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E. S. JOHNSTON ru&ntry
OF THE 33D INFANTPY DIVISION
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' , sjf W Mr S:" \ .' - .... MAY 18,1945 PUBLISHED iy AC of S,' G«3 V « m 1945 A)*/> o /h^ -mm COMMANDING GENERAL HEADQUARTERS A. P. O. 33. CARE POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO. CAL.
20 May 1945
Maj. Gen. Karl Truesdell Commandant The Command and General Staff School Fort Leavenworth, Kansas dh'iS2 i iggsj
Dear General Truesdell:
I am sending you herewith a copy of a report covering the highlights of the operations of the 33d Infantry Division which resulted in the capture of Baguio.
The operations were unusual in that the Division advanced over an extremely wide front and the advance was canalized by the nigged mountainous terrain to "routes" rather than "fronts."
The report stresses supply, evacuation, communica tions, and air and artillery support, since these were extremely difficult due to the distances and terrain involved.
Sincerely,
f. W. ULAKKSUN Major General, U. S. Army Commanding.
1 Incl. COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
4 Jun 45
Major General P W Clarkson Condg 33d Inf Div' APO 33, c/e Postuaster San Francisco, Calif
Dear Clarkson:
I have just finished reading your Divisional History on the Bagaio operation. Very interesting. You know that I have always had your outfit much in Bind — old associations. We are particularly interested in your special operation on account of the rugged type of terrain, the detached ooluons, all as against our present pet enemy located oa the Japanese main islands. In this latter connection, with the present class we are completely out of Europe and have all our applicatory work sited in the area north of you.
With warmest personal regards
As ever
KARL TRVESOm* Maj Gen, USA Coodt Auth: CG, 33d Inf Div Init: Date: 15 May 1945
INTRODUCTION
In tho 22 months that the 33d Division has been overseas, tho Luzon campaign afforded the first opportunity for the Division to operate as a unit. The Hawaiian Islands Defense Mis sion, and the Wakde-Sarrai and Morotai actions employed the Division as combat teams. It is with renewed interest then that we observe tho results of our first Divisional action. Row, at the conclusion of a three month campaign it is well to summarize and to review operations worthy of note*
FRAUg/J.'SACKTON Lt. Col., G.S.C. A. C* of S, G--3 INDEX Pag' THE BATTLE FOR BAGUIO ~ 1
Summary of the Action Progress Map Organization Chart
Combat Strength Chart Friendly and Enemy Casualties Decorations and Awards
NIGHT OPERATIONS 5 FIELD ARTILLERY 11 COMBAT ENGINEERS . 14
MEDICS IN COMBAT . 16 ...'xi SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS 18 ASSAULT SWITCHBOARD 19
AIR SUPPORT.. 21 PROVISIONAL PACK TRAIN 24 INFANTRY SCOUT DOGS.... 2?
INFORMATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM. 31 t® BAfiCIO
1^3 MANILA for BABOO
REPRODUCED BY 67lst EN6R. TOPO. CO. SWPA MAY 1945 THE BATTLE FOR BA GU I 0
This,is a thumbnail sketch of the 33d Division's opera tions in the Luzon Campaign from 13 February to 13 May, 194-5. From the moment the Division went into the line in Northern Luzon it was apparent to all that the objective was Baguio. But there were to be many hard-bought battles before the Philippines Summer Capital was captured. For three months the Division was engaged in bitter mountain fighting over the most rugged terrain of all Luzon. The battles were sharp and severe against the enemy who fought and died on his hill top positions. There was no easy route to Baguio; it'.was uphill over the mountains all the way and we brought our roads with us. The attached map shows the progress of the Battle For Baguio and shows the extension of our front from twenty miles on 13 February to sixty-five miles on 13 May. During this period over 800 square miles of Luzon were liberated.
PHASE I The Relief During the period 13 - 15 February the 33d Division re lieved the 43d Infantry Division and the 158th Regimental Combat Team in the Damortis - Rosario - Pozorrubio Area with the mission to secure the key terrain along that line and to push aggressive reconnaissance to the front. The Division went into position with the 136th Infantry on the right, the 130th Infantry in the center and the 123d Infantry on the left. PHASE II. 16 - 28 February
In order to open the Rosario - Pozorrubio Highway it was necessary to drive the enemy from the dominating ground SE of Rosario. On 19 February the 3d Battalion, 130th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 136th Infantry began an assault on Bench Mark and Question Mark Hillsi The two battalions, with excellent artillery support, captured these objectives in four days of bloody fighting. This cracked the Japanese first line of defense in the rugged Caraballo Mountains. Following this action Hills 600 and 1802 were captured by el^ffl^its of the 130th and 136th Infantry Regiments, thus se,curing^ thf Division ' right flank at Alibeng. „ rx('W.\ *'• vf £ I
r n y 't \ % >'* • 1 . ^ PHAS|%ii11|,'*T _ pil&f On the Division left'*#rafik" Hills "X" and "Y" were a con- - 1 - If n $; -r ^^ ^ rm ^ Bfe stant threat to jp\ir fortes f'.because off*|&<£Ixcellent observa- "°n *h®y offoray j,|ljjB|n ^ thls *hr«»t re" quired the capture or The ni"rs, ana plans were made to ac complish this. Preliminary to this move however, the 123d Infantry secured the favorable ground along Santo Tomas, Am- bangonan and Maoasoas as a springboard for the attack. In order to maintain equal pressure along the entire front, ele ments of 130th and 136th Infantry Regiments executed a double envelopment to secure the high ground in the Twin Peaks Area astride Kennon Road. At the same time the 136th Infantry pushed forward along the right flank from the Kennon Road to Alibeng.
PHASE IV 7-18 March \ The stage was set now for the push to capture Hills "X" and "Y", To insure the success of the operation it was nec essary to protect the left flank by capturing Aringay also. Acting on information obtained by the 33d Cavalry Reconnais sance Troop in an extended patrol of the Agoo-Aringay Area, the 1st Battalion of the 130th Infantry moved in a night at tack and secured the Aringay River Bridge, the Town of Aringay and its commanding ground. Simultaneously the 123d Infantry pushed north through Agoo and east into the Fugo River Valley securing the Town of Pugo and the dominating hills. Thus in one swift coordinated operation the Division captured the im portant 920 ft Aringay road and railroad bridges, advanced the Division left flank 15,000 yards, and opened two new routes to Baguio. Meanwhile the 136th Infantry advanced north along the winding canalized Kennon Road against determined enemy opposition, and after a series of bitterly contested actions secured the Camp 3 Area.
PHASE V 19 March to 10 April In a surprise night attack, elements of the 130th Infan try (motorized) seized the Town of Bauang and its important bridges. They then swept northward into San Fernando and eastward into Naguilian in a move that caught the enemy com pletely off balance. The 123d Infantry also in a surprise night attack seized Hill 3000, 1 a highly J^portant terrain feature on the route to Tuba. Then th@^f^% Infantry turned its attention to Mount Calugong apd "aiBtefcV days of bitter fighting secured this point als'oV/In SL of attacks in itiated by the 123d Infancy %an^ completed by the 130th In fantry, strong en£.my\forc0f t'in,porsition on Mount Bilbil and Mount Lomboy were contained and b'y^^Ssed, and with the sei zure of Galiano and Asin an all^^aj&her road to Baguio was uncovered. Meanwhile the 129th Regimental Combat Team, at tached to the Division, drove eastward from Naguilian along Highway 9 as far as Salat.
PHASE VI 11 - 26 April The 37th Division then took over the left flank, of the Division north of Highway 9, and in relieving elements of the 32d Division our right flank was extended to San Nicholas and Tebbo. Elements of the 136th Infantry began aggressive pa trol action in this mountainous area while other elements pushed patrols into Camp 4 on the Kennon Road, Meanwhile elements of the 130th Infantry began an attack along the Gal- iano-Baguio Road and seized the Asin Tunnels. At the same time the 123d Infantry continued its advance from Mount Calu- gong to Tuba. The 123d and 130th Infantry Regiments then executed a double envelopment to seize Hill 24-A atop Mount Mirador overlooking the very heart of Baguio, The stage was now set for the final drive into Baguio and the 33d Division and the 37th Division made a coordinated attack and seized the Summer Capital and nearby Camp John Hay on April 26.
PHASE VII 27 Aoril - 13 May The occupation of Baguio ushered in the final phase of the campaign. Elements of the 123d and the 130th Infantry Regiments eliminated the isolated pockets of enemy resistance in the areas around Mount Bilbil, Mount Lomboy, and Mount Santo Tomas. The 123d Infantry drove southward down the Ken non Road and made contact with the 136th Infantry in the vic inity of Camp 4. The 130th Infantry pushed to the south from Camp John Hay through Itogon and Dalupirip to the Tebbo Area and joined forces with elements of the 136th Infantry which had driven northward through agonizing terrain against bitter enemy resistance. The last strong point of enemy resistance was located on the right flank atop Skyline Ridge. Here a large body of enemy controlled the San Nicholas - Tebbo - Itogon Route. On 12 May the 136th Infantry launched a coordinated attack in volving a double envelopment of the enemy.positions and took the objective after one of the most severe battles of the en tire campaign. This, action';-broke the last organized enemy resistance in the Divis^oli Zton^.Y iJJl with the withdrawal of the 37th Division our forces were extended from the coast at Bacnotan southeastward through the mountains to San Nicholas, sixty-five miles away.
