Central & Eastern Europe

Convergence and Divergence in “Europe’s Periphery”

Think Tank Landscape

Think Tank and Civil Societies Program Summer 2020 Central and Eastern Europe Research Team Jan Nowak, Project Lead Quynh Nguyen, Data and Presentation Curator Alexander Basescu Nadiia Dubchak Avraham Tsikhanovski Phillip Batov Italia Messina Dennis Ronel Anna Newnam

Table of Contents Introduction……………………………………………………3 Central & Eastern Europe at a Glance……………………....4 Objectives………………………………………………………5 Methodology………………………………………………...... 6 Analysis by Subregion Russian Federation……………………………………………...7 Finland………………………………………………………...17 The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania……………..25 Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova……………………………….36 Poland…………………………………………………………48 Hungary……………………………………………………….56 Czech Republic and Slovakia…………………………………64 Eastern Balkans: Romania and Bulgaria……………………...73 Western Balkans: The Former Yugoslavia and Albania………90 Summary: Key Takeaways………………………………...108 Bibliography………………………………………………...112

Introduction The Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region comprises all countries––with the addition of Finland––which spent the majority of the 20th century under communist and/or Soviet rule. The region’s shared communist legacies, post-Soviet shifts, rapid market transitions, and, in many cases, political instability have provided scholars in the last three decades with a plethora of contemporary case studies. Such examples include the development of civil society in newly established, liberal, formerly second world countries, but also of other, more nuanced policy questions. In particular, the prevalence of frozen conflicts, democratic backsliding, NATO and Russia’s tense relations, the European Union’s “Eastern Enlargement,” institutionalized corruption, and other policy concerns have come to dominate the policy discourse in these countries. Think tanks serve as critical organs and functionaries in a civil society by pioneering research that helps politicians and lawmakers alike make informed choices on impactful policy decisions, and it is for this reason that it is necessary to analyze and monitor the state of think tanks, especially in a region as diverse and fluid as CEE. Countries in the CEE region provide think tanks with decidedly diverse climates that impact the success or lack thereof of think tanks and research organizations. Despite the shared legacies and networks of think tanks, it is not possible characterize the region unilaterally; from the developed and thriving civil societies of Finland and Slovakia, to countries in illiberal transition such as Poland and Serbia, countries in frozen conflict such as Kosovo or Moldova, or authoritarian regimes as exist in Hungary, Belarus, and Russia, CEE’s diversity defines it. The region, despite its geographic compactness, produces unique challenges in this regard. While some countries and subregions in CEE are transparent and encourage the success of civil society within their borders, other countries create barriers to a successful civil society, which impedes the work of think tanks by means of chronic underfunding and other official and unofficial means. In creating a landscape analysis of the region, the Summer 2020 CEE Research Team has analyzed think tanks by country based on the following factors: quantity, location, research focus, bias, publication trends, institutional affiliation, staff size, year of founding, and yearly budget size. Although many CEE think tanks are not transparent regarding information such as staff or budget size––or simply have very little to no online/public presence––through a combination of a macroanalysis of all identified 692 think tanks in the region and the use of representative samples, our research team has managed to create a comprehensive analysis of the nature of think tanks by country throughout the region.

Central & Eastern Europe at a Glance

Objectives

1. To create a comprehensive update of the identified think tanks in Central & Eastern Europe from the TTCSP 2019 Global Go To Index Report 2. To identify the nature of the think tank climate in the Central & Eastern Region by country and to answer the following questions: What are the primary research focuses of think tanks in CEE? What issues currently face think tanks in CEE? What are the trends that have shaped the think tank climate in each country in the CEE region? 3. To analyze through qualitative and quantitative measures the nature the nature of research and policy discourse among think tanks in the CEE region

Methodology

1. In order to create a revised and updated list of all think tanks in the CEE region, the CEE Research Team has verified the existence of listed think tanks on the following criteria: a. Online presence and the existence of their website by means of ownership of their web domain b. Verification of existence/closure from other think tanks and think tank executives c. Intensive research of any media or publication mentions of think tanks to indicate their activity (or lack thereof) outside of traditional online channels 2. In order to analyze the think tank climate and trends per country, the CEE Research Team has conducted a qualitative analysis on the following criteria: a. Historical analysis of public policy research and the activities of research institutions ranging to the early 20th century b. Literature review of think tank activities and the state of civil society in each CEE country 3. In order to analyze the nature of the research discourse, the CEE Research Team has conducted a qualitative and quantitative analysis on the following criteria: a. Creation of a compilation of think tank publications from September 2019 to July 2020, by CEE subregion, and sorting by larger subject matter b. Think tanks were chosen to have their publications analyzed based on their ranking in the 2019 TTCSP Global Go To Index Index, their subjective prestige and activity within their own subregion, rate of publicly available online publications, and thematic/institutional diversity

Russian Federation: The Suppression of Multiple Narratives in an Increasingly Authoritarian State

Background:

The direct translation for “think tank” into Russian is a complex subject in the academic community. Many researchers and foreign policy experts opt for the comprehensive term «аналитический центр» (translating into English as “analytical center”), while the literal translation «мозговой центр» – among others like «фабрика мысли» (thought factory) «мозговой трест» (brain trust) – is just as acceptable. A lack of a solely-used unifying term for “think tanks” does not, however, adequately reflect on the important role that these institutions play in the policy making process, and assessing the socio-economic ramifications of political decisions in Russia. While Russian rules prohibit these institutions from directly influencing political decision-making, it is evident that their debates and activity have set in motion the parameters for foreign policy measures, and formed the elites’ and public’s perceptions on internal and external political environments throughout history. Especially in times of crisis, the link between think tanks’ policy recommendations and Russian policy making is visibly direct. Russian think tanks have been greatly shaped by the nation’s disparate regimes, from pre- Soviet monarchy to a contemporary presidential republic. Throughout history, major events have dictated the structures of emerging analytical institutions as well as their chief areas of focus; such pivotal moments include the Russian Civil War, Krushchev’s Thaw, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of power throughout the 2000s.

*Data Excludes Think Tanks that are no longer active The earliest evidence of think tanks in Russia dates back to the early 19th century. Institutions like the Institute of Oriental Studies (IVRAN) have roots as early as 1818, during which they were prominent museums or academies that evolved to their status as think tanks today. Generally, think tanks in Russia could be classified as one of three groups depending on factors such as ownership, funding, and how they evolved historically: academic and university- affiliated, privatized, and state-sponsored. With exception to the more historic organizations, many modern think tanks saw their rise in the late 1950s and 1960s during Kruschev’s Thaw. In these two decades, think tanks were most commonly academic, state-funded institutions, encompassing research institutes founded in the system of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) and state universities (such as MGIMO) oriented on studying foreign policy and international relations. Many of these centers that are government managed are referred to as GONGOs (Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization), in which they are run by the state with an intent to further political interests, but advertised as semi-independent.1 Such institutions are distinguishable by their funding; financial support may come from the state, but also from other sources such as foreign grants. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, many scholars, journalists, and military officers established an emerging sector of private think tanks. Despite political pressure causing many to close their doors, some of these institutions are still in operation to this day. With shifting political ideologies in post-Soviet Russia, these centers differentiated themselves by completing work on contract basis, maintaining an aspiration for autonomy, having a significant share of businesses in their client base, and wanting to diversify research. At this time, in the turmoil of dissolution, the area of focus of many Russian think tanks shifted from external issues (like geopolitical competition between US and Russia) to internal ones (such as a changing political system and civil society concerns).2 Social movements at the time also led to the creation of informal organizations, but rarely officially-recognized think tanks institutions. Putin’s election in March 2000 brought forth political action increasingly centralized to the administration; maintaining policy influence outside the administration became harder to achieve. Yet in the late 2000s, Russia saw a rise in state-sponsored think tanks devoted to the creation of foreign policy plans and promoting Russian soft power globally. Such think tanks represent sentiments of a nation perceiving its internal economic and political systems as stable enough to strictly focus on foreign policy issues. The state actively invested in such institutions throughout the late 2000s.3 Suppression against civil society, and particularly independent think tanks, has not always been a staple to Russian administrations. Civil society organizations first began to appear with Catherine the Great’s reforms to Russian Estates, which saw the emergence of influential associations like the Russian Geographical Society, the Free Economics Society, and the

1 Carolina Vendil Pallin and Susanne Oxenstierna, “Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power,” September 2017.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319747832_Russian_Think_Tanks_and_Soft_Power 2 Anton Barbashin and Alexander Graef, “Thinking Foreign Policy in Russia: Think Tanks and Grand Narratives,” Atlantic Council, November 12, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/thinking-foreign-policy-in-russia- think-tanks-and-grand-narratives/. 3 Barbashin and Graef, “Thinking Foreign Policy in Russia: Think Tanks and Grand Narratives.” Moscow Agricultural Society.4 Under the Soviet Union, civil society organizations and institutions were either repressed or nationlaized and controlled. However, from the 1980s to 2000, independent civil society was thriving in the form of political debate, protests, and opposing media. In fact, in the 1990s, the administration under Boris Yeltsin not only refrained from impeding independent citizen organization, but implemented certain policy initiatives to encourage it. After Putin assumed office in 2000, the Russian government began tightening its regulatory control over civil society (especially in Putin’s second term), with a driving ideology that these organizations were foreign-imposed and conflicted with Russian society and political culture. Suppression came in the form of strict legislation that created bureaucratic, social, and financial hardships for NGOs and certain privatized think tanks, in particular for those that received funding from Western sources or expressed sympathy for pro-Western narratives.5 After Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, the allegiance of think tanks to the administration’s policies were tested. Many Western and Russian think tanks began to diverge on opinions and the justifications behind Russia’s foreign policy actions. As President Igor Ivanov of the Russian International Affairs Council stated on the matter “The West and Russia have failed to understand each other’s position.” 6 Today, the Russian think tank community has become rather large and developed, with most active organizations finding their niche and occupying it. However, the growing administration’s regulations place many think tanks at risk if they do not better align themselves with the narrative of the state.

Geographic Distribution

As is the case with many other regions in CEE, most historically leading think tanks in Russia are found in the nation's capital: Moscow. For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Moscow Center – which not only ranks as the top think tank in Russia, but 3rd in the CEE region according to Global Go To Think Tank Index in 2019 – as well as the Institute for US and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN), and the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation are all found in Moscow. Out of 93 assessed think tanks, 75 (81%) are found in Moscow, 8 (9%) in St. Petersburg, 2 (2%) in Russia’s Blatic exclave of Kaliningrad, and the rest among different smaller cities/regions in Russia, with only 1 (1%) found above the Arctic Circle in Petrozavodsk. While this does not directly compare to some of the other CEE regions where little to no think tanks exist outside of the capital city, Russia’s large geographic area that stretches across two continents and encompasses multiple regional interests, time zones, and ethnic groups can explain the need for several think tanks at different locations in the country.

4 Charles Buxton and Evgenia Konovalova, “Russian Civil Society: History, Today, and Future Prospects,” INTRAC for Civil Society, December 2012, https://www.intrac.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Briefing-Paper-37-Russian-civil-society- history-today-and-future-prospects-1.pdf. 5 “Delegitimization and Division in Russia - Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 18, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/18/delegitimization-and-division-in-russia-pub-69958. 6 Barbashin and Graef, “Thinking Foreign Policy in Russia: Think Tanks and Grand Narratives.”

Think Tanks by Research Area

The top three areas of focus that think tanks in Russia generally choose to address are economics (35%), international affairs (19%) and democracy/transparency (13%). About 6% of think tanks (especially leading think tanks) prided themselves on covering multiple sectors. These think tanks generally rank higher on the TTCSP Global Go To Index, possessing a variety of clients they advise and strong online-publishing presences. These proportions are similar to ones found in other CEE regions, as an overwhelming primary focus on economics and a secondary focus on international affairs is a common trait of CEE-based think tanks. One may observe that think tanks in Russia generally lack focus on technology & innovation and scientific development, as collectively, the think tanks that do focus on these fields only make up a bit more than 10% of the total. While they exist, scientific development-focused, independent think tanks like the Ecoterra Agency (environmentalism) tend to have weaker online presences and are outnumbered by think tanks focusing on national politics, foreign policy, and international and domestic economics.

Russian Think Tanks by Institution Affiliation

Within a representative sample of 30 think tanks from Russia, a total of 25 think tanks can be classified as independent, 3 as university-affiliated, and 2 as government-affiliated.7

7 Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID), Carnegie Moscow Center, Institute for the U.S. & Canada Studies (ISKRAN), Valdai Although it appears that independent think tanks overwhelmingly outweigh university and government-affiliated think tanks, this is in fact an accurate representation of proportions for all think tanks in Russia. Out of 102 total think tanks sorted, 84, or about 82%, are independent. It is important to note that in regards to information available on budget and staff size, independent think tanks provided the most amount of data on both, with 13 think tanks sending in these statistics. For university-affiliated think tanks, 3 institutions provided information for both categories. However, out of the 2 government affiliated think tanks that have supplied information, neither have disclosed their budget sizes, and thus, the statistics are unavailable to determine the average budget size for government affiliated think tanks in Russia. A failure to provide information on their budget sizes may indicate that the government would prefer to prevent possible criticisms from the public/media about excessive funding issues or misappropriated funds, in order to maintain the integrity of the institutions they are affiliated with. Within the representative sample, independent think tanks had extremely varying budgets and staff sizes. The budgets of these think tanks ranged from $300K to $30M, while staff sizes ranged from 14 to 381 members. A correlation can be drawn between budget size and the prominence of the think tank in the region; the larger and more influential think tanks would have a budget of at least $1,000,000. However, the correlation between staff size and budget is not strong, as the PIR Center-Center for Policy Studies in Russia, for example, has the largest budget of $30M, but maintains one of the smallest staff sizes at 17 members. University-affiliated think tanks generally possessed the smaller budgets – compared to just independent think tanks – and staff sizes. The budget sizes for these places were nowhere near as varied (none of the budgets exceeded $1,000,000) and the average was a bit over $300,000. This stark difference in budgets and staff sizes is not that surprising, since university- affiliated think tanks are often departments of larger institutions, such as the Higher School of Economics (HSE) or the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Such institutions have their own overarching budgets they allocate to multiple departments, thus diluting the funding that university-affiliated think tanks receive. Out of the three, government- affiliated think tanks provided the least amount of information, with neither of the two submitting think tanks disclosing budget size. The average staff size of government-affiliated think tanks (85) outnumbers that of university-affiliated think tanks (41), but is smaller than the staff size of independent think tanks (110). However, with only two data entries to work with, a proper assessment of variance and average staff size for government-affiliated think tanks throughout the Russian region is challenging to establish.

International Discussion Club, Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, Center for Regional Studies, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION), Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights, Citizens' Watch, Institute of International Economic & Political Studies, Center for Applied Political Studies, Analytical Center Research Division of Media Holding EXPERT, Gorbachev Foundation, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, Institute of Economics & Industrial Engineering, Institute of Europe, PIR Center-Center for Policy Studies in Russia, National Committee on BRICS Research, Foundation for the Development of Research Programs "Informatics for Democracy" (INDEM Foundation), Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Kaliningrad Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Institute for Urban Economics, Institute of Latin America at the Russian Academy of Sciences, ROMIR Monitoring, Center for Independent Social Research, Southern Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Levada Center

Biases

With an administration that actively coerces institutions and organizations to align with their narrative, the development of pro-government biases in Russian think tanks is not unusual. It can be observed in some cases that in order to secure sufficient funding and maintain an influential status as an institution, they need to demonstrate a desire to uphold amicable relations with the administration. For many think tanks, the pro-government bias is clear in the fact that they are federal, state institutions, or cooperate closely with just the federal government in Russia – for example, the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation heavily exhibits these traits. They maintain the government as their primary, if not sole entity for advising, and thus, the values that they propose would have to align with the values of the administration for the think tank to be functioning. In other cases, it may be a bit more difficult to determine if the think tanks share pro- government sentiments, as it is not openly discussed by the institution. For example, while the Valdai Discussion Club states on its site that it develops an “objective assessment of global political and economic issues,” third-party sources suggest major pro-government bias: Nikolay Petrov of the Carnegie Moscow Center identified Valdai as "a project used as blatant propaganda by the Kremlin." 8 With Putin implementing a stronger and more centralized regulatory structure in the Russian Federation, an increasing number of think tanks have formed from pro-government

8 Marcel H. van. Herpen, “Reputation Laundering,” in Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), pp. 62. sentiments. In addition, since the late 2000s, state-sponsored think tanks that seek to promote Russian soft power globally have been given increased funding and subsequently could overtake private think tanks in size and influence.

Issues and Challenges

One issue that think tanks face is political pressure. As stated in the history section, independent think tanks that emerged after the fall of the soviet union faced great political pressure. As such, independent think tanks who strive to be objective in their research or policy- advising can find themselves struggling with financial support and acknowledgement from state officials if their ideas go against the administration’s ideology. Civil society organizations, especially NGOs and independent think tanks, have faced a large struggle to exist and flourish in Russia post-2000s. With Putin asserting stricter control over civil society than Yeltsin, these organizations have been suppressed by several initiatives from the government. First, the administration generally seeks to discredit foreign-funded groups, which are publicly portrayed as undermining Russia’s national sovereignty and harming the collective good. A specific example of this is the passage of the “foreign agent” law in 2012, in which all NGOs that are involved in politics and accept foreign donations must register themselves as “foreign agents” 9. This brings along a connotation that these organizations, no matter the nature of their work, allegedly promote the interests of foreign powers in Russia. The government also relies on bureaucratic and legal instruments to weaken independent civic actors, coupled with intimidation of civil society as a whole by the threat of selective prosecution. Finally, the government strives to fill in vacancies by promoting and funding apolitical and pro- government organizations, pitching them as socially useful. As such, independent and private think tanks tend to combat immense political pressure from a government pushing for tighter control over ideas spread by these institutions. They often face challenges with engaging in international cooperation, out of fear of being labeled a “foreign agent” and consequently face legal and financial hardship. Russia’s ruling regime since the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000, is often seen as pushing a consistent and coherent narrative, and granting little space for plurality of opinions.10

Research Publications Analysis

Publications from leading think tanks in Russia and a few institutions prominent in their respective sectors were chosen to evaluate the latest topics of discussion. Leading institutions were chosen because they were able to produce updated content in the face of the pandemic and

9 Ivan Polynin, “Think Tank Survival Guide: How to Keep on Working in the Authoritarian Countries of the Former Soviet Union?,” On Think Tanks, January 17, 2017, https://onthinktanks.org/articles/think-tank-survival-guide-how-to-keep-on- working-in-the-authoritarian-countries-of-the-former-soviet-union/. 10 Edwin Bacon, “Policy Change and the Narratives of Russia's Think Tanks,” August 7, 2018, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0148-y. also provide the widest range of subjects. A total of 94 publications were assessed across the following 10 general topics: “Foreign Policy/International Affairs”, “Technology and Innovation”, “Democracy and Transparency”, “Human Rights Watchdog”, “Social Policy”, “Domestic Economics”, “International Trade and Economics”, “Energy Policy”, “Environment”, and “European Union”, with dates of publication ranging from November 2019 to July 2020. For scientific articles, studies, analytics, monographs, etc. published by top think tanks in Russia within the past 9 months, there are a few trends to note. Of course, given the recent coronavirus pandemic, many (but not as many as one may expect) analyses were published regarding the impact of the virus on a variety of areas, such as industry, politics, and society. Many of the think tanks that appear closer to the top of the list of leading centers dedicate research to a myriad of fields, ranging from foreign policy to technology. On the other hand, moving down the list will present more specialized think tanks that focus on a niche topic rather than a wide range of sectors (such as the IUE focusing on housing and factors influencing housing in Russia). A large amount of the leading centers did not have new material published online within the past 9 months, suggesting either they publish on their websites later on, have slowed down efforts due to the pandemic, or in some cases, do not focus on releasing material on their websites (in the case of the Institute for Applied Economic Research only publishing once every couple of years).

Summary: Key Takeaways

One may struggle to find a concrete name for the institutions that have been coined as “think tanks” in Russian, but their presence and influence across many sectors cannot be overlooked. Understanding think tank development in Russia is recognizing the importance of political climate: the government and the Russian Academy of Science (RAS) have ushered in state-funded institutions geared towards foreign policy during times of strong political stability, like with Khrushchev’s regime and Putin’s subsequent terms. During times of instability, like after the collapse of the Soviet Union, private citizens spearheaded the formation of autonomous think tanks and NGOs. Think tanks have and continue to provide the public outside of Russia, although often through biased panes, a look into political actions of the Kremlin that have consistently remained obscured. However, a trend of increasing political pressure and control over information and ideas communicated among institutions and the public by the administration cannot be denied. True, a look at the representative sample shows that 25 out of 30, or roughly 83% of think tanks consider themselves independent with autonomy and a non-profit status. Many of these institutions show limited to no bias and have produced various content even on controversial issues like corruption in Russia; it seems think tanks are given some liberties to facilitate opposing view sides for the sake of debate and further research. However, academics still point to an increase in regulation and control that overpowers perceived liberties. For example, with the nationalist and Eurasian policy shift in 2012, reinforced by the crisis in and around Ukraine, some private think tanks that existed as NGOs had to relinquish foreign funding, were declared foreign agents, and considerably reduced their activities. More than ever, think tanks (even the most critical) are hesitant to directly oppose or question much of the Kremlin’s foreign policy, rather trying to nudge existing strategies and express ideas in very diplomatic dialogue. This shift also raises questions about the future of think tanks. As Putin extends his presidency with a new mandate, and his approval ratings take major hits, the question should be asked: is this political pressure on think tanks and civil society sustainable? Especially after Russia’s foreign policy changes in the 2010s, many Western countries and institutions condemn the Russian state for employing some think tanks and other outlets to “weaponize” information by promoting inconsistent and contradictory information. The Russian public itself is divided on the political structure it wants the nation to maintain, and as an extension, the impact the government should have on think tanks. As such, while the think tank community is developed and diverse, the threats facing these institutions are very real. Think tanks of tomorrow must adapt by either removing national politics from their agenda, lowering their standard of objectivity, or cutting support they receive from international clients. In the direction that the current administration is heading, it is difficult to see the prospects of Russian think tanks in the future as favorable.

