NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
02 August 2019 DOCUMENT NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV) AC/225-D(2019)0003 (INV)
NATO INDUSTRIAL ADVISORY GROUP (NIAG)
NATO ARMY ARMAMENTS GROUP (NAAG) JOINT CAPABILITY GROUP VERTICAL LIFT (JCGVL)
FINAL REPORT OF NIAG STUDY GROUP 227 ON ROTORCRAFT MANNED/UNMANNED TEAMING
Note by the NIAG Secretary
1. Enclosed is the Final Report of NIAG study on Rotorcraft Manned/Unmanned Teaming, as conducted by NIAG SG.227, which is now published to the Sponsor.
(signed) Nathalie Van Donghen
1 Enclosure Original: English
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -1- NHQD137898 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to the Invitee, North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV)
AC/225-D(2019)0003 (INV)
NIAG SG.227 On Rotorcraft Manned/Unmanned Teaming (29 June 2019)
The work described in this report was carried out under the provisions of the NIAG Study Order for Study Group 227.
Disclosure, utilization, publication or reproduction of this report by industry is subject to pre-approval by NATO until such time as NATO may have released such work to the public
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background NATO faces an increasingly complex, sophisticated and lethal operating environment. The re-emergence of peer and near-peer potential adversaries, with high-end Anti Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, drives NATO into investigating candidate technologies that will permit future air operations to be conducted at acceptable risk, with minimal attrition of both platforms and operating crews. Manned / Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) is one such set of technologies, offering the promise of enhanced combat operations, increased platform survivability and improved decision making with networked assets. MUM-T promises significant improvements to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) functions, and the opportunity to dramatically reduce the number of manned aircrafts required to sustain a high operational tempo. An excellent opportunity exists for force multiplication with unmanned aircrafts by leveraging technology advances in Autonomy, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Augmented Reality. Technical Summary The SG-227 study effort was divided into four areas - Overall Concept & Operations, Architecture and Concept of Integration, Human Machine Interface (HMI) / Automation, Data link/Networking/Cyber-Electronic Warfare (EW). The Overall Concept & Operations area developed representative operational scenarios, derived from both ATP-49G and user input. Other areas exploited these scenarios to define the critical technical and integration issues that effective MUM-T would need to mature in order to deliver genuine capability. SG-227 took a medium to long term view of MUM-T, identifying candidate technologies that could be fielded on legacy rotorcraft (in the next 10 years) and influencing the design strategy for Next Generation Rotorcraft (NGR) as postulated by the output of SG-219. , The SG-227 team has met the objectives of the “Study Order” identifying: MUM-T military utility, critical enabling technologies, option for launch/recovery, system integration issues, HMI related issues and outlining viable representative technology development programs. The team addressed the specific issues enumerated in the study order in the appropriate sections in the report. Conclusions The following provides key conclusions and recommendations; more detailed information is available in the Chapter-6 of the report. • SG-227 Developed five operational scenarios. With minimum modifications, the Group believes these can support further work in influencing and maturing MUM-T studies in the future. • SG-227 concluded the three most important options in terms of mission effectiveness are: 1. Escort UAV (E-UAV); 2. Air Launched Effector UAV (ALE-UAV) and 3. Optionally Manned Rotorcraft (OMR) (including the OMR version of the proposed NGR). Airborne recovery for selected UAVs is assessed as viable, though complex, and requiring further detailed analysis.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -2-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Open system standards including Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA) will be required to support high-speed processing and modular construction for legacy and NGR platforms. • SG-227 determined that airborne UAV release and recovery is a major technical challenge. • The additional tasks needed for advancing MUM-T, such as increased planning, can only be accomplished by significant improvements in HMI, a significant ‘easing’ to the manned platform pilotage task, a sharing of mission management duties and the adoption of AI/Automation technologies. • A rapidly growing threat to data link performance is Cyber EW attacks that detect and jam RF operations. Operating in a hostile electromagnetic environment is critical to mission success. Two key features to consider influencing low probability of detection / anti-jamming (LPD/AJ) performance are the waveform and antenna. • SG-227 determined NATO does not have a standardized cryptographic solution. This disrupts the ability of collaboration between countries to operate securely. A commonly agreed upon cryptographic solution is needed for interoperability between NATO member countries. • The networking concept supporting MUM-T has some unique challenges that need to be considered. Current Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) or Flying Ad-hoc Networks (FANET) may need to evolve in a hybrid solution to accommodate those challenges. Recommendations • NATO should develop Training, Tactics, and Procedures (TTP) and Doctrine for MUM-T operation and validate suitable testing scenarios for further use. • The modular multinational MUM-T subsystems architecture developed in this study should be demonstrated by simulation or demonstration. • NATO should consider Implementing and maturing Artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms and data for the MUM-T. • Next generation aircraft should be designed to include advanced MUM-T requirements from their conceptual stage. • The combination of multimodal HMI technologies, decision support tools, data fusion capabilities and autonomous behavior requires further development to provide an optimized mix for changing conditions, including system failure cases. • MUM-T C2 links should operate in either Ka or E-band frequencies to take advantage of wider available bandwidths, less congestion, and smaller components. • Further study should be devoted to advancing the evolution of Low Probability of Detection (LPD) waveforms to defeat energy, structure, and feature detectors and hide the signal below the noise floor. Build a living library of field updateable countermeasures to defeat the latest jammer threats. • A commonly agreed upon cryptographic solution is needed for interoperability between NATO member countries.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -3-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENT LIST OF PARTICIPANTS REPORT
Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 8 1.1 Background ...... 8 1.2 The study objectives and scope ...... 8 1.3 Study Organisation ...... 9 1.4 Participants ...... 9 1.5 Meetings Schedule ...... 10
Chapter 2: Overall Concept of MUM-T Operations ...... 10 1. Identify & assess the military utility of advanced MUM-T; ...... 10 2.3 Methodology...... 11 2.4 Identify & assess the military utility of advanced MUM-T ...... 12 2.5 Development of representative mission scenarios ...... 13 2.6 Identify unique platform capabilities required for each scenario and Define the various manned rotorcraft and unmanned options ...... 13 2.7 Place in priority order the three best options based on mission effectiveness, technology challenges, near term (5-10 years) implementation and cost...... 14 2.8 Technical Constraints...... 16
Chapter 3: Architecture And Concept Of Integration ...... 17 3.1 Introduction ...... 17 3.2 Capabilities and Technologies ...... 17 3.3 MUM-T Packages ...... 18 3.4 MUM-T Flight Phase Matrix ...... 20 3.5 Manned Air Vehicle System and Integration ...... 20 3.6 Outline Technical Demonstration Program ...... 20
Chapter 4: Implications on Human Machine Interface and Automation Development ...... 21 4.1 Introduction ...... 21 4.2 The Human Factor ...... 21 4.3 Development of the MUM-T Human Machine Interface ...... 22 4.3.1 Head Down Displays ...... 23 4.3.2 Helmet Mounted Display Technology ...... 23 4.3.3 Multimodal Display Input and Interaction Schemes ...... 23 4.4 Decision Support and Autonomy ...... 24 4.4.1 Application of Autonomy in MUM-T ...... 24
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -4-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
4.4.2 Autonomy in the Manned Segment ...... 25 4.4.3 Autonomy in the Unmanned Segment ...... 25 4.4.4 Automation Technology Road Map ...... 25 4.5 Integration ...... 26 5.1 Introduction ...... 26
Chapter 5: Networking/ Cyber/EW……………………………………………………………26 5.2 Cyber /EW ...... 26 5.3 Data link/Waveform ...... 28 5.4 Antenna ...... 29 5.5 Networking ...... 30 5.6 Platform ...... 31
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 31 6.2 Architecture and Concept of Integration ...... 32 6.3 HMI / Automation ...... 32 6.4 Data Link - Networking - Cyber/EW ...... 34
ANNEXES
Annex-A: Teams responsibility versus study Objectives Annex-B Members Contribution Annex-C: Meetings Schedules and Reports Annex-D: Team-1 report on Overall Concept of MUM-T Operations Annex-E: Team-2 report on Architecture and Concept of Integration Annex-F: Team-3 report on HMI / Automation Annex-G: Team-4 report on Networking / Cyber/EW Annex-H: Acronyms
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -5-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS (as per Annex 1 of the Study Order)
SG Chairman Rajindar KAUSHIK United States Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation SG Vice-Chairman Marco GAZZANIGA Italy Leonardo Company SG Vice-Chairman Michael C. DUDLEY United States The Boeing Company SG Rapporteur Georges THIBAUT Belgium S-LabConsult
S-LabConsult/GaiT Georges THIBAUT Belgium Mehmet GUNDUZ (UN)MANNED NV Filip VERHAGUE Thierry DE BOISVILLERS Airbus Helicopter -FR Stéphane RUBINO France Pierre DUBOIS Rockwell Collins -FR Eric Thomas Tobias PAUL Elektroniksystem- und Logistik GmbH Ingrid ROSSKOPF Hensoldt Sensors GmbH Thomas MÜNSTERER Germany Juergen BITTNER IABG Thomas SCHMID-ZUREK P&L&S Consulting Kurt HAUSLER ADC – Aerospace and Defence Consultancy Mario DE LUCIA Consortium for Research on Intelligence and Security Carlino CASARI Services Monica COSTANTINI Paoloandra (Paolo) Leonardo Company- IT CASTELLETTII Italy Marco GAZZANIGA Alessandro MASSA Vitrociset Silvio MAZZARO S3Log Bruno DI MARCO Andrea Menconi WL Gore Andrea Zampieri Grey Moose José ROSA DIAS Portugal Andre OLIVEIRA Tekever Duarte BELO Turkey Aselsan Fahri Ersel ÖLÇER Paul KENNARD 2Excel Aviation Ltd/Ascalon Defence United Dick DOWNS Kingdom Pascal NORMAN BAE Systems Anthony MITCHELL (US)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -6-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Andrew (Andy) WALBRIDGE Callen-Lenz Associates Limited Adrian EVES Andrew Sean MERRICK Leonardo Helicopters-UK Andy MERRICK Mark LUPTON Nexus Imaging Ltd Grant POWELL NOVA systems John LING Sean STOREY Thales - UK Matthews MOORE Trevo WOOLVEN The Boeing Company Michael C. DUDLEY HONEYWELL Howard (Howie) WIEBOLD Ryan Clark BEARD Kil SAWFORD L3 Technologies Richard WATTS United Timothy ALMOND States Luigi U. RICCI MORETTI Piasecki Aircraft Corporation Frederick W. PIASECKI Daniel TOY Rockwell Collins -Inc Geoffrey SHAPIRO Rajindar (Raj) KAUSHIK Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation a LM Company Curtis ESHBAUGH
QRT / Governmental Agency & Organization United States US -C-RAM -SFAE-MSL-CRO Alan L. (leigh) MOORE United States US Army RDECOM AMRDEC Matthews (Matt) WHALLEY United Kingdom UK MOD- Army HQ-Air Patrick (Pat) COLLINS Maneuver Capability
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -7-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background The high technology threat spectrum poses increased challenges and risk for rotorcraft, and future vertical lift platforms, conducting Special Forces (SF) and conventional missions beyond the range of traditional Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and other supporting assets. The output from the NIAG SG227 study will support the work being performed by the JCG VL in the development of a NATO Staff Target/Requirement for an enhanced operational and survivable rotorcraft. The study will also contribute to various NATO organizations such as SOF Working Group (SOFWG), the Joint Capability Group on Unmanned Air Vehicle (JCGUAV), and to future NIAG and NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO) activities. The study will contribute to further defining the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) rotorcraft Long Term Capability Requirements (LTCR’s). The study findings and recommendations enable NATO and member nations to understand and evaluate their future rotorcraft/vertical lift Manned and Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) capabilities and modernization options. There is a high potential for the creation of a NATO Smart Defence Initiative joint program associated with this effort. In this context, the JCG VL has also sponsored several NIAG studies addressing enhancements to rotorcraft capability, including SG-167 Operations in Degraded Visual Environments (DVE), SG-193 Airworthiness Certification of DVE Enhanced Platforms and SG-219 Next Generation Rotorcraft Capability.
1.2 The study objectives and scope The study objectives are: a) To identify and assess the military utility of advanced manned/unmanned teaming, including the development of representative mission scenarios. Identify unique platform capabilities required for each scenario. b) To identify critical enabling technologies, technical architectures, requirements and technology challenges that would enable the implementation of rotorcraft manned/unmanned team concepts. c) To define options for the launch, operation and recovery of an unmanned system (fixed and/or rotary wing) under the control of the manned rotary wing platform (one-to-one, one-to-many and/or mixed formations). Optimize and document the three best options. d) To identify and document the systems engineering and integration issues associated with a typical manned rotorcraft platform, to include an estimate of the weight penalty associated with the addition of the manned/unmanned team capability. e) To define and identify challenges in the human-machine interface, identify methods to mitigate the human factors and workload issues inherited by the manned platform pilots when operating in a manned/unmanned team mode, and recommend concepts for human machine interaction for the control and
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -8-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
exploitation of unmanned systems. f) To propose a viable representative technology development program to develop this capability over time with identifiable incremental capability enhancements.
The scope of this NIAG study is to evolve a technical architecture to support advanced MUM-T, identify and document the technology challenges that would impact capability implementation, document the systems engineering and platform integration issues, and address the Human Factors impacts (including crew workload) when operating in a MUM- T environment. It will also be important to identify the weight penalty and qualitative cost of integrating this capability into a manned platform
Note: During the study the representative of the Sponsor (QRT) provided clarifications on the Study Objectives and suggested guidance
1.3 Study Organisation A Study Management Team (SMT) was formed, comprising the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen and Rapporteur, with responsibility for delegating team tasks, selecting sub- team leaders and monitoring the overall progress of the Study. The team leaders augmented the SMT where appropriate. The SMT worked closely with the Sponsor Group to ensure throughout that any assumptions used for the Study were correct, relevant and appropriate. Four teams have been created for this study:
Team 1: Overall Concept of MUM-T Operations (Pros, Cons, number of Unmanned assets per Manned asset, Launch/Recovery& execution CONOPS aspects); Team Leader: Paul Kennard (2 Excel Aviation Ltd - UK)
Team 2: Architecture and Concept of Integration; Team Leader: Marco Gazzaniga (Leonardo Company- IT)
Team 3: Human Machine Interface (HMI) / Automation (Crew workload and controls, Human Factors, unmanned platforms automation issues); Team Leader: Andrew Merrick (Leonardo Helicopters-UK)
Team 4: Data Link - Networking - Cyber/Electronic Warfare (EW) (Sub-part of Technology Group and covering mainly communication aspects); Team Leader: Michael Dudley (The Boeing Company – US)
Detailed description of teams’ responsibility versus study objectives is in Annex A.
1.4 Participants The Study participants represented a broad spectrum of industry experts from major defence contractors in Belgium France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. Throughout, there was close engagement with the Study Sponsors
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -9-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
(NAAG JCGVL). Contribution of the sponsors and members to the Study are listed at Annex B
1.5 Meetings Schedule The Study was conducted over a 15-month period, from April 2018 to June 2019, and comprised 6 plenary meetings and a final editorial meeting. An Interim Report was presented to the JCGVL on 19 September and the NIAG on 14 November 2018. The Final Report is due for delivery at the end of June 2019. The Final Study Briefing will be presented to the NIAG at their Fall 2019/Spring 2020 Plenary and will be presented to Sponsor Group at its September 2019 meeting. The schedule of the Study meetings and reports are in Annex C
Chapter 2: Overall Concept of MUM-T Operations
2.1 Concept Decomposition
For the purpose of this study, MUM-T, is defined as: “a single, manned rotorcraft combined with a single or multiple unmanned air vehicle(s) controlled by the manned aircraft, to increase the probability of mission success”.
Team 1 decomposed the concept into focus areas and tasks:
1. Identify & assess the military utility of advanced MUM-T; 2. Development of representative mission scenarios (for the other teams to use in developing their own concepts and systems); 3. Identify unique platform capabilities required for each scenario; 4. Define the various manned rotorcraft and Unmanned Air vehicle (UAV) configurations (rotorcraft, fixed wing or combination thereof); 5. Place in priority order the three best options based on mission effectiveness, technology challenges, near term (5-10 years) implementation and cost. However, additionally, the significant performance gains offered by the Next Generation Rotorcraft (NGR) should also be considered.
2.2 Assumptions
2.2.1 The Study Group established and applied the following assumptions
1. The “manned platform” will be a conventional rotorcraft. However, the NGR as defined by the NIAG SG-219 study will be considered. 2. To contain the study to a practical size, 5 bespoke scenarios (broadly analogous to current ATP-49 doctrine, but not restricted by it) have been developed to test MUM-T operations;
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -10-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
3. There would be only one manned platform per scenario. All other “players” were to be unmanned, providing maximum stress on C3 arrangements and crew workload; 4. Launch and recovery of UAVs from the rotorcraft would be studied; 5. SG-227 would not study maritime aspects of MUM-T. It was considered that Study Group 232, “Utility of Unmanned Vehicles in NATO ASW Operations”, will cover most of the required ground and duplication of effort was not desirable.
2.3 Methodology 2.3.1 The starting point was generating a generic mission timeline (fig 2.1) based upon standard Composite Air Operations (COMAO) planning techniques. This was used to identify the missions and roles of the UAVs supporting the manned platform.
Figure 2.1 – Exemplar Mission Planning Sequence
2.3.2 This timeline approach lent itself to the development of a number of more detailed scenarios influenced by existing mission types (based on ATP-49). These were Reconnaissance, Attack, Transport (Air Mobility), Transport (Aero-Medical Evacuation) and Specialist Tasks – Personnel Recovery (CSAR).
2.3.3 Each scenario was hand drawn, discussed and amended until agreed for use. It was then “digitised” into an OV-1 style slide (examples below).
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -11-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Fig 2.2 – Hand Drawn Scenario 2 Fig 2.3 – Digitised OV-1
2.3.4 From the approved Operational View- 1 (OV-1), “needs” between the various “players” in the scenario were captured and a comprehensive UAV attributes table was generated. This table is essential to answering the questions outlined at Para 2.2.1 above. An extract from the table is illustrated below, with the whole table in Annex D
Table 2.1– Portion of UAV Attributes Table
2.4 Identify & assess the military utility of advanced MUM-T 2.4.1 Using the timeline and scenarios, Team One has been able to identify and assess the following as having military utility;
1. Range Extension of Situational Awareness Sensors. MUM-T provides the ability for the rotorcraft to exploit off-board sensors to best tactical advantage. This could include using a UAV ahead of the platform to look for potential enemy threats, reconnoitre the proposed target area/landing site, provide communications and signals intelligence, and provide flightpath obstacle information in Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) conditions. These functions permit the rotorcraft crew to make more informed decisions regarding mission parameters, routing and tactics, sensitive to dynamic mission parameters.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -12-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
2. Improved Air Platform Protection / Reduced Platform Attrition. The use of unmanned, networked, wingman fitted with the appropriate equipment, will enable the rotorcraft to more efficiently detect, geo-locate and defeat potential threats. This builds upon the advantages of Networked DAS (NDAS) as studied and reported by NIAG SG-211. A dedicated Escort UAV (E-UAV) could carry a number of DAS sensors and offensive/defensive effectors. Ultimately, if required, the E-UAV could sacrifice itself to protect the rotorcraft as a last line of defence.
3. Reduced Risk Exposure. The ability for the rotorcraft to deploy its sensors forwards permits the platform to potentially remain “masked” throughout weapons employment. Own-ship weapons can be cued by a UAV or released by the UAV via command and consent from the manned platform. By using a Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) link to its own UAVs, the rotorcraft can maintain a largely passive profile. By exploiting UAVs to conduct real-time flightpath obstruction detection, the rotorcraft can also ingress / egress at low level in DVE conditions, thus permitting 24/7 all-weather operations and reducing the risk from of a visual or optically laid threat system.
4. Reduced Aircrew/Maintainer Numbers. Aircrew and maintainers are increasingly expensive to recruit, train and retain. Future force predictions indicate that the trend towards smaller militaries with higher levels of automation is common across NATO. The use of unmanned platforms offers the militaries of the future the chance to sustain output with significantly fewer personnel. Typically, 3 crews are required for 24H coverage for each manned asset; ergo an enduring 3-ship capability 24/7 requires at least 9 crews. If escort or wingman functions were flown by an unmanned or Optionally Manned asset this requirement could be reduced to 3 crews. Furthermore, to deploy future rotorcraft effectively in the Optionally Manned role, mission-adaptive Artificial Intelligence (AI) will require development to both respond/react consistently to instruction (within the predictability envelope of a manned aircraft). SG-227 expects the scope of Optionally Manned operations to start with the mundane resupply of stores and material before broadening to insert personnel as autonomous vehicles technology matures and Society becomes more accepting of “driverless transport”.
2.5 Development of representative mission scenarios 2.5.1 Five representative mission scenarios were developed using the methodology described in Section 2.3. They are at Para 2.3.2 above detailed in Annex D.
2.6 Identify unique platform capabilities required for each scenario and Define the various manned rotorcraft and unmanned options 2.6.1 The scenarios were used to identify the UAVs that are required to fulfil each individual mission set. As noted above, to place the maximum stress on the unmanned “players” and C3 links, all roles apart from the manned rotorcraft were configured as unmanned in all scenarios. There were some UAV types that were consistent across the
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -13-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
scenarios, such as the E-UAV and the Air Launched Effector-UAV (ALE-UAV). Others, such as the UAV Tanker, only appear as a stressor for long range or long endurance missions. These platform capabilities were then captured in detail and are contained in “UAV Attributes Table” contained in Annex D. The following platform configurations were identified;
1. Fixed Wing. Fixed wing UAVs are important for long range, high altitude and long endurance roles due to their superior aerodynamic properties and space for energy storage (fuel, battery cells, solar panels). In the “high-end” E-UAV, the fixed wing offers high speed, low observability and enhanced dynamic manoeuvrability potential.
2. Convertiplane. Tilt wing and tilt rotor technology are already increasingly making their presence felt in the vertical lift community. An E-UAV utilising such technology would be able to keep pace / accelerate ahead of both conventional rotorcraft and platforms such as the NGR, whilst be capable of operating from the same locations.
3. Compound Rotorcraft. Thrust/Lift compounding (with associated slowed main rotor) is another technology that offers vertical lift, manoeuvrability and high forward speed. This configuration is already used by a number of small UAVs so could be considered as an ALE-UAV. Compounding is also a candidate technology for a number of full size global vertical lift projects. Like the convertiplane, a compound rotorcraft offers the potential for high speed/long range as an E-UAV.
4. Multi-rotor. The quintessential “Drone”. Multi-copters can provide a cheap, flexible, disposable asset; they can be employed in large numbers, or a “swarm, to achieve an effect with significant redundancy. However, they are relatively short ranged with low endurance (due to both aerodynamic inefficiency and lack of power density) and have a low transit speed. Therefore, their deployment needs adroit planning. Depending on the pervading threat, they could be gravity dropped in the target area, pre-seeded awaiting activation or even deployed from a stand-off range by an ALE-UAV. Concepts are studying differential rotor-pitch / speed on quadcopter designs, enabling the vehicle to transition to/from the vertical into horizontal flight, exploiting not only rotor thrust but also wing-borne lift to enable far higher transit speeds and longer range.
2.7 Place in priority order the three best options based on mission effectiveness, technology challenges, near term (5-10 years) implementation and cost.
Team One considers the following three options as the most important in terms of mission effectiveness. They are essential in all the scenarios examined. Option 3, the Optionally Manned NGR, whilst out of scope in terms of timescale, is considered an essential
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -14-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
technology given the manning and whole-life cost drivers for future military force structures.
1. Escort UAV. The E-UAV is a complex high-performance UCAV which provides protection to the NGR. Against less complex threats, the Escort could be an unmanned NGR with additional weapons/sensor modules, or it could be a dedicated vertical lift platform. In the low-tech scenario, the E-UAV provides extended sensor range, a data rebroadcast facility, enhanced (networked) platform protection and FIRES. In a higher threat scenario, greater vehicle dynamic performance (to permit Air-Air combat against advanced platforms) and low observability (visual, radar and IR) would be required. The “low-tech” E-UAV is assumed to require similar operating structure to the NGR (airfield, FOB, ship flight deck) in order to operate, whereas the “high-end” system will likely require a conventional airstrip due to its performance requirements. Due to cost/complexity the E-UAV will only be sacrificed on the most important missions or as a last-ditch resort to protect a manned platform from imminent destruction.
2. Air Launched Effector UAV. The ALE-UAV provides a high level of mission flexibility for the planners of the future, but at the risk of increased complexity and exposure. The “effect” can be a number of actions on the battlefield, from simply “daisy-chaining” as a communications rebroadcast network in the case of severe Space/Network denial, to Over the Target (OTT) functions such as Counter-IED and comms jamming, Full Motion Video (FMV) transmission, SigInt, injecting “tactical cyber” into enemy IT networks and, more mundanely, assessing the target in terms of environmental conditions and obstructions. The ALE-UAV can reach its OTT position via several means. Conceptually, it could be carried and deployed at an appropriate stand-off range by the manned platform either via gravity launch (ramp/cabin door, window or external container) or via a converted missile body with the guidance/warhead elements replaced by a single, or several, UAVs. Alternatively, it could be “seeded” into the overhead by a third-party aircraft or delivered via a long-range chassis launched from air, ground, sea or subsurface, potentially hours or days in advance awaiting activation at the appropriate time.
