4. The Truth and Avidyd

This chapter is focused on the question of how the identity of

Brahman and can be explained by Sankara. It is through the purport of the Upanisadic texts that the identity is known and interpreted consistently by him. Just as the text itself is established with the help of the logic of avidyd, the truth of the text is also properly established with the help of its logic. As all the Upanisadic texts do not provide the idea of advaita with compatibility, Sankara has to interpret them consistently by means of the purport (tdtparya) of the text, i.e. the identity of

Brahman and Atman. After establishing the Upanisads as the texts,

Sankara’s another step is to give complete harmony to the texts themselves for maintaining their authority. However, the ground of the two processes is one and the same since the identity of the reality paves the way for the making of the text and for the verification of the truth in the text as well. Avidyd in this chapter is again proved to be a device that supports the advaita purport for the textual harmony. Though Sankara’s expositions always seem to be mixed without a semblance of

order, he never misses what he has to accept and reject, and the logic of

avidya is applied to take charge of what he has to reject in the

interpretation of the texts.

The first section. The Purport for Textual Harmony, deals with

the meaning and importance of purport or import in Sankara’s system. It

is proved that the purport is the vital core of Sankara’s interpretation of

the Upanisads not only for the textual harmony but also for consistent

systematization of advaita theory. Though the purport of the Upanisads

is well known, it is traced here again according to Sankara’s own

remarks. The application of the purport is for the most part related to the

theory of creation, so in the second section, Creation Theory and

Avidya, the main topics of Sankara’s creation theory is discussed as an

example of his application of the purport to the textual harmony. Though

Sankara uses many terms for the subject of creation and prime matter of

creation, there cannot be any terminological confusion as the purport is

always maintained in the context. Again, while Sankara interprets

different expressions of the Upanisads on the cause and the effect, he

does not miss the identity of both by placing the difference under the

realm of avidya. This methodological usage of avidya has bearing on the

Two Viewpoints and the Truth (which consists of the third section),

insofar as the scope of avidya is the relative or empirical viewpoint, and

the truth or Brahman is never touched by that avidya. Together with the

or transcendental viewpoint, the relative viewpoint is a great

force to make the texts into the harmony or reconciliation, and as a

118 result the truth is automatically revealed.

1. The Purport for Textual Harmony

It has been a long debate in the modern circle of the Advaita

Vedanta whether Sankara’s commentary is faithful to the real intention of ’s Brahmasutra. G. Thibaut in his introduction of the translation of BSB gives us a negative answer that the do not teach what Sankara explains in BSB. The four points suggested by

Thibaut are; (1) the sutras do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman, (2) they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Isvara, (3) they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world, and (4) they do not proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the higher Self.' These four points are so crucial to Sankara’s system, if Thibaut’s analysis be correct, then

Sankara’s commentary on the Brahmasutra should be regarded as an independent interpretation different from the sutras themselves. On the other hand, V. S. Ghate insists that none of the five major commentators of the Brahmasutra, namely, Sankara, , Nimbarka, Madhva and

Vallabha, could succeed to know the real and natural meaning of the sutras. After analyzing their com^ftentaries objectively, he makes the conclusion: “In any case the sutras are absolutely unaware of the

*Cf. G. Thibaut, The Sutras, Introduction, p. c. In the same page he says that the system of Badarayana has greater affinities with that of the Bhagavatas and Ramanuja than with that of Sankara. For the similar opinion, see M ax MuHer, The Six Systems of , p. 117.

119 particular dogmas enunciated by each of the different Vedanta schools of the later tim es.The gulf between the Siitrakdra and the Bhdsyakdra

(Sankara) is also pointed out by P. M. Modi who specially investigates the Brahmasutra 3.3. Modi displays many instances of Sankara’s difference from the Siitrakdra, together with his suggestion that Sankara wrongly organizes adhikarana and misinterprets the sutras in a large number of cases. Some of his instances are: (1) while the Siitrakdra holds rUpavai and arupavat Brahman, which have nothing to do with attributeless Brahman, Sankara insists saguna and nirguna Brahman, (2) while the SQtrakdra’s Brahman is laid down by vidhi (Vedic injunctions),

Sankara’s Brahman is above any vidhis, (3) while the Siitrakdra emphasizes parindma or modification of Brahman (dtmakrti), Sankara the creation from Brahman that is associated with mdyd etc.^ As stated above, it is an almost undeniable fact that Sankara does not sincerely follow the system of the Siitrakdra so far as his own commentary is concerned. Then, does Sankara, at any rate, follow the Upanisadic lines of thinking in BSB instead of the BrahmasUtral

As a matter of fact, the BrahmasUtra has a similar character with the Upanisads in the sense that it can be interpreted in more than one- way.'^ It is quite possible that the BrahmasUtra is in the beginning the culmination of one line of traditions (Vedic school called sdkhd, or

V . S. Ghate, The Vedanta, p. 170. ^Cf. P. M . Modi, A Critique of the Brahmasutra (III.2.11-IV), Part II, pp. 364- 365. ■*Cf. V. S. Ghate, The Vedanta, p. 41. He also says that every school of the Vedanta appears to attempt to find its own system in it, shutting its eyes to all contradictory passages or more often trying to interpret them in a far-fetched manner, so as to confirm their own doctrine (pp. 47-48).

120 larger Vedic school called carana), and in the course of time, many others are complementarily appended to the original forms.^ It is also possible that Sankara does interpret the sutras for the sake of revealing or systematizing the Upanisadic teachings within the boundary of

“-bhdsya” tradition. In the commentaries on the Upanisads and the

Upadesa-sdhasri Sankara does not directly quote the Brahmasutra, while there are innumerable quotations in BSB from all the Upanisads except the Upadesa-sdhasri. If Sankara bears the authority of the sutras themselves in mind, he should at least quote them for reference in his commentaries on the Upanisads and the Upadesa-sdhasri to some extent, although the authority of the BrahmasHtra does not match that of the

Upanisads. Thus we may propose that for Sankara, the faithful interpretation on the Brahmasutra is less important than the compatibility with the Upanisadic texts in BSB. In this regard, so far as the consistency with the Upanisads is concerned, we may say that

Sankara’s commentary on the Brahmasutra is probably the best which can be devised.^

Another question we have to ask is, if Sankara’s commentary on the

Brahmasutra is somehow compatible with the teachings of the

^Thibaut places the Vedantasutra at the intermediate position between the Upanisads and Sankara, cf. G. Thibaut, The Vedanta Sutras, Introduction, p. cxxvii. P. Deussen first mentions the intimate connection between the Chdndogya Upanisad and the Brahmasutra (cf. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedanta, p. 31, fn. 21), and Belvalkar further insists that the present Brahmasutra is originated from ’s Sdrlrakasutra, which is postulated “Chdndogya” Brahmasutra, since Jaimini and the Chdndogya Upanisad belong to the Sdmaveda (cf. S. K. Belvalkar, Vedanta Philosophy, p. 141). For more detailed discussion of the relationship between the Chdndogya Upanisad and the Brahmasutra, see S. M. Bhatkhande, The Chdndogya Upanisad and the BrahmasHtras of Bddardyana. *Cf. G. Thibaut, The Vedanta SHtras, Introduction, p. cxxii.

121 Upanisads, then, is there a consistency in the Upanisadic texts themselves? Many scholars have a doubt that there is no such consistency in the Upanisads as Sankara intends to build up. A single idea or system cannot be deduced from the Upanisads, for they are no homogeneous products but are compilations from different sources.^ The

Upanisads are taken root in different periods by different thinkers, and it is almost impossible to reduce the whole instructions of the Upanisads to a single doctrine. Furthermore, it may be added that the philosophy of the Upanisads is in the condition of origin and fluidity.^ In other words, the Upanisads are culmination of philosophical speculations, which is still in the form of a sprout, and are the chapter of various thought experiments which is still not completed as a system, although “there is material useful even for the different systems of philosophical thought”.^

However, S. Radhakrishnan alike G. Thibaut admits that Sankara’s view is representative of the classical Upanisads, though he does not ignore the divergent view of the whole Upanisads. So far as the early

Upanisads are concerned, there are some fundamental and distinctive ideas or doctrines, which are finally systematized in the philosophy of

’Cf. R. E. Hume. The Thirteen Principal , p. 9. Also, see H. Nakamura, A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy, pp. 110-111. *Cf. E. Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, p. 75. '’T. G. Mainkar, The Making of the Vedanta, p. 34. ‘®Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. II, p. 467. Also, see F. M ax Muller, Vedanta philosophy, p. 20. Also, see V. S. Ghate, The Vedanta, p. 21. The classical or early Upanisads are, according to Deussen, 6 ancient prose Upanisads (Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, Taittirlya, Aitareya, Kausltaki, Kena) and 5 early metrical Upanisads {Kdthaka or Katha, Isa, Svetdsvatara, Mundaka, Mahdnarciyana). cf. Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 22-25. But Belvalkar and Ranade show a complicate chronological order of the Upanisads according to which the same Upanisads can be grouped in the early and later period simultaneously, cf. S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade, History of Indian Philosophy—The Creative Period, p. 135, fig.

122 Sankara. In this way, the identity of Brahman and Atman, as we have decisively mentioned before, can be said to be the fundamental idea of the early Upanisads on which Sankara mainly writes commentaries."

Brahman is the first principle of the universe by which the world is created, preserved and dissolved into, and Atman as the subjective side of Brahman is the inner Self, through which Brahman can be known. The identity of the universal being and the individual being is no doubt the genuine purport of the Upanisads. Thus no matter what different ideas are found in the Upanisads, Sankara’s interpretations are at least compatible with the fundamental purport of the Upanisads, i.e. the identity of Brahman and Atman.

The significance of the purport or import {tdtparya) cannot be overemphasized in Sankara’s interpretation of the Upanisads. The purport is indispensably related to the term samanvaya, which means right correlation or textual harmony.'^ Sankara starts to explain the

BrahmasHtra 1.1.4, '"tattu samanvaydt":

The word tu (but) is meant to rule out the opponent’s point of view. Tat (That) means Brahman, which is omniscient and omnipotent, which is the cause of the origin, existence, and dissolution of the universe, and which is known as such from the Upanisads alone. How? Samanvaydt, because of being the object of their fullest import; for in all the Upanisads the texts

“ Paul Deussen says: “All the thoughts of the Upanishads move around two fundamental ideas. These are: (1) the Brahman, and (2) the atman.'' He further says that the dogma of the Vedanta system can be expressed as “-dtma-aikyam'' (unity of the Brahman and the atman). cf. P. Deussen, The philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 38-39. The necessity of samanvaya proves conversely contradictions and inconsistencies of the Upanisads themselves.

123 become fully reconciled when they are accepted as establishing this very fact in their fullest import.*^

Brahman, which is defined as the cause of the birth, etc. of the universe in the Brahmasutra 1.1.2 (Janmadyasya yatah), can be known only from the Upanisadic texts because of samanvaya. The fact that all the

Upanisadic sentences have the teaching of Brahman for their purport is the evidence of the textual reconciliation or samanvaya. Thus samanvaya lies in the arrangement of all the passages according to the purport from the beginning to the end. Vacaspati in the Bhamatl writes that samanvaya is samyak anvaya (right or full relation),and that:

“that with which a statement begins and that with which it ends, that alone is considered to be the meaning of the statement, by those who understand the nature of the knowledge resulting from verbal testimony.”'^ The meaning or purport of the sentence is to be known from the unity {ekavdkyatd) of the beginning passage {upakrama) and the ending passage (upasamhdra). This criterion of the purport that brings about the textual harmony is in fact one of the six kinds of criteria {sadvidhalihga) in the canons of the Mlmdmsaka interpretation.

The six criteria are: (1) concurrence of commencement and conclusion

{upakramopasamhdrau), (2) the repetition of theme (abhydsa), (3) the novelty (apiirva), (4) the fruitfulness (phala), (5) eulogy (arthavdda).

'^BSB 1.1.4, p. 11, lines 6-9; Gambhira, p. 21: tusabdah purvapaksa- vydvrttyarthah. tat brahma sarvajnam sarvasakti jagadutpattisthitilayakdranam veddntasastrddevdvagamyate. katham? samanvaydt. sarvesu hi veddntesu vdkydni tdtparyenaitasydrthasya pratipddakatvena samanugatdni. Vacaspatimisra, Bhdmatl, p. 149, line 16: samyaganvayah samanvayah. ’^Ibid., p. 150, lines 11-12; (tr.) p. 150: yena hi vdkyamupakramyate yena copasamhriyate sa eva vdkydrtha iti sabdah.