Finland: The Role of Think Tanks in a Nordic Haven for Civil Institutions

Background

The serious development of the think tank industry in Finland has been recent compared to many comparably developed Western countries. Finland’s low development and lack of urbanization in the first half of the 20th century following independence in the wake of the Russian Revolution meant that there was little historic social and political precedent for liberal civil society in the country. The first think tank initiative was economically focused: in 1946 the Finnish Association of Industry founded the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. In the 1950s, urban migration took off as more manufacturing jobs became available, and the government invested more in research on growing the economy. The Finnish Parliament eventually founded the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra in 1967. Throughout the 20th century, Finland became more integrated into Western Europe and the world, and by the 1990s, private, independent think tanks were established. In 1999, the social democrats became the ruling party, and think tanks became more socially and internationally focused. One of the oldest Finnish think tanks, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs takes a pro-EU stance on foreign policy, but in 2014 EuroThinkTank became one of the first think tanks founded with a strongly anti-EU ideology. Since the political pendulum swung left at the turn of the millennium, right wing think tanks like Libera, the Anders Chydenius Foundation, and The Finnish Business and Policy Forum have become more outspoken about the need for free-markets to keep the Finnish economy competitive internationally. Many others have been founded to emphasize environmental research, but several others take a more narrow focus on the topics of international development, domestic integration, water security, and world peace. Geographic Distribution

Finland has eighteen think tanks. This is a small number compared to the rest of the Central and Eastern Europe region and given its position on the 2019 global Human Development Index.11 Finland ranks twelfth on the index which incorporates life expectancy, education, and per capita income. This is the highest in Central and Eastern Europe. The Czech Republic, which has thirty think tanks, is the next highest in the region at 26th on the HDI. However, Finland has a population of 5.5 million people, which corresponds to one think tank per 300,000 people, which is higher than the one per 350,000 people in the Czech Republic and one per 1.5 million in Russia. Finland has a lower raw number of think tanks than its neighbors but an average or greater representation given its population. The connection between policy making centers and think tanks research is evident in Finland. Notably, thirteen think tanks are located in Helsinki, Finland’s capital and largest city, which is home to 650,000 people. The Water and Development Research Group is headquartered in the nearby city of Espoo at Aalto University. Espoo neighbors Helsinki on the southern coast of the country and is the second largest Finnish city with 280,000 inhabitants.12 Two others are also located in the south of Finland: the Aland Islands Peace Institute in Mariehamn and the Tampere Peace Research Institute at Tampere University in the third largest Finnish city. The Anders Chydenius Foundation is headquartered on the western coast in Kokkola. The Arctic Center at the University of Lapland is located on the edge of the Arctic Circle in Rovaniemi.

Finnish Think Tanks by Research Areas

The most common research areas for Finnish think tanks relate to domestic economics, the environment and energy, and foreign policy. Domestic economics is a primary focus for Finnish think tanks; eight institutions (44%) devote at least some research to the study of the Finnish Economy. In particular, free-market economics serves as the primary mission for a few explicitly fiscally conservative think tanks in the country. These are Libera, the Anders Chydenius Foundation, the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, and Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA). Others, like Tänk and the Arctic Center at the University of Lapland are heavily focused on economic research in general and employ economists from a variety of backgrounds. The next major research focus is energy, climate change, and the environment. Six Finnish think tanks (33%) research these areas. For five of these think tanks––the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, Toivo, Demos Helsinki, Visio, and the Arctic Center at the University of Lapland––energy, climate change, or the environment is the primary focus. Think tanks that strive for a healthy democracy and serve as champions of government transparency also occupy

11 “Human Development Report 2019,” United Nations Development Programme, 2019, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf. 12 Oishimaya Sen Nag, “Biggest Cities In Finland,” WorldAtlas (WorldAtlas, March 7, 2019), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-biggest-cities-in-finland.html. a large presence in Finland. Three think tanks in the country prioritize creating liberal and open debate. Lastly, the topics of International Relations and the European Union are prevalent in Finnish research and publications. Seven Finnish think tanks devote resources to foreign policy research. Finnish think tanks have a wide variety of policy focuses given the strength of their domestic economy, membership to the European Union, and geography that is vulnerable to climate change.

Finnish Think Tanks by Institutional Affiliation

Of the eighteen think tanks in Finland, ten are independent institutions, four are university-affiliated, and four are government-affiliated institutions.13 Notable differences exist between these three types of institutions. Independent institutions tend to have the fewest employees given the available data. On average these think tanks have ten employees, although the numbers range from five to fifty-seven. Six of the ten have ten or fewer staff members with a 2:1 or greater ratio of research to administrative staff. Budget information is limited––data is available from two of the ten independent institutions––but suggests that independent think tanks

13 Aland Islands Peace Institute, Anders Chydenius Foundation, Arctic Center at the University of Lapland, Demos Helsinki, EuroThinkTank, Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA), Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Kalevi Sorsa Foundation, Libera, Magma, Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Tampere Peace Research Institute/Institute for Advanced Social Research (IASR); Tampere University, Tänk, Toivo, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Visio, Water and Development Research Group function off of $5,000,000 or less per year. Government-affiliated institutions have the widest range of employees from four to 167, though they tend to be relatively small; three of the four have fewer than 20 employees. The largest of these is the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, the fourth oldest Finnish think tank. The available budget information suggests that government institutions work with the highest budget each year; the largest of these is over $30,000,000. University-affiliated institutions are generally medium-sized, with an average of fifty staff members. The ratio between research and administrative staff varies widely from research departments five times the size of the administrative department to think tanks balanced with one-third researchers and two-thirds administrators. Budget information is most available for university think tanks. The finances range from $40,000- $10,000,000 per year. Finnish think tanks vary widely in staff sizes and budgets, although financial information is limited.

Biases

Finnish think tanks generally are not explicitly-biased, but several tend to lean into one of three ideological focuses: free-market, pro-environment, and pro-Europe or Eurosceptic. Finland is a country with a relatively free economy––Finland ranks eleventh of the forty-five European countries and twentieth worldwide in the Economic Freedom Index14––so the economic system is a major focus for think tanks. The Economic Freedom Index is based on measurements of government size, regulatory efficiency, open markets, and rule of law. Domestic economics is a primary policy area for Finnish institutions, and four of the eight who devote research to this area

14“Finland,” Finland Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption, 2020, http://www.heritage.org/index/country/finland. are heavily free-market oriented and focus virtually all of their research and publications to promote these ideals. The think tanks in the category are Libera, the Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA), and the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), and the Anders Chydenius Foundation. Notably, these four think tanks were all founded in extremely different eras. ETLA, established in 1946, was the first think tank founded in Finland. Next, the Finnish Business and Policy Forum was founded in 1974, the Anders Chydenius Foundation was founded a generation later in 2003, and Libera was founded most recently in 2011. Five of the eighteen Finnish think tanks––the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, Toivo, Demos Helsinki, Visio, and the Arctic Center at University of Lapland are strongly pro- environment. Of these five institutions, two are government-affiliated, two are independent, and one is university-affiliated. It is evident that environmental protection and clean energy research is broadly supported in Finland given the variety in funding, location, and affiliations of these organizations. Lastly, there are strong Eurosceptic and a pro-European integration presences from two separate Finnish Institutions. EuroThinkTank is extremely vocal about their disapproval of the EU, while the Finnish Institute of International Affairs leans in favor of the Union. Notably, the latter is much older, as it was founded in 1961 and EuroThinkTank is only six years old. Also, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs is much more active in publishing than EuroThinkTank. FIIA has published seven articles on EU Dynamics since May 2020. EuroThinkTank’s most recent available publication is from November 2018 entitled “How to Leave the Eurozone: The Case of Finland.”15 In general, this divide on the subject of the EU is reflective of the general trend toward Euroscepticism throughout the union. Although Finnish think tanks are generally unbiased, eleven of the institutions trend toward either free-market ideals, pro-environmentalism, and or strong stances on EU membership. The other seven have wider scopes of research that include social policy and general economic trends.

Issues and Challenges

Finnish think tanks have a distinct disparity between the large institutions and their smaller counterparts. A few of the largest organizations have close to fifty employees, with Sitra’s employment tallying at over 150. On the other hand, a third of the think tanks have ten or fewer total employees. These think tanks are primarily single-issue institutions and tend to have budgets well under a million USD, while the major think tanks work with several million dollars a year. Five Finnish think tanks have five or fewer researchers. This correlates to fewer publications in the last year than the institutions with ten or more times the manpower.

15 Malinen, Tuomas, Peter Nyberg, Heikki Koskenkylä, Elina Berghäll, Ilkka Mellin, Sami Miettinen, Jukka Ala- Peijari, and Stefan Törnqvist. “How to Leave the Eurozone: The Case of Finland.” De Gruyter. De Gruyter, November 17, 2018. https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/ev/15/1/article-20180020.xml.

Another issue to note is the lower global profile of Finnish think tanks––for example, no Finnish think tanks is ranked as a top think tank in the 2019 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, the rankings of which are largely based on recognition from peer institutions. Despite the fact that some of the largest Finnish think tanks work with large budgets and consistently release publications, they nevertheless do not participate as actively in the international think tank community. Finland, like its Nordic neighbors, is more integrated in Western Europe than in the rest of the Central and Eastern Europe region. Although absense from the Global Go To Think Tank Index does not discount the quality of Finnish think tanks, it could pose a barrier in terms of grants and funding if private organizations reference the index for their partnership decisions.

Staff Size & Budget Size Distribution per Think Tank Affiliation

Independent Government University

# of Think Tanks 10 4 4

Staff Size ~20 4-167 ~50 1-5 million 500,000-35 40,000-10 Budget Size Average, USD USD million USD million USD

Finnish Research Publication Analysis

The analysis is based on data from the following institutions: the Arctic Center at the University of Lapland, Demos, the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), EuroThinkTank, the Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA), the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Kalevi Sorsa Foundation, Libera, Magma, SaferGlobe, the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, Toivo, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, and the Water and Development Research Group. Given that Finland has eighteen think tanks, this data surveys all but the Anders Chydenius Foundation and Visio, whose news articles solely cover intra-institutional events, Tänk, whose works are published through the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, and the Aland Islands Peace Institute, whose available research articles data back ten years. In order to compile and analyze the most relevant data, the publications in the analysis date from July 2019 to June 2020. However, many institutions have very few publications that are free and publicly accessible online. Often the only publications on the think tank websites are a few years old. For this reason, the analysis includes publications from Libera and EuroThinkTank from 2014 and 2018 respectively because the free-market and Eurosceptic ideologies of these think tanks are important to note. Others, like ETLA, are very active in publishing. The publications research and categorization takes into consideration the available information on the websites of all of Finland's think tanks. The publication compilation is made up of a variety of works from fourteen think tanks, although nine of the fourteen institutions have fewer than five available publications since July 2019. The majority of my publications were dominated by ETLA and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Of the seventy publications categorized, twenty-seven were written by ETLA and fourteen by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. The seventy publications were categorized into eleven focus topics: Democracy and Transparency, Domestic Economics, Energy Policy, Environment, European Union, Food and Water Security, Foreign Policy/International Affairs, Human Rights Watchdog, International Trade and Economics, Social Policy, and Technology and Innovation. Notably, the topic of the European Union was a common theme on which seven different think tanks published at least one article. This is important because some research areas––like food and water security and human rights––are the focus of one think tank that specializes in the field. The environment and energy policy are also prominent research areas in Finland because several of the think tanks are solely focused on climate change and energy. Fourteen of the seventy publications (20%) concentrate on these topics. Also, COVID-19 is a major trend and encompasses many sectors with it, but this was a trending topic, especially on the front pages of the websites. Domestics Economics, Social Policy, and Technology and Innovation were also common trends, and these two often incorporated aspects of climate, energy, health, or COVID- 19 in some way. The European Union, at 24.6% of the articles, and Domestic Economics, Social Policy, and Technology and Innovation at 14.5% are the themes and trends with the most publications since July 2019.

Summary: Key Takeaways

Finland has a small number of think tanks compared to other developed countries in both Eastern and Western Europe, although this is largely a reflection of its small population. A few Finnish think tanks are highly active and there have been four new institutions established in the last decade and ten since the turn of the millenium. These are small think tanks, but their publications demonstrate niche focuses like a free-market economy, the environment, democracy, and water security. A prominent focus in Finland relates to its northern location in the Arctic Circle. Several Finnish think tanks focus their research on environmental protection through renewable energy promotion and goals for a sustainable future. Progressive and left- leaning institutions focus more on issues regarding social policy, though they are less specialized compared to some of their peer organizations. Based on the increase in the number Finnish think tanks in the last decade and the success of the more established ones, it is evident that the transparent and free environment in Finland is conducive to think tank growth. The Finnish think tank community will likely continue to expand as more small think tanks are founded with goals of solving societal challenges in Finland and around the world.

The Baltic States Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia: Public Policy Research in the Post-Soviet Climate of Europeanization and Security Anxiety

Background:

While the Western think tank community was growing, the Soviet occupation undermined the public policy research in the Baltic states at its naissance. Although a few government-affiliated institutions, such as Estonian Institute of Economic Research, have existed since the early 20th century, the return of the USSR authorities after World War II prevented the formation of independent think tanks. At the same time, it would be a mistake to claim that public policy research was non-existent during those five decades. With the beginning of Khrushchev Thaw in 1954, the Party recruited consultants from the Central Committee of the Communist Party and KGB, to devise political and economic instruments that would allow the Soviet Union to catch up with the developing West. Although these organs worked primarily to validate the Party’s decisions, their methods resembled the strategies employed by modern think tanks. In the 1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introduced reforms, known as glasnost and perestroika, that enabled community organizing and independent thought. As the economic and political relations underwent liberalization, all Baltic states formed three distinct yet unified independence movements. The Latvian Popular Front led the 1987 demonstrations at the Riga Freedom Monument, the Estonian National Independence Party headed the Singing Revolution, and the Reformation Movement spearheaded the re-establishment of the independent Lithuania. As Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all declared independence in 1991, think tanks rapidly emerged to facilitate the Baltic states’ transition into democratic, free-market, and pro-European nations. Among the oldest organizations, the Lithuanian Free Market institute founded in 1990 and the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, which emerged in 1992, actively facilitated the political, market, and civil society reforms across the entire region.16 Since independence, Baltic think tanks have retained a firm pro-Western orientation and made significant contributions to the states’ successful admission to both the EU and NATO in 2004. Moreover, extending the legacy of the 1989 Baltic Way, a 400-mile-long human chain from Vilnius to Tallinn, many think tanks continue to prioritize the pan-Baltic solidarity and cooperation. Initially, many think tanks in Baltic countries were funded by grants from North European governments, Swedish in particular, to help research and maintain security in the region. Gradually, many institutions became self-sustainable, and new powerful organizations

16 Linas Eriksonas, "Lithuania Social Briefing: Lithuania’s Think Tanks Find Their Way On the Global Map of the Public Policy Think Tank Organizations," China-cee.eu, December 06, 2018, |PAGE|, accessed July 21, 2020, https://china-cee.eu/2018/12/06/ lithuania-social-briefing-lithuanias-think-tanks-find-their-way-on-the-global-map-of-the-public-policy-think-tank-organizations/. were founded by the governmental agencies.17 While the Baltic states still remain the only former Soviet republics that succeeded in their European integration course, think tanks continue to play an essential role in expanding the political, civil, and economic transformation of the region. Now, security concerns, especially regarding the Russian Federation and its foreign policy, remain a key challenge, both for the Baltic governments and for the local think tanks.18

*Data Excludes Think Tanks that are no longer active

Geographic Distribution

In the subregion, 51 think tanks currently remain active. Historically, like in other CEE countries, think tanks in the Baltic states are concentrated in the three capitals, which are simultaneously the largest cities in the respective countries. Among the think tanks situated outside of Vilnius, Riga, or Tallinn, the overwhelming majority are either affiliated with a local university or have been established by the governmental agencies. Similarly, the majority of Lithuanian think tanks, — 16 out of 19, or over 84%, — are located in the nation’s capital of Vilnius. Moreover, all three Lithuanian top ranked think tanks in TTCSP’s 2019 Go To Global Index are located in Vilnius (population 544k), including Lithuanian Free Market Institute, the oldest public policy research organization in the Baltic region. Two think tanks are located in Kaunas, the second-largest city in Lithuania after Vilnius, with a population of 295 thousands: Lithuanian Regional Research Institute was founded on the basis of the Kaunas University of Technology while Lithuanian Energy Institute is a state

17 Stephen Boucher, "Europe and Its Think Tanks: A Promise to Be Fulfilled," Think Tank Directory, October 2004, 56, accessed July 20, 2020, http://www.thinktankdirectory.org/downloads/Boucher_2006_Europe-and-its-Think-Tanks.pdf. 18 "Think Tank CEOs Gather in Lithuania to Challenge Status Quo," 4Liberty.eu, September 21, 2015, accessed July 21, 2020, http://4liberty.eu/think-tank-ceos-gather-in-lithuania-to-challenge-status-quo/. institution. Finally, the youngest think tank in the region founded in 2019, Memel Institute, is located in Klaipėda, the nation’s third-largest city with a 153-thousand population. In Latvia, the pattern of state capitals being the center of the national think tank industry is true to even a higher extent—all the 16 think tanks identified are located in the capital of Riga (pop. 633k). Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS and Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), which are the only two Latvian organizations ranked among the 106 top think tanks in CEE in the Global Go To Index, are also based in Riga. No other think tank locations in Latvia have been identified during the research. In a similar manner, the overwhelming majority of Estonian think tanks, — 14 out of 16, or 87.5%, are located in the capital of Tallinn (pop. 427k). Two out of the three top ranked Estonian think tanks in TTCSP’s 2019 Go To Global Index are situated in Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) and PRAXIS Center for Policy Studies, which is also the country’s only think tank that has achieved a top 10 position in the aforementioned ranking. Finally, two out of the country’s 16 think tanks, or 12.5%, are based in Tartu, which is the second-largest city in Estonia after Tallinn. In addition to the government-affiliated Baltic Defense College, Institute of Baltic Studies (IBS), which has been ranked among the TTCSP’s 2019 Go To Global Index, is also based in Tartu. Among the Baltic states, all three countries hold virtually equal leadership positions, both in terms of the quantity of think tanks and their impact on the national and regional political discourse. As compared to the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe, each Baltic state holds approximately 2.5% of the general think tank population, which is relatively insignificant. However, as a joint force, they have a 7.3% share in the CEE think tank community, in terms of quantity, while seven Baltic think tanks have also been placed on the TTCSP’s 2019 Go To Global Index. Thus, many think tanks across the Baltic states emphasize the value of the pan- Baltic cooperation, in regards to both the state international policy and civil society.

Think Tanks by Research Area

Since the formation of the first independent think tanks in the Baltic states, the public policy research profile has remained highly diversified, reflecting the complex nature of the civil society’s objectives. Thus, in the first years of independence, the newly established think tanks did not focus exclusively on democratization, free-market transition, or European integration but also explored a wide range of social, environmental, and economic issues. At the same time, there is a clear trend of increase in the quantity of think tanks focused on the EU, security, and international affairs, in the late 1990s and after the countries’ integration into the EU and NATO. To analyze the research focus of all 51 think tanks in the subregion, eight distinct subject categories have been defined: “Democracy and Transparency,” “Foreign Policy/International Affairs,” “Human Rights Watchdog,” “Domestic Economics,” “International Trade and Economics,” “Energy Policy,” “Environment,” “Rural and Agricultural Studies,” “Food and Water Security,” “European Union,” “Social Policy,” and “Technology and Innovation.” As a result, 14 out of 51 think tanks, or 27.5%, focus on “Foreign Policy/International Affairs” examining the efficiency of the governmental structures, the EU’s political and economic relations, and, in particular, the security and national defense challenges related to Russian aggressive foreign policy. The next two most popular spheres of research and outreach are “International Trade and Economics” and “Democracy and Transparency,” with 9 think tanks whose principal focus lies in these fields each. “Human Rights Watch” think tanks, the majority of which were created in the mid-1990s, make up another 14%. As in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, “Technology and Innovation” (1 think tank), “Rural and Agricultural Studies” (1), and “Food and Water Security” (0) remain the most understudied areas.