*********
In the rugged and tortuous terrain through which we op erated, the problems of communication, supply and evacuation, over a front extending for nearly sixty-five miles, required tireless energy and great ingenuity on the Dart of all our arms and services. The Battle for Baguio was won by a coor dination of efforts that, in the crucible of combat, fused the Division and its attachments into a capable and efficient team. There occurred during the course of the campaign cer tain operations which should be given prominence, and it is these highlights we wish to present at this time.
4 X H V* v ' ' BAYOYO GA1 V V\>LA^L6V. ^ \ if ( \ o\i I •)|» BADAYAN ID^OteM OF THE 33d D|V»S\ON/#t ||PANGPANG PUGO BAGTANGANN ^PGAMBANG J • THE BATTLE FOR BAGUIO PALINA ' * PHASE TD1 BAGUIO, SAN FERNANDO, PHILIPPINE IS. 2.7 APRIL - VJ KAAV J|LACONG LEBONG MILES I • BUGUIAS •
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SAN JACINTO SAN MANUEL 5. NICOLAS MAJ.GEN.P.YV.CLAR KSON DIV COMOR X X
ASST DIV COMDR OIV AQTV COMDR X X BRIG.GEN. DONALD J.MYERS BPIG.GEN. ALEXANDER G^-PAXTON
COL ANDQEW T. MCANSH
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123 IMF REGT 130 INF RFCGT 136INF QEGT COL. PAVUL C- SERFF COL. ARTHUR. S. COLLINS.JK COL. RAY E. CAVENEE
EX O EX O LT COL. WILLIAM W. KLEIN WAN LT.COL-O. AMNTON LT.COL.ARTHUR T. SAUSER
1ST BN 1ST BN 2O BN 3D BN 1ST 8N 2D BN 3D BN LT. COL.CHARLES F.COAJES IT-COL JA/VIE SH.HILTON MA.KS&NFORD I.WOLFF IY\AJ. C.V. TALBOTT,SC. NUU. J.B. FAULCOMER LT.COL. E. BLAKE MAX MILTON EHRLLCW LTCOL WNVWVHAYCOCK LTCOL IAH.HULBERTJJ*
O [33OQMCO1 LIOE# MEOBNI 1I08*EN6QBN"1 733DORDCO 33O MP |33ORCN TR| 1HQ COFEDETI CAPT. F.J.WAF?CLETT CAPT J.H.THORNTON LT COL D. SMITH LTCOL F- P KANE IT. J.C. CHRAPT MAJ. V.E.WARHER.JV-. CAPT. H. H.TAYLOR,JR. CAPT H.C.FTVIHGER * 4/ -
EX O #I" § •? , COL. RALPH MAC DONALD I ISB 5" * I 1 1 MAJ. FRANK W. FLOOD LTCOL JOHN E.RO0B PREPAQED BV G*3, 33O IHFANTRV DIVISION •4> Iff* ^ >0 MAY 1945 Ml PA- BN" 113 FA BM | 124 FA BN ZIO FA BN MAO. WILUAM |A. HADFIELD LTCOL- HAROLD O.CARLSON LT.COLTHOMASJ TRUXTON o M EX # X EX O EX O MAJ. LEE A. F?OOGER5 MAJ. EVERETT W. SHAPP MAO.DONALD T NULLED MA). JOHN WA0DE.N M OF EFFECTIVE COMBAT STRENGTH 123 INF 130 INF 136 INF
STRtHSTH, ONE EFPSCTIVE STRENGTH INF REST (EM) THESE FIGURES SHOW EFFECTIVE COMBAT STRENGTH DURING THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE LUZON CAMPAIGN
REPRODUCED BY 671st ENGR. TOPO. CO. SWPA MAY 1945 •,4^t COMBAT STRENGTH |!i%iTRY IfflGIMSNTS (EM OM) W 1 MAY, 1945
Present For Duty Effective Combat Strength 123 130 136 123 130 136 Unit Inf Inf Inf Inf Inf Inf
Hq & Hq Co 112 98 94 106 96 92 104 Co A 187 ' 130 119 130 129 116 127 Co B 187 131 96 121 130 93 120 Co C 187 115 86 121 114 86 119 Co D 152 137 125 106 136 123 103 Total 1st Bn 825 611 520 584 605 510 573
Hq & Hq Co 112 94 104 102 90 101 100 Co E 187 134 121 127 130 121 126 Co P 187 131 115 129 129 114 127 Co G 187 116 118 121 115 117 120 Co H 152 134 127 112 133 123 111 Total 2nd Bn 825 609 585 591 597 576 584
Hq & Hq Co 112 98 89 103 96 89 101 Co I 187 122 110 136 120 107 132 Co K 187 132 96 124 131 93 123 Co L 187 • 122 92 124 120 88 122 Co M 152 133 121 120 129 120 117 Total 3rd Bn 825 607 508 607 596 497 595
A-T Co 152 128 109 123 108 135 Cn Co 85 78 ^82. 77 80 84 Serv Co 96 98 97 112 103 Regtl Hq & Hq Co 91 85 • ... 84 104 108 Med Det 126 97 102 107 TOTAL REGT 1 3025 $^3^2125 2324 2276 2089 2289 \ EFFECTIVE COIfBAT STRENGTH OF RIFLE COMPANIES DEDUCTING "20" NOT ACTUALLY ON FRONT LINE POSITIONS 1 MAY, 1945
123 130 136 Inf Inf Inf Co A 109 96 107 Co B 110 73 100 Co C _94 _66 99 Total 313 23!? 306
Co E 110 101 106 Co F 109 94 107 Co G 97 100 Total 314 292 313
Co I 100 87 112 Co K 111 73 103 Co L 100 68 102 Total 311 22B 317
TOTAL REGT 938 755 936
v^: it . T;* im Vm ft 4 v.•$ r \, (15 Feb - H May) \: ft
OP*>ay ^ 123 130 136 108th 33d Inf. -Inf Inf 33d Engr Ren Regt Regt Rest D/A (C) Bn Tr Other Total
Killed in Action 59 103 HI 6 1 2 0 282 Died of Wounds 15 30 43' 0 0 2 1 91 Missing in Action 1 20 0 0 1 0 4 Wounded in Action Seriously 37 62 100 _ 1 204 Wounded in Action' ; Lightly- 191 330 313 20 22 884 Injured in Action Seriously- 2 5 0 0 0 Injured in Action Lightly 25 66 122 12 1 2 3 231 TOTAL 330 598 689 39 7 32 8 1703 • ; ^ ^
Emm CASUALTIES ACCUMLATBti.xg^ £ONE (15 FEB - 13 MAY)
123d 130th 136th Guerr- Zone Zone Zone Misc illas Total Killed in Action 2553 2866 2828 356 . 1137 9?fO Prisoners of far 36 63 14 28 145 2589 2929 2842 384 1141 9885
RATIOS Friendly KIA and D0T? to enemy KIA - 1:26.1 RATIO: Total Friendly casualties to total enemy KIA & POW - 1:5.8 "Will ya kindly get your mind offa Jackson Park ?"
OPERATIONS
REPRODUCED BY 671st ENGINEER TOPO. CO, SWPA MAY 1945 !- * J ik '&L£->N i -' o T i o N s
Back in those somber and melancholy days of the war when the belief prevailed among the multitude that the Japanese soldier was a superman, there crept into our military practi ces the "perimeter defense" doctrine and the "dig in before dark and don't move until daylight" dogma. To many in the New Guinea and Solomons campaigns this doctrine became gos pel. But even as the myth of Japanese superiority began to fade the more thoughtful began to realize that "perimeter de fense" was nothing more than all around security combined with cover and concealment—as old in principle as war itself and that the restraint on night movement was not dictated by the character of the enemy but rather by the density of the jungle.
the 33d Division we have always believed that we can operate at night and that there are many advantages to be gained by doing so. In the Toem-Maffin Bay-Sarmi areas of New Guinea and again on Morotai we learned through actual ex perience that night movement even in the jungle was not only possible but very often desirable. On Luzon we have had an /^T^ opportunity to conduct night operations and to compare their / effectiveness with similar operations conducted in daylight. - As a result, night operations are highly favored by our com bat commanders.
A captured Japanese document made the interesting com ment that American troops were "daylight" fighters and de clared that we stopped our tactical activities and dug in a few hours before darkness. The fol^lpwing examples tend to prove the document somewhat in error.