The ALE-UAV will come in several airframe configurations, dependant on required role, OTT endurance, payload and stand-off range. Vehicle size and energy density likely restricts the vehicle from flying an extended distance back to a friendly location. Therefore, the ALE-UAV will need to be recovered safely from a secure ground location during the RTB, be able to be recovered in mid-air or be prevented from passing classified data/technology to the enemy by assured zeroise/self-destruction. Landing to recover the ALE-UAV may not be practical due to terrain nor tactically sound due to the threat. The cost vs risk vs reward balance will be tested on a case by case basis, depending on the needs of political deniability for the operation and the cost/technological sensitivity of the ALE-UAV and its sensors. Recovery via air, covered in detail at Annex D will also place the rotorcraft at risk; there will be a danger to personnel inside the helicopter (unless,
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -15-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
of course, the TE-UAV recovers to an unmanned wingman), a risk of collision with a critical system external to the platform and the potential for the platform to have to fly straight and level for an extended period while recovery occurs, placing the aircraft in a tactically poor position. Perhaps analogous to Sonobuoys used in ASW and an increasing number of RF decoys, certain classes of ALE-UAV may be considered “born disposable” where their recovery is an unexpected bonus rather than an absolute necessity.
3. Optionally Manned Rotorcraft (OMR) and the Future NGR. Team One contends that the shape, size and cost of future forces all fuel the drive towards commonality and increased automation, where feasible and appropriate. Therefore, the future force mix should be as common as possible for manning, training and sustainment reasons. OMRs derived from legacy designs could fulfil a number of roles in the scenarios, from escort to ISR to AAR – releasing increasingly scarce human resource to conduct mission planning and Air Mission Commander duties 24/7 at a sustained rate through a future campaign. This ability to run OMRs (and the future optionally manned NGR) “hot” for prolonged periods has a significant increase in operational output, a large reduction in deployed personnel footprint and increased mission flexibility afforded by, in the case of the NGR, re-configurable modules that can be fitted as required for specific missions (or even parts of missions). It is suggested that this sustainability and manpower footprint perceived advantage is studied in follow-on work, such as SG-239.
2.8 Technical Constraints.
Team 1 have considered the technological constraints associated with delivering the above capabilities. They are captured in detail at Annex D but are summarised as:
1. The E-UAV does not currently exist as a separate vehicle. It requires improvements in connectivity, HMI for C3 from the manned rotorcraft and maturation in configuration and Artificial Intelligence (AI). 2. Stand-off ALE-UAV deployment. The ability to deploy ALE-UAVs from a stand- off range is not yet mature and requires development. 3. Safe, reliable and certifiable means of recovering ALE-UAVs to a rotorcraft whilst in flight need developing. 4. Power Density continues to restrict the utility of ALE-UAVs to either deploy from range or provide enduring protection in the target area. 5. NDAS is a critical technology for unlocking the power of distributed, networked, air vehicles. Development of NDAS protocols is a key technical constraint in exploiting this capability. 6. Data Links are recognised by Team One as essential for the C2 of dedicated UAVs from the rotorcraft (E-UAV, ALE-UAVs), and for the timely passage of mission critical data within the “network” and to/from higher C2 functions.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -16-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Chapter 3: ARCHITECTURE AND CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION
3.1 Introduction The current applications (operational or experimental) of MUM-T concepts and doctrine are related to rotorcraft having different levels of control with the UAV, and with the crew exercising active roles under the supervision of a GCS (Ground Control Station). The GCS currently supervises the authorisation and dissemination of UAV generated information on the tactical (local/remote) networks and the changes of the UAV roles using “Network Distributed Capability”.
This situation is supported by existing MUM-T architectures, where the LOI (Level Of Interoperability) and AL (Autonomy Levels) are bounded by the rotorcraft and UAV on- board computer systems and sensor capabilities, in conjunction with the CDL (Common Data Link) constrains and performances.
This Chapter provides an analysis of envisaged MUM-T capabilities, the enabling technologies and the associated Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to permit a leap ahead in terms of achieving high LOI/AL MUM-T mission effectiveness for both the unmanned and the manned air segments, impacting both legacy and future vertical lift platforms. Such technologies will need to be aware of the inherent risk of increasing crew workload and thus decreasing the Situational Awareness (SA) during tactical operations.
The detailed description of these elements is provided in ANNEX E and their key features are summarized in the paragraphs below.
3.2 Capabilities and Technologies
3.2.1 System Capabilities.
Future MUM-T operations, as described by the operational scenarios considered by this study, will require high levels of autonomy and interoperability in order to provide effective capability in the battle space, with minimum crew workload impact. To fully support the required Operational Capabilities, the document identifies a modular reference architecture, based on LOI 5 (Control and Monitoring of UAS Launch and Recovery), with redundant components that will provide and support the following spiral approach to the required ALs in accordance with Autonomy Level For Unmanned System (ALFUS) categories:
• Phase 1 - The architecture performs ranking tasks and displays options and criteria to the crew;
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -17-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Phase 2 - The architecture performs ranking tasks and displays options but no criteria to the crew; • Phase 3 - The architecture performs ranking tasks without displaying options to the crew.
The architecture is based on MOSA (Modular Open System Architecture) compatible components, capable of hosting OPSW (Operational Software) updates Through Life.
The modular solution will also allow the presently deployed rotorcraft to install a MUM-T kit for joint operations with the newly produced and delivered UAVs.
3.2.2 Capabilities, Enabling Technologies and KPIs.
Operational experience acquired during recent asymmetric campaigns have clearly identified the following capabilities and the associated technologies as critical to permit full MUM-T implementation during deployments in support of all type of operations:
a. Interoperable exchange of C2 information (C1); b. Interoperable exchange of sensors data (C2); c. Human-centric HMI facilities (C3); d. Hand-over to participating forces (C4); e. Area of Operation flight autonomy (C5); f. Local deployment and recovery (C6); to be implemented as modular kit with federated or integrated hardware and software architectures for rapid MUM-T capability integration.
These capabilities are analysed in this report using the following KPIs;
I. Situational Awareness (SA); II. Integration and Interoperability (I2); III. Level of Autonomy (LA); IV. Innovation (IN); V. Openness (OP); VI. Operability (OR); VII. Cost (CO),
Each one is applicable to the identified Enabling Technologies (T01 to T17) identified in Annex E Para 5, that are used to define the envisaged Technology Roadmap, addressing gaps and applicable solutions.
3.3 MUM-T Packages
3.3.1 One to One Operations
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -18-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
This condition foresees the exclusive interaction by a single manned platform to each single unmanned platform, using bespoke Link. See Section 2.1.1 of ANNEX E for details.
3.3.2 One to Many Operations The Non-exclusive interaction of manned platform via a similar C2 / Link to single or multiple unmanned platforms. See Section 2.1.2 of ANNEX E for details
3.3.3 One to Mixed Operations The Non-exclusive interaction of a manned platform via dissimilar C2 / Link implementations to multiple unmanned platforms. See Section 2.1.3 of ANNEX E for detail
3.3.4 One to Network Operations
This condition foresees Task based request published from a manned platform to all other platforms via an intelligent mobile ad hoc network which is autonomously actioned by most platform, and represents the intended evolutionary solutions for full scale MUM-T architectures described at Section 2.1.4 of ANNEX E
3.3.5 Three Best Options
Based on the roles criticality the following key configuration are therefore proposed as the “best 3” to take forwards, as between them they each cover off most of the LOR options, across most of the Scenarios:
• Escort Role (A) • Tactical Effector (C)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -19-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Tactical Effector Mid-range (D).
See Section 2.2.6 of ANNEX E for details
3.4 MUM-T Flight Phase Matrix
3.4.1 Launch, Flight and Recovery Operations
The Launch, Flight and Recovery operations considered in this study, with functional allocation to the Platform Type and Launch, Operation and Recovery (LOR) Scenarios are provided in the matrix of operations detailed in Section 2.2.
3.5 Manned Air Vehicle System and Integration
3.5.1 Reference Architecture Contemporary manned rotorcraft has avionic suites composed of a number of integrated systems that form the core avionics for the aircraft. Specific mission role related equipment, that provide Mission Systems/Equipment capabilities, are either integrated or federated architectures. A reference architecture has been identified, highlighting the impacts foreseen by the MUM-T capability for both legacy and NGR platforms, with specific MUM-T capabilities that will be integrated in the Mission System by the Mission Management System. SWaP (Size, Weight and Power) elements applicable to legacy platforms are also provided to guide the definition of the NGR requirements.
3.5.2 NGR Architecture A MOSA type architecture – envisaged for NGR aircraft family - will accommodate several modules to provide the necessary mission flexibility. Spiral upgrade methodology will permit the required capabilities to be added, using controlled delivery of the OPSW (Operational Software) integrated in the Mission System. Specific details are provided at Section 5 of ANNEX E.
3.6 Outline Technical Demonstration Program
Although the execution of a MUM-T experimental demonstrations (from Year 2020 to Year 2030) is not part of this task, a description of the envisaged capabilities is provided as a part of a HVT (High Value Target) Exercise, where the following architectures could be demonstrated and evaluated:
1) Control of UAV from a helicopter 2) Small UAV launched for a door of a helicopter 3) Small UAV launched from a pylon from a helicopter
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -20-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
4) Large UAV launched from a helicopter 5) UAV recovered to a helicopter (fixed wing UAV) 6) UAV recovered to a helicopter (Multirotor) with the support of NATO helicopter operators and under appropriate certification and airworthiness rules, limited to the exercise time. The description is based on the three MUM-T packages that will be deployed with a proper mission mix. Annex E Para 6 provides the description of each packages and their intended use.
Chapter 4: Implications on Human Machine Interface and Automation Development
4.1 Introduction Human factors are a fundamental element when considering the introduction of MUM-T capability. In addressing the associated challenges, improvements in HMI are proposed together with the inclusion of AI/Automation technologies.
Chapter 4 provides a precis of the work done in this area in support of SG227. This is supported by the more detailed commentary provided in Annex F.
4.2 The Human Factor MUM-T provides tactical and operational gains by increasing the availability of effects (sensors, weapons, communication, jamming, counter- measures) that can be delivered by the team. However, this increase comes at a price in the form of workload intensive operations that cannot be performed without evolutionary improvements to existing interfaces and autonomy technologies.
Future cockpit designs will need to consider HMI advancements in visualization techniques in order to present off board sensor data to the operators as well as deliver reductions in crew workload. The HMI design methodology associated with MUM-T operations are illustrated at Figure 4.1.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -21-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Figure 4.1: MUM-T Human Machine Interface Design Methodology
Additionally, future MUM-T operators will need low workload methods and autonomy management decision aids to rapidly task and re-task teams of unmanned assets.
The introduction of MUM-T technology into the cockpit of legacy and/or current generation rotorcraft will result in an increased level of mission management, and the existing architecture of the proposed manned platform will have an impact on the ability to integrate a MUM-T capability. Therefore, given that the introduction of a MUM-T will require modification of the existing HMI it may be considered impractical (from a cost and time perspective) to attempt to retro-fit early generation aircraft with a MUM-T capability.
Additionally, the increased workload associated with the introduction of MUM-T must not exceed what is deemed a safe or acceptable level. Therefore, any decision to integrate a MUM-T capability into legacy and/or current generation rotorcraft needs to be cognisant of current aircrew workloads such that the overall effect is close to workload-neutral; it is suggested that in doing this, the level of MUM-T capability will be limited.
4.3 Development of the MUM-T Human Machine Interface An optimized cockpit HMI which is conceived with the recognition of a MUM-T role, will be critical to realizing the full utility of a MUM-T capability. Whilst the visual sense will remain the critical conduit, this will be enhanced by the provision of monaural and binaural audio cues to enable crew to utilise fused sensor imagery from both onboard and off board sensor resources, overlaid with accurately displayed color-coded symbology, thereby delivering enhanced situational awareness information in an intuitive and timely manner.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -22-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
The HMI must enable rapid and accurate management of platform resources, including sensor and weapons, and the capability to share command and control information in multi-platform operations in a very dynamic operational environment without adversely impacting pilot workload. Specific HMI optimization will include the use of techniques such as Color Symbology, Perspective view (or 3D) conformal symbology, 3D audio cues, and Head/Eye/ Iris tracking.
The resultant HMI subsystem will leverage intelligent planning systems, optimized workflows, and real-time decision aids to assist operators in workload management, and will include: i) Innovative Head Down Display Pilot Vehicle Interfaces ii) Advanced Helmet Mounted Display Technology iii) Multimodal Display Input and Interaction Schemes, incl. voice control
4.3.1 Head Down Displays Head down displays will be used to provide wide area situational awareness and enable effective mission planning and monitoring; the so called “Gods Eye View”. In current/legacy implementations these displays will still utilise traditional flat panel displays optimised for the task at hand. For effective MUM-T operations, head down display Pilot Visual Interfaces (PVIs) should display primary flight information, subsystem statuses, and provide interfaces to interact with the autonomous teammates. A large battlespace management surface will allow the operators to maintain situational awareness and monitor teamed asset status and progress.
4.3.2 Helmet Mounted Display Technology The inherent capabilities delivered of HMD (or other wearable head devices) to reduce high workload situations are a critical enabling technology in the provision of enhanced Situation Awareness for pilot centred views, which in turn will enable mission managers more capacity to monitor and control deployment of MUM-T autonomous systems.
HMD core technology development programs are focused on delivering technology “building blocks” which will ensure that increased capability can be realised through modular (spiral) upgrade paths. Specific example development areas applicable to MUM-T capabilities include: i) Larger / wide field of view optical solutions, ii) Advanced helmet tracking/ Integrated eyeball/ iris tracking, iii) Compact and powerful display processing solutions, iv) Innovative 3D conformal symbology, v) Digital active noise reduction & integrated 3D audio,
4.3.3 Multimodal Display Input and Interaction Schemes It is envisaged that multimodal interaction technologies shall provide a solution that allows the operator to utilize individual modalities based on mission context and operator’s
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -23-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
available resources rather than saturating a single modality. Moreover, this technology will enable coupled control schemes that improve decision making and operational effectiveness. Technologies to provide assisted interaction with mission management systems include speech recognition systems, vibrotactile actuators, eye gaze, touch-based gesture controls and 3D Audio.
4.3.4 HMI Technology Development In examining the HMI technologies that would be necessary to support MUM-T operations, it is perceived that many are already at useful level of maturity, however, in order to utilise these to their fullest capability, the integration and optimisation of all of the technologies in combination is required.
4.4 Decision Support and Autonomy The human segment in MUM-T will quickly suffer from information overload without introduction automated decision support technologies. In order to minimize the workload associated with MUM-T operations, the autonomous assets will need to be capable of both actioning supervisory command and control inputs from manned operators and be equipped with autonomous teaming algorithms to optimize user specified mission objectives.
Current autonomous capabilities are limited by machine learning techniques, with little external visibility of how the result was obtained. Future autonomy capabilities and decision aids will need to emphasise explainable autonomy techniques, that expose algorithmic decision-making processes to the operator, in order to build trust between the human and automation.
4.4.1 Application of Autonomy in MUM-T Automation will be required to adapt and control the workload of human participation to a level that is sustainable and ensures mission success. Automation is not only used to reduce crew workload; automation will also be critical to realise an increased level of situational and environmental awareness across the entire battlespace and this is equally applicable to both the manned and unmanned segments, which will require automatic processing of sensor payload data in real time.
Command of a future teamed UAS will differ significantly from the direct (remote) control associated with legacy/current systems. The design aim is to deliver a UAS that behaves the same as a manned element within a MUM-T formation. The workload associated with the “command task” to be realised by the operator will be on the basis of task descriptions to the involved UAS, with the UAS providing appropriate reporting responses
With respect to the “control task” the automation shall be capable of solving simple problems on its own, whilst keeping the “human in the loop” when considering those issues that influence mission progress / efficiency or require operator decisions with respect to overall mission effectives or success
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -24-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
4.4.2 Autonomy in the Manned Segment To achieve the required abstraction level of controlling the Unmanned Segment, task- based guidance will be required. When considering the “One-To-Network” model for MUM- T, workload issues alone will preclude the human from executing direct command and control over multiple unmanned systems. Command and Control will be executed by the operator sending a command to the “network”, with the overarching “automated network intelligence” assessing the task and providing a solution to fulfil the operator tasks.
Automation of the manned platform pilotage task will also be necessary to ensure that the crew have sufficient capacity to manage the additional mission workload.
4.4.3 Autonomy in the Unmanned Segment Safety constraints associated with the human inhabited platform with dictate that the UAS behaviour shall be predictable with respect to the other MUM-T entities; however, the UAS also needs to avoid setting predictable pattern and potentially expose the location of the overall team. In order to deliver this capability, the UAS behaviour will need to be rule based on an abstract level on the first hand; multiple sources must be considered to provide input for these rules, such as the ICAO Rules of the Air1,local Rules of Engagement and task priorities.
Autonomy in the unmanned segment will also need to enable a deviation detection system, which is able to compare the current situation with the expected mission plan and propose or execute amendments.
Automation must also support the processing of UAS payload data such that the task associated with derivation of the tactical information out of the payload data is also automated and will also require real-time decision-based support to implement an understanding of the changing environmental model, incl. terrain, weather and tactical data. For example, artificial Intelligence based image processing technologies such as neuronal networks and machine learning could be applied to electro-optic based data. In addition, the solution algorithm will need to consider self-diagnosing capabilities in order to estimate resultant levels of accuracy.
4.4.4 Automation Technology Road Map In the longer term, UAS behaviour might develop by machine learning technologies during the on-going mission. Integrating MUM-T in such operations will require a powerful explanation component where the unmanned segment communicates derived intent to the manned segment in real time.
Developing Artificial Intelligence systems that are able to react within dynamic scenarios will require the system to have a thorough understanding of the overall operational environment and will require the Artificial Intelligence to Comprehend the environment,
1 Rules of the Air. s.l. : International Civil Aviation Organization, 2005. BDL-00002-000-15-E-P.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -25-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Perceive its progress towards achieving the mission and Project the current temporal situation into the future.
4.5 Integration The development of an integrated HMI, including the application of AI technologies will require extensive and realistic simulation/live virtual constructs to be developed and utilised, with progressively more complex and sophisticated scenarios in order to develop operator skills and trust in the AI/Autonomy features.
As concepts of employment and operation develop, the associated underpinning architecture will need to be sufficiently modular and flexible to support the evolving needs.
Chapter 5: Networking / Cyber/EW
5.1 Introduction This section summarizes “critical enabling technologies, technical architectures, requirements and technology challenges that would enable the implementation of rotorcraft manned/unmanned team concepts” in the framework of Cyber/EW, Data Link, Antenna, Networking and platforms.
5.2 Cyber /EW 5.2.1 Cyber/EW Definition/Concept
At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO Allies recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations – just like air, land and sea. NATO now has an overall approach on cyber defence summarized in Annex G ref. 11, but no definition/concept on CYBER/EW in the context of this study has been found in current NATO documents, justifying the investigation of DOD/MOD documents
For the purpose of this study, the following definitions/concepts have been used that are consistent with references in Annex G (ref. 11 FM 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic activities, dated Feb. 2014). Cyber EW consists of the following three activities: cyber electronic attack (cyber EA), cyber electronic protection (cyber EP), and cyber electronic warfare support (cyber ES).
5.2.2 Threats
Cyber electronic attack (cyber EA) Cyber EA is understood as the use of electromagnetic energy to attack an adversary’s electronics or access to the electromagnetic spectrum with the intent of destroying an enemy’s ability to use data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -26-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
This includes techniques such as: • Jamming • Intrusion • Interception and Detection • Denial of service attack, • Network sniffing, • Packet spoofing
Note: This study does not go further in details in those techniques, but will focus on the protection aspects, that means being resilient to enemy attacks using above techniques
Cyber electronic protection (cyber EP) Cyber EP is understood as any means taken to protect electronics from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of cyber EW that destroys ability to use data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures. Threats considered are: - Saturation: Radio spectrum saturation from overuse leads to relocating to new frequency bands. Higher frequency bands have the primary advantages of wider available bandwidths and fewer users. Of interest are the use of particular parts of Ka and E Band that offer good RF performance and have less competition for regulatory permission from spectrum management authorities. Another cyber EP advantage of relocating to a new frequency band is to move away from the currently deployed EW attack systems from adversaries, which are currently heavily focused on frequencies at Ku band and below.
Laser technologies offer significant advantages for cyber Electronic Protection but is hampered by inconsistent RF performance due to it’s vulnerability to common weather patterns found at the lower altitudes rotorcraft operate. Due to the unpredictable nature of laser communication connectivity, optical technologies are not recommended by this study group, but it should be monitored for future breakthroughs (See Annex G par. 3.3).
- Threats to network such as Denial of service attack, Network Sniffing, Packet spoofing, Malware, Man in the Middle” (MitM) attack, Trojans, Data Breaches will depend of the robustness of the network (see Annex G par 3.5 and 6).
- Information interception: This threat will be reduced by using encryption, discussed in Annex G, par 3.6, and concluding with the need for a NATO Interoperable wideband encryption system and the need to start investigating within NATO in the new quantum encryption technologies
- Future Threats (i.e. Directed Energy Weapons such as high-power microwave and laser system). For those threats there is a need to define a cyber resilience hierarchy applicable to military platforms (see Annex G Par. 3.7). Ultimately, the levels of the
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -27-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
cyber resilience hierarchy guide the discussion of what is feasible and best for both new and legacy military platforms.
- Threats to communications link (i.e. detect, exploit, and/or deny) could be minimized by using a low power tight beam provided by a highly directional antenna radiating only the minimum power required to maintain the link. For more on communication protection see appropriate waveform technologies (Annex G, par. 4) as well as appropriated Antenna (Annex G Par. 5)
Cyber electronic warfare support (cyber ES) Cyber ES is any action to locate sources of electromagnetic energy from networked systems for the purpose of immediate threat recognition or conduct of future operations.
Note: This aspect has not been further examined as being part of dedicated assets designed for locating and identifying sources of electromagnetic energy from networked systems
5.2.3 Additional comments
Other elements have an impact on cyber security such as: - Strict procedures. Indeed, cybersecurity vulnerabilities could arise from carelessness or negligence on the part of those using the systems. This call for better resiliency (Annex G Par. 3.7) but also for new identification systems such as biometric identifiers. - Design: Bolting on cybersecurity late in the development cycle or after a system has been deployed is more difficult and costlier than designing it in from the beginning. Considering cybersecurity in the earliest phases of system design is also a key issue highlighted in the (US) Government Accountability Office report on cyber security. (Annex G, Ref.14 and 15)
5.3 Data link/Waveform The Data Link provides the Command and Control (C2) link to the UAV for MUM-T operations. The waveform used for C2 should be Low Probability of Detect (LPD), Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) and Anti-Jam (AJ) for increased mission effectiveness. It is important to note that some features that improve LPD/LPI performance can reduce the anti-jam effectiveness, and vice-versa, so it is not always desired to operate with all features all the time. Thus, the data link needs to be able to host a waveform that can sense and dynamically adapt to its environment in real time. It should operate as LPD/LPI when covertness is the top priority but be able to instantly switch into an AJ mode to maintain a solid link through active jamming by an adversary to ensure mission effectiveness. Maintaining positive UAV control during MUM-T operations is a top priority.
The Data Link should employ advanced features and waveforms that give it advantages in spectrum efficiencies, LPD/LPI/AJ performance, multiple user access, and supports advanced Networking protocols, Today, NATO has standardized two waveforms:
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -28-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
STANAG 7085 for high speed, secure transmission/reception of data for multiple applications, including Remote Video Terminal. However, STANAG 7085 does not meet MUM-T requirements. It is thus recommended to push for a NATO interoperable data link architecture standard meeting MUM-T network requirement (i.e. network oriented)
STANAG 4660, lower speed data link (100 K bps) for robust and secure transmission / reception of data and control of UAS. However, STANAG 4660 also do not meet MUM-T requirements (i.e. more than 5 nodes)
It is recommended to update or replace STANAG 7085 to meet MUM-T requirement and continue to evolve LPI/LPD/AJ waveforms that can dynamically adapt to the environment to defeat various types of RF detectors and is resilient to operate through various types of jammers.
5.4 Antenna Antennas and their integration on the manned platforms, as well as on the unmanned ones, need to answer several challenges: they shall not create additional drag (conformal designs needs to be considered), they shall be located far enough from the platform rotating parts (e.g. rotorcraft’s blades) and they shall allow the formation of highly directional beams to remain LPI/LPD, and not compromise the stealth. They also need to facilitate connections between UAS and manned platforms at altitudes and locations that will vary throughout the mission.