In Lithuania in particular, 5 out of 19 think tanks, or approximately 26%, are aimed at conducting research to assess the transparency of governmental structures, evaluate civil engagement, and develop strategies to increase the efficiency of the national democracies. Another 16%, or 3 think tanks, can be defined as institutions focused on foreign policy which reflects the general trends in the region. A unique feature of Lithuanian think tank community is a key role of social policy research and human rights watch, which are principal research areas of over 10% of institutions. In Latvia, on the other hand, international trade and international affairs research, usually directed at the EU, Russia, or China, remain the two areas of the highest priority, with six and five think tanks each, and overshadow other fields of public policy.

Like in Latvia, a relatively large part of Estonian think tanks, — 6 institutions, or almost 38%, — focus on “Foreign Policy/International Relations” and, similarly, examine primarily national defense issues and security challenges caused by the Russian presence in the region, from the EU or NATO’s perspectives. In Estonia, a unique feature of the think tank community is the focus on human rights watch, especially women’s rights and gender equality, as a quarter of all think tanks specialize in these fields. Think Tanks by Institutional Affiliation In creating a representative sample of 13 Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian think tanks by institutional affiliations, the think tanks analyzed include 7 independent institutions, 3 government-affiliated institutions, and 3 university-affiliated institutions19. Despite the seeming underrepresentation of university- and government-affiliated think tanks, in fact, this ratio reflects the patterns in the general think tank population in the subregion, where 32 institutions out of 51, or almost 63%, are independent. Moreover, it is crucial to note that only one think tank in the sample, Lithuanian Free Market Institute, has provided the information on its budget size and staff size. For the rest of the sample, only the data accessible to the public online were used. Furthermore, only one government- and one-university affiliated institutions publish their budget information openly and, thus, only these two data entries could be used in the analysis. There exist many practical differences between independent, university-affiliated, and government-affiliated think tanks in the subregion. Though only one out of the four government think tanks in the sample openly provide budgetary information, it is clear that these think tanks vary greatly in their staff size, ranging from less than 20 to more than 250, and, thus, probably in their budget size as well. Similarly, among the university-affiliated think tanks, the size diversity is also significant. For instance, The Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (SSE Riga), as an independent higher education institution, employs over 100 employees while Eastern Europe Studies Center (EESC), which is a think tank project affiliated with the Vilnius University, only has 9 staff members. Finally, due to the lack of budgetary information, it is not possible to state if there is a correlation between the staff size and budget size among these think tanks. At the same time, it is clear that independent think tanks in the sample are a much more uniform group, with the staff size ranging from five to 25, which is also much smaller than the average number of employees at the government- and university-affiliated institutions. Moreover, the variation in budget size is also much less defined, ranging from 100 hundred thousand to over one million dollars. Although the ratio between the admin and research staff varies greatly, most institutions can afford to have a majority of their employees involved in research as experts. Finally, unlike in the case of government- and university-affiliated think tanks, there is a well-defined direct correlation between the staff size and budget capacity. For example, the independent think tank with the smallest budget in the sample, Baltic Institute of Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Communication Research (INVENT), also has the smallest staff size among all the institutions (five employees). Similarly, Praxis Center for Policy Studies, which is a top ranked CEE think tank according to the Global Go To Index and has the largest budget among the independent organizations in the sample, employs the largest number of both research and total staff (25).

19 Baltic Institute of Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Communication Research (INVENT), Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS, Eastern Europe Studies Center (EESC), Estonian Institute of Economic Research (EKI), Institute of Baltic Studies (IBS), Institute of International, Relations and Political Science, International Centre for Defence and Security, Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), Lithuanian Energy Institute, Lithuanian Free Market Institute, Praxis Center for Policy Studies, Stockholm Environment Institute Tallinn Centre (SEI Tallinn), The Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (SSE Riga).

Biases In the subregion, the majority of think tanks do not hold explicit bias, however, there are several types of agendas that need to be noted. First of all, almost all government-affiliated institutions could be described as having a pro-government bias since they receive their funding primarily or fully from the national government and supply research directly to the governmental agencies. Moreover, many of the government-affiliated think tanks specializing in foreign policy and international affairs collaborate closely with and, thus, represent the interests of the national defense apparatus.20 International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), a leading think tank in the Baltic region, is a good example of this pattern. With all its Board Members affiliated with the governmental structures, from the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Security advisory to the President of the Republic of Estonia, ICDS strives to “strengthen Estonia’s security and defence sector” and “[enhance] Estonia’s intellectual role within NATO and the EU.” Moreover, although pro-Europe views in the Baltic states are rarely deemed controversial, approximately 20% of think tanks across the Baltic states can be described as having an explicit pro-EU ideology, as they exist primarily to promote EU cooperation and political values. In this group, several organizations also strongly advocate for NATO’s interests and aim at increasing the Baltic state’s role within the alliance. At the same time, unlike in other Central and Eastern European countries, there are no explicitly anti-EU think tanks, which illustrates the Baltics’ firm pro-European orientation. Similarly, the Institute of Democratic Politics, founded by a group of Conservative and Christian Democratic politicians, is the only conservative think tank in the region that represents the region’s center-right movement.

20 Chen Xin, "Estonia Social Briefing: Major Think Tanks in Estonia. An Overview," China-cee.eu, December 06, 2018, accessed July 21, 2020, https://china-cee.eu/2018/12/06/estonia-social-briefing-major-think-tanks-in-estonia-an-overview/. Finally, many think tanks define the pan-Baltic and Euro-Atlantic cooperation, often with North European countries and Poland as well, as one of their key objectives, in terms of cultural development, foreign policy, and, especially, security. For instance, in 2019, a think tank project called the Baltic Security Foundation (BSF) emerged to examine the Baltic Sea region within the Euro-Atlantic framework and “foster Baltic regional defense and security.”21 Similarly, in 2020, four think tanks based in the Baltic States and the Warsaw Institute launched the Baltic Fund, a new institution that would “strengthen cooperation in the region” by partnering closely with the national governments.22

Issues and Challenges

As the only former Soviet republics that gained admission to both the EU and NATO, the Baltic states have largely overcome the post-Soviet era of low transparency and economic struggle. At the same time, due to the geographical and cultural proximity of the Russian Federation, the three countries are increasingly more concerned about the influence of Russian revisionist foreign policy on security in the Baltic Sea region.23 Similarly, pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns are becoming an increasingly greater concern. For instance, in April, Lithuanian National Defense Minister, media, and state structures received a falsified email from NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg informing about a “decision to withdraw NATO troops from Lithuania.”24 In this charged information space where agents attempt to discredit the Baltic states’ pro-EU and -NATO orientation, think tanks need to expand their outreach and relevant research, to further cultivate a knowledge-based, democratic society and help the region transition from the vulnerable Allied states into essential agents. Similarly, many think tanks in the Baltic states are devising ways of examining and impacting energy policy, as a key element of regional security. Mainly, energy independence and sustainability play an essential role in both reducing dependence on Russia and maintaining the status within the EU.25 First of all, the Baltic grids are still part of the post-Soviet BRELL ring, which includes Russia and Belarus, and remain dependent on the control center in Moscow. Secondly, synchronization of the Baltic power grid with the continental Europe is an important step towards a more comprehensive economic and industrial integration. Finally, as the three countries begin to revitalize their post-COVID-19 economies within the so-called “Baltic bubble,” think tanks need to be prepared to examine the shifting regional

21 "Baltic Security Foundation Established to Promote Regional Defense Synchronization," The Baltic Times, July 12, 2019, accessed July 21, 2020, baltictimes.com/baltic_security_foundation_established_to_promote_regional_defense_synchronization/. 22 "The Baltic Fund Concept Presented to the Authorities of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland," Warsawinstitute.org, February 12, 2020, |PAGE|, accessed July 21, 2020, https://warsawinstitute.org/baltic-fund-concept-presented-authorities- estonia-lithuania-latvia-poland/. 23 Linas Kojala, "Baltic Security: The Same Challenges Remain, Even During a Pandemic," Fpri.org, May 28, 2020, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/05/baltic-security-the-same-challenges-remain-even-during-a-pandemic/. 24 Ibid. 25 Linas Kojala, "Baltic Security: The Same Challenges Remain, Even During a Pandemic," Fpri.org, May 28, 2020, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/05/baltic-security-the-same-challenges-remain-even-during-a-pandemic/. business and labor market. For the past decade, the issues of human talent migration and low technology inclusion have become increasingly relevant, as the Baltic states struggled with maintaining the pace of their Western European partners.26 Now, many think tanks need to expand their research and engagement in the regional social and economic policy-making, to ensure a well-balanced economic development and international competitiveness of the Baltic states.

Research Publications Analysis To understand the key themes and questions that Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian think tanks prioritize in their research, seven organizations that all were identified among the top 106 think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe, according to the Global Go To Index, have been selected. Then, all their publications that are openly available to the public online from the past 9 months, from October 2019 to July 2020, were thoroughly analyzed. The representative sample for the publications analysis contains Lithuanian Free Market Institute (LFMI) and Eastern Europe Studies Center (EESC) based in Lithuania, Centre for Public Policy (PROVIDUS) and Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA) from Latvia, and three Estonian think tanks: Praxis Center for Policy Studies, International Centre for Defense and Security (ICDS), and Institute of Baltic Studies (IBS). Overall, 84 publications from the past 9 months have been analyzed during the research process. Based on the comprehensive analysis, several clear trends in the focus, priorities, and activity of the think tanks in the subregion have been determined. First of all, the level of publication activity varied greatly across different organizations. For instance, while the Tallinn- based International Centre for Defense and Security produced 21 publications over the last 9 months, the Eastern Europe Studies Center (EESC) located in Vilnius has only posted 4 analytical works. Moreover, the breadth of the research also differs significantly across the think tanks: while some institutions focus exclusively on one or two areas, such as Lithuanian Free Market Institute (LFMI) specializing in Economics and Finance research, other centers try to cover a wider range of topics, which is most likely connected with the institution's budget. For instance, Praxis Center for Policy Studies, which has the largest documented budget within the representative sample analyzed, published works focused on migration policy and disability rights, as well as on poverty reduction and the national labor market. To analyze the focus of all 84 publications, eight distinct subject categories have been defined: “Foreign Policy and Security,” “Economics and Finance,” “Civil Society and Human Rights,” “COVID-19,” “Democracy and Transparency,” “Health, Education, and Social Policy,” “Technology and Innovation,” “Energy and Environment.” First of all, the two most prominent themes among the think tanks' interest areas are “Foreign Policy and Security” (31 publications, or almost 37%) and “Economics and Finance” (20 publications, or nearly 24%). 13 publications, or 15.5%, focus on “Civil Society and Human Rights” while other areas, — especially

26 Anna-Liisa Laarits, "What If Think Tanks Were Operated by the Public?" Artun.ee, September 19, 2019, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.artun.ee/en/what-if-think-tanks-were-operated-by-public/. “Democracy and Transparency” and “Energy and Environment,” — have been heavily understanding. Most likely, this pattern represents the shifting priorities among the Baltic think tanks: while environmental and energy policy still have not attracted significant attention, democratization has lost its urgency, as more than 15 years has passed since the countries’ integration into the EU and, thus, successful rejection of its communist legacy. Finally, only one publication focused on COVID-19 has been published, which contrasts the urgency that the topic has been given in the rest of the CEE region. This might be connected with the low number of coronavirus cases, as compared with the more densely populated European countries.

Summary: Key Takeaways

As the Baltic think tank industry celebrates the nations’ Euro-Atlantic integration and its own leadership within the global think tank community, new geopolitical challenges threaten these successes. In the energy sector and sustainability shift, the countries remain isolated from Western European markets and their rapid “green” transition. Similarly, as high labor migration and low innovation challenge the Baltic economies, think tanks struggle with examining and addressing those evolving trends to ensure international competitiveness. On the other hand, public policy research institutions need to wrestle with the Kremlin-directed disinformation campaigns in the regional discourse, as well as balance between impartiality and the need to respond to the Russian aggressive regional influence. At the same time, think tanks in the Baltic states successfully utilize these challenges to increase their own flexibility and invent diverse, innovative projects, from pan-Baltic intellectual cooperation to smart urbanism initiatives. In their unique position of Europeanized post-Soviet republics, the Baltic states need to navigate the rising economic, security, and cultural issues to safeguard their continued mission: becoming essential agents within the European and global progressive democratic alliance.

Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova Europe’s Eastern Periphery: Public Policy Research in the Post-Soviet Climate of Democratic Pursuits and Political Instability

Background:

In Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, the think tank landscape has been shaped by the 70- year-long existence of the USSR and the deep-roots of its communist legacy. While the earliest government and university-affiliated research centers, such as Kyiv-based Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies, have existed since the early 20st century, the totalitarian regime of the Communist Party has delayed the formation of independent think tanks by a few decades. Although politically independent research organizations were not able to thrive, the state- controlled “information centers” can be seen as the pioneers of the local think tank movement.27 After the death of Stalin, in the mid-1950s, the Khrushchev Thaw urged the Party to set its course for “domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution" and modernizing internally to catch up with the U.S. and Western Europe. This transition was then led by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, KGB, and the Academy of Sciences. While these state organs aimed primarily at validating the Party’s decisions rather than conducting evidence-based analysis, their methods nevertheless resembled the strategies employed by modern think tanks.

*Data Excludes Think Tanks that are no longer active In the 1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introduced reforms, known as glasnost and perestroika, which allowed for community organizing and independent political thought.

27 James G. McGann and Robert Kent Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 250. After the USSR collapsed and Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova all declared independence, in 1991, new think tanks rapidly emerged to research free market economies, democratization, and security.28 Among the first institutions, Moldova’s oldest non-governmental think tank Institute for Development and Social Initiatives "Viitorul" was founded in 1993 while, in Ukraine, the 1st ranked think tank in Central and Eastern Europe Razumkov Center emerged in 1994.29 In Belarus, the civil society has made a crucial achievement by founding the Belarusian Association of Think Tanks in 1997. While the think tank industry has steadily grown since the early 1990s, the civil societies of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova have been heavily influenced by several key geopolitical phenomena. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 encouraged the establishment of new think tanks focused on anti-corruption and pro-democracy work. In Moldova and Ukraine, think tanks actively joined the pro-EU integration movement, by examining economic factors and popularizing “European values.”30 At the same time, the Transnistria War, the annexation of Crimea, and the War in Donbas, have challenged the regional civil community and led to the advancement of the security and defence discourse, especially in regards to the Russian Federation and its aggressive foreign policy.31 In Belarus, since the mid-1990s, think tanks have been suffering harsh criticism and legal persecutions from the state-controlled media and governmental agencies.32 In 2016, IISEPS, a leading Belarusian think tank, had to cease its activities in the country, after decades of threats and false claims made by the administration of the President Lukashenko.33

Geographic Distribution

In the subregion, 102 think tanks currently remain active. Historically, like in other CEE countries, the majority of Ukrainian think tanks, — 57 out of 74, or 77%, — are located in the nation’s capital of Kyiv. Four out of the six top ranked think tanks in TTCSP’s 2019 Go To Global Index are situated in Kyiv, including Razumkov Center and Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF). Among the 24 cities of regional significance, Lviv (population 721k), which is considered the country’s cultural and civil society center, has the largest number of think tanks, six. Dnipro (pop. 966k), Kharkiv (pop. 1.4M), and Odesa (993k) have larger populations yet only have two think tanks each. The rest of the assessed think tanks are located in Chernihiv

28 James G. McGann and Robert Kent Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 253. 29 Klas Markensten and Igor Grozu, "Review of Civil Society Organisations in Moldova. Final Report," Sida Review 2011, no. 12 (October 2011), accessed July 20, 2020, https://www.sida.se/contentassets/24b52bf509f04e2d9dd3fa9c9858b6ed/review-of- civil- society-organisations-in-moldova_3242.pdf). 30 Joshua P. Mulford, "Non-State Actors in the Russo-Ukrainian War." Connections 15, no. 2, 7 (2016): 89-107. Accessed July 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/26326442. 31 Ibid., 8. 32 Wolfgang Sender, "Think Tanks in Belarus: Ein Überblick Über Geschichte Und Gegenwärtige Situation," Kas.de, November 12, 2018, 6, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.kas.de/en/web/belarus/laenderberichte/detail/-/content/think-tanks-in-belarus1. 33 Olga Hryniuk, "Belarusian Independent Think Tanks: Surviving Despite the Odds," BelarusDigest, August 30, 2018. Accessed July 21, 2020. https://belarusdigest.com/story/belarusian-independent-think-tanks-surviving-despite-the-odds/. (286k, one), Lutsk (214k, one), Poltava (285k, one), and Voznesensk (one), which, surprisingly, is not a city of regional significance and has a small population of 96k inhabitants. One think tank, Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, resides in Brussels, Belgium. Finally, several think tanks based in Kyiv also have established smaller regional offices, however, this fact is not reflected in the geographical distribution analysis. In Moldova, the pattern of state capitals being the center of the national think tank industry is true to even a higher extent––all the 12 think tanks identified are located in the capital of Chișinău (pop. 670k). The Institute for Public Policy (IPP), which is the only Moldavian organization ranked among the 106 top think tanks in CEE in the Global Go To Index, is also based in Chișinău. No other think tank locations have been identified during the research. Similarly, in Belarus, all the 11 think tanks based in the country are located in the capital of Minsk (pop. 1.98M). One of these think tanks Ostrogorski Center also has a second office in London, the UK. Due to the legal repressions and criticism in the state-controlled media, four think tanks had to stop their activity in Belarus and relocate to Vilnius, Lithuania or have been founded there by immigrant Belorusian civil society leaders. Even abroad, these centers continue to focus on the political and socio-economic challenges faced by Belarus in their research and outreach activities. In this way, Independent Institute of Socioeconomic and Political Studies (IISEPS) and Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) are now based in Vilnius.34 One think tank, CASE Belarus, is located in Warsaw, Poland yet is considered a Belorusian institution by the TTCSP CEE team, as it focuses exclusively on the economic development of Belarus. Within the region of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine is a leading figure, both in terms of the quantity of think tanks and their impact on the national and regional political discourse. As compared to the 12 active think tanks based in Moldova and the 16 Belarusian ones that were recorded by the TTCSP Central and Eastern Europe team in the summer of 2020, in Ukraine, 74 similar organizations exist. In addition to the fact that the territory and population of Ukraine are several times greater than those of the other two countries, the political climate in Ukraine has become more favorable to the development of independent think tanks as the Revolution of Dignity revealed the need in a resilient civil society and new pro-liberalization groups have joined the governmental structures.35 Moreover, in the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, six Ukrainian institutions have been identified among the 106 top think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe, while only one Moldavian and no Belarusian think tanks have entered the ranking. As compared to the rest of the CEE region, however, the think tank community in Ukraine still lacks independence, stability, and influence. For instance, even though the 106 Top CEE Think Tanks in 2020 were led by the Ukraine-based Razumkov Center, by the number of establishments in the ranking, Ukraine falls far behind Russia, Poland, and Czech Republic and does not surpass several other countries in the region.

34 Olga Hryniuk, "Belarusian Independent Think Tanks: Surviving Despite the Odds," BelarusDigest, August 30, 2018. Accessed July 21, 2020. https://belarusdigest.com/story/belarusian-independent-think-tanks-surviving-despite-the-odds/. 35 Joshua P. Mulford, "Non-State Actors in the Russo-Ukrainian War." Connections 15, no. 2, 5 (2016): 89-107. Accessed July 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/26326442.

Think Tanks by Research Area

Think tanks in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova primarily focus on policy research regarding their nations’ democratic and free-market transitions from nascent capitalist economies to aspiring established global economic actors. Thus, the oldest think tanks in the subregion often focus on democratic processes, governmental structures, and transparency while, among the think tanks established in the 21st century, policy research is increasingly more diversified. To analyze the research focus of all 102 think tanks, eight distinct subject categories have been defined: “Democracy and Transparency,” “Foreign Policy/International Affairs,” “Human Rights Watchdog,” “Domestic Economics,” “International Trade and Economics,” “Energy Policy,” “Environment,” “Rural and Agricultural Studies,” “Food and Water Security,” “European Union,” “Social Policy,” and “Technology and Innovation.” As a result, 42 out of 102 think tanks, or approximately 41%, focus on “Democracy and Transparency” examining the ongoing democratization and liberalization, assessing the performance of governmental institutions, and monitoring elections. The second most popular sphere of research and outreach is “Domestic Economics”: 16 think tanks, or nearly 16%. Usually, think tanks who specialize in this area also focus on international trade and regional economics, as another significant policy research sphere. Among the population, 13 institutions focus on “Foreign Policy/International Affairs,” which often involves comparative analysis of Russia's foreign policy, in terms of regional security, the war in Donbas, and conflict mediation. Among the 102 think tanks, 11 focus on “Social Policy,” which usually centers around public health issues and education policy, while 7 organizations center their research around the EU.

