Explaining Enforcement Patterns of Anticorruption Agencies: Comparative Analysis of Five Serbian, Croatian and Macedonian Anticorruption Agencies
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The London School of Economics and Political Science Explaining Enforcement Patterns of Anticorruption Agencies: Comparative Analysis of Five Serbian, Croatian and Macedonian Anticorruption Agencies Slobodan Tomid A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, April 2016 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and another person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgment is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 99,983 words. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Alex Harris. Abstract Anticorruption agencies (ACAs) have drawn scholarly attention in recent times. While authors focused predominately on studying ACAs’ performance and their contribution to the reduction of corruption, ACAs’ enforcement – as a process that precedes policy outcome - has remained understudied so far. This thesis seeks to contribute to filling this gap, by exploring the enforcement choices of five ACAs from three Western Balkans’ countries – Serbia, Macedonia, and Croatia, in the period 2001-2012. The thesis utilises three theoretical accounts in order to explore the determinants of the enforcement of the five ACAs’ enforcement. These are organisational, temporal, and leadership based accounts. Organisational accounts include de-jure independence and agency resources as key factors, temporal accounts include life-cycle and political-cycle as determinants of agency behaviour and, finally, leadership-based accounts highlight the role of leaders, i.e. human agency, in shaping agency enforcement. While failing to lend support for the organisational and temporal accounts, the empirical analysis offers evidence in support of the leadership based account. Overriding the organisational and temporal boundaries and constraints, the ‘personal’ (human) factor turns out to have been the key driver of the analysed ACAs’ enforcement. The thesis also sets out to investigate whether the ACA model has implications for ACAs’ enforcement. The first – the preventive ACA model - is argued to be able to exhibit the harshest forms of enforcement even if the organisational factors are weak. The other - the suppressive ACA model - is hypothesised to be able to exert the harshest forms of enforcement only under strong organisational factors. The empirical analysis yields support to this hypothesis. It is shown in the thesis that the two ACA models provide for different reputational opportunities and risks, factors that crucially shape the enforcement choices. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis would not have been possible without the generous contribution of many people. I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Martin Lodge (LSE) and adviser Christel Koop (King’s College London) for their support and patience throughout the studies. Working with Martin and Christel has been a privilege, as one can learn a lot from what they teach and from what they do as scholars. Their guidance, intellectual rigour, and research enthusiasm, spurred me to study regulation and public policy with ever increasing zeal. I am also grateful to the members of my dissertation committee, Colin Provost (UCL) and Jan Meyer-Sahling (University of Nottingham), for their time and effort to read through the thesis and provide constructive feedback. The number of clever and helpful people - from the Government Department and other LSE departments - whose presence has enriched my studies is so vast that I will be able to mention only some of them. I thank Uglješa Grušid, Stefan Paduraru, and Daniel Wang for the stimulating discussions and for all the fun we have had ever since the days of master studies. I consider myself truly blessed to have had people with such human and academic qualities for friends and fellows. My thanks also goes to Milan Dinid and Danyar Nurmakhatov, people who I wish could have spent more than one year at LSE. Special appreciation goes to the fellows from the GV401 research room - Marta Wojciechowska, Robert van Geffen, Ellie Knot, Kenneth Bunker, Gisela Calderon-Gongora, Ed Poole, Pon Souvannaseng, Randi Solhjell and many others, who I have shared with the suffering and joy of PhD studies. I am also grateful to Maja Kluger Rasmussen, Jürgen Braunstein, and Flavia Donadelli, for their collegial support during the teaching on the undergraduate course Politics of Economic Policy. There are many fellow academics outside LSE whose friendship and support have been precious over the course of the research days. I would like to particularly mention Branislav Radeljid, Radman Šelmid, Marija Zurnid, and Marko Milanovid. This research would not have been possible without the help of the interviewees, who found the time to talk about their experience and role in the anticorruption policies and anticorruption agencies studied in this thesis. I am very grateful for their valuable contribution. I am also grateful to the donors who provided financial support for the PhD studies. Marko Vojinovid, my dear friend from Belgrade, and Mile Prodanovid, my cousin from Zürich, were there to help out when it was most difficult and when it was quite uncertain whether the research project will reach its end one day. Thanks, Marko and Mile, we’ve pulled it off! I dedicate this thesis to those who made supreme sacrifices because of my PhD studies: to my wife Ivana and my parents, Stevo and Živojka. It is their tremendous love and support that kept me motivated to persevere despite all the difficulties that such an endeavour carries. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 Contribution to the study of agencies ..................................................................................................... 4 Contribution to the ACA literature ........................................................................................................... 7 Contribution to the study of public sector reforms in the Western Balkans ......................................... 12 Contribution to the regulation literature .............................................................................................. 14 Thesis outline ......................................................................................................................................... 18 CHAPTER 2 Methods ................................................................................................................................. 21 Research design and case selection ....................................................................................................... 21 Countries’ background .......................................................................................................................... 32 Data and measurement ......................................................................................................................... 37 CHAPTER 3 Theory .................................................................................................................................... 42 Why enforcement varies: theoretical approaches ................................................................................ 42 Organisational explanations .................................................................................................................. 44 ‘De-jure independence matters’ ....................................................................................................... 44 ‘Resources matter’ ........................................................................................................................... 47 Temporal explanations .......................................................................................................................... 49 ‘Time matters’ .................................................................................................................................. 49 ‘Political-cycle matters’ ................................................................................................................... 50 Leadership based explanation ............................................................................................................... 52 ‘Leadership matters’ ....................................................................................................................... 52 Summary of theoretical accounts ........................................................................................................ 54 Do two ACA models direct into different enforcement logics? ........................................................... 56 Capturing regulatory enforcement ...................................................................................................... 63 Enforcement strategy ......................................................................................................................