124 and (6) the argument {upapatti)}^ Sankara also uses these six criteria of interpretation to decide the meaning of any special word, or the purport of the passages in the Upanisads. First of all, we will see Sankara’s attitude on the textual interpretation of the Upanisads.

When we read carefully the commentaries of Sankara, we come to realize that the meaning of the sentence should be decided not only through the sentence itself but also through the purport or tdtparya.

Even where the sentence has to be interpreted literally there is always a

/ certain purport behind it. Sankara says that when the words of the

Upanisadic passages are ascertained to refer to Brahman with the purpose of the textual harmony (samanvaya), it is improper to fancy some other sense.Thus the direct meaning of the passages cannot be abandoned in favor of mere assumption, and the right purport should also be determined according to the ultimate purpose of the Upanisads.

Sankara warns against the fanciful and deceptive interpretation in several places, and for instance:

And it is not proper to explain these texts otherwise than literally, for they are meant to show that the individual self is no other than the Supreme Brahman. And all the Upanisads end by giving out this sole meaning. Therefore persons skilled only

*®This sadvidhalinga is seen in the form of condensed verse in the Sarva- Darsana-Samgraha. cf. p. 158, lines 9-10: upakramopasamhdravabhyaso'purvata phalam, arthavddopapattl ca lihgam tatparyanirnaye. It is mentioned there that the verse is ascribed to the Brhatsamhita written by Varahamihira (c. 475-550 A.D.)- For the detailed definitions of each lihga, see Sadananda, Veddnta-sara, Chapter V, pp. 108-113. ‘^Cf. B S B 1.1.4, p. 11, lines 13-14: na ca tadgatdndm paddndm brahmasva- rupavisaye niscite samanvaye’vagamyamdne’rthdntarakalpand yuktd, srutahany- asrutakalpandprasangdt.

125 r in fancifully interpreting the Srutis all distort their meaning. 18

The literal and precise meaning of the passage paves the way for finding out the real purport which should be maintained without distortion and conflict. The Upanisads have the authority because there is no contradiction in their meaning. To put it in another way, since the

Upanisads have the same purport, their passages should be interpreted without any contradiction. They do not provide us a contradiction such as ''Brahman is existent, and is not existent”, for there are no contradictory passages in the Upanisads against the unity of Brahman.

Sankara says:

But it is not an accepted canon of the system that tests passages (Mimarnsa) that the same passage may have different meanings. If it has, one will be the proper meaning, and the other will be contradictory to it. But it is not an accepted rule with those who test passages that the same passage may have different meanings— one appropriate, and the other contradictory to it. For passages have unity only when they have the same meaning.*^

As the same passage cannot have more than one meaning (arthaikatva).

*®BrB 2.3.6, p. 330, lines 16-19; Madhava, p. 236: na cd”sdm srutlndm srutddarthdntarakalpand nydyyd. dtmanah parabrahmatvopapdddndrthaparatvdd- dsdmetdvanmdtrdrthopaksayatvdcca sarvopanisaddm. tasmdcchutyarthakalpandku- saldh sarva evopanisadarthamanyathd kurvanti. Also, see BSB 1.1.5, p. 24, lines 16-l’9. BrB 1.4.6, p. Ill, lines 13-14. ‘®BrB 2.1.20, p. 304, lines 8-12; Madhava, pp. 214-215: na tu vdkya- prdmdnyasamaya esa nydyo yadutaikasya vdkyasydnekdrthatvam. cdnekdrthatve svdrthasca sydttadvidhdtakrcca viruddho 'nyo'rthah. na tvetadvdkyapramdnakdndm viruddhamaviruddham caikam vdkyamanekamartham pratipddayatityesa samayah. arthaikatvdddhyekavdkyatd. Also, see B S B 2.3.6, p. 266, lines 19-20: ••• ekasya vdkyasya vydpdradvaydsambhavdt. And also, see USII 18.41, p. 216: na hyarthdntaranistam sadvdkyamarthdntaram vadet.

126 so the unity of all the Upanisadic passages {ekavdkyatd) is assured by the purport in the form of the textual harmony. In consequence just as the ritualistic passages of the produce their own valid meaning and the purport, so do the Upanisadic passages. Therefore, it can be summarized that the Upanisads have the same purport because there are no contradictory passages, and because a single passage has only one meaning for the unity of the text.

While Sankara says that the textual harmony comes from the same purport of the non-contradictory passages of the Upanisads, he also claims that the seemingly contradictory passages have to be interpreted with regard to the purport. Whenever there is the conflict of interpretation, the purport has priority over imagination of some

t contradictory meaning. Sankara in BSB 1.4.3, shows this standpoint directly;

••• the determination of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject.

The point here is that the meaning of a word or a passage should be determined for the unity of the purport by the consideration of context of the passages, or their connection. If it is not done properly, it surely

^°BSB 1.4.3, p. 150, lines 4-6; ThibautI, p. 245: ■■■ ekavdkyatadhlnatva- darthapratipatteh. na hlme purvottare dmnate ekavdkyatdmandpadya kamcidartham pratipadayatah, prakrtahdndprakrtakriydprasahgdt.

127 vitiates the first and the most important rule of sadvidhalihga, viz. concurrence of commencement and conclusion {ekavdkyata). In another place Sankara also lays great emphasis upon the principle of ekavdkyatd.

BSB 2.3.6 is started by saying that non-difference between all things and

Brahman is maintained only when all things are originated from

Brahman alone in the Upanisadic passages. Sankara enumerates a number of examples, but the question is that the creator who is mentioned only once cannot be connected with two things created, which are mentioned in different places, because two things cannot both be created first. He replies:

••• one creator may successively create more than one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scriptural passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator mentioned only once is to be connected with two created things; for the other (second) created thing is supplied from another scriptural passage.^*

As long as the purport of the Upanisads about creation consists in the fact that everything is created from Brahman, the seemingly contradictory passage should' be interpreted in the light of another scriptural passage. Any specialty mentioned in one Upanisad in connection with the same subject has to be added to it in the other

^'BSB 2.3.6, p. 266, lines 20-23; Thibautll, p. 11: srastd tveko'pi krame- ndnekam srastavyam srjet—ityekavakyatvakalpanaydm sambhavantydm na viru- ddhdrthatvena srutirhdtavyd. na cdsmdbhih sakrcchrutasya srastuh srastavyadva- yasambandho 'bhipreyate, srutyantaravasena srastavydntaropasamgrahdt.

128 Upanisads as well.^^ Furthermore, a prelude in a general form cannot be contradicted by any special statement in the complementary portion, since a general statement raises expectations about the particulars.^'^

Thus all the Upanisads have the same import, and at the same time they have to be interpreted by the way they have the same import. Sankara even says that different readings do not lead to the different purport just like ''ahara patram ” (bring the pot) and "'pdtram dhara'' (the pot, bring it). In evidence of the above case, “even in spite of the difference in the manner of propounding, there is non-difference in the entity expounded.” Therefore, it may be suggested that Sankara’s interpretation of the Upanisads is “purport-oriented”, for the purport of the Upanisads is an already established fact.

The purport-oriented interpretation of Sankara is reconfirmed in reference to the BrahmasHtra 1.2.2, ''vivaksitagunopapattesca". Sankara says that the term vivaksitdh, which means those qualities intended to be expressed, has inadmissible meaning of “intention”, or “desire”, for the

Vedas are not the work of man (apauruseya). However, it is used in the sQtra figuratively in the sense of “resulting in being accepted”. T h e following statement of Sankara as the interpretation of the sUtra is really suggestive:

^^Cf. B S B 3.3.17, p. 389, lines 1-2; Gambhira, p. 670: srutyantaraprasiddho hi samanavisayo visesah srutyantaresupasamhartavyo bhavati. Also, see BSB 3.3.4, p. 378, line 26- p. 379, line 2. ^^Cf. B S B 3.3.17, p. 390, lines 20-21; Gambhira, p. 673: samanyopakramcisca na vakyasesagatena visesena virudhyate, visesdkdhksitvatsamdnyasya. ^‘'ibid., lines 25-26; Apte, p. 646: pratipddanaprakdrabhede’pi pratipd- dydrthdbheda iti siddham. The translation of the words “updddnena phalenopacaryate” is quite complicated, and yet we follow “Gambhira” because of its well connection with following passages (fn. 26).

129 In common experience also, any sense expressed of a word, that is acceptable, is said to be its intended meaning, and what is not acceptable is said to be unintended. Similarly in the case of the Vedas, the intended meaning is known from the fact of its being presented as acceptable and the unintended meaning is that which is unacceptable. Acceptability or unacceptability, again, is determined from what is or is not the meaning of a Vedic text.^^

Like in ordinary language, the intended meaning of the Vedas is known from that which is acceptable, and the acceptable is again inferred from the purport of the text. If we apply these principles to the sutra itself:

“because the intended qualities are acceptable or justifiable” in the case of Brahman, and therefore, the passage refers to Brahman that is the purport. In case that the intended qualities are not possible in Brahman, the passage refers to other than Brahman, or to that which is not the purport. At any rate, while the intended meaning has the possibility to be matched with the purport or not, the purport is always purport itself without relation to the intended meaning. The purport is invariably connected with Brahman, which is an already established fact, and consequently, the purport is also an established fact insofar as the interpretation of the Upanisads is concerned. This purport-oriented interpretation is a natural result of the text-oriented starting-point of

Sankara’s philosophy.

Now, we will examine what Sankara says about the import of the

“ BSB 1.2.2, p. 64, line 22- p. 65, line 1; Gambhira, p. Ill: loke hi yacchabdd- bhihitamupddeyam bhavati tadvivaksitamityucyate, yadanupddeyam tadavivaksita- miti. tadvadvede'pyupddeyatvenabhihitam vivaksitam bhavati, itaradavivaksitam. updddndnupaddne tu vedavdkyatdtparydtdtparydbhydmavagamyete.

130 Upanisads for the purpose of drawing its important role in his exegetic field. Beyond doubt the import of the Upanisads is the aim of the

Vedanta which is nothing but the revealing of an established fact, i.e.

Brahman. Sankara writes in BSB 1.3.25 that: “••• the Vedanta-passages have a twofold purport; some of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self.”^’ The first one is about Brahman, and is expressed in many places variously through Sankara’s works. He says that Brahman, or the knowledge of Brahman is the theme, or the import of all the

Upanisads^^ and yet it is questionable whether he intends only formless

{nirakara) Brahman or not. Sankara comments on the Brahmasutra

3.2.14, “arupavadeva hi tatpradhdnatvat” (For Brahman is formless only, because of this being the main purport of the scriptures):

On the ground of such passages we therefore must definitively conclude that Brahman is devoid of form. Those other passages, on the other hand, which refer to a Brahman qualified by form do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman, but rather at enjoining the worship of Brahman. As long as those latter texts do not contradict those of the former class, they are to be accepted as they stand; where, however, contradictions occur, the passages whose main subject is Brahman must be viewed as having greater force than those of the other kind.— This is the reason for our deciding that although there are two different classes of scriptural texts. Brahman must be held to be

^^BSB 1.3.25, p. 120, lines 1-3; ThibautI, p. 198: dvirupa hi vedantavakyanam pravrttih, kvacitparamatmasvarupaniriipanapard, kvacidvijriandtmanah paramdt- maikatvopadesapard. “ See B S B 1.2.4, p. 11, lines 6-9; 1.1.5, p. 24, lines 8-9; 1.4.17, p. 167, lines 23-24. BrB 1.3.1, p. 59, lines 30-31 (3.8.9, p. 487, line 18); 1.4.9, p. 148, line 18; 1.4.10, p. 158, lines 15-16; 2.1.20, p. 304, lines 6-7. PrB 6.1, p. 54, lines 7-8.

131 altogether without form, not at the same time of an opposite nature.

Sankara admits that there are two classes of texts; one deals with

Brahman without form, and the other Brahman with form, and that the

scopes of each text should be accepted respectively so long as there is

no contradiction between them. Brahman with form (dkdra), which is

further expressed riipa (with form), savisesa (with qualification),

savikalpa (with attribute), saguna (determinate), and apara (lower), is

enjoined for the worship or meditation (updsand), or the rites.