In Ukraine in particular, 37 out of 74 think tanks, or 50%, are aimed at conducting research on the national democratization, monitoring elections, increasing the efficiency of governmental structures, and also exposing corruption within the government, which is a unique characteristic of the CEE region. As compared to the rest of the subregion, Ukraine also has a significant amount of human rights watch organizations that act as think tanks. At the same time, only 19% of Belarusian think tanks focus on “Democracy and Transparency”; instead, the most popular areas of focus are “Domestic Economics” (7 out of 16 think tanks) and “Foreign Policy/International Affairs” (4 think tanks). In Moldova, on the other hand, foreign policy remains an area of low interest as only one think tank focuses on these issues. At the same time, 25% of think tanks focus on “International Trade and Economics” while another quarter prioritizes social policy research. Like in Ukraine, democracy is also an area of high priority.

Across the entire subregion, research on “Environment,” “Energy Policy,” and “Rural and Agricultural Studies” seems to remain of the lowest priority: out of the 102 think tanks, only three organizations focus on energy policy and markets, agricultural development, and environmental policy, and all of them are based in Ukraine. Research on food and water security seems to be heavily underdeveloped as well. Finally, although many think tanks are interested in the digitalization of democratic processes, the entire subregion seems to lack strongly in “Technology and Innovation” research as there are no think tanks focused explicitly on this field.

Think Tanks by Institutional Affiliation

In creating a representative sample of Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Moldavian think tanks by institutional affiliations, the think tanks analyzed include 28 independent institutions, 4 government-affiliated institutions, and 3 university-affiliated institutions36. Despite the seeming underrepresentation of university- and government-affiliated think tanks, in fact, this ratio reflects the patterns in the general think tank population in the subregion, where 85 institutions out of 102, or 83%, are independent. Moreover, it is crucial to note that not all the think tanks in the sample have provided the information on their budget size and staff size and, in that case, the data accessible to the public online were used. Furthermore, in the sample, two out of four government-affiliated institutions do not open their budget information to the public and, thus, only two data entries could be used in the analysis. Finally, among the Belarusian think tanks, which included three independent and one government-affiliated institutions, none provide access to their budgetary details while a half of them publish little information about their staff size and roles. For instance, both independent think tanks located in Minsk have refused to provide any data on their budget by claiming that the information is entirely confidential. Most likely, this lack of publicity and transparency is one of the Belarusian think tanks’ strategies to protect themselves from the continuous legal threats and criticism in the state-controlled media that the government has been initiating since the mid-1990s.37 There exist many practical differences between independent, university-affiliated, and government-affiliated think tanks in the subregion. Though only two out of the four government think tanks in the sample openly provide budgetary information, it is clear that these think tanks vary greatly both in their staff size, ranging from less than 10 to more than 200, and in their budget size. Moreover, the two factors do not correlate with each other, suggesting that a greater

36 Association for Community Self-Organization Assistance (ACSA), Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC), Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS), CEDOS Think Tank, Center for Democracy and Rule of Law, Centre for Economic Strategy, Centre of Policy and Legal Reform (CPLR), City Institute by Lviv City Council (LCC), Civil Network OPORA, DiXi Group, Dniprovskyi Center for Social Research, Europe Without Barriers (EwB), Expert Center for Human Rights, Expert Grup, Foreign Policy Association of Moldova, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism,” German- Ukrainian Agropolitical Dialogue, Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF), Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER), Institute for Public Policy, Institute of Analysis and Advocacy (IAA), Institute of Economics of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus (NASB), Institute of World Policy, International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS), Kyiv National Economic University (KNEU), NGO Ukrainian Centre for European Policy (UCEP), NGO “Come Back Alive,” NGO “Institute for Social and Economic Research” (ISER), National Institute for Strategic Studies, Novak Laboratory, Razumkov Centre, School For Policy Analysis of National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA), Ukrainian Institute for the Future, VoxUkraine 37 Wolfgang Sender, "Think Tanks in Belarus: Ein Überblick Über Geschichte Und Gegenwärtige Situation," Kas.de, November 12, 2018, 6, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.kas.de/en/web/belarus/laenderberichte/detail/-/content/think-tanks-in-belarus1. financial capacity does not necessarily mean greater research opportunities, due to certain limitations. For instance, the annual budget of City Institute by Lviv City Council (LCC) is approximately $280,000 while German-Ukrainian Agropolitical Dialogue operates on a much larger budget of $2,500,000, even though its staff is two times smaller. Among the independent think tanks in the sample, the variation in staff sizes is much less defined, ranging from less than 10 to over 45 employees. However, across different think tanks, the ratio between the admin and research staff varies greatly. As such, for larger, well established think tanks, funding is generally in the range of around $1,000,000, or even over 2 million dollars, while middle-size think tanks operate on several hundred thousand dollars annually. Finally, university-affiliated think tanks tend to be much larger, with over 100 employees and budget size from $2 to 10 million. At the same time, certain smaller institutes within one large university, such as School For Policy Analysis of National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA), also exist and operate on a much smaller budget and with a smaller staff, similarly to the independent think tanks.

Biases

In the subregion, the majority of think tanks do not hold explicit bias, however, there are several types of agendas that need to be noted. First of all, almost all government-affiliated institutions, as well as many think tanks affiliated to state universities, could be described as having a pro-government bias since they receive their funding primarily or fully from the national government and supply research directly to the governmental agencies. For instance, the Kyiv-based European Information and Research Center conducts analytical research exclusively for the members of Verkhovna Rada to facilitate the activities of the Ukrainian parliament. In Belarus, the remaining independent think tanks have repeatedly noted how the state-affiliated research institutions, such as Scientific Research Institute of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, are essentially “state-controlled” and often serve to counter the research and arguments made by the experts and organizations who criticize the government’s actions.38 Secondly, 17 Ukrainian and 3 Moldavian think tanks can be described as pro-EU as, in their missions and activities, they aim at implementing the countries’ integration into the EU and also popularizing “European values” in the society. For example, the mission of the Kyiv-based New Europe Center is to examine and increase support for “Ukraine’s European and Euro- Atlantic prospects” in the EU and NATO. Surprisingly, during the research, the TTCSP CEE team has not identified any anti-EU organizations. Moreover, in Ukraine, several think tanks also can be described as anti-Russian: for instance, School For Policy Analysis of National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Ukraine claims that its objective is to examine “Russian world” — a popular derogatory term that describes Russia’s cultural and political influence as detrimental to Ukraine’s development.

Issues and Challenges

In the entire subregion, the think tank community still remains fragile and exerts limited influence on the national and regional policy due to several challenges. First of all, most independent think tanks in the countries still lack self-sustainability and struggle with procuring stable sources of funding.39 As a result, many institutions that have been founded to conduct expansive independent research have to narrow down their activities and provide paid confidential information to individual clients, such as political groups or private businesses, which then compromises their impartiality. On the other hand, many think tanks choose to rely on grants from the international non-governmental and governmental organizations which, however, requires a lot of human resources and also deprives the think tanks of the freedom to define their agenda and focus area.40 Moreover, especially in Ukraine, the competition for Western donors often negates the "intellectual cooperation" between independent analytical centers. Mainly, think tanks often perceive each other as rivals and refuse to initiate joint, larger- scale projects or research that their cooperation would allow for, which then prevents the civil society from influencing the state’s decision on the regional or national level.41 Secondly, think tanks in the subregion still struggle with developing relationships with governmental structures.42 For instance, in Belarus, the authoritarian political regime generally views independent think tanks with suspicion, especially when they rely on funding from the

38 Olga Hryniuk, "State-Controlled Think Tanks in Belarus – Who Are They?" BelarusDigest, October 3, 2018, https://belarusdigest.com/story/state-controlled-think-tanks-in-belarus-who-are-they/. 39 James G. McGann and Robert Kent Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 250. 40 Sergei Konoplyov, "Analytical Centers in Ukraine," Belfercenter.org, November 1998, 5, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/disc_paper_99_08.pdf. 41 Ibid., 6. 42 James G. McGann and Robert Kent Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 255. Western donors, which are often regarded as hostile to the Belarusian nation. Moreover, the restrictive political and legal framework often prevents think tanks from collaborating with local businesses, applying for state funding, or conducting large-scale joint projects with the government, particularly in areas viewed as politically sensitive. As a result, think tanks still exert very limited influence on the national state policies and regional political narrative. Finally, a unique problem faced by the think tanks in the subregion is that they are forced to challenge Russian monopoly in the post-Soviet analytical sphere. For example, many international organizations still reach out to Russia-based think tanks when data on Ukraine, Belarus, or Moldova are needed, which not only brings up biased materials but also deprives think tanks in the countries from a key opportunity to procure funding and expand their activities.43 This lack of visibility and support also results in the fact that the think tank community in the subregion is heavily understudied.

Research Publications Analysis

To understand the key themes and questions that Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Moldavian think tanks prioritize in their research, eight organizations that all were identified among the top 106 think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe, according to the Global Go To Index, in the past have been selected. Then, all their publications that are openly available to the public online from the past 9 months, from October 2019 to July 2020, were thoroughly analyzed. The representative sample for the publications analysis contains the following think tanks: Razumkov Centre, Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF), Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, Dniprovskiy Center for Social Research, Institute of World Policy (IWP), Institute of Analysis and Advocacy (IAA), and International Centre for Policy Studies all based in Ukraine and the Moldova-based Institute for Public Policy (IPP). It is important to note that the Institute of World Policy, although active on the social media platforms, has not updated its website since 2017 and, thus, no publications by this think tank have been taken into account. Overall, 120 publications from the past 9 months have been analyzed during the research process. Based on the comprehensive analysis, several clear trends in the focus, priorities, and activity of the think tanks in the subregion have been determined. First of all, the level of publication activity varied greatly across different organizations: for instance, while Razumkov Center has produced 24 publications over the last 9 months, the Moldova-based Institute for Public Policy (IPP) has only posted 5 analytical works. Moreover, the breadth of the research also differs significantly across the think tanks: while some institutions focus exclusively on one or two areas, such as Institute of Analysis and Advocacy (IAA) specializing in Public Health, other centers try to cover a wider range of topics, which is most likely connected with the institution's budget and number of employees.

43 Sergei Konoplyov, "Analytical Centers in Ukraine," Belfercenter.org, November 1998, 6, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/disc_paper_99_08.pdf. To analyze the focus of all 120 publications, eight distinct subject categories have been defined: “Foreign Policy and Security,” “Economics and Finance,” “Civil Society and Human Rights,” “COVID-19,” “Democracy and Transparency,” “Health, Education, and Social Policy,” “Technology and Innovation,” “Energy and Environment.” First of all, the two most prominent themes among the think tanks' interest areas are “Foreign Policy and Security” (28 publications, or over 23%) and COVID-19 (19 publications, or almost 16%). 18 publications, or 15%, focus on “Democracy and Transparency,” 17 on “Civil Society and Human Rights,” and 16 published works examine “Health, Education, and Social Policy.” 12 publications, or 10%, are focused on “Economics and Finance” issues while only 8, or 7%, and 2, or 1.7%, examine “Energy and Environment” and “Technology and Innovation,” respectively.

In terms of the “Foreign Policy and Security” area, think tanks across the region conduct research related to Russia, from the War in Donbas to international sanctions to the cultural impact on the region. Moreover, in Ukraine and Moldova, many think tanks conduct comparative studies where they review the connections between their respective country and EU, in terms of politics, social policy, and economic development.44 Among the coronavirus-related publications, the economic recovery following the pandemic seems to be of the highest priority to these think tanks. Within the publications dedicated to “Civil Society & Human Rights,” gender equality, immigrant rights, and the right to health seem to be of the highest interest. Furthermore, environmental protection and sustainability seems to be of little importance; the only issue that reappears often is energy policy and security. Reflecting the fact that the entire region has no think tank specializing in “Technology & Innovation,” few publications touch on

44 Ernest Vardanean, "Moldova between Russia and the West: Internal Divisions behind the Commitment to European Integration," Russie.NEI.Visions, no. 110 (August 2018): https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/ moldova-between-russia-and-west-internal-divisions. the technology's impacts and mostly focus on the digitalization of democratic processes or FinTech.

Summary: Key Takeaways

Although the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union only allowed for the existence of state-controlled analytical centers only and delayed the formation of independent think tanks for decades, since gaining their independence in 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova have actively engaged in the global think tank community. In their work, think tanks have to balance between Western international donors and the skeptical, often openly hostile governments while seeking financial stability and paving the ways to impact national politics. Nearly 30 years after the collapse of the USSR, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Moldavian think tanks continue to examine the subregion’s transition from the Soviet Republics into independent democratic states with free market economies.45 Meanwhile, they still have to struggle with and respond to limited funding, governmental distrust, and the economic and political challenges in the region. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, the escalating economic crisis, and the rise of populism, think tanks in the region again need to adapt to the changing socio-political landscapes, to persist in leading the regional civil society. In order to strengthen the research on Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Moldavian think tanks in the future, more data needs to be compiled and analyzed regarding the complex relationship between think tanks and the national governments. For instance, in Belarus, the animosity of the state directly impacts the geographic distribution, confidentiality policy, and research areas of the country’s think tanks. Moreover, as the civil society in all three countries is still growing yet remains fragile, the information on the quantity of think tanks needs to be updated regularly, in order to account for the new ones, as well as the ones that had to close down. Finally, to provide more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the think tanks’ biases and agendas, it is key to maintain close communication with the institutions and access their data on funding, as the reports accessible to the public online are often limited or missing.

45Ernest Vardanean, "Moldova between Russia and the West: Internal Divisions behind the Commitment to European Integration," Russie.NEI.Visions, no. 110 (August 2018): https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de- lifri/russieneivisions/moldova-between-russia-and-west-internal-divisions. Poland: An Analysis of Think Tanks in a Democracy in Crisis

Background:

Historically, public policy research in Poland before 1989 was largely relegated to university faculties and programs and other research institutions that were almost exclusively concerned with foreign policy. Following the Second World War, the first research institutions to be founded were either de facto government institutions––such as the Institute for International Affairs (PISM)––or university faculties, such as those of the University of Warsaw46. As is the case in most Central and Eastern European countries, think tanks in Poland since the end of communist rule have mostly focused on democratization, civil society, market reform, and integration with the West. Through the early-mid 2000s, think tanks have largely reflected the prioritization of these areas in policy research, and have also shifted to encompass orientation toward the European Union and the United States.47

*Data Excludes Think Tanks that are no longer active

46 Dorota Stasiak, “Think Tanks in Poland: Policy Experts at the Crossroads,” Polish Journal of Political Science 2, no. 1 (2014): pp. 95-140, 108. 47 Amelie Kutter and Vera Trappmann, “Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe: The Ambivalent Legacy of Accession,” Acta Politica 45, no. 1-2 (2010): pp. 41-69, https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2009.18, 41. Today, however, many think tanks that were founded in the nascent Third Polish Republic have since disbanded due to shifts in national priorities in a country no longer defined by its market and government transition. There is an acute shortage of think tanks concerned with domestic public policy in areas such as urban development, preservation of political institutional integrity, renewable energy, rural development, health policy, educational policy, and technology and innovation. Furthermore, many new think tanks in the last 1-2 decades have become increasingly partisan and politically oriented with right-wing think tanks in particular, such as the Sobieski Institute, having taken more present roles in the industry and in national dialogues. Although think tanks serve integral roles in countries’ informed public policy making, there has been little historical or contemporary precedent for their preeminent role in public policy in Poland,48 and think tanks struggle to find sustainable sources of public or private funding in the country. Poland's nature as a large, stable, and developed Central European country has led to its development of a relatively large and well regarded think tank sector, though the future of the industry in the country is increasingly threatened.

Geographic Distribution

As of July 2020, there are 62 think tanks in Poland. Most of these think tanks are located in the capital of Warsaw––however, unlike most other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the concentration of Polish think tanks in its capital is less extreme. Poland has historically been a heavily agrarian country with no clear metropolitan center––though Warsaw has been the capital since the late middle ages, Krakow has maintained its status as a large regional city. Similarly, other cities, particularly in western and northern Poland––formerly in the more developed German partition––also maintained their relevance and have thrived historically, namely cities such as Poznan, Gdansk, or Wroclaw. This compares to other CEE countries such as Slovakia, Albania, Belarus, and Hungary, where there are none, or nearly no think tanks outside the capital city. Poland’s lack of population centralization around Warsaw is reflected in the distribution of think tanks around the country. Though Warsaw has the overwhelming majority of think tanks with 42 (68%) located in the capital, many other regional Polish cities have think tanks of their own: Gdansk (3), Gliwice (1), Krakow (4), Lodz (2), Lublin (1), Olsztyn (1), Opole (1), Poznan (3), Przemyśl (1), Szczecin (1), Wroclaw (1).

48 David Cadier and Monika Sus, “Think Tank Involvement in Foreign Policymaking in the Czech Republic and Poland,” The International Spectator 52, no. 1 (February 2017): pp. 116-131, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1272240, 116. Think Tanks by Research Area

The landscape of Polish think tanks has shifted since the rise of the industry as a whole in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Reflecting this trend, all surviving think tanks that were formed from the period of 1987-1993, such as the Adam Smith Research Centre, CASE, or Stefan Batory Foundation, focus primarily on democratization, domestic economic policy, or Eastern European foreign policy. Polish think tanks have significantly diversified since the end of communist rule. While a historical emphasis on foreign policy and international affairs remains (33.9%), many more think tanks focus on issues regarding social policy, European integration, and the environment. It must be noted that Polish think tanks, as a whole, rarely focus solely on specific policy issues, and usually have several varied research objectives. Many think tanks focus simultaneously on issues such as energy policy, the E.U., technology and innovation, and the environment. Generalist think tanks like these include WiseEuropa, CASE, the Kosciuszko Institute, and the Institute of Public Affairs.

Nonetheless, the highest profile think tanks in Poland generally focus on foreign policy and are funded by the government, such as the internationally regarded Polish Institute of International Relations (PISM) and the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW). Both of these think tanks exhibit high profile institutional affiliations, and maintain strong networks between private, university-affiliated, and government-affiliated institutions while maintaining an above average number of administrative and research staff, and also consistently rank highly in the TTCSP Global Go To Index.

Polish Think Tanks by Institutional Affiliation

In creating a representative sample of Polish think tanks by institutional affiliations, the think tanks analyzed include 12 independent institutions, 4 university-affiliated institutions, and 3 government affiliated institutions.49 The choice to underrepresent independent think tanks in the sample was decided due to the lower profile and smaller size of many non-affiliated Polish think tanks, which are not wholly representative of the active and well recognized nature of the Polish think tank climate. Many smaller institutions have little to no funding, and operate largely based on contracted work to private companies. Many practical differences exist between independent, university-affiliated, and government-affiliated think tanks in Poland. Though no government-affiliated think tanks provide budgetary information, these think tanks are generally medium sized (total staff size ranging from 20-60), with a larger proportion of administrative staff to research associates, suggesting greater financial stability. Conversely, staff sizes for independent think tanks in Poland vary widely, from less than 10 to close to 100 staff. However, many of these employees work part time, and the proportion of administrative staff to research staff is much lower. As such, for larger, well established think tanks, funding is generally in the range of several hundred

thousand dollars to around $1,000,000. Finally, university affiliated think tanks tend to be much larger (100+), although numbers vary by institution and faculty. University faculties and research centers do not provide financial statements in Poland.

49 Adam Smith Research Centre, CenEA, Center for International Relations, Center for Social and Economic Research, Centre for Europe - Warsaw University, Instytut Studiów Strategicznych, Institute for Western Affairs, Institute of Regional and Global Studies of the University of Warsaw, WiseEuropa, World Economy Research Institute, Kosciuszko Institute, Pulaski’s Foundation, Jagiellonian Institute, Green Institute Foundation, Stefan Batory Foundation, Center for Eastern Studies, Polish Institute of International Relations, Jagiellonian Club’s Centre of Analysis, Fundacja Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju (FOR)

Biases

Compared to in other countries in Central & Eastern Europe, think tanks in Poland tend to be biased in ways that are non-partisan and generally not related to the government. Reflecting the divided political atmosphere in Poland, think tanks that do show explicit bias (or proclaim it themselves) tend to fall into four main categories: liberal market economics, pro-Europe, progressive and pro-environment, and traditional Christian-Conservative. Older Polish think tanks, such as the Adam Smith Research Centre or the Polish Ludwig von Mises Institute, focus on market economics in the transition and port-transition eras of the Third Polish Republic. These think tanks produce research and publications in line with the Chicago School of Economics with ardently anti-socialist economic views. As such, these institutions focus largely on reflections on market transition, domestic economic policy, and transnational economics with a focus on the European Union. As is the case in nearly all other CEE countries, many Polish think tanks are explicitly pro-EU and pro-European integration. Reflecting the fact that pro-Europe views in Poland are not controversial and most research institutions are not Eurosceptic, several institutions such as the Fundacja Amicus Europea (founded by former PM Aleksander Kwaśniewski), European Institute, or Institute for Western Affairs exist explicitly for the research and promotion of pan- European integration and political values. Furthermore, another new development in Polish think tanks is that of pro-environment and progressive think tanks. While these institutions––most notably the Green Institute Foundation and WiseEuropa––do not together represent an impactful force in the industry, the rise of such think tanks represents the institutional presence of Poland’s left-wing, which since the 1990s has been historically fragmented and increasingly irrelevant politically. Lastly, several think tanks in Poland, mostly founded in the mid-early 2000s such as the Foundation Globalization Institute in Gliwice or the Sobieski Institute in Warsaw are both socially and politically conservative, with Christian-Conservative values. Given the socially conservative and religious nature of Polish society, this is an expected development. It should be noted that these institutions, besides being pro-market, are generally anti-immigration, support traditional “family values” and strict gender roles, are anti-LGBTQ+, and support the political institutionalization of Christian conservatism.