NARRATIVE On the night 6-7 March 1°45, the 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, reinforced, was motorized and moved from Damortis under cover of darkness 12 miles north to capture the city of Aringay and the tactically important Aringay bridge. The bridge was secured during darkness and at dawn^our forces met the enemy north of the river on the high•g^bund overlooking the bridge. The enemy strength was- one;coa^a^, and with its direct observationtdf. the 'objective ^uM^Kave repelled a daylight attack on the 1 ,bri,dg$ gajg'Hy^and could have destroyed U ¥ ' • • % ** V* W: 'KJH - 5 - flMPI Si li «j' 'i3 i,/1S nv'- i< fFfS it at will. The enefey^Is** off-balance and his sur prise permitted us to secure undamaged the 920 foot steel and concrete bridge. In two daylight attacks troops of a battalion of the 136th Infantry had been unsuccessful in assaulting a key hill east of Sison. To overcome the Japanese it was necessary to move a battalion into Dosition on the far side of the hill to exercise a flanking maneuver. Movement during daylight was not feasible due to excellent enemy observation. On the night of 5-6 March, 1945, the battalion moved to a favorable line of departure and attacked at dawn. The movement caught the enemy by surprise and the hill was captured in short or der.
On 6 March 1945, the 2d Battalion, 123d Infantry was harrassed by small groups of enemy while enroute to the line of departure for a major effort. T,rhen it became apparent that daylight movement would be too costly, the battalion moved during the night and covered the distance of 7000 yards to the line of departure without casualties. At dawn the battalion attacked and accomplished its mission. It was a relatively simple matter to send combat patrols later to mop up the scattered enemy groups in the rear area. Evacuation of wounded after our engagement on Hill 1802, near Labayug, provided an interesting night experience. S8at- tered enemy fire precluded the possibility of daylight evac uation with the result that evacuation was attempted at night. During the first night movement our litter bearers ran into a group of the enemy who were so surprised th?t they were eas ily killed or dispersed without a single casualty among our troops. On the night of 18 - 19 March 1945, 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, reinforced and motorized,moved from a position near Aringay into an assembly area 2000 yards south of the Bauang River and eight miles north of our front lines..There.it dis mounted and moved on foot under cover of darkness to secure the two concrete and steel bridges south of Bauang, the town of Bauang, and the high ground commanding it. It was known that the bridges were mined and the enemy was prepared to de- ! fend them from positions at the north end of the bridges and in the town itself. The presence of our troops was not dis covered by the enemy until the mines had disarmed and removed by an engineer detachment. They/themopened fire on our engineers but were quickly dispersed-ty >m^chine gun fire from our troops who were already in •position. Our forces
t* f ' "if 1
V\ \: % •} \ w* 18 B B ?* ,, * w .! i 1' if " * ia iajj| then advanced and soon after dawn secured the town. While the enemy was still demoralized the attack was continued against the high ground commanding the town, and by 10001 those objectives had been secured. Enemy resistance then stiffened, but our preliminary advantage was exploited and by 21 March all organized resistance in the area had been over- coae. The operation • throughout its entirety proceeded ac cording to plan. The night approach march was quiet, orderly and well regulated, and in spite of a long cross-country move by a reinforced battalion in single file, and the accompany ing maneuver to secure the bridges, the enemy was surprised. The full extent of the success of this night operation is re flected in the casualty totals for the battle. Enemy casual ties, 284 killed,, one captured. Our casualties,three killed, three wounded in action. Hill 3000 was an important terrain feature needed as a starting point for a foot assault.on Hill 4980, a high point on the route to Baguio. We had found it to be stoutly defend ed in our daylight attempts. During the night 31 March - 1 April, the 2d Battalion, 123d Infantry, began a night attack. Ey O63OI the assault elements had reached objectives on the summit and prominent noses of the hill. At dawn, totally un aware of the presence of our forces, the enemy came out of their caves and dugouts on the forward (south) slopes to man their positions and were quickly eliminated. On the reverse slope of the hill the enemy used caves as living quarters. Also unaware of the occupation of the hill by our troops, they emerged from their caves and began to prepare breakfast. They too were quickly eliminated. Here again the results in dicate how completely the enemy was surprised by a night move ment. In several instances we have found it practicable and relatively simple to occupy key terrain features at night with small groups, thus permitting the remainder of the force to follow during daylight hours covered by the fires of the first group. Such limited attacks at night have oaid tremen dous dividends» For reasons of security, displacements of our artillery ai'e normally made under dover of darkness \ never have they experienced any difficulty.
A great advantage other than surpris^ v&£js%&ccrued to us as the result of night operation*v.;' Bayl'^ht'Movement over rugged mountain terrain :j,s extremei"y;;';.f>mguing and has in some instances resulted in'failur§ ,:<8f^Me mission due to heat V,'' ' .'k V<\ , » W** 4 " m exhaustion.' Movement at night ' fesfjpesulted in more rapid progress, much smaller demand for water, and no heat casual ties. There have been occasions when, due to extremely rugged terrain and very dark nights, movement during the hours of darkness proved impracticable. In such cases advantage was taken of the half light of early morning and late evening. Night reconnaissance parties have been particularly suc cessful during moonlight nights when detailed reconnaissance was feasible, and we have learned that ambushes prepared at night are far more successful than those attempted by day.
CONCLUSIONS ; do not advocate night operations as a panacea for all L ills; rather we encourage its use only after a thoughtful an- alysis of each situation. In such an analysis the following. points seem worthy of consideration.
when night movement of friendly forces restricts the em- ployment of artillery and automatic weapons, and the attitude of the enemy is such that he will attack our positions, ?/e should not move at night outside of defensive installations. In such cases we can do more damage to the Jap by having him come to us where we can place prepared fires on him. (Exam ple; During the night of Aoril 9 - 10 an estimated 100 Japs attacked defensive position of Co F, 136 Infantry (nlus HMG section of Co H). Our position was wired with double apron fence, and the heavy machine guns and artillery had planned defensive fires. In the one attack against our position we killed 32 Japs without suffering a single casualty.)
When the attitude of the enemy is such that he moves about promiscuously but does not attack our positions, then the elements are all in our favor for ambush operations and we should ambush all trails, routes and avenues the Jap uses. (Example; During three nights of ambush operations (19 - 21 March 45) our forces in the Bauang-Naguilian area killed 104 Japs at a cost of one slightly wounded casualty to ourselves).
In circumstances where neither of th© above conditions exist it is definitely to our advantage^; to-&iroloy free move ment at night and to harass the enemy in his defensive posi- ' : ^ _ 8 - ""I.w' ;f? ^4-^^ f/ J*3 tions and to attack lJ jf
Regardless of situation and circumstance, nothing that we have learned leads us to believe that the employment of night movement, night patrolling and night attack in this theater differs in any way from the orthodox. We have found that the doctrine of night operations as outlined in our Field Manuals is sound and has worked exceedingly well on Luzon.
FUNDAMENTALS A brief review of the fundamentals may not be amiss.
A successful night operation depends largely UDon the maintenance of direction and control and the achievement of surprise. To the accomplishment of these ends certain fact ors may be noted.
(a) Fresh, well trained troops should be employed. (b) The objective must be *vell defined and easily rec ognized in the dark.
(c) Attacking units should be able to form opposite the objective and near it.
(d) Maneuvers are to be avoided5 each column must drive through without regard to other uhits. (e) Subordinate leaders should be given adequate oppor tunity for daylight reconnaissance, and routes of ^approach should be clearly defined and unmistakable in the dark. (f) Formations should be adopted that facilitate tijhe maintenance of direction and control; to thissend therskir* mish line is not desirable.