Recommended Antenna Technologies Electronically Scanned Array (ESA) technology looks ideal for a highly directional antenna solution. Compared to omnidirectional antennas, which have been the backbone of the DoDs/NATO communications systems for 60+ years, ESAs offer higher gain, reconfigurable beam patterns, and microsecond beam scanning speeds. Due to their planar nature, they are ideally suited to integrate with the exterior aircraft structure, making them conformable. This gives them two benefits: 1) not adding any drag to the platform, 2) not adding to the Radar Cross Section (RCS). The technology is also suitable to support maturing sidelobe active cancelling/nulling techniques which further improves LPI/LPD/AJ performance.
The active components in current ESA antennae generate a tremendous amount of excessive heat that must be managed. Early generation ESAs required liquid cooling, but progress is being made with better thermal materials and use of more efficient components. Thermal management should be addressed up front to assess impacts to the platform. Improvements in thermal management should be sought to consider: 1) developing innovative cooling techniques, which might include something like heat pipe technologies 2) use of materials with better thermal properties, and 3) using more efficient, low-power components to decrease the generated heat as much as possible.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -29-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
One of the historical challenges that have kept ESA technology from seeing widespread adoption is the cost of implementation. This challenge is improving to provide ESA technology with capability sets and price points that will enable widespread adoption of next gen directional data links. However, the relatively high amount of heat radiated by ESA antennas will need to be considered for their integration (cooling techniques, etc.) in the airframe. Metamaterial antennas might solve significant size and integration issues. Due to the properties of metamaterials (namely values for electromagnetic permeability and permittivity that cannot be found in nature), it is possible to overcome common size constraints linked to the antenna wavelength. More information on Metamaterial is provided in Annex G (para 5).
5.5 Networking The obvious task of a network is to route information among all participating units. Especially in an airborne environment, this quickly can get challenging with size, number of units, and distances between them.
Fig 5.5 – Typical Airborne Network
Because of the agility of the aircraft, static routing is not possible. Therefore, technologies for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) or Flying Ad-hoc Networks (FANET) should be considered. To solve the problem of topology changes, Hybrid Routing Protocols are most promising for future use in FANET. This is because they are fit for both small and large
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -30-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
topology sizes, their signalling overhead is average, and the communication latency is relatively low. Further technical information is contained in the Annex G. Network protocols are available to solve this task. Scalability (in the sense of number of participants) and performance (e.g. throughput, delay) have to be evaluated, preferably by simulation. Physical layers (i.e. radios) that are capable for this have to be identified. Additionally, routing protocols have to be adapted to and optimized for the use in MUM-T. In “everyday life” the shortest path usually is the best. In MUM-T other parameters have to be used to search for a usable path. These include bandwidth (in case video has to be routed and some UAV do not provide adequate bandwidth), latency (in case time-sensitive data has to be transmitted). These specific requirements must be supported by the protocol. If not already available, they must be implemented.
5.6 Platform Unmanned and manned airborne systems increasingly rely on autopilot control systems that eliminate or limit human in the loop requirements. To ensure safety and security when operating in friendly and hostile environments, robust coding standards and secure development practices are required. Mission critical systems are increasingly reliant on software for a wide range functions including but not limited to flight controls, payload controls, communications, navigation, and surveillance. Vulnerable systems dependent on external sensors such as GPS, radar, LIDAR, vision, and IR sensors are susceptible to sensor spoofing. Threats include attempts to gain access to programmable hardware components and threats to sensors for the purpose of manipulating the environment to send false data [Ref: 16-Annex G – c) applicable to Launch, Operations, and Recovering] [ human factors] [a) mission utility b) critical enabling technologies].
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Overall Concept of MUM-T Operations – Technological constraints
6.1.1 Conclusions
C1 Team 1’s role in the study was to generate and test suitable scenarios for the other teams to exploit. However, these 5 scenarios are not considered comprehensive enough for broader use. C3 The three most important options in terms of mission effectiveness are: 1. Escort UAV (E-UAV); 2. Air Launched Effector UAV (ALE-UAV) and 3. Optionally Manned Rotorcraft (OMR) and the Future NGR. C5 Airborne recovery for selected UAVs is assessed as viable;
6.1.2 Recommendations
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -31-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
R1 The scenarios developed for SG 227 analysis should be tested and validated by national and NATO authorities for further use R2 Improve and mature Air Launched Effector UAVs to enable manned platform stand-off capabilities R3 TTPs and Doctrine for MUM-T operation are required R4 Airborne recovery of UAVs needs further study.
6.2 Architecture and Concept of Integration
6.2.1 Conclusions
C1 A modular multinational interoperable architecture to support MUM-T operations has been identified for legacy and future platforms. C2 Open system standards including Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA) will be required to support high-speed processing and modular construction for legacy and NGR platforms C3 Data link technologies with suitable performance / bandwidth to enable concurrent multiple data streams in the range of 100 Gb/s will be required C4 Unmanned platforms release and recovery is a major technical challenge, including the performance differences of the manned aircraft involved C5 AI (machine learning, “deep learning”, image analysis etc..) will be required to fully exploit the UAV functionality and provide the necessary autonomy and capability of the UAV system(s) when operating either automatically or in close MUM-T cooperation
6.2.2 Recommendations
R1 A modular multinational MUM-T subsystems architecture developed in this study should be demonstrated by simulation or demo R2 Implement/mature the use of AI algorithms and data. R3 Common C2 architecture is required for connectivity with ground forces R4 Next generation aircraft should be designed to include advanced MUM-T requirements from their conceptual stage.
6.3 HMI / Automation
6.3.1 Conclusions
The additional tasks resulting with advanced MUM-T are associated with the planning, flight, health status monitoring and payload control of UAS(s) together with analyse of the data generated by the UAS sensors. Adding these tasks to the aircrew in the manned platform can only be achieved if capacity can be created in the current (high) workload. This can be accomplished by significant improvements in HMI, a significant ‘easing’ to the
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -32-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
manned platform pilotage task, a sharing of mission management duties and the adoption of AI/Automation technologies.
To achieve this objective, it has been concluded that the HMI will need to improve in the following areas: • Usage of multimodal HMI technologies in combination. • Task / service request-based interaction with UAS, using natural language voice commands. • Adoption of a common platform user interface for interaction with UAS, irrespective of the type and capability of the UAS.
Support from high level AI/Automation technologies is also anticipated in the following areas: • Data fusion and data analysis tasks enabling identification of potential areas/objects of interest. • Mission decision aids based on the automatic analysis of substantial data from various sources. • Tactical auto routing capabilities • Autonomous flight capabilities, in the manned platform • Intelligent UAS network service that provides appropriate effects based on the manned platform request.
Single pilot operations present the most stressing scenario where adaptable AI technologies, providing a range of additional support measures, will be necessary in response to a real time measure of pilot stress levels.
The inclusion of these significant changes to legacy platforms may be cost prohibitive and as such the MUM-T capability in these platforms will have operational limitations.
6.3.2 Recommendations
The above conclusions are underpinned by the following recommendations:
R1 Next generation aircraft should be designed to include advanced MUM-T requirements from their conceptual stage. R2 The combination of multimodal HMI technologies, decision support tools, data fusion capabilities and autonomous behavior requires further development and integration to provide an optimized mix for changing conditions, including system failure cases. R3 It is strongly recommended that Single pilot MUM-T operations are supported by physiological monitoring and adaptive autonomy. R4 Extensive and realistic simulation/live virtual construct should be developed and utilized, with progressively more complex and sophisticated scenarios in order to develop trust in the advanced MUM-T autonomy concepts.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -33-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
R5 Develop a NATO standard for the platform HMI, including voice commands, to support advanced MUM-T. R6 Future architectures and HMI need to be sufficiently modular and flexible to support evolving platform, UASs and teaming concepts.
6.4 Data Link - Networking - Cyber/EW
6.4.1 Conclusions
C1 There are many factors that need to be considered and balanced in selecting the operating frequency such as: required bandwidth, atmospheric absorption limitations to performance, spectrum availability and government regulatory approval, and the presence of currently fielded detectors/jammers. C2 A rapidly growing threat to data link performance is Cyber EW attacks that detect and jam RF operations. Being able to operate in a hostile electromagnetic environment is critical to mission success. Key features to consider that influence LPD/AJ performance are the waveform and antenna. C3 The primary role of the antenna is radiate electromagnetic energy for the Data Link, however, it can have secondary effects on the platform in terms of aerodynamic drag and Radar Cross Section (RCS). It is important to consider the antenna technology implemented and placement on the platform.
C4 NATO does not have a standardized cryptographic solution. This disrupts the ability of collaboration between countries to operate securely. A commonly agreed upon cryptographic solution is needed for interoperability between NATO member countries. C5 The networking concept supporting MUM-T has some unique challenges that need to be considered. Current Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) protocols need to evolve to accommodate those challenges. C6 Evaluating current NATO waveform standards do not meet the bandwidths, network architectures, and Cyber EW requirements to meet the MUM-T mission. STANAG 7085 and STANAG 4660 are insufficient.
6.4.2 Recommendations
R1 Operate in either Ka or E-band frequencies to take advantage of wider available bandwidths, less congestion, easier regulatory approvals, and smaller components. R2 Advance the evolution of LPD waveforms to defeat energy, structure, and feature detectors and hide the signal below the noise floor. Build a living library of field updateable countermeasures to defeat the latest jammer threats. A common NATO threat database should also be considered. R3 The use of directional antennae and rapidly dynamic closed loop power control reduces the electronic signature to make the platform harder to detect by an adversary.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -34-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
R4 The antenna system should be comprised of two to four conformable ESA panels that are distributed around the aircraft to provide a full 360°-degree Field of View (FOV) in azimuth. Use of conformal antennae reduces the platforms RCS, increasing its survivability. Investigate and enhance the use of metamaterials in the antenna to reduce the antenna size. R5 Standardize a common cryptographic solution among NATO members. R6 Define a hybrid networking protocol to support the unique aspects of the MUM-T mission. R7 Update or replace STANAG 7085 to include the networking, Cyber EW and wider bandwidths that are anticipated for meeting the MUM-T mission.
.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED -35-
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX A ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Annex A Teams responsibility versus study Objectives
Tasks Teams Team 1 – Team 2 – Team 3 – Team 4 – Concept of Architecture HMI/Automation Networking/ Study Objectives Operations and Cyber/EW Concept of Integration a) To identify and 1.Identify and assess the military assess the military utility of advanced utility of advanced L manned/unmanned manned/unmanned teaming, including teaming the development of 2. Development of representative representative L mission scenarios. mission scenarios Identify unique 3.Identify unique platform platform capabilities capabilities L S required for each required for each scenario scenario b) To identify 1.Identify critical critical enabling enabling L technologies, technologies technical 2.Identify technical L architectures, architectures requirements and 3.Identify technology requirements and challenges that technology would enable the challenges that implementation of would enable the L S S rotorcraft implementation of manned/unmanned rotorcraft team concepts. manned/unmanned team concepts c) To define 1.Define options S L S S options for the for the launch, launch, operation 2.operation L S S and recovery of an 3.and recovery of unmanned system an unmanned (fixed and/or rotary system (fixed S L S S wing) under the and/or rotary wing) control of the under the control of manned rotary the manned rotary
NATO UNCLASSIFIED A-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX A ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Tasks Teams Team 1 – Team 2 – Team 3 – Team 4 – Concept of Architecture HMI/Automation Networking/ Study Objectives Operations and Cyber/EW Concept of Integration wing platform (one- wing platform (one- to-one, one-to- to-one, many and/or mixed 4.one-to-many S L S S formations). 4.and/or mixed S L S S Optimize and formations). document the three 5.Optimize and best options. document the three S L best options. d) To identify and 1.Identify and document the document the systems systems engineering and engineering and L S S integration issues integration issues associated with a associated with a typical manned typical manned rotorcraft platform, rotorcraft platform to include an 2.Include an estimate of the estimate of the weight penalty weight penalty L associated with the associated with the addition of the addition of the manned/unmanned manned/unmanned team capability. team capability e) to define and 1.Define and identify challenges identify challenges S L in the human- in the human- machine interface, machine interface identify methods to 2.Identify methods mitigate the human to mitigate the factors and human factors and workload issues workload issues inherited by the inherited by the S L manned platform manned platform pilots when pilots when operating in a operating in a manned/unmanned manned/unmanned team mode, and team mode recommend 3.Recommend concepts for concepts for human machine human machine L interaction for the interaction for the control and control and
NATO UNCLASSIFIED A-2 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX A ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Tasks Teams Team 1 – Team 2 – Team 3 – Team 4 – Concept of Architecture HMI/Automation Networking/ Study Objectives Operations and Cyber/EW Concept of Integration exploitation of exploitation of unmanned unmanned systems systems f) To propose a 1.Propose a viable viable representative representative technology technology development development program to develop program to develop this capability over L S S S this capability over time with time with identifiable identifiable incremental incremental capability capability enhancements enhancements.
Specific Issues to be addressed a) Identify and 1.Identify and document the document the technical technical architecture architecture required to required to L incorporate the incorporate the S manned/unmanned manned/unmanned advanced teaming advanced teaming capability into the capability into the command2 command rotorcraft platform rotorcraft platform b) Identify the 1.Identify the technology technology challenges challenges excluding excluding certification issues certification issues L S that exist today that exist today and in the near and in the near term that would term that would preclude or delay preclude or delay the implementation the implementation
2 Command, as used in this study proposal refers to the manned rotorcraft platform directing the operations (launch, operations, recovery) of the unmanned platform.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED A-3 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX A ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Tasks Teams Team 1 – Team 2 – Team 3 – Team 4 – Concept of Architecture HMI/Automation Networking/ Study Objectives Operations and Cyber/EW Concept of Integration of the of the manned/unmanned manned/unmanned advanced teaming advanced teaming capability. Develop capability and document 2.Develop and methods to document methods L mitigate any to mitigate any S identified identified technology gaps. technology gaps c) Define the 1.Define the various manned various manned rotorcraft and rotorcraft and unmanned options unmanned options L S (rotorcraft, fixed (rotorcraft, fixed wing, or wing, or combination combination thereof). Place in thereof). priority order the 2.Place in priority three best options order the three based on mission best options based effectiveness, on mission technology effectiveness, challenges, near technology L S term (5 to 10 challenges, near years) term (5 to 10 implementation years) and cost. implementation and cost. d) Identify any 1.Identify any penalty (weight, penalty (weight, aerodynamics ....) aerodynamics ....) associated with associated with L S incorporating the incorporating the manned/unmanned manned/unmanned capability in the capability in the command platform. command platform Identify the specific 2.Identify the equipment that specific equipment created the penalty that created the L and the physical penalty and the value of the physical value of element creating the element the penalty.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED A-4 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX A ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Tasks Teams Team 1 – Team 2 – Team 3 – Team 4 – Concept of Architecture HMI/Automation Networking/ Study Objectives Operations and Cyber/EW Concept of Integration creating the penalty. e) Clearly identify 1.Identify and and define the define the specific specific human human factors factors issues issues associated associated with the with the incorporation of incorporation of L advanced advanced manned/unmanned manned/unmanned capabilities in capabilities in single or dual single or dual piloted command piloted command platform. platform. f) Identify and 1.Identify and define human- define human- machine interface machine interface concepts to concepts to S S L command and command and control the control the unmanned unmanned systems, and to systems rapidly understand 2.Identify and and interpret the define human- information they machine interface provide. concepts to rapidly S S L S understand and interpret the information they provide. g) Conduct an 1.Conduct an analysis of the analysis of the aircrew workload aircrew workload associated with the associated with the S S L addition of the addition of the manned/unmanned manned/unmanned capability. Identify capability methods or 2.Identify methods alternatives to or alternatives to reducing any reducing any S S L workload workload increases. increases.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED A-5 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX A ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Tasks Teams Team 1 – Team 2 – Team 3 – Team 4 – Concept of Architecture HMI/Automation Networking/ Study Objectives Operations and Cyber/EW Concept of Integration h) Identify and 1Identify and document the document the system integration system integration issues associated issues associated with incorporating with incorporating L S the the manned/unmanned manned/unmanned capability into capability into existing command existing command platforms. platforms L= Lead; S= Support
NATO UNCLASSIFIED A-6 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX B
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Annex B Members Contribution This annex contains real participation and could be slightly different from the Study Order (Annex 1)
Meet Meet Meet Meet Meet Meet Meet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NIAG SG 227 - Members Participation
Company 4-5 11-12 6-7 30-31 14-15 13-14 14-16 Name First name Last Name Role May June Sept Oct Jan Mar May Rapport. S-LabConsult/GaiT Georges, L THIBAUT T4 v v v v v v v (UN)MANNED NV Mehmet GUNDUZ T2 v v v v Thierry de BOISVILLERS T1 v v v v v Airbus Helicopter -FR Damien CHEVREY T2 v v v v
Rockwell Collins -France T4 v Pierre DUBOIS Deputy v v v v Elektroniksystem- und Logistik T3- v GmbH (ESG) Tobias PAUL Deputy v v v v v Hensoldt Sensors GmbH Thomas MÜNSTERER T3 v v v v Juergen BITTNER T4 v v IABG Thomas SCHMID-ZUREK v P&L&S Consulting Kurt HAUSLER T2 v v v T1 ADC Mario DE LUCIA Deputy v v v v v v Consortium for Research on Intelligence and Security Services (CRISS) Carlino CASARI T3 v v v v W.L. Gore & Associati S.r.l Andrea ZAMPIERI T2 v v v
NATO UNCLASSIFIED B-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX B
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Andrea MENCONI T2 v v v
v Paoloandra (Paolo) CASTELLETTII T1 v v v v
Leonardo Company- IT VC v Marco GAZZANIGA T2 Lead v v v v v Pier Antonio CATELLA T3 v Andrea MACCAPANI T1 v Alessandro MASSA v v VITROCISET -IT Silvio MAZZARO T1 v v S3Log Dr. Bruno DI MARCO T1 v v v v Grey Moose José ROSA DIAS v v v v v ASELSAN Fahri Ersel ÖLçER T2 v v v v v 2Excel Aviation Ltd/Ascalon v Defence Paul KENNARD T1 lead v v v v v v BAE Systems Pascal NORMAN v v v v Callen-Lenz Associates Limited Andrew (Andy) WALBRIDGE T2 v v v v
Leonardo Helicopters-UK Andrew Sean MERRICK T3 Lead v v v v v v v
Nexus Imaging Ltd // Nexus T2 v Nine Mark LUPTON Deputy v v v v Grant POWELL v NOVA Systems John William LeGrys LING TI v v v v v Sean STOREY v THALES UK Kieran SMITH T3 v v v Trevor WOOLVEN T3 v v v v BAE Systems - US Anthony MITCHELL T4 v v
NATO UNCLASSIFIED B-2 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX B
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
VC v The Boeing Company Michael C. DUDLEY T4 Lead v v v v v Daniel (Dan) NEWMAN v HONEYWELL* Howard (Howie) WIEBOLD T1 v v v Ryan Clark BEARD T4 v L3 Technologies Timothy (Tim) ALMOND T4 v Kil SAWFORD T4 v v v Piasecki Aircraft Corporation Luigi U. RICCI MORETTI v Daniel TOY T1 v v Rockwell Collins -Inc / Collins Aerospace Emily FLAHERTY-WOODS T3 v v v Geoffrey SHAPIRO T3 v v Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation a LM Company Rajindar (Raj) KAUSHIK CH v v v v v v v 27 28 28 24 19 27 8
SFAE-MSL-CRO Alan L. (leigh) MOORE QRT v v v v v v v US Army Matthews (Matt) WHALLEY QRT v v v v 29 29 30 25 21 28 10
NATO UNCLASSIFIED B-3 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX C
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Annex C Meetings Schedules and Reports (The period of the study is from April 2018 to June 2019)
Meet #1: KOM: 4-5 April at Shelton (CT-US) Host: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
Meet #2:11-12 June 2018 at Vergiate (IT) - Host: Leonardo Helicopter
Meet #3: 6-7 September 2018 - Prague (CZ) – Host: Honeywell
Intermediate brief report to the JCG VL: 19 September 2018 (NATO HQ)
Meet #4: 30-31 October 2018 - Verona (IT) Host: W.L. Gore
Intermediate brief report to NIAG: 15 November 2018 (Berlin-GE)
Meet #5:14-15 January 2019 - Mesa (AZ-US) - Host: Boeing
Meet #6:13-14 Mars 2019 - Lisbon (PT) - Host: Grey Moose
Meet # 7:14-15-16 May 2019, Editorial Meeting - London (UK)-Host: NexusNine
Delivery of the Final Report: end of June 2019
Final Brief Report to Sponsor: 12 September 2019, in conjunction with the DSEI 2019 - Defence & Security Event (London, 10-13 September)
Final Brief Report to NIAG: NIAG Fall 2019 meeting / Spring 2020 meeting (TBC)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED C-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Annex D Report on Overall Concept of MUM-T Operations
CONTENT 1. Introduction 2. MUM-T Vignettes 2.1 Introduction and Assumptions 2.2 Vignettes Vignette # 1 Reconnaissance Vignette # 2 Attack Vignette # 3 Transport - Air Mobile Vignette # 4 Aero Medical Evacuation Vignette # 5 Specialized Tasks - Personnel Recovery - CSAR 3. UAV Attributes Matrix 4. Technology Constraints
1. Introduction
Team 1 was assigned the lead for 5 devolved tasks;
1. Identify & assess the military utility of advanced manned/unmanned teaming; 2. Development of representative mission scenarios (for the other teams to use in developing their own concepts and systems); 3. Identify unique platform capabilities required for each scenario; 4. Define the various manned rotorcraft and unmanned options (rotorcraft, fixed wing or combination thereof); 5. Place in priority order the three best options based on mission effectiveness, technology challenges, near term (5-10 years) implementation and cost.
Team 1 members and roles/backgrounds are summarised at Table D1 below. The deputy leader, Mario de Lucia, also managed a sub-team that conducted a “deep dive” into the detail behind the scenarios.
Name Nationality Company Background Remarks Paul Kennard UK 2Excel Aviation Ltd RAF CH-47 OT&E Pilot Team Lead Capability manager Mario de Lucia Italy ADC Aerospace engineer Dep Lead Project manager Allessandro Italy Leonardo Aerospace engineer Massa Paoloandrea Italy Leonardo Aerospace BD Castelletti Thierry De- France Airbus Helicopters FAF RW Pilot / Instructor Boisvilliers Aerospace BD
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Bruno Di Italy S3 Log Research PhD Marco Ex Unmanned Warrior
Table D1 – Team One Members
The following assumptions were used by Team One;
1. The “manned platform” would be based on the attributes reported by the NIAG SG-219 Next Generation Rotorcraft (NGR) study; 2. To contain the study to a practical size, 5 scenarios (broadly analogous to current ATP-49 doctrine) would be studied; 3. There would be only one manned platform per scenario. All other “players” were to be unmanned, providing the maximum stress on C3 and crew workload; 4. Launch and recovery of UAVs from the NGR would be studied; 5. None of the scenarios would examine the maritime applications of MUM-T. It was decided that Study Group 232, “Utility of Unmanned Vehicles in NATO ASW Operations”, would cover the utility of MUM-T in the maritime context.
Methodology. The starting point for developing the overall concept was the generation of a mission timeline, familiar to Mission Planners and Operators, and based upon standard Composite Air Operations (COMAO) planning techniques. This was used as the “top level” planning aid to tease out the key enablers and links. An example mission timeline is shown below at Figure D1.
Figure D1 – Exemplar Mission Planning Timeline
This timeline approach lent itself to the development of several more detailed scenarios based upon existing mission types derived from a number of sources such as ATP-49. Each scenario was hand drawn, discussed and amended until agreed for use. It was then “digitised” into an OV-1 style slide.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-2 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References The original whiteboard diagrams and digitised equivalents are included below for completeness. The detailed description of the vignettes is discussed in Para 2 (below).
2. MUM-T Vignettes
2.1 Introduction and Assumptions
The vignette approach provides to the system architect the easiest way to extract the operational requirements to be translated into significant elements of a Logical Architecture. The Logical Architecture, when fitted by specific hardware and software contents, becomes a Reference Architecture to meet specific requirements.
In general terms and according to the current practice, each vignette consists of a number of features as outlined below:
• Targets to be achieved • Narrative description • Operational steps along which the vignette develops – What are the trends – What is actually going on – What is in common between the actors and influencers • Main actors • Resources to be used
The vignettes that follow, developed according to a pre-determined template, are considered quite representative for MUM-T situational scenarios against threats of symmetric nature. They may be used for implementation in real/simulated version.
The capabilities of the assets are assumed to be in accordance with the standard level NGR envisaged for the next 25 years capabilities.
. The scenarios analysed to develop the vignettes refer to the following ATP-49 missions: 1. Reconnaissance 2. Attack 3. Transport - Air Mobile 4. Transport - Aero Medical Evacuation 5. Specialized Tasks - Personnel Recovery - CSAR
2.2 Vignettes
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-3 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Vignette # 1: RECONNAISSANCE
Principles and Characteristics
This vignette provides the description of a typical MUM-T RECCE mission conducted by at least one manned helicopter escorted by at least one UAV.
