The Armenian Genocide, 1915 U ur Ümit Üngör ‘Either the Armenians would eliminate the Turks or the Turks would eliminate the Armenians. I didn’t hesitate for one moment when confronted with this dilemma. My Turkish identity won out over my profession. I thought: we must destroy them before they destroy us. If you ask me how I as a doctor could commit murder, my answer is simple: the Armenians had become dangerous microbes in the body of this country. And surely it is a doctor’s duty to kill bacteria?’ 1 Dr Mehmed Reshid (1873-1919), Governor of Diyarbekir during the genocide ‘The Turkish government began deporting the Armenian community in Sivas in convoys. Each neighbourhood was given a certain date for leaving. On the first day I watched in amazement at the crowds waiting to be deported, an endless throng of people stretching from one end of the street to the other. The pushing and shoving of the mules and the creaking of the carts made an ear-deafening noise. Men wearing hats to protect them from the sun walked alongside the carts, followed by women wearing white head scarves. Each had a task: one person was holding the cart, another the reins of the mule and yet another was watching over the family posses- sions. The children walked on either side of their parents as if they were setting off on a pleasant journey. At each end of the caravan rode mounted Turkish policemen, leading and controlling the convoy. The Turkish neighbours watched the spectacle from their windows. The streets were packed with Turkish children who ran alongside the caravan calling us names, giving the oc- casional prod to a mule or throwing stones at us.’2 Shahen Derderian (1907-1984), Sivas genocide survivor 46 Introduction In the early 20th century, the Ottoman Empire stretched across three continents. It was largely an agricultural society, the Sultan’s reign was far from absolute and in some remote regions local rulers enjoyed a comparatively large degree of autonomy. At the height of its power the empire counted 29 provinces, each subdivided into towns and cities, districts and villages. Ottoman society included a huge diversity of ethnic and religious groups, who based their identity largely on their religious convictions: people were viewed first and foremost as Muslim, Jew or Christian. The Ottoman Armenians formed a mixed community: a rich Armenian trader in Istanbul may have spoken several languages and travelled abroad frequently, whereas a poor Armenian peas- ant from one of the villages in Eastern Anatolia may only have spoken Armenian and barely travelled at all. Most Armenians were Apostolic Christians, although in some cities they were Protestant or Catholic. Armenians lived mainly in the eastern provinces, in a huge area stretch- ing from Sivas in the west to Van in the east, and from Trabzon in the north to Aleppo in the south. In this territory they lived side by side with Kurds, Turks, Arabs and others. Just before the First World War there were around two million Christian Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. In the spring of 1915, the Ottoman government initiated measures which signalled the start of the persecution of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. By the end of the First World War only a fraction of the pre-war Armenian community was left in the region and today there are hardly any Armenians living in the Anatolian interior. These bare facts sum up the complex history of the Armenian genocide in a nutshell. 1. Historical background The Ottoman Empire reached the height of its power in the 16th and 17th centuries, when it grew from a small princedom to become the single most important state in the Mediterranean and the Near East. However, external pressure from Western imperialism combined with internal turmoil caused by separatist movements put an end to the empire’s growth. Technological innovation and economic development allowed Western Europe to surpass the Ottoman Empire both economically and in terms of military power. The most significant Western concept to find its way into the Ottoman Empire was undoubtedly that of nationalism. The number of nationalist parties in the empire grew rapidly and nationalism went on to become the most serious problem in Ottoman domestic politics. The decline of the Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire began to lose territory rapidly. In 1821 Greece unilaterally declared independence from the Empire, followed in 1875 by Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Mol- davia. