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Financial Policies This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein, editor Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-24109-2 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/feld03-1 Conference Date: October 19-21, 2000 Publication Date: January 2003 Title: Financial Policies Author: Frederic S. Mishkin, Andrew Crockett, Michael P. Dooley, Montek S. Ahluwalia URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9775 2 Financial Policies 1. Frederic S. Mishkin 2. Andrew Crockett 3. Michael P. Dooley 4. Montek S. Ahluwalia 1. Frederic S. Mishkin Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in Emerging Market Countries 2.1.1 Introduction In recent years, financial crises have been a common occurrence in emerging market (and transition) countries, with devastating consequences for their economies. For example, the financial crises that struck Mexico in 1994 and the East Asian countries in 1997 led to a fall in the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) on the order of ten percentage points. The financial crises in Russia in 1998 and Ecuador in 1999 have had similar neg- ative effects on real output. These crises led not only to sharp increases in poverty, but to political instability as well. Given the harmful effects and increased frequency of financial crises in emerging market countries in recent years, an issue that is now high on the agenda of policymakers throughout the world is the prevention of these crises. Specifically, what financial policies can help make crises less likely? This paper examines this question by first developing a framework for understanding what a financial crisis is in emerging market countries and the dynamic process through which these crises occur. It then uses this Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not those of Columbia University or the National Bureau of Economic Research. 93 94 Frederic S. Mishkin framework to examine what particular financial policies may help to pre- vent financial crises. 2.1.2 What is a Financial Crisis? A financial system performs the essential function of channeling funds to those individuals or firms that have productive investment opportunities. To do this well, participants in financial markets must be able to make ac- curate judgments about which investment opportunities are more or less creditworthy. Thus, a financial system must confront problems of asym- metric information, in which one party to a financial contract has much less accurate information than the other party. For example, borrowers who take out loans usually have better information about the potential returns and risk associated with the investment projects they plan to undertake than lenders do. Asymmetric information leads to two basic problems in the financial system (and elsewhere): adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs before the financial transaction takes place, when potential bad credit risks are the ones who most actively seek out a loan. For example, those who want to take on big risks are likely to be the most eager to take out a loan, even at a high rate of interest, because they are less concerned with paying the loan back. Thus, the lender must be con- cerned that the parties who are the most likely to produce an undesirable or adverse outcome are most likely to be selected as borrowers. Lenders may thus steer away from making loans at high interest rates because they know that they are not fully informed about the quality of borrowers, and they fear that someone willing to borrow at a high interest rate is more likely to be a low-quality borrower who is less likely to repay the loan. Lenders will try to tackle the problem of asymmetric information by screening out good from bad credit risks. However, this process is inevitably imperfect, and fear of adverse selection will lead lenders to reduce the quantity of loans they might otherwise make. Moral hazard occurs after the transaction takes place. It occurs because a borrower has incentives to invest in projects with high risk in which the borrower does well if the project succeeds, but the lender bears most of the loss if the project fails. A borrower also has incentives to misallocate funds for personal use, to shirk and not work very hard, and to undertake invest- ment in unprofitable projects that serve only to increase personal power or stature. Thus, a lender is subjected to the hazard that the borrower has in- centives to engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view: that is, activities that make it less likely that the loan will be paid back. Lenders do often impose restrictions (restrictive covenants) on bor- rowers so that borrowers do not engage in behavior that makes it less likely that they can pay back the loan. However, such restrictions are costly to en- force and monitor and inevitably somewhat limited in their reach. The po- Financial Policies 95 tential conflict of interest between the borrower and lender stemming from moral hazard again implies that many lenders will lend less than they oth- erwise would, so that lending and investment will be at suboptimal levels. The asymmetric information problems described above provide a defini- tion of what a financial crisis is: A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse se- lection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to channel funds efficiently to those who have the most productive investment opportunities. A financial crisis thus results in the inability of financial markets to function efficiently, which leads to a sharp contraction in economic activity. 2.1.3 Factors Promoting Financial Crises To flesh out how a financial crisis comes about and causes a decline in economic activity, we need to examine the factors that promote financial crises and then go on to look at how these factors interact dynamically to produce financial crises. There are four types of factors that can lead to increases in asymmetric information problems and thus to a financial crisis: (a) deterioration of fi- nancial-sector balance sheets, (b) increases in interest rates, (c) increases in uncertainty, and (d) deterioration of nonfinancial balance sheets due to changes in asset prices. Deterioration of Financial-Sector Balance Sheets The literature on asymmetric information and financial structure (see Gertler 1988 and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1998 for excellent sur- veys), explains why financial intermediaries (commercial banks, thrift insti- tutions, finance companies, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pen- sion funds) play such an important role in the financial system. They have both the ability and the economic incentive to address asymmetric infor- mation problems. For example, banks have an obvious ability to collect in- formation at the time they consider making a loan, and this ability is only increased when banks engage in long-term customer relationships and line- of-credit arrangements. In addition, their ability to scrutinize the checking account balances of their borrowers provides banks with an additional ad- vantage in monitoring the borrowers’ behavior. Banks also have advantages in reducing moral hazard because, as demonstrated by Diamond (1984), they can engage in lower-cost monitoring than individuals, and because, as pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), they have advantages in prevent- ing risk-taking by borrowers since they can use the threat of cutting off lending in the future to improve a borrower’s behavior. Banks’ natural ad- vantages in collecting information and reducing moral hazard explain why 96 Frederic S. Mishkin banks have such an important role in financial markets throughout the world. Indeed, the greater difficulty of acquiring information on private firms in emerging market countries explains why banks play a more impor- tant role in the financial systems in emerging market countries than they do in industrialized countries (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 1994). Banks (and other financial intermediaries) have an incentive to collect and produce such information because they make private loans that are not traded, which reduces free-rider problems. In markets for other securities, like stocks, if some investors acquire information that screens out which stocks are undervalued and then they buy these securities, other investors who have not paid to discover this information may be able to buy right along with the well-informed investors. If enough free-riding investors can do this and the price is bid up, then investors who have collected informa- tion will earn less on the securities they purchase and will thus have less in- centive to collect this information. Once investors recognize that other in- vestors in securities can monitor and enforce restrictive covenants, they will also want to free-ride on the other investors’ monitoring and enforcement. As a result, not enough resources will be devoted to screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, because the loans of banks are private, other investors cannot buy the loans directly, and free-riding on banks’ restrictive covenants is much trickier than simply following the buying patterns of oth- ers. As a result, investors are less able to free-ride off of financial institutions making private loans like banks, and since banks receive the benefits of screening and monitoring they have an incentive to carry it out. The special importance of banks and other financial intermediaries in the financial system implies that if their ability to lend is impaired, overall lending will decline and the economy will contract. A deterioration in the balance sheets of financial intermediaries indeed hinders their ability to lend and is thus a key factor promoting financial crises.
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