper ection nge forloyaltytowardscentral l oflocalautonom with centralizingtend theperiodswithsuccessful betw inhandwithte s levelsinperiodswith i i o norities een the d likelihood ofethnic th thehypothesisthat ntm s withcon e localaffairs;th al elitesandalso a e ’s attem pirical analysis nt resourcesat ’ la m y, a tte o bilization r centr t encies. andthe leastin rrito p ts to ated ria e l
CEU eTD Collection Donbass regionRussophonesm Communists’ dom Moldova G mobilized despiteoftheexiste reveal herecasesinwhich for ethnicm towards thecentre.Theseim been co f to loca strong enoughfactortoovercom centr regim political m o rm ation of alizatio Nevertheles By enforcin e was l f -opted in i o s a bilization. i cal r atitsstrongestphases.Thiss n andim norities’ mobilizati localadministra gauzian m e g centralization,in s to thelocaladm , theem sourc inant positioninthecentr plicitly, enhan i e norities m s, thelo pirical analys plications ofc territorially-concentrated m tive e on, astheaccess nce ofconcentratedpowerand o e thepotential bilized inthe2 c obilized afte a ced contro i cum lites. Inm nistrative l le b is ader ents of ofth oncentrationist regim s’ decision-m 284 l overthereg uggests thatintheseregionstheeffectof a of e dynam r 2001,duringtheperiodwithPartyof al power,whileCrimeanrussophonesand ny casesth topoten concentrated po fices, inexchangeof influence ofotherfact nd halfof1990s,whenLeonidKuchm i tial m cs ofethnicm i nor a i e localpo king power onal politic ities inMoldovaandUkraine obilizing resourceswascut. wer decreasedthefreeaccess territorial centr e s decreased thelikelihood te i thepoliticalloya s norities ntia , andalsothevery ors leadingtoethnic , didnotconstitu l m obilizers hav ’ m alization. In obilization te a a lty ’s e
CEU eTD Collection positiv mobiliza whether powerconcentrationinethnicallypl concepts areatthecoreoftheoreticalappro the politicalopportunitystructur this the mobiliza concentratio while them presented in was drivenbythelogicofstructuredfocuse conflicts. T known intheregionbothfortheirperiodswith concentratio ethnically p driven conflicts.Iftheform the periodoftransitionsom driven bytheem intr
insic ele In thesearchforananswertom Accordingly The m e ans s is wasinspiredbytwoconceptsintheac tion tion h l w m a n. n), ratherthan ural s a accord againstth agains ese repub in goalofthis in f er, whilep ents thatm pirical observati o t , cus of ates s theresearchfocusedonanal t thestate). ance withap lics areGe hould bebuiltinaway o e state.As theanalys a litical oppo y bef researchwas e er haveinanyway countriesexperi on explainingthedependentva a on ofthepost-Sovietregionr vorable f orgia, Moldov e. Althoughnotdirectlyrelatedtoeachother, boththese r e-determ explaine is wasonth rt Conclusions: unity structure-anegative one. todeterm a o in re r ined 285 the escalationofethnic d inChapter1,consociationalism enced bothpowerconcentrationandethnically- a d com a, andUkraine.Theanalysisofthese3cases ches thatsug to dim search question, concentrated powerandfortheirinter-ethnic theoreticalschem adem trigg e effectoftheindependentvariable(power ural societiesleadsto ysis ofthreepost-Sovi ine whetherp e p ic liter i red th arison. Also,theem nish theprobabilityforpoliticalpower
a e la g ture –thec eality, aregioninwhichduring est anans thetheoreticalfram tte o r wer concentrationcon r, th i e ab andcausalm co le e nf n (ethn onsocia politica w ethnicm licts. Th e t er tothequestion republicsthatare pirical datawere i c tiona minoritie suggestsa l s is e goalwas y ework of i chanism lism stem norities t and ain s in s’ s ’ ,
