DOCSLIB.ORG

Ghazni City As Vulnerable to Taleban As Before

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ghazni City As Vulnerable to Taleban As Before Unheeded Warnings (2): Ghazni city as vulnerable to Taleban as before Author : Fazal Muzhary Published: 30 December 2018 Downloaded: 22 December 2018 Download URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-admin/post.php The Taleban may have been pushed back out of Ghazni city after their five-day siege in August, but they have continued to expand into new territory around the city. They now have full control of eight districts in Ghazni province. They control the Ghazni-Paktika highway and continue to put pressure on the Kabul-Kandahar highway. In this, the second of a two-part series, AAN’s Fazal Muzhary, who visited Ghazni before the August attack and several times since (and with input from Ali Yawar Adili), finds the city still vulnerable to another Taleban attack. An upsurge in night raids and airstrikes has limited Taleban movement, but also caused civilian casualties and impelled some people to leave their villages. As yet, these have had no impact on the Taleban’s control of territory in this strategic province. The first part in this mini-series, "Unheeded Warnings (1): Looking back at the Taleban attack on Ghazni" can be read here. Increasing Taleban control of the districts Levels of anxiety among the inhabitants of Ghazni city that the Taleban will attack again has not diminished in the four months since the insurgents’ onslaught in August. People from various neighbourhoods, such as Bazazi, the Kandahar bus stand, Gudali, Pashtunabad, Qala-ye Jawz, Rauza and the Ali Lala Saheb all described to AAN how they had lost confidence in their 1 / 10 government’s ability to protect them. They have seen that the government has redeployed Afghan National Police (ANP) to only some of the security posts on the outskirts of the city that were taken over or destroyed by the Taleban in August 2018. Meanwhile, they have also watched with dread as the Taleban have expanded their control over several more districts in the province, including ones close to the city. Residents’ views are shared by elected representatives and officials from the province. MP Abdul Qayum Sajjadi, for example, warned of a possible second fall of Ghazni in a statement that he shared on Facebook on 15 October 2018. He urged President Ashraf Ghani to order an anti-Taleban clearing operation in the province (see his remarks here in Dari). Speaking at the ceremony to introduce a new provincial police chief on 23 October, governor Wahidullah Kalimzai raised his concerns that the war “was still intensifying, the security forces stepping back and the Taleban are tightening their siege of Ghazni city” (more about this below). According to provincial council member Abdul Bari Shelgarai (quoted here), in September the Taleban had full control of six of Ghazni’s 19 districts – Deh Yak, Khwaja Omari, Ajristan, Jaghatu, Jaghatu and Khogyani– as well as the central district, with the exception of Ghazni city itself (see Ghazni’s profile here here), The governor’s spokesman, Aref Nuri (quoted in the same news report), played down the situation and claimed the Taleban controlled only three districts, namely Khwaja Omari, Ajristan and Nawa. However, Nuri admitted to AAN that the government considered districts to be under government control if government security forces were present somewhere in the district, even if their presence was limited to only a few security posts. He insisted the government had the ability to retake these three districts, but there were “not enough forces” to protect territory once they were recaptured. On 20 September, the Taleban claimed they had captured another district in the province, Abband, on the main Kabul-Kandahar highway about 76 kilometres south of Ghazni city. Shelgarai told AAN the district had not fallen to the Taleban and that the police were able to hold the attackers back. He added, however, that the Taleban remained in control of most areas of the district. By early November, the number of districts definitely in Taleban hands, ie with the insurgents controlling the district centre and no government officials present, had increased further – to eight. The Taleban took complete control of Andar (apart from two military bases) on 15 October and Khugyani on 5 November (see this Pajhwok report, and other reports here and here). On the day Andar fell, the Afghan National Police (ANP) unit stationed in the district compound abandoned their position and moved to a nearby military base in the Chahrdiwal area. The ANA also has control over another military base in Senai village of the district. The ANA are currently holding a purely defensive position in both. Even so, in a phone interview with AAN, Nuri insisted the government still controlled