(g) A strong leader and a few resolute and determined men should be in the lead. A reliable man should bring up the rear. (h) Orders must be explicit and raillleaders must know the objective, compass directipn^ "^ornfetidn, exact mission, signal for the assault, a^tistm iri C'a&e"•'the' enemy is not sur prised, location of rallyirife action upon carrying the position and means of Identifying friendly troops. (i) Secrecy an v . v If^ %V\ ^ % £ VV»M \ vjS Tfi&~v $k ; » It ^ . '^4r;t '<'V, ^ IWV*UJ&I - 10 - ^ ARTILLERY APOWOGLES^RFR BILCMBOUOIH "Trigger, this is Stormy, I have a target for you, but you'll have to be patient." REPRODUCED BY 671st EN6R- TOPO. CO. SWPA MAY >945 You may never have heard of a "J" battery, but we have. In fact we have a "J" battery, and the "J" stands for Jap. This unique organization consists of four captured Japan ese 105mm howitzers, and is manned by officers and key nomcoms from elements of the Division Artillery plus a complement of officers and enlisted men from the Philippine Army. Captured German sights, shipped fron the States, were substituted for those in the guns. Captured Jap machine guns, rifles, and pistols furnish local protection for the guns, and captured radios provide communication with higher echelon. Ammunition abandoned by the Nips was plentiful and was fired back at them with no restriction placed on its expenditure. "J" battery has truly given the Japs a taste of their own medicine by fir- irig approximately 1500 rounds in general support missions. Our field artillery has performed the normal functions of artillery and performed them well. Direct and general support missions, including call and prepared fires, interdiction and harassing fires, and counterbattery fires have been rendered with 73,835 rounds fired at the enemy. Counterbattery fire has been noteworthy because of the type of Jap installations. As enemy field pieces -were normally in caves precision adjust ment was a necessity5 however, our artillery definitely des troyed 35 field pieces and damaged an additional 55» the com plete destruction of which could never be confirmed. To the infantry an artillery liaison rlene in the air means immediate help, and to the Japs in their holes, trouble. Jap shelling is a most unusual occurrence with a plane over head. Flying from daybreak until after dark over mountainous enemy terrain the liaison pilots of Division Artillery find targets, adjust fires, hover over friendly patrols reporting their location and condition, give warning of enemy movements, and drop supplies to isolated units. No one in the Division has been busier than the Pilots of the Division Artillery. Everyone has become air minded. Cub planes are used by com manders to reconnoiter terrain and by engineers to make route reconnaissances. Cubs even provide courier service twice daily to Corps Headquarters forty piXes to the south. During the first seventy days of the J,ujsoh campaign Division Artil lery pilots flew 2630 hourS(,, entirely over enemy ter rain and occasionally ur^ei^OIntense antiaircraft fire. One pilot was wounded and practically all planes have patched over bullet holes. During ^this operation twelve separate air , V'" - 11 - M H? ft. H : | U V -l strips were used, some hardly justifying the name, even for helicopters. Like the "J" Battery, the Division Artillery Fhoto Sec - tion is over and above T/0 & E. However, this section fills a long felt need not only for Division Artillery but for the entire Division. Equipped with obsolete rebuilt TC-20 cameras and improvised developing equipment this section of one offi cer and two enlisted men has proved invaluable. Low and high obliques and vertical photographs were taken for projected road routes for the engineers, terrain studies preceeding op erations for the infantry commanders and the general staff, in addition to missions for the artillery. Fanned, trained, and equipped within the artillery, this section is able to take, develop and air drop requested photos to friendly troops within three hours. During the current operation from 15 February to 20 April forty photographic missions were flown, over 1000 shots were taken and some 74-00 prints were distri buted. All missions were over enemy terrain and often at al titudes as low as 300 feet. The Division Artillery has overcome many difficulties in order to render close support to the infantry. On occasion deception has been gained by displacing forward at night ^ith the substitution of trucks for slow, noisy tractors, and by camouflaging gun sections as trailers and filtering them into normal road traffic in daylight. With the strongest concen tration of Jap artillery yet encountered in Northern Luzon facing our troops from the high ground across the Rasario plain, nightly shelling became SOP, and enemy snipers and in filtrators have been a constant menace. By changing positions during the night and by digging in and camouflaging positions these threats ,,rere minimized. For the battalions, constant displacement meant new check points for the survey crews. Survey control was constantly up with the infantry forward elements and the sight of a transit outlined against the sky, often forward of our pa trols, was not uncommon. The Japs, masters of concealment, had their foxholes on the narrow ridge lines and their caves and tunnels on the crests or on reverse slopes. Many of their artillery positions were in tunnels with entrances from the reverse slope and only a small aperture for the tube on the forward slope. Normally only:?"flash" observation was avail able to our ground and air o^servefs^ Yet precision adjust ment on these targets was'f^quir.^^y and a change of elevation of one mil wasted a round ""'ovelr the ridge or dropped it dan gerously close to our own troops. Precision firing was the 12 n |4 ^ V. % I.-' ii-1 f:^"V%P 1 '"l rule ins eQc.ceiJifiar^lri many situations. That the Division Artillery has accomplished its mission is evidenced by the statement of a Japanese prisoner of war; "Your artillery falls upon us like the rain," op * V''1 * v> " u AMMUNITION fXPCNDED..73,835 ROUNDS MILES OF WIRE LAID |437 FIELD PIECES DESTROYED... 35 A ^1'' FIELD PIECES DAMAGED ....55 M©1s * MORTARS DESTROYED..45 AMMO DUMPS DESTROYED-63 VEHICLES DESTROYED.....40 . *. -Hftv * / *.-Vrv TUNNELS^SEALED 36 \ V:^ \sJ Xitko btf 9/4 Cntfi/ier'i Q..7 9fqi RANGES Kj> £40 H 90 MM 8" HOW 155 H EFFECW ONE BTRY 7 FIRING OPEN SHEAF litho bif 9N Ctu/mct'i O J. Wq. Cc. I u I M i m "Maybe the Infantry has some extra "K" rations... They'll be along in a minute." ENGINEERS REPRODUCED BY 671st ENGINEER TOPO. CO., SWPA MAY 194 An army travels on its stomach. "rith its great demands for fuel for vehicles and ammunition for guns the army of to day has many more mouths to feed than when Napoleon uttered that axiom. The answer to the problem is good roads, and it is the job of our engineers to build them. The story of our North Luzon campaign is largely "the story of supply and of the men who furnished the means for that supply. The magnitude of the task can be realized only by those who have seen the terrain through and over which roads have been built. Viewing a stretch of the road our en gineers built on HILL 3000, the Commanding General, Sixth Army, summed it up in one word, "Incredible!". The 108 Engineer Combat Battalion entered the Luzon Cam paign with a personnel shortage of 10# and an equipment short age of 20%, The amount of work that faced it was staggering, so the utmost use was made of civilian labor to relieve en gineer personnel for more pressing tasks. Our engineers repaired damaged roads and bridges 5 they built new roads and new bridges; they operated gravel pits and stone crushers. They performed the preliminary reconnaissance for all operations, securing and conoiling information oQi roads, bridges, terrain and engineer materials available bey ond our lines. They sent engineer detachments with many in fantry oatrols deep into enemy-held territory. They operated water points, filtering & chlorinating our water. They built cub strips in forward areas for the use of artillery liaison planes and the evacuation of battle casualties. They removed enemy mine fields and demolitions. They built coffins, traf fic control signs and Derformed many other odd jobs. But this is not all they did. They also fought. f A Japanese mine field, tactically located on the '.Fennon Road near Camp Three and covered fire, held up our advance toward Baguio. An engin^f^^^|lil attempted to re move the mines but was driven enemy fire. Infantry assistance was not immediat^^^^'llibl^ ' so the detail again moved forward using its o%i^ifIemen *"and a captured Jap knee mortar for protectijpifl3 This^time, without cover and under direct observati^a.f- ?ind ,f"ire t>f the enemy, the detail removed 46 Type 93 land mines and loo pounds of RDX. Then the infan-$ try advance continued; J - 14 - To secure intactt%^wb concrete and steel bridges span ning the Baaiang Rive®*was essential to our islan to push rapid-- ly up the ll^gftilfan Road toward Baguio. It was known that these bridges were mined and that the enemy occupied posi tions Sorth of the river that commanded the bridges and their approaches. In a night operation an infantry battalion, pre- ceeded by a platoon of combat engineers and a mine and explo sives detection detachment, moved to the south bank of the river. The infantry forded the river below the bridges to attack the town of Bauang from the west. The engineers ad vanced to the bridges and one detail removed approximately 400 pounds of explosives from the stringers of the south span while a second detail moved across to the far abutment of the north span. It had located and removed the last of two 100- kilogram bombs when it was fired unon at point blank range, by enemy machine guns and riflemen. One engineer was killed but the attack was repulsed by machine gun fire from the engineer platoon which was already in position. The bridges were se cured undamaged. These are but two of many instances of engineer work being done under fire. Engineers worked with and sometimes in advance of the infantry and were subjected frequently to enemy mortar, machine gun and rifle fire, often relying upon their own weapons for defense. The measure of courageous service rendered by the men of our engineer battalion in the face of enemy action is indi cated to some extent by the awards and "decorations made to them thus far in the Luzon Campaign: six Silver Stars, '"twe lve Bronze Stars and four Purple Hearts. But the true mea sure of this service may better be found in the magnificient respect and admiration of the infantryman for the combat en gineer. Until the fighting began few of us realized why the word "Combat" was included in the designation "108 Engineer Com bat Battalion." Nov; we know. :3 Attached map & chart indicate the,?