CEU eTD Collection the accesso hypotheses suggestthat concentrat ethnic m and 2008.Thedatarevealthatthehighestlevels mobilization the dynam but eventuallydim mobilization reached acriticalpoint.Incaseo as atoo of thepartiessupportedRussophone too weaktoopposethepresidentan was characterizedbyastrongexecutivethatcoha by thepresenceofastrongexecutivethatenjoye specific character:whileinMoldov ethnic m in MoldovaandArm Ukraine, an high levelofm m the re state occurredinperiodswithdispersedpower,a i nority groups,bythelevelofm The initialstepintothee The dataals
spective period
W l ag obiliza i ith av norities i a d thatsom cs ofpowerconcentrationcorrelate f againstthestateinpost-Soviet occurredin i ethnicm nst theex tion was obilization duringtheperiods i ’ ew tode o m i provethatcerta nished. e obilization, s, e nians inGe i ec nority g ofthem m thein m utive. Neve i te norities’ a r intained m m r itial p ining thelinkb evenincreased oups pirica theres orgia. IncaseofRussophonesin i norities’ protes ion ofpower m in ethn d hisCabinet.Inthishighly a andGeorgi population’sm f tom r becauseth h Gagauzia t hele l ana ase oftheconcerned obilizatio earch obilizi ss, ic m l ysis cons 286 Georgia,Mo th wasdriv i withpowerconcentration-Russophonesin itwhenpowergotcon is mobiliza norities e ns inMold ofethnicm n wasinten ng resources nd notinperiodswithconcentratedpower.In containsintrin tween concentrationof e Ukrainian d withthedyna a concen t, andbythelevelofm bited withahighlyf d absolutem obilization agains isted ondeter stillm en tration ofpowerwascharacterize tion ld p byth ova andArm i s norities’ ova, andUkrainebetween1991 neededforpotentialp concentra e if weakenedo a riod withp ied byth naged tom fragm sic elementsthatm a jority support,inUkrainei m m Ukraine,acertainlevelof ree hypotheses. ining thedegreetowhich i cs inethnicm t thecentralg m e centrated -Gagauzians nted parliam o r t i politicalpowerand agm ion ofpowerhada bilization againstthe e num norities’ rebellion. o e v a wer concentration, nians inGeorgia, intain arelativ er tim e nted parliam ber of e Allthese overnm andnever a r e otest and i y reduce nt, som norities ethnic e e e nt nt l d y e ’ t
CEU eTD Collection f rebellion actionsagainstthecent disproportional elem hypothesis s institutionalization ofmulti-ethnicityandin integ and Georgiaconfirm power wenthandinwithcertainstate-m access ofloc concentratio resource form leade Saakashvili andShevarnadze,i. significant integrationistpolicieshavebeen polic split betwee itself dividedintoa“Moldovan” because ofspecifichis accentu towards m concentration ofpowerinth Moldova doesnotprovetheexpectation,beca presiden Ukraine thestate-m act thatinregim r ies. r As showninChapter4 ationis s into ated inperiodsofpowerconcentration.T cy ofKuchm i norities. M n tendstoincreas m t n thetwo.Thisdiv t a statepolicies,ascom ates thatp l poten a obilization -theethnicpartie instrea e s withcon i tia nority relationsapproach ents intoth the a l mobilize t , whichwasaconcentra m o o o expectation r reover, in wer concentrationhi partiesa ical circumstances, , centrated powerincum thethre e thecontro is co e electoralsystem i r e. duringregim identity anda“Ro ral power.Thefirsthypothesisstat sio s tom untry werecharacterize certain nd which p n thatconcen ared to m e c obiliza a a de it l over ses dif casesaccom 287 the nationalidentityofm i stead inencouragingintegration.Thesecond fragm ed m no n t ion resourc discourages theconsolidationanim d im d s. Thethirdhypothesisstatesthatpower tionist regim h use boththeperiodsoffragm ers m rity relations.Thee i the regionalpolitics,whichalsohinders f tration ofpowerwillbe e f e Moldovanexceptionisduetothefactthat e f s withconcen i r inthedegree , whichlead a m e cult to ple xi ntation ofpower. b anian” iden ents are m obilization becauseittend m u ent m degreeof e implem m s e d byaccommodationistpolicies .