Issues and Challenges

The think tank industry in Poland suffers from chronic underfunding and the effects of progressive democratic backsliding in the country50. As compared to Western Europe or certain peer CEE countries such as the Czech Republic, Polish think tanks have not been primary participants in policy decisions, which is a critical function of think tanks in a democratic society. In fact, after the accession to the EU of Poland in 2004, Polish think tanks have become progressively less involved in foreign policy decision making.51 This development is in large part due to the fact that the “originally American phenomenon of ‘revolving doors’ between academia, the civil service and think tanks… remains very limited in Poland, mainly due to the professionalisation of the civil service, which does not make movement between the administration and research centres very rewarding.52” Furthermore, according to the Federation of American Scientists, “Most Polish think tanks have relatively few researches, and, with the exception of government-funded institutes, they suffer from a lack of funding. Even though their political influence is limited, a number of think experts have been appointed to senior government positions.”53 As such, Polish think tanks face both financial and systemic political barriers in becoming meaningful contributors to public policy decision making, although nevertheless they are part of the “revolving door” of human capital between government and research institutions. In light of the recent Polish presidential election in July 2020 re-electing incumbent President Andrzej Duda from the populist, national conservative Law and Justice Party, it is likely to assume that the think tank industry in Poland will suffer from a de-liberalization of civil society similar to Hungary, which has experienced democratic backsliding within the past decade. Following the politicization and weakening of the federal Polish judiciary and recent re- election of the Law and Justice Party, it will be necessary in the future to see if Poland will continue to compromise on democratic principles and whether or not think tanks will be forced to close or conform to implicit and explicit federal directives to continue to secure public funding.

Research Publications Analysis

In order to analyze the nature of contemporary research discourse within the Polish think tank industry, it is important to evaluate the nature of think tank publication patterns within a recent, relevant timeframe from well regarded, diverse, and active research institutions. To this end, the following data comprises an analysis of think tank publication between Fall 2019 to June 2020 from the following institutions: Adam Smith Research Centre, Center for Eastern Studies (OSW), Center for Economic Analysis (CenEA), Center for Social and Economic

50 “OSC Media Aid: Poland -- Think Tanks Guide July 2018,” Federation of American Scientists, July 2018. 51 David Cadier and Monika Sus, “Think Tank Involvement in Foreign Policymaking in the Czech Republic and Poland,” The International Spectator 52, no. 1 (February 2017): pp. 116-131, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1272240, 127. 52 David Cadier and Monika Sus, “Think Tank Involvement in Foreign Policymaking in the Czech Republic and Poland,” The International Spectator 52, no. 1 (February 2017): pp. 116-131, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1272240, 126. 53“OSC Media Aid: Poland -- Think Tanks Guide July 2018,” Federation of American Scientists, July 2018. Research (CASE), Sobieski Institute, WiseEuropa, the Kosciuszko Institute, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Institute of Public Affairs, and the Jagiellonian Club’s Centre of Analysis. The choice of these think tanks was made based on GTGTTI 2019 Rankings, rate of think tank publication output, and diversity of think tanks on research focus, affiliation, and size. Within these parameters, 81 major reports and publications were analyzed and categorized with the following results:

As is visible from the chart, despite mission statements and research focuses that imply more narrow scopes of research, Polish think tanks in fact produce a wide variety of research. In particular, it is notable that democracy, energy policy, and technology and innovation are overrepresented in think tank publications compared to primary research focuses. Of course, it is also important to note that coronavirus related research has spiked within the last few months, accounting for over 12% of publication output. The analysis of think tank publications, especially when compared to official mission statements and stated research focuses of Polish think tanks, indicates a positive trend of these institutions whereby think tanks are pivoting to address contemporary issues such as cybersecurity and democratic backsliding. Traditional issues of democratization and market transition are no longer relevant to Polish public policy, and think tanks have shifted to their focuses to reflect

Summary: Key Takeaways

Although the think tank industry in Poland is simultaneously well developed and the host to several internationally regarded prestigious think tanks, its future as a critical civil institution in the country is under threat. Polish think tanks are regularly recognized as leaders in the region, yet chronic underfunding and the potential descent into continued democratic backsliding, partisan influences in civil society, and alienation from the European political sphere threaten the strength of these institutions. Nevertheless, think tanks in Poland––though still retaining many outdated transition-era research centers––continue to develop into modern and flexible institutions producing high caliber research on a diverse range of topics.The current political and social climate in Poland has yet to resolve many questions of Polish social identity––how “Western” is Poland? Are Catholic values an integral part of the nation? How can the gap between Poland’s western and eastern regions be resolved? This social turmoil is reflected in the activities of think tanks as well, which have splintered into ideologically diverse research institutions with differing priorities and ideological subscriptions.

Hungary: An Analysis of Think Tank Growth Amidst Illiberal Governance

Background

Hungary, like other countries part of the former Soviet Bloc, did not experience a widespread growth of its think tank industry until after it left the Soviet Bloc in 1989. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Hungary was bereft of think tanks until 1989. Government- sanctioned research centers, either as government agencies or affiliated with universities, were established as early as 1954, with the founding of the Institute for Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.54 Other examples include the Public Policy Institute, which was founded in 1972 as a government-run economics research center.55 These think tanks, which lacked the freedom to pursue independent research and policy proposals under Communist rule, transformed into independent think tanks post-1989. From the 40 think tanks currently operating in Hungary, 8 (20%) were established before 1989. While these eight think tanks are a small fraction of the currently operating think tanks in Hungary, it is still significantly higher than the proportion of think tanks established pre-1989 in soviet-era Czechoslovakia (7%). 3 of these 8 think tanks or 37.5% were established in the four years between 1985-1989 when the Soviet Union started reform that increased freedom of speech and expression (referred to as glasnost and perestroika). Following Hungary’s exit from the Soviet Union in 1989, the think tank industry rapidly took off. In ten years (1989-1999), 14 of the currently operating think tanks (35%) were established in Hungary. It is estimated that more were established, but have since closed or ceased to operate. Furthermore, all of the think tanks or policy research centers established before 1989 gained independence and transitioned to the category of fully-independent think tanks. Hungarian think tanks in the 1990s faced considerable challenges. According to a study that analyzed think tanks in post-Soviet countries (including Hungary), most think tanks were small, with only 1-2 paid full-time researchers. About a third (30-35%), were larger, with 5-10 paid full-time researchers.56 Although funding initially came from private Western foundations, throughout the 1990s, that source of funding fell and was only partially replaced by public EU funds. Many think tanks would take on consulting roles for commercial enterprises to raise additional revenue but risked losing governmental legitimacy. This trade-off led to the implementation of “sister-organizations,” one that would focus on policy research and another that would raise funds through commercial work.57 An example of such an arrangement is the TARKI Centre, which had separate research and commercial consulting divisions.

54 (Sági 1970) 55 (Schneider 2002) 56 (Struyk 2003) 57 (Schneider 2002) Think tank growth continued throughout the 2000s. Between 2000-2009, 15 (37.5%) of the currently operating think tanks were established. This growth, however, sharply decreased in the 2010s. Between 2010 and 2019, only two think tanks (5%) were established. With the rise of an illiberal right-wing government in Hungary, several think tanks have either been closed, taken over by the government, or expelled from the country. Indeed, the rapid growth of the Hungarian think tank industry that categorized the first two decades post-Soviet Hungary seems to have disappeared and raises questions about the future of think tanks in Hungary.

Geographic Distribution and Numbers

As mentioned above, 40 think tanks currently operate in Hungary, which has a population of 9.78 million. Of those 40, 36 (90%) operate in Budapest, the capital city (population: 1.76 million). This pattern is similar to other countries in the region (Prague, Czech Republic - 82.8%, Bratislava, Slovakia - 86.2%). 2 think tanks have no address listed and cannot be identified as having physical headquarters in any particular city (Hungarian Spectrum and Local Governance Innovation and Development Ltd.). Finally, one think tank is located in Hungary’s third-largest city, Szeged (population: 161,870) and Pécs (population: 145,010). In terms of think tanks per capita, Hungary is not an outlier in the CEE region. Finally, 8 (20%) Hungarian think tanks are ranked in the Top 100 for the CEE region according to the Global Go To Think Tank Index.

Research Areas of Focus

The most dominant focus within Hungarian think tanks is social policy (policy relating to public issues such as housing, health, and food). 12 (30%) of think tanks focus primarily on these issues. The next most dominant research area is the field of economics, finance, and trade. 10 (25%) think tanks focus on these issues. Foreign policy and international relations are in third place, with 7 (17.5%) think tanks focusing on these issues. The fourth most dominant category, with five think tanks, are issues relating to democracy and transparency (12.5%). 3 (7.5%) of think tanks focus on issues relating to the environment. The least focused areas are energy policy and technological innovation, which each have one think tank devoted to those issues. Despite the substantial prevalence of social-policy based think tanks, none of the think tanks in that category addressed policy relating to freedom of speech and expression, even though Hungary has implemented a policy that drastically reduced those freedoms. Furthermore, no human-rights watchdog think tanks were found in Hungary. These phenomena, combined with the prevalence of such think tank activity in other CEE countries, suggest that Hungarian think tanks tend to avoid topics that may prove controversial with the government.

Biases Although right-wing populist views (views defined as anti-immigrant, nationalist, anti- EU, etc.) have steadily been gaining popularity both among Hungarian citizens and government in recent years, a majority (77.5% ) of think tanks in Hungary remain either politically in the center, or do not publish views or have mission statements that can place them identifiably on the right-left political spectrum. Nonetheless, nine think tanks have been analyzed and show political bias. Four categories of bias were chosen: pro-Orban government, anti-EU, conservative, and progressive. Four think tanks consistently defended or support the Orban-led Fidesz party: Antall József Knowledge Centre, Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy, Foundation for a Civic Hungary, and Szazadveg Policy Research Center. One think tank, the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, supported the Orban government but focused its publications overwhelmingly on anti-EU rhetoric. One think tank exhibited a conservative foreign policy ideology: Institute for Transitional Democracy and International Security. Three think tanks were identified as progressive, in that the institution advocated either for socialist economics, social justice, or supported fringe methods for solving the issue of climate change. The three think tanks identified as progressive were: Center for Policy Studies, the Tancsics Mihaly Foundation, and the National Society of Conservationists. As mentioned earlier, however, the majority of think tanks did not exhibit any heavy ideological bias.58

58 (Moldasz 2018)

Institutional Affiliations

The use of the political spectrum is but one way to measure institutional biases. In order to gain a better understanding of Hungarian think tank biases, all think tanks were categorized either as independent, university-affiliated (think tank is either a branch of a university department or operated by a university), or government-affiliated (think-tanks is either operated by or receives the majority of funding from government institutions). This analysis found that seven think tanks (17.5%) were government-affiliated, ten think tanks (25%) were university- affiliated, and 23 think tanks (57.5%) were independent. For the analysis of institutional affiliation, a survey was sent out to think tanks to collect data on budget and staff sizes. The results demonstrated that university-affiliated think tanks tended to have larger budgets and staff sizes than independent think tanks ($911,950 and $742,985; 25 and 17). Government-affiliated think tanks did not respond to the survey.

Challenges and Obstacles

Since 2010, Hungary has been under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. His policies and views have been categorized as Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant, and illiberal. In 2011, he supported and implemented changes to the Hungarian Constitution, which curbed freedom of speech and expression, strengthened executive power, and placed weakening restrictions on the judicial branch..59 After George Soros, an expatriate Hungarian billionaire who funds NGOs across Central and Eastern Europe, criticized Orbán’s policies on immigration, Orbán retaliated by verbally denigrating Soros and the institutions he funds. In 2017, Orbán’s government passed a bill placing heavy restrictions on foreign-based universities.60 As a result, Central European University, home to the Center for Policy Studies, relocated from Budapest to Vienna, Austria. In July 2019, Hungary passed legislation that removed 15 research centers and think tanks from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and placed them under government jurisdiction. These actions, coupled with increasing legislation curbing the freedom of the media, NGOs, and think tanks, have increased concern among Hungarian think tanks that they too, might be forced to close or expelled if they advocate for policy that is opposed by Orbán or his Fidesz party.61

Publication Analysis: Trending Themes and Subjects

Although one can understand the themes from the think tank area of focus analysis found above, an analysis of think tank publications reveals the current trends within the think tank industry. For the analysis, eight think tanks were chosen, 4 of which are ranked on the Top 100 list (Center for Policy Studies, Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Institute of World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) and 4 which were chosen based off of the diverse range of institutional affiliations and ideologies these institutions covered: Centre for Fair Political Analysis, Budapest Institute for Public Analysis, Eotvos Karoly Public Policy Institute, and the Antall József Knowledge Centre. Between these eight think tanks, 42 publications published between September 2019 and July 2020 were analyzed. To analyze the publications, the publications were categorized and sorted into one of eight categories: Democracy and Transparency, Domestic Economics, Energy Policy, European Union, Foreign Policy/International Affairs, International Trade and Economics, Social Policy, and Technology and Innovation. The distribution of publication focus area, descending from

59 (Freedom House 2019) 60 (Foer 2019) 61 (Foer 2019) highest to lowest was: 1. Social Policy (11 publications/26.2%) 2. Foreign Policy and International Relations (8 publications/19.0%) 3. European Union (7 publications/16.7%) 4. Domestic Economics (6 publications/14.3%) 5. Technology and Innovation (5 publications/11.9%) 6. International Trade and Economics (2 publications/4.8%) 7. Democracy and Transparency (2 publications/4.8%) 8. Energy Policy (1 publication/1.4%). The focus of Social Policy among Hungarian think tank publications can be partially explained by the fact that Hungary places in the bottom ranks (#38) of social policy internationally.62 Spending cuts to education, a small healthcare budget, and rising economic inequality have diminished the Hungarian middle class and expanded the lower class.63 The prevalence of these issues may be reflected in the publication focus area. It is important to note, however, that no publication categorized in Social Policy explicitly criticized the Orban administration. Compared to other countries in the Visegrad-4, Hungary has the lowest focus on domestic economics. Furthermore, Hungary has a relatively disproportionate focus on the European Union, an anomaly amongst the Visegrad-4. The critical nature of these publications is reflective of growing anti-EU sentiment in Hungary. In addition, Democracy and Transparency is also the least dominant focus area relative to other countries in the Visegrad-4, despite the trend of illiberal policy implementation in recent years. This suggests that Orban’s restrictions on free speech may be having their desired effect.

62 (Àgh, Dieringer and Bönker 2019) 63 (Àgh, Dieringer and Bönker 2019)

Summary: Key Takeaways

The Hungarian think tank industry rapidly expanded in the two decades following its exit democratic transition. Even though think tanks in the 1990s faced considerable funding challenges, by the end of the 2010s, Hungary had established 38 of its current think tanks. Social policy, economics, and foreign affairs were the three main areas these think tanks focused on in their policy research. Nonetheless, the 2010s proved to dampen the considerable progress made in the two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union. With the rise of Orbán and the Fidesz party to power in 2010, right-wing populism and illiberal ideologies gained control of the Hungarian government. Within several years, liberal reform that granted Hungarians freedom of speech and expression was overturned and restricted. Whether Orbán’s rule played a role in the severe reduction of newly established think tanks in the 2010s is yet to be determined. Nevertheless,

Orbán’s role in CEU’s decision to leave Hungary and the government’s takeover of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is indisputable. With these two phenomena, it is clear that Hungarian think tanks face an uncertain future, a future where two decades of think tank growth may give way to a muted civil society.

Czech Republic and Slovakia: Similarities and Differences in Think Tank Trends in Post-Soviet Czechoslovakia

General Overview:

Czechoslovakia's exit from the Soviet Bloc in 1989 and its subsequent split into two independent states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, allowed for the emergence of an independent think tank industry. Nonetheless, communist-era Czechoslovakia (1948-1989) left an impact on the two countries' newly emerging think tanks. The first was the development of government-sanctioned institutions that focused on research or government policy. Under the rule of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC), all publications and media had to go through review and approval by the Office for Press and Information.64 This policy restricted think-tank activity, and limited policy-focused institutions either to government agencies or universities. Despite their history of restriction and governmental dependence, many of these think tanks evolved into independent institutions with Czechoslovakia's exit from the Soviet Union. This evolution is exemplified by institutions such as the Institute of State and Law, founded in 1955 as a legal research center. Under Communist control, the Institute conducted legal research, albeit heavily limited in its scope by the government. Another think tank, the Institute of International Relations - Prague, was established in 1957 under the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2007, the Institute transitioned into a fully public research organization. These institutions, as well as others founded during the Soviet era, gained independence and contributed to the growth of the think tank industry within the Czech Republic and Slovakia.65 The Soviet-era also influenced the ideological bend of contemporary Czech and Slovakian think tanks. Illiberal policies such as censorship of the press and restrictions on speech led to growing public disapproval in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1968, under the leadership of Alexander Dubček, the KSC abolished state-imposed censorship. Shortly after, publications critical of the regime entered into circulation, and pro-market ideology gained popularity. This period, known as the Prague Spring, was quickly put to an end with the invasion of Soviet Bloc forces in August of 1968. The reforms that were implemented were quickly abolished, but the Prague Spring paved the way for the reform period of the 1980s.66 In the 1980s, Soviet leadership initiated a series of liberalizing policies known as perestroika and glasnost. The government no longer limited freedom of speech and independent political thought. In 1984, the Prognostic Institute was founded under the auspices of the Czech Academy of Sciences to transform Czechoslovakia’s socialist economy into a market-based

64 (Battiata 1989) 65 (Schneider 2002) 66 ("Prague Spring" 2018) economy.67 The Prognostic Institute was the first of many subsequent think tanks that adopted pro-market, libertarian values as a backlash to the Soviet regime. For example, the Liberal Institute and F. A. Hayek Foundation, established in 1989 and 1991 respectively, focused on spreading libertarian thought by Milton Friedman and Paul Heyne into the mainstream.68 In 1989, the Velvet Revolution ushered Czechoslovakia’s exit from the Soviet Union and a rapidly growing think tank industry. Between 1989 and 1995, 21 of the current 58 or 36% of the current think tanks in the Czech Republic and Slovakia were established. Between 1995 and 2000, an additional 13 (22.4%) were established. In total, 58.4% of current think tanks were established in the decade following Czechoslovakia’s exit from the Bloc. Although three decades have passed since the Velvet Revolution, the current landscape of the think-tank industry is still influenced by the impact of the socialist-era. Think tanks in the Czech Republic and Slovakia tend to promote liberalism, pro-market economies, and involvement within the European Union. Even in the face of rising Euro-skepticism in neighboring countries, Czech and Slovakian think tanks tend to promote European solidarity and international cooperation.

Geographic Distribution and Numbers

67 (Buchar 2010) 68 (Evans 2010) At the moment, 58 think tanks currently operate within the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Of those 58, 29 operate in the Czech Republic and 29 in Slovakia. While this distribution seems to indicate an even split in both countries, a per capita analysis reveals that Slovakia has a significantly higher proportion of think tanks per capita. The 2020 population in Slovakia is 5.45 million and 10.69 million in the Czech Republic. Despite the difference in think tanks per capita, the two countries share a similar geographic distribution of think tanks. In the Czech Republic, 24 of 29, or 82.8%, are located in its capital: Prague. In Slovakia, 25 of 29, or 86.2% are located in the capital city, Bratislava. Once again, the similarity between these two countries fades away when analyzing the think tanks per capita for each capital city. Most recent data from 2016 shows Bratislava’s population to be 424,400, while Prague has a population of 1.267 million. The remainder of Czech think tanks are located in its second-largest city: Brno (population: 380,000). Of Slovakia’s remaining think tanks, two are located in Banská Bystrica, one in Košice, and one in Šamorín. Košice is Slovakia’s second-largest city with a population of 240,000, Banská Bystrica, a town with 78,000 inhabitants, and Šamorín has a population of 13,300. Finally, the Czech Republic and Slovakia place competitively on the Top 100 Global Go To Think Tank Index in Central and Eastern Europe. The Czech Republic has 8 think tanks on the list, while Slovakia has 6.