Andar, even though, as the author has witnessed, 2 / 10 Taleban fighters are now in the district compound, which had been controlled by government forces in late October 2018. (More detail on the situation in Andar can be found below.) Elsewhere in Ghazni province, the insurgents attacked the district centres of Jaghori and Malestan in late October 2018 and came close to capturing both on 7 and 10 November. The attacks set off mass displacement and fears that the Taleban might even push further north into the Hazara-inhabited districts of Maidan-Wardak province (more detail in these AAN analyses, here and here). The Taleban have since been repelled from both districts, but they continue to control major transport routes through Qarabagh, Nawur and Gilan districts. Although most schools in the two districts, which had closed following the Taleban attack, have now reopened for this year’s final exams, some remain closed, especially in areas of Jaghori bordering Gilan and Muqur in Ghazni and Khak-e Afghan in Zabul provinces. IDPs have been reluctant to return to these places after the Taleban blocked roads leading to the two border districts on 9 December (here). On 18 November, the Ministry of Interior announced it [sic] would establish two territorial army companies (tolai) and mobilise 600 locals within the framework of public uprising forces in the Jaghori and Malestan, to maintain security in their areas. The Territorial Army is a new local defence force under the command of the Ministry of Defence, while uprising forces are supposedly spontaneous rebellions organised by locals against the insurgency, generally funded and often organised by the National Directorate of Security (NDS). Neither fall under the Ministry of Interior’s remit. Local sources, including a district security official who asked not to be named, told AAN that the Taleban had ordered local people in Jaghori to ask the new government security forces dispatched to the area after the attack to leave the district. They had also ordered the people not to allow the formation of uprising forces or territorial army units in their district. The situation in Ghazni city As for the provincial capital, the Taleban are maintaining a considerable presence in many areas along the outskirts of the city. AAN spoke to several local residents including a driver, Esmatullah, who said he and other locals had seen Taleban in the Qala-ye Mirai area, no more than three kilometres south of Ghazni’s police headquarters. Other residents, such as drivers and labourers living in this area, confirmed the presence of Taleban fighters there. A businessman in the city, Naqeb, told the author the Taleban had free movement in the Gudali area, about three kilometres to the northwest of the police headquarters. When President Ghani made a second trip to Ghazni city on 27 September, the Taleban used those positions, notably in the Jangalbagh area, a little further out, about five kilometres to the northwest of the city, to fire rockets into Ghazni to disrupt his visit. On 21 November, the author witnessed the Taleban rocketing the city again, when General Scott Miller, commander of NATO and United States forces, visited (media report here). One of the rockets hit a private health clinic about 300 metres from the author’s own residence, in the centre of the city. Luckily, there were no casualties. 3 / 10 The Taleban’s ban on telephone companies operating between seven and ten o’ clock in the morning, already in place between 4 and 20 September, further stoked public concerns. Although the Taleban have not actually lifted this ban, phone companies currently only operate intermittently. Government officials mostly communicate with the help of the state-run Salaam network. Other networks only cover the city and limited areas along its outskirts; sometimes conversations are cut off. More detail on Andar district, now under full Taleban control Andar is one of the districts on the fringes of Ghazni city’s suburbs. Its centre, Mirai, is merely a 30-minute drive away. For Andar’s population, the district’s takeover by the Taleban on 15 October actually normalised public services. Full control by one side has proved a better situation for civilians than their district being contested. A week after Afghan security forces abandoned the district centre, the town reopened. Shops that had previously had to shut because of the fighting, as the Taleban tightened their grip on the district compound, the ANP forces’ last bastion, in May 2018 (see AAN’s previous dispatch here),are again open; it is ‘business as normal’. The Taleban gave permission for the Sultan Shahabuddin High School to move back into its old building in the district centre on 25 October; it had to leave its premises there in 2006 when Taleban attacks intensified that year. Education officials had relocated the school to Narmi, a Taleban-controlled village where it continued to operate in a primary school building. The school was managed by the Taleban, but funded by the government.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Fråga-Svar Afghanistan. Resväg Mellan Kabul Och Ghazni