However, the final purport is not Brahman with form but formless

Brahman of which equivalent terms are , nirvisesa, nirvikalpa,

nirguna and para, since the latter is more authoritative than the former

in all the Upanisads. Thus Sankara asserts that: “the whole Upanisad

seeks to teach about the unconditioned Brahman,"^^ The second purport

of the Upanisads is about ‘’'dtma ekatva", the unity of the individual soul

(vijndndtman, jivdtman) and the highest Self (paramdtman), namely, the

identity between Brahman and Atman}^ Sengaku Mayeda differentiates

^’B S B 3.2.14, p. 357, lines 13-18; Thibautll, pp. 155-156: tasmddevam- jdtiyakesu vdkyesu yathasrutam nirdkdrameva brahmdvadhdrayitavyam. itarani tvdkdravadbrahmavisaydni vdkydni, na tatpradhdndni. updsandvidhipradhdndni hi tdni, tesvasati virodhe yathdsrutamdsrayitavyam. sati tu virodhe tatpradhdndnyatat- pradhdnebhyo baliydmsi bhavanti—ityesa vinigamandydm hetuh. yenobhaylsvapi srutisu satisvandkdrameva brahmdvadhdryate, na punarviparltamiti. is an unquestionable fact that the conditioned Brahman should always be understood of relevance to the meditation and the rites. ^'BrB 2.1.15, p. 273, line 18; Madhava, p. 192; nirupdkhyo hi vijijndpayisitah sarvasydmupanisadi. ^^he evidences are not necessary, but we refer to an interesting statement: “The words dtmd (Self) and Brahman are the adjectives and substantives of each other. The word Brahman rules out the Self limited by the body. And the word dtmd (Self) rules out the meditation on the sun etc., which are different from the Self as Brahman. The Self is indeed Brahman, and Brahman is surely the Self, without any duality.” cf. C hB 5.11.1, p. 299, line 23- p. 300, line 1; Gambhira, p. 379.

132 two statements, ''Brahman is Atman" and "'Atman is Brahman", from each other according as the same truth may be differently approached.

While the knowledge of ''Brahman is Atman” is set out from Brahman through a theological or cosmological approach, that of "Atman is

Brahman" is from Atman through a psychological or epistemological approach. At last Mayeda says that the second line of approach, viz. the way of "Atman is Brahman" is more frequently adopted by Sankara than the first.Moreover, he again puts in one more aspect by which the identity between Brahman and Atman is attainable, and says that: “the conclusion arrived at by the two approaches is to be confirmed and authenticated by the Srutis."^^ Irrespective of the validity of these three approaches Mayeda’s method is enough to deliver the idea that the identity of Brahman and Atman is the central teaching of the Upanisads as well as Sankara, and is known and confirmed by the texts alone. As a matter of fact the two purports discussed here are not different in kind, though they should be distinguished and applied differently in the context. Whether the starting point is Brahman or Atman, or whether the method adopted is cosmological or epistemological, the conclusion of the identity between the two is same, and this identity includes all the discourses of the Upanisads. In this sense it may be said that the identity of Brahman and Atman is the most central and comprehensive purport of the Upanisads in the exegesis of Sankara.

For Sankara the identity of Brahman and Atman, which also implies

^^Cf. Sengaku Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, p. 18. ^^Ibid. For the detailed discussion of the three approaches, see pp. 18-68.

133 the nature of Brahman and Atman and their identity, and which is the main purport of all the Upanisads, is the ground of the minor purports that conform themselves to the main purport. Once the purport is established for the textual harmony, there is no possibility of other purports because of its being the exegetic direction of interpreter. The identity of Brahman and Atman, of course, can be the best possible purport compared to others, and yet it becomes the true one throughout the process of Sankara’s exegetic effort. Sankara elaborates double strategy for the textual harmony: first, the text should have the final purport irrespective of interpretation, and second, the final purport is again confirmed through the exegesis. In other words, just like Brahman the purport is an already accomplished purport, and again it has to be re­ read and re-certified through the interpretation that repairs to itself.

These two methods correspond to the sravana (listening) and

(reflection) of the triple process of Vedantic discipline,which is prescribed for the attainment of Brahma- or Brahma-jfidna. The knowledge of Brahman or Atman that is heard from sruti should be reaffirmed through the reflection to remove all conceivable doubts; similarly the given import has to be exposed adequately for the conviction of its certainty. We will see in the following how Sankara

^^Saiikara says: “ Accordingly, it stands established that Brahman is presented as an independent entity in the scriptures; for as a result of the proper determination of the Upanisadic texts, they are seen to speak of It.” cf. B S B 1.1.4, p. 23, lines 11- 13; Gambhira, p. 43: tasmdnna pratipattividhivisayatayd sdstrapramdnakatvam brah- manah sambhavatltyatah svatantrameva brahma sastrapramdnakam veddntavdkya- samanvaydditi siddham. ^®The triple process, sravana, manana, and nididhydsana (contemplation or meditation) is described in the dialogue of -Maitreyl of the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad 2.4.5, and 4.5.6.

134 applies this method to the theory of creation as an example, and at the same time, how avidyd plays a role in Sankara’s textual exegesis for the assurance of purport.

2. Creation Theory and Avidyd

The term advaita means non-difference of the supreme Being

(Brahman) and the individual being (), but it also essentially implies that of the cause {Brahman) and the effect (the world). Like other Indian philosophical systems, Sankara’s philosophy allows a large space for the

theory of creation which is mainly concerned with the problem of

causality. It is generally accepted that Sankara maintains the theory of

satkdryavada (effect pre-existent in cause), with which the effect is

unreal appearance (vivarta) of the cause. Just as the diverse standpoints

of the theory of causation in Indian Philosophy^’ are inevitably related

to the various viewpoints of the reality, Sankara’s theory of causation,

whether it can be called vivartavdda or not, cannot be separated from his

metaphysical position that Brahman is nirguna, and that there is advaita

between Brahman and the world. Thus the study of the theory of

causation, which is another expression of the theory of creation,

necessarily includes that of the reality and its relation to the world. It is

because of this reason that we choose the theory of creation as an

Indian Philosophy the followers of asatkdryavada are , - Vaisesika, and Prabhakara Mimamsa, those of satkdryavada are Satnkhya- and all the Vedanta systems. The theory of and Bhatta MTmamsa may be called sadasatkaryavdda (effect is both real and unreal before its production) or anekdntavdda (everything both same and different).

135 example to examine Sankara’s method of textual harmony and to trace the methodological usage of avidyd in his textual interpretation.

First of all we will discuss how Sankara comes to arrive at the textual harmony when he interprets the subject of creation or Brahman.

As is universally known, there are no evidences in the Upanisads that there are two kinds of Brahman, namely, nirguna and saguna, or para and apara, which Sankara thoroughly insists on throughout his works.

The only clue of this distinction is found in the passage of the

Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 2.3.1 where two forms of Brahman are mentioned as gross and subtle, mortal and immortal, limited and unlimited, defined and undefined.Moreover, it is hardly possible that the Brahmasutra shows the distinction of two that Sankara always proclaims. The Brahmasutra 3.2.11, “na sthanato’pi parasyobhayalihgam sarvatra hi” suggests that there are twofold characteristics of Brahman {ubhaya lihgam) which are said to be arupa

(without form) and rupa (with form). Sankara explains this sutra:

The scriptural passages which refer to Brahman are of a double character; some indicate that Brahman is affected by difference, so, e.g. ‘He to whom belong all works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes’ (ChU 3.14.2); others, that it is without difference, so, e.g. ‘It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short

^*Cf. BrU 2.3.1, p. 204: dve vdva brahmano rupe. murtam caivamurtam ca. martyam cdmrtam ca. sthitam ca yacca. sacca tyam ca. W e exclude the sole expression of param Brahma, which is seen in several places of the Upanisads, since the counter-concept, i.e. aparam Brahma is not found with it. ^’Translation goes: “Not on account of (difference of) place also twofold characteristics can belong to the highest; for everywhere (scripture teaches it to be without any difference).” cf. Thibautll, p. 152.

136 nor long,’ «&c. (BrU 3.8.8)/°

Sankara seems to insist that the Upanisads themselves teach twofold characteristics of Brahman, Brahman with qualification (savisesa) and without qualification (nirvisesa). However, according to P. M. Modi, though Sankara takes one aspect, i.e. arupavat as the chief one

(pradhdna), Brahman is arupavat not in the sense that it is

“exclusively” arupavat, but that it is only “chiefly” arupavat.*^ The point is that whereas the Sutrakdra's Brahman is arupavat as well as rupavat, and is no aspect of absolutely attributeless, Sankara’s Brahman is only nirguna or nirvisesa in the sense that is a fancied form of nirguna Brahman. At any rate, there are twofold

Brahman in the Upanisads and the Brahmasutra, and yet the distinction is not the same as Sankara’s one. Nevertheless, Sankara tries to prove two kinds of Brahman in the Upanisads in order to maintain the textual harmony.

The two forms of Brahman occur first in BSB when Sankara replies to the doubt as to what is the purpose of the remaining parts of the sutras after showing the cause of the universe on the basis of the

Upanisads in the previous sHtras such as 1.1.2 (janmddyasya yatah) and

‘*°BSB 3.2.11, p. 355, lines 17-20; Thibautll, p. 152.- santyubhayalingdh srutayo brahmavisaydh— ‘sarvakarmd sarvakdmah sarvagandhah sarvarasah' ityevamddydh savisesalihgdh. 'asthHlamananvahrasvamadirgham' ityevamddydsca nirvisesalihgdh. For the statement that the surti itself refers to two kinds of Brahman, see B S B 1.2.2, p. 65, lines 17-19 (suddha and saguna); 3.2.14, p. 357, lines 13-15 (nirdkdra and dkdra). Also, see BrB 2.1.15, p. 273, lines 17-20 {nirupdkhyd and visesa) '*‘Cf. BS 3.2.14: arupavadeva hi tatpradhdnatvdt. *^Cf. P. M. Modi, A Critique of the Brahmasutra (II1.2.11-IV), Part II, p. 175.

137 1.1.11 {srutatvdcca). Sankara says:

Brahman is apprehended under two forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolutions of name and form (i.e. the multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatever. ••• All these passages, with many others, declare Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either of Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is the object of Nescience, there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion, and the like.'^^

In these passages we know firstly that Brahman has two forms—one is possessed of the limiting conditions {upddhi) and the other devoid of them. However, the supreme Brahman is the primary meaning of the word '"Brahman”, the inferior one being its secondary meaning, and as between the primary and secondary meanings, one readily understands the primary one alone.Secondly, we come to know that while the lower Brahman is the subject matter of avidyd, the higher Brahman is that of vidyd. Brahman is in fact only one, but because of superimposition of avidyd, the formless Brahman is appeared to be

Brahman with form, qualification, attribute, etc.'^^ Thirdly, it is known

‘*^BSB 1.1.12, p. 34, line 16- p. 35, line 3; ThibautI, pp. 61-62: dvirupam hi brahmdvagamyate, ndmarupavikdrabhedopddhivisistam, tadviparitam ca sarvopd- dhivivarjitam. ■■■ iti caivam sahasraso vidydvidydvisayabhedena brahmano dviru- patdm darsayanti vdkydni. tatrdvidydvasthdydm brahmana updsyopdsakddilaksanah sarvo vyavahdrah. ‘*^Cf. B S B 4.3.12, p. 496, lines 17-19; Gambhira, p. 882: param hi brahma brahmasabdasya mukhyamdlambanam, gaunamaparam. mukhyagaunayosca mukhye sampratyayo bhavati. “^See BrB 2.1.14, p. 264, lines 1-8; 2.3.1, p.320, lines 15-16.

138 that as the lower Brahman is the object of avidyd, it is associated with the worship or meditation. The relation between the lower Brahman and meditation is well mentioned in BSB 4.3.9:

As the lower Brahman is in proximity to the higher one, there is nothing unreasonable in the word ’’Brahman' being applied to the former also. For when the highest Brahman is, for the purpose of pious meditation, described as possessing certain effected qualities—such as consisting of mind and the rest— which qualities depend on its connexion with certain pure limiting adjuncts; then it is what we call the lower Brahman^^

Here, Sankara says that there is proximity (samipya) of the lower

Brahman to the highest one, since the lower one is nothing but the highest one with the limiting adjuncts {upadhi). Because of this proximity Sankara makes an assertion that knowledge of the lower

Brahman leads to that of the higher one."^^ However, Brahman is only formless, attributeless, and unconditioned; conditioned Brahman is spoken of meditation only, for non-difference is the only purport of the

Upanisads. As long as saguna Brahman is a different aspect of nirguna

Brahman for a special purpose, there is no break in the topic of the

Upanisads', in other words, there is the unity of the purport for the textual harmony.