Research Areas of Focus

As was stated above, the aftermath of the Soviet-era led to the increased popularity of liberal, pro-market ideas and think tanks committed to realizing those goals. To this day, those effects are recognizable in the think tank industry. Of the 58 think tanks in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 18, or 31.2% focus primarily on economics and trade. Social policy, which includes health and education policy, is the second most dominant area of focus. 13, or 22.4% of think tanks focus on social policy. Foreign policy and international affairs is in third place (11, or 19%). Issues relating to democracy and transparency are in fourth (8, or 13.4%). The European Union is in fifth place, with 3 think tanks, or 5.2%. Human rights watchdogs and issues relating to the environment are both tied for sixth place (2, or 3.4%). Finally, technology and innovation is the area least focused on, with one think tank, or 1.7% focused on that area. An analysis of each country individually shows differences between the compositional layout of think tank focus area. For example, Slovakia has two human rights watchdog think tanks, while the Czech Republic has none. Furthermore, Slovakia has two thinks focused on EU policy, while the Czech Republic has none. Despite these differences, the macro trends in think tank focus area composition show strong similarities. Both countries have economics as the most dominant focus area, followed by social and foreign policy. These similarities are evidence of two think tank industries that share a common history that shaped their development.

Biases Aside from several outliers, an overwhelming majority of think tanks in the Czech Republic and

Slovakia do not have any apparent biases. This result means that most think tanks hold views that are center of the political spectrum (pro-market, pro-EU, etc.). Of the 29 think tanks in the Czech Republic, only 3 think tanks were found to have a non-mainstream ideological bias. The think tanks that lean heavily conservative, or to the right, are the Civic Institute and the Liberal Institute. The Economy and Society Trust is the only think tank with an apparent progressive or left-wing bias. In Slovakia, 4 think tanks were found to have non-mainstream ideological biases. Two were conservative (F.A. Hayek Foundation and the M.R. Stefanik Conservative Institute), and two were progressive (VIA IURIS and Association ASPEKT). The roughly even split in think tank ideological bias, coupled with the low prevalence of ideological outliers, is evidence of a robust civil society that seems to be mostly unaffected by the growth of populism in Europe. These results suggest a civil society that is mostly unpolarized, despite the growth of polarization in other European countries.

Institutional Affiliations TThe use of the political spectrum is but one way to measure institutional biases. In order to gain a better understanding of Czech and Hungarian think tanks, all think tanks were categorized either as independent, university-affiliated (think tank is either a branch of a university department or operated by a university), or government-affiliated (think-tanks is either operated by or receives a majority of funding from government institutions). Of the 58 think tanks, only 7 (12.1%) institutions were found to have government-affiliation (defined as primary financial backing), 12 (20.7%) were either directly connected to, or an extension of a university department and 39 (67.2%) were categorized as independent.

Publication Analysis: Trending Themes and Subjects

Although one can gain an understanding of the themes from the think tank area of focus analysis found above, an analysis of think tank publications reveals the current trends within the think tank industry. For the analysis, 14 think tanks were chosen, 8 from the Czech Republic and 6 from Slovakia. From the 8 Czech think tanks, 6 were featured on the Top 100 Global Go To Think Tank Index.69 Two think tanks were not featured on the ranking, but were included due to their sizable publication output.70 From the 6 Slovakian think tanks, 4 were featured on the Top 100 Global Go To Think Tank Index71. Two other think tanks were included for their sizable publication output.72 In total, 73 publications published between September 2019 and July 2020 were reviewed in this analysis. However, it is important to note that not all think tanks produced an even amount of publications. Some think tanks published only one publication, while others published over 20. To analyze the publications, the publications were sorted into one of ten categories: Democracy and Transparency, Domestic Economics, Energy Policy, Environment, European Union, Food and Water Security, Foreign Policy/International Affairs, International Trade and

69 Association for International Affairs, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Institute of International Relations, Liberal Institute, Prague Security Studies Institute, and the Institute for Democracy and Economic Analysis (IDEA) 70 Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies and the Masarykova Democratic Academy. 71 Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, GLOBSEC Policy Institute, Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), and the F.A. Hayek Foundation 72 Slovak Governance Institute and the Institute of Economic Research--Slovac Academy of Sciences Economics, Social Policy, and Technology and Innovation. The two most dominant focus areas were Foreign Policy/International Relations and Domestic Economics, each with 15 publications (20.5%). Social Policy was the third most dominant, with 12 publications (16.7%). International Trade and Economics was fourth with 8 publications (11.1%), followed by Technology and Innovation, which had 7 publications (9.7%). Democracy and Transparency was tied with the European Union for sixth-most dominant category, with 6 publications each (8.3%). Food and Water Security, Energy Policy, and Environment were the least dominant areas, with only one publication (1.4%). Considering the overall distribution of think tanks, these results are not surprising. The top three publication focus areas are the same as the top three focus areas of Czech and Slovakian think tanks overall. If Domestic Economics and International Trade and Economics were to be combined into one category, it would be the most dominant category. This result supports the historical trend of think tank development in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The earliest think tanks were overwhelmingly focused on economic issues, a trend that continues to this day. In addition, it was unsurprising that food and water security, as well as Energy Policy, were the least dominant publication focus areas. As developed countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are not facing food, water, or energy crises. However, it is surprising that the environment was the focus of only one publication. With the threat of climate change growing ever more significant, it is striking that few publications are focused on that issue. This result may be explained by the public’s low awareness of climate change and the government’s adoption and compliance with progressive climate regulation.73 74

73 (Filčàk 2016) 74 (Skalík 2015)

Challenges and Obstacles

According to the Freedom Index, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia enjoy high levels of freedom of speech comparable to the United States of America and France.75 Censorship is prohibited by law in both countries, and as a result, think tanks have the freedom to produce and research independently. Nonetheless, an analysis of Czech and Slovakian think tanks ranked in the Top 100 Go To Think Tank Index (CEE) shows that 5 of the 14 (35%) institutions have not published any new material in the past year or maintained an active online presence.

Summary: Key Takeaways

In the immediate wake of post-Soviet Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia conveyed their desire to join the international community, adopt a market-based economy, and form a liberal society through their growing think tank industry. Within two decades, the two countries increased their think tank quantities six-fold and established a robust civil society devoted to resolving economic, social, and international issues. The high prevalence of support among academia, the public, and civil society for a market-based economy is no coincidence. This current phenomenon was shaped in the initial history of post-Soviet Czechoslovakia.76 Although current trends in ideological biases and strong protections of freedom of speech are evidence of a healthy civil society, this robustness does not guarantee immunity from future change. As part of the Visegrad-4 Alliance (cultural and political alliance between Hungary,

75 (Cato Institute 2019) 76 (Evans 2010) Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland), Czech and Slovakian civil society is undoubtedly influenced by trends in Hungary and Poland. With the rise of illiberalism, populism, and nationalism within Hungary and Poland, Czech and Slovakian think tanks must contend with the effects of those trends on civil society. Furthermore, the aftermath of COVID-19 will test the resilience of Czech and Slovakian think tanks. What role will they play in the aftermath? How will they grapple with mass frustration and change in ideological trends? The current lack of polarization among think tanks and strong liberal tradition will undoubtedly benefit this process. However, to maintain these trends, Czech and Slovakian think tanks must be aware of the future change.

The Eastern Balkans: Romania, Bulgaria, and the State of Think Tanks on the E.U.’s South-Eastern Frontier

Romania: Public Policy Research in a Climate of Systemic Corruption and Democratic Backsliding

Background

Think tanks and independent public policy research organizations in Romania were relatively non-existent prior to the Romanian Revolution of 1989. Prior to this period, about 6 policy research organizations had been founded as government entities in the 1950s and 1960s. Romania became a socialist republic in the post-WWII era and was ruled by a communist government until the 1990s.77 During this time, very few public policy organizations existed apart from the Institute of National Economy and the Institute for World Economy. Following the 1989 Revolution and the fall of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu, the country saw a prominent increase in the number of think tanks and policymaking institutions.78 In the early 1990s, think tanks in various fields were founded to compensate for services that the government had previously failed to provide. The following two decades were marked by growth of independent organizations focused on foreign policy and international affairs, social policy, democracy and transparency, and other topics that required action. In terms of founding periods, Romania is not unique compared to the CEE region as a whole. Countries such as Poland, Hungary, Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania, and others that became democracies after the fall of communism in the early 1990s experienced a surge of think tank openings during this period.

77 Keith Hitchins, A Concise History of Romania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 227. 78 Ibid., 292.

Like many other Central and Eastern European countries in the 1990’s, Romania’s main policy issues related to privatization, democratization, integration with Western Europe, and market reforms after the fall of communism.79 Such discussions in Romania were mainly led by academics who wished to address these subjects by founding independent, non-partisan public policy institutions. Romania was well-prepared for a democratic transition given the vast human rights abuses, severe rationing, and ruthless secret policing and censorship that had occurred under Ceaucescu’s rule with the aid of the Securitate.80 The breaking point and subsequent Romanian Revolution of 1989 fostered an open climate for think tanks to begin independent research operations. As a result, the country saw a sharp increase in the number of think tanks devoted to these issues in the early to mid-1990s. However, these organizations have limited online presences, and many seem to have closed due to shifts in national priorities and declining emphasis placed on democratic and market transitions since the mid-2000s. There is also a significant shortage of think tanks focused on political institutional integrity, gender equality, energy, and the environment. The Romanian Academic Society has emerged as Romania’s leading think tank, though it has become increasingly partisan and affiliated with right-wing politics. Other prominent Romanian think tanks include the Center for Institutional Analysis and Development (CADI), Ludwig von Mises Institute, the Institute for Public Policy, and the

79 Oleh Havrylyshyn et al, “25 Years of Reforms in Ex-Communist Countries: Fast and Extensive Reforms Led to Higher Growth and More Political Freedom,” Cato Institute, July 12, 2016, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/25-years-reforms-ex-communist-countries-fast-extensive- reforms-led. 80 Mick O’Hare, “‘Shameful but Necessary’: How the Romanian Rulers Who Starved Their People Met Their End,” The Independent, December 25, 2019, www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/long-reads/ceausescu-romania- bucharest-communism-politics-history-a9234806.html. European Institute of Romania. Despite the CEE Team’s list of over 40 Romanian think tanks, few of them have updated online presences with available resources such as recent publications and contact information.

Geographic Distribution

There are 42 Romanian think tanks, 35 of which are located in the capital of Bucharest. Bucharest is the most populated city in Romania at 1.83 million people. Most government operations and university activity is located within Bucharest, thus explaining the concentrated presence of think tanks in this area. The remaining think tanks are scattered in very low numbers throughout Timișoara (2), Cluj-Napoca (2), Targu Mures (1), Sibiu (1), and Iasi (1). These cities are dispersed in every direction throughout Romania and are not sparsely populated rural areas. Timișoara borders Serbia, Cluj-Napoca, Targu Mures, and Sibiu are located in the north-central region of Romania, and Iași borders Moldova. Their populations are listed as follows: Timișoara (306,462), Cluj-Napoca (706,905), Targu Mures (142,327), Sibiu (401,006), Iași (793,779). If Romania becomes less centralized around Bucharest, it is possible that there will be increased think tank operations in these cities and in more rural areas, though the likelihood depends on a variety of factors such as regional development and economic stimulus in less developed regions.

Think Tanks by Research Area

The earliest Romanian think tanks of the 1950s and 1960s centered their operations around domestic and international economics. While these think tanks are still functioning, there has not been a substantial increase in the number of new think tanks focusing on these areas. Rather, the 1990s and 2000s saw a sharp increase in the number of think tanks concerned with democracy, transparency, and international affairs. Pre-EU accession Romania also saw a rise in the number of think tanks focusing on the EU and social policy. However, many of these think tanks have since halted those operations since joining the EU. Romanian think tanks mainly focus on foreign policy and international affairs, with 13 institutions contributing to these fields. 9 think tanks focus on democracy and transparency, while another 9 focus on education, health, and social policy. Think tanks focusing on democracy and transparency remain particularly relevant today, given Romania’s issues with government corruption as a relatively young democracy. Think tanks such as the Resource Center for Public Participation and the Euroregional Center for Democracy that were formed in the mid- to late 2000s focus on engaging the public with democratic institutions and voting, while think tanks such as the Initiative for Democracy in Eastern Europe and the Foundation Democratic Change that were formed immediately before and after the Romanian Revolution of 1989 focused on establishing democracy in Romania at a baseline level. Today, 8 institutions focus on domestic economics and/or international trade, with the remaining think tanks split between technology and innovation (2) and the EU (1). There are 0 institutions focusing on the environment, energy policy, or gender equality. Given the importance of these issues, there is potential space for think tank innovation.

Romanian Think Tanks by Institutional Affiliation

The representative sample for Romanian think tanks by institutional affiliation included 8 independent institutions, 3 government affiliated institutions, and 2 university affiliated institutions.81 Though independent and autonomous institutions are underrepresented in this sample, many were excluded due to their lower profile and small size that did not fully represent the established think tank climate of Romania. Many of Romania’s independent and autonomous institutions were established in the 1990s and 2000s, though it is unclear whether they still publish research online today. The following pie chart is an analysis of the institutional affiliation of the total 42 think tanks in Romania.

81 Ludwig von Mises Institute, Institute for Public Policy, European Institute of Romania, Institute for World Economy, Romanian Center for European Policies, Romanian Academic Society, Resource Center for Public Participation, Center for Institutional Analysis and Development, Romanian Center for Economic Policies, Middle East Political and Economic Institute, Military Technical Academy, Pro-Democracy Association, National Administration Association

In addition to institutional affiliation, the representative sample also analyzed staff size average and budget size average. The sample shows that independent think tanks employ an average staff of 10, university affiliated think tanks employ an average of 13, and government affiliated think tanks employ an average of 35. This would suggest that government affiliated institutions have greater financial resources that allow them to employ more staff. However, the staff size average of 35 is distorted by an outlier and is an overrepresentation of government affiliated institutions’ staff size average. Government affiliated think tanks in Romania do not disclose this specific information and were unresponsive to contact seeking to gather such statistics. Overall, Romanian think tanks tend to employ more research staff than administrative staff, suggesting a greater focus on research and a lesser focus on internal affairs and other operations. The representative sample was unable to draw conclusions about budget size average given that the majority of Romanian think tanks do not make this information publicly available. Of the 3 figures obtained from different Romanian think tanks, these budgets range from $200,000 USD to $11,400,000 USD. However, there is not enough budgetary information available from the entire Romanian think tank landscape to draw substantial conclusions about think tank funding in Romania.

Biases

Generally, think tanks in Romania do not show extremely prevalent biases, though there are a small handful of think tanks focusing on liberalism and limited government intervention in economics. These institutions include the Ludwig von Mises Institute and the Center for Institutional Analysis and Development (CADI). The institutions identify themselves as partners on their respective websites, and both advocate for similar liberal ideals. At just 2 out of 42 think tanks, they do not comprise a substantial portion of the Romanian think tank population. There are also several pro-EU think tanks and pro-government think tanks that state these aims clearly on their websites. The Romanian pro-EU think tanks can usually be identified by their institution names, including the EUROED Foundation, Eurolink - House of Europe, European Institute of Romania, Pro-Europe League, and the Romanian Center for European Policies. These think tanks focus on issues involving the EU in terms of social, economic, and political policy. At 5 out of 42 think tanks, they comprise 20% of the Romanian think tank population. Pro-government think tanks include the Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, Institute for Quality of Life, Institute of National Economy, Military Higher Education and Research Institute, and Military Technical Academy. These think tanks have strong governmental ties and mainly pertain to security in the military, economic, and standard of living fields. These institutions comprise an additional 20% of Romanian think tanks, which is a substantial amount given the relatively small number of think tanks in Romania compared to other Central and Eastern European countries like Russia and Ukraine with much higher think tank populations. Apart from these institutions, many other Romanian think tanks identify themselves as pro-NGO, government transparency, and civil society. These institutions include CENTRAS, Euroregional Center for Democracy, Foundation for Democratic Change, Initiative for Democracy in Eastern Europe, Pro Democracy Association, Resource Center for Public Participation, Romanian Foundation for Democracy, Romanian Institute for Recent History, Romanian Society of Political Science, Strategikon, and Transparency International Romania. At 11 out of 42 think tanks or 26%, these institutions comprise a substantial portion of the Romanian think tank landscape.

Issues and Challenges

It is difficult to assess the contribution of think tanks to the establishment of specific policies in Romania for a variety of reasons. There are little to no statistics or distinctions available, “as the authorities' openness to the scientific production of research and expertise centres is at low levels.”82 Public policies are mainly designed by government officials, and Romania is recognized as a country where “contribution of the non-governmental organizations to the public debate is low.”83 In a UNDP report, political scientist Ivan Krastev remarks, “...at present, Central and East European think tanks might be described as public policy research institutes without research.”84 Despite the importance of think tanks in Romanian civil society, these organizations have struggled to adopt a prominent role in public policy. It is also important

82 Oana Cristina Popovici, “Romania Social Briefing: The Think Tank Situation in Romania,” Weekly Briefing 12, no. 3 (November 2018): 1. 83 Ibid. 84 Ivan Krastev, “Post-Communist Think Tanks: Making and Faking Influence,” Taylor & Francis (2008). to note that there has been little historical precedent for these types of organizations in Romania and many other Eastern European countries. Countries like Romania with rising right-wing politics and nationalist sentiment will likely struggle to increase the prominence and influence of independent think tanks and policymaking institutions.85 Populist and nationalist politics may be hostile to international organizations and independent institutions that are critical of the government. Additional improvement areas for Romanian think tanks are transparency and communication levels, as well as online presence. Many Romanian think tanks have not updated their website content in years and often feature outdated information. Some websites are not user-friendly and contain little information pertaining to publications, news, events, and staff contacts. Of the 42 think tanks in Romania, only 9 provided easily accessible publications and research on their websites from the previous year. As a result of the above issues, many Romanian think tanks keep a much lower profile than some other internationally renowned Eastern European think tanks.

Publications Analysis

For this analysis, 71 publications were collected from 9 different institutions. The analysis can be broken down by publication as follows: Ludwig von Mises Institute (7), Institute for Public Policy (4), European Institute of Romania (20), Institute for World Economy (3), Transparency International Romania (1), Romanian Center for European Policies (5), Romanian Academic Society (2), Resource Center for Public Participation (3), New Strategy Center (4), and Middle East Political and Economic Institute (22). The top three Romanian think tanks listed in the GTTI are the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Institute for Public Policy (IPP), and Center for Institutional Analysis and Development (CADI). Despite their high rankings in the 2019 TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, these institutions have limited publicly available research online from within the past 9 months. In fact, CADI has not made publications available online since the mid-2010s. Nonetheless, CADI is a well-established and respected institution in Romania, and the publications analysis for Romania will relate to the Ludwig von Mises Institute and IPP’s publications from within the past year. The latter institutions published 6 publications each throughout this timeframe. The remainder of analyzed publications are from the European Institute of Romania, Institute for World Economy, Middle East Political and Economic Institute, New Strategy Center, Resource Center for Public Participation, Romanian Academic Society, Romanian Center for European Policies, and Transparency International Romania. These institutions maintain updated online presences and are reliable sources of recent policy research and contact information. Recent publications from the aforementioned institutions mainly focus on COVID-19, democracy and transparency, and foreign policy, security, and international relations. Other

85 Dragos Dragoman, “‘Save Romania’ Union and the Persistent Populism in Romania,” Taylor & Francis, (July 2020). prevalent themes include EU integration and politics, human rights, youth, and migration, and domestic economics or international trade. A small number of publications from these institutions also pertain to social policy and agriculture. Publications related to COVID-19 tend to focus on the different implications for Romania and the EU, methods being used to mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic, and commentary on what the “new normal” may look like going forward. Publications related to democracy and transparency take a variety of forms, including long-form reports and shorter articles or blog posts. Foreign policy, security, and international affairs publications tend to evaluate EU issues as well as relations with China, the Middle East, and the United States.

Summary: Key Takeaways

Romanian think tanks must confront certain challenges threatening their success and survival in the near future. They must revamp their online presences and communications in order to draw support and recognition from peer institutions, while finding modern methods of policy dissemination and research presentation. Think tanks in Romania also have the potential to appeal to and engage with the public on a broader scale, rather than limit the scope and findings of their work to other already established academics in their fields. Most importantly, Romanian think tanks must address government corruption that has been threatening Romania’s democracy throughout the most recent decade. Due to the lack of EU enforcement mechanisms or incentives, Romania reverted to certain aspects of corruption after being granted EU membership. Addressing such democratic backsliding is crucial for think tanks to remain relevant actors in the Romanian civil society space and foster democratic values in their country. Bulgaria: Public Policy Research in the post-Soviet Era of Neoliberalism

Background Though what we know as modern day think tanks began to become established in the 1990’s in Bulgaria, there were political and economic research institutions that existed in Bulgaria back in the first half of the 20th century. Eight of the 33 currently active Bulgarian think tanks were founded before the dissolution of the Soviet Union when Bulgaria was still a socialist republic. The oldest Bulgarian policy research institution, the Institute for Security and International Studies, dates back to 1927. Other policy institutions such as the Economic Policy Institute and the Institute for Social and Political Studies date back to 1949 and 1963 respectively. During the Soviet era, these research institutions were less developed and less liberalized than the current think tanks that exist today. In fact, these early institutions could be thought of as state- controlled “information centers” which laid the foundation for the modern day liberal think tank. In 1989, reforms in the Soviet Union inspired demands for democratization in Bulgaria and as a result, a multiparty system was introduced in the republic. In 1991, a new constitution proclaimed Bulgaria a parliamentary republic and provided a broad range of liberal freedoms.86 The 1990’s saw a dramatic increase in the number of new think tanks created as a result of the newfound liberal climate. In 1992, The Institute for Market Economics was established and became the first and oldest independent economic policy think tank in Bulgaria. Many other prominent Bulgarian think tanks including the Centre for Liberal Strategies (CLS) and the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS) were also established in the 1990’s. Bulgaria made significant strides towards European and global integration in the first decade of the 21st century. In 2004, Bulgaria was admitted into NATO and in 2007, Bulgaria, along with Romania, was admitted into the European Union. Though Bulgaria has successfully achieved this form of social and economic integration, the nation remains politically corrupt and relatively poor compared to other EU member states. This is why, despite Bulgaria’s status as an EU member state, the most important Bulgarian think tanks focus on continuing economic integration into Europe, fostering international cooperation beyond Bulgaria’s borders, democratizing Bulgaria as well as post-communist countries along with reducing political corruption, and making reforms in sectoral, developmental, business, and environmental policy.

