IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
CASE NO: CCT89/17
In the matter between:
UNITED DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT Applicant and
SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY First Respondent
PRESIDENT JACOB ZUMA Second Respondent
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS Third Respondent
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE Fourth Respondent
ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS Fifth Respondent
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY Sixth Respondent
NATIONAL FREEDOM PARTY Seventh Respondent
CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE Eighth Respondent
FREEDOM FRONT Ninth Respondent
AFRICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY Tenth Respondent
AFRICAN INDEPENDENT PARTY Eleventh Respondent
AGANG SOUTH AFRICA Twelfth Respondent
PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA Thirteenth Respondent AFRICAN PEOPLE’S CONVENTION Fourteenth Respondent
COUNCIL FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION First Amicus Curiae
UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT Second Amicus Curiae
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES Third Amicus Curiae
SHOSHOLOZA PROGRESSIVE PARTY Fourth Amicus Curiae
THIRD AMICUS CURIAE’S PRACTICE NOTE
1. Date of Hearing: 15 May 2017
2. Counsel: -For 3rd Amicus Curiae: Ngwako Hamilton Maenetje SC:
083 459 6358
Reghana Tulk: 0733647462
3. Nature of the Application
This is an application for a declaration that the Constitution requires, alternatively,
permits a motion of no confidence in terms of section 102(2) of the Constitution to
be voted on by way of secret ballot.
4. Relevant portions of the record
The whole record is relevant.
5. Estimated duration of the argument
It is estimated that that the third amicus’ argument will take no longer than 30
minutes; and that one day is required to hear the application.
6. Summary of Issues Involved:
The ISS makes, in summary, the following submissions in support of the relief that
the applicant seeks: o Parliamentary oversight over the Executive is vital to ensure that
constitutional and statutory obligations are properly executed. o A vote of no confidence in terms of section 102 of the Constitution is a
vital tool for parliamentary oversight over the Executive, including the
President under section 102(2) of the Constitution. o As a vital tool for parliamentary oversight, a motion of no confidence
must always be effective and not illusory or rendered nugatory in any
circumstances. If its effectiveness is undermined, the Constitution is
undermined because the Executive would not, effectively, be held to
account. o Where in a vote of no confidence against the President there is a risk of
members of the National Assembly being constrained from voting freely
according to their conscience in the fulfilment of their constitutional
obligations as public representatives, properly interpreted the
Constitution requires or permits a secret ballot to retain the effectiveness
of a vote of no confidence as a vital tool for parliamentary oversight
over the Executive. o The Rules of the National Assembly must be interpreted to permit a
secret ballot at the very least in an environment of threats and
intimidation. The Rules are reasonably capable of such an interpretation. o To the extent that the Rules of the National Assembly are not reasonably
capable of the interpretation above, then they are, to that extent,
inconsistent with the Constitution and must be declared invalid.
7. List of Authorities
The list of authorities are attached to the submissions of the ISS.
NH Maenetje SC
R Tulk
Counsel for 3rd Amicus Curiae
Duma Nokwe Chambers, Sandton
9 May 2017