^ope of 108 Engineer functions in the Luzon campaign.': LlOANS .BAYOYO ©AT i-»iA£4g, 8ADAYAN PUGO &AGTANGAK% fj»6AM8ANG BAGU10, SAN FERNANDO, PHILIPPINE IS Jk LACONG IEBONG BACNO I • BU&UIAS MILES 1 YARDS LIPAY ooo 2000 3000 4000 Sooo RtPARED BV AC OF 5 0*3 M BULALA SAN JUAN AAASI p AMCJNTOC APUNAN .*GOSARAN OF THE 108th. ENGINEERS 20 BRIDGES CONSTRUCTED 773 LIN haiohts BUNGALO PLACE SAN FERNAND* fcSAN ("16, FEB.- I, MAY 45 Ulutab SAN FERNANDO 15 BRIDGES REPAIRED s 803 LIN. FT. / V 7\ K.APANGAN —jpPAUNTOCAMG 35 BYPASSES CONSTRUCTED NAGUILIAN TUBLAY NAGUIIJ^A CONSTRUCTED 57.9 Ml BAUANG TA&IO OAKLAN ROADS MAINTAINED 165.1 Ml SALAT \tfsABLAN ALOT II CUB AIRSTRIPS CONSTRUCT PANASAN (NTlCAX TAklAN SA COPSplace IQUIOENG GRAVEL HAULED .TRINIDAD 6ALIAN0 22 WATER POINTS 3,870,508 GALS PlNQUE ^AANEA 14 MINE FIELDS REMOVED TOTALING 234 MINES \ 714 LBS. OF EXPLOSIVES CAMP JOHN COBOOY APMi .TUBA V HAY ARINGAY iRrzAL PALINO BM4e,E 1TOGON BAG01I KAYAPA BAN&g MT. SANTO TOMAS^ SAMOYAO tf -WAGON BALAN ANDOLOR CNPOLITAN DAOVJPAN MACA /• P1NGGAN INABA AN YABUAH StMAN i ban bantaik) DAMORTIS PADCAL|» \ I \ r ONLOG DONGON \u - LAWtCAN IPINIOWAN ESP€RANZA IABON TYOAA TEWING AURINGAN ilonq LUBANG DAY NAT ANSAGA 8AHNIT BAYUG 7 LONE STAR -A,. MINE, N FABIAN ALtBENG POZORRUBIO VALOEI S. \S»DORO BOAABU AYA JACINTO SAN MANUEL SAN NICOLAS Damnedest plasma I ever saw REPRODUCED BY 671st ENGR. TOPO. CO. SWPA MAY 1945 God and the Doctor are often forgotten except in time of need. Back in our training days the medics were a necessary evil, used only to ruffle our composures with shots and in oculations and periodic short arm inspections. The only time we ever saw an aid man was when he cricked a blistered foot at the end of a long hike. In those days we said some pretty rough things about the."pillrollers." But then came combat and we awakened to a new sense of values regarding many things, ^/e saw the aid man administer ing blood plasma under fire. T?e saw the litter bearer scorn the enemy and sometimes become a litter case himself. We saw the medic gently caring for his wounded, and on occasions we saw him fight like hell to protect them. Of the 126 men composing the medical detachment,136 Inf, six were killed in action and 27 wounded. Ten percent of the total personnel of our regimental medical detachments have be come battle casualties. During much of the Luzon campaign the Division front has extended for more than fifty air miles and many more road miles. For this reason two collecting companies were rein forced with surgeons from the clearing company5 and each com pany operated 25-bed stations. This resulted in the giving of definitive treatment within a short period of time. A recent development has been the evacuation of wounded by air. Instead of long, rough ambulance hauls, smooth,soeedy evacuation is accomplished by the use of L-5 planes which can land and take off from a 1200-foot runway. The x'/ounded are flown directly from the clearing station to medical installa tions in the rear. During the period from 1$ February to 1 May more than 1000 battle casualties were evacuated by air. This saved time and lives and meant less discomfort to the wounded. Company aid men, litter bearers, ambulance drivers, aid collecting,clearing station personnel and battalion headquar ters personnel have all had a hand in caring; x';f,6r, the 3869 patients who have received taedical care dur,i'hg-: the^period 15 February -11 May. Of this number1323 wer%w©uhd,ed'in action, 265 injured in action and 2281 suffered froi% i-lfness. Of a total of 1323 wounded in %|iB%:^during this-period only 43, or 3.3 percent, died of wounds within Division eche lons. An additional thirty-five, or 2.9 percent, died after being evacuated beyond Division. In other words, approximate ly 94 of every 100 men wounded in action survived,and of these 75 have or will return to duty. There have been no deaths among the 265 injured in action. We have, indeed, awakened to a new sense of values. In many of our line companies the men make up a monthly purse to give their aid men "combat r>ay" equal to their own. If you want an opinion on our medics, ask the front line soldier -- he remembers both God and the medic. NUMBER AND TYPES QF-CASfmjt 15 Feb, -^llkay '194i) • V'», y ••• V.^ t/:V ^ V V' "n ' * k ** ' *' "* i%\. , ' TOTAL BATTLE IS"6^221 WIA IIA CASUALTIES Gunshot Wounds 187 29 522 738 Mortar & Shell Fragment bounds 83 7 421 511 Bayonet •& Knife Wounds 2 9 11 Grenade Frag ment wounds 11 4 227 242 Aerial Bomb Wounds 3 2 11 .16 Land Mines & Booby Traps 2 1 26 29 Concussions 3 64 67 Miscellaneous Injuries 2 265 267 KIA, Cause Unknown 9 9 TOTAL 302 43 1280 265 1890 Note; DOW total represents only deaths resulting from wounds while under 33d Division Medical care. Figures include attached and Divisional Units. COMMUNICATIONS I } w - wV^> •%/ Headquarters wants to know how the weather is, sir" REPRODUCED BY 671st ENGINEER TOPO. CO., SWPA MAY 19- V it h 'V\ SIGNAL C'O M MUNICATION "Congress makes a general, but he is not a Commanding General until we put a telephone in his hand." Putting 'tele phones into commanders' hands on a Division front as extended as ours has been a real problem. Our signal and communications personnel have answered the problem, but in doing so they laid 124 2i--ton truck loads or 620,270 pounds or 4-583 miles of wire,and that's a lot of wire. But to appreciate the problem, consider the tactical si tuation. The road distance between Division Headquarters and a regimental command post has at times exceeded forty miles. In one instance an artillery battery was thirty-four miles from its fire direction center. Using the Staff Officers Field Manual as a guide and, for sake of argument, putting all the infantry battalions of a division on the line, the maxi mum frontage in an attack would be 9000 yards. But our front hss at times measured more than 90,000 yards. The use of field expedients has been the rule father than the exception. Maximum use of line boosters, employing wire in duplicate strands instead of single, "borrowing" open wire circuits, and the use of physical voice relays were all a part of the job. But the most important item of all was laying and maintaining wire night and day as we never did before. Another communications highlight was the use of pigeons* Pigeons carried over 550 messages and map overlays. Upon re turn from long range patrols, soldiers have said • they would rather carry a pigeon instead of the radio set. They will al so tell you that the pigeons "get the message through," and that is a fact, because in 550 tries not one message has fail ed to get through. The importance of signal communications iinjnan Infantry Division is indicated by the T/0, for one out of every ten men in the Division has signal communications as his assigned duty* The following chart and map indicate the scope of our signal activities. -• 18" - UMRIUAIUJ SADAYAN K PANGPAN 33D INFANTRY DIVISION WIRE NET BAGTANGAXX'*4 JPG^MGANG •M 5 APRIL. 1915 PALINA / BAGUlO, SAN FERNANDO, PHILIPPINE IS. M LACONG OTAN I • BU&UIAS C? &AO MILES YARDB P LIPAY tOO O O IOOO ZooO 3000 5000 SOOO FCOO • 70O0 8000 90oo PREPARED BV A C OF 5 G-3 9 APRIL IQ45 AMLlAAAY m BULALA SAN JUAN HAKDLED BY 1^33D DIVISION MESSAGE CENTE * '5 *EB7fe 6 MAY AMONTOC UV, I 1945 APUNAN _«0>USA&AN MOTOR FERNANDO •LUTAB SAN FERN AND \ <»BAG airplane KAPAHGAN " " "TPPAUNTOCANG. TELETYPE wM /sv \ • TUBLAV RADIO BAUAN6 BURGOS 5AIAT «\ N G SAB1 TELEGRAPH A LOT COP: PLACE TELEPHONE 'ESI 123 ING Q GAUANO GUNNER E 1108" BA3UIO t.Q INGAY PIGEON TOTAL 52794*-? * DIV HO ONLY TOTALS DO NOT INCLUDE THE MANY THOUSANDS HANOLEO BY ARTY, iWP RE©TS «*"*'SEPARATE UNITS AOOO svlXl!2S '•CAMP 3 TE^BO F 33 ~SL5S PADCALJB \ I \ TONLOG LAWICAN DAN\ORTtS EAC^Y ' — <' I pOSARIO IPINLOWAN cN EKjiSO . [±1694 73o E5PERANZA TVOAA , RABOM STA ROSA LOND LOO JB^NG DAY NAT ISO \ v SAPINIT V L ABA YDO SAN FAblAN &I66 INTO NG ALDAN SAN MANUEL SV y*J 4 - •" •; i, 4,. & * * This ain't no General Hospital,! ain't no nurse and I ain't goin' to no party!" Ti/J SWITCHBOARD THE A S S"A 8 W I f C'fff 0 A B D —' «,g A3 Perhaps you have never carried a BD-7T switchboard (it weighs 52 pounds). But at some time you must have seen some soldier struggling through the surf or scrambling across coun try laden down with one - in addition to field equipment. In any event, a member of the 33d Signal Company recog nized the problem and did something about it. He developed a switchboard that would do the job of the BD-71, but which was much smaller and lighter. The acid test in the use of the board came during the Luzon Campaign, because here we were continually confronted with the problem of hand carry to get equipment forward. The Assault Switchboard weighs 2 3/4 pounds and is small enough to be carried in a canvas dispatch case, being but 11 inches long, inches wide and 1 3/4- inches thick. It is de signed to accommodate six parties and so is ideal for battaEton use. Toggle switches and neon lamps are used to replace cords drops and jacks, but it can be used without lamps. It has no audible signal and is not adapted for use with headset and chest phone. But on the move the operator forgets these dis advantages when faced with the bulk and weight of the BD - 71* Phantom and simplex circuits may be used by employing external coils. The board may be used with sound power tele phones, in which case it operates without lamps. The assault switchboard is not intended as a complete substitute for the BD-71, but to supply the need of a switch board until the tactical situation permits the heavier board to be brought forward. On that basis, two of the boards were issued to each infantry and artillery battalion. Our infantry battalions have used it whenever displacing forward and in any situation where compactness and light weight are of primary importance. 