Recce is the precursor to all operations and may be accomplished through passive surveillance, technical means, human interaction, or by fighting for information;
The mission will be conducted: - NOE (Nap of the Earth), in an area at 6000ft altitude - In symmetric environment - In coordination with ground forces - In high contested electromagnetic environment. - In low visibility environment (Night or bad weather conditions) - FOB can be from a land base or from a navy vessel
The use of UAV’s intended to: - Reduce attrition rate (preserve high value manned helicopters) - Improve discretion on the battlefield - Reduce mission footprint of operation (reduce time on scene, reduce noise, avoid being detected)
Purpose of the Mission: This mission focuses on gathering tactical or technical information about enemy or terrain. When enemy localized, the mission consists in keeping the contact to transfer the enemy to other friend forces. The contact will then be passed to friendly ground forces for their subsequent actions. In some cases, force can be used to compel the adversary to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or intention of the force by making the adversary respond to offensive action. Dedicated armed Helicopters, with their standoff target detection and engagement ability, speed and lethal firepower, can employ this method very effectively. Recce in force can also determine the opponent’s willingness to fight.
Supported NATO Task(s)
Successful Recce operations are planned and performed according to the following Recce fundamentals:
− Gain and maintain adversary contact. − Orient on the Recce objective. − Report all information rapidly and accurately. − Retain freedom to manoeuvre. − Develop the situation rapidly. − Ensure maximum Recce force forward.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-4 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References − Ensure continuous Recce. − Avoid decisive engagement
Key planning elements which should be considered during the planning:
Before conducting a route Recce, the flight lead must know the following information: − Critical tasks to be accomplished by air Recce teams and ground elements, when used. − Any tasks that may be deleted during the Recce are identified. − Task organization. Any reinforcements, especially engineers, and their relationship to the company are identified. Supporting artillery relationships are also defined. − Start point, release point, and designation of the route. − Mission to be performed from the start point and after reaching the Release point. − Time the mission is to start and, if required, to be completed. − Critical points along the route identified as checkpoints. − IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield) information on the route and threat situation. − Any constraints or restrictions. − Expected weather conditions for the time of movement. − Type of unit or vehicles expected to use the route, if applicable.
Executive summary:
• The mission is performed in the frame of a brigade operation up to 160 NM mission radius with a speed up to 250 Kts. • The mission is prepared in coordination with all assets engaged: - Forward sensors (MALE drone, Satellite, fixed wings, ground forces…) - UAV’s available for the recce mission (Escort A and Tactical Effector G, long endurance UAV’s) • The manned reconnaissance helicopter is supported by the Escort UAV. Both are dedicated to find, report all threat and eventually to engage the enemy if required. • Tactical Effector UAV are released in operations area to provide additional situational awareness (approach with discretion a potential enemy area, to localize a threat, to provide precision targeting if needed.)
Modes of Action: 1) Mission Briefing (main focus on teaming Manned\Unmanned + based MALE information) 2) Ingress Phase to line of engagement (picture needs to be adjusted) 3) Start the reconnaissance and ensure continuous recce 4) Detect and identify 5) Report all information rapidly and accurately 6) Keep the contact 7) Engage the enemy if required 8) Transfer the enemy to other friend forces 9) Egress phase
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-5 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Narrative Description of the Vignette:
A. BACKGROUND A MALE UAV performs surveillance to achieve situational awareness regarding relevant defensive assets and any other possible threats. This activity initiates before the mission start and keeps throughout the entire mission.
B. MISSION PLANNING AND PREPARATION • The first phase is the definition of the goals of the mission. • The mission is planned according to the goals defined at the previous step, the orographic and geographic features of the scenario, the rules of engagement, the weather conditions, all the information acquired by the MALE UAV (see phase A), and any other intelligence information available. • The personnel involved is briefed on the plan and ROE (if required). The plan shall contain all information about last enemy situation, friend forces situation, environment, weather, ROE, command and control plan and reporting. Planning data contain all information regarding the helicopter and the UAV.
C. MISSION START The mission starts with the take-off, at minimum, of one armed reconnaissance helicopter and one UAV. Besides the manned VTOL, 2 types of unmanned A/C’s can take part in the action, namely: - Drone 1, with Attack, SEAD, Targeting and EW CM capabilities; - Drone 2, deployable from the Manned Helo; has high capabilities sensors for reconnaissance and precision Targeting.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-6 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Figure 1: Reconnaissance Mission Scenario, OV-1 Representation
D. INGRESS The helicopter, flying in formation with Drone 1, moves towards the operations area at cruise altitude. During this phase, Drone 1 moves ahead of the helicopter to provide additional situational awareness and NDAS, if needed.
E. RECCE (inside dedicated boundaries: Line of departure, lateral boundaries and phase lines) The formation descends to low altitude. All the rest of the mission is performed NOE. Both the manned and the Escort UAV will: - Recognize all terrain the threat can use to dominate movement along the route. - Recognize all checkpoints that could be suitable for ambush. - Find and report all threats that can influence movement along the route. - Identify suspicious items along the route (IEDs, VBIEDs, or ambush sites). - Constantly report about situation - Mapping
During all the recce phase, the MALE UAV is providing information to the recce formation.
In some specific cases, a Tactical Effector UAV can be launched to ensure a stealth and safe approach of a potential enemy location. This TE UAV can be especially efficient to make recce in urban areas (small, stealth, not noisy).
If required, the manned and Escort UAV can use their weapons to compel the adversary to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or intention.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-7 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
When located, the formation is following the enemy to determine its route or its activity
F. ENEMY TRANSFER (to friend forces)
Armed recce helicopter and E UAV keep the contact with the enemy and define with friend forces a point to transfer the enemy. The recce aircrafts ensure a visual transfer of the enemy to the friend forces.
G. EGRESS As soon as the ground forces are in touch with the enemy, both aircraft leave the area and return to a refuelling area to continue the mission if required.
Required Assets and Capabilities
• Armed recce Helicopter - Endurance: 3,5 - 4h - Weapons: Machine gun, canon, rockets, guided rockets - NOE in an area at 6000ft altitude - Satellite link: available - Capability to control an escort drone (drone 1) - Capability to carry (and control) one or more mini UAV (Drone 2)
• UAV type 1: Escort A (Attack + SEAD + Targeting + EW CM) - Endurance 6H to 8H • UAV type 2: Tactical Effector G (Long Endurance, Precision Targeting, Recoverable, Deployable from Manned Helo)
• Both Helo and UAV shall be equipped with:
- Passive systems (as far as possible) aimed at achieving maximum autonomy and survivability. - Defence Aid Suite to detect threats at a very early stage and eliminate them. ▪ Sensors to detect hostile electromagnetic activities ▪ Jammers to avoid being tracked, locked or engaged ▪ Laser weapons countermeasures - DVE systems to allow operation in degraded visual environment - High capabilities multi-sensors to capture information in bad weather and specific operational conditions
The MALE UAV is transferring information to both attack mission assets and HQ during the whole mission
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-8 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Vignette # 2: ATTACK
Principles and Characteristics
This vignette provides the description of a typical MUM-T attack mission conducted by at least one manned helicopter escorted by at least one UAV.
The mission will be conducted: - NOE (Nap of the Earth), - In symmetric environment - In coordination with Fixed wings unmanned and manned aircrafts. - In high contested electromagnetic environment. - In low visibility environment (Night or bad weather conditions) - FOB can be from a land base or from a navy vessel - In high altitude 6000ft required
The use of UAV’s intends to: - Reduce attrition rate (preserve high value attack helicopters) - Contribute to concentrate fire on the enemy (use of weaponized drones) - Provide information before, during and after the attack mission (real time) to help : o Situational awareness o Target localization o Target identification o Improve coordination of forces engaged o Assess Battle damage - Improve precision fire by contributing to targeting (Target designation closer to the enemy) - Reduce mission footprint of operation (reduce time on scene, reduce noise, avoid being detected)
Purpose of the Mission: This operation aims to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade or destroy an adversary’s military potential. Manned and unmanned aircrafts can also provide augmented situational awareness and precision fire support to ground forces in the pursuit of their objectives.
Since modern wars are driven by economics, cost effective systems are mandatory to ensure future military campaigns.
Doctrine employed ATP49 G has been taken as reference.
Supported NATO Task(s) Critical tasks accomplished during the conduct of this attack mission include the following;
- Perform deliberate or hasty attack planning.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-9 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References - Establish triggers for commitment of forces. - Establish bypass, engagement, and success criteria. - Conduct engagement area development and direct fire planning. - Isolate and destroy key adversary forces and capabilities. - Synchronize complimentary fire support and CAS to enable maneuver to and from the target. - Focus on key objectives and fleeting high value targets. - Perform BDA (Battle damage assessment)
Key planning elements, which should be considered during the planning
- Detailed air interdiction coordination - Thorough engagement area analysis and coordination - Detailed ingress/egress plan - T-Hour management (from higher) - Establishing weapons delivery technique and rules of engagement - Designating security responsibilities. - Coordinating for indirect fires (to include joint fires). - Determining FARP (forward arming and refuelling point) rotation. - Reporting combat information to higher. - Confirming a thorough command and control plan is in place to ensure coordination (air routes, relief on station, etc) as the situation develops.
Executive summary:
• The mission is performed in the frame of a brigade operation up to 160 NM mission radius with a speed up to 250 Kts. • The mission is prepared in coordination with all assets engaged : - Forward sensors (MALE drone, Satellite, fixed wings, ground forces…) - UAV’s available for the attack mission (Escort A and Tactical Effectors C) • Drone 1 (type: escort A) provides early warning for the attack mission through reconnaissance, screening, escort and targeting/firing during the attack • Drone 2 (type: Tactical Effector C) are released in operations area to provide additional situational awareness during the attack phase to localize the target, to provide precision targeting and to ensure tactical security of the operation (screen, flanc guard, cover)
Modes of Action: 10) Mission Briefing (main focus on teaming Manned\Unmanned + based MALE UAV (type: ISR E/F) information) 11) Ingress Phase to line of engagement (picture needs to be adjusted) 12) Approach to operations area 13) Release of the small UAV to improve SA (type: Tactical Effector C), identify target and ensure security of the operation (cover, flank guard)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-10 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References 14) Precision fire concentration (coordination between Manned and unmanned weaponized platforms) 15) Assess battle damage and report to ground forces 16) Egress phase
Narrative Description of the Vignette:
A. BACKGROUND A MALE UAV performs surveillance to achieve situational awareness regarding target, relevant defensive assets and any other possible threats. This activity initiates before the mission start and keeps throughout the entire mission.
B. MISSION PLANNING AND PREPARATION • The first phase is the definition of the goals of the mission. • The mission is planned according to the goals defined at the previous step, the orographic and geographic features of the scenario, the rules of engagement, the weather conditions, all the information acquired by the MALE UAV (see phase A), and any other intelligence information available. • The personnel involved is briefed on the plan and ROE. The plan shall contain all information about target, environment, weather, ROE, weapons delivery technique, coordination to direct fire, command and control plan and reporting. Planning data contain all information regarding the helicopter and the UAV.
C. MISSION START The mission starts with the take-off, at minimum, of one manned helicopter and one unmanned aircrafts. Besides the manned VTOL, 2 types of unmanned A/C’s can take part in the action, namely: - Drone 1, with Attack, SEAD, Targeting and EW CM capabilities; - Drone 2, is deployable from the Manned Helo; it has Precision Targeting, last minute RECCE capabilities and long endurance..
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-11 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Figure 2: Attack Mission Scenario, OV-1 Representation D. INGRESS The helicopter, flying in formation with the escort drone, moves towards the operations area at cruise altitude. During this phase, Drone 1 moves ahead of the helicopter to provide additional situational awareness and NDAS, if needed. The Drone 1 ensures the escort of the manned aircraft.
E. INSERTION The formation descends to low altitude. All the rest of the mission is performed NOE. The Helicopter/drone 1 receives in real time an updated situation of the area and the target from other assets (MALE drone, satellite…)
F. ACTIONS ON TARGET Attack helicopter and drone 1 remains at a safe distance from the target. Drone 2 is released shortly before reaching the operation area, approaches the target and provides additional situational awareness at a lower altitude and shorter distance. When target is localized and identified, drone 2 provides targeting to the other weaponized aircrafts. Other drone 2 (if any) are stationed close to the area to ensure the flanc-guard and cover the action Attack helicopter and drone 1 deliver the weapons in coordination (concentrate fire) and at distance from the target. Drone 2, closer to the action continue to provide situational awareness and assess the battle damage The Helicopter crew ensure the report to the command control
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-12 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
G. EGRESS Drone 2 is spent against an enemy target or self-destroyed. The formation returns to the secure zone in NOE, then proceeds to FOB at cruise altitude, still supported by Drone 1 capabilities, if it was not sacrificed during the action.
Required Assets and Capabilities
• Attack Manned Helicopter - Range of operation: 160 NM. - Speed: 250 Kts - NOE in an area at 6000ft altitude - Satellite link: available - Capability to control at least one Escort A drone (Drone 1) - Capability to carry (and control) one or more Tactical Effectors (Drone 2) - DVE Sensors.
• UAV type 1: Escort A UAV (Attack + SEAD + Targeting + EW CM) • UAV type 2: Deployable Tactical Effector (Precision Targeting + Last minute RECCE + Deployable from Manned Helo + Expendable
• Both Helo and UAV shall be equipped with:
- Passive systems (as far as possible) aimed at achieving maximum autonomy and survivability. - Defense Aid Suite to detect threats at a very early stage and eliminate them - Sensors to detect hostile electromagnetic activities - Jammers to avoid being tracked, locked or engaged - Laser weapons countermeasures - Optionally, the UAV can be equipped with DVE Sensors
• The MALE UAV is transferring information to both attack mission assets and HQ during the whole mission
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-13 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Vignette # 3: TRANSPORT - AIR MOBILE
Principles and Characteristics
This vignette provides the description of a typical MUM-T transport mission conducted by at least one manned helicopter escorted by at least one UAV. A military transport mission aims to the movement of troops or logistics supplies such as armament, ammunition, vehicles and any other military systems. Food, beverage and medicaments can also be transported, either for the military personnel or civilians on-site. However, personnel recovery, due to its peculiarities, is analyzed in Vignette 5, “Specialized Tasks”.
For this vignette has been taken as example a troop deployment mission, with some optional tasks.
Purpose of the Mission: Deployment and sustainment of combat forces and their equipment across the battlefield.
Doctrine employed ATP49 G has been taken as reference.
Supported NATO Task(s) The main mission is to carry out an air transport of troops. It supports as well: • ISR • Close Air Support • Combat Forces re-supply
Executive summary:
• The mission develops up to 300 NM mission radius with a speed up to 250 Kts. • FOB sends a plan to the drone(s) that is (are) tasked to support the helicopter performing early warning and other services • Drone 1 (type: Escort A) escorts the transport helicopter • Furthermore, Drone 1 uses satellite link to relay indication to the manned helicopter • If needed, Drone 3 (type: Resupply) provides re-supply to the to the combat forces at the appropriate point of the mission • Drone 2 (type: Tactical Effector C), if present, is released in operations area to provide additional SA and further secure the landing zone • All the mission is performed in NOE
Both Helo and UAV shall be equipped with Defense Aid Suite to detect threats at very early stage. The UAV should have also active capability to eliminate them. The MALE UAV (type: ISR E/F) is transferring information to both manned and unmanned assets throughout the mission.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-14 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Modes of Action: 1) Mission Briefing (main focus on teaming Man\Uman + based MALE information) 2) Ingress Phase to line of engagement (picture needs to be adjusted) 3) Re-supply operations by Transport UAV 4) Approach to operations area 5) Release of the Tactical Effector UAV’s to improve SA 6) Loading/Unloading under protection by escort drones 7) Egress phase
Narrative Description of the Vignette:
H. BACKGROUND A MALE UAV performs surveillance to achieve situational awareness regarding target, relevant defensive assets and any other possible threats. This activity initiates before the mission start and keeps throughout the entire mission.
I. MISSION PLANNING AND PREPARATION • The first phase is the definition of the goals of the mission. • The mission is planned according to the goals defined at the previous step, the orographic and geographic features of the scenario, the rules of engagement, the environmental and meteorological conditions, all the information acquired by the MALE UAV (see phase A), and any other intelligence information available. • The personnel involved is briefed on the plan. The plan shall contain all information about landing area, environment, weather and ROE. Planning data shall contain all information regarding the helicopter and the UAV.
J. MISSION START The mission starts with the take-off, at minimum, of one manned helicopter and one unmanned aircraft. Besides the manned VTOL, three types of unmanned A/C’s can take part in the action, namely: - Drone 1, always present, is an UCAV with Attack, SEAD, Targeting and EW CM capabilities; - Drone 2, optional, is deployable from the Manned Helo and is expendable in case of need; it has Precision Targeting and Last minute RECCE capabilities. - Drone 3, optional, is a Transport UAV for re-supplying the combat forces.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-15 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Figure 3: Transport - Air Mobile Mission Scenario, OV-1 Representation
K. INGRESS The helicopter, flying in formation with the drone(s), moves towards the operations area at cruise altitude. During this phase, Drone 1 moves ahead of the helicopter and overflies it to provide situational awareness data and NDAS, if needed.
L. INSERTION The formation descends to low altitude. All the rest of the mission is performed NOE. Drone 3, if present, re-supplies the troops. Afterwards, it may either return automatically to the FOB or be re-tasked to provide additional cargo capability, e.g. to perform troop extraction.
M. ACTIONS ON TARGET Once reached the target, the manned A/C lands quickly to perform it main task of combat forces deployment/extraction, while Drone 1 overflies the action zone to provide SA and support if needed. Drone 2, if available, has been released shortly before and provides support flying at a lower altitude.
N. EGRESS Drone 2 is spent against an enemy target or self-destroyed. The formation returns to the secure zone in NOE, then proceeds to FOB at cruise altitude, still supported by Drone 1 capabilities, if it was not sacrificed during the action.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-16 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Required Assets and Capabilities
• Transport Manned Helicopter - Range of operation: 300 NM. - Speed: 250 Kts - NOE in an area at 6000 ft altitude - Satellite link: available - Capability to carry (and control) one or more mini UAV
• Escort UAVs - High end/medium/low end • Scenario Combat radius: 160 NM • Speed: 250 Kts • Drone 1: type Escort A (Attack + SEAD + Targeting + EW CM) • Drone 2: type Tactical Effector C (optional): Deployable mini-UAV (Precision Targeting + Last minute RECCE + Deployable from Manned Helo + Expendable • Drone 3 (optional): type Resupply H (Transport UAV for re-supplying, 500Kg/2000Kg) the combat forces • Both Helo and UAV shall be equipped by Defence Aid Suite (active\passive) to detect threats at a very early stage and eliminate them • MALE UAV: type ISR E/F is transferring information to both attack mission assets and HQ during the whole mission
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-17 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Vignette # 4: TRANSPORT - AERO MEDICAL EVACUATION
Principles and Characteristics
This vignette provides the description of a Forward Aero Medical Evacuation (FAME) operation, often shortened to MEDEVAC, to achieve timely movement by helicopter and en-route care provided by medical personnel to wounded being transported from battlefield. Highly skilled medical crews rely on rotorcrafts for rapid access directly to the wounded, regardless of the proximity to the enemy positions: according to the above, MEDEVAC remains as a priority mission. Escort UAVs are considered a support to the mission success particularly for attacking the enemy defence facilities while approaching the landing area, thus facilitating a quick and relatively safe evacuation from the battlefield.
Purpose of the Mission In accordance with NATO STANAG 3204, Forward MEDEVAC is “…..the phase of evacuation which provides airlifts for patients between points within battlefield, as far forward as the point of wounding, to the initial point of treatment…..” This means that urgent casualties are evacuated from the area of operations to a support point (MTF Role 1) in less than 60 minutes within the so-called “golden hour” rule; if needed, the wounded is further moved to higher level facilities (Role 2 and 3). The concept of a “golden hour” in trauma has circulated for over 30 years and has long influenced the doctrine of military medicine. Immediate surgical interventions within the first 15 minutes after wounding has been shown to have no impact on survival. Therefore, emphasis has been placed on evacuating early survivors to the closest medical facility within 60 minutes, namely the “golden hour”. This model persists despite growing evidence that longer evacuation timelines may be acceptable.
Doctrine Employed AJP-4.10.1 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine covers the medical support for land, air and maritime operations including SOF. Disaster relief operations are covered as well.
Supported Tasks • Joint operations • High degree of flexibility and mobility • Achievement of lower average casualty rates than have traditionally been planned for an Article 5 scenario • Emphasis on medical support to achieve outcomes of treatment equating to best medical practice • Requirement to support humanitarian emergency situations • Asymmetric threats leading to adequate self-protection of medical assets
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-18 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
STANAG Compliance
STANAGs Title Current edition
2087 Medical Employment of Air Transport in 6 the Forward Area 3204 Forward MEDEVAC 8
Executive Summary Reports of the intelligence confirmed the presence of a HVT, a TL leading a preminent group of insurgents along the border of Afland and Pacland , presumably staying within a compound hideout of the nearest city to the border. The insurgents are active in guerrilla actions brought against Afland. Radio activities increase indicating the intention to transfer the TL to another location to deceive the intelligence. After confirmation by MALE flights improving the SA of the area through JISR and supported by HRC, the HQ decide to launch a SOF combined action, air and ground, to eliminate the HVT and the order is passed to OPS for execution. The raid is executed by night by SOF platoons carried by two transport helicopters to support the deployment, sustain of combat forces and their equipment across the battlefield. Once in view of the compound, one helicopter starts the descent while the other loses suddenly the control falling on the ground with the tail over the wall of the compound. The majority of the platoon can leave the helicopter while many SOF are seriously injured. The pilot decides to request a MEDEVAC operation from the FOB to recover the casualties. In the meantime, a MALE UAV overflies the compound to update the SA. A DUSTOFF unit leaves the FOB in Afland and, after crossing the border escorted by an armed UAV and a deployable UAV, lands in Pacland outside the compound. On the ground, the medical crew hop out and patients are laid on the litters. The helicopter remained on ground only few minutes. The full commando was flown to the Role 1 at FOB where it received on field medication; after that, three SOF were moved to another MTF Role 2 for medical treatment and one is evacuated by STRATEVAC to a Role 3.
FULL NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION A brigade is operating in an area of 160 x 160 NM within an out-of-area expeditionary NATO mission on the border between Afland and Pacland where ambushes and IED attacks are brought by groups of insurgents that intend to de-stabilize the area. Sometimes the local scenario involves amphibious operations. NATO HQ is established in Jalal- close to the FOB- to support Afland government: presently, there is a rising tension with Pacland that protects the terrorists operating along the border. Continuous firefights occur and, to this extent, DUSTOFF units are available at the FOB in Afland - some 80 NM from border (such as UH-60A Blackhawk with Red Cross symbol and a configuration of 3-6 patients litters; the medical crew consists of 2 EMB-T for en route interventions including active warming, intravenous access,……). Other FAME
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-19 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References platforms may be available (PEDRO based on HH-60 armed with miniguns and MERT based on CH-47 with miniguns and M60) upon short request. Within the brigade AOO, attacks were giving awareness of an ever increasing terrorist activity centered around a compound located in Attab at approximately 90 NM from the border in Pacland . MALE ISR activities increased to the point when the HQ was convinced that a HVT was in the compound: an air assault plan was formulated.
A combined action, by air and ground, is considered as the most viable with intervention of a SOF platoon. Mission is conducted stealthy in darkness (at 02.00 AM) to minimize Pacland air defence reaction. HAF and GAF are tasked to infiltrate the compound where a building has been identified as the most probable hideout of the TL. TL was supposed to live inside with the family and guerrillas in the compound at the outskirt of Attab (in Pacland at some 90 NM from the border); from that position, the TL was able to control the terrorist activity in many countries. One helicopter is close to HLZ on top of the suspect building: FRIES is activated to perform a fastrope of the SOF to the roof. The other helicopter loses suddenly the control falling on ground, the pilot is able to manage the descent until the machine stays with many SOF injured.
O. MISSION START At approximately 4 a.m. in the morning, the FOB located in Jalal receives the request message (the so called 9-line message through the combat/tactical radio) for a DUSTOFF unit to support survivors of the transport helicopter crash that had caused the casualties to SOF in the mission to extract the HVT. The Pilot-in-command went to be briefed minimally with main focus on the MUM-T details of the mission. The combat UAV, already loitering on target for protection of the HAF, is re- directed to escort the DUSTOFF unit. The MALE UAV continues performing surveillance to update the SA regarding the AOO including the target, relevant enemy AD defensive assets and any other possible threats. This activity was initiated before the mission start to continue all over the mission. Figure 4 and Figure 5 present an OV-1 according to NAF, showing the ingress and egress during the overall MEDEVAC operation.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-20 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Figure 4: Aero Medical Evacuation Mission, Ingress Phase Scenario, OV-1 Representation
• Figure 5: Aero Medical Evacuation Mission, Egress Phase Scenario, OV-1 Representation
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-21 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
P. INGRESS The helicopter, under coverage by the escort UAV, leaves the FOB flying at cruise altitude and aims to the Afland border. During this phase, the escort UAV moves ahead of the helicopter flying at a higher altitude to provide updated situational awareness data and NDAS. The helicopter reaches rapidly the cruise altitude by flying at night for some 80 NM in friendly airspace to the border between Afland and Pacland at the speed of 250 kts.
