The Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Gauge Theories
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Gauging What’s Real This page intentionally left blank Gauging What’s Real The Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Gauge Theories Richard Healey 1 1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford 26 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York Richard Healey 2007 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–928796–3 10987654321 Contents Preface ix Acknowledgements xiii Introduction xv 1. What is a gauge theory? 1 1.1 Classical electromagnetism: a paradigm gauge theory 3 1.2 A fiber bundle formulation 7 1.2.1 Electromagnetic interactions of quantum particles 14 1.2.2 Electromagnetic interactions of matter fields 18 2. The Aharonov–Bohm effect 21 2.1 Fiber bundles 26 2.2 A gauge-invariant, local explanation? 31 2.3 Geometry and topology in the Aharonov–Bohm effect 40 2.4 Locality in the Aharonov–Bohm effect 44 2.5 Lessons for classical electromagnetism 54 3. Classical gauge theories 58 3.1 Non-Abelian Yang–Mills theories 58 3.1.1 The fiber bundle formulation 64 3.1.2 Loops, groups, and hoops 70 3.1.3 Topological issues 74 3.2 A fiber bundle formulation of general relativity 77 3.2.1 A gravitational analog to the Aharonov–Bohm effect 78 4. Interpreting classical gauge theories 82 4.1 The no gauge potential properties view 83 4.2 The localized gauge potential properties view 85 4.2.1 Problems defining theoretical terms 91 4.2.2 Leeds’s view 99 4.2.3 Maudlin’s interpretation 102 4.3 The non-localized gauge potential properties view 104 4.4 A holonomy interpretation 111 4.4.1 Epistemological considerations 112 4.4.2 Objections considered 119 4.4.3 Semantic considerations 122 4.5 Metaphysical implications: non-separability and holism 123 vi contents 5. Quantized Yang–Mills gauge theories 129 5.1 How to quantize a classical field 131 5.2 Coulomb gauge quantization 133 5.3 Lorenz gauge quantization 135 5.4 Classical electromagnetism as a constrained Hamiltonian system 136 5.5 The free Maxwell field as a Hamiltonian system 139 5.6 Path-integral quantization 141 5.7 Canonical quantization of non-Abelian fields 143 5.8 Path-integral quantization of non-Abelian fields 145 5.9 Interacting fields in the Lagrangian formulation 146 6. The empirical import of gauge symmetry 149 6.1 Two kinds of symmetry 150 6.2 Observing gauge symmetry? 155 6.3 The gauge argument 159 6.4 Ghost fields 167 6.5 Spontaneous symmetry-breaking 169 6.6 The θ-vacuum 175 6.7 Anomalies 182 7. Loop representations 184 7.1 The significance of loop representations 185 7.2 Loop representations of the free Maxwell field 186 7.3 Loop representations of other free Yang–Mills fields 192 7.4 Interacting fields in loop representations 195 7.5 The θ-vacuum in a loop representation 197 7.6 Conclusion 198 8. Interpreting quantized Yang–Mills gauge theories 200 8.1 Auyang’s event ontology 200 8.2 Problems of interpreting a quantum field theory 203 8.2.1 Particle interpretations 205 8.2.2 Bohmian interpretations 209 8.2.3 Copenhagen interpretations 212 8.2.4 Everettian interpretations 215 8.2.5 Modal interpretations 218 9. Conclusions 220 A. Electromagnetism and its generalizations 229 B. Fiber bundles 233 C. The constrained Hamiltonian formalism 248 contents vii D. Alternative quantum representations 257 E. Algebraic quantum field theory 265 F. Interpretations of quantum mechanics 272 F.1 The Copenhagen interpretation 272 F.2 Bohmian mechanics 274 F.3 Everettian interpretations 276 F.4 Modal interpretations 278 Bibliography 280 Index 287 This page intentionally left blank Preface The quest for the deep structure of the world, begun by the pre-Socratic philosophers some two and a half thousand years ago, was pursued with great success by physicists during the 20th century. The revolutions wrought by relativity and quantum theory in the first quarter century created the scaffolding around which theories of the fundamental forces of nature were then constructed. After some mid-century struggles, by the end of the century these theories had been consolidated into two ‘‘packages.’’ Gravity has now been successfully described up to cosmological distances by Einstein’s general theory of relativity, while what has come to be known as the Standard Model has been successfully confirmed in its predictions of the behavior of the so- called elementary particles and their interactions down to the tiny subnuclear distance scales explored by high energy accelerators. While physicists keep trying to combine these into a single overarching theory, now is an appropriate time to pause and take stock of what has already been achieved. By ‘‘taking stock,’’ I don’t mean offering a detailed historical account lauding scientists and their achievements, though the history is fascinating and there is plenty of praise to spread around. Nor do I mean popularizing contemporary theories of fundamental forces to engage the interest of the casual reader by sub- stituting metaphor for faithful exposition and anecdote for critical analysis. What is needed is a careful logical and philosophical examination of the conceptual structure and broader implications of contemporary theories of fundamental forces like that which followed the rise of relativity and quantum theory. Logical positivists like Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick, along with many other philosophers including Bertrand Russell and (especially) Hans Reichenbach, eagerly undertook such an examination of the physical theories of their day. Karl Popper acknowledged Einstein’s relativity as a major stimulus to the development of his own critical realist view of scientific investigation, while rejecting what he saw as the instrumentalism infecting Bohr and Heisenberg’s understanding of quantum theory. The philosophy of physics has since become a flourishing branch of the philosophy of science, raising the level of foundational discussion of relativity and quantum theory within this small interdisciplinary community of philosophers, physicists, and mathematicians. But science has moved on, and there are as yet few (if any) sustained investigations into the conceptual foundations of the theories of fundamental forces that emerged as an important culmination of twentieth century physics. I offer this book as both a contribution and a stimulus to the study of the conceptual foundations of gauge theories of fundamental interactions. I have x preface changed my mind and corrected my own misunderstandings often enough while working toward it to realize quite clearly that the book does not represent the last word—or even my last word—on this topic. If I have conveyed a sense of its intellectual interest and importance, while provoking some reader to do a better job, then I will be satisfied. To whom is this book addressed? To my fellow philosophers of physics, certainly—but I set out to reach a far wider class of readers. There is much food for thought here for other philosophers; not only for philosophers of science, but also for general epistemologists and metaphysicians. We have here a paradigm of reliable, objective knowledge of matters very distantly related to human sensory experience. But what are the scope and limits of this knowledge, and by what processes and what reasoning have we come by it? Indeed, how exactly should we understand the content of theoretically mediated knowledge claims in this domain? Do fundamental forces act at a distance, and if not how (and on what) do they act? Do traditional distinctions between matter and force even make sense in these theories, in the absence of any clear ontology of localized particles or fields? I write also for students and practitioners of physics and other sciences. The distinction between philosophy and science may be convenient for librarians and educational administrators, but it marks no true intellectual boundary. Physics is a source of both novel concepts and intractable conceptual problems. Understanding these concepts and dealing with these problems is the common concern of the physicist and the philosopher. Each can learn from the other, and both can learn from the mathematician. Professional commitments are only a potential hindrance to what is best viewed as an essentially collaborative enterprise. Students of physics typically have little time to reflect on the foundations of their discipline, and even find themselves discouraged from such reflections by their teachers.