odation tendencieswereeven d duringthepresidenciesof e . Onthecontrary,caseof inter s toco-optationofm tity, withthem trated power.Sim towhichconcentr e e nt genuineinteg m es thatthisisduetoth sted indiscour pirical dataonUkraine integration duringthe In Georgia,them coupledwith a jority groupwas a e jority group nta s toinduce ag ilarly, in tion and r ation ationis ing the portant i nority m o of o re st e t
CEU eTD Collection concentration ofpowerindeedtendstofavor respective governm mobiliza during Saak 1990s. Armeniansprotestedagains agains protes with streng the financial,adm in prac concentration ofpowertendstoaugm ethnic m parties andwiththat–thepo leade conditions theconsolidationofethnicparties m disproportionality effectwasnotobserved.Wh existence ofahighlyfragm executive powerbyaparliam system concentratio i norities accesspow r In relationtothesecondhypothesis,data Finally, thedatainChapter6proveth ting againsttheintegrationtendencies. s with
t th
, butonlyinthose tic On theotherhand,incaseswhic i tion nor al term e s thening integ n, reg m t waskeptatare ashvili’s p ities toim ate whenth e mberships into s thisimpliesaninc i i onal leadersandregional bud nistrative, a e ntal policies. portan r er m r esidency aftertheRose e education ation polic cases inw t m ented parliam a liticization ofethnic inly byallyingwith nd politicalaffairsatregional m e lativ obilizing resou ntary m a instream ies, this t the“Georgianization”of h andthelang e r ich thecoreofpowerc ly sm eased con ent central a jority. On e all le pa did notnecessa nt 288 RussophonesinUkrain rties andbyhinderingth r t that cannotopposetheex is hindered.Therefore,byattractingm ro c gets b h concentrationofpower disproportionalelem vel anddid e uage policieswerebein ization. Asshownintheem en disproportionalityisencouraged,ethnic ity, powerconcentratio l of s. at assuggestedinthethirdhypothesis Revolution presentedinChapter5dem thecontrary,whenitsco politica ecam m a instream e m r ily depr oncentration liesinthesupportof nothavea l . incum Still,inb levels. Inconditionsofpower o education andofbureaucracy re dependentupon partie ive e b ent atcen ents e m e for g t n lim s, becauseinsuch hnic m ny im “Ukrain wenthandin ecutive power,this o intotheelectoral obilized th of m its theaccessof pirical analysis, ation ofethnic pact overthe tra re lies i norities f thes onstrate that i l th zed” in toprotes le e cen vel over e case inth i nority r th t om ral e e s t
CEU eTD Collection the reg struc option thatcom or playingth proves thatdespiteth stability orgovernm to m resources. power. This choosing thestrategyofstate-m ethnically p centralization ofpower disproportionality inthe mobilization throughout thethesis,concentrat line withthisgoal,thethesis mobiliza pictu com m concentration ofpowerdoesnotsolelyhave accessing m m i i norities to norities’ mobiliza p obilize –evenif t r rehensive m ure an However, asthedatapr However, them e. i m tion e s withconc l d whilenotallowingan explic obilizing resources.Th reducedth ural s , agains theresourcesneededform e m butthenatureof u b lti-ethn a t ines elem ates, incum nner, otherfactorsandcom t thestate.Thiswas e a tion e elem ntal policie a t in goalof are e acces , andto entra icity card.In electoral system agains ents oft latively en e t b s ed po ents ofconcentr ts ofpowerconcentration ented inthisthes theimpactthat s ofethnicm i nority relations,whichareeither dem de-politicizeethnicity.This t th s –duringcertainperiodswith th ion ofpowerdidnottrigger, is insignif wer m onstrates thatatleastin confirm cum is thesiswa e sta h e two: obilization, andhe b it m ents of t a e. If i cant levelandw 289 y containm s i a theexpectatio norit ated powerdonothave while rem b anoverwhelm due toits c nif is p in nce toco-optm thela oncentr concentratedpowerm s nottoexplaintheoccurrenceofethnic e ation offactorsshouldbebroughtintothe station of ies toimportantleadership r the m ov e, som ation th tter i a norities canfin u inin intrins lti-cu at m needsto m e n st ith noconsiderableim of ethnicm g m thethreecountriesanalyzed findingsuggeststhatinthe ing infl u lti-e a powerm i ltur playingthenationalistcard, ated inthe nority leaders,tostrengthen y lim butitdiscouragedethnic concentratedpower.This a i c tendenciestoinduce jorita a t hnicity a l e on uence overtheethnic it theaccessofethnic i beexpla a norities l d y alsochooseathird ly twooptio rian ininstitutiona em alternativewaysin a y haveoverit.In ents bym t politicallev troduction th an stillm d financial i ned ina pact over ns while a naged a king e at l, l