Increase in the Number of BulgarianThink Tanks since 1920 up to 2010

86 "Bulgaria Profile," 2018. *Data Excludes Think Tanks that are no longer active

Geographic Distribution

There are 33 currently active think tanks in Bulgaria. This number is close to the average number of think tanks per capita for countries in the Central and Eastern Europe region. 30 of the 33 think tanks are located in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia, 2 are located in the central city of Plovdiv, and 1 is located in the western city of Pernik. Bulgarian think tanks are highly concentrated in Sofia because a large portion of the country is rural and covered by the Balkan mountains, which run laterally through the middle of the country from west to east. As of 2018, 75% of the Bulgarian population lived in urban areas such as Sofia, Plovdiv, and Pernik.87 In addition, about ⅙ of the Bulgarian population currently resides in the capital city of Sofia.88 Sofia has also been named one of the top ten best places for start-up businesses in the world and many of Bulgaria’s most prominent institutions are located in the capital.

Think Tanks by Research Area

87 "Bulgaria - Urban Population (% Of Total Population)," 2019. 88 "Bulgaria Population 2020 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs)," 2020.

There are three prominent research focuses of note of Bulgarian think tanks. The first research focus is foreign policy oriented and particularly relates to the further elaboration and implementation of European policy. Think tanks such as the Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute, the Institute for Security and International Studies, and PanEuropa Bulgaria focus on deepening the economic benefit that Bulgaria is rewarded by the EU and improving bilateral political, economic and cultural relations with the countries of Southeast Europe. Many of the think tanks that primarily operate in the field of foreign policy also focus on finding sustainable solutions to the issue of migration given that Bulgaria is a popular transit country used by refugees to eventually settle in western or northern Europe. Despite a 91% drop in irregular arrivals since 2015, detention remains a key feature in the country’s response to migration flows.89 Bulgarian refugee camps are plagued by substandard health and living conditions. About 10 of the 33 Bulgarian think tanks have made migration a central focus of their studies. Finally, the foreign policy oriented think tanks largely concern themselves with the ethnic-national problems that are very prevalent in Bulgarian society. Bulgaria’s crossroads situation in the Balkans and the dramatic historical destiny of its population “have resulted in the formation of many layers of diverse ethno-cultural models and traditions, as well as in varying interpretations of the relationship between the agents of these differing cultural models.”90 Bulgarian think tanks focus on foreign policy strategies in dealing with countries such as Turkey given that a high proportion of Bulgaria denies its Ottoman past and Turkish identity. These think tanks, along with their foreign policy studies, focus on defining Bulgarian ethnic identity. About 27% of Bulgarian think tanks focus on anti-corruption measures and the further democratization of several Bulgarian institutions including the judicial system, the police, public

89 "Immigration Detention In Bulgaria: Fewer Migrants And Refugees, More Fences (April 2019) - Bulgaria," 2019. 90 Tafradjiski B., Radoeva D., and Minev D, 1992. services, land administration, tax administration, and civil society. According to a 2018 poll conducted by Transparency International, 76% percent of Bulgarian respondents believe that the Bulgarian political parties are corrupt. 86% also believe that the judiciary is corrupt. Transparency International also discovered that 12% of Bulgarian public service users had paid a bribe in the past year.91 This has resulted in Transparency International deeming Bulgaria the most corrupt nation in the EU. Bulgarian think tanks such as the Center for the Study of Democracy, the Institute of Modern Politics, and the Open Society Institute Sofia study the legislation and policy that is necessary to reduce the influence of money in Bulgarian politics and ensure that political outcomes are better determined by the people rather than powerful individuals with certain interests. The third popular research focus of Bulgarian think tanks, which comprises about 24% of these institutions, revolves around two main realms of social policy. The first is the issue of poverty. In 2018, the Sofia Globe reported that 22% of Bulgarians fall below the poverty line.92 With a per capita GDP of $8,301 USD, Bulgaria is the 10th poorest country in Europe.93 Think tanks such as the Agency for Social Analysis and the Institute for Social and Political Studies study various social policies that may alleviate poverty including improvements to education, health care, and the labor market. The second realm of social policy that Bulgarian think tanks tend to focus on also involves conditions of poverty but along ethnic lines. The rates of poverty are highest among the Roma ethnic group and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. These poverty rates are 28.6% and 26.5% respectively. Think tanks like the Institute for Social Integration study and propose policy solutions that are aimed at ethnic minorities in Bulgaria. These think tanks aim to foster a collaborative environment for ethnic minorities and propose to do so through resource allocation and socially democratic institutions. About 12% of Bulgarian think tanks focus on economic issues which mostly deal with continued EU integration and improving poverty in Bulgaria. There is a lack of think tanks, however, that focus on environmental sustainability, clean energy, and technological innovation. The lack of environmental think tanks (about two) is particularly surprising given Bulgaria’s rich array of forests, land, water bodies, and biodiversity. In addition, only one think tank, the Applied Research and Communications Fund, focuses on innovation and global technological systems.

Think Tanks by Institutional Affiliation

91 "Bulgaria," 2020. 92 "Twenty-Two Per Cent Of Bulgarians Below Poverty Line In 2018 – Statistics Institute," 2018. 93 "Poorest Countries In Europe 2020," 2020.

A representative sample of the following 10 Bulgarian think tanks was created:

1) Centre for Liberal Strategies 2) European Institute Foundation 3) Institute for Market Economics 4) Institute for Social Integration 5) Institute for Security and International Studies 6) Centre for Advanced Study 7) Economic Policy Institute 8) Institute of Modern Politics 9) Access to Information Programme Foundation 10) Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute

These 10 think tanks were selected for the sample because they closely represent a broad range of Bulgarian think tank interests, they consist of both prominent and non-prominent think tanks, and because they have a range of different affiliations. From this sample, 50% of the think tanks are independent, 30% are university affiliated, and 20% are government affiliated. University think tanks have the largest average staff size of 91 (government average: 63, independent average: 25). The average budget size is much higher for a university affiliated think tank than an independently affiliated think tank. The average university budget was $2,243,000 and the average independent budget was 693,000. Unfortunately, these averages cannot be compared to government think tank budget averages because all of the government think tanks keep their budget size confidential.

Biases

The ideologies of Bulgarian think tanks are varied. About 24% of Bulgarian think tanks maintain a progressive ideology, meaning that their main interests revolve around instituting political, economic, and/or social reform in the country in order to bring about desired change. This change may revolve around improving poverty, integrating minorities, or redistributing resources. About 21% of Bulgarian think tanks take a firm pro-EU stance and support Bulgaria’s continued integration into the union. Though these think tanks may propose reforms within the EU, they are committed to the EU and hope to reap continued economic benefits. 12% of Bulgarian think tanks are pro-government. Institutes such as the Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute and the Manfred Wörner Foundation are supportive of their leaders and do not believe that democratic reform is particularly necessary. Only one Bulgarian think tank, the International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, is religiously oriented. This centre focuses on the incorporation of religious minorities into Bulgarian society. However, most Bulgarian think tanks (38%) do not ascribe to a particular ideology. These institutions simply research policy and try to objectively provide their analysis and opinion with no particular goals in mind. They tend to be neutral and strictly academic.

Issues and Challenges

The largest challenges that Bulgarian think tanks face are issues of funding. Generally, domestic funding is scarce given that Bulgaria is one of the poorest countries in the EU. However, the largest source of funding for Bulgarian think tanks has been international funding and ever since the early and mid 2000’s, this funding has been diminishing. Bulgarian think tanks are mostly funded from abroad, mostly from the United States and the EU. According to the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Bulgaria, U.S. funding of Bulgarian think tanks has decreased ever since Bulgaria joined the EU. American donors refer to democratization and the fact that Bulgaria’s EU status as a main reason for decreased funding.94 The EU has also failed to provide adequate funding to Bulgarian think tanks because a large portion of Bulgarian think tanks are not consistently in favor of EU policies. According to the Centre for Liberal Strategies, projects of individual think tanks that question practices of the government, or, god forbid, the EU, tend to become censored in their funding.95 Due to diminished American and EU funding, Bulgarian think tanks continue to struggle to find the resources to develop innovative policy solutions. Another issue that Bulgarian think tanks face is that they are mostly restrained to academic study and find it difficult to translate their academia into action that would benefit Bulgarian society. Many Bulgarian think tanks, unless they are government affiliated, are not provided much governmental support and also do not have the political leverage to make their research more applicable to the Bulgarian political landscape. Many Bulgarian think tanks simply remain institutions that exist for study and do not maintain any influence.

Research Publications Analysis

94 Kyuranov, Deyan, 1992. 95 Kyuranov, Deyan, 1992.

25 publications were analyzed from the following Bulgarian think tanks mostly published between the September of 2019 and June 2020: the Centre for Liberal Strategies, the Institute for Market Economics, the Institute of Public Administration, the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), and the Centre for Advanced Study (CAS). These particular think tanks were selected because they are some of the most prominent in Bulgaria and because they also provide a wide range of various issues given that they all study various developments. Only 25 publications were selected because there were many repeat topics across Bulgarian think tank publications. Some of the evaluated publications were published before Fall of 2019 but most fall within the aforementioned timeframe. The issues that these Bulgarian think tanks have been researching lately include the improvement of corrupt democratic institutions, the reform of political financing, populism, national security and foreign relations in Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian migration and minority crisis, and EU borders. Most of the publications work to study and develop anti-corruption measures in domestic politics and tackle the European migration issue from economic, cultural, and human rights oriented points of view. 32% of the publications are foreign policy oriented, whether this policy be directed towards neighboring countries, the EU, NATO, or the United States. 28% focus on transparency and anti-corruption. 24% tackle economic issues and poverty within Bulgaria. 12% of the publications proposed progressive social policies to reform Bulgarian society particularly in improving the quality of education. There was only one article that discussed technological assistance in the digital age.

Summary and Conclusion

The most important issues for Bulgarian think tanks include reducing poverty amongst the Bulgarian population, improving democratic institutions so as to reduce the high levels of corruption, mitigating the issue of refugees and migrants that have been using Bulgaria as a transit country for EU access, and better integrating ethnic minorities into the social climate. Although Bulgaria is a member of the EU and NATO, recent years have shown that these statuses have not necessarily improved economic conditions and democracy in the country. Some Bulgarian think tanks do take a pro-EU stance and others are more progressive in their goals to improve education, employment, and resource distribution. However, there are a number of Bulgarian think tanks that are also pro-government and do not agree with increased democratic reform. Unfortunately, Bulgarian think tanks remain underfunded both domestically and internationally and cannot produce much meaningful action from the policies that they analyze and propose. Bulgaria still has a long way to go in developing its democratic institutions and prosperity. Bulgarian think tanks generally echo these main issues.

The Western Balkans: An Analysis of Think Tanks in a Region Defined by Ethnic and Political Divides Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia

Former Yugoslavia: Think Tanks as Civil Society’s Tools for European Integration and Healing from the Yugoslav Wars Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia

Background

Pre-1945

The first think tank founded in the former Yugoslavia was the Institute of Economics, founded in 1939 in Zagreb, Croatia, inspired by European economic reconstruction in the interwar period to formalize research methods and provide a collaborative forum to do so.96 The National Liberation Army, also known as the Partisan Resistance or Partisans, mobilized over 800,000 members of the various Slavic ethnic groups within the nation to fight against the Axis powers during WWII. Led by Josip Broz Tito, the Partisans used communist ideology to distance themselves from their fascist invaders and create a federalist state in Yugoslavia that recognized the individual rights of Serbs, Macedonians, Slovenes, Kosovars, Albanians, and Croats.97

Postwar Period to 1963

Under Tito’s Partisan leadership, the newly named Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia implemented a planned economic system involving nationalized factories, small private businesses, and land becoming nationalized then redistributed and collectivized. Critically, the Young Communist League of Yugoslavia used youth work brigades for the public works projects the nation needed such as roads, railways, infrastructure, and electrical technology.98 The Economics Institute in Serbia was established in 1947 to consult the young government on communist economic ideology. Under Tito, the majority of former Yugoslav think tanks were public-university-affiliated or government-affiliated, acting as research hubs for the government that helped facilitate economic development throughout the Cold War.

96 “Homepage.” Ekonomski institut, Zagreb. Available at: https://www.eizg.hr/en. 97 Ibid 98 Allcock, John B. Explaining Yugoslavia. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2000. 1948-1955 was a period characterized by the breakdown of Yugoslav-Soviet relations despite their shared communist ideology. Yugoslav nationalism and communism were predicated on Partisan military success during WWII, without much assistance from the Red Army, which led to Tito believing their relationship was one of mere communist allyship while Stalin believed communism itself made Yugoslavia a Soviet satellite.99 Yugoslavia became economically and politically isolated as it attempted to develop international relationships while retaining its status as a non-aligned state, leading to chronic unemployment and volatile internal stability as Stalinist Yugoslavs led rebellions, military insurrections, and acts of sabotage. In 1963, Tito renamed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia to become the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Composed of six socialist constituent republics along ethnic lines, Yugoslav politics increasingly became a matter of reconciling national identity with the various ethnic identities of member states, with minority groups from some states facing opposition in others despite falling under the same federal government.100 The six socialist republics were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia, with Serbia containing two socialist autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, that increasingly grew in population and political power to the point of gaining relatively equal political consideration by the federal government of the SFRY, cementing Serbian ethnic leadership as a tenet of nationalism. The next year, the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb was founded to further specialize in the development of domestic education policy and the peaceful coexistence of diverse ethnic groups within the SFRY.101

1980s

The 1970s oil crisis led to massive foreign and domestic debt plus inflation, which rose by 140% between 1980 and 1987.102 Economic reorganization under Edvard Kardelj’s theory of associated labor, in which complex management structures and trade unions were implemented in nationalized industries to resolve the frequent strikes triggered by leaders between socialist republics, was used for domestic stabilization alongside currency restructuring.103 Kardelj developed these plans through research by the Institute of Public Finance, established in 1970 in Croatia to further Tito’s need for expert consulting for good governance, educational policy, and development.104 Following Tito’s death in 1980, Federal Prime Minister Planinc, then Mikulic, then Markovic tried to resolve debt by turning to IMF loans, US aid, and austerity measures that ultimately carried conditions of financial liberalization and widespread privatization,

99 Ibid 100 BBC. “Europe | Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia,” May 22, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm. 101 “About the Institute.” Institute for Social Research in Zagreb. https://www.idi.hr/en/o-nama/o-institutu/. 102 Ramet, Sabrina P. The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005. DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006. 103 Ramet, 2006. 104 “Institute of Public Finance.” Accessed July 21, 2020. http://www.ijf.hr/eng/about-us/. fundamentally shifting the cultural landscape of the SFRY from nationalistic and socialist to capitalist and ethnically divided.105

1990s Onward

After the League of Communists of Yugoslavia dissolved in 1990, a wave of declarations of independence by socialist republics ensued and the SFRY broke apart.106 However, ethnic tensions within each new country between dominant ethnic groups and minorities previously united with them under the SFRY heightened as new governments developed their administrations. The break out of the Yugoslav Wars and the Bosnian Genocide were a direct result of this primordial tension between nationalism and ethnicity. The Serbian government, led by Slobodan Milosevic, used nationalist rhetoric to divide the former Yugoslavia’s army, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), so secessionist movements would not be inhibited. However, the conflation of ethnic supremacy and the national supremacy that justified secession by Milosevic had adverse humanitarian implications that ultimately cost over 140,000 lives from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, on top of his life imprisonment ordered by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1993-2017).107 The Ten-Day War (1991), Croatian War of Independence (1991-5), Bosnian War (1992-5) including a genocide in which Bosnian Serbs killed over 8,000 Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats in Srebrenica under the direction of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Milosevic, Kosovo War (1998-9), Presevo Valley insurgency (1999-2001), and Macedonian insurgency (2001) chipped away at human life, political unity, and public bureaucracies. In 1997, the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM) in Montenegro108 and the Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCSP)109 were founded in direct response to the Yugoslav wars, utilizing university research and public advocacy to capture the lessons found in the fresh wounds of the former Yugoslavia about the importance of human rights, peacebuilding, and democratization. In 2001, the Center for Security Studies (Bosnia and Herzegovina) was established to create independent research to promote domestic security policy as part of the reform process following the genocide.110 In 1992, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina gained independence followed by Macedonia the next year and the remaining territory renamed as the State union of Serbia and Montenegro, which then split in 2006. Think tanks in the former Yugoslavia blossomed in

105 Allcock, 2000. 106 BBC, 2006. 107 Ramet, 2006. 108 “Medijski Centar Za Izvještavanje o Životnoj Sredini.” Center for Democracy and Human Rights. https://www.cedem.me/en/. 109 “BCSP.” Belgrade Center for Security Policy. http://www.bezbednost.org/BCSP/2001/Home.shtml. 110 “Centar Za Sigurnosne Studije – BiH: Centre for Security Studies – BH,” Center for Security Studies, BiH. April 3, 2019. http://css.ba/profile/. number and utility to young governments during the early 2000s as various governments’ need for expertise on economic development and European integration grew, a trend which slowed in the 2010s due to populism and democratic backsliding. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence and in 2019, Macedonia was renamed the Republic of North Macedonia following the Prespa Agreement with Greece. Notably, cultural European integration should be distinguished from integration into the European Union, a process that many nations of the former Yugoslavia have been undertaking through the last decade. For example, in 2011, the European Policy Institute (Republic of North Macedonia)111 and European Policy Centre (Serbia)112 were founded to assist national governments with their EU ambitions by working with civil society organizations and conducting empirical research to make policy recommendations. In Novi Sad, the Center for History, Democracy, and Reconciliation (CHDR) aims to further coordinate peacebuilding between the nations of the former Yugoslavia.113 Aided by the rise of the Internet, the wars themselves contributed to the accelerated development of new think tanks as reconciliation between new countries and development by new governments warranted expert consultation and recommendations made from the empirical research think tanks specialize in, evident by the corresponding jump in the rate new think tank creation in 1991, from less than one annually to approximately four annually.

111 “Mission and Vision.” European Policy Institute. https://epi.org.mk/about- us/%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0-%D0%B8- %D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0?lang=en. 112 Lazarević, Nebojša, Strahinja Subotić, Marija Ćirić, Vladmir Mihajlović , Vladmir Mihajlović, and Miloš Đinđić. “CEP.” Center for European Policy. Available at: https://cep.org.rs/en/ 113 “Centerforhistory - Home,” Center for History Democracy and Reconciliation. Available at: https://chdr-ns.com/

Geographic Distribution

Geographically, the vast majority of think tanks are located in the capital city of their respective countries, benefitted by intellectual communities in closeby universities and government officials in closeby bureaucracies, following the “revolving door” model of human capital exchange present in the American think tank community.114 Sarajevo, Skopje, and Belgrade are the three think tank capitals of the former Yugoslavia. Many smaller cities have one social policy oriented think tank that works with civil society organizations to work on local development projects. While this somewhat blurs the line between a think tank and a civil society organization, it can be better understood as an example of how partnerships between public groups and private, independent research institutions can facilitate a mutually beneficial relationship whereby the public gains empirical evidence, analysis, and policy recommendations while think tanks gain increased validity and sources of funding without relying on governments.115 Think Tank Location Across the Former Yugoslavia

Bosnia and Croatia (22) Kosovo (14) Montenegro North Serbia (35) Slovenia (16) Herzegovina (12) Macedonia (42) (29)

Sarajevo: 32 Zagreb: 19 Prinstina: 13 Podgorica: 11 Skopje: 25 Belgrade: 29 Ljubljana: 14

Zenica: 1 Rijeka: 1 Gjakova: 1 Ulcinj: 1 Prilep: 1 Nis: 3 Bled: 1

Tuzla: 1 Dubrovnik: 1 Gostivar: 1 Prokuplje: 1 Koper: 1

Banja Luka: 3 Split: 1 Ohrid: 1 Novi Sad: 2

Mostar: 3 Bitola: 1

Think Tanks by Research Area Following the logic of embedded liberalism, education embeds liberalism’s value of cultural diversity in the minds of new generations of citizens of these new countries. Thus, education and European integration are processes whereby think tanks theorize the goal of democratization can be reached and two of the top subthemes of all think tank research in the

114 McGann, James G. The Fifth Estate: Think tanks, public policy, and governance. Brookings Institution Press, 2016. 115 Delić, Anamarija, Slavica Singer, and Mirela Alpeza. “The Ninth International Conference:‘Challenges of Europe: Growth and Competitiveness – Reversing the Trends,’” 1–18. Split-Bol, Croatia, 2011. former Yugoslav region. The Open Society Foundation has established branches in each country of the former Yugoslavia, providing financial and human capital for both research areas.116 Contemporarily, the landscape of think tanks in the former Yugoslavia reflects regional history of ethnic conflict, independence movements, economic development, and youth power. In the 2019 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, 3/144 of the top global domestic economic policy think tanks, 1/156 of the top foreign policy think tanks, and 3/67 of the top transparency and good governance think tanks were in the former Yugoslavia. No think tanks in the region appear at all among the top global think tanks for energy and resource policy, defense and national security, environmental policy, domestic health policy, global health policy, international development policy, international economic policy, science and technology policy, social policy, food security, and water security.117 Most notably, 15/74 of the world’s top educational policy think tanks come from the former Yugoslavia. The lingering communist cultural value of youth civic engagement once used to build much of the region’s infrastructure has been evidently redirected to teach peacebuilding to avoid the wars the parents of today’s students once experienced. Furthermore, education helps protect against brain drain and assists in developing minds that can adapt to European integration and newly liberalized economies. In terms of think tank areas of focus, social policy is the cost common, followed by democracy/transparency research and domestic economic research. Human rights and EU integration research are next, areas that are often aims rather than research areas, as social policy, economic development, and democratization are perceived as the means to achieve these ends.