    2015-09-03 Fråga-svar Afghanistan. Resväg mellan Kabul och Ghazni Fråga - Går det flyg mellan Kabul och Ghazni? - Är resvägen mellan Kabul och Ghazni säker för hazarer? - Finns det några organisationer i landet som kan bistå andra med t.ex. eskort för att göra resan säker? - Hur kan underåriga ta sig fram? Svar Nedan följer en sammanställning av information från olika källor. Sammanställningen gör inte anspråk på att vara uttömmande. Refererade dokument bör alltid läsas i sitt sammanhang. Vad gäller säkra resvägar så kan läget snabbt förändras. Vad som gällde då nedanstående dokument skrevs gäller kanske inte idag! Austalia Refugee Review Tribunal (May 2015): Domen handlar om en hazar från Ghazni som under lång tid levt som flykting i Iran. Underlaget till beslutet beskriver situationen angående resvägar i Afghanistan speciellt i provinsen Ghazni. Se utdrag nedan: 33. DFAT’s 2014 Report statcontains the following in relation to road security in Afghanistan: Insecurity compounds the poor condition of Afghanistan’s limited road network, particularly those roads that pass through areas contested by insurgents. Taliban and criminal elements target the national highway and secondary roads, setting up arbitrary armed checkpoints. Sida 1 av 8 Official ANP and ANA checkpoints designed to secure the road are sometimes operated by poorly-trained officers known to use violence to extort bribes. More broadly, criminals and insurgents on roads target all ethnic groups, sometimes including kidnapping for ransom. It is often difficult to separate criminality (such as extortion) from insurgent activity. Individuals working for, supporting or associated with the Government and the international community are at high risk of violence perpetrated by insurgents on roads in Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces
    European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9485-650-0 doi: 10.2847/115002 BZ-02-20-565-EN-N © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © Al Jazeera English, Helmand, Afghanistan 3 November 2012, url CC BY-SA 2.0 Taliban On the Doorstep: Afghan soldiers from 215 Corps take aim at Taliban insurgents. 4 — AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT Acknowledgements This report was drafted by the European Asylum Support Office COI Sector. The following national asylum and migration department contributed by reviewing this report: The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, it but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY
    [Show full text]
  • Daily Situation Report 31 October 2010 Safety and Security Issues Relevant to Sssi Personnel and Clients
    Strategic SSI - Afghanistan DAILY SITUATION REPORT 31 OCTOBER 2010 SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES RELEVANT TO SSSI PERSONNEL AND CLIENTS STANDING THREAT ASSESSMENT (KABUL): Threat reports continue to indicate that insurgents aspire to conduct coordinated attacks in Kabul City, as such the threat remains extant. Recent threat reporting has also indicated likely reconnaissance of areas and businesses frequented by members of the international community. Although no significant attacks were carried out in Kabul during the recent parliamentary election, or indeed after the event, the recent reduction in physical security in the city may provide insurgents with exploitable opportunities to carry out attacks. Suicide and complex attacks remain the preferred choice for insurgents in order to gain maximum casualties figures and the associated high degree of media attention. It remains possible that insurgents will still seek to undermine the democratic process by conducting high profile attacks when the final results are announced at the end of October. It remains prudent for international agencies in the Kabul area to maintain a high degree of security vigilance. Sporadic IDF attacks in the city centre are to be expected. Any attacks are likely to consist of between one and four 107 mm rockets launched towards the city centre. Incidents of intimidation, executions by insurgents and targeting of government officials are increasing throughout the country. It seems to be a form of revenge by insurgents as they have lost more than 300 insurgent commanders over the past few months due to successful IM/ANSF operations. MAJOR COUNTRY WIDE EVENTS Herat: Influencial local Tribal Leader killed by insurgents Nangarhar: Five attacks against Border Police OPs Helmand: Five local residents murdered Privileged and Confidential This information is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under applicable law.