CEU eTD Collection of concentrationpower,st phenomena thathaveneverbeencollectedandan mobilization against the state,th reasons than thefearofethnicinstability. concentration ofpoweristo constitute atopicoffurtherresearch,thedata findings beyondtheperiodoftransitiontode either at central level, or atlocal level, orboth. While thequestion of generalisability of these minorities an integral part of theregime andsp political developments inthesethreecountriesbetween1991and2008. contribution totheliterature transition haveneverbeenexplored and ofdegreedecentralizat While analyzing specificcausalmechanisms betweenpowerconcentration andethnic ion in Moldova, Georgia,and on post-Sovietregion, be avoidedinthepost-Soviet ate-minority relations,ofminori is thesisalsopresentsempiricaldata anddescriptionof insuch details before. Therefore, thisthesis brings alsoa 290 mocracy andbeyondthepost-Sovietregionmay ecifically by co-opting their leaders intopower alyzed before. The analysis of the dynamics alyzed before.Theanalysisofthedynamics presentedinthisthesissuggestthatif through abetteru Ukraine throughout17 yearsof region, itshouldbeforother ties’ political representation, nderstanding ofthe compared) 218 217 O P G Ro By J Ro B G R U M T groups reproduced byPiotrEberhardt (2003). e o o u u t e a c w W o h l W t r g r l s elorussian m m e l a g m e a i s a d s s l a a r n a i itho itho u
o h a a s n
r i Source: Tablecom Annex 1:TheEthnicCompositionofPopulation inMoldova,Ukrain z
n v n i
a i a i a n s a s a u u n
n
n s n t t s
Tran s s s Sou
s
t h Ossetiaan sd n 0 0 6 - 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 0 1 i
% , , , , 4 0 , , 3 , , 3 estria 3 1 6 2 0 5 5 5 M , 0 , ,
5
0
8
o 1 l
d 1160 4 2750 7 4335 2794 8 - 6570 5621 1960 1534 6004 9
N 7 3 8 o d Ab 8 p 0 0 4 9 v r 0 0 0 iled bytheauthor,on
. a
0 0
4
7 0 0 0 0 0 0
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0
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0 CEU eTD Collection 0
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azia
- - - - 1 5 7 - 4 1 - 2 8
% , 0 5 , , , , 9 9 4 2 4 0 ,
8
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- - 2012 3383 2564 6 1475 - 7327 2824 - 0
- N 5
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6
2
B U o B M T J T G H R Ro P e groups t o o a y u u k r u h w o t e l t l elorussian s m r n e a e l a g e a i s d r g r s s l k a a i i s s
o
a h a n r n s
basis ofnationalpopulation censusesdata r v n i
i
i a i a a a s a n n
n n n s s s s s
s
1 0 1 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 % , , 0 , , 2 , , , , , , 2 0 6 4 2 3 3 9 3 9 4 0 , ,
7
1
4901 5145 3245 2 9860 3741 8690 1631 4863 1348 4400 2192 1135 1 N U 3 9 3 r 8 k 291 8 . 9
r 0 2 0 0 0 910 0 0 0 0 0 0 560
a 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 i
0
n 0
0 e
- 0 1 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 e, andGeorgia(1989subsequentpopulation censusesdata
% , 0 , , 7 , , , , , , 7 2 2 5 3 3 4 3 6 2 0 , ,
8
3
- 9150 4845 7 3 1441 1 2 2586 1510 2758 1036 8334 2
N 3 7 5 0 0 3 4 6 5 r 0 0 6 6 4 . 1
0 0 0 710 0 170 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
providedbylocalDepartm K G O Osseti Y U A A A G T R groups o u i ezids/ k b z rm r t e s h e t e o s r k t a e e a s r s r h e l i k r i i g
a s a n n s s i a
z
n i i a
n a a
s n Kurd s n n
s
s s
- 1 1 1 8 1 1 5 6 7 0 3
% , 0 , . , . . , . 0 , 8 5 1 9 0 3 7 0 6 0 ,
1
Georgia 1 9
9 - 4371 8 4 1 5 3411 1 3 3 3
8 N 5 1 0 3 2 6 7 0 3
9 e 8 5 0 4 7 4 8 3 7 r
nts ofStatis 5 6 3 4 2 0 3 7 5 .
