Naval War College Review Volume 65 Article 14 Number 1 Winter

2012 How the Helicopter Changed Modern Warfare K.J. Delamer

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Recommended Citation Delamer, K.J. (2012) "How the Helicopter Changed Modern Warfare," Naval War College Review: Vol. 65 : No. 1 , Article 14. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/14

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Delamer: How the Helicopter Changed Modern Warfare BOOK REVIEWS 171

attacks of 9/11, when he observed that administration’s actions deserve a sober the nation would have to work “the second look. However, far too much dark side, if you will,” Cheney was seen seemstobeatstakeforthattooccur. by many as a champion of un-American STEPHEN F. KNOTT practices, including water boarding and Naval War College warrantless wiretapping. Cheney vigor- ously defends both programs, arguing that the wiretapping “saved lives and prevented attacks. If I had it to do all

over again, I would, in a heartbeat.” Boyne, Walter J. How the Helicopter Changed The administration’s “liberation” of Modern Warfare. Gretna, La.: Pelican, 2011. Iraq, which, in concert with the after- 352pp. $29.95 math of Hurricane Katrina, dramatically “In either case, the helicopter has sig- eroded public support for President nificantly changed the face of modern Bush, is also vigorously defended, al- warfare. It has done so despite restric- though Cheney concedes that “we could tions placed on its performance by its have done things better” in terms of inherent design features. And perhaps dealing with Katrina. more than anything else, it has done so Cheney and his loyal lieutenants, I. because of the brave, talented aircrews Lewis “Scooter” Libby and David who flew the helicopter in the most in- Addington, saw themselves as restoring tensely dangerous conditions of warfare the American presidency to the status it that have ever been seen.” hadheldpriortoVietnamandWater- So concludes the final chapter of a new gate. Some refer to this bygone era as andtimelybookbynotedaviation one dominated by an “imperial presi- writer and retired U.S. Air Force colo- dency,” but for Cheney it was the natu- nel Walter Boyne. This volume revolves ral, constitutional, order of things. around two theses. The first is stated in Presidential precedents were on their the title: helicopters, since their intro- side but the quiet constitutional revolu- duction, have produced dramatic tion that occurred while Cheney served changes in the conduct of warfare. The as Gerald Ford’s chief of staff—a revo- second thesis suggests that helicopters lution that produced an adversarial me- themselves have failed to keep pace with dia with no qualms about releasing the the very changes caused by their intro- nation’s most closely held secrets; a ju- duction. The conclusions drawn from diciary willing to overrule executive and this corollary idea are likely to prove legislative war powers, while sometimes controversial. invoking elements of international law; and a Congress eager to challenge presi- Boyne’s prose combines accuracy with dents on sensitive national-security is- regard to technological issues with a sues, including intelligence matters— clarity that renders these complex ideas triumphed in the end. Bush and Cheney accessible, even to readers unfamiliar left office as discredited figures, and with the intricacies of rotorcraft aero- while both remain optimistic that his- nautics. The scientific and engineering tory will vindicate them, this book challenges are interwoven with the sto- makesastrongcasethatsomeofthe ries of such industry pioneers as Igor

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172 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEW College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 1, Art. 14

Sikorsky, Frank Piasecki, and Arthur Walter Boyne has delivered a timely Young. The narrative offers a tip of the study that asks difficult, important hat to the Marine Corps, acknowledg- questions about the future of military ing that institution’s decision to cham- aviation, especially in an era when the pion this emerging technology, as well nature of combat operations is rapidly as the parts played by the Navy and evolving. For these questions alone, it is Coast Guard, but the strength of this a worthwhile read. The lucid analysis of book resides in its examination of the the technological issues and the com- helicopter’s influence on combat over pelling stories of the pioneers and war- land. riors who brought the helicopter to TheVietnamWarservesasthelens prominence are icing on the cake. through which the rapid development K. J. DELAMER of helicopter-borne operations is stud- Naval War College ied. Anecdotes about operational lead- ers whose vision married capabilities provided by industry with the arduous conditions of the Southeast Asian bat- tlefield provide evidence of how mod- Tully, Anthony P. Battle of Surigao Strait. Bloom- ern warfare was changed. Anecdotal ington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2009. 329pp. $18.45 evidence is supported by statistics de- The sprawling battle of Leyte Gulf was tailing the number of troops and the fought from 23 to 26 October 1944, and amount of material transported within nearly seventy years later it still has the the theater, as well as the grim losses power both to fire the imagination and suffered in accomplishing these mis- to provide enduring military lessons. As sions. Within the Vietnam context, the drama goes, the battle (or more pre- tactical and operational impacts of rotary- cisely, a series of engagements, each wing aircraft are clearly demonstrated. deserving a name of its own) is an ap- The argument revolves around the parently bottomless cornucopia of postwar failure to maintain the wartime personalities, desperate gambles, and momentum. heroism, as well as of enough “what-ifs” The discussion of the post-Vietnam de- to spawn a cottage industry of alternate velopments asks difficult and uncom- histories. In at least one way, Leyte Gulf fortable questions. Delving into the has similarities to Gettysburg. Both bat- fiscal disparity between the research tles have been written about so exten- and development efforts supporting sively that some authors focus on the fixed-wing, tactical aircraft and similar smaller engagements that together com- efforts for the benefit of rotary-wing plete the picture of the larger conflict. aviation, the author reaches conclusions The basic story of Leyte is a familiar that may be disconcerting for advocates one. Faced with growing U.S. naval of traditional airpower. This critique of power, a steadily weakening fleet, and overspending on fixed-wing research initial American landings in the Philip- and development at the expense of sur- pines, Japanese naval authorities initi- vivability, lethality, and capability for ated a bold stroke. Using their precious rotary-wing aircraft gives the book a remaining carriers as bait, they drew off controversial edge. Admiral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet

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