    [Show full text]
  • 19 October 2020 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
    Res. 1988 (2011) List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1988 (2011) Generated on: 19 October 2020 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals TAi.155 Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﯿﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non- Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL- UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices- Individuals click here TAi.121 Name: 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: ABDUL AHAD 3: na 4: na ﻋﺰﯾﺰ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻋﺒﺪ اﻻﺣﺪ :(Name (original script Title: Mr Designation: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates DOB: 1972 POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghanistan Passport no: na National identification no: Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 44323 na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Wrangling Behind Deteriorating Security
    Eye on the News [email protected] Truthful, Factual and Unbiased Vol:XI Issue No:288 Price: Afs.20 www.afghanistantimes.af www.facebook.com/ afghanistantimeswww.twitter.com/ afghanistantimes MONDAY . MAY 22. 2017 -Jawza 01, 1396 HS ABUL: Meshrano Jirga chairman Fazl Hadi Mus Klimyar on Sunday directed the Independent Administrative By Farhad Naibkhel killed and 10 wounded,” said pro- Taliban in the districts. A convoy iban under the name of Mansoori, Reform and Civil Services Com- vincial spokesman Gul Islam Syal. of Afghan forces was on the way this was the biggest attack in south- ABUL: At least 20 police mission (IARCSC) and the Com- He said that in retaliation trig- to Sahjoi came under attack by ern Afghanistan. Taliban spokes- puterized Identity Cards Distribu- officers were killed and 10 gering Taliban also sustained heavy Taliban, where only one Afghan man Qari yusof Ahamdi in a state- others wounded in a Tali- tion Authority (CIDCDA) heads K casualties, but no figures in hand. forces wounded, he added. He said ment confirmed clashes between to appear before the upper house’s ban attack on their outposts in the He said that despite attacks that the convoy reached to the Afgahn forces and their fighter in next session. Last week, 20 sena- southern Zabul province Saturday over different check posts Taliban Shahjoi district safely. Zabul is one three districts last night and said night, provincial officials said Sun- tors staged a walkout in protest failed to capture any check post of the most volatile southern prov- that they succeeded to capture against not summoning IARCSC day.
    [Show full text]
  • ·~~~I~Iiiiif~Imlillil~L~Il~Llll~Lif 3 ACKU 00000980 2
    ·~~~i~IIIIIf~imlillil~l~il~llll~lif 3 ACKU 00000980 2 OPERATION SALAM OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CO-ORDINATOR FOR HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN PROGRESS REPORT (JANUARY - APRIL 1990) ACKU GENEVA MAY 1990 Office of the Co-ordinator for United Nation Bureau du Coordonnateur des programmes Humanitarian and Economic Assistance d'assistance humanitaire et economique des Programmes relating to Afghanistan Nations Unies relatifs a I 1\fghanistan Villa La Pelouse. Palais des Nations. 1211 Geneva 10. Switzerland · Telephone : 34 17 37 · Telex : 412909 · Fa·x : 34 73 10 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD.................................................. 5 SECTORAL OVERVIEWS . 7 I) Agriculture . 7 II) Food Aid . 7 Ill) De-m1n1ng . 9 IV) Road repair . 9 V) Shelter . 10 VI) Power . 11 VII) Telecommunications . 11 VI II) Health . 12 IX) Water supply and sanitation . 14 X) Education . 15 XI) Vocational training . 16 XII) Disabled . 18 XIII) Anti-narcotics programme . 19 XIV) Culture . ACKU. 20 'W) Returnees . 21 XVI) Internally Displaced . 22 XVII) Logistics and Communications . 22 PROVINCIAL PROFILES . 25 BADAKHSHAN . 27 BADGHIS ............................................. 33 BAGHLAN .............................................. 39 BALKH ................................................. 43 BAMYAN ............................................... 52 FARAH . 58 FARYAB . 65 GHAZNI ................................................ 70 GHOR ................... ............................. 75 HELMAND ...........................................