7 9 5 0 3 1 6 1 3 1 5
3 8
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% 0 , , , , , 3 , , , , 1 4 2 6 2 4 5 7 9 0 ,
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2002 tics, and 5
3 1 - 7 6767 7 3 1 2 2 3
N 4 5 5 1 0 6 8 8 8 4 218 0 2 1 1 3 6 3 4 0 8 r 6 7 0 0 9 1 2 2 7 9 .
6 8 1 1
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Annex 2:EthnicMaps Map 1-TheEthnicofGeorgia
CEU eTD Collection
292
Source: EuropeanCentreforMinorityIssues
CEU eTD Collection , 2008;providedattheauthor’srequest. 293 CEU eTD Collection Source: UniversityofTexas, Map 2-MajorEthnicGroupsinMoldova(R "Perry-Castañeda L 294 i brary MapCollection". SS MoldovaCensus1989) CEU eTD Collection 2 Source: Mapavailableat
0 1 1 ) . Map 3-Territorial-Administrativ
http://moldovagate.com/article/sh e UnitsofMoldova(asin2003) 295 o w/99 (accessedonOctober2nd,
Source: Gennadi V.Poberezhny,Rutgers Univer Map 4-PopulationofE
CEU eTD Collection t hnic UkrainiansinUkraine(UkraineCensus2001) sity 2008,provided atth 296 e author’srequest.
Source: m Map 5-Transcarpathya,Donbass,andCrimea(Ukraine) a de bySvenTeschke, (Germ
CEU eTD Collection a ny) andmodified bytheauthor. 297
CEU eTD Collection Shugart andCarey(Shugart& Annex 3:Measurementschemefo
2 Restri 4 Noamend Exclusiv 0 Nodecree 1 Onlynega 2 Subjecttoex-po 3 Forlimitedtime 4 Unlimited(todefinecon Decr 0 Nopartial 1 Overrideb 2 Overrideb 3 Overrideb 4 Nooverri Partial Veto/ 0 Noveto 1 Overrideb 2 Overrideb 3 Overrideb 4 Nooverri Packag Legislative Pow 1 Presid 2 Presid 4 Presid Judicial Rev 0 Nopre 1 Need 2 Countersi 3 Rest 4 Unre Proposal of 0 Unre 1 Assembly 2 Preside 3 Assembly 4 Preside Budg 0 Noexclu 1 Unre ee eta ri e Veto/Ov stri stri stri s parliamenta ent, cabi ent alonerefers ent, cabi cted ct r e s y n n ed cted autho cted amen cted id Introduc Po s t setsu t prep d d ential autho gnature ofminister O Referen i i amendm
veto tive powers e e may redu may increa powe ment byasse v y y y y y y e w e powe extraordin extraordin simplemajo simplemajo
absolutem absolutem v w e e
rride net, orm net, ormi rs ares b e ppe s r rride tion of s, o e t app d dme rity ofasse rs r r ent byassembly s a y ap ce b r limitontotalspendi r u rity toproposereferen se o d a a ro n a a a n get; noamen ry majority ry majority nor s expendituresonlyifitdesi mbly proval u t byasse rity ofquorum rity ofquorum jo val Legislation jority ofwhol jority ofwhol ly asdele titution andi t notincre rity ofas ity ofasse req mbly toprepa Carey, 1992),withFrye’s u mb ire g sembly mayrefer a r FormalPresidentia a d ly se amountofb dment pe t (reserv t e membe e membe mbly mayrefer
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ng, withi re o da e 298 d polic rmitted r r r shi shi a n m b whi p p gnate ly udget items
end bu y c areas) h a s ne dget s m se l w revenue P odifications (Frye,2002) mbly mayamend o