Q. INSERTION. Once entered into the hostile airspace, the helicopter starts a tactical descent to achieve a safe ingress to the line of engagement (approximately 90 NM from the border) flying NOE. The MALE UAV and the forces on the ground provide continuous information and SA, including RECCE data concerning insurgents’ movements and meteorological situation at the HLZ. The combat UAV approaches quickly the HLZ by loitering around to eliminate threats. HLZ is anticipated to the helicopter pilot and the landing occurs soon.
R. ACTIONS ON TARGET The HLZ was outside the compound close to the 4 m high wall (built to prevent inadvertent sight inside). On the ground, the crew hopped out heading toward the wounded SOF who were inside the compound previously supported by a combat lifesaver. The helicopter is put in security surrounded by those SOF who had completed their mission by entering the building to eliminate the TL and all the other guerrillas inside. Medical crew evaluates the situation mainly consisting of medium and severe trauma. Wounded are boarded using PTS and the stabilization step involves the determination of the adequacy of interventions already received. All the raid was monitored in real time via footage shot by the MALE UAV flying high above Attab
S. EXTRACTION. Medical evacuation was performed under safe conditions with minimal reaction by Attab local police. Wounded were boarded using PTS and the helicopter was on the ground only few minutes. Actual en-route medical capabilities involved whole body physical examination, determination of injury severity, analgesic treatment, tourniquet adjustment and control, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, oxygen administration etc. The commando was flown to the hospital at FOB for Role 1 actions consisting of primary health care, specialized first aid, triage within the commando, resuscitation and stabilization. Three SOF were sent to MTF Role 2 for medical treatment and only one was sent to Role 3 (quite far from FOB).
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-22 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Role 3 facility is quite far from FOB and the wounded conditions push for a rapid move: therefore, a tanker is requested to join the helo when flying from the FOB. Refuelling is performed successfully and the helo moves fast to reach Role 3. The wounded is stabilized during the flight so that he arrives safely to Role 3 where the hospital contact team is ready to acknowledge him. The SOF is immediately treated by a specialized surgical intervention with success.
Required Assets and Capabilities
• Transport Manned Helicopter - Range of operation: 160 NM. - Speed: 250 Kts - NOE in an area at 6000 ft altitude - Satellite link: available - Capability to control at least one escort drone (drone 1) - Optional capability to carry (and control) one or more tactical UAV (drone 2)
• Drone 1: type Escort A (Attack + SEAD + Targeting + EW CM) • Drone 2: type Tactical Effector C (Precision Targeting + Last minute RECCE + Deployable from Manned Helo + Expendable
• Both Helo and UAV shall be equipped with:
- Passive systems (as far as possible) aimed at achieving maximum autonomy and survivability. - DVE Sensors. - Defense Aid Suite to detect threats at a very early stage and eliminate them - Sensors to detect hostile electromagnetic activities - Jammers to avoid being tracked, locked or engaged - Laser weapons countermeasures
• The MALE UAV is transferring information to both attack mission assets and HQ during the whole mission
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-23 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Vignette # 5: SPECIALIZED TASKS - PERSONNEL RECOVERY - CSAR
Principles and Characteristics
This vignette provides the description of a MUM-T for recovering isolated personnel on the battlefield (combat search & rescue/recovery): the mission will be prepared in full details. In a combat radius of 160 NM (250 kts speed) with refuelling capability performed possibly by unmanned asset, an armed Escort UAV with EW capabilities (SEAD cap, high level threat) and payload capability (eg. Swarm of Drones) tries to recover isolated personnel A deployable mini-UAV follows for support while a fixed or rotary tank aircraft for helo refuelling helps in the ingress phase.
Purpose of the Mission: Recover isolated personnel on the battlefield (combat search & rescue/recovery).
Doctrine employed ATP49 G has been taken as reference.
Supported NATO Task(s) The main mission is to carry out an isolated personel. It supports as well: • ISR • Close Air Support • Combat Forces re-supply
Executive summary:
• Combat radius: 160 NM • Speed: 250 Kts • UAV type 1: Armed Escort UAV • UAV type 2: Deployable mini-UAV • Manned Transport Helo: Medical Helicopter with medical team on-board with streatchers
Both Helo and UAV shall be equipped with Defense Aid Suite to detect threats at very early stage. The UAV should have also active capability to eliminate them.
MALE UAV is transferring information to both manned and unmanned assets.
Modes of Action:
1) Minimal Mission Briefing (main focus on enenemy and victim position on battlefield )
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-24 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References 2) Continuous information and SA provided by ground forces and MALE to be transferred to MUM rescue Team 3) Fast Ingress Phase to line of engagement 4) Approach to operations area 5) Release of the small UAV to improve SA 6) Boarding under protection by escort drones 7) Fast Egress phase
Narrative Description of the Vignette:
T. BACKGROUND An Escort UAV performs surveillance to achieve situational awareness regarding personel to recover, relevant defensive assets and any other possible threats. This activity initiates before the mission start and keeps throughout all the mission.
U. MISSION PLANNING AND PREPARATION • The first phase is the definition of the goals of the mission. • The mission is planned according to the goals defined at the previous step, the orographic and geographic features of the scenario, the rules of engagement, the meteo conditions, all the information acquired by the Escort UAV (see phase A), and any other intelligence information available. • The personnel involved is briefed on the plan. The plan shall contain all information about personnel to recover, environment and weather. Planning data contain all information regarding the supporting rotorcraft and the UAV.
V. MISSION START The mission starts with the take-off, at minimum, of one manned helicopter and one unmanned aircraft. Besides the manned VTOL, three types of unmanned A/C’s can take part in the action, namely: - Drone 1, Armed Escort UAV, always present, is an UCAV with attack, SEAD, targeting and EW CM capabilities; - Drone 2, mini-UAV, is deployable from helo manned and is expendable in case of need; it has precision targeting and last-minute RECCE capabilities. - Manned transport helo, optional, is a transport UAV for re-supplying the combat forces.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-25 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Figure 6: Specialized Tasks - Personnel Recovery - CSAR Mission Scenario, OV-1 Representation
W. INGRESS The helicopter, flying in formation with the drones, moves towards the operations area at cruise altitude. During this phase, Drone 1 moves ahead of the helicopter and overflies it to provide situational awareness data and NDAS, if needed.
X. INSERTION The formation descends to low altitude. All the rest of the mission is performed NOE. Manned transport helo, if present, re-supplies the troops. Afterwards, it may either return automatically to the FOB or be re-tasked to provide additional cargo capability, e.g. to perform troop extraction.
Y. ACTIONS ON TARGET Once reached the personnel to recover, the manned A/C lands quickly to perform its main task, while Drone 2 overflies the action zone to provide SA and support if needed. Drone 2, if available, has been released shortly before and provides support flying at a lower altitude.
Z. EGRESS Drone 2, if possible, is recovered on board of the manned A/C, otherwise it is spent against an enemy target or self-destroyed. The formation returns to the secure zone in NOE, then proceeds to FOB at cruise altitude, still supported by Drone 1 capabilities, if it was not sacrificed during the action.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-26 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Required Assets and Capabilities
• C-SAR Manned Helicopter - Range of operation: 300 NM. - Speed: 250 Kts - NOE in an area at 6000ft altitude - Satellite link: available - Capability to carry (and control) one or more Tactical Effectors B/D - Capability to control one or more Escort A UAV (Drone 2)
• Escort UAVs - High end/medium/low end • Scenario Combat radius: 160 NM • Speed: 250Kts • UAV type 1: Escort UAV (Attack + SEAD + Targeting + EW CM) • Drone 1: type Escort A (Attack + SEAD + Targeting + EW CM) • Drone 2: type Tactical Effector B (Precision Targeting + Last minute RECCE + Deployable from Manned Helo + Expendable) • Drone 3: type Tactical Effector D (C-SAR Personnel Location and Authentication)
• Both Helo and UAV shall be equipped with: - Passive systems (as far as possible) aimed at achieving maximum autonomy and survivability. - DVE Sensors. - Defence Aid Suite to detect threats at a very early stage and eliminate them - Sensors to detect hostile electromagnetic activities - Jammers to avoid being tracked, locked or engaged - Laser weapons countermeasures
• The MALE UAV is transferring information to both attack mission assets and HQ during the whole mission
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-27 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References 3. UAV Attributs Matrix
By using the mission timeline (Fig D1) and the Scenarios, several UAV attributes were identified that were assessed as required for successful mission execution. These attributes were further rationalised to create 3 UAV “classes” (Escort, Tactical Effects and Support), each of which contained two sub-types of UAV. The classes, and their identified attributes, are contained in Table D1 below.
Threat UAV Role Airframe Attributes Avionic Attributes Weapon Recovery Remarks Level Attributes Low Escort Same range/speed as NGR MWS A2G Mx RTB Non attritable LWS Gun -Airfield Endurance? NGR+ HFI Rockets -Ship Similar price point to NGR? NDAS with NGR -Field Site Tilt Wing / Tilt Rotor / Fixed Wing Tail Sitter/ CMDS Unmanned NGR? Conventional Fixed Wing DIRCM DVES (EO/IR, NGR re-roled as AAR 600Kg Weapons LIDAR, MMR) Tanker? Laser Designator Capable of Take-Off landing from land and USMC MU-X / V-247 maritime bases BDA High Escort High Performance – Speed and Energy As above plus; As above plus; RTB High value sacrifice Manoeuvrability for Air to Air combat RWR -Airfield RF Jamming AAMs – RF/IR -Ship Jet powered fixed wing to permit required EAD speed and Energy Manoeuvrability Radar? ARMs MADL? SEAD/DEAD IRST Electronic SEAD Attack
Low Tactical Small Mission None Optionally Modular payload Effects Carried by NGR or Escort Configurable; recoverable
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-28 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Threat UAV Role Airframe Attributes Avionic Attributes Weapon Recovery Remarks Level Attributes High Tube/Rail launched (rocket powered) depending on “One to Many” ? or “One to (Air Gravity dropped EO/IR Sensor UAV One (many)”connecting to a Launched “Hover” / slow descent GPS/INS configuration, mini-network? Using Effector) RW? RFI tactical situation several on one target with FW? Zero-ise on impact and risk to NGR, different payloads Quadcopter? Link to NGR sensitive data & “Sycamore”? Counter-IED political BDA/Wpn Effects Parachute? SIGINT deniability. Decoy/Diversion Tactical Cyber -Comms Re-use Hellfire/Brimstone airframe? Localised Post-use land -Radar emissions COMJAM on & zeroise; -Noise / flares Unlikely to have power density / fuel to CSAR personnel -risk assessment recover to friendly territory if mission is location of NGR landing Cost point ~Hellfire deep within enemy airspace. CSAR on to recover. Authentication UAV either lands Consider “seeding” on Target Designator on LZ or ingress / having “on call” recovers to pre- programmed Equivalent of a sonobuoys recovery point in terms of usage -3rd party ground unit recovery
In-flight recovery options (with associated risk to NGR) -Home to, and recover, via rear ramp -Recover to external storage container -“Brodie System”
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-29 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Threat UAV Role Airframe Attributes Avionic Attributes Weapon Recovery Remarks Level Attributes – external trapeze mechanism -“Fulton Skyhook” recovery mechanism – UAV deploys a balloon to maintain altitude and NGR collects it. -Cable recovery. As per RQ-21 Blackjack. NGR streams cable which captures UAV -“Probe and Drogue” AAR style recovery. NGR trails a drogue and UAV “plugs in” and is recovered.
Risks to NGR -Collision with UAV - Injury to personnel on NGR (recover to unmanned escort NGR)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-30 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References Threat UAV Role Airframe Attributes Avionic Attributes Weapon Recovery Remarks Level Attributes -NGR exposed to enemy fire/IEDs by landing to recover -Loss of tactical manoeuvre ability for mid-air recovery (several seconds of predictable flightpath)
Table D2 – UAV Attributes
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-31 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
4. Technology Contraints
A number of technology constraints have been identified. If the scenarios described in this paper are to be successfully delivered, R&D effort will need to be expended in developing suitable capabilities to fulfil all mission requirements. Candidate technologies are listed below, with an assessment of the time required to develop them.
NGR. The NGR is the single most important element in the scenarios. Its inherent abilities of high cruise speed (250+kts) and high cruising altitude (25Kft) confer significant advantages over conventional rotorcraft. Likewise, its ability to be Optionally Manned permits it to act as the E-UAV if circumstances dictate, lowering the overall deployed footprint. NATO SG-219 assumed that an NGR would achieve IOC in the 2030-2035 timescale, though platforms developed from the US Army FVL/JMR programme will achieve similar capabilities earlier (albeit without the inherent modularity and optionally manned capability of the “full” NGR specification). Therefore, it is assessed that the fielding of a full capability NGR will take approximately 15 years to achieve.
E-UAV. The E-UAV is the most essential supporting capability. Although the NGR could be re-roled to provide the E-UAV function, a dedicated E-UAV would confer higher performance and an optimised package for both low observability and sensor/countermeasure performance reasons. Though weaponised RPAS (such as the MQ-9 Reaper) and autonomous ISR UAVs (for example the RQ-170) are now well established in several NATO members’ Ordre of Battle (OrBats), a semi-autonomous weaponised UAV has not been fielded. The ability to control and assign tasks to a virtual wingman is still immature, though recently revealed capabilities such as the Boeing “Loyal Wingman” and the XQ-58 Vigilante concept programme show such projects are a reality and would be candidate platforms for the role of the “high-end” escort role. For most missions, the NGR would be adequately supported by a tiltrotor / tilt wing E-UAV, as proposed by Bell with their V-247 Vigilant contender for the USMC MUX competition. In terms of flight control laws, aerodynamics and propulsion, the E-UAV is already fairly mature. The issue remains the protocols and HMI for the safe control of the E-UAV from the manned NGR, tasks allocated to other teams within SG-227. It is the assessment of Team 1 that a functioning E-UAV could be fielded in the next 5-10 years if enough R&D resource was apportioned to its development.
ALE-UAV. In many respects, the concept of an ALE-UAV is nothing new – the ADM-20 Quail decoy was produced in the 1960s. Tactical aircraft have long used autonomous decoys to confuse or saturate enemy defences, and the USAF is currently continuing to mature the MALD (Miniature Air Launched Decoy) to equip its aircraft with defence confusing capability. The significant difference with the proposed ALE is the variety of roles it can potentially perform; these include ISR, jamming, close-in target recce, target designation, Collateral Damage Estimates (CDEs), Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and comms rebroadcast. The ALE is required to be air launched from the NGR or E-UAV.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-32 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX D
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References They could be gravity dropped from weapon stations, doors, ramps or windows. Alternatively, they could be delivered from a stand-off range by using an existing missile body (such as Hellfire or Brimstone) fired from an existing stores rail / management system. Whilst this technology is mature, key elements require work; primarily, again, these are the C3 elements of launching and maintaining perhaps a number of ALE-UAVs with complimentary capabilities into the overhead of a potential targets. Additionally, though some concepts expect the ALE-UAV to be expendable, much like a sonobuoy, depending on expense, concerns over the exploitation of sensitive technology by an opponent and the need to provide deniability of operation in some countries, the recovery of the ALE-UAV presents additional problems. In its simplest form, the ALE-UAV can be programmed to either self-destruct or zero-ise upon mission end, denying the enemy the potential to examine the UAV. Alternately, the ALE-UAVs could fly to a pre-programmed collection point where the NGR could land on and recover them. However, this exposes the NGR to several risks. Therefore, the JCG VL are keen to investigate methods for recovering the ALE-UAV in flight. This poses several risks to the NGR, not least the likely need for the NGR to fly relatively straight and level during recovery. This air recovery element is the least well-developed technology required for full-spectrum ALE-UAV use. It is assessed that basic ALE-UAV capability could be deployed within 5 years, but reliable airborne recovery likely to be at least 10 years away.
Power Density. Battery technology is continually improving, and the rapid acceleration on technology surrounding Automated Urban Transport systems and electric/hybrid vehicles are all moving the technology on swiftly, but power density remains an impediment to fielding much of this technology. Electric power will be required for comms, nav, ISR and jamming capabilities and, increasingly, for propulsion. It is estimated that suitable power density batteries will be available within 10 years.
Networked Defensive Aids Suite (NDAS). NDAS has been identified by SG-211 as a key enabler for operations in the future highly contested battlespace with acceptable attrition. NDAS permits rapid cross-confirmation of threat data, faster geo-location of threats, protection in areas of clutter/malfunction, co-ordinated responses (jamming/countermeasures) and, as a last resort, the sacrificing of the UAV to protect the NGR. SG-211 provided a full report into the benefits of NDAS and the protocols required to develop the capability. If significant R&D funding were to be invested, it is estimated that NDAS could be deployed within 5 years.
Data Links & Bandwidth. The control of multiple UAVs and the passage of data between them requires significant bandwidth to deliver. Given the importance of these links, it is also likely that an enemy will attempt to jam, spoof or take control of them. Links can also be exploited by the enemy to detect and track friendly platforms. Therefore, the development of high bandwidth, highly tamper resistant and low probability of intercept (LPI) links to command and control a network of UAVs is considered extremely important. Such a technology is estimated to be between 10-15 years away.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED D-33 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
ANNEX E Report on Architecture and Concept of Integration
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction to Team 2 work 2. MUM-T Operations 3. Air Vehicle System and Integration 4. Impacts on System Architecture and Integration 5. Technology, Gaps and Roadmap 6. Outline of Technological Demonstration Program (TDP) 7. Conclusions and Recommendations
1 Introduction of Team 2 work
This Chapter provides a summary of the envisaged MUM-T architecture, its impact on the Legacy Rotary Wing Assets (LRWA) and the driving capabilities for the NGR aircraft classes.
1.1 Scope of Work
This document (Annex E) defines the System Architecture and Concept of Integration capabilities, foreseen by the NIAG SG-227 project, based on the analysis of the mission requirement relevant system areas (Annex D) and the End Users feedback received by the Sponsor’s representatives (QRT) during the joint sessions.
This additional guidance enabled the SG-227 group to fully leverage the domain and technology specific expertise available from the industrial partners fro the creation of system level requirements and architectures.
1.2 Specific Task Description
Table E-01 below addresses the Study Order requirements considered in ANNEX E.
Requirement Task Description Para Allocation Number T2_01 Identify critical enabling technologies 5.1 T2_02 Identify technical architectures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 Identify requirements and technology 5 challenges that would enable the T2_03 implementation of rotorcraft manned/unmanned team concepts T2_04 Define options for the launch 2.2.1
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Requirement Task Description Para Allocation Number T2_05 Operation 2.2.2 and recovery of an unmanned system (fixed 2.2.3 T2_06 and/or rotary wing) under the control of the manned rotary wing platform: (one-to-one, 2.1.1 T2_07 one-to-many 2.1.2 T2_08 and/or mixed formations). 2.1.3/4 Optimize and document the three best 2.2.6 T2_09 options. Identify and document the systems 5.5.1 T2_10 engineering and integration issues associated with a typical manned rotorcraft platform Include an estimate of the weight penalty 4 T2_11 associated with the addition of the manned/unmanned team capability Propose a viable representative technology 5 development program to develop this T2_12 capability over time with identifiable incremental capability enhancements Identify and document the technical 3.3.1.5 architecture required to incorporate the T2_13 manned/unmanned advanced teaming capability into the command rotorcraft platform Identify the technology challenges excluding 5.2 certification issues that exist today and in the T2_14 near term that would preclude or delay the implementation of the manned/unmanned advanced teaming capability Develop and document methods to mitigate 5.2 T2_15 any identified technology gaps Identify and document the system integration 4.1 issues associated with incorporating the T2_16 manned/unmanned capability into existing command platforms Table E-01
1.3 Definitions
Architectural Framework: architecture framework establishes a common practice for creating, interpreting, analysing and using architecture descriptions within a particular domain of application or stakeholder community.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-2 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
UAV: An unmanned aerial vehicle, commonly known as a drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot aboard. UAVs are a component of an unmanned aircraft system (UAS); which include a UAV, a ground-based controller, a system (network) of communications and – in our study – the capabilities to operate in a MUM-T mode. The flight of UAVs may operate with various degrees of autonomy: either under remote control by a human operator or with various degree of autonomous capabilities.
MUM-T: The use of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles in concert, i.e., when they can influence each other’s course of action by using their own autonomous capabilities.
AUTONOMY: Own ability of sensing, perceiving, analysing, communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting/executing, to achieve its goals as assigned by its human operator(s) through designed HRI (Human-Robot Interaction)
1.4 Considerations and Assumptions
The current initial applications (operational or experimental) of the MUM-T concept and doctrine are related to Rotary Wing Assets (RWA) having different levels of control with the UAS (Unmanned Air System), with the on-board crew exercising the active roles always under the GCS (Ground Control Station) supervision to authorize the dissemination of the UAS generated information on the tactical (local/remote) networks and the changes of the UAS roles using the “Network Distributed Capability”.
This situation is also backed-up by the present MUM-T architectures where the existing LOI (Level of Interoperability) and AL (Autonomy Levels) are bounded by the RWA and UAS on-board computer systems and sensors capabilities, in conjunction with the CDL (Common Data Link) constrains and performances.
This Annex E provides an analysis of the modern envisage MUM-T capabilities, the enabling technologies and the associated KPIs to permit a leap ahead in terms of achieving high LOI/AL MUM-T mission effectiveness for both the UAS and the manned air segments, affecting the NGR aircraft class and the LRWA ones.
This approach will be documented in the following analysis that will describe:
• The system architecture capabilities linked to the provided scenarios; • The present technologies and their evolutionary roadmaps; • The MUM-T packages definition and composition and their airborne use; • The required manned air vehicle systems updates - from the LRWA to the NGR aircraft – to integrate the high LOI/AL MUM-T weapon systems.
The detailed description of these elements is provided later in ANNEX E and their key features are identified in the paragraphs below.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-3 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
2 MUM-T Operations
2.1 MUM-T Interactions
MUM-T interactions between the command platform (NGR) and the UAV have been analysed and are presented in the following schematics for the prime C2 requirement paths, the high-level definitions are as follows: • One to One o Exclusive link • One to Many o Non-exclusive interaction via similar C2/Link to single or multiple unmanned platforms. • One to Mixed o Non-exclusive interaction via dissimilar C2/Link implementations to multiple unmanned platforms • One to Network o Task based request published to all platforms via intelligent mobile ad hoc network; autonomously actioned by most able platform
The interactions have been used in the study to focus the necessary impacts on command and control communications for the scenarios provided by Team 1.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-4 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
2.1.1 One to One Operations
One to One – Exclusive interaction by manned platform to each single unmanned platform using bespoke Link as in Figure E-01 below.
One to One
Figure E-01
One to One Package The following definition is considered applicable to the study: • Exclusive interaction by a single manned platform to each single unmanned platform, using bespoke Link. • This would be achieved using several bespoke datalinks, protocols and HMI fitted to the manned aircraft, and a suitable matching datalink fitted to each platform.
Role: UAV would act as a Point Man, with the following attributes: • Low Level of Autonomy • Sensor Guided Flight • Reliable, Autonomous Flight • Shared Airspace Flight • Adaptable, Tactical Behaviours
Pros: • Backwards compatible to existing technology • Datalinks selected as required to meet Bandwidth and Range requirements
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-5 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Cons: • High Operator workload • Minimal Interoperability between UAV platforms – data exchange would be via manned • Multiple datalinks resulting in a high SWAP-C per manned platform • Numerous antennas mounted to airframe • Spectrum Management would be complex • No Redundancy if link interrupted – single point to point communication • Minimal interoperability between Nations • High training and maintenance burden
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-6 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
2.1.2 One to Many Operations
One to Many – Non-exclusive interaction via similar C2/Link to single or multiple unmanned platforms as in Figure E-02 below
One to Many
Figure E-02
One to Many Package The following definition is considered applicable to the study: • Non-exclusive interaction of manned platform via a similar C2 / Link to single or multiple unmanned platforms • This would be achieved using a single datalink with a suitable common protocol fitted to each platform.
Role: UAV would act as a Point Man or Wing Man, with the following attributes: • Medium Level of Autonomy • Close Proximity Flight • Tactical Perception • Intuitive Interface • Team Survivability & Lethality • Weaponized
Pros: • Spectrum Management less complex • Low SWAP-C • Low training and maintenance burden
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-7 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Interoperability between UAV platforms – data exchange would be via common C2
Cons: • Medium Operator workload • Poor Redundancy if link interrupted – single point to point communication • Bandwidth and Range restricted • Limited interoperability between Nations
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-8 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
2.1.3 One to Mixed Operations
One to Mixed – Non-exclusive interaction via dissimilar C2/Link implementations to multiple unmanned platforms as in Figure E-03 below.