The problem of the cause of creation becomes more complicated

^^BSB 4.3.9, p. 495, lines 21-24; Thibautll, p. 391: parabrahmasamipyad- aparasya brahmanastasminnapi brahmasabdaprayogo na virudhyate. parameva hi brahma visuddhopadhisambandham kvacitkaiscidvikdradharmairmanomayatvadibhi- rupdsandyopadisyamdnamaparamiti sthitih. ^’Cf. BrB 2.1.14, p. 264, lines 6-7: etdvadvijndnadvdratvdcca parabrahma- vijndnasya yuktameva ■■■.

139 when we come across Sankara’s three terminologies of para Brahman, apara Brahman, and Isvara (God or the cosmic Lord). Colonel G. A.

Jacob declares that:

Therefore, according to Sankara’s own showing, the terms param Brahma, aparam Brahma, para Isvarah and fsvarah are all exactly synonymous, and there is no difference after all between his views and those of Ramanuja in this respect!'^*

G. Thibaut also treats Isvara and the lower Brahman as synonyms'*^ with a view to differentiation of Sankara’s two Brahman {para and apara) from Ramanuja’s one personal Brahman, or God. Sankara holds the identification of the higher Brahman or Atman with Isvara:

Although the one God, the supreme Self, is to be meditated on as possessed of those qualities, still the results differ in accordance with the quality meditated on, •••

••• the Vedic texts make us understand God as our very Self, Hence one should fix one’s mind on the Self which is God.^‘

Through these passages it can be inferred that the supreme Self or

Brahman is identified with God or Isvara,^^ and that Isvara is also

'**G. A. Jacob, The Veddntasdra, Preface, p. ix. ‘*®Cf. G. Thibaut, The Veddnta-Sutras, Introduction, pp. xxvii, xxx, cxiii. ^“BSB 1.1.12, p. 35, I ines 5-7; Gambhira, p. 63: eka eva tu paramdtmesvara- staistairgunavisesairvisista updsyo yadyapi bhavati, tathdpi yathdgunopdsanameva phaldni bhidyante. ^*BSB 4.1.3, p. 464, line 12; Gambhira, p. 819: grdhayanti cdtmatvenciive- svaram veddntavdkydni. And, ibid., p. 465, line 12; Gambhira, p. 821: tasmdd- atmetyevesvare mano dadhlta. ’^Satchidanandendra remarks: “ Sankara persists in this identification of the

140 identified with the lower Brahman (saguna Brahman), since meditation is always related to saguna Brahman in Sankara’s writings. Further, as saguna Brahman is considered to be Brahman as having various attributes due to the limiting adjuncts (upadhi), so the identification of saguna Brahman and Isvara is unquestionable, for example:

Therefore the unconditioned Self, being beyond speech and mind, undifferentiated and one, is designated as ‘Not this, not this’; when It has the limiting adjuncts of the body and organs, which are characterised by ignorance, desire and work. It is called the transmigrating individual self; and when the Self has the limiting adjuncts of the power of eternal and unlimited knowledge (i.e. ), It is called the Internal Ruler and isvara. The same Self, as by nature transcendent, absolute and pure, is called the Immutable and Supreme Self.^^

When the unconditioned {nirupadhi) Self or para Brahman has the conditioning factors. It is called the Internal Ruler {antarydmi), which is nothing but Isvara. Saguna Brahman or apara Brahman and Isvara are therefore two names of nirguna Brahman on account of the limiting adjuncts.

The identity and difference of these three terms, nirguna Brahman,

absolutely featureless Brahman with Isvara in the body of his Bhashya throughout.” cf. Satchidanandendra , Sankara’s Clarification of Certain Veddntic Concepts, p. 33. According to P. Hacker’s investigation of B S B , Isvara is synonymous with para Brahman mostly and with apara Brahman infrequently (p. 96). For the sources of their synonymous usage, see Paul Hacker, “Distinctive Features” , pp. 85-96. ’^BrB 3.8.12, p. 492, line 28- p. 493, line 15; Madhava, p. 367: tasman- nirupddhikasyd”tmano nirupdkhyatvdnnirvisesatvddekatvdcca neti netiti vyapadeso bhavati. avidydkdmakarmavisistakdryakaranopddhirdtmd samsdri jlva ucyate. nityaniratisayajndnasaktyupddhirdtmd'ntarydmi ucyate. sa eva nirupddhih kevalah suddhah svena svabhdvendksaram para ucyate.

141 saguna Brahman, and fsvara, should be put in order according to the purport of the Upanisads, but not to the terminological frequency and synonymous usages. Rudolf Otto points out the various expressions and terminological confusion of Sankara, and insists that nirguna Brahman and saguna Brahman are not exclusive opposites but samuccaya

(summing up).^"^ His attempt to lead the philosophy of Sankara to the theistic direction bears the statement that the impersonal Brahman rests on a theistic basis.Otto’s line of thought has quite prevailed in the circle of modern expositors of the , but their conclusion lacks the understanding of special pedagogical aspect of the Indian philosophy, and especially of Sankara’s philosophy. P. Hacker’s investigation of the term fsvara, on the other hand, proves the synonymous usage of Isvara, para Brahman, and apara Brahman, and

Sankara’s inclination to the non-distinction of Isvara and para

Brahman.^^ Does the interchangeability of two terms, namely, Isvara and para Brahman in BSB mean a complete identification? Hacker’s examination has the limit that he does not deal with all the works of

Sankara, for there is little appearance (and accordingly less importance) of the term Isvara in Sankara’s other works except BSB. Although the concept isvara is so important in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta unlike the later Advaitism, it is hardly intelligible that his Isvara is the same as para Brahman without reference to the purport. It is true that Sankara sometimes used Isvara identically with saguna Brahman, and more

Rudolf Otto, East and West, pp. 127-128. ^^Cf. ibid., p. 121. ^*Cf. Hacker, “ Distinctive Features” , pp. 94-96.

142 frequently with nirguna Brahman. Even his two forms of Brahman

(saguna and nirguna) are exactly corresponded to two forms of Isvara, viz. His qualified aspect and unqualified aspect.However, so far as the purport of the Upanisads is concerned, the three terms are restored to one term, the higher Brahman or nirguna Brahman. They are altogether one and the same Brahman, but are expressed differently for their own purpose, and are finally gathered together towards the textual harmony. Firstly, in the case of saguna Brahman and Isvara though

Isvara is also the object of meditation, it is generally saguna Brahman that harmonizes the portions of rites and meditation in the Upanisads. isvara is, on the other hand, related to the creatorship and the

Lordship,and it may be a wider concept than saguna Brahman.^^ Thus isvara is the cause and the ruler of the empirical world, and is used by

Sankara to harmonize those passages of the Upanisads which are concerned with the creatorship and the Lordship. As we have seen, the

Upanisadic passages are not consistent as they are, and yet there can be the textual harmonization through the purport. Saguna Brahman and isvara are the textual what should be as well as interpretative request by which all the passages of the Upanisads become consistent and compatible with the passages about nirguna Brahman. Secondly, with

’’Cf. B S B 4.4.19, p. 511, lines 15-16: atasca yathaiva dvirupe paramesvare nirgunam rupamanavapya saguna evdvatisthante, ■ ■. Also, see Hacker, “Distinctive Features” , p. 96. ’*Paul Hacker classifies the usage of Isvara into three: (1) the Lord of the universe, (2) the controller of individual fate, and (3) object of meditation, cf. Hacker, “Distinctive Features” , pp. 89-94. ’’Comans says that saguna Brahman is Isvara Itself, but with the further predication of specific qualities for the purpose of meditation. H e further insists that saguna Brahman is often the same as Hiranyagarbha, the first born of the creation, cf. Michael Comans, The Method of Early Advaita Vedanta, pp. 217-218.

143 regard to the identification of para Brahman and Isvara the confusion lies in the misunderstanding of viewpoint. Swami Satchidanandendra says: “The distinction is admitted only from the thought-position of the student of Vedanta and there is no distinction or difference allowed in

Brahman itself.”^® Whether Brahman is called simple Brahman, para

Brahman, Atman, paramdtman, Isvara or para Isvara, It never lose Its own nature. From the empirical point of view the subject of creation has to be explained according to the thought-position, for the authoritative texts themselves mention it in various ways from the beginning to the end. Thus it seems that for Sankara the best name to explain the subject of creation together with concerning passages is the supreme Lord or isvara, which is also expressed by the name of Brahman, paramdtman, para Brahman, etc. If we make inquiry into Sankara’s whole works just as we look into the purport of the Upanisads, his main concern is also the same as that of the Upanisads in which impersonal nirguna Brahman is the final aim but not personal God or even “suprapersonal” existence. The names of Brahman in the empirical level do not distort the Reality of Sankara, which is beyond names, and is attributeless.

After all there may be only two levels of Brahman-, one is attributeless and the other with attribute, for there is not enough reason to differentiate saguna Brahman from Isvara. Brahman without attribute is the subject matter of knowledge, and Brahman with attribute that of

“ Satchidanandendra Saraswati, Sankara’s Clarification, p. 38. ^'Comans writes that para Brahman does not fit the Western category of “ impersonal” , and he suggests that Sankara’s Absolute is “suprapersonal” , in order to give some theistic character to It. cf. Michael Comans, The Method, p. 230.

144 ignorance. Then, does one part of the subject of creation belong to the scope of knowledge, and the other part that of ignorance? This question is somewhat coupled with the terminological clarification of nirguna

Brahman, saguna Brahman, and Isvara. Sankara in BSB 2.1.14, where all the significant terms are assembled, gives a clear answer after saying that ndmariipa is conjured up by avidyd, and is anirvacaniya, maydsakti of isvara, and so on:

But omniscient God is different from them, as is known from the Upanisadic text, “That which is Space {Brahman) is the accomplisher of name and form. That in which they subsist is Brahman” (ChU 8.14.1). Thus like space conforming to the conditioning factors like pot, jar, etc., God conforms to the limiting adjuncts— name and form— created by nescience. And within the domain of empirical existence. He rules it over the selves which identify themselves with the (individual) intellects and are called creatures, and which though identical with Himself, conform, like the spaces in pot etc., to the assemblages of bodies and senses created by name and form that are called up by nescience. Thus God’s rulership, omniscience, and omnipotence are contingent on the limiting adjuncts conjured up by nescience; but not so in reality can such terms as ‘the ruler’, ‘the ruled’, ‘omniscience’, etc., be used with regard to the Self shining in Its own nature after the removal of all limiting adjuncts through illumination.*^^

“ BSB 2.1.14, p. 201, lines 5-15; Gambhira, p. 334: tabhyamanyah sarvajna isvarah, ‘akaso vai ndtna ndmarupayornirvahitd te yadantard tadbrahma ’ iti sruteh, ■■■ evamavidydkrtandmarupopddhyanurodhlsvaro bhavati, vyomeva ghatakarakd- dyupddhyanurodhi. sa ca svdtmabhutdneva ghatdkdsasthdniydnavidydpratyupasthd- pitandmarupakrtakdryakaranasamghdtdnurodhino jlvdkhydnvijndndtmanah pratlste vyavahdr avis aye. tadevamavidydtmakopddhipariccheddpeksamevesvarasyesvaratvam sarvajnatvam sarvasaktitvam ca, na paramdrthato vidyaydpdstasarvopddhisvarupa dtmanisitrlsitavyasarvajnatvddivyavahdra upapadyate.

145 isvara is conditioned by the limiting adjuncts {upddhi) that are

ndmariipa conjured up by avidyd, whereas jiva is by the assemblages of

the body and the organs created by ndmariipa, which is conjured up by

avidyd. Brahman is solely Isvara when there is such division as the ruler

{isvara) and the ruled (Jiva),^^ but in the state of the highest reality all

the characteristics of Isvara {Isvaratva, etc.) cannot be used with regard

to the supreme Brahman that is the Self. After these passages Sankara

enumerates the scriptural examples according to which all the empirical

treatments cease to exist in the state of the highest reality. Thus there

are two clearly different passages seen in the Upanisads\ one belongs to

the empirical level and the other to the transcendental level. Both of

these have different purports, and Sankara connects the former with

avidyd and the latter with jfidna or vidyd. In consequence the subject

matter of both the levels, i.e. Isvara and para Brahman, also belong to

the realm of avidyd and vidyd respectively. Therefore, we can come to

know that avidyd has a special role to maintain the purport of the

Upanisads in Sankara’s exegesis. Isvara or saguna Brahman, which is

the dealing of empirical level as the result of avidyd, cannot be the final

purport, and yet it has its own privilege insofar as the creation is

concerned.