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0 Noprovi 1 Rest 2 Requi 3 Rest 4 Unre Dissolu 0 Unre 1 “Con 2 Assem 4 Assem Cens 0 Ministers 1 Presid 2 Presid 3 Presidentdismi 4 Presid Cabine 0 Presid other mini 1 Presid 2 Presid 3 Presid 4 Presid Cabine Non-legislative Pow 0 Presid ure ricted ricted: structi stri st t For t Dis tion ofAs re ent maynotreferornopri ent's powe ent dismi ent dismi ent cannotnam ent nominate ent appoi ent appoi ent appoi ri b b sters, possiblywi s n cte ct ly maycen ly maynotcen s io may beremo e m mation by frequen onlyasre v e d d n issal e” voteofnoconfide w presi cen
s s s nts pri nts mini nts mini sembly s ses mi ses mi ses mi r u todismissth r s denti s e u p sp r cy orpointwithi m e ministe e, r s ved onlybyassemblyonvoteofcen nisters butm nisters atwill nisters atwill e i sters witho sters onse tospe e ministe m
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CEU eTD Collection Central ElectionsCommissionwebsite Natadze- Peoples’Front”;UnionofChildrenGod. (Unity); LeagueofIntellectualsGeorgi Conservative (Monarchist)Part of De 1.5. Manifestosforthe2004pa Abkhazia. Protection ofVeterans,Georgia Didrogi"; NationalFront-SocietyofIlyaChav Labor Party 1.4. ElectoralSurveysforthe1999 Gruzija, 2October1992) Citizen 1.3. Peasants Dem 2.1. Manifestosforthe 1994 pa 2. Moldova h http://cec.gov.ge/?que=eng/archive/ published in National Concord;UnitedRepublican Socialist Party;SolidarityBloc;Unionof Citizen 1.2. Manifestosforthe1995pa 1992) National IntegrityParty. Union ofSocialJustice;NationalIntegrity Merab KostavaSociety;UnionofNationalAgre Peace Bloc;October11DemocraticParty; 1.1. Manifestosforthe1992pa 1. Georgia Electoral SurveyAns website, accessedat 25 October2010: Green Party;NewRights;Chri United NationalMovem 1.6. Manifestosforthe2008pa accessed at25October2010) ttp Georgian m ://www.pa
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rm e m nt; RepublicanParty;D s. o o cratic Forces;Partyfor o cratic Agra , accesseda y ofRegions;YuliyaTymoshenkoBloc;OurUkraine –People’sSelf y ofRegions;RukhPopularMovem shenko Bloc;Nataliy e o Socialis cial-Liber t Party o t Party cratic Party rliamentary elections: rliamentary elections: rliamentary elections: rliamentary elections: rliamentary elections: rliamentary elections: rliamentary elections: rliamentary elections: Communists;ChristianDem y “Edinstvo”;PartyofRevival ; t Pa stian De S ria ; t al Party;PartyofDe UnitedSoci 10December2010) o n rty; Soc cial Dem e Party; nt; SlavicPartyofUkraine. ; United m o
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tive ManifestoProjectresearchgroup,atthe al Dem l o ly; Peas Social DemocraticParty;ForwardUkraine; oc. cr m atic Party;CongressofNationalists; o cratic andProspe m . o ant Party;Rena o cratic Party cratic Kuchm h e ristian-De nt; ViktorYushenkoBloc“Our s ant Par o Forces cr and R atic PopularParty;Social- a BlocforReform ; De t UnitedUkraineBloc; y; AllUkrainia Commission’s website econciliation; Partyof mocratic Party;Rukh ; Dem issance ofCrim mocratic Co rous Moldova,Civic o cratic Agrarian nvention n Union l s; Party ections ea.