1ITherever the situation has called for the mass ing of mortar fires the heavy weapons companies have employed the board with great success. Our artillery battalions have also used it to bring together forward observer lines for a single lead into the fire direction center. These are commer^t§ ?pfr!-corMrunicatiorifro'o^i^-cers in the Division; 11 f ^ ^ ; -.c; . y|. ^ fja |" J / , V ,, A • p' ,fIn using the sMix switchboard with a mor- tar platoon we have connected each observer to his mortar sec- - 19 - tion through the board. Three fire missions could then be carried on simultaneously. In many cases it was desirable to mass the fire of all sections on o^e target5 in such cases all sections were connected with the bblervfr: wha was to direct the mission and the other observers were disconnected^,.. "Frequently the heavy weapons company commander or the mortar pi?toon leader was connected to the board and monitor ed fire missions modifying them as he desired." "It is practicable at times to bring the fires of all mor tar platoons in the regiment on a single target. In an exper iment, a circuit was laid from a BD-72 switchboard to the as sault board of each mortar platoon. The results were excel lent in that centralized fire control was established for all the mortars." "We have put the board to practical use in establishing night perimeters. To promote better control the commander divided his perimeter into sectors and ran a line from each sector into an assault board. This system was found to be a great improvement over the former practice of using party lines." The assault switchboard is a very simple device, that fulfills our needs, and like most simple devices it works. Following are an illustrative and circuit diagram of the assault switchboard. - 20 - T. v t£ •&/&*$*$> '•'•>fcr*;, • -..^vt.*; V- •.'>'•'.v?' '. • • CIRCUIT DIAGRAM OF ASSAULT SWITCHBOARD Operator's Fhone LM-1 LM-2 LM-4 R-1 R-2 R-3 R-4 R-5 R-6 One Sile of Each Line Comnnn 1-2 2-3 3-4 5-6 1-3 2-4 3-5 4-6 -1-4 3-6 1-5 1-6 One Side of Incoming Lines WOW, Talk about close air support! REPRODUCED BY 671st ENGINEER TOPO. CO., SWPA MAY 1945 AIR SUPPORT Air support played an important part in our Luzon cam paign. The success of the first few strikes overcame our na tural reluctance to employ an unfamiliar weaaon; OCir. comman ders now rely upon the air as a powerful supporting arm. We have used air support to harass and demoralize the enemy as well as destroy him and his supplies. Here are three examples of its effectiveness: The 2d Battalion, 123d Infantry was ordered to attack and seize Hill 3000. During the period 27 March - 31 March, six air strikes were executed against the Hill 3000 area. A total of 85 planes dropped 52.2 tons of bombs and made numerous strafing runs over the target. Ground observers and attacking troops testified to the great effectiveness of the strikes. Official G-2 reports show that the 2d Battalion and its sup porting arms killed a total of 334 enemy during the period 21 March - 1 April. Of these, 36£ percent were killed by infantry troops, 43£ percent by artillery, and 20 percent by air sup port. It is difficult if not impossible to distinguish between enemy killed by air and those killed by artillery; however, it is believed these percentages are not far wrong. During the period 3-7 April, the 2d Battalion, 129th Infantry had made several attempts to take the high ground overlooking Salat, but each attack, including a night raid, was repulsed with heavy casualties. On the morning of 7 April 24 P-38s dropped 18 tons of bombs and 1980 gallons of Napalm on the hill. On completion of the strike the infantry jumped off for the attack and occupied the hill without opposition. The company commander later reported that the Japs, apparently unaware of his units' oresignce on the hill, came out of the deep caves in which they had taken refuge and were wiped out by our troops. The 3^ Battalion 130th Infantry had the mission of at- . tacking and seizing the town of Bauang, the Bauang River brid ges, and the hills surrounding the town. The enemy occupied positions from which he could defend all those objecti\Q|i and was capable of reinforcing his forces from garriso!#W% San Fernando and Baguio. To prevent any enemy r^n|wlg%elp| a squadron of planes was placed on air alert t$9\ - 21 - Just after dawn, having seized the bridges. and occupied the town, the troops began the attachoti the surrounding high ground. As the atmroach march began the planes, as they had been instructed,buzzed the ground troops and stunted for their benefit. Later, many men stated the sight of our planes in the air encouraged our forces even as they must have demoral ized the enemy. The attack progressed according to plan and by 104-5 the first phase of the operation was accomplished. Trith our planes in the sir the enemy made no attempt to reinforce the garrison or to withdraw along the highway0, instead they withdrew into the hills where they were bombed and strafed. Later a patrol counted over 100 dead Japs in this area. The presence of num erous tail assembly fragments confirmed that these Japs were killed by air. Shortly after we took Baguio Artillery Liaison Pilots discovered many concentrations of Japs and installations along the Mountain Trail ftforth of Baguio. It was decided the Air Corps could effectively deal with this target, and that the use of a Cub plane to guide the planes to the target area and to mark the target would be more efficient than the normal method of marking with artillery smoke. The Support Air Farty officer in the Cub was able to see the enemy and pick out the installations exactly. He then dropped Australian white phos phorus grenades which explode on impact, thus marking the tar get and pin-pointing it. This method enabled the strikes to be placed on targets of opportunity and saved time by elimina ting the artillery adjustment. It has worked with complete success, and we believe it worthy of future use and improve ment. The Air Corps has flown both close and general support missions for the Division in the Luzon campaign. The results were not always immediately obtainablej however, when Baguio and the Camp John Hay area were finally captured patrols con tinuously reported finding many bodies of Japs killed by artil lery and air support. This Division has employed air support not only to kill the enemy and destroy his supplies, but also to > disrupt his lines of communication and to demoralize him. The effect of our »ir strikes is clearly illustrated by two entries taken from a diary belonging to a dead Jap who was «member of the Baguio Defense Force, ^ "Formation of six planes attacked us at noon. Six men r» r, I', vj Fl p p from our unit and two men from Intellijgfrjqf &;pjed,?•, <4>|ij ,f.•; r./ V \ .' ' ,r V«b are under daily air strikes and rftmrd S^fca't^iHly* v decreasing. Life is harder to endure than death, btft?5hj fight to the bitter end--." Last entry» ^ v , p v. >. u a n I Va V,\i r V „ T .- S. "•• The following map and charts indicate air surnjort acti vity during a tyoical month. - 23 - MONTH OF APRIL, 1945 E^CNO ;#TSYMBOL INDICATES NUMBER \ SAN JUAN J \» K /o( SOQT1E5 BOMB TONNAGE m AMONTOC <-'125 INF US INF H- «+H-•+*+*4-•+ nun 150 INF H- H- H- 30 INF nt"3f^2T0HS —7-t 136 INF 136 INF II J I Y 225 TONS special H- •+ •+ «4 •+ strikes II t I t X 287 TONS msk EACH SYMBOL* 50 SORTIES pJ TOTALMIO6 SORTIES EACH SYMBOL =50 TONS TOTAL 955 TONS NAPALM (GALLONS) © 23430 GAL 156 INF SPECIAL STRIKES DAY NAT ANSAGA EACH symbol lOOO GAL TOTAL *\9 46Q ©At PROVISIONAL I "She just found out she ain't on the T/O" REPRODUCED BY 67lsf ENGR. TOPO. CO. SWPA MAY 1945 X&A W* $$ M ^ m>.•** A^ m M # .& *?* 4 If# §.