Distribution of Think Tanks by Area of Focus

116 Soros, Alexander. “We Can Learn from Sarajevo.” Open Society Foundation, 2019. Available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/keeping-open-society-alive-in-sarajevo 117 McGann, James G. "2019 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report." (2020).

Think Tanks by Institutional Affiliation

While many of the contemporary think tanks that predate the break up of the former Yugoslavia are university-affiliated since such institutions endured conflict, those that are relatively newer are mostly independent, with only a handful of government-affiliated tanks remaining since state-owned research institutions struggled to endure the dissolution of the centralized state.118 Independent think tanks are much more progressive and pro-EU in bias, working with civil society organizations to both “think-and-do” their research by finding ways to implement their recommendations without bureaucratic involvement. Government think tanks focus more on economic themes given that employment and trade are activities to which they are held responsible by constituencies, so think tanks act as consultants to help politicians and agencies facilitate favorable economic development. University think tanks operate as research institutes within the faculty of academic departments, which means they are much more specific in sticking to one main policy area of focus than independent think tanks, who often have secondary and even tertiary research areas of focus.

Distribution of Think Tanks by Affiliation

118 Bakota, Ivica. “Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Briefing: Report: Think Tanks in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” China- CEE Institute 12, no. 3 (November 2018): 1–6.

Biases Democratization has been the overarching goal of think tanks and the new nations of former Yugoslav countries, as governments more open to international cooperation and civil responsibility in Europe can benefit from the funding gains of international trade and investment on top of the social gain of stability earned from satisfying the interests of constituents, especially those seeking peace following conflict in the 1990s.119 The IMF has issued loans for many countries of the former Yugoslavia, carrying liberalizing conditions that require governments to harmonize to EU fiscal policy standards on top of their own political desires to gain entry into the EU. Thus, many think tanks are pro-EU. Education serves a cultural purpose relevant to the region as well. Many educational research publications from think tanks in the region address the culturally-cognizant integration of multi-ethnic student bodies to prevent a repeat of the human rights violations that occurred during the Yugoslav Wars as a result of ethnic tension, part of the reason why think tanks are predominantly progressive. Many think tanks are also pro-government given that they receive funding from their central government and are contracted by different government agencies to conduct their research.120

Distribution of Think Tanks by Bias

119 Delić, Anamarija, Slavica Singer, and Mirela Alpeza. “The Ninth International Conference:‘Challenges of Europe: Growth and Competitiveness – Reversing the Trends,’” 1–18. Split-Bol, Croatia, 2011. 120 Bakota, Ivica. “Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Briefing: Report: Think Tanks in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” China- CEE Institute 12, no. 3 (November 2018): 1–6.

Issues and Challenges

Serious concerns over democratic backsliding under current regimes continuously provides new research opportunities but undermines the utility of think tanks who are discredited and underfunded by governments who are not friendly to criticism. Turning to international sources of funding from Germany, the EU, or the USA is a strategy used by many independent think tanks to stay afloat.121 To circumvent government inefficiencies, social policy, especially educational policy and ethnic reconciliation, is the most common area of focus for former Yugoslav think tanks as civil society organizations and local governments are more receptive to receiving policy recommendations on issues, like education infrastructure, that are administered at levels under that of central governments. Funding, in terms of diversification of sources and having a sufficient quantity of money, is a maintained challenge, especially for independent think tanks.122

Research Publication Analysis

121 Ibid 122 Regional Research Promotion Program. “The State of Research at Think Tank Organisations in Kosovo,” June 2013. Of a sample of 129 of the most recent think tank publications from the region, 54 addressed education and social policy issues while 34 addressed democratization, European integration, or human rights explicitly. For research purposes, these publications were selected from a smaller representative sample of think tanks from each country and their main focuses. Economics research is also a common research focus of think tanks, especially among government and university affiliated think tanks such as the National Competitiveness Council (Croatia), the Center for Economic Analysis (North Macedonia), and the Economics Institute (Serbia). Many think tanks work alongside NGOs, CSOs, journalistic organizations, and startups to further promote development and the overarching goal of democratization.123 European integration is a much larger publication theme than the general area of focus for think tanks themselves. This suggests that European integration is a process understood to be a solution to issues across many other policy spheres. For example, the Centre for European Perspective uses research on pan-European issues to subsequently make domestic recommendations to the Slovene government about foreign and social policy.124

Distribution of Think Tank Publications by Area of Focus

Summary: Key Takeaways

123 Regional Research Promotion Program. “The State of Research at Think Tank Organisations in Kosovo,” June 2013. 124 “What Is CEP?” Centre for European Perspective. Available at: https://www.cep.si/about/what-is-cep/

Across the region, the breakdown of areas of focus of think tank missions as well as publication outputs support the notion that educational policy and European integration are the two most common themes for think tank research, reflecting the membership bids of the relatively new countries that emerged from independence movements of the Yugoslav Wars in the early 1990s. This means that these two areas may be perceived by the private research and public policy making sectors as means to achieve ends to other types of crises stemming from changing human migration patterns, ethnic tensions, and unemployment in the region. European integration should be understood as broad cultural, economic, and political regional assimilation across the continent but also as a process whereby think tanks strengthen government’s applications for EU membership because the recommendations they give follow the harmonization trend of past EU applicants. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo are currently potential candidates for membership while Montenegro, Serbia, and North Macedonia are currently negotiating their terms of joining the EU. Croatia successfully joined the EU in 2013 and Slovenia successfully joined in 2004. Subsequently, democratization and transparency is a complicated issue because it is necessary to governments to adhere to these principles for their European integration interests but ultimately a challenge for them to admit errors and reform, especially with the rise of populist parties across Europe and within the subregion. Given the history of the founding of the seven former Yugoslav countries, out of wars and ethnic conflict, human rights and social policy are key motivations and research areas for think tanks.125 Developing independent nations that maintain close spatial, cultural, historical, and economic ties requires attentiveness to social issues, meaning think tanks are a perfect, albeit underutilized, resource that can coordinate this process between governments and civil society actors by maintaining their fundamentally empirical research practices to make objective recommendations.

125 Regional Research Promotion Program. “The State of Research at Think Tank Organisations in Kosovo,” June 2013. Albania: Public Policy Research in the Eastern Europe’s Cultural Isolate

Background

Albania was ruled by a Marxist-Leninist government from 1946 to 1992. No currently active think tanks or research institutions existed in Albania during this dictatorship. However, in 1992, the Albanian Democratic Party won the newly instituted multiparty elections and party leader Sali Berisha became the first democratically elected president. In the 1990’s, political leadership in Albania was divided into periods of rule by the Socialist Party and periods of rule by the Democratic party. With the new democratic reforms, the Open Society Foundation for Albania became the first established think tank in 1993. Its main focus was and is to improve Albanian democracy and reduce political corruption. As will be described further, governmental reform towards democratization and transparency is the main focus of most Albanian think tanks because the Albanian government has been internationally condemned for its rampant corruption. About 7 of 14 Albanian think tanks also focus on European integration and accession into the EU. To this day, the issues of democratization and European integration have remained the most significant issues that Albanian think tanks involve themselves with.

Increase in the Number of Albanian Think Tanks since 1993 up to 2001

*Data Excludes Think Tanks that are no longer active Geographic Distribution

There are fourteen think tanks in Albania and all of them are located in the capital city of Tirana. This think tank number is slightly lower per capita than many other countries in the Central and Eastern European region. In addition, think tanks in Albania are far less geographically spread out than think tanks in other neighboring countries given that all of them operate from one city. The reason for the concentration of all Albanian think tanks in the urban capital is because most of Albania rises into mountains and hills all across the length of the country from north to south. Other areas of the country consist mostly of rural plains and farmland. Tirana is one of the few urban centers in Albania and is the most important economic, financial, political and trade center in Albania due to its significant location in the center of the country. As a result, all Albanian think tanks have situated themselves in this sprawling urban center.

Think Tanks by Research Area

Albanian think tanks focus primarily on issues regarding democracy/transparency and European integration. “Democracy and transparency” simply refers to a focus on democratization that tackles the issues of weeding out political corruption, increasing civic participation, promoting civil discussion, reforming unrepresentative democratic institutions, and aiming to transform Albania’s political landscape away from oligarchic and dictatorial practices. According to the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, the world’s largest opinion survey on corruption, 66% of respondents indicated that the level of corruption has increased in Albania.126 Corruption has presented challenges to establishing businesses in Albania and even though there have been moderate attempts at corruption reform, the enforcement of this legislation remains weak and has produced very low conviction rates.

126 "Global Corruption Barometer 2013," 2013. The failures of democratization in Albania have become more apparent in recent years. In fact, in a 2020 report, Transparency International declared Albania the most corrupt country in Europe, having fallen 23 spots in three years on their Corruption Perception index among EU member and candidate countries.127 As such, seven of fourteen Albanian think tanks including the Institute for Democracy and Mediation, the Institute for Public Policy and Good Governance, and the Cooperation and Development Institute (CDI) have made it their main mission to propose reforms to institute anti-corruption measures in the country. Democracy, transparency, and anti- corruption are therefore some of the greatest focuses of Albanian think tanks. The second primary focus of Albanian think tank institutions is European integration and accession into the European Union. European integration manifests in various forms for Albanian think tanks. Some think tanks such as the Albanian Institute for International Studies and the Cooperation and Development Institute (CDI) pursue a foreign policy oriented approach regarding EU accession, focusing on cooperation with neighboring member states and the Euro-polity as a whole while working to politically exemplify that Albania is in fact a European nation. Other think tanks such as the Institute for Democracy and Mediation and the Institute for Development, Research and Alternatives take a pro-EU stance through an approach that emphasizes the need for Albanian democratization and integrity which could be provided by the EU. Many of these institutions as well as the Institute for Public Policy and Good Governance also focus on the economic benefits of EU membership and work to persuade Albanian citizens that European integration would provide economic well-being. About seven of fourteen Albanian think tanks, whether through an economic, foreign policy, or democratically oriented approach, work to speed up the process of European integration. Albania has been in talks of joining the EU since 2006. While Albania’s acceptance into the EU failed in 2010, the EU has just recently reopened accession talks with Albania in 2020, indicating another attempt to include Albania in the EU. As such, many Albanian think tanks continue to study the positive economic effects of EU membership as well as attempt to streamline the acceptance process. According to European Views, 93% of Albania’s citizens are in favor of their country’s accession to the European Union and these institutions work to make this wish a reality.128 Three out of the fourteen Albanian think tanks focus on sustainability, pollution reduction, climate change, and the preservation of particular Albanian environments and species. These include the Association for Protection of Aquatic Wildlife of Albania (APAWA), the National Center for Environment, Tourism, and Sustainability, and Institute for Environmental Policy in Albania. Albania is well known for its ecological biodiversity and multitude of environmental habitats. Because Albania is located on the Meditteranean sea, there exists a plethora of terrestrial and marine ecosystems with a great diversity of flora and fauna.129

127 Taylor, 2020. 128 "Albania Overwhelmingly Wants EU Membership, Serbia Not So Much," 2018. 129 The Nature Protection Directory, 2020. In Albania, there appears to be a lack of think tanks focused on technology/innovation and social policy. The two main issues that Albanian citizens claim are the most important are unemployment and corruption.130 As a result, the current focus is on European membership and improving democracy in Albania. Albanian think tanks believe that EU membership and honest, transparent leadership are the most effective reforms necessary in order to improve economic conditions and corruption.

Think Tanks by Institutional Affiliation

Out of the 14 Albanian think tanks, 13 of them are independent and only one is university- affiliated. There are no government affiliated think tanks in Albana primarily because the government is not supportive of these institutions and lacks the funding to supply any necessary resources. The university affiliated think tank, the Institute for Public Policy and Good Governance, has a staff size of about 10 individuals. The Institute for Public Policy and Good Governance has not published any information regarding their budget size. In a representative sample of 1 university affiliated think tank and 4 independent think tanks, the average staff size for the 4 independent think tanks was 18, higher than the Institute for Public Policy and Good Governance. The average budget size for the independent think tanks was $704,000.

Biases

Albanian think tanks tend to be either pro-EU or progressive. There is a general pro-EU stance among Albanian think tanks given that such a large proportion of the population is in favor

130 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011. of accession into the EU. 6 of the 14 Albanian think tanks can be classified as progressive, meaning that their main interests revolve around instituting political, economic, and/or environmental reform in the country in order to bring about desired change. Progressive think tanks such as the Centre for Economic and Social Studies and the Institute for Public Policy and Good Governance have proposed strong reforms within the country to strengthen the government and improve the poor and the unemployed including anti-corruption legislation and wealth redistribution. If an Albanian think tank is neither vocally pro-EU or progressive, it is likely to be a neutral research institution that simply studies and analyzes policy. 4 of 14 Albanian think tanks are neutral in that they do not take a politically leaning stance and simply analyze various issues without a particular goal in mind. There are no religious think tanks and very few of the think tanks seem to take a conservative or a pro-government stance.

Issues and Challenges

One of the main challenges for the Albanian system of think tanks is simply that the number of Albanian think tanks remains small, only 14. Many of these think tanks also identify themselves as think tanks for reasons of prestige but in fact they do not perform the typical think tank functions. In addition, Albanian law is not supportive of the development of the think tank sector. According to a research report commissioned by PERFORM, a project of Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), “the weakness in cooperation between the [Albanian] government and think tanks is reinforced by mutual distrust. The common opinion of the representatives of the think tank sector is that their organizations’ role is limited due to the inadequate demand on the side of the authorities at central and local level.”131 As a result, domestic funding opportunities for Albanian think tanks are very scarce. Albanian think tanks are extremely dependent on foreign grants, and the situation will not change in the foreseeable future because of the lack of other viable sources of finance. Furthermore, a large portion of the research agenda of the Albanian think tanks reflects the priorities of these foreign donors rather than independently decided research topics. Finally, the social sciences in Albania are quite restricted to the academic field and typically do not offer applicable research. Many Albanian think tanks publish their findings only for academic purposes and do not intend nor are able to translate their research to effective policy implementation. Think tanks in Albania mostly exist for theory and study. These organizations do not have the resources or support to enact the change they seek.

Research Publications Analysis

131 Xhindi, Nevila & Włoch, Renata, 2018.

20 publications were evaluated from the following Albanian think tanks mostly published between the fall of 2019 and June 2020: the Albanian Institute for International Studies, the Institute for Public Policy and Good Governance (IPPM), the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM), and the Cooperation and Development Institute (CDI). I analyzed the publications of these institutions not only because these think tanks are some of the most prominent in Albania, they also provide a wide range of various issues given that they all study various developments. Some evaluated publications were published before Fall 2019 but most fall within the aforementioned timeframe. The issues that these Albanian think tanks have been researching recently include the high rates of corruption, the improvement and enforcement of political accountability, the impact of COVID-19 on the national economy and resources, relations with Serbia, economic development and employment, and European integration. With the onset of the global pandemic and recently opened accession talks with the EU, the research that has been recently conducted is not surprising. Albanian think tanks continue to advocate for European integration, economic improvement, and focus on tensions with Serbia over Kosovo’s independence. About 25% of the analyzed publication focus on improving transparency and the strength of Albanian democratic institutions . One publication focused on increasing voter turnout, another on the percent of citizens that engage with Albanian government, another on Albania’s growing corruption, and another on the importance of citizen cooperation to fight corrupt practices. 30% of publications revolved around COVID-19 and its economic impacts. 10% of the publications were economically oriented and covered topics such as the changing nature of work, unemployment, and resources. 10% of the publications analyzed Albanian tensions with Serbia and how to mitigate the battle over Kosovo’s independence. Only 1 article discussed agricultural productivity and environmental sustainability.

Summary and Key Takeaways

Overall, the most important goals of Albanian think tanks are to improve transparency, limit political corruption in democratic institutions, and continue to attempt to succeed in accession into the EU. The past 30 years of Albanian history have demonstrated that the Albanian government does not necessarily work for its people. Albanian citizens agree almost unanimously that corruption is rampant and unemployment remains high. Most institutions and citizens believe EU accession would drastically improve economic conditions. While these are the main focuses of most Albanian think tanks, other areas include the improvement of national security, encouraging regional cooperation, promoting sustainable practices, and expangin targeted outreach and advocacy particularly towards Albanian youth. Many Albanians want to see political and economic change, which explains why a majority of these think tanks take a pro-EU stance or are progressive in nature.

Summary: Key Takeaways

The TTCSP Central & Eastern Europe region is home to 692 think tanks scattered across countries as diverse as the institutions within them. Though the countries of the region share common histories, cultures, and diplomatic ties, there is an increasingly strong divergence in the quality and health of civil societies in CEE. Countries such as Slovakia and Slovenia contain disproportionate amounts of think tanks compared to countries such as Russia––the largest country in the region––and other autocratic or democratically backsliding states such as Belarus or Romania. Notably, countries with improving democracies such as Bosnia & Herzegovina or North Macedonia have begun to emerge as hosts to increasingly more think tanks, reflecting the promising liberalization of their civil societies. Nevertheless, the majority of CEE think tanks are still located primarily in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia.

The distribution of think tanks in CEE highlights the disparity between the undeveloped rural regions and the cultural and economic centers of capital regions. This development is particularly pronounced in CEE, as very few think tanks exist in cities outside of capitals. For example, although perhaps the only truly global non-capital city in the region is Russia’s St. Petersburg, the city only contains 8 think tanks despite its population nearly equaling that of Finland. Thus, in analyzing the distribution of think tanks, it is important to note the four main factors in think tank density in a location: city capital-status, city and country population, regional development disparity between urban and rural areas, and the health of the country’s democracy. These traits are particularly of note in the three “think tank capitals” of CEE: Moscow, Kiev, and Warsaw. It is no coincidence that these cities are all capitals, are located in countries with significant wealth disparities between the capital and periphery, and are located in the three most populous CEE countries.

The main challenges for think tanks in CEE are chronic underfunding, authoritarianism and/or democratic backsliding, and lack of precedent as leading actors in countries’ public policy decision making. Particularly in southern and far eastern Europe––especially in the countries of Belarus, Hungary, Romania, and Russia––think tanks are often limited in research output due to funding cuts, are pushed out of the country (as was the case with Central European University in Hungary and the majority of independent think tanks in Belarus), or are simply shut down. Many think tanks have already closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic due to budget instability issues, and it will only be possible to truly gauge the damage done to the industry in the years to come. Despite the challenges facing think tanks today, think tanks in CEE have proven adaptable in terms of shifting research priorities and staying afloat, despite systemic challenges that are more severe compared to in more developed regions such as Western Europe or North America. Although many think tanks have not been able to produce research at internationally competitive rates, the cause of this phenomenon is the frequent necessity of think tanks to contract their research services to private corporations in order to guarantee enough income to maintain operations. Furthermore, think tank publication trends indicate a deviation of research away from the previous most relevant topics in the region––democratization and market transition––to other issues such as environment and energy policy, social policy, and European integration (regardless of EU membership status). Overall, Central & Eastern Europe presents a picture of a region divided. The differences between the health of civil societies in the region and the climate for think tanks in different countries provides insights into the longer term health of democratic states in the context of government changes, economic transition, and populist influences. Think tanks in CEE will continue to serve as both valuable civil institutions and critical indicators for the health of civil society across the diverse scope of countries, cultures, governments, and economies.

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