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Treisman’s Indicators(Treisman,2002) Annex 10:Operation Indicator 2:AppointmentDecentra 1 0.5 0 1 0.5 0 Indicator 4:FiscalDecentraliz 1 0.5 0 Indicator 3:Electora 1 0.5 0 Indicator 1:Decision-makingDecentraliz The localexecutiveselec The localexecutivesar The localex authorities, andpartly sub-national levelsofgovernm local budgetsisrelativelybalanced preponderant directly electedthr The shareof The shareof The shareof The centralgovernm Half ofthesub-nationaltiers There arenopopularlyelect The authorityoverm All oftheregiona The authorityoverm ecutiv ownrevenuesinthelocalbudgetsispreponderant ownrevenuesanddirect directtransfersand/or aliz l Decentra l tiershavepopularly es arenom ough universalsuffrage ation andMeasurem e o o b nt hasexclusiv st policyareasar st policyareas e nom y centralpo ted onlybylocal(popularly ation: liz ed sub-nationalauthorities i i have popularlyelectedauthorities nated partlybylo nated b ation: e nt liz 307 ation: wer shared revenuesinthelocalbudgetsis e authorityoverm y are sharedb transfers and/orsharedrevenuesinthe centralpo ation: e sharedbetweencentralgovernm elected authorities ent ofDecentraliz cal (popularlyelected) wer e tween sub-nationaltiers elected) authorities,or o st policyareas ation, basedon e nt and CEU eTD Collection Belits Beliaev, M.(2006).PresidentialPowersa Beissinger, M.R.(2002). Beissinger, M.R.(1996).HowNationalism BDHRL. (2006). Barry, B.(1975).ReviewArticle:Political Banducci, S Bach, S.(1996).From Aznar, M.(1998).Ladifficileem Arzaghi, M.,&Henderson,J.V.(2005).W Ar Belostecinic, A.(2001). Arel, D.(1995).Ukraine-TheT Andeweg, R.B.(2000).ConsociationalDem Am Alonso, S.,&Ruiz-Rufino,R.(2007).Political Allison, L. Allison, L.(1996).TheGeorgian Alfredsson, G.(2005).Minorities, Benoit, K.(2007).Electoral LawsandPolitic m or, A.(2004). i ngeon, K.(2002).Consociationalism er, N.(2000).TheConstitu References Context of Dem Ca Cycles ofNationalistContention. of State,BureauDemocr British Jour Journal ofP Eastern Europe 1994. InD.M.Olson&P.Norton(Eds.), 177-189. Emergence ofLocalAutonomyinUkraine of PublicEconomics89 Politica, 37 pp. 157-188).NewYork:M.E.Sharpe. Birm Conference FuzzyStatehoodandEurope (Ed.), 509-536. Visit toGeo Dem 280. and Self-Determination Matter of Change ofElectoralInstitutions. Chisinau: In m , etal. b o o . ingha A. ridge: Ca cracies. cracies. Political CultureandCivicSocietyin , etal. In (1993).TheGeorgianElectionof1992.
International Religi m: UniversityofBir Civic andPolitica Intere , 121-138. r nal ofPoliticalScience,5 stitu terna o gia litics, 66 Comparative PoliticalStudies,39 European JournalofP m . London:FrankCass. SoviettoParliam : UnitedNations,Econom (2004).MinorityRepresentation, te ofPublicPolicies b tiona The AnalysisofthePublic ridge UniversityPress. thnic Nationalist Mobilizationandthe l Law.In (2), 534-556. . Boston:MartinusNijhoffPublisher. RelationsandEthnic 1157–1189. tion Election acy, Hum IndigenousandTribalP e ergence del' l m a Rights,Includingthe ous FreedomReport l Proces m p N. Ghanea&A.Xanthaki(Eds.), tation of ingham Annual ReviewofPolitical Science,10 Social Research63 e s a nt ofNovem hy ofMoldova. Accomm a o nd Econom (4), 477-505. 308 inUkraine:theVerkhovnaRadaduring1992- n Rights,andLabor. Sp litical Research,46 s in o Countries AreFiscallyDecentralizing. nd ConsolidationofNe al Consequences:Explaining theOriginsand cracy. .