One to Mixed
Figure E-03
One to Mixed Package The following definition is considered applicable to the study: • Non-exclusive interaction of a manned platform via dissimilar C2 / Link implementations to multiple unmanned platforms. • This would be achieved using several bespoke datalinks, protocols and HMI fitted to each platform
Role: UAV would act as a Point Man or Wing Man, with the following attributes: • Medium Level of Autonomy • Close Proximity Flight • Tactical Perception • Intuitive Interface • Team Survivability & Lethality • Weaponized
Pros: • Backwards compatible to existing technology • Datalinks selected as required to meet Bandwidth and Range requirements • Potential redundancy if link interrupted – several point to point communication paths
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-9 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Interoperability between UAV platforms – data exchange would be via different C2 • Potential for Interoperability between Nations
Cons: • Medium Operator work load • Multiple datalinks resulting in a high SWAP-C per manned platform • Numerous antennas mounted to airframe • Spectrum Management would be complex • High training and maintenance burden
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-10 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
2.1.4 One to Network Operations
One to Network – Task based request published to all platforms via intelligent mobile ad hoc network; autonomously actioned by most able platform as in Figure E-04 below.
One to Network
?
? ? ? ?
? ? Figure E-04
One to Network Package The following definition is considered applicable to the study: • Task based request published from a manned platform to all other platforms via an intelligent mobile ad hoc network which is autonomously actioned by most able platform. • This would be achieved using dedicated network with a suitable common protocol • UAS activity would be On Demand
Role: UAV would act as a Point Man, Wing Man or Task Force, with the following attributes: • High Level of Autonomy • UAV Platoons • Distributed Control • Self-Organizing/Tasking • Autonomous Over-watch • Swarming
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-11 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Pros: • Low Operator workload • Interoperability between UAV platforms – data exchange would be via autonomous C2 • Interoperability between Nations • Low SWAP-C • Low training and maintenance burden • Spectrum Management less complex and more efficient • Good redundancy if link interrupted – multiple points of communication
Cons: • Requires a high bandwidth solution • Not currently viable with today’s Technology
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-12 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
2.2 MUM-T Flight Phase Matrix 2.2.1 Launch Operations
Launch operations have been considered for each size, type and capability of UAV and considering also the environment for operations such as maritime, land and air.
The following Launch options have been considered applicable to the study: • Self-Propelled – this involves the launch of a UAV which would require a prepared take off area which would have to be proportionate to the size and capabilities of the platform to perform a self-launch under its own power. This could also be applicable to smaller UAV who have VTOL capability such as hybrids and multi rotors • Hand – this assumes a small platform which can be launched by hand, either from a maritime craft, land or by a crewman from a manned platform • Gravity – this assumes that the UAV has been provided with a suitably high take off position, either from a balloon, another UAV or an aircraft, which could be the MUM-T platform or other manned aircraft. It is assumed that the UAV would be essentially ‘drop launched’ when suitable flight conditions of the host platform are met. • Catapult / Compressed gas – This approach can be used from a variety of UAV from maritime and land environments, the UAV platforms can be launched using suitable (appropriate) infrastructure which is not suitable for aircraft. An alternative rail launched system may be employed for aircraft which may employ gravity, rocket or momentum assistance as discussed elsewhere in this section • Rocket – rocket assistance may be used in conjunction with either catapult or aircraft rail launched approaches, there would have to be considerable analysis carried out on the benefit of rocket assisted launches in view of the UAV structural strength and mass trade off and for vehicle performance issues such as attainment of suitable take off speed. • Momentum – launch using momentum is only applicable to air transportable UAVs and would have to consider the launch criteria for the platform and a suitably safe release envelope and launch aircraft flight profile.
2.2.2 Flight Operations
Flight operations with MUM-T aircraft and UAV have been considered with input from Team 1 and have been identified through review of operational scenarios developed by Team 1 and reviewed with the wider groups.
Each operational scenario has been analysed by Team 2 as part of the LOR phases and a consolidated table is provided in the follwon sections. .
The following Operation options have been considered applicable to the study: • SAR
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-13 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• COMINT • SIGINT • CIED • REBRO • Environmental (light/Weather/Wind/Slope) • SA (Obstructions/DVE) • Targeting • Cyber • Jamming • FMV • Decoy • FIRES • Authentication • A2A Refuelling • SEAD / DEAD • OCA • NDAS • Sacrifice • Route Recce
The options considered above have impacts on the overall launch and recovery phases as they are directly responsible for the type, size/mass, capability and performance of the UAV to be used. The type of roles will determine the payload / performance of a UAV and will impact the launch and recovery options discussed within this document; it is not intended to discuss the impacts further here as a complementary analysis is required to match roles to UAV types.
2.2.3 Recovery Operations
Current launch and recovery options are limited to launch and recovery at the same site, recovery post mission or expendable.
It is anticipated that future missions will require the whole breadth of launch and recovery options which will have a significant impact on both recovery infrastructure / mechanisms and the impact on the UAV itself.
There are several considerations that future analysis would have to consider including the receiving aircraft type and capabilities, such as fixed wing, helicopter or hybrid, all of which could be optionally manned.
The following Recovery options have been considered applicable to the study: • Vertical / Manual - this approach is primarily related to UAV that have a VTOL capability such as multi-rotors or small helicopters and can be either automatically landed or with support from an external pilot.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-14 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
• Run-on - this is primarily for fixed wing aircraft that require suitable infrastructure / space to land with either undercarriage or belly landing, this would be suitable for either maritime or land-based recovery, the requirements for which would be driven by the UAV size, mass and capability • Net / Basket – this approach is suitable for small UAVs in all environments including maritime, land and air. There is a concern that obtaining a suitable flight envelope for either a fixed wing aircraft recovery, or a helicopter/VTOL platform recovery would be very challenging. It is anticipated that any net/basket recovery would necessitate a very restrictive flight regime for both recovering aircraft and the UAV and may not be desirable in certain operational scenarios. • Hook / Arrestor - this is primarily concerned with a fixed wing UAV being recovered to a maritime platform or land-based site that has limited space for a run-on landing, this also has implications for the infrastructure required to manage the landing and also the structural requirements and mass implications for the UAV. • Trailing - this recovery method has been considered for the recovery of different types of UAV (such as multi-rotors, helicopters, fixed wing, hybrids) that are required to be recovered in the air. Depending on the type of recovery platform, there are considerable impacts from the recovery mechanisms (structural requirements, size of equipment/facilities) and the necessary requirement to provide the necessary flight envelope to recover the UAV in a timely manner. The impacts on the UAV are also considerable not least of which is the ‘mating’ recovery equipment, the structural requirements for the unmanned platform and the flight control and ‘homing’ performance to achieve an automatic recovery capability. The issue of recovery platform flight regime and aerodynamic effects on both platforms will required further investigations. There remains a requirement for the UAV platform to home onto a recovery point, either visually or RF enabled, which is not yet available, this is defined as a technology gap. A conclusion may be drawn that a number of UAV types could not be recovered using this method, namely multi-rotors and helicopter derivatives. • Fulton Sky Hook - this type of approach has been considered to enable recovery in the air, any pursuance of this technique will have to consider the provision of a suitable elevated recovery ‘rope’ and the ability of the recovering platform to successfully retrieve the ‘rope’ in an ‘in-flight’ scenario when both recovering and UAV would be flying. A more benign scenario may be possible when the UAV has landed on the ground but would require a suitable elevated rope as above. • Cargo bay - Fly in – this approach would require the use of a larger recovery aircraft and would present very similar problems for recovery as the net / basket / trailing recovery options discussed above. This approach would present more safety concerns associated with recovery especially with a rotary wing recovery platform. Speed regime and aerodynamics performance associated with environmental issues would be significant challenges. • Destruction - this approach has a number of operational considerations not least of which would be the safe and secure destruction of the platform, when intended and is assumed to be via explosive or chemical energy source. Safety concerns would also be raised regarding the safety and deployment of the UAV and the
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-15 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
necessary safety interlocks and system integrity. Ensuring that the UAV was successfully destroyed would be paramount • Disposable / Zeroise - this approach may apply to a number of platform types but is assumed to be related to smaller UAVs that would be cost effective (inexpensive) and present a small environmental / safety impact. This approach also assumes that any a successful verifiable zeroization of the UAV is possible, either by command or timing and may be linked to a destruction type approach as detailed above. There is also a tactical ‘Risk vs. Reward’ analysis required on the deployment of certain UAV types.
2.2.4 Platform Type Allocation
Platform types are very closely linked to the mission scenario and the required mission performance, the study has reviewed a number of UAV types which are summarised in the Team 1 outputs.
2.2.5 LOR Scenarios
LOR scenarios and associated options for maritime, land and air operations have been generated based on the input from Team 1, they are follows: • Reconnaissance & Tactical Security Mission • Attack Mission • Transport “Air Mobile” Mission • Transport (Aero Medical Evacuation) • Specialized Tasks (Personnel Recovery)
The summary of the 5 scenarios and the developed LOR phases are provided below which includes, the following data related to platform types: • Platform description • Origin • Launch method • C2 flight and navigation • Operational roles (capabilities) • Destination • Recovery method
Tables E-02 below identifies the Launch (02-a), Operation (02-b) and Recovery(02-c) Analysis for the applicable Mission Scenarios
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-16 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Launch
Platform TypePlatform Platform Origin Launch (Ground) Vehicle (unprepared) Ground Runway Aircraft Ship Submersible Method Launch Propelled Self Hand Gravity gas / Compressed Catapult Rocket Momentum Scenario 1: Attack A Escort X X X X B Tactical Effector (Sonoboy Type) X X X
Scenario 2: Transport - Air Mobile D ISR (MALE) X X X X A & F Escort and X X X X Tanker B Tactical Effector (Disposable Sonoboy) X X X
Scenario 3: Reconnaissance D ISR (MALE or/and or/and Strategic) X X E C Tactical Effector (Mid range X X X X X Recoverable)
Scenario 4: Specialized task - Personal recovery - CSAR A Escort X X X X B Tactical Effector (Disposable Sonoboy) X X X
Scenario 5: Transport - Aeromedical Evacuation A Escort X X X X B Tactical Effector (Sonoboy Type) X X X X X
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-17 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Table E-02-a- Launch
Operation
Platform TypePlatform Platform Navigation and Flight C2 / AI Autonomous / re-task) reconfigure (manual Automatic Roles SAR COMINT SIGINT CIED REBRO (light/Weather/Wind/Slope) Environmental SA (Obstructions/DVE) Targeting Cyber Jamming FMV / EO/IR Decoy FIRES/Armament Authentication Refuelling A2A /SEAD DEAD OCA NDAS Sacrifice Recce Route Scenario 1: Attack A Escort X X X X X X X X X X X B Tactical Effector (Sonoboy Type) X X X X X X X X X
Scenario 2: Transport - Air Mobile D ISR (MALE) X X X X X X X A & F Escort and X X X X X X Tanker B Tactical Effector (Disposable X X X X X X X X Sonoboy) Scenario 3: Reconnaissance D ISR (MALE or/and or/and Strategic) X X X X X X X X X E C Tactical Effector (Mid range X X X X X X Recoverable) Scenario 4: Specialized task - Personal recovery - CSAR A Escort X X X X X X X X X X X B Tactical Effector (Disposable X X X X X X X X Sonoboy) Scenario 5: Transport - Aeromedical Evacuation A Escort X X X X X X X X X X X B Tactical Effector X X X X X X (Sonoboy Type)
Table E-02-b - Operation
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-18 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015 (INV), Multi References
Recovery
Platform TypePlatform Platform Destination (Ground) Vehicle (unprepared) Ground Runway Aircraft - Deck Ship Water surface area recovery Nominated Method Recovery / Manual Vertical Run-on /Net Basket / Arrestor / Trailing Hook Sky Hook Fulton - Fly bay in Cargo Destruction / Zeroise Disposable Scenario 1: Attack A Escort X X X X B Tactical Effector X X X X (Sonoboy Type) Scenario 2: Transport - Air Mobile D ISR (MALE) X X A & F Escort and X X X X Tanker B Tactical Effector X X X X (Disposable Sonoboy) Scenario 3: Reconnaissance D ISR (MALE or/and or/and Strategic) X X X E C Tactical Effector X X X X X X X (Mid range Recoverable) Scenario 4: Specialized task - Personal recovery - CSAR A Escort X X X X B Tactical Effector X X X X (Disposable Sonoboy) Scenario 5: Transport - Aeromedical Evacuation A Escort X X X X B Tactical Effector X X X X X X (Sonoboy Type)
Table E-02-c - Recovery
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-19 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
2.2.6 Three Best Options on Operations
An analysis has been conducted with a weighted bias for each of the scenarios considered, and the results for the three best options presented in Table E-03 below.
Mission Analysis ID Type Type Survivability Requirement Costs Technical Avionic Weapon Marking Remarks ID Complexity Attributes 1 A Escort Very High 30 Very High 5 High 10 High 5 High 10 60 2 B Tactical Effector Medium 20 Low 30 Low 20 Low 10 N/A 0 80 (Disposable Sonobuoy Type) 3 C Tactical Effector High 25 Low 30 Medium 15 Medium 7 Medium 6 83 (Mid range Recoverable) 4 D ISR (MALE definition TBC) Low 10 High 10 High 10 High 5 Medium 6 41 Zephyr, Reaper equivalent
5 E ISR (Strategic) Low 10 Very High 5 Very High 5 High 5 N/A 0 25 Global Hawk, RQ-170 equivalent 6 F Tanker Low 10 High 10 Medium 5 Medium 7 N/A 0 32
Weighting / % 30 30 20 10 10 Scoring VH 30 VH 5 VH 5 VH 2 VH 10 H 25 H 10 H 10 H 5 H 8 M 20 M 20 M 15 M 7 M 6 L 10 L 30 L 20 L 10 L 4 N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 Table E-03
From the analysis, based on the role criticality the following key configuration are therefore proposed as the “best 3” to take forwards, as between them they each cover most of the LOR options, across most of the Scenarios.
a. Tactical Effector Mid-Range Recoverable (Type C) C2 as one-to-one, with the following basic capabilities: • Long range and endurance (TOS 350 nm/8 hr) (Range and endurance greater than Disposable Tactical Effects UAV) • Ground / Air Launched
b. Tactical effector (SUAS) role (Type B) C2 as one-to-mixed, with the following basic capabilities: • Small UAS, carried by NGR or Escort • Tube/Rail/Bay launched • “Hover” / “Orbit” with slow descent • Vertical lift capable
c. Escort role (Type A) LOR with C2 as one-to-many NGR or similar, with the following basic capabilities: • Same range/speed as NGR • Tilt Wing / Tilt Rotor / Fixed Wing Tail Sitter
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-20
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
• 600 kg Payload • Capable of Take-Off landing from land and maritime bases
The scenarios are recommended for use when considering the Critical Enabling Technology required and the Manned Platform System and Integration issues, as well as for Teams 3 and 4 to use to consider suitable network, AI and autonomy capabilities.
3 Air Vehicle System and Integration
3.1 General Architecture
The following pages provide a detailed overview of above referenced segments, highlighting the impacts foreseen by the MUM-T capability for both the legacy and the NGR system.
It should be noted that this solution, based on legacy and new interfaces, provides a modular “glue” to use existing qualified components and newest MUM-T ones having extremely high throughput to deal with the overall latency issues related to C2 and Payload data management.
The principal integration media between the suites of avionic equipment is composed by the following interface links:
• MIL-STD-1553B (dual redundant) data buses • ARINC 429 links. • AFDX (Avionics Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet) deterministic network • Ethernet gigabit network • ARINC-818 Supplement 2 fibre optical links.
Table E-04 below provides a comparison among the available airborne interfaces and their suitability to be used for MUM-T integration and operations.
Interface Type Speed/ MUM-T Bandwidth Mil-Std-1553B Multipoint Low Not usable Arinc-429 Point-to-point Low Not usable Mil-Std-1760 Multipoint Low Usable, Weapon systems only
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-21
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Interface Type Speed/ MUM-T Bandwidth Mil-Std-1760E Multipoint (FC-AV High Usable, Weapon support) systems only Arinc-664 Full duplex High Usable (allows AFDX deterministic, based on 1553 and 429 IEEE 802.3, supports topology Virtual Link mapping) Ethernet Full duplex statistic, High Usable based on IEEE 802.3bm Fibre Channel Full duplex, Gigabit High Usable (Copper) Fibre Channel Full duplex, Gigabit Very High Usable (Fibre Optical) Arinc-818-2 Point-to-point & High Usable (Copper) Switched-fabric bus, (ADVB on FC- Gigabit AV) Arinc-818-2 Point-to-point & Very High Usable Switched-fabric bus, (ADVB on FC- (Fibre Optical) Gigabit AV) Table E-04 3.1.1 Networking and Interface Requirements
The envisaged architecture is imposing high bandwidth, error free, secure and protected connections for the on-board installations, for both the physical layer (cables) and the connectors.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-22
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Figure E-05
Figure E-05 above provides the indication of the considered present and near future solutions to provide the required integrity and performances for high speed data transmission.
Given the anticipated operational requirements of MUM-T, a low latency high-speed data transmission media is crucial to support the integration on the legacy and NGR class aircraft.
The selection of the right data transmission media we should take into account not only the present requirements but also the foreseeable and unforeseeable future needs. The minimum suggested requirement should be the Ethernet CAT6a (10 GB/s @ 100 meters) or higher (CAT6e or CAT7). However, the data transmission over copper has a physical limitation in terms of achievable speed for this reason it is strongly suggested to develop the entire system architecture as Optical Fibre (hereinafter F/O) native.
The F/O is the only media that can support mid-term and long-term future requirements in terms of data transmission (> 100Gb/s and in future prospective up to 450Gb/s, speed is highly dependent on transceiver technology and OM level, however it would provide sufficient bandwidth to any foreseeable future application). An additional benefit of F/O is their intrinsic immunity to EMI and Jamming in a contested environment.
The use of F/O will also minimize the weight penalty on the platforms reducing cabling weight in excess of 70%.
Careful consideration should be given to the extensive use of crush resistant F/O complaint with the EN-3745 standards, to survive with the by rotorcraft vibrations profiles and during installation/maintenance of the aircraft.
Raw fibre optic glass is inherently more fragile than copper conductor, therefore, how the glass is packaged into a simplex cable is critical to the fibre optic cable’s durability during and after routing and installation. In order to use 1.8mm simplex in a rugged aircraft environment, the fibre optic cable should meet, in addition to the above-mentioned aerospace specifications, additional mechanical requirements to ensure system reliability.
The fibre optic cable must pass the specifications outlined in Table E-05 below.
Test Method Test Name Requirements EN 3745
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-23
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Residual variation in attenuation: ≤ 0,3 dB at 850 nm Energy to be applied: 3 J – Radius intermediate piece :15 mm Impact 506 Mass of hammer: 800 g – Height: 400 mm Number of impacts: 5 – Sample length > 700 mm Number of samples: 5 – Distance between impacts : 0 mm Visual Examination in accordance with EN 3745-201 Monitor attenuation to determine fiber breakage of the sample during testing at 20 °C and 150 °C Cut-through 507 Load to be applied: 20 N Duration of load application :1 min Number of samples: 3 – Sample length: (2 ± 0,01) m Rate of load application: (50 ± 10) N/min Variation of attenuation: ≤ 0,25 dB Number of samples: 1 – Sample length: (2 ± 0,01) m Torsion 508 Load to be applied: 150 N – Number of cycles: 1 000 Distance between the rotating grip and the fixed grip: (0,25 ± 0,01) m Permissible variation of attenuation: ≤ 3 dB Kink 509 Minimum loop diameter: 10 mm Number of samples: 3 – Sample length >10 times bend radius Visual examination in accordance with EN 3745-201 variation of attenuation: ≤ 0,2 dB Residual attenuation after removing the specimen from the test 510 method Bend equipment: ≤ 0,1 dB A Load to ensure contact between the cable and the mandrel: 20 N Mandrel diameter: 25 mm – Number of turns: 10 Number of sample: 1 – Sample length: (10 ± 0,01) m Visual examination in accordance with EN 3745-201 Permissible variation in attenuation: ≤ 0,25 dB at 850 nm Flexure 512 Load: 5 N – Mandrel diameter: 30 mm endurance Number of cycles: 3 000 – Sample length: 5 m Number of samples: 3 Variation of attenuation: ≤ 1dB Crush 513 Load: 500 N during 10 s – Mandrel diameter: 10 mm resistance Number of samples: 5 – Sample length: 5 m Table E-05
3.2 Common MUM-T Elements
This section identifies the architectural elements that have been identied as the basic MUM-T components for the Legacy and Future airvehicles.
3.2.1 Vehicle Specific Module (VSM)
The VSM (see example in Figure E-06 below) provides the MUM-T direct interface capabilities with the on-board components required to provide the MUM-T operations with other architectural elements supporting MUM-T operations. They are summarized as follows:
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-24
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
• MESH/MIMO terminals • LTE (Long Term Evolution) Terminal • FMV CDL (Full Motion Video Common Data Link) • Encoder/Decoder • MMS Interface (Mission Management System).
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-25
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-26
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Figure E-06
The VSM OPSW (OPerational SoftWare) shall be designed to • Manage the C2 and Payload on-board the Manned and Unmanned Aircraft • Support different payload configurations • Support different control node installations: fixed land installation; ship-based installation; and mobile installation • Support multiple control nodes connected concurrently to the UAS in order to permit the handover of payload control between control nodes • Support multiple user nodes that can concurrently view the payload data streams • Be based upon standard interfaces to permit a compliant module to control and monitor payload • Based upon standard interfaces to permit the integration of the UAS into a much wider C4I context (e. g, Ship combat management system, operations centre) • Support private messages structure for legacy aircraft • Manage the ad-hoc mesh network is created as radios enter/exit the network. It provides an IP interface to the VSM (Rotary Wing) and (ground) applications for the exchange of UDP unicast and multicast messaging. The group of radios making up the mesh network can be regarded as a level 2 Ethernet switch by the applications • Manage the payload data streams are provided using multicast UDP to any radio which is listening on the mesh. All data streams between the VSM (Rotary Wing) and VSM (ground) are compressed to maximise the bandwidth utilization – meaning that they maybe non-standard in the over-the-air transport but the VSM (ground) will always present a standard interface to the user Apps
To provide the greatest VSM reuse among air and ground assets, and its integration with legacy assets and NGR derived ones, the VMS should be designed using a small factor LRU with high throughput (1TFLOPS range) and defined growth path, supporting the ARINC-818-2 interface.
3.2.2 MANET and MESH MIMO Datalink
Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) solutions are commonly for existing ground- operations and are quickly becoming very interesting to the aerospace community thanks to features such as:
• No master node • No Pre-Existing infrastructure
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-27
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
• Mobility, nodes are free to move randomly and organize themselves arbitrarily • MANET network capabilities to deal with the problems introduced by the mobility of nodes • MANET ability to move, expand and contract without service or data interruptions leveraging Multicast features supporting multiple stream, data and clients.
When used with MIMO (Multiple Inputs Multiple Outputs) features and thanks to the relay hub associated with the multi-hops’ modes on the air vehicle, it could easily overcome the out-of-range situations (see Figure E-07) that could occur during tactical operations.
Figure E-07 Its flexibility makes it very interesting to provide MUM-T C2/Payload redundant communications features to the legacy aircraft when integrated with the VSM and address the requirement to be considered for the NGR aircraft class and the modern UAS no longer based on the CDL solutions.
When used in conjunction with the on-board LTE terminals it guarantees seamless integration with the tactical ground forces, supporting the air-to-ground deployments.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-28
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
3.2.3 Tactical Data Link
Link-16 (J-series message) and VMF (K-series messages) tactical data links are commonly used on legacy aircraft and are expected to be updated to support air to ground operations, by adding UAS specific message categories and types, supporting MUM-T operations.
While the specific implementation should be based on well-defined CONOPS, the proposed architecture provides the update capabilities thanks to the MMS modularity for both the legacy and the NGR aircraft classes, given by the M-DLP (Multiple-Data Link Processing) embedded features that supports:
• Link 11 A/B • Link 22 • Link 16 • JREAP-B/C • VMF
Applications, and the foreseen updates to the AEP-84/STANAG-4586 messages, will not imply modifications for the TDL terminal/units, since the required new/modified/reused OPSW will be allocated to the MMS.
3.2.4 Common Data Link (CDL)
CDL systems (L/S/C/Ku bands) are commonly used on legacy aircraft and are expected to be updated to support air to ground operations, by adding NATO UAS specific waveforms (following the STANAG 7085 roadmap) supporting MUM-T operations.
While the specific implementation should be based on well-defined CONOPS, the proposed architecture provides the update capabilities thanks to the MMS modularity for both the legacy and the NGR aircraft classes, given by the Ethernet embedded features supporting Gigabit interfaces and TCP/IP Multicast and Unicast protocols.
No modifications are therefore foreseen for the CDL terminal/units since the required new/modified/reused OPSW will be allocated to the MMS.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-29
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
3.2.5 Encoder/Decoder
High definition encoder systems, providing H.264/H.265 optimized compression with embedded metadata (KLV – Key Length Value) are commonly used on legacy aircraft and are expected to be updated to support air to ground operations, by adding Gigabit capabilities with parallel processing.
The proposed architecture provides the update path thanks to the MMS modularity for both the legacy and the NGR aircraft classes, given by the Ethernet embedded features supporting Gigabit interfaces and TCP/IP Multicast and Unicast protocols.
Specific roadmap should be considered to add ARINC-818-2 to H.265/KLV decoding features to support the new FMV high definition sensors sources.