Another crucial problem pertaining to Sankara’s theory of creation

is the relationship between Brahman and the world, or the cause and the

®^The division of the ruler (isitr) and the ruled (isitavya) occurs again in the same page (line 22), and B S B 3.2.38, p. 373, line 6. This division is corresponded to the impeller (pravartaka) and the impelled {pravartya). cf. BSB 2.2.2, p. 222, line 26.

146 effect. Since Sankara holds on to advaita position, there is no cause of the world other than Brahman. That Brahman is the cause of the world is explained in innumerable places including BSB 1.1.2, and Sankara further says that Brahman is not only the efficient cause (kdrana) but also the material cause (prakrti),^ or rather. Its manifestation is caused by the gradation of the minds by which It becomes conditioned.^^ Even though Brahman is one without a second, It is transformed into various forms on account of Its possession of diverse powers.Just as Brahman is nirguna as well as saguna. It is characterized by non-activity inherent in Its own nature, and at the same time, by moving power inherent in mdya.^^ The universe is created by the power (sakti) of the supreme God

iparamesvara), which is called differently as ndmarupa, mdyd, prakrti, , etc. As we have already seen in the second chapter, ndmarupa is prime matter (avydkrta ndmarupa) as well as the phenomenal world

{vydkrta ndmarupa), and on the other hand, sakti is unevolved ndmarupa

as well as the latent condition of evolved n d m a r u p a . However, whatever name of the prime matter or the creative power Sankara presupposes for the creation, he cannot help denying its ontological position, for he criticizes severely the pradhdna or prakrti of the

Samkhya, which is as real as purusa or Pure Consciousness. The

^Cf. B S B 2.1.6, p. 188, lines 8-9: ■ ■ cetanam brahma jagatah kdranam prakrtiscetydgamatdtparyasya prasddhitatvdt. ®*Cf. B S B 1.1.12, p. 35, lines 10-13; Gambhira, p. 63. “ See B S B 1.4.9, p. 156, line 24; 2.1.24, p. 210, line 20; ibid., lines 24-25; 2.1.30, p. 215, lines 7-8; 2.1.31, p. 215, lines 24-26. ” Cf. B S B 2.2.7, p. 225, lines 24-25; Thibautl, p. 374; paramdtmanastu svarii- pavyapdsrayamauddsinyam, mdydvyapdsrayam ca pravartakatvamityastyatisayah. ^*Cf. B S B 1.4.9, p. 157, lines 4-5: ••• saktiravydkrtandmariipd ndmarupayoh prdgavasthdnendpi

147 insentient pradhdna cannot be the cause of the world, because in all the

Upanisads consciousness itself is apprehended uniformly as the cause of f creation. Sankara proves this in several places, and especially in BSB

1.4.1 to 1.4.7 by the analysis of the relation between avyakta and pradhdna. The point of dispute is related to the passage of the Katha

Upanisad 1.3.11, ''mahatah paramavyaktamavyaktdt purusah parah",

which means “Higher than mahat is avyakta, higher than avyakta is purusa”. Sankara postulates that the order of purusa, avyakta, and mahat

is the same as the ’s, and that out of these terms, avyakta is

meant by their pradhdna or prakrti. Hence, the possible question is, is

avyakta or pradhdna the cause of the universe as it is known in the

Upanisad and the Samkhya smrtil Sankara points out before everything

else that: “the identity of a thing cannot be established merely from the

similarity of the order of treatment, unless the nature of the thing itself

is recognized as identical.The term pradhdna is simply a technical

term (paribhdsd) of the Samkhya, and it cannot be applied to determine

the meaning of the Upanisadic texts. Sankara, therefore, says that

avyakta signifies the subtle body (suksmam sariram) alone and not pradhdna of the Samkhya, since the unmanifest {avyakta) can stand for

the undeveloped state of the creation by the analogy of the subtle body,

whereas the manifest (vyakta) for the gross body {sthularn sariram)

Further, he tries to prove his contention by saying that avyakta is

nothing but bljasakti or mdyd, which cannot be defined either as real or

®’BS B 1.4.1, p. 145, line 22- p. 146, line 1; Gambhira, p. 244.- na ca krama- mdtrasdmanydtsamdndrthapratipattirbhavatyasati tadriipapratyabhijndne. ™Cf. B S B 1.4.2, p. 148, lines 4-6.

148 as unreal,and goes through the list of many passages in the Upanisads.

At any rate, of the Samkhya has to be known to discriminate itself from purusa for the sake of liberation, but avyakta of the above passage is a mere epithet but not a thing to be known. No text of the

Upanisads shows that avyakta should be known or worshipped, since it means the latent state in which namarupa is undeveloped and undifferentiated. Therefore, the meaning of the text is to be determined on the basis of the purport, and accordingly, there is no other cause of the creation, like pradhana of the Samkhya, other than Brahman. In order to maintain the purport of the texts, viz. the unity of Brahman, even primary matter, or creative power has to be regarded as the figment of avidyd, otherwise Sankara cannot avoid the dualistic position of the

Sarnkhya. Sankara says:

although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience.’^

Sankara’s monism is different from the dualism of the Samkhya, nevertheless his theory of causation is akin to that of the Samkhya, since it is generally believed that Sankara maintains vivartavdda based on

^'Cf. B S B 1.4.3, p. 149, lines 7-8: avyakta hi sa mdya, tattvdnyatvanirupana- sydsakyatvdt The expression is similar to the epithet of namarupa, i.e., “tattvdnyatvdbhydmanirvacaniya'', which occurs four times in B S B . Avidyd as anirvacaniya does not appear throughout the works of Sankara. Its first appearance is seen in the Brahmasiddhi of Mandanamisra (p. 9, lines 12-14). ^^BSB 2.1.31, p. 215, lines 25-26; ThibautI, p. 355: sarvavisesasydpi brahmanah sarvasaktiyogah sambhavatltyetadapyavidydkalpitarupabhedopanydse- noktameva. Also, see BSB 4.3.14, p. 499, lines 3-4.

149 satkdryavdda. However, as C. Sharma points out, in the pre-Sarikara period and in Sankara as well, the terms vikdra, parindma and vivarta are treated as synonymous and are used in the general sense of

“change”. F o r the examples of his assertion Sharma says that the

r Buddhists before Sankara use the terms parindma and vivarta interchangeably, and that Sankara uses the verbs “vikriyate”,

''parinamate” and '"vivartate" without distinction of the meaning.In the West it is Paul Hacker who indicates Sankara’s unawareness of an illusionistic usage of the word vivarta. According to him, Sankara’s cosmological view is “a kind of illusionistic parindmavdda” since the theory that the world is parindma of avidyd and vivarta of Brahman has

r ’je been established only in the post-Sankara period. On the other hand, S.

Mayeda says that though Sankara does not use the term vivarta technically, his view is much closer to vivartavdda than to parindmavdda, and might be styled “early vivartavdda" He argues that the relationship of Brahman and the world is like between pure water and dirty foam, and therefore, Brahman as the cause is only real while the world as the effect is unreal. Putting aside these various opinions on Sankara’s theory of causation we will go directly through what Sankara says about the transformation of the world from Brahman.

In the works of Sankara ndmarupa is the representative term for

^^Cf. Chandradhar Sharma, The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy, p. 184. ibid. For Sharma’s example on the case of Sankara, see BSB 2.2.1, p. 221, lines 1-3: ••• pradhanam svabhdvenaiva vicitrena vikdrdtmand vivartata iti. ^^Re-quotation from S. Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, p. 25. cf. Vivarta (Mainz: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der pp. 208-236. /' V- V ^®Cf. Sengaku Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings, p. 26.

150 prime matter, and is defined neither as reality nor as something else because of its state of becoming (parindma).^^ In almost half of its usages ndmarupa, whether it signifies undeveloped or developed state, is described as upddhi of Brahman, or figment of avidyd. Sankara’s clearest statement on the creation with reference to ndmarupa and avidyd is seen in BSB 2.1.27:

No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts.— Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent

^’Cf. Hacker, “Distinctive Features” , p. 73. The word '‘anirvacanlya" is supplemented by “tattvanyatvabhyam” in B S B 1.1.5, 1.4.3, 2.1.14, and 2.1.27, and according to Hacker, there are two possibilities of interpretation: (1) “” is the abstract noun of “tat” (Brahman), and the meaning is “ndmarupa cannot be determined either as identical to Brahman or as something other than Brahman", and (2) it stands for just “essence” or “reality” , and the meaning is “ndmarupa cannot be determined either as a reality or as something else.” W e believe that the two interpretations are equally valid, for the first one is correct by the evidence of simile, viz., water and foam (e.g. AiB 1.1.1, p. 29, lines 19-21), and the second one by the grammatical analysis as well as by the nature of ndmarupa.

151 world; that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own.^*

I Here, Sankara says that the break or the difference in aspects of

Brahman is merely created by avidyd, just as for a man of double vision

(timira i.e. diplopia) the moon appears to be more than one.™ It is only by this characteristic of avidyd that the causal chain of avidyd and ndmarQpa has to be understood properly. Sankara’s expression that ndmarupa is avidyd-krta (made), -pratyupasthdpita (presented), -kalpita

(imagined), -adhyasta (superimposed), etc. is not a strong causal relationship, for there are no such specific causal notions as kdrana, hetu, or nimitta (caused) in his• works. 80 Thus avidyd cannot be considered to be prime matter like ndmarQpa, and further its position should not be connected with the process of creation. Just as one moon appears to be two because of timira or double vision to a man suffering from that disease. Brahman appears to be the difference of ndmarUpa because of avidyd. Just as the real moon is not affected by timira, or water does not undergo change due to ripples, waves, foams, bubbles,

’*BSB 2.1.27, p. 213, line 22- p. 214, line 3; ThibautI, p. 352: naisa dosah, avidydkalpitariipabheddbhyupagamdt. nahyavidydkalpitena rupabhedena sdvayavam vastu sampadyate. nahi timiropahatanayanendneka iva candramd drsyamdno’neka eva bhavati. avidydkalpitena ca ndmarupalaksanena rupabhedena vydkrtdvydkrtd- tmakena tattvdnyatvdbhydmanirvacaniyena brahma parindmddisarvavyavahdrdspa- datvam pratipadyate. pdramdrthikena ca rupena sarvavyavahdrdtltamaparinatama- vatisthate. vdcdrambhanamdtratvdccdvidydkalpitasya ndmarupabhedasyeti na nira- vayavatvam brahmanah kupyati. na ceyam parindmasrutih parindmapratipddandrthd, tatpratipattau phaldnavagamdt. sarvavyavahdrahinabrahmdtmabhdvapratipddand- rthd tvesd, tatpratipattau phaldvagamdt. ” See B S B Adhydsabhdsya, p. 2, lines 4-5; 3.2.5, p. 347, line 12. BrB 1.4.10, p. 176, line 6; 4.4.6, p. 664, lines 14-15. TaB 2.8.5, p. 91, lines 20-21; ibid., p. 93, line 21. AiB 1.1.intro., p. 20, line 11. PrB 6.4, p. 71, line 20. U SI 1.40, p. 128. *“Cf. Hacker, “ Distinctive Features” , p. 74.