autonom read: EasternEurope i Representation andEthnicConflictinNew the NationalizingState.InV.Tism ] c andSocialCoun the Autonom . RussiaandNewStatesofEurasia Ann odation andConsociationalDemocracy. Opinion Barometer,1998,2000,2001 b an IntegrationinEasternEurope. Annual ReviewofPoliticalScience,3 The NewParliamentsofCentraland Settlem er 1995. (3). uaire desCollec ic Perform Electoral Studies,12 ie localeenUkraine . WashigtonD.C.:U.S.Departm Question ofR E (1). e m oples power ous RepublicofCrimeainth Collapse oftheSovietState e Electoral Studies,15 nt, , 237-267. : Definition a cil. nce inSwitzerland. Paper presentedatthe m e Adrift theTydesand nt, andParticipation. tiv e w Post-Communist M lig ites Locales,18 i ious Into n o (2), 174-179. ofTerm , 363-390. rities, Peo [ T he Difficult (2), 275- (Vol.7, lerance. Journal aneanu s asa Acta p (7), e les nt e . , .
CEU eTD Collection Brubaker, R Brubaker, R Brubaker, R Bresser-Pereira, L.C.(1993).Econom Brancati, D.(2006).Decentralizatio Botan, I.(2 Carson, T.P.(2005). Ca Bunce, V.(1997). Botan, I.(2003).TheUnder Boix, C.(1999).SettingtheRulesof Bogasheva, N.,&Klyuchkovskiy,Y Birch, S.(2000). Birch, S.(1995).TheU Bilaniuk, L Chandra, K.(2004). Bolashvili, P.(2002).FiscalAu Blais, A.,&Massicotte,L.( Blais, A.,&Carty,R.K. Blais, A.,&Carty,K.(1987).TheImpactof Bird, K.(2003).ThePoliticalRepres Birch, S.,&Zinko,I.(1996). Birch, S.(2003).TheParliam m e ron, C. and RacialStudies,19 New Europe the NewEurope. Developmen Conf written forE Chisinau: A Representation inCongress? Hopkins UniversityPress. Advanced Dem Evolution oftheElectoralSystemUkraine London: SagePublications. (Eds.), Studies, 14 11 Education inUkraine. Electo Ukraine: IF Davey (Ed.), Duverger' Governm the Academ Dem 22 Sigm India (5), 340-372. (3), 503-559. 007). TheR ., &M o . . lict and . a. . Cam (1996a). (1996b).N (1995).NationalMinorities,Natio , etal. cracies: AFram r al Sy Comparing Democracies.ElectionsandVotinginaGlobalPerspective e s nt Elections andRepresentationinPost-CommunistEasternEurope ElusiveFactor. (1), 1993-1999. b y ssociation forPartic ES Surveys, stem . Ca Secession t, 21 s ridge: Cam C ofMigrationStudiesinDenmark(AMID) e (19 Fiscal AutonomyandEfficiencyin Presidents andtheTransitioninEasternEurope lny MI Project‘Enhancing Why EthnicP Electoral Studies,5 Nationalism Reframed:Nationhoodand o Attitudes towardChange,theCurr ecent E m cracies. (8), 1337-1353. s. k Daedalus, 124 k, S.(2008 a 96). DoM b rain tionalizing Statesin ridge: Cam (1991). ThePsychologicalIm ework forComparativeResearch, The DilemmaofRegionalism ian Parliam , 411-437. 1996). Electoralsystem is International JournalofBilingua b l e 1994–2000 m ections inGa m ridge UniversityPress. The AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,93 ntary ElectionsinUkraine,March2002. tonom ining oftheElectoralP ? British JournalofPoliticalScience,21
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