3.2.6 Router/Switch
Flight qualified routers/switches (Ethernet and AFDX capable) with Ipv4/Ipv6 Gigabit interfaces and programmable QoS are commonly used on legacy aircraft and are expected to be installed on the NGR aircraft classes.
The proposed architecture provides the update path thanks to the MMS modularity for both the legacy and the NGR aircraft classes, given by the Ethernet embedded features supporting Gigabit interfaces and TCP/IP Multicast and Unicast protocols.
3.3 Manned Air Vehicle System and Integration (Legacy Systems) 3.3.1 Reference Architecture
The presently operating manned rotary wing assets (LEGACY) have avionic suites are composed by several integrated systems (Figure E-08) that form the core avionics for the aircraft, with specific mission role related equipment that provide Mission Systems/Equipment capabilities via integrated or federated architectures.
The Basic Avionics System is defined by the following segments: • Aircraft Management System • Central Warning System • Cockpit Display System • Helmet Mounted Display System • Automatic Flight Control System • Communication System • Navigation Sensor System • Radio Navigation Aids System
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-30
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
• IFF/ATC System • Surveillance System (HTAWS, TCAS, Radar) • Emergency Avionics System.
The Mission System includes the following segments: • Mission Management System, • Observation System • Obstacle Warning System (DVE capable). • Tactical Data Link (Link 16/VMF/SADL) system • Integrated Self Protection System, and • Weapon Management System.
Specific MUM-T capabilities will be integrated in the Mission System by the Mission Management System computer system.
These capabilities es shall also be integrated in the NGR-based architectures where the Key Technologies identified in the SG-219 report could be introduced either as updated or new OPSW running in the available real-time computer systems or in the form of new LRU with the required features.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-31
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Figure E-08
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-32
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
The MUM-T capability, classified as Recommended Priority in the above referenced SG- 219 report, fits nicely in this approach because the envisaged resources (hardware and software) could be introduced in both modes on the legacy and future NGR weapon systems. Figure E-08 identifies the on-board segments that will be affected by the introduction of the MUM-T capabilities, whilst specific details are summarized in Table E-06.
Affected Modification Legacy/NGR Notes Segments Class Class Status Hardware & Additional LRU needed AMS Existing Software for Legacy aircraft New high-speed interface Hardware & MMS Existing New operational Software software; New HMI software CDS Software Existing HMI interfaces AFCS Software Existing New upper modes VSM New h/w and s/w To be designed Dedicated LRU Updated J/K series TDL Software Existing messages with on- board gateway Hardware & Updated STANAG- CDL Existing Software 7085 waveforms Hardware & MESH/MIMO Existing ARINC-818-2 interface Software ARINC-818-2 to ENCODER New h/w and s/w To be designed Ethernet interface ROUTER Existing Existing QoS capable NETWORKING Existing Existing IEEE 802.3xx New fibre optic ARINC-801 and INTERFACES connectors and Existing ARINC-802 cables
Table E-06
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-33
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
The following pages will provide a detailed description for the affected segments, the required functionalities and the requested interfaces to support MUM-T integration.
A dedicated table will include specific consideration on legacy aircraft driven gaps and criticalities, the suggested recommendations and the direct requirements applicable to NGR air vehicle aircraft categories and associated new/existing UAS architectures.
3.3.2 Aircraft Management System
The Aircraft Management System (AMS) provides the core avionic systems management functions including status monitoring, equipment control, aircraft systems interfaces, flight management functions together with failure management, reporting and recording.
Specific capabilities include: • Monitor the aircraft plants and systems • Manage the data flow to the Integrated display system • Execute the Health and Usage Monitoring functions • Manage the communication equipment • Manage the Navigation and Radio navigation aids sensors • Perform the selection of navigation sensor data providing an integrated navigation solution capable of self-updating • Digital map and tactical data display management • IFF/ATC/TCAS management • HTAWS management • Interface the CDS system and HMD (Helmet Mounted Display) • Interface the AFCS system.
The dual AMC represents the main processing units of the AMS. Each computer contains the hardware necessary to perform all the processing needed for basic vehicle avionic operation and management.
The two AMC operates in a matched pair, with one computer being master and the other operating in hot standby mode, in order to guarantee the redundancy of all safety and mission critical functions. The two AMC are installed in different avionic compartments in order to enhance their survivability to a single shot.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-34
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Basic avionic operation executed by the AMC include the following functions: • Aircraft systems monitoring (MUM-T specific) • Alarms management • Maintenance data recording • Performance computation • Crew interface • Navigation and communication equipment management • Flight Management System (FMS) including autopilot steering/coupling commands • VMC/IMC Flight execution • MUM-T FMS management (AFCS steering mode)
The following Table E-07 provides an analysis of the envisaged AMS impacts due to the introduction of the MUM-T capabilities on legacy aircraft.
Hardware Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities Single Core Processor already available with Should the existing SBC not available monoprocessor/multipro for modifications, the legacy aircraft cessor architectures. will need an external LRU to provide This architecture the MUM-T required interfaces and requires the generation functionalities should the existing SCP of newly partitioned solutions not available for CSCI/CSC/CSU on the modifications. SBC (Single Board Mil-Std-461/-704/-810 LRU available Computer) to integrate with VPX 3U form factor and 5 kg MUM-T functionalities in mass. the existing context. MCP benefits include higher throughput, better SWaP, future growth and longer supply availability.
MCP Not Applicable SoC (System on Chip) details to be carefully assessed for proprietary design features.
Legacy interfaces New solutions should maximize the Interfaces available including IEEE use of Open System Architectures 802.3 and ARINC 664 (OSA) based on programmable high
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-35
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities (AFDX), but present throughput components for the MUM- solutions do not support T integration. ARINC-818-2 bandwidth up to 28.05 Gbps (FC- 32x rate), compression/encryption, switching, channel bonding and data-only links, therefore limiting the available data rates. Existing with envisaged MCP solutions to be considered for Status supplier’s availability the UAS segments. (end of production) Software Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities ARINC-653 Supplement 4 and FACE LynxOS-178, VxWorks RTOS Version 3 compliance. and GHS-178 available NEAT security policy required. Use of new SBC recommended to introduce MUM-T OPSW CAST-32A assessment required operational software and avoid the integration of new LRU. Modifications of FMS features required to support formation flights and AFCS MUM-T steering/coupling, based CAST-32A assessment required CSCI on own/remote sensors data. HUMS data categorization required for mission validations. Integration Legacy Aircraft NOTES & Validation
SIL (System Existing assets May require new virtual simulators Integration
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-36
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities Lab – LRU) FASIR (Full Avionic May require new System Existing assets stimulators/simulators Integration Rig) DT&E Delta activities A/C required OT&E Delta activities A/C required Table E-07
3.3.3 Mission Management System
The Mission Management System (MMS) provides the core avionic systems management functions including • Mission equipment status monitoring, • Mission equipment control, • Observation System (EOIR) management • Obstacle Warning System (OWS) management • Basic avionic interface; • CDS and HMD interface.
The MMS provides tactical and recording and recording capabilities to: • tactical data link (J/K messages), • common datalink (FMV waveforms) • integrated self defence system • weapon systems, and • MUM-T components.
The dual MMC (Mission Management Computer) represents the main processing units of the MMS. Each computer contains the hardware necessary to perform all the processing needed for mission system operation and management.
As for the AMC the two MMC operates in a matched pair, with one computer being master and the other operating in hot standby mode, in order to guarantee the redundancy of all safety and mission critical functions. The two MMC are installed in different avionic compartments in order to enhance their survivability to a single shot.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-37
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Mission system operations executed by the MMC include the following functions: • Mission equipment and sensors status management • Mission NAS data recording • Tactical database management • Tactical presentation on CDS and HMD • Tactical datalink management • Tactical datalink forwarding • Tactical alarm management • Tactical navigation and route assessment • MUM-T VSM management • MUM-T Mesh/MIMO management • MUM-T CDL management • MUM-T LTE management • MUM-T High Speed Bus Encoder/Decoder • MUM-T Network management.
The following Table E-08 provides an analysis of the envisaged MMS impacts due to the introduction of the MUM-T capabilities on legacy aircraft.
Hardware Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities Single Core Processor already available with Should the existing SBC not available monoprocessor/multipro for modifications, the legacy aircraft will cessor architectures. need an external LRU to provide the This architecture MUM-T required interfaces and requires the generation functionalities should the existing SCP of newly partitioned solutions not available for CSCI/CSC/CSU on the modifications. SBC (Single Board Mil-Std-461/-704/-810 LRU available Computer) to integrate with VPX 3U form factor and 5 kg MUM-T functionalities in mass. the existing context. MCP benefits include higher throughput, better SWaP, future growth and longer supply availability. MCP Not Applicable SoC (System on Chip) details to be carefully assessed for proprietary design features.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-38
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities
Legacy interfaces available including IEEE 802.3 and ARINC 664 (AFDX), but present solutions do not support New solutions should maximize the ARINC-818-2 bandwidth use op Open System Architectures Interfaces up to 28.05 Gbps (FC- (OSA) based on programmable high 32x rate), throughput components for the MUM-T compression/encryption, integration. switching, channel bonding and data-only links, therefore limiting the available data rates. Existing with envisaged MCP solutions to be considered for the Status supplier’s availability UAS segments. (end of production) Software Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities ARINC-653 Supplement 4 and FACE LynxOS-178, VxWorks RTOS Version 3 compliance. and GHS-178 available NEAT security policy required. Use of new SBC recommended to introduce MUM-T OPSW CAST-32A assessment required operational software and avoid the integration of new LRU. The following new CSCIs are envisaged to be integrated in the MCS architecture: MUM-T 1. VSM CAST-32A assessment required CSCI 2. MESH/MIMO 3. CDL 4. LTE 5. ENCODER
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-39
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities 6. NETWORK
Modifications of existing CSCI are also foreseen because of the MCS integrated tactical architecture. Integration Legacy Aircraft NOTES & Validation SIL (System Integration Existing assets May require new virtual simulators Lab – LRU) FASIR (Full Avionic System Existing assets May require new stimulators/simulators Integration Rig) DT&E Delta activities A/C required OT&E Delta activities A/C required Table E-08
3.3.4 Cockpit Display System
The Cockpit Display System (CDS) is typically composed by a number (up to five) Display Unit (DU, 10-inch x 8-inch) integrated with the aircraft systems via the high speed ARINC-664 AFDX and ARINC-429 interfaces.
Each DU can be used in the PFD (Pilot Flight Display), MFD (Multi-Function Display) and SMD (System Management Display) modes, providing: • PFD Mode • PFI (Primary Flight Indicators) • NDI (Navigation Display Indicator) • CAS (Crew Alerting System) synthetic presentation. • MFD Mode • FPL (Flight Plan) with Basic Avionics data • VID (Video), supporting analogue/digital signal and /Ethernet FMV, with PiP and Mosaic display
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-40
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
• DMD (Digital Map Data) for overlay, PiP, tactical layers • MSD (Mission System Display) for tactical sensors presentation, track overlay, BFT (Blue Force Tracking) and BMS (Battlefield Management System) operations. • MUM-T Operations • SMD Mode • CAS detailed presentation • System BIT • SAD (System Assisted Diagnostic) • MUM-T Status. The DUs are “smart” displays with embedded ARINC-661 compatible symbols generators interfaced via the AFDX high speed bus (with the required switches) with the AMS and MMS, and it is therefore, capable to integrated new HMI modes, control and display symbology.
CDS controls are provided using touch screen, CCD (Cursor Control Device), Bezel Keys and Voice interfaces.
The following Table E-09 provides an analysis of the envisaged CDS impacts due to the introduction of the MUM-T capabilities on legacy aircraft.
Hardware Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities SCP Single Core Processor MUM-T UA to be partitioned already available with between DU, MMS and AMS. monoprocessor/graphic processor architectures. This architecture support new UA (User Applications) via DF (Definition Files) management, suing the AMS/MCS AFDX data interfaces. MCP Not Applicable BPM (Back Path Monitoring) required to minimize freezing and latency.
Interfaces Legacy interfaces based on New solutions should maximize the ARINC 661 and ARINC 664 use of Arinc-661 Supplement 5 (AFDX), but present based on SCADE display and
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-41
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities solutions do not support suite. ARINC-818-2 bandwidth up to 28.05 Gbps (FC-32x rate), compression/encryption, switching, channel bonding and data-only links, therefore limiting the available data rates. Status Existing with envisaged MCP solutions to be considered for supplier’s availability (end of the UAS segments. production) Software Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities RTOS LynxOS-178, VxWorks and ARINC-653 Supplement 4 and GHS-178 available FACE Version 3 compliance. NEAT security policy required. OPSW Use of DF (Definition Files) CAST-32A assessment required foreseen, using the AMS/MCS AFDX data interfaces. MUM-T No modifications of existing CAST-32A assessment required CSCI CSCI are considered, allocation the display functionalities to DF and the processing elements to the MMS/AMS. Integration Legacy Aircraft NOTES & Validation SIL (System Existing assets May require new virtual simulators Integration Lab – LRU) FASIR (Full Existing assets May require new Avionic stimulators/simulators System Integration Rig) DT&E Delta activities A/C required
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-42
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware Legacy Aircraft NOTES Capabilities OT&E Delta activities A/C required
Table E-09
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-43
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
3.4 NGR Architecture and Integration 3.4.1 Envisaged Architectures
The NGR (also with OPV capabilities - Optional Piloted Vehicle) will be the main backbone for the future MUM-T envisaged platform and the SG-219 report identifies the control of MUM-T assets from the NGR in 2 areas; control of the vehicle itself, and/or control of the payload (sensors, effectors and weapons). Because modularity has been identified as the major principle to new systems design and it will be the key to Operational Effectiveness, the following features will be necessary: • To provide “plug-and-play” type installation of varying sensor fits and countermeasure systems, so allowing the matching of total system capabilities to expected threats. • To reconfigure sensor and countermeasure systems through mission specific data loads, so allowing the matching of system specific performance to the expected threats. • To allow the fulfilment of mission with a combination of assets working in cooperation when required, decreasing the possibility of the opposite forces to defeat all the applied capabilities • Re-configurability is the foundation for a Condition Based Operation (CBO) focus. Without it, a specific mission will not be optimized, or possibly not carried out.
Plug-and-play must be enabled by modular architectures and dynamic reconfiguration of on-board-networks, supporting real time protocols to optimise the time to mission.
3.4.2 Modularization (NGR)
Products/systems are deemed “modular” when they can be decomposed into several components that may be mixed and matched in a variety of configurations. The components can connect, interact, or exchange resources (such as energy or data) in some way, by adhering to a standardized interface.
The objective is to build a system with easily replaceable parts that using standardized interfaces can provide different configurations/mission profiles. This approach allows a user to upgrade certain aspects of the system easily without having to buy complete new one.
The modular approach is still based on the building blocks of the Reference Architecture and its impacts are described in the following sections.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-44
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
3.4.3 Impacts to NGR
The impacts to the NGR are presented as a table-based analysis, highlighting required updates/changes/introduction of: • On board computer architectures (h/w, f/w); • RTOS; • OPSW; • Interfaces (internal/external); • Cables/connectors; • Sensors; • Terminals and antennas; • E3/Environmental/Safety of Flight; • SIL/RIG impacts; • DT&E and OT&E impacts.
3.4.3.1 AMS Functional Impacts (NGR)
The following Table E-10 below provides an analysis of the envisaged AMS functionalities required to implement integrated MUM-T capabilities for the NGR aircraft family types.
Hardware NGR Family NOTES Capabilities Should the existing SBC not available for modifications, the legacy aircraft will need an external LRU to provide the MUM-T required interfaces and SCP Not Applicable functionalities should the existing solutions not available for modifications. Mil-Std-461/-704/-810 LRU available with VPX 3U form factor and 5 kg mass. Ser-Des MCP benefits include higher throughput, (Serialized/Deseriali better SWaP, future growth and longer zed) capable Multi supply availability. Core Processor to MCP be considered for MUM-T applications SoC (System on Chip) details to be based on AMP carefully assessed for proprietary (Asymmetric Multi- design features. Processing), UMP
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-45
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware NGR Family NOTES Capabilities (Unified Multi- Processing) supporting BMP (Bound Multi Processing) for deterministic behaviours. SMP (Symmetric Multi-Processing) non-considered to avoid latency effects. AFDX and full native ARINC-818-2 and its evolution to be New solutions should maximize the use provided at LRU of Open System Architectures (OSA) level avoid Interfaces based on programmable high degradation of the throughput components for the MUM-T deterministic integration. processing and the introduction of aircraft data latency. Existing, under MCP solutions to be considered for the Status CAST-32A UAS segments. assessment Software NGR Family NOTES Capabilities Specific versions needed to support ARINC-653 Supplement 4 and FACE MCP architectures. RTOS Version 3 compliance. Ongoing efforts available from the NEAT security policy required. key RTOS OEMs. Use of dedicated CORE recommended for OPSW CAST-32A assessment required modularity and resource management.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-46
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware NGR Family NOTES Capabilities WCET (Worst Case Execution Time) model to be defined to address performances and resource management. Interference analysis for inter core, intra core and off processor effects to MUM-T be defined as capital CAST-32A assessment required CSCI requirements also affecting the CSCI/CSC/CSU running on other COREs. Integration NGR Family NOTES & Validation SIL (System Integration New environment May require new virtual simulators Lab – LRU) FASIR (Full Avionic System New environment May require new stimulators/simulators Integration Rig) DT&E Specific activities A/C required OT&E Specific activities A/C required
Table E-10
3.4.3.2 MMS Functional Impacts (NGR)
The following Table E-11 below provides an analysis of the envisaged MMS functionalities required to implement integrated MUM-T capabilities for the NGR aircraft family types.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-47
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware NGR Family NOTES Capabilities Should the existing SBC not available for modifications, the legacy aircraft will need an external LRU to provide the MUM-T required interfaces and SCP Not Applicable functionalities should the existing solutions not available for modifications. Mil-Std-461/-704/-810 LRU available with VPX 3U form factor and 5 kg mass. Ser-Des (Serialized/Deseriali zed) capable Multi Core Processor to be considered for MUM-T applications based on AMP (Asymmetric Multi- MCP benefits include higher throughput, Processing), UMP better SWaP, future growth and longer (Unified Multi- supply availability. MCP Processing) SoC (System on Chip) details to be supporting BMP carefully assessed for proprietary (Bound Multi design features. Processing) for deterministic behaviours. SMP (Symmetric Multi-Processing) non-considered to avoid latency effects. AFDX and full native ARINC-818-2 and its evolution to be New solutions should maximize the use provided at LRU op Open System Architectures (OSA) level avoid Interfaces based on programmable high degradation of the throughput components for the MUM-T deterministic integration. processing and the introduction of aircraft data latency. Status Existing, under MCP solutions to be considered for the
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-48
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware NGR Family NOTES Capabilities CAST-32A UAS segments. assessment Software NGR Family NOTES Capabilities Specific versions needed to support ARINC-653 Supplement 4 and FACE MCP architectures. RTOS Version 3 compliance. Ongoing efforts available from the NEAT security policy required. key RTOS OEMs. Use of dedicated CORE recommended for modularity and resource management. OPSW WCET (Worst Case CAST-32A assessment required Execution Time) model to be defined to address performances and resource management. It is recommended to allocated the MUM-T CSCI a specific CORE whilst allocating the sensor management to another CORE and the tactical MUM-T presentation/databa CAST-32A assessment required CSCI se management to a third CORE, under hypervisor supervision.
Interference analysis for inter core, intra core and off
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-49
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware NGR Family NOTES Capabilities processor effects to be defined as capital requirements also affecting the CSCI/CSC/CSU running on other COREs. Integration NGR Family NOTES & Validation SIL (System Integration New environment May require new virtual simulators Lab – LRU) FASIR (Full Avionic System New environment May require new stimulators/simulators Integration Rig) DT&E Specific activities A/C required OT&E Specific activities A/C required
Table E-11
3.4.3.3 CDS Functional Impacts (NGR)
The following Table E-12 below provides an analysis of the envisaged CDS functionalities required to implement integrated MUM-T capabilities for the NGR aircraft family types.
Hardware NGR Family NOTES Capabilities SCP Not Applicable MUM-T UA to be partitioned between DU, MMS and AMS. MCP LAD (large Area BPM (Back Path Monitoring) required to Display) solution minimize freezing and latency. with Multi Core
Processor and GPU (Graphic Processor Unit) to be considered for
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-50
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware NGR Family NOTES Capabilities MUM-T applications at least supporting 2560x1024 pixel per lines/60Hz graphic resolution. Interfaces Updated AFDX and New solutions should maximize the use full native ARINC- of Arinc-661 Supplement 5 based on 818-2 and its SCADE display and suite. evolution to be provided at LRU level avoid degradation of the deterministic processing and the introduction of aircraft data latency. Status Existing, under MCP solutions to be considered for the CAST-32A UAS segments. assessment Software NGR Family NOTES Capabilities RTOS Specific versions ARINC-653 Supplement 4 and FACE needed to support Version 3 compliance. MCP architectures. NEAT security policy required. Ongoing efforts available from the key RTOS OEMs. OPSW Use of dedicated CAST-32A assessment required CORE recommended for modularity and resource management. WCET (Worst Case Execution Time) model to be defined to address performances and resource management.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-51
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Hardware NGR Family NOTES Capabilities MUM-T It is recommended CAST-32A assessment required CSCI to allocate the MUM- T CSCI a specific CORE whilst, providing direct GPU interface. Integration NGR Family NOTES & Validation SIL (System New environment May require new virtual simulators Integration Lab – LRU) FASIR (Full New environment May require new stimulators/simulators Avionic System Integration Rig) DT&E Specific activities A/C required OT&E Specific activities A/C required
Table E-12
3.4.4 Advanced Teaming
MUM-T Advanced Teaming relates to the synergy among different types of forces able to use and share the available assets towards a true Network Enabled Capability (NEC).
Although the current definition of MUM-T is related to air vehicle operations with piloted, Optionally Piloted Vehicles (OPV) and unmanned vehicles, the ongoing technological evolution has clearly demonstrated that similar operations are possible through Advanced Teaming with ground, surface and subsurface assets.
The rotorcraft air crew may need assume control over a teamed UAV and/or its payload (sensors, weapons, etc.) for part or all of a mission. Protocols for the hand- over and take-over of UAVs for certain mission elements and tasks will need to be developed, as will a suitable HMI to permit the crew and/or embarked troops of the NGR to direct and control the UAV and its payload. This, potentially, could significantly increase crew workload. Therefore, the HMI needs to be carefully considered, and maximum use of automation/AI utilised to reduce operator burden.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-52
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
The NGR will take advantage of the cooperation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Surface assets, Maritime assets and Dismounted teams. This fits within the overall framework of the development of a “Networked Distributed Capability”.
The MUM-T architectures under definition are envisaged to provide major advantages such as sensor range being extended far beyond the manned platform – scouting for threats and obstructions, as well as providing LZ recce for the NGR crew, embarked troops and higher commanders. Beyond line-of-sight target engagement at longer standoff ranges can be employed, keeping the NGR out of range of threat systems. Furthermore, UAVs can act as decoys and diversionary assets – drawing attention away from the NGR and, ultimately, sacrificing themselves against incoming weapons.
The analysis of SG 219 of the Tactical operator’s capabilities-vs-technologies matrix, involving various families of technologies as for training, Human-Machine Interface (HMI), communications, remote sensors, defensive aids, Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs3), networking, cyber has identified the “bleeding edge” technologies necessary to permit a leap ahead in terms of achieving suitable MUM- T mission effectiveness (see examples in Figures E-09 and E-10 below).
Figure E-09 and Figure E-10
3 Examples being smart phones and internet-enabled tablet computers.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-53
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Unmanned Air System 3.4.5 UAV Architecture
This section identiies the UAV common architecture (Figure E-11) that has bee considered in this study as applicable to future UAV, to be used with the Legacy and NGR manned assets leveraging the Reference Architecture.
UAV Platform Flight Functionality Vehicle Flight Comms Navigatio Managem Control System n System MUM-T Architecture Datalink ent System Functionality All configurations System Network Intelligence
High Speed Data Link Software Defined Radios
Mission Functionality Antennas System
Planning Launch Stores Payload and and Managem Decision Recovery ent Engine System
UAV MUM-T Architecture
Figure E-11
The UAV architecture has been simplified to present Flight, Mission, Datalink and UAV on-board High-Speed Datalink functions.
3.4.6 Flight Functionality:
Flight Functions are managed through a High-Level Flight A.I. Engine, which autonomously conducts all aspects related to flight operations in a dynamic environment; it’s including flight paths management, navigation rerouting, failures/degraded modes management, reconfigurations, and communications.
It’s achieved by the A.I. Engine, interacting with the following sub-systems: • A Vehicle Management System • A Flight Control System • A Communication Management System • A Navigation System
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-54
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
The Flight A.I. Engine interact with the Mission A.I. Engine to contribute to the tasks outcome.