    [Show full text]
  • Study Uncovers $10M Bribery Bid in Mines
    Add: V-137, Street-6, Phase, 4, District 6, Add: V-137, Street-6, Phase, 4, District 6, Shahrak Omed Sabz, Kabul Shahrak Omed Sabz, Kabul Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Phone: 0093 (799) 005019/777-005019 Phone: 0093 (799) 005019/777-005019 www.outlookafghanistan.net www.thedailyafghanistan.com Back Page March 12, 2017 Jalalabad Clear Ghazni Chance Kandahar Clear Mazar Partly Herat Chance Bamayan Chance Kabul Partly of Rain Cloudy of Rain Daily of Rain Cloudy Outlook 19°C 6°C 17C 13°C 14°C 0°C 8°C Weather 2°C °C 6°C -3°C 0°C 0 -6°C -4°C Forcast US Lawmaker Moves Bill to Name Pakistan a Study Uncovers $10m Terrorist Sponsor State KABUL - BriberyA recent investi- Bid in Minesfurther says most of the gation shows high-ranking country’s mines are under Ministry of Mines and Petro- Taliban’s control. The rebels leum (MoMP) officials have extract the riches and earn been trying to give contracts hundreds of millions of dol- for 217 extraction projects in lars, using the money for exchange for $10 million in buying weapons and am- bribe. munition. KABUL - An influential U.S. dent to issue a report within The study by the Afghan Khan Zaman Amarkhel, Congressman on Friday intro- 90 days, answering whether Anti-Corruption Network AACN head, expressed his duced a strongly worded bill Pakistan has provided sup- (AACN) named “Looting of concern over the unprofes- in the United States Congress port for international terror- mines and apparent scandal sional extraction of mines by to declare Pakistan a state ism.
    [Show full text]
  • “They've Shot Many Like This”
    HUMAN RIGHTS “They’ve Shot Many Like This” Abusive Night Raids by CIA-Backed Afghan Strike Forces WATCH “They’ve Shot Many Like This” Abusive Night Raids by CIA-Backed Afghan Strike Forces Copyright © 2019 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-37779 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org OCTOBER 2019 ISBN: 978-1-6231-37779 “They’ve Shot Many Like This” Abusive Night Raids by CIA-Backed Afghan Strike Forces Map of Afghanistan ............................................................................................................... i Summary ............................................................................................................................... 1 Recommendations ..............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Over a Century of Persecution: Massive Human Rights Violation Against Hazaras in Afghanistan
    OVER A CENTURY OF PERSECUTION: MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION AGAINST HAZARAS IN AFGHANISTAN CONCENTRATED ON ATTACKS OCCURRED DURING THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT PREPARED BY: MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN HASRAT DATE: FEBRUARY,2019 ABBREVIATIONS AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission ALP Afghan Local Police ANA Afghanistan National Army ANBP Afghanistan National Border Police ANP Afghanistan National Police ANSF Afghanistan National Security Forces ANDS Afghanistan National Directorate of Security BBC British Broadcasting Corporation DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade EU European Union HRW Human Rights Watch IDE Improvised Explosive Devices IDP Internal Displaced Person ISAF International Security Assistance Force IS-PK Islamic state- Khorasan Province MP Member of Parliament NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organizations NUG National Unity Government PC Provincial Council UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDP United Nations Development Programmes I TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…1 2. SECURITY CONTEXT OF AFGHANISTAN …………………………………………………………………………….….…3 3. METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………6 4. THE EXTENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION AGAINST HAZARAS IN AFGHANISTAN....6 5. TARGET KILLING AND ORCHESTRATED ATTACK...………………………....…….………….………………….11 a. THE TALIBAN ATTACKS ON JAGHORI, UROZGAN AND MALISTAN…...…................………….….…11 b. SUICIDE ATTACKS ON MAIWAND WRESTLING CLUB..................................................................................16
    [Show full text]
  • RRTA 277 (7 May 2015)