152 etc.,*' Brahman remains unchanged even though there can be diverse

creation. Consequently, Sankara says that all the scriptural passages

which deal with the transformation of Brahman, do not propound the

fact of transformation itself; rather they inform that Brahman is still

beyond all the process of creation. Even the Upanisadic passages of

creation do not refer to the highest reality because they are valid only

within the range of the empirical world which is characterized by

ndmarupa, the figment of avidya}^ Therefore, all the Vedanta texts of

the origin, continuity, and dissolution of the universe are only to

strengthen our idea of Brahman being a homogeneous unity, and not to

make us believe in the origin etc. as an actuality.*^ If we accept all the

theory of creation as a real fact, there would be a break of the topic or

the purport. The theory of creation has to be placed under the realm of

avidyd so that the purport of sruti, viz. the oneness of the individual self

and the supreme Self is strengthened and preserved for the sake of

liberation. This is why Sankara repeats himself that ndmarupa or prime

matter is made, presented, imagined, or superimposed by avidyd, which

makes Brahman to be different apparently. In this way Sankara’s theory

of causation cannot be parindma “of” avidyd, as the later Advaitins

*'See BrB 2.4.11, p. 351, lines 17-19; 3.5.1, p. 451, lines 16-20. C hB 6.10.3, p. 370, lines 3-4. A iB 1.1.1, p. 29, lines 19-21. *^Cf. B S B 2.1.33, p. 217, lines 5-6: na ceyam paramarthavisaya srstisrutih, avidydkalpitandmarupavyavaharagocaratvdt, ■■■. *^Cf. BrB 2.1.20, p. 299, lines 4-5; Madhava, p. 211: tasmddekarupaikatva- pratyayaddrdydyaiva sarvaveddntesutpattisthitilayddikalpand na tatpratyayakara- ndya. Also, see ibid., p. 296, lines 28-30. Sankara in B S B 3.2.4 says that the whole creation is mdyd like dream. Here, mdyd represents the illusory characteristic of the world, cf. B S B 3.2.4, p. 347, line 1: •" samastasya prapaficasya mdydmdtratvam. And also, see B S B 2.1.22, p. 209, lines 13-14: apagatam bhavati tadd jivasya samsdritvam brahmanasca srastrtvam, ■■■.

153 advocate, but it should be parindma “from the viewpoint of” avidyd\ it cannot be vivarta “of” Brahman as well, but it should be vivarta “from the viewpoint of” Brahman. Since avidya is not prime matter, its parindma is impossible, and since Brahman never changes, any kind of change including vivarta is untenable. Once knowledge dawns, there is neither parindma nor vivarta but only the oneness of the supreme Self and the individual self, or the experience of existence of Brahman and of non-existence of the world. The Upanisadic passages show not merely the process of creation but also oneness of Brahman, and yet Sankara reconciles both teachings by way of employing two viewpoints for the purpose of keeping the final purport, i.e. liberation which is the realization of the reality.

Liberation is in fact a decisive factor to judge the validity of the

Upanisadic passages; in other words, the purport of the texts is also determined by the fruit of liberation, as we can see in the previous quotation. The passages about transformation do not lead to the fruit or result (phala), which is one of sadvidhalinga to make out the purport, whereas those about the oneness of Brahman have the fruit of liberation.

Elsewhere, Sankara writes that all the passages about creation are eulogistic {arthavdda), and the thing to be imparted by the passages of the Upanisads is the realization of the Self.*'* He goes on to say:

Or a more reasonable explanation is that the Deity, who is omniscient and omnipotent and is a great conjurer, created all

*‘*Cf. A iB 2.1.intro., p. 55, lines 12-13: atrd’’tmdvabodharthamdtrasya vivcik- sitatvdtsarvo ’yamarthavdda ityadosah.

154 this like a magician; but the parable etc. are elaborated for the sake of easy instruction and comprehension just as it is done in ordinary life. For the mere acquaintance with anecdotes regarding creation etc. leads to no useful result, whereas it is well known in all the Upanisads that from the knowledge of the unity of the Self as Its real nature follows immortality as a result;

The theory of creation in the Upanisads is useful for easy instruction and comprehension in the empirical level. It is only the knowledge of oneness of Brahman that leads to the result, i.e. immortality, which is nothing but liberation. Therefore, it can be said that all the discourses about creation in the Upanisads are not to be freed from the scope of avidyd, for as long as avidyd is at work there is no result of liberation.

Not only this creation theory but also other discourses of the Upanisads are useful for the instructions of liberation within the realm of avidyd, and there is just one final purport of the unity of Brahman which leads to liberation. When Sankara understands the final purport for the textual harmony, there cannot be any other logical necessity than that other discourses except it should be under the category of avidyd.

Now, we have to clarify Sankara’s ontological position pertaining to the relation between Brahman and the world together with the role of avidyd in order to supplement his theory of creation in connection with the purport. As is generally known, Sankara admits that the world is not

*^Ibid., lines 13-16; Gambhira, p. 44: mdydvivadvd mahdmdydvl devah sarva- jnah sarvasaktih sarvametaccakdra sukhdvabodhanapratipattyartham lokavaddkhyd- yikddiprapanca iti yuktatarah paksah na hi srstydkhydyikddiparijndndtkimcit- phalamisyate. ekdtmyasvarupaparijfidndttvamrtatvam phalam sarvopanisatprasi- ddham.

155 absolutely unreal, for all common dealings and Vedic observances including creation, injunctions, and all the means of knowledge are valid before the realization of the Self.^*" However, he does not mean that the world is comparatively real, since the world is the result of superimposition on Brahman and the fictional reality is finally sublated when the true knowledge dawns. The world is therefore simply mithyd or anrta (false) ontologically, since “something unreal is denied on the basis of something real, as for instance a snake etc. on a rope etc.”*^

Then, what kind of relation does this superimposed world have with the reality or Brahmanl Regardless of the contention as to whether there is a real relation between them or not,^^ according to Sankara, there are both identity and difference between them. In the Upadesa-sdhasrl he says:

As you are possessed of consciousness, you exist for yourself and are not made to act by anyone else. For an independent conscious being is not made to act by another as it is not reasonable that one possessed of consciousness exists for the sake of another possessing consciousness, both being of the same nature like the lights of two lamps. Nor does one possessed of consciousness exist for the sake of another having no consciousness; for it is not possible that a thing exists for

“ See B S B 1.1.4, p. 23, lines 19-20; 2.1.14, p. 198, lines 17-22; ibid., p. 199, line 26- p. 200, line 1; 3.2.4, p. 347, lines 1-2. *’ln Sankara mithyd is used in the sense of “false” alone, and not of “ neither real nor unreal” , which the later Advaitins adhere to. In this way anrta has the same as mithya as opposite term of (true), cf. BSB 2.1.14, p. 199, line 26. TaB 2.1.1, p. 48, lines 29-30. *®BSB 3.2.22, p. 364, lines 18-19; Gambhira, p. 625: kimciddhi paramdrtha- mdlambydparamdrthah pratisidhyate yathd rajjvddisu sarpddayah. ®’D e Smet insists that between the cause and the effect, there is constant ontological dependence. O n the other hand. Comans argues that there can be no relation between the mithyd world and the para Brahman because the effect (clay- pot) is not a “ thing” whereas the cause (clay) alone is “ thing” , cf. R. V. D e Smet, “ Sankara and Aquinas on Creation” , Indian Philosophical Annual, vol. VI, p. 118, and Michael Com ans, The Method, p. 230.

156 itself for the very fact that it is non-conscious. Nor again is it seen that two non-conscious things exist for each other, as wood and a wall do not serve each other’s purpose.

Sankara suggests three possible relations such as between

consciousnesses, between consciousness and non-conscious thing, and

between non-conscious things. Consciousness cannot exist for others

{paratantra), but exists for Itself (svatantra), and therefore it does exist

neither for another consciousness nor for non-conscious thing. On the

other hand, non-conscious things cannot exist for one another, as a thing

never exists for itself. Again, although the self-existent consciousness

has no contact with anything, the non-conscious things are not devoid of

the very consciousness.^’ Thus a typical formula can be made as: A (the

world) is dependent on B {Brahman), B is not dependent on A, or A is

non-separated from B, B is separated from A. The formula can be

expressed in another way in terms of superimposition: A is

superimposed on B, so A appears to be different from B, and yet B

remains unchanged. After all, the final formula, which includes all these,

would be as: A and B are identical, but apart from B A is non-existent.’^

’°U SI 2.71, p. 136; Jagada, p. 46: evam tarhi svarthastvam citimattvanna parena prayujyase. na hi citimdnparatantrah parena prayujyate, citimatasciti- madarthatvanupapatteh samatvatpradlpaprakasayoriva. napi acitimadarthatvam citimato bhavati, acitimato’citimattvddeva svdrthasambandhanupapatteh. ndpi acitimatoh anyonydrthatvam drstam. na hi kdsthakudye anyonydrtham kurvdte. ®'Cf. U SI 2.58, pp. 133-134. Sankara compares this relation to that of the ether {dkdsa) and things. Though the ether has no contact with things, things are not devoid of the ether. ’^With regard to this formula S. S. R o y ’s statement gives a clear idea: “The world and the individual are no doubt identified with Brahman in the sense that Brahman is their ground, but as abstracted from Brahman, they have a tendency to claim, as it were, a domicile in another sphere, and as so domiciled, they may well have an entitative status of a pragmatic order, but it does not mean, that as subsisting in this manner, they are the same as their Ground.” cf. S. S. Roy, The

157 Sankara says in the commentary on the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad 2.4.7:

But how can we know that all this is but the Self now? Because of the inherence of Pure Intelligence in everything we conclude that everything is That. ••• Similarly nothing particular is perceived in the waking and dream states apart from Pure Intelligence. Therefore those things should be considered non­ existent apart from Pure Intelligence.^^

The identity of Brahman and the world lies in the fact that Brahman is self-existent and the world is dependent on Brahman, while the difference of the two that the world does not exist without dependence on Brahman.

The world is actually a different configuration of the same

Existence {Brahman), and the Existence is never affected by the world, which is merely a delusion. The world is unreal because of its being sublated (badhya), viz. of its superimposed characteristic. Ontologically there is only one Brahman without a second, and undifferentiated and differentiated ndmarupa are both unreal (mithyd). The idea of difference between God and a transmigratory soul, or between Brahman and the world is caused by non-discriminating knowledge or false knowledge, or avidyd, because of which the identity is hidden and the difference is

Heritage of Sankara, p. 96. ” BrB 2.4.7, p. 347, lines 3-15; Madhava, p. 249: katharn punaridanlmidam sarvamatmaiveti grhitum sakyate. cinmatrdnugamatsarvatra citsvarupataiveti gamyate. tatha prajndnavyatirekena svapnajdgaritayorna kascidvastuviseso grhyate. tasmdtprajfidnavyatirekendbhdvo yuktastasdm. Similar statement is seen in TaB 2.8.5, p. 92, lines 17-18; yaddhi yasya ndnydpeksarn svaruparn tattasya tattvam yadanydpeksarn na tattattvam. (Because, the reality is that which exists in its own right without dependence on others, and the unreality is that which depends on others.)

158 imagined.^'* The empirical world is a joint product of Brahman and avidyd,^^ but it is so in the sense that the world is identical with

Brahman as well as different from It, since the ontological ground of identity is Brahman and the epistemological ground of difference is avidyd. Once the advaita position is built up by the only ontological reality, Brahman, all the differences must be categorized by avidyd. This rule is applicable to the interpretation of the texts, for the purport of advaita has to be supported by the logic of avidyd. Once the purport of advaita becomes the criterion of the textual harmony, all other passages that do not contain that purport are to be placed in the empirical level which is governed by avidyd. Thus it is a natural result that the removal of difference or that of avidyd is taken to be the purport of the

Upanisads as it leads to the result of liberation.

As we have already said, Sankara suggests two purports of the

Upanisads, namely, the unity of Brahman, and the identity of Brahman and Atman, which are both expressed in a positive way. Just as liberation consists in the emergence of knowledge and the removal of ignorance, the purport of the texts is also completed by both positive and negative ways, which bring about but one result.Sankara says in the

Adhydsabhdsya of BSB that the study of allthe Upanisadic texts is begun in order to eradicate the cause of evil, i.e. adhydsa or avidyd, and

’^See B S B 1.1.5, p. 28, lines 8-9; 1.1.17, p. 39, lines 9-10; 1.3.19, p. 114, lines 1-2; 1.4.22, p. 173, lines 12-14; 2.1.14, p. 198, line 6; 2.1.22, p. 209, lines 14-15; 2.1.27, p. 213, lines 22-23; 3.2.5, p. 347, lines 10-11; 3.2.26, p. 367, lines 20-21. ” Cf. T. R. V. , “Samvrti and Paramartha in Madhyamika and Advaita Vedanta, Edited by H. G. Coward, Studies in Indian Thought, p. 190.

