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ENGLISH SEVENTEENTH CENTURY COLONIAL EXPANSION AS a FORM of RENT-SEEKING Except Where Reference Is Made to the Work of Others

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ENGLISH SEVENTEENTH CENTURY COLONIAL EXPANSION AS a FORM of RENT-SEEKING Except Where Reference Is Made to the Work of Others ENGLISH SEVENTEENTH CENTURY COLONIAL EXPANSION AS A FORM OF RENT-SEEKING Except where reference is made to the work of others, the work described in this dissertation is my own or was done in collaboration with my advisory committee. This dissertation does not include proprietary or classified information. ____________________________________ William Macy Finck Certificate of Approval: ________________________________ ______________________________ T. R. Beard Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Chair Professor Eminent Scholar Emeritus Economics Economics _______________________________ ______________________________ Richard W. Ault Joe F. Pittman Associate Professor Interim Dean Economics Graduate School ENGLISH SEVENTEENTH CENTURY COLONIAL EXPANSION AS A FORM OF RENT SEEKING William Macy Finck A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Auburn University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Auburn, Alabama December 17, 2007 ENGLISH SEVENTEENTH CENTURY COLONIAL EXPANSION AS A FORM OF RENT SEEKING William Macy Finck Permission is granted to Auburn University to make copies of this dissertation at its discretion upon request of individuals or institutions at their expense. The author reserves all publication rights. ___________________________ Signature of Author ___________________________ Date of Graduation iii ENGLISH SEVENTEENTH CENTURY COLONIAL EXPANSION AS A FORM OF RENT SEEKING William Macy Finck Doctor of Philosophy, December 17, 2007 (M.S., Auburn University, 2002) (B.A., Bellarmine University, 1999) 168 Typed Pages Directed by Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. The central purpose of this dissertation is to apply a rent-seeking analysis to seventeenth century colonial policies in England. The dissertation is an extension of the rent-seeking model which Robert Ekelund and Robert Tollison developed and applied to English domestic trade policy in Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society (1981). I contrast this new perspective with historians’ traditional view of mercantilism, which emphasizes self-sufficiency and wealth accumulation. England’s colonial policy in the seventeenth century, while frequently paralleling such actions as would be inspired by traditional mercantilist ideas, were actually intended to maximize revenues through the regulation of markets, regardless of whether colonial production freed Britain from dependency on imports from other European nations. Developments in the tobacco industry show that when the paths of mercantilism and revenue maximization diverged, iv the crown selected a course that contradicted the tenets of mercantilism in favor of policies designed to maximize revenues. I also show that while the colonial policies were designed to capture rents from regulated markets, opportunistic behavior on the part of groups of agents within the regulated markets (as well as within the government) caused the dissipation of contrived rents. This opportunistic behavior was made possible by the crown’s inability to properly enforce market regulations. Throughout the seventeenth century, England’s colonial policies evolved to correct the enforcement problems and allow the crown to capture a greater share of the available rents. I follow the development of England’s colonial policies and analyze the effect of policy changes on the behavior economic agents attempting to capture the contrived rents for themselves. In modern society we still see many of the unintended consequences of economic regulation which troubled the English government in the seventeenth century. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank Dr. Robert Ekelund for his support, patience and advice throughout the process of writing this dissertation. Thanks are also due to my wife, Emily, and our parents, Bill, Mary Beth, Anthony, and Frieda, for their love and support during this process. vi Style manual or journal used: Southern Economic Journal style Computer software used: Microsoft Word vii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ..........................................................................................................x LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................................xi CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................1 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW.........................................................................7 Monopoly Profit and the Rent-Seeking Model .....................................................9 Opportunistic Behavior and the Regulation of Domestic Markets.......................17 Political Landscape: Competition for the Right to Supply Regulation.................25 Regulation of Imports and Exports.....................................................................27 Chartered Companies and Regulation of Colonial Markets.................................30 Conclusion.........................................................................................................38 CHAPTER 3. THE COLONIZATION OF VIRGINIA AND EARLY REGULATION OF THE COLONIAL TOBACCO TRADE AS A FORM OF RENT-SEEKING...........40 Traditional Explanation of Colonial Regulation..................................................41 Colonization as Rent-Seeking: Charter of the Virginia Company .......................44 Regulation of the Tobacco Industry: Overview...................................................52 Pre-Colonial Regulation of Tobacco...................................................................57 Introduction of Colonial Tobacco.......................................................................63 The Royal Tobacco Monopoly ...........................................................................67 Regulation of Retailers and Improved Enforcement in the Colonies ...................73 viii Conclusion.........................................................................................................76 CHAPTER 4. OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE NAVIGATION ACTS...................................................................................................79 Traditional Explanation of the Navigation Acts..................................................80 The Economic Theory of Regulation..................................................................83 Historical Perspective.........................................................................................84 The Navigation Act of 1660...............................................................................87 An Economic Interpretation of the Navigation Acts ...........................................90 The Staple Act of 1663.....................................................................................111 Additional Attempts to Increase Revenue.........................................................120 The Navigation Act of 1685.............................................................................131 Conclusion.......................................................................................................138 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION....................................................................................143 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................148 APPENDIX.................................................................................................................154 ix LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Estimated Rents ..............................................................................................54 Table 2. Market Structure .............................................................................................56 x LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2-1. Market with Constant Costs: Competition vs. Monopoly ............................11 Figure 2-2. Market with Constant Costs: Identifying the Welfare Loss..........................13 Figure 2-3. Opportunistic Behavior Within a Cartel......................................................18 Figure 2-4. Equilibrium Price and Quantity in a Monopsony Market Structure .............37 Figure 3-1. Tax Revenue Maximization........................................................................62 Figure 4-1. Long Run Firm Profits: Unregulated vs. Regulated Markets ........................92 Figure 4-2. Market with Constant Costs: Identifying the Welfare Loss..........................95 Figure 4-3: Effect of Customs Duties on Prices of Foreign Goods ...............................105 Figure 4-4. Effect of an Increase in Duties on Total Revenue when Demand is Elastic124 xi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION The central purpose of this dissertation is to apply a rent-seeking analysis to seventeenth century colonial policies in England. The dissertation will be an extension of the rent-seeking model which Robert Ekelund and Robert Tollison developed and applied to English domestic trade policy in Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society (1981). This approach to mercantilist colonial policy is unique, and I intend to contrast this new perspective with historians’ traditional view of mercantilism, which emphasizes self- sufficiency and wealth accumulation. England’s colonial policy in the seventeenth century, while frequently paralleling such actions as would be inspired by traditional mercantilist ideas, were actually intended to maximize revenues through the regulation of markets, regardless of whether colonial production freed Britain from dependency on imports from other European nations. Developments in the tobacco industry show
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