>, A'.;/ PROVIS IONAL PACK An army can move no faster than its supplies can be pushed forward. In modern warfare supply is dependent large ly on a good road net. The terrain over which the Division has operated in the Luzon Campaign has been extremely mountainous and character**' ized by steep, wooded trails impassable to vehicles. Due to the shortage of civilian carriers and the fact that to util ize combat troops as porters tends to defeat their purpose, a provisional pack train was organized to substitute for hand carry. There were no tables of organization or equipment within the Division for such a unit, therefore improvisation was necessary. The Division Chemical Warfare Officer volunteered for and was charged with the organization and development of the unit. A canvas of the Division was made for men exper ienced as horsemen or packers with the result that a nucleus of five experienced men was procured. \ A wide and extensive search was necessary to find suita ble animals. Many reports turned out to be false alarms, some of the equipment reported proved to be too mutilated to be of value, and many of the horses turned out to be Filipino ponies. But by following up reports from patrols, civilians and liaison pilots the pack train began to accumulate a siz able herd of horses and much salvaged enemy equipment. The horses were coralled in pasture lands near Cataguin*. tingan, and the work of treating and conditioning began. Many of the animals had bad sores, cuts, and bruises, and all were in poor condition as a result of long neglect. An officer of the Veterinary Corps was assigned to the Division and treat ment was begun. Veterinary supplies and medicines were not available, however normal supplies obtained from the Medical Battalion were used very successfully. A blacksmith set, the only item secured through normal channels, was obtained from the Quartermaster and all animals were shod with captured Jap shoes and nails. Captured Japanese pack saddles and halters were repaired and made ready for use with improvised saddlers' equipment. jff ,5: 3 m The pack train was initially o^ganTi^d Jlvfe®* tsrOr sections with 10 horses in each section. .iCurrantl#'.^^,'d^risi's'tS operating sections of 12 horses each,1 "anelvi Ctrl-ining''ser*^ - 24 - of an additional 12 horses. The section leaders and £ packers per section are soldiers while the horse leaders are all ci vilian Igorot men who are familiar with the mountainous ter rain. Here are some typical missions'of the pack trains On 24 April, in order to supply elements of the 123d Infantry advancing on Mount Calugong, the train carried 418 rounds of 8lmm mortar ammunition weighing 5016 pounds, 40 cans of water weighing 2200 pounds, 3 cases of cal. .30 am munition weighing 324 pounds, 4 8lmm mortars weighing 480 pounds, and a mixed load of mortar sights, shoes, picks, sand bags, and mail. This haul up a steep, winding trail inmassa- ble to vehicles was made without incident. When the decision was made to evacuate Company B, 136th Infantry from positions in the vicinity of Tebbo the tactical situation was such that the evacuation could be executed with safety only under cover of darkness. There were no roads, and movement by foot on the narrow precipitous trail was diffi cult even by daylight. Soon after nightfall on 1 May, one section of the train loaded with 2 8lmm mortars and 60 rounds of ammunition, 2 heavy machine guns, 2 light machine guns, 2 60mm mortars and miscellaneous ammunition, gear and spare parts chests, began the tortuous descent. Four horses fell off a sheer cliff; one was killed but the others were saved and their loads salvaged. Before daylight the evacuation of all personnel and supplies was completed. In the Tebbo area the terrain is such that many enemy positions were defiladed from artillery fire. Yet heavy sup porting fires were needed. To supply this need it was plan ned to move in a 4.2" Chemical Mortar Platoon. Again roads were non-existent and the weights involved made a hand carry out of the question. The pack train was called on as the only means of transportation, and on 7 May it succeeded in moving two complete mortars, each weighing 298 pounds, 200 rounds of ammunition weighing 5,000 pounds and miscellaneous equipment into position. It has been found by experience that a horse can pack two hundred pounds very successfully. Horses are very quiet on the march and are not bothered by gunfire or artillery. The animals can, to a large extent, forage off the country if Bermuda grass or native cane is available, but nir^e pounds of oats per day for each horse must be provided to keep the ani mals in good health. •: - 25 - .A',-, %*i:S " ' • Several observations and conclusions wa«%.ihade; the use of our pack train. w„ J.** $ At least .the night before the pack is to be mal^J^Jne commander of the pack, train must know the weight and composi tion of the load. He must also know where the load is to. be picked up and where and when it is to be delivered. This is the old story of prior planning paying off. If possible, a t>rior route reconnaissance should be made by a member of the pack train to determine what obstacles, such as low hanging branches and telephone wires will have to be removed, and what obstacles such as rocks and steep slip pery slopes will have to be by-passed. If the tactical situation permits, the pack train, once it begins movement should never be halted for more than a very short time as the animals tire very quickly when stand ing with a load. Also a halted pack train makes a very ex cellent target for enemy artillery, mortars or snipers. Our experience with the Provisional Pack Train has again demonstrated that necessity is the mother of invention. How ever difficult the oroblem may at first:appear, determination and ingenuity can generally find a solution. m ' '• ,. • - ' <$ .m •is * c - 26 - 'V- . 1 fOD»CED BY 671st ENGR. TOPO. CO. SWPA MAY 1945 One section of the pack train at work INFANTRY (T) SCOUT REPRODUCED BY 671st ENGR- TOPO. CO. SWPA MAY 1945 vV L : \ £ isu |£ . . A. • " ^ IN F A W TRY SCOUT DOGS Have you ever heard of a dog that doesn't bark? Or of one that doesn't sniff malevolently at every tree and then add injury to insult? Well, we have? several of them. They are Infantry Scout Dogs and we would like to tell you some thing about them. During the period from 5 March through 1 May the men and dogs of the 39th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon attached to 'this Division participated in over eighty combat missions with enemy contact on more than forty occasions. Although 97 Japs were killed by these patrols our own casualties -'fere one kil led, one wounded. Here are some examples of their work: On 15 March, while on patrol with elements of Co I, 136th Infantry T/5 Menking's dog, Priskie, alerted on an enemy pos ition, The patrol leader asked Menking to lead the patrol around the enemy for a flank attack. Friskie alerted on an other group of Japs and an ambush was avoided. Artillery fire was placed on the area and the patrol moved in. Enemy cas ualties were 33 killed; our casualties, none. On 11 March while on patrol with the I & R Platoon, 136th Infantry T/5 Cleary's dog, Pal, alerted a number of times and the six-man reconnaissance natrol was able in each case to avoid the enemy and complete the reconnaissance mission suc cessfully. On 16 March, while on patrol with elements of Company F, 136th Infantry T/5 Elrod's dog, Chief, alerted-and one Jap was killed. A few moments later he alerted again and four more Japs were killed. On 18 March,while on perimeter guard with Anti-Tank Com pany, 136th Infantry T/5 Sirs' dog, Butch, alerted on three Japs approaching from the rear. Sims killed one Jap and the others fled. On 24 March, while on patrol with elements 123d Infantry T/5 Elrod's dog, Chief, alerted on thfc-ee*separ ate occasions and ten Japs were killed. On 4 April, while on patrol with elemliits'df 2d Battal ion, 123d Infantry Sgt. Brown's dog, Rii^,Jmd 'Sg.t. Rhodes' dog - 27 - Teddy, alerted. Four Japs were surprised and killed. On 1 May, while on patrol r^ith elements of Company K, 123d Infantry T/5 Peto's dog, Bobin, alerted and nine Japs were killed. These are but a few of the cases in which scout dogs were of invaluable assistance to infantry patrols. There were many cases in which patrols were saved from ambush by the timely warning of a dog, and in many instances dogs lo cated well concealed supply and ammunition dutiros. A dog's senses of smell and hearing are more than eight times as acute as those of a human being. Consequently he is able to detect the presence of others long before a person can. This is especially true when visibility is restricted, A scout dog is trained to alert when he senses the presence of human beings other than those in his party. And his hand ler is able to interpret that alert. Men operating on patrols in enemy territory realize that they can seldom expect to get the first shot. The Jap from his concealed position can detect the "lovement of our patrols and lie in wait. But a good scout dog to a large measure nullifies this advantage. The confidence of our patrols in their scout dogs was such that the great tension on our men was tremendously reduced with a consequent lessening of fa tigue and a corresponding increase in the areas covered. Both the scout dog and his handler are carefully selec ted for this job. Each separately undergoes a long and in tense period of training and then the handler is assigned his dog and the two become a team. After they have worked toge ther for several months their teamwork develops to the point that they are ready for combat. On patrol this team forms the point. The handler must stand in order to observe his dogs reactions, and through their long association he is able, from those reactions and from the direction of the wind, to determine the approximate location of the enemy. He then calls up the patrol scouts who investigate the area he points out. The handler1£^entire attention is concentrated on his dog, and he is dependent for fire support upon the automatic fire of the patrol scout. He and his dog are the enemy's prime target and,- if the wind is wrong and the dog cannot first detect the enemy's presence, they make an easy target. - 28 - Under some circumstances even after the dog alerts the patrol has difficulty