159 in order to obtain knowledge of the unity of Atman.^^ Sometimes, tiie removal of difference or that of avidyd is more seriously conceived to be the purport of the texts, as Sankara says:

If it should be objected that if Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the sdstra can impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that the aim of the sdstra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience. The sdstra’s purport is not to represent Brahman definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject {pratyagdtman, the inward Self) is never an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known, knowers, acts of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by Nescience.’^

Brahman cannot be presented by sdstra positively by saying this or that as It is not an object but the inmost Self of the knower. The scripture aims at removing the differences imagined by avidyd in order that

Brahman can be revealed as It is. In fact, the positive description of the identity is not enough to include all the Upanisadic passages, and furthermore, its logical difficulty that identical Brahman cannot be an object requires the help of a negative purport that the texts only remove the difference conjured up by avidyd. Therefore, two purports, namely, the inclusion of identity and the exclusion of difference are on the whole

’*Cf. B S B Adhydsabhdsya, p. 4, lines 4-5; asydnarthahetoh prahdndya, dtmai- katvavidydpratipattaye sarve vedantd drabhyante. ’^B S B 1.1.4, p. 16, lines 16-20; ThibautI, p. 32: avisayatve brahmanah sdstrayonitvdnupapattiriti cet,— na, avidydkalpitabhedanivrttiparatvdcchdstrasya. nahi sdstramidamtayd visayabhutam brahma pratipipddayisati. him tarhi. pratyagdtmatvendvisayatayd pratipddayadavidydkalpitam vedya-veditr-vedanddi- bhedamapanayati. Also, see BrB 2.1.20, p. 300, lines 14-16; 4.4.20, p. 683, lines 17-19.

160 the strategic and methodic division for the same purpose of the Self- realization. The passages which contain the identity and those which contain the difference are accordingly meaningful, for the former is acceptable in the realm of knowledge and the latter is rejectable in the scope of ignorance. It is by these two ways of purports, acceptability of knowledge of identity and rejectability of ignorance of difference, that the Upanisads can reach the textual harmony without discarding any single passage.

Up to now we have discussed Sankara’s theory of creation and the intervention of avidyd in it with regard to the purport of the Upanisads.

Finally, the terminological confusion which lies in the interpretation of

Sankara on the texts should be explicated here, particularly about the subject of creation and the primary matter of creation. The subject of creation is described as para Brahman, Brahman, saguna Brahman, para isvara, Isvara, etc., and the primary matter as ndmarupa, mayd, sakti, bljasakti, avyakta, etc. It seems that Sankara does not care for precise terminology to fit in a certain context as if all the terms have the same meaning. Again, it is an indisputable fact that in many cases those terms are used interchangeably, and are even synonymous with one another.

However, there is absolutely no defect in the terminology of Sankara if we consider the state of “text-interpretation”, in which the various opinions of the Upanisads are interpreted by a single manner, or through a single purport. The diverse terminologies of the Upanisads have to be used as they are, and they have to be meaningful even though they do not constitute the purport of the texts, since all the Upanisadic passages

161 are authoritative as sruti. Thus Sankara’s terminological usage should

very often be understood not by primary sense but by contextual sense, or even by the point of view. One and the same terminology is made use of indicating two or three or more meanings in different places, or it

serves as a representative term. Nevertheless it can be read according to the context or related viewpoint. Though the Upanisads do not convey a

single purport unanimously, they come to convey it through the interpretation of Sankara. His distinction of transcendental and empirical viewpoints which are corresponded to the scope of Brahman

and avidyd respectively makes him or us to re-read the Upanisadic texts in a different way.

3. Two Viewpoints and the Truth

Even though there is terminological difference from the

Madhyamika Buddhist two truths, paramdrthasatya (Absolute truth) and samvrtisatya (truth so-called), Sankara also takes two views of reality

and truth for granted in his system. However, Sankara’s distinction is more or less epistemological two viewpoints or standpoints on the ontological reality unlike the Madhyamika theory of two truths, which is thoroughly epistemological.^^ Jadunath Sinha points out that Sankara

’^Sankara clearly mentions, for example, that the reference of the superior and inferior Brahman should be determined by the consideration of the meaning of the sentence, cf. B S B 1.1.12, p. 35, lines 19-21. ^T. R. V. Murti says that the Madhyamika is epistemological in his procedure while the Vedanta is ontological. Thus he calls the former an advayavdda (no two views), and the latter an advaita (no two things), cf. T. R. V. Murti, “Samrti and Paramdrtha in Madhyamika and Advaita Vedanta” , Edited by H. G. Coward, Studies

162 admits three degrees of reality: (1) ontological (pdramdrthika sattd), (2)

empirical {vydvahdrika sattd), and (3) illusory reality {prdtibhdsika

sattd),^^ but his presentation is hardly intelligible, since Sankara does

not use the term ''prdtibhdsika", and he always adheres to one pair of

viewpoint. P. T. Raju even insists that Sankara accepts four levels of

reality: (1) absolute {pdramdrthika), (2) empirical {vydvahdrika), (3)

illusory {prdtibhdsika), and (4) non-existent level {tuccha),^^^ but these

distinctions are ascribed to the later Advaitins only. So far as Sankara

himself is concerned, as we have seen his expressions of vastutantra and purusatantra, the reality has no such degrees or levels, but the same

reality appears to be different according to viewpoints or standpoints.

This is why Sankara says that nobody knows the unreality of the world

before realization, and that the world is certainly to be known as unreal

after realization. The pdramdrthika viewpoint has relation to the

realization of the reality, while vydvahdrika concerns epistemological

error of the same reality.

Sankara uses the term paramdrtha in the sense of true or real thing,

or the highest entity (or the highest truth) which is nothing but Brahman.

The true knowledge that is the means of liberation is of a uniform nature

on account of its dependence on the thing itself {vastutantra), and that

which ever remains one and the same nature is said to be paramdrtha.^^^

in Indian Thought, p. 194. ‘“ Cf. J. Sinha, Indian Realism, p. 251. Venkatarama Iyer accepts Sinha’s three distinctions, but his English terms are different: (1) transcendental reality, (2) empirical reality, and (3) phenomenal reality, cf. M . K. V. Iyer, Advaita Vedanta According to Samkara, pp. 48-50. *®'Cf. P. T. Raju, Thought and Reality, p. 179. '“ Cf. B S B 2.1.11, p. 193, line 25- p. 194, line 1: tacca samyagjndnam-

163 That which gives uniform characteristic to the right knowledge is vastu like fire itself of the knowledge, “Fire is hot”, and yet with regard to knowledge for liberation this epistemological side of “the thing” (vastu) is the same as its ontological side of “the highest thing” (paramdrtha), or Brahman. Vyavahdra that includes human thought based on reasoning as well as human conduct (purusatantra), on the other hand, has no real relation with the reality, and consists of the epistemological defect of avidyd. In order to clarify these two terms in detail centering around two viewpoints we will intensively discuss BSB 2.1.14, where two terms most frequently appear with certainty.

In BSB 2.1.14 Sankara uses the terms on one side paramdrthatah, paramdrtha avasthd, paramdrtha abhiprdya, and pdramdrthika, and on the other side vyavahdra, vyavahdra gocara, vyavahdra visaya, vyavahdra avasthd, vyavahdra abhiprdya, and vydvahdrika. Just as the scope of avidyd is expressed by the terms gocara, visaya, and avasthd,^^^ paramdrtha and vyavahdra are also combined with those terms together with abhiprdya (import) and their respective modifications by the secondary suffix “ika" (relating to, regarding to). At any rate, all these terms are presentations of two different viewpoints or standpoints relating to paramdrtha and vyavahdra. These two viewpoints cannot coexist at the same time like knowledge and ignorance, since in the state of paramdrtha there is cessation of all the empirical dealings (vyavahdra

ekarupam, vastutantratvdt. ekarupena hyavasthito yo’rthah sa paramdrthah. ™ Cf. Chapter 2, fn. 114.

164 abhdva).^^ When the perfect knowledge of the reality dawns, there is no more ignorance to be removed; similarly in the state of highest reality there is no more empirical difference, which is caused by avidyd.^^^ The two viewpoints are further cleared up in the light of other terms. In the case of pdramdrthika Sankara uses the term vastuvrttena almost synonymously in the context,and therefore, the highest or ultimate viewpoint is based on the thing itself which is unchanging and everlasting reality. In the case of vydvahdrika the term vyavahdra stands not only for worldly dealings (laukika) but also for the Vedic religious dealings (vaidika), which are both justified by the relation with the manifoldness based on karma-kdnda of the Vedas. Vydvahdrika viewpoint is therefore understood as those views that are dependent on the difference or manifoldness produced by worldly and religious activities, and that are simply attached to “becoming” but not to “being” of pdramdrthika viewpoint. These points will be more ascertained if we look into Sankara’s motivation to employ these two viewpoints in BSB

2.1.14.

Sankara deals with the relationship between cause and effect relying on the Upanisadic passages in BSB 2.1.14. He starts discussion with the emphasis on the non-difference between cause and effect:

B S B 2.1.14, p. 201, line 18: ••• evam paramarthdvasthayam sarvavyava- hdrdbhdvam vadanti veddntdh sarve. Also, see ibid., p. 198, line 2. '“^Sankara clearly says that the domain of empirical experience or dealings (samvyavahdravisaya) is made by ignorance {avidyd). e.g. TaB 3.10.6, p. 116, lines 5-6. “’^Cf. B S B 2.1.14, p. 196, line 20: natu vastuvrttena vikdro ndma kascidasti. '°^Cf. ibid., p. 197, line 14: ••• ndndtvdmsena tu karmakdnddsrayau laukika- vaidikavyavahdrau setsyata iti. Also, see laukika-vaidika-vyavahdra: ibid., p. 198, line 22; p. 200, line 1.

165 The refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect.’”*

The identity between Brahman and the manifold world is known from the sruti passages about “origin” {drambhana) etc., for in the Upanisads the modification of Brahman including origin etc. is to show an illustration how knowledge of everything is known through that of one

Brahman. Once the false identification between the changing body and the eternal Atman is sublated just as the idea of superimposed snake is removed by the real rope, all the empirical things, which are grounded on the false knowledge of independent existence of individual soul are also sublated at the same time. Thus the unity is seen from the viewpoint of pdramdrthika, and the manifoldness that is evolved out of false

1 knowledge, i.e. avidyd is seen from that of vydvahdrika. At the end of

BSB 2.1.14 Sankara connects these two viewpoints with the theory of creation of the universe by saying that the creatorship etc. of Isvara are valid within the domain of empirical dealings {vyavahdravisaya), but they do not belong to the Self after the emergence of knowledge in reality {paramdrthatah). It is by this perspective of Sankara supported by the Vedantic texts that he says the cessation of all empirical dealings

Ibid., p. 196, lines 9-11; ThibautI, p. 320: abhyupagamya cemam vydvahdrikam bhoktrbhogyalaksanam vibhdgam syallokavaditi parihdro'bhihitah, natvayam vibhdgah paramdrthato'sti, yasmdttayoh kdryakdranayorananyatvam- avagamyate. ‘“’Cf. ibid., p. 198, lines 5-6; ••• ekatvamevaikam pdramdrthikam darsayati. mithydjndnavijrmbhitam ca ndndtvam.

166 in the state of reality. Sankara says;

The Bhagavadgita also (‘The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord receives no one’s sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance; hence all creatures are deluded;’ BG 5.14-15) declares that in reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal world is concerned. Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgita states; compare BrU 4.4.22, ‘He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded;’ and BG 18.61, ‘The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.’ The Sutrakdra also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding Sutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).

What Sankara wants to say here is that all the important three texts of the Vedanta tell unanimously the identity of the cause {Brahman or isvara) and the effect (the world or the individual) from the viewpoint

" “ibid., p. 201, line 18- p. 202, line 1; ThibautI, p. 330: tathesvaragltasvapi— ‘na kartrtvam na karmdni lokasya srjati prabhuh. na karmaphalasamyogam svabhdvastu pravartate. nadatte kasyacitpdpam na caiva sukrtam vibhuh. ajndnendvrtam jndnam tena muhyanti jantavah’ iti paramdrthdvasthdydm- isitrlsitavyddivyavahdrdbhdvah pradarsyate. vyavahdrdvasthdydm tuktah srutdva- plsvarddivyavahdrah— ‘esa sarvesvara esa bhutddhipatiresa bhutapdla esa seturvidharana esdm lokdndmasambheddya' iti. tathd cesvaragltdsvapi— ‘isvarah sarvabhutdndm hrddese'rjuna tisthati. bhrdmayansarvabhQtdni yantrdrudhdni mdyayd' iti. sutrakdro'pi paramdrthdbhiprdyena 'tadananyatvam' itydha. vyavahdrdbhiprdyena tu ‘sydllokavat ’ iti mahdsamudrasthdniyatdm brahmanah kathayati.