    5KIPGFD[#WUV.++ 1313731 [2015] RRTA 277 (7 May 2015) DECISION RECORD RRT CASE NUMBER: 1313731 COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Afghanistan TRIBUNAL MEMBER: Melissa McAdam DATE: 7 May 2015 PLACE OF DECISION: Sydney DECISION: The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act. Statement made on 07 May 2015 at 5:23pm Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431(2) of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant. 4GVTKGXGFHTQO#WUV.++QP,WN[CV 8GTKH[XGTUKQP 5KIPGFD[#WUV.++ STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS APPLICATION FOR REVIEW 1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). 2. The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Afghanistan, applied for the visa [in] September 2012 and the delegate refused to grant the visa [in] September 2013. 3. The applicant was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent. RELEVANT LAW 4. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s.36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
    [Show full text]
  • UNHCR Field Office Ghazni DISTRICT PROFILE 24/02/2003 Province: Ghazni, District: Malistan
    UNHCR Field Office Ghazni DISTRICT PROFILE DATE: 24/02/03 PROVINCE: Ghazni Geo-code 06 DISTRICT: Malistan Goe-code 606 Population 1990: 56,117 individuals CURRENT ESTIMATED POPULATION Total Returned IDPs Recent Returnees IDPs Children under Female Households 2002/2003 12 (assisted) 100,000 81 families 710 families/ 45fam/270 ind. 46,000 907 (0.9%) according to individuals (not assisted) 1,018 individuals (source: Villages’ Representatives MORR Ghazni) ETHNIC COMPOSITION: 100% Hazara EXPECTED RETURNS IDPS 265 families RETURNEES 1,280 families AUTHORITY Head Of District: Self-appointed authorities rule the district: - Military Commander: Commander Abdul Hakim Nassiri - Head of district: Haji Mahdawi Ghi Khan Other Information: Since the fall of the Taliban’s regime, Malistan district has been led by a People’s Shura and a Security Shura, backing self-appointed authorities. The district is under political and military control of Nasr faction, affiliated to Hezb-e-Wahdat (Khalili). The self- appointed authorities having strongly resisted the appointment of the official District Administrator in September 2002, arguing that the new appointee, Pashtun from neighbouring Ajristan, where he was previously acting as Head of the district, belonged to Hezb-e-Islami and had killed many Hazara under Taliban regime. It was explained to FO that male inhabitants, convoked by village’s elders and Mullahs had selected representatives of main villages. The People’s Shura [Mardoumi Shura] is composed of 30 members, 6 of whom are also members of Security Shura [Fawj Shura]. Qazi Haji Mahdawi Ghi Khan chairs the People’s Shura. The People’s Shura works in close co-operation with Security Shura, which is composed of 6 commanders.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Report November 2010 - June 2011 (PART II)
    Report Afghanistan: Security Report November 2010 - June 2011 (PART II) Report Afghanistan: Security Report November 2010 – June 2011 (PART II) LANDINFO – 20 SEPTEMBER 2011 1 The Country of Origin Information Centre (Landinfo) is an independent body that collects and analyses information on current human rights situations and issues in foreign countries. It provides the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet – UDI), Norway’s Immigration Appeals Board (Utlendingsnemnda – UNE) and the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police with the information they need to perform their functions. The reports produced by Landinfo are based on information from both public and non-public sources. The information is collected and analysed in accordance with source criticism standards. When, for whatever reason, a source does not wish to be named in a public report, the name is kept confidential. Landinfo’s reports are not intended to suggest what Norwegian immigration authorities should do in individual cases; nor do they express official Norwegian views on the issues and countries analysed in them. © Landinfo 2011 The material in this report is covered by copyright law. Any reproduction or publication of this report or any extract thereof other than as permitted by current Norwegian copyright law requires the explicit written consent of Landinfo. For information on all of the reports published by Landinfo, please contact: Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre Storgata 33A P.O. Box 8108 Dep NO-0032 Oslo Norway Tel: +47 23 30 94 70 Fax: +47 23 30 90 00 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.landinfo.no Report Afghanistan: Security Report November 2010 – June 2011 (PART II) LANDINFO – 20 SEPTEMBER 2011 2 SUMMARY The security situation in most parts of Afghanistan is deteriorating, with the exception of some of the big cities and parts of the central region.
    [Show full text]