locating the enemy, and the handler, realizing the danger to himself, must work his dog forward until the location is definite. The following action is typical; An enemy machine gun position menaced our pack train sutmly route. On 16 April a combat patrol from the 3d Battalion 123d Infantry was sent out to locate and destroy the gun. T/5 Willis Knisely and his dog, Danny, were in the lead. Danny alerted. Somewhere ahead was the machine gun but the members of his patrol could not locate it. The dog was signalled forward and again he alerted. Still the enemy could not be found. Again they ad vanced and Knisely located and pointed out the gun. Knisely was killed but three Japs were also killed and the gun was destroyed. Dogs alert on all human beings, not on the enemy alone, and therefore they cannot be used in congested areas. But this alerting on friend as well as foe may prevent friendly patrols from firing on each other. A dog will not alert on a dead body even if it has been dead for only a few hours, but it will alert on areas recently vacated by the enemy. This enables patrols to locate ^ell camouflaged and concealed am munition and supply dumps. Because of the great sensivity of their ears dogs cannot stand the concussion caused by heavy artillery, 4.2 mortar fire and bombings. One dog on duty with Comoany B, 136th In fantry was so shell shocked by the explosion of a bomb which landed in the bivouac area that he is of no more value as a scout dog. Our patrols have operated through extremely rugged ter rain and we have learned that scout dogs tire as quickly as our men. Unlike a man, a dog will not drive himself when ex hausted 5 he just quits work. For that reason it has been found advisable on patrols of long duration to use two scout teams; one works while the other rests. Dogs should be withdrawn from active duty every two months for rest and rehabilitation. They relish C rations no- more than we do, and being carnivorous animals require a fresh meat diet to restore their vitality. Our practice has been to assign dog teams to the front line units most actively engaged in natrolling. The greatest efficiency is promoted when dogs are permitted to work with - 29 - 'S the same unit for a period of time, an reason chan- ges are made only when necessary. We have made it a policy to follow the suggestions and recommendations of the Scout Dog Platoon Leader and of the dog handlers. This has resulted in the most efficient use of the dogs and has also fostered an excellent spirit of cooper ation oh the part of the dog platoon personnel. The attitude of our troops toward scout dogs and their handlers is reflected in the following excerpts of statements of battalion and regimental S-3s: "The scout dogs are very effective in alerting the pa trols whenever they are nearing Japs, Jap positions or bivouac areas. The feeling of security the men have whenever the scout dogs are with them is reflected in their condition upon returning from the patrol. The dogs are well behaved under fire." "This Battalion desires to continue the use of dogs. A request has been made to Regimental S-3 for six (6) more dogs to be attached to this Battalion." "Scout dogs have been used on patrols by Companies C, I, and L. Patrol leaders and men report that the presence of scout dogs gives the patrol a distinct advantage. On several occasions a scout dog gave warning in time to enable patrols to escape enemy fire. 7henever the dogs alerted,patrols en countered enemy or located signs of Activity," "Company I has made extensive use of messenger dogs with patrols and reports they increase the speed of transmission and conserve the strength of the patrol." "Dogs have been used as sentinels on road blocks opera ted by X-Ray Force and Anti-Tank Company and in forward posi tions by Company C. They were quick to detect and give warn ing of the approach of the enemy." "We desire to continue the use of dogs. We feel thatjflgt have a definite need for another platoon tto 'be used on present mission," In these sentiments we heartily concur. ' , r A-* ** 4$ % % - 30 - NX T . f- • " mmfc ; - \w... :»•' ' • ' ., • -v;-? - 4 :• - . - :" \ s A.:• -' - -\- . . jggy*' •,.. *»/»• »: '"''' #v:^ iPllllfiV ft' $v ? >WJ RB^S On Patrol REPRODUCED BY 671st ENGR. TOPO. CO. SWPA MAY 1945 I&E PROGRAM "A.n idle mind makes a bored nerson." In order to pre vent boredom through enforced idleness during those periods when units are in rest camps, the Division Information and Education Section has prepared a program that is both inter esting and educational. Individual study through Armed Forces Institute Self- Teaching Courses, through Armed Forces Institute Corresnond- ence Courses, or through University Extension Correspondence Courses, and group study in classes conducted within the reg imental echelon, are available to those interested in the program. The Division I & E Officer with the I & E Officer of each infantry regiment and separate unit has utilized the period that the Division has been in combat to set up pro grams, enroll students for later study, procure texts, select teachers, and plan the administration and physical facilities for the classes. A survey taken of approximately twenty-five percent of the Division personnel shows that eighty-two percent of those questioned are interested in some form of study during the rehabilitation period. If this same ratio holds true for the entire Division and all those interested in off-duty study actually participate, some 10,000 soldiers will be engaged in preparing themselves for a better future. le believe this large scale project to be unparalled in any other Division, and the figures speak for themselves to show the well planned selling campaign conducted by our I & E Section. The Information and Education Officers also perform gui dance service regarding educational needs of a rarospective student. This guidance to include testing and examination service, accreditation service, and information regarding sub jects and courses. Another highly important function of the Information and Education Section is to keep the comnand informed. To accom plish this end War Information Centers have been maintained. These centers contain up to date situation maps of all thea ters and fronts, current events posters, magazines and oeri- odicals, and eye catching displays of captured enemy material. All of the centers are made so that they can be quickly taken down and transported, and some ^ar Information Centers have been carried forward at regular intervals to front line troops. ^ - 31 A The I & E program will result in making the Hating man a better informed soldier during his combat perioai^jin§^i;,ll enable him to prepare for the future by utilizingvr|^|&ajp;f rehabilitation periods to good advantage. The following pictures and charts..'indicate the scope of • the I & E planning phase in the Division,ft,. , I? v 1$ Jfc "' £ 4*-• $ Msg®| - 32 - "IN TIME OF WAR FRSPARE FOR PEACP", the Division Commander has said, urging enrollment in Armed Far ces Institute off-duty study cc rses. Here is seen at the forward C.P. during the present campaign, handing his own appli cation and money order for one of these courses to 1st It. Clyde F. McClintock, INFORMATION & EDUCATION OFFICES of 33d Div. Hq. Co. "OFF-DUTY" STUDY COURSES ENROLLMENT RESULTS " a. % of completion of canvas in Unit. (E.M. strength as of 28 Apr 45). b. Number of men desiring courses. c. % of enrollments to number Canvassed. Unit a. c, Total 3 Inf Regts 20% 1256 Total Div Arty 36# 583 77% Total Div Troops 19% 300 11% TOTAL DIVISION 22$ 2139 82# INFORMATIONS EDUCATION £kdyJbasnt m*m V » 'WW^VK«>i;f'r ' A'V. wKara"v **•> /•«£*•* /•; hmrnmmm INSTITUTE SELF GROUP STUDY s<»V..•,w»?''W?i>X' •. :.. TEACHING COURSES 3S^ jrC* X ' * &*AN'51 60$ 55% StlSSSl NO OURSE IIISTIxUTE INTEREST mWSm NOT INDIVIDUAL 21 $ DETER- CORRESPONDENCE I ilili STUDY lili.EE Wf.MWm m 19 TVPE of INSTRUCTION OFF jDl)TV STUDM DESIRED INTEREST ZgZ&PZy.??*: l^j&pEjSBgBWhkk* •>.>•• :y,y. ;*? -:>2 iffiCHANICAL *v -"v.'.™?;: •.••?•« LiATHMATICS and and SCIENCE ELECTRICAL 25»8^ ~ 265? MOTHER AUTO % iECH \ \ • .* ',*• * I ARITH • OTHER. * J LANGUAGE OTHER A.TvSSiyS'V.'-N- M THAN ENGLISH x OTHER ENGLISH '**WWSB^-.-J* 16% , : * v £»*&< ^rn^mm BUSINESS 2k% SOCIAL STUDIES M .-•^jriPB'^aaJ^gw;• ENBOUMENIS by SUBJECT ENGLISH GRAMMAR COMPANY Of & BATTERY FFICER Sample I & E poster frnW-f NO PLUMBING COMPANV or JU Ifthrf BATTERV I < E OFFICER Sample I & E Poster \ I i CARPENTRM C6MPANU or BATTECM Sample I & E Poster REPRODUCED BY 67lst ENGR. TOPO. CO. SWPA MAY 1945 A typical regimental display of captured enemy equipment RECLASSIFICATION OF MATERIAL Authority is granted to reclassify material of OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS, 33d Inf Div, May 15, 1945 as follows; Item Reclassification All title page sketches No classification All litho photographs No classification All I 4 E "USAFI" Cartoons No classification Decorations and Awards Chart Restricted I & E Program Restricted Signal Communications (Except, Map which remains SECRET) Restricted Assault Switchboard Restricted Field Artillery Confidential The classification of the following material may be reduced to RESTRICTED by eliminating unit and place identifications, NIGHT OPERATIONS COMBAT ENGINEERS (Except map which remains SECRET) MEDICS IN COMBAT (Except figures of friendly cas ualties which remain SECRET) AIR SUPPORT (Except map which remains SECRET) PROVISIONAL PACK TRAIN INFANTRY SCOUT DOGS r A . FRANK J. VACKTON Lt. Col. G.S.C. AC of S, G-3 COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH KS 3 1695 00535 9500 £->- #0 22176 il"* O o 1p^ "v •*> £* #0507/o ?, #081075flfc