167 of the reality and the difference of the both from the viewpoint of the practical. All “becoming”, though valid from the empirical, practical, or phenomenal viewpoint, is said to be unreal on the ground of “being” or

Brahman. Precisely speaking, there is only “being”, and the superimposed “becoming” is falsely appeared to be real due to the epistemological error, i.e. adhydsa or avidyd. Thus the Upanisadic purport of advaita is maintained by these two viewpoints on the truth or reality, or Brahman. The distinction of two viewpoints answers to

Sankara not merely for his philosophical effort of systematization but also for the consistency of his interpretation on the Upanisadic texts. / Rather, the consistent interpretation through two viewpoints makes his philosophy possible, since, for instance, two viewpoints on the theory of creation and causality, which lead to the consistent truth of the texts result in his non-dualistic system.'"

It may be said that the connection of two viewpoints, namely, pdramdrthika and vydvahdrika, with the textual harmony for the truth f seems to be strengthened by another pair of terminology of Sankara, sdstradrsti and lokadrsti. Swami Satchidanandendra equates the former pair to the latter one by illustrating BSB 2.2.3."^ Sankara says:

In Brahma-Sutra Bhdshya II.i.24, so far as ordinary worldly

*'*G. C. Pande remarks: “ As a result, in interpreting the Vedantic texts as a consistent system of spiritual non-dualism capable of facing logical objections, Sankara was led to recognize two voices within the Vedantic texts, one voice clearly and directly affirmed the central truth of Vedanta, the other spoke of a lower and relative truth relevant to those still engaged in religious worship, meditation or works. This mode of interpretative reconciliation became possible on account of the theory of Two Truths.” cf. G. C. Pande, Life and Thought of Safikaracdrya, p. 174. I I A f Cf. Satchidanandendra Saraswati, Sankara’s Clarification, p. 54.

168 experience is concerned, it has been indicated, that a cause depending only on itself, may bring about an effect without needing any outside means; but from the point of view of the Shdstra, the conclusion that is inevitably arrived at in this Sutra is that in all cases, effects have to depend upon the Lord, and it does not contradict (what is stated in the previous Sutra).^^^

From the viewpoint of the convention (lokadrsti) it seems that the effect or the world is at work without an external cause, just as milk has natural tendency of nourishment for calves. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the scripture (sdstradrsti) all effects are dependent on God, since the effect is non-existent apart from its cause. To be brief, the identity of cause and effect, or Brahman and the world is not known in the conventional world, but is known in the Vedantic scriptures. This is more explicitly described in Sankara’s commentary on the

Brhaddranyaka Upanisad 3.5.1:

But when name and form are tested from the standpoint of the highest truth in the light of the above Sruti texts, as to whether they are different from the Supreme Self or not, they cease to be separate entities, like the foam of water, or like the modifications (of clay), such as a jar. But the believers of the highest truth, while discussing in accordance with the Srutis, the actual existence or non-existence of things apart from Brahman, conclude that Brahman alone is the one without a second, beyond all finite relations.

"^BSB 2.2.3, p. 223, lines 16-18; Apte, p. 350: ityatra tu bahyanimitta- nirapeksamapi svdsrayam kdryam bhavatityetallokadrstyd nidarsitani. sastradrstyd tu punah sarvatraivesvardpeksatvamdpadyamdnam na pardnudyate. “ “BrB 3.5.1, p. 451, lines 16-18, p. 452, lines 11-13; Madhava, pp. 332-333: yadd tu paramdrthadrstyd paramdtmatattvdcchrutyanusdribhiranyatvena niriipyamd-

169 The reason that Sankara adopts two viewpoints here is not different from

other cases, for the difference between Brahman and the world is denied

from the viewpoint of the highest truth. The significant thing in these

passages is, however, whether the sastric viewpoint {sdstradrsti) is used

synonymously with the highest viewpoint {paramdrthika or paramdrthadrsti) or not. Sankara seems to say that the viewpoint of the

truth has to be in accordance with sruti texts, especially with the

passages that contain the purport of advaita. It may be suggested that

there are two reasons to support the identity of sdstradrsti and paramdrthadrsti: first, there is no other source to impart the highest

truth or reality other than the Upanisadic texts, and second, the

distinction of two viewpoints still belong to the realm of empirical level

so far as there is no such distinction after the Self-realization. In the

case of vydvahdrika and lokadrsti it is undoubtful that both terms are

identical with each other. Sankara goes on to say:

We do not maintain the existence of things different from Brahman in the state when the highest truth has been definitely known, as the Surti say, ‘One only without a second’, and ‘Without interior or exterior’. Nor do we deny the validity, for the ignorant, of actions with their factors and results while the relative world of name and form exists. Therefore scriptural or conventional outlook depends entirely on knowledge or ignorance. Hence there is no apprehension of a contradiction between them. In fact, all schools must admit the existence or

ne namarupe mrdddivikdrayadvastvantare tattvato na stah salilaphenaghatddivikd- ravadeva ■■■. paramdrthavddibhistu srutyanusdrena nirupyamdne vastuni kirn tattvato’sti vastu kimvd ndstlti brahmaikamevddvitiyam sarvasamvyavahdra- sunyamiti nidhlryate ■■■.

170 non-existence of the phenomenal world according as it is viewed from the relative or the absolute standpoint.*'^

According to these passages, the scriptural and conventional viewpoints are again corresponded to the absolute and relative viewpoint respectively. As the textual situation of which the passages are classified into two viewpoints is a matter of the practical situation, the contents of two viewpoints inside texts and outside texts are not different from each other. There is conventional or relative outlook because of non-discrimination or ignorance of the Self, and where the true knowledge of the Self is delivered, scriptural and absolute outlook is established. Since knowledge of the reality is imparted only by the scripture, the pair of sdstradrsti and lokadrsti is emphasized, but generally, since the realms of knowledge and ignorance are prevailed not only in the scriptures themselves but also in the conventional world, the pair of pdramarthika and vydvahdrika can be accepted to be more proper usage of two viewpoints. Without the distinction of the Upanisadic texts according to two viewpoints, or, without the consistent truth of the texts through the correct interpretation, the truth followed by liberation is impossible due to the obscurity of its sources and means. Therefore, it may be concluded that the device of two viewpoints of Sankara is basically to establish the textual harmony for the truth, and is

*’^Ibid., p. 452, lines 13-19; Madhava, p. 333: nahi paramdrthavadhdrana- nisthdydm vastvantardstitvam pratipadydmahe. "ekamevddvitlyam" “anantaram- abdhyam” iti sruteh. na ca ndmarupavyavahdrakdle tvavivekindm kriydkdraka- phalddisamvyavahdro ndstlti pratisidhyate. tasmdjjiidndjndne apeksya sarvah samvyavahdrah idstriyo laukikasca. ato na kdcana virodhasankd. sarvavddindm- apyaparihdryah paramdrthasamvyavahdrakrto vyavahdrah.

171 secondarily to steer one’s liberation to actuality.

In the above passages Sankara says that two viewpoints are not contradictory because they are dependent on knowledge and ignorance respectively. What he wants to suggest is that just as ignorance is removed by knowledge the relative viewpoint is sublated by the absolute one. Even though the purport of advaita seems to be contradicted to the worldly difference of ndmarupa in the Upanisadic passages, if two viewpoints are admitted on the ground of knowledge and ignorance, all the Upanisadic passages come under the textual harmony without contradiction. There are many instances how much Sankara emphasizes two spheres of the Upanisads, namely, knowledge and ignorance, which are nothing but two scopes of pdramdrthika and vydvahdrika. Sankara says:

The whole of this Upanisad is exclusively devoted to showing the distinction between the spheres of knowledge and ignorance. We shall show that this is the import of the whole book."^

That the truth which is constituted by the results of karma, the subject matter of the lower knowledge, is only relatively so. But this is the subject matter of the higher knowledge, since it is possessed of the characteristics of the supreme Reality.”^

“®BrB 1.4.10, p. 177, lines 16-18; Madhava, p. 118: sarva hiyamupanisad- vidydvibhagapradarsanenaivopakslnd. yathd caiso'rthah krtsnasya sdstrasya tatha pradarsayisydmah. Also, see BrB 2.1.intro., p. 252, lines 9-12. “’MuB 2.1.1, p. 19, lines 11-12; Gambhira, p. 107: yadaparavidydvisayam karmaphalalaksanam satyam tadapeksikam. tu paravidydvisayam paramdrtha- sallaksanatvdt tadetatsatyam yathdbhutam vidydvisayam. Also, see, PrB 4.1, p. 29, lines 18-22.

172 Two viewpoints are merely subjective and epistemological because their criteria are knowledge or higher knowledge and ignorance or lower knowledge. Sankara does not use the term such as paramdrthasat and vydvaharikasat, which may be the expressions of degrees of reality, and therefore, it cannot be said that the world has a certain degree of

1 1 Q reality. The truth as the reality does not undergo change whether it is viewed from the relative or absolute viewpoint. In the relative viewpoint the superimposed thing is believed to be the reality due to ignorance, and in the absolute viewpoint the reality is revealed as it is by means of knowledge. Where knowledge of the reality dawns, the truth and the reality are one and the same;“^ and there is no distinction at all.

Sankara’s two viewpoints are conducive to the harmony of the text for the presentation of the truth, and in actuality these are helpful for obtaining liberation. However, these viewpoints are not as conclusive as the pair of knowledge and ignorance, for the latter pair everywhere can replace the former one in Sankara’s writings. Especially about vydvahdrika viewpoint and the view of avidyd Swami Satchidanandendra observes:

Now the Vedantic view is that all our ideas, speech and conduct based upon practical life {vydvahdrika), are really due to

“®Paul Hacker states: “Even in Gaudapada, Sankara, and Mandanamisra, the earliest Advaita philosophers whose works we possess, we find expressions which attribute to the world a certain degree of reality.” cf. Hacker, “The Theory of Degrees of Reality in Advaita Vedanta”, p. 138. ‘*’Cf. Satchidanandendra Saraswati, Misconceptions about Sankara, p. 21. He does not distinguish advaya, which is suggested by T. R. V. Murti to call the Madhyamika philosophy, from advaita by saying that the ultimate Intuition of Brahman is neither ontological nor epistemological.

173 ignorance from the Pdramdrthika (transcendental, Really Real) stand-point. So then, Vydvahdrika view is the same as the view of ignorance (dvidydkadrsti) or the view that distinguishes the knower and the known {pramdnaprameyadrsti), or the view of ordinary life (lokadrsti), or the view based upon waking life (Jdgraddrsti). It is on the inborn tendency of the human mind to falsely superimpose the Self and the not-Self (the body, the senses and the mind of waking state) upon each other that this Vyavaharic view is based.

Whatever name he uses to call the view that is based on other than the

Self due to superimposition (adhydsa), it should be regarded as vydvahdrika viewpoint within the realm of avidyd. Apparent contradiction in the Upanisads, according to Sankara, is caused by the non-apprehension of this viewpoint of avidyd, and because of this method of Sankara, his commentaries can also be read according to two viewpoints. Whenever he says that something belongs to the domain, scope, realm, or category {visaya, avasthd, gocara) of avidyd, he means that that something must be viewed from the empirical or relative point of view. That which is caused by avidyd can at best be the pseudo-reality as far as empirical viewpoint is concerned. Thus it may be said tiiat

Sankara’s usage of avidyd together with vidyd or jndna definitely leads to the theory of two viewpoints. When there are two discourses pertaining to the scopes of knowledge and ignorance either in the

Upanisads or in Sankara’s works, two viewpoints are a device to solve the contradiction of two discourses for the harmony of non-dualistic truth. The most basic meaning of avidyd is superimposition of the non-

'^®Satchidanandendra Saraswati, Sankara’s Clarification, p. 55.

174 Self on the Self; then how would it be possible that all the Upanisadic discourses about the non-Self be freed from the scope of avidydl

However, those discourses are not completely meaningless, since they serve as the instruction of the reality and for the Self-realization, which is the real purport of the texts. Sankara’s logic of avidyd, before its removal by knowledge, does not stop its operation until liberation is drawn from the inside text to the outside text.

175