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Ottoman Empire was forced to grant independence to Serbia, Romania and Montenegro as well as some degree of autonomy to Bulgaria. In 1882, Great Britain occupied first Cyprus and then Egypt. The remainder of Ottoman North Africa was lost between 1830 and 1912, as France occupied Algeria in 1830 47 and Tunisia in 1881, and Italy invaded Libya in 1912.3 The Ottoman Armenians made considerable economic progress throughout the 19th century. The Armenian financial and industrial elite and the urban middle classes and skilled craftsmen were treated relatively mildly by the Ottoman government. The economic elite financed social organisations such as schools, hospitals and charities. Armenians became imperial architects, armourers, watchmakers and cabinet makers; they were responsible for the Imperial Mint, the cannon and shipbuilding industries, and they dominated trade. Armenian businesses based in Istanbul successfully branched out to European cities such as Marseille and Manchester. As a re- sult of this renaissance the Armenian elite gained economic power, although no political power. Armenian economic superiority Of the 166 Ottoman importers, 141 were Armenian and 13 Turkish. Of the 9,800 shopkeepers and craftsmen, 6,800 were Armenian and 2,550 were Turkish. Of the 150 exporters, 127 were Armenian and 23 Turkish. Of the 153 industrialists, 130 were Armenian and 20 were Turkish. Of the 37 bankers throughout the country, no fewer than 32 were Armenian. Krikor Zohrab, Armenian parliamentarian and writer, 1913 This disparate economic development and modernisation led to envy on the part of the Otto- man Turks. The Turkish political elite in Istanbul in particular took exception to the success of the Armenian merchants.4 The decline of the Ottoman Empire led to major political strife. The autocratic Sultan Abdulha- mid II (1842-1918) enforced a policy of centralisation, which provoked feelings of radicalism and separatism. This radicalism pervaded every level of society and education. Ottoman intellectu- als disseminated European nationalistic theories at military, political and medical educational institutions. In 1889, the resulting generation of well-educated public servants and military cadets established the Committee of Union and Progress ( ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, CUP). The goal of this illegal committee was to restore the constitution of 1876. Most of these Young Turks (Jeunes Turcs) lived in Paris, spreading propaganda against the Sultan. Major CUP members were party leader Mehmed Talaat (1874-1921), Major smail Enver (1881-1922), and activist Dr Bahaeddin Shakir (1874-1922).5 2. Ideology The ideology of the CUP represented three main streams: Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. This trichotomy was formulated by historian Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) who, in 1904, wrote the influential manifesto Three Types of Politics. In this pamphlet Akçura stated that the Ottoman 48 Ismail Enver Pasha Source: Armenian Genocide Museum Insti- tute political elite was standing on the threshold of rejecting Ottomanism and Islamism: the first through religious discord, the second through the well-developed nationalism among non- Turkish Muslims such as Albanians. Akçura’s conclusion was that people should accept Turkish nationalism as their guiding ideological principle. He found these thoughts echoed in the work of Ziyâ Gökalp (1876-1924), a sociologist who wrote a great deal about Turkish nationalism throughout his career. His most important writings cover the Turkification of the Ottoman Empire, for example in the fields of language, religion, public life, ethics and economy. In his articles and poems, Gökalp extolled the virtues of Turkish culture and history in particular and expressed open hostility towards non-Turkish sections of the population. The decline of the state radicalised both the internal political culture and the ideology of the CUP. One of the most radical factions developed a profoundly ethnic Turkish nationalism driven by a collective hatred of Armenians.6 49 Territorial Modifications in the Balkans Source: The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retro- spect, George F. Kennan (Washing- ton, DC; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), p. 70 3. Causes of the genocide The genocide of the Ottoman Armenians was the result of three important factors: the loss of the Balkan War and territory in 1912-1913, the coup by the Young Turks of 23 January 1913, and the start of the First World War. On 17 October 1912, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman army was unprepared and ill-equipped to fight. Following the Bulgarian offensive in November 1913, the Ottoman army retreated to the trenches 30 kilometres west of Istanbul. The attack was repelled and the capital Istanbul remained under Ottoman control. Further fighting led to the complete and permanent loss of the Balkan Peninsula. The Treaty of London, signed on 30 May 1913, was regarded as a watershed for the Ottoman Empire. It had a deep and traumatic impact on Ottoman society. The loss of major Ottoman cities, personal pos- sessions and human life, and the dismay regarding the inadequacy of the army had wounded the 50 pride of the Ottoman elite. Ottoman society, culture and identity had been dealt a heavy blow. From 1913 onwards, nationalists felt that the idea of a unified ‘Ottoman’ identity was no longer realistic.