IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA CASE NO: CCT89/17 In the matter between: UNITED DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT Applicant and SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY First Respondent PRESIDENT JACOB ZUMA Second Respondent AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS Third Respondent DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE Fourth Respondent ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS Fifth Respondent INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY Sixth Respondent NATIONAL FREEDOM PARTY Seventh Respondent CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE Eighth Respondent FREEDOM FRONT Ninth Respondent AFRICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY Tenth Respondent AFRICAN INDEPENDENT PARTY Eleventh Respondent AGANG SOUTH AFRICA Twelfth Respondent PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA Thirteenth Respondent AFRICAN PEOPLE’S CONVENTION Fourteenth Respondent COUNCIL FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION First Amicus Curiae UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT Second Amicus Curiae INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES Third Amicus Curiae SHOSHOLOZA PROGRESSIVE PARTY Fourth Amicus Curiae THIRD AMICUS CURIAE’S PRACTICE NOTE 1. Date of Hearing: 15 May 2017 2. Counsel: -For 3rd Amicus Curiae: Ngwako Hamilton Maenetje SC: 083 459 6358 [email protected] [email protected] Reghana Tulk: 0733647462 [email protected] [email protected] 3. Nature of the Application This is an application for a declaration that the Constitution requires, alternatively, permits a motion of no confidence in terms of section 102(2) of the Constitution to be voted on by way of secret ballot. 4. Relevant portions of the record The whole record is relevant. 5. Estimated duration of the argument It is estimated that that the third amicus’ argument will take no longer than 30 minutes; and that one day is required to hear the application. 6. Summary of Issues Involved: The ISS makes, in summary, the following submissions in support of the relief that the applicant seeks: o Parliamentary oversight over the Executive is vital to ensure that constitutional and statutory obligations are properly executed. o A vote of no confidence in terms of section 102 of the Constitution is a vital tool for parliamentary oversight over the Executive, including the President under section 102(2) of the Constitution. o As a vital tool for parliamentary oversight, a motion of no confidence must always be effective and not illusory or rendered nugatory in any circumstances. If its effectiveness is undermined, the Constitution is undermined because the Executive would not, effectively, be held to account. o Where in a vote of no confidence against the President there is a risk of members of the National Assembly being constrained from voting freely according to their conscience in the fulfilment of their constitutional obligations as public representatives, properly interpreted the Constitution requires or permits a secret ballot to retain the effectiveness of a vote of no confidence as a vital tool for parliamentary oversight over the Executive. o The Rules of the National Assembly must be interpreted to permit a secret ballot at the very least in an environment of threats and intimidation. The Rules are reasonably capable of such an interpretation. o To the extent that the Rules of the National Assembly are not reasonably capable of the interpretation above, then they are, to that extent, inconsistent with the Constitution and must be declared invalid. 7. List of Authorities The list of authorities are attached to the submissions of the ISS. NH Maenetje SC R Tulk Counsel for 3rd Amicus Curiae Duma Nokwe Chambers, Sandton 9 May 2017 .