The Vehicle Management System includes: • An electrical power supply to the vehicle. This provides power generation (alternator(s), battery(ies)), distribution to primary bus for critical systems, secondary bus for mission systems. It’s including charging / switching from external to internal power supply capabilities. • A Health & Usage Monitoring System (HUMS), continuously monitors critical attributes related to the ability of the platform to complete his mission/task (temperatures, pressures, equipment status etc.). The system monitors these parameters and the sub-systems / functions to perform reconfigurations to be able to continue the mission whenever possible or provide alternative options to safely operate the platform. • Built-In Tests (BIT) which monitors the operation of critical characteristics to determine if a fault condition exist. If this is the case, the system is able to take the necessary actions to gracefully degrade before automatically failing safe.
The Flight Control System provides the stabilisation of the platform during flight, using the flight controls surface actuation and the thrust/lift management.
The Communication Management System provides information and communications to interact with the other airspace users. It’s includes Air Traffic Control (ATC) radio(s), transponder/IFF information.
The Navigation System is in charge of flight path establishment and maintains the related trajectory of the platform. It’s is based on miscellaneous primary sensors, like GNSS sensors, IMU(s), Air data Sensor(s), etc. The Navigation System also maintains the Situational Awareness using meteorological sensors and Detect and Avoid.
3.4.7 Mission Functionality:
Mission functions are also managed through a dedicated High-Level Mission A.I. Engine, which permit to plan a mission, elaborate the launch and recovery operations, manages the External Stores and payloads.
Mission functions are delivered by the A.I. Engine, interacting with the following sub- systems: • A Planning and Decisions Engine • A launch and Recovery module
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-55
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
• A Stores Management System • A Payloads Management System
This Mission A.I. Engine also interact with the Flight A.I. engine.
The Planning and Decisions Engine is able to establish Mission objective (targets, PoI) and constraints (no fly zones, restrictions, etc.) and Success criteria, Rules of Engagement, Emergency/contingency/reversionary actions, prioritisation logic, taking into account the platform role configuration.
The Launch and Recovery module elaborate the launch and recovery sequences, timings, in coordination with the platform manoeuvres.
The Stores Management System engage the offensive (effects and fires) and defensive measures (electronic and kinetic), depending of the threat on the UAV and/or Rotorcraft platform(s).
The Payloads Management System includes and manages the following payloads, depending of the mission objective: • EO systems • Rebro / Comms • Cyber • RF Sensors and Jammers • Target designation • Environmental sensors
It also provides cueing, targeting and autonomous data correlation/fusion capabilities.
3.4.8 Datalink Functionality:
The Datalink system provides the necessary functions to interface the unmanned platform to the network. It is based on: • A Network intelligence • Software Designed Radios • Antenna systems
The Network Intelligence allows the autonomous optimal utilisation of the MUM-T mobile Network by the UAV platform.
Software Defined Radios are in charge of the signal waveforms generation, and the Data Transmission and Reception.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-56
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Antenna System are connected to the Software Designed Radios to transmit/receive RF signals. It could manage antenna positioners (if any), in a case of directional antenna usage.
3.4.9 UAV on-board High-Speed Data Link
A High-Speed Data Link system is a high speed on-board network link, which is able to disseminate/broadcast/distribute data between the above subsystems. Further details are provided at ANNEX G.
3.4.10 UAV Types
The following UAV types have been agreed with Team 1 and are provided in full in ANNEX D, the analysis has been summarised into 3 classes of UAV and a total of 6 types:
3.4.10.1 Escort UAV - Controlled by NGR
Low Threat Escort UAV - Turboprop powered, tilt-wing / tail sitter configuration (including NGR in unmanned mode role fitted for escort duties) to provide matched performance and escort functions in “low threat” environment. Capable of being marinised.
High Threat Escort UAV - Jet powered high performance UAV with LO characteristics and comprehensive sensors/effectors for A-A, A-G and SEAD missions. CTOL / Carrier capable.
3.4.10.2 Tactical Effects UAV - Controlled by NGR
Air Launched Effector - Self-carried and self-deployed from NGR platform. Depending on size/cost could be considered disposable, but LOR phases need close scrutiny on a “risk vs reward” basis. Configurable to provide several different capabilities which the NGR will require in the target area (such as ISR, SigInt, Elint, ComJam, C-IED, environmental, targeting, obstruction mapping, Electronic Attack, Tactical Cyber etc.). Conceptually, the size/weight profile between a hand-deployed system and one that can be ejected from a sonobuoy- style launcher or from a weapon pylon rail launcher.
Ground Launched Effector - Larger system, analogous to the current H450/Predator/Falco. Self-launched/recovered with NGR assuming responsibility when airborne and controls flightpath/payload for tactical effect.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-57
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
3.4.10.3 Support UAV - Interacts with NGR
Tanker - Autonomous tanker for NGR (and escorts) to refuel from on ingress/egress. Likely CTOL with carrier capability. Potential for providing EW/Elint support and launch platform for decoys. NGR will require to “team” to achieve safe refuelling.
Operational ISR - Either low-tech/threat or high-tech/threat. Conceptually, an already “on station” asset (HALE/MALE) which currently simulcasts to all players. The “teaming” portion is when the NGR has the asset temporarily “chopped” to the crew and can directly control the asset’s orbit location and payload for a certain time period.
4 Impacts on System Architecture and Integration
4.1 System Engineering
The definition and development of a MUM-T system shall be captured by a Capstone SEMP (System Engineering Management Plan) that provides a detailed description and allocation of all technical aspects and their interfaces with the project processes as showed at Figure E-12.
The SEMP includes numerous controls to ensure design and process integrity that shall also detailed in the companion documents such as the RMP (Requirements Management Plan) and IMCP (Interface Management Control Plan), specific to the MUM-T application.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-58
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Figure E-12 The SEMP guides the System Architecture definition as a Top Level Structure of the Composition of the MUM-T System Solution, Organized into Logical Groupings, and:
• Splits the System into Technical Specialist Areas; • Establishes a Framework for Work Product Review and Acceptance; • Provides Alignment to the WBS; • Allows Organization for Complete Discharge of SE Process.
Using this approach every requirement is allocated to the outline architecture structure and the systems engineering and specialty engineers will review and attain acceptance of each requirement wording to ensure ‘Full’ requirements coverage and demonstration. Allocation will drive further derivation and bounding to remove ambiguity and add details to the engineering requirements with the different disciplines like manufacturing engineering, control engineering, software engineering, electrical engineering and others as necessary. Systems engineering ensures that all likely aspects are considered and integrated into a whole, as showed at Figure E-13 below.
Figure E-13
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-59
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
In the early program stages the Systems Engineering – using dedicated Working Groups – (Figure E-14) will be able to research new and emerging technologies with a focus of applying this knowledge to a new or existing system, or to increase the capability of existing system. Systems Engineering is also responsible for system architecture and system design tasks which are the cornerstones of any well-defined avionics or power management system.
Figure E-14
As a programme matures, the systems team has the overall responsibility for managing the user requirements to ensure the programme remains compliant to user needs, providing risk mitigation where applicable.
This requires a good systems level understanding and a high degree of engineering as well as an ability to effectively communicate with users and senior management when discussing engineering concepts to support the Technical Review Timeing and Processes (Figure E-15).
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-60
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Figure E-15
4.2 Systems Engineering issues associated with the introduction of the MUM-T capability
This section provide a System Engineering overview of the overall systems implications involved by the introduction of the MUM-T capabilities and associated architecture.
4.2.1 SE Challenges at ‘System of System’ level
a. Multiple assets at different speeds/altitudes/capabilities/ID systems/performance limits b. Accessing networks, including joining, leaving and authorisation c. Authorisation of C2/weapons/priorities d. Authorisation of missions/priority setting e. Cyber resilience f. C2 Datalinks/cyber/jamming/encryption/accessing network g. Dissimilar C2 links
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-61
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
h. Range of payload datalinks with high bandwidth, multiple channel requirements – this may require different technology links (range vs. bandwidth) i. AI and autonomy capabilities
4.2.2 SE Challenges at System (Aircraft) level
a. Multiple link capabilities requiring RF transceivers/power/antennas/control HMI/multiple LRUs b. Mechanical launch capability c. Mechanical recovery capability d. Having flexible modularity to enable different configurations of UAV to be used, this may also be apparent for the launch and recovery systems e. Mass budgets f. Automatic flight path control for launch and recovery g. HMI interaction with pilots / aircraft / UAV – Provision of AI and ML to offload pilot workload h. Launch envelope of UAV from NGR when flying at maximum speed i. Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3)
4.2.3 SE Challenges at System (UAV) level
a. Complexity of avionics, including SWaP b. Close proximity to multiple transmitters and avionics - E3 c. Multiple links / antennas d. Crypto’s/software authorisation e. Multiple payloads f. Power sources/endurance/power availability to avionics g. Maybe limited functionality in small UAV/endurance/payload h. Automatic flight path control and precision approach for launch and recovery
4.2.4 SE Challenges at Subsystem level (Subsystem integration of platform systems, manned and UAV platforms)
a. Standardised Modular concepts b. Miniaturisation of equipment – migrate to modular processing with software applications hosted anywhere c. Interface specifications for both hardware and software
4.2.5 SE Challenges at LRU level (both manned and UAV platforms)
a. Performance of equipment/processing capability/heat dissipation/battery technology
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-62
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
b. Modularity of interfaces, both hardware and software c. Antenna size d. Software crypto’s, encryption
4.3 Legacy and Future (NGR) Aircraft Class Impacts
The following sections provide a first assessment of the envisage installation impacts for the introduction of the MUM-T architecture on both the manned and unmanned segments.
4.3.1 Installation Impacts (SWAP)
An analysis has been performed considering the Size, Weight and Power requirements of the systems to be introduced to the manned rotorcraft, both legacy and NGR types – also included are some aspects of the UAV where it is carried by the manned platform.
The analysis has been based on current technology (2019) with estimates provided for similar systems and equipment installed in military helicopters. It is anticipated that future evolution of processor and microelectronics will mean the further miniaturisation of LRUs and lighter weight.
For NGR, it is assumed that there is a core backbone (Integrated Modular Architecture) that is primarily software based, and uses sharing of distributed processing to host the software (applications) and use specific hardware where required, also as plug in modules (e.g. RF modules) to provide specific technology interfaces.
Summary details are provided at Table E-13/1 (Legacy), Table E-13/2 (NGR) and Table E- 14 below.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-63
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Table E-13/1
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-64
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Table E-13/2
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-65
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Table E-14
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-66
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
5 Technology, Gaps and Roadmap
This section provides indications of the identified architecture and the associated concept of integration by leveraging the:
• Enabling Technologies, • Key Performance Indicators (KPI), • Envisaged Gaps, and • Technology Roadmap.
To maximize the work and conclusions defined in the following Year 2018 NATO reports (TM-AVT-ST-005 “Future Rotorcraft Technologies” and SG-219 “Next Generation Rotorcraft Capability”) their roadmaps have been used as integrated foundations for this document.
Their metrics, linked to Capabilities, Technologies and KPIs is therefore used to characterize the LUAS (existing UAS), UAS (next generation UAS), LRWA (existing Rotary Wing) and NGR as summarized in the following Table E-15, which defined the asset assumed capabilities for MUM-T capacle architecture(s):
TECHNOLOGY LUAS UAS LRWA NGR T01-High Air Vehicle None Limited Limited Available Performances T02-Modular Systems Limited Limited Limited Available T03-OPV Capable None Limited Limited Limited
T04-Autonomous A.I. Limited Available Limited Available T05-Cognitive/Neuro None Available Limited Available HMI T06-Inceptors/Active Limited Available Limited Available Controls T07-Fly-by-Wire Limited Available Available Available T08-Fly-by-Light None Available Limited Available T09-MOSA Avionics None Available Limited Available T10-MOSA OPSW None Available Limited Available T11-MCP Architecture None Available Limited Available T12-High Speed Limited Available Limited Available Interface Lanes T13-Secure High Limited Available Limited Available
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-67
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
TECHNOLOGY LUAS UAS LRWA NGR Throughput MANET Terminals T14-Smart FMS Limited Available Limited Available T15-Real-time None Limited Limited Available SmartHUMS/Conditio n Based Maintenance T16-Quantum None Limited Limited Available Crypto/Thermal Management Technique T17-On-board HST None None Limited Limited
Table E-15 The Technological Roadmap define above does not include any Governmental Participation and qualification activities derived from Governmental Agencies. Figure E-16 below, provides the graphical view of the MUM-T system integration challenges associated to the considered technologies.
Figure E-16
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-68
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
5.1 Enabling Technologies and KPIs.
The operational experiences acquired during asymmetric warfare operations have clearly identified the following Capabilities and allowed the identification of the critical Technologies (Table E-16 below) to enforce MUM-T operational deployment.
Capabilities Technologies Notes C1 - Exchange of command & T4-T9-T10-T11-T12- Including establishment of control data; T13-T16 common basic standard for interoperable C2 C2 - Exchange of payload data T10-T11-T12-T13- Including MCP gateway to T16 LRU TDL traffic C3 - HMI facilities T4-T5-T14-T15-T17 Including MFD tactical situation dependent modes C4 - Hand-over to participating T1-T2-T3-T4-T5-T6- Including GNSS denied forces T7-T8-T13-T14-T16 systems with specific Kalman filter applications C5 - Theatre dependent flight T4-T5-T13-T14-T16 Including miniaturized autonomy sensors and AAR (gas/enhanced battery) availability C6 - Local deployment and T1-T2-T3-T4-T15-T17 including launch and recovery recovery mechanisms
Table E-16
The required capabilities and the associated technologies are analysed in this report using the following KPI (Key Performance Indicators) parameters, with the associated Costs Metrics [Extremely High (XH), High (H), Medium (M), Low (L), Very Low (VL)] to address and evaluate the implication related to the architecture implementation:
KPI INDICATORS • Situational Awareness (SA); • Integration and Interoperability (I2); • Level of Autonomy (LA); • Innovation (IN); • Openness (OP); • Operability (OR); • Cost (CO).
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-69
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
KPI category and sub-category have been selected to measure the performance in achieving the main project objectives, namely the operational and technical innovation and the impact making objectives.
KPIs and metrics are intended to achieve a precise and proper evaluation of the outcomes and performance of the envisage architectures as well as the proposed simulated trials and live trials, where the sponsor will be involved in the KPI evaluation at specific project features related to the trials.
The outcome of this KPI process will help the Sponsor to evaluate the envisaged project performance, identifying areas of weakness and criticalities in order to identify ca series of corrective actions can then put in place to steer the project towards a successful completion.
5.1.1 Situational Awareness KPIs & Metrics
Situational Awareness (SA) is a mental construct, which is defined as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the future”.
The Situational Awareness KPI category refers to those KPIs that represent a state of knowledge which is adequate to obtain a specific goal, such as conducting a military operation. Two different sub-categories have been identified as relevant to the assessment of the Situational Awareness component provided in this SG-227 study solutions, namely Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) and Global Situational Awareness (GSA) level.
The SA category also needs to account for both the quality of the system components that enable SA and the human component. The human component includes the operators who are the elements of the operational environment that hold the Situational Awareness, through the support of the systems. Although the quality of the SA enabling system (e.g. ROZ/GSA quality) is an important element to be assessed, it is not enough to have a complete evaluation regarding the enhancement (or degradation) of operators’ SA. There are other factors (e.g. mental workload) that might play a fundamental role in the overall level of SA, so that for instance a high quality RMP may present an amount of information exceeding human processing capacity which might result in SA degradation. It is important to notice that SA and workload, which is included in the Operability category (Section 1.6.6) are two different yet correlated concepts.
The ROZ/GSA quality subcategory includes accuracy, clarity, completeness, continuity, timeliness and consistency attributes as KPIs. The GSA subcategories includes the Level of Situational Awareness KPI.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-70
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
The metrics and methods for evaluation for the RMP quality KPIs are derived from the defined methodologies. Those measurements of performance are instantaneous but can be extended to time average ratios if needed. Except for consistency the metrics are provided for single platforms (or single systems) but can be extended to platform/system average if needed. The following subsections provide definitions regarding the Situational Awareness KPIs and the related measurements of performance, which are summarized in Table E-17 below.
ARCHITECTURE LUAS UAS LRWA NGR SUPPORT Exchange of command XH M H L & control data
HMI facilities XH M H L Exchange of payload XH L M L data
Hand-over to XH M H L participating forces Theatre dependent XH H H H flight autonomy Local deployment and XH H H H recovery
Table E-17
5.1.2 Integration & Interoperability KPIs & Metrics
The components identified and considered within the SGS-227 report be integrated to an overall MUM-T system and these systems then integrated to the identified operation package that must be interoperable with each other and with other National, EU and NATO systems.
The following subsections provide definitions regarding the Integration & Interoperability KPIs and the related measurements of performance, which are summarized in Table E-18 below.
ARCHITECTURE LUAS UAS LRWA NGR SUPPORT Exchange of command XH H H M & control data
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-71
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
ARCHITECTURE LUAS UAS LRWA NGR SUPPORT
HMI facilities XH M H M Exchange of payload XH L M L data
Hand-over to XH H XH M participating forces Theatre dependant XH H H H flight autonomy Local deployment and XH H XH H recovery
Table E-18
5.1.3 Level of Autonomy KPIs & Metrics
Autonomy and collaborative autonomy are important components of the MUM-T solutions. In order to create valuable autonomy KPIs and metrics, the project has started from work that has been widely accepted. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have developed an approach called ALFUS, which stands for Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems.
The ALFUS objective is to provide a framework to facilitate characterizing autonomy for unmanned systems through: • Standard terms and definitions for requirements analysis and specifications, and • Metrics, processes and tools for evaluation/measurement.
In this section, only the latter will be addressed, to define and establish proper common foundations.
The scope of ALFUS covers: • A generic framework covering all UAS; • The full range from ‘remote control’ through ‘full autonomy’; • The range from a single MUM-T missions (which covers collaborative autonomy for mixed configurations)
Other features defined in ALFUS are: • Metrics-based, measurable levels with smooth transitions; • A basis for a general performance metrics framework for unmanned systems.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-72
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
The ALFUS approach (see Figure E-17) uses two autonomy/metrics sub-categories, complexity and independence.
The (human) independence relates to: • The frequency and duration of robot-initiated interactions, and the • Operator to UAS ratio.
Complexity is divided into two lower levels: environmental and mission complexity.
Environmental complexity covers aspects such as: • Terrain variation; • Object frequency, intensity and intent; • Climate; • Mobility constraints and • Communication dependencies.
Mission complexity includes properties such as: • Level of decision making; • Organization, collaboration • Performance; • World model complexity and • Sensing capabilities.
Figure 5.1.3-1 - ALFUS Roadmap
Figure E-17
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-73
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
The envisaged LA performances are summarized in Table E-19 below.
ARCHITECTURE LUAS UAS LRWA NGR SUPPORT Exchange of command XH H H M & control data
HMI facilities XH H H M Exchange of payload XH H M M data
Hand-over to XH H H M participating forces Theatre dependant XH H H M flight autonomy Local deployment and XH H H M recovery
Table E-19
5.1.4 Innovation KPIs & Metrics
The Innovation category includes KPIs, which are related to impact-making objectives, which are divided in the following subcategories: • Technology Readiness Level (TRL), • communication, • dissemination and • exploitation.
The following subsections provide definitions regarding the Innovation KPIs and the related measurements of performance, which are summarized in Table E-20 below.
ARCHITECTURE LUAS UAS LRWA NGR SUPPORT Exchange of command XH M H M & control data
HMI facilities XH M H M Exchange of payload XH M H M data
Hand-over to XH M H M
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-74
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
ARCHITECTURE LUAS UAS LRWA NGR SUPPORT participating forces Theatre dependent XH M H M flight autonomy Local deployment and XH M H M recovery
Table E-20
5.1.5 Openness KPIs & Metrics
One of the biggest difficulties of MUM-T study, as a system of systems, is to be able to adapt to different Manned/Unmanned systems from different End-Users. For these reasons, the Open System Joint Task Force (OS-JTF) definitions - addressing the open architecture system as the ones based on non-proprietary specifications for interfaces, services, and supporting formats to enable properly engineered components to be utilized across a wide range of systems with minimal changes, other components on local and remote systems, and to interact with users in a style that facilitates portability, - have been used in this report.
The following subsections provide definitions regarding the Openness KPIs and the related measurements of performance, which are summarized in Table E-21 below.
ARCHITECTURE LUAS UAS LRWA NGR SUPPORT Exchange of command XH L H L & control data
HMI facilities XH M H L Exchange of payload XH L H L data
Hand-over to XH M H L participating forces Theatre dependent XH M H M flight autonomy Local deployment and XH M H M recovery
Table E-21
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-75
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
5.1.6 Operability KPIs & Metrics
MUM-T operability can be defined as the ability to keep a system, equipment or installation in a safe and reliable functioning condition, according to pre-defined operational requirements.
The KPIs will need to cover a wide range of factors, such as logistic impact, safety, asset availability, workload, training and usability, in order to measure the MUM-T system’s operability in the defined mission profiles.
The following subsections provide definitions regarding the Operability KPIs and the related measurements of performance, which are summarized in Table E-22 below.
ARCHITECTURE LUAS UAS LRWA NGR SUPPORT Exchange of command XH M H L & control data
HMI facilities XH M H L Exchange of payload XH L H L data
Hand-over to XH M H L participating forces Theatre dependent XH M H L flight autonomy Local deployment and XH M H L recovery
Table E-22
5.1.7 Costs KPIs & Metrics
The Cost category accounts for the manpower and the operational costs subcategories.
The relevant KPI for the manpower subcategory is the required workforce, while operational costs include four KPIs: • UAS costs, • manned aircraft costs • maintenance costs, and • MUM-T mission hour (MH) costs.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-76
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
The following subsections provide definitions regarding the Costs KPIs and the related measurements of performance, which are summarized in Table E-23 below.
ARCHITECTURE LUAS UAS LRWA NGR SUPPORT Exchange of command XH M H M & control data
HMI facilities XH M H M Exchange of payload XH L L L data
Hand-over to XH M H M participating forces Theatre dependant XH M H M flight autonomy Local deployment and XH M H M recovery Table E-23
5.2 Envisaged Gaps
The following Table E-24 provides a summary view of the envisaged capabilities gaps applicable to Legay UAS and Legacy RWA, that shall be sorted out for integrated NGR MUM-T operations.
CAPABILITIES Legacy UAS Gaps Legacy RWA Gaps Exchange of Via GCS only. UAS not Via GCS only. Aircraft command & control designed for direct MUM-T ops. architectures not designed for data integrated MUM-T solutions
HMI facilities None, limited to ground-based Limited by present cockpits and controls controls. Smart interfaces required Exchange of payload Limited by legacy CDL system Limited by legacy CDL system data that impose closed architectures Handover to co- Not designed or supported Not designed or supported operating forces Theatre dependent Not designed or supported Not designed orsupported flight autonomy Local deployment and Not designed Not designed.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-77
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
CAPABILITIES Legacy UAS Gaps Legacy RWA Gaps recovery Physical support and deployment mechanisms not available Table E-24
Section 5.3 below, provides a tabular and narrative description of the envisaged technology and capability roadmaps in the Year 2020 – 2030 timeframe to create a NGR- integrated MUM-T architecture.
5.3 Technology Roadmap
Table E-25 provides a summary view of the envisaged technology roadmap for MUM-T operations in the 2020 – 2035 time frame, using the definitions of Table E-27 as metrics, limited in this document to the Technological Readiness Level (TRL) indicators.
TECHNOLOGY Year 2020 Year 2025 Year 2030 Year 2035 T01-High Air Vehicle TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) Performances T02-Modular Systems TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) FOC
T03-OPV Capable TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC)
T04-Autonomous A.I. TRL 4 TRL 6 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) T05-Cognitive/Neuro TRL 4 TRL 6 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) HMI T06-Inceptors/Active TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) Controls T07-Fly-by-Wire TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) FOC
T08-Fly-by-Light TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) T09-MOSA Avionics TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC)
T10-MOSA OPSW TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC)
T11-MCP Architecture TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) FOC
T12-High Speed TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) FOC Interface Lanes T13-Secure High TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) FOC Throughput MANET Terminals
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-78
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
TECHNOLOGY Year 2020 Year 2025 Year 2030 Year 2035 T14-Smart FMS TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) FOC
T15-Real-time TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) FOC SmartHUMS/ Condition Based Maintenance T16- Quantum TRL 3 TRL 5 TRL 8 (IOC) FOC Crypto/Thermal Management Technique T17-On-board HST TRL 7 TRL 8 TRL 9 (IOC) FOC
Table E-25
TRL 8 (System completed and qualified through test and demonstration) value in the table above is being used as technological threshold value to qualify the maturity level versus time of the seventeen parameters (T01 to T17) to be used for integrated MUM-T solutions for IOC (Initial Operational Capabilities) and FOC (Full Operational Capabilities) MUM-T integrated architectures.
To reach the FOC by Year 2035 for the considered state-of-art MUM-T architectures, a significant effort should be provided to gain the TRL 8 value for all technologies by Year 2025 with fully integrated experimental configuration composed by UAS and NGR-based packages, providing harmonized SRL capabilities (Table E-26).
CAPABILITY Year 2020 Year 2025 Year 2030 Year 2035 Exchange of SRL5 SRL7 SRL8 (IOC) SRL9 (FOC) command & control data
HMI facilities SRL5 SRL7 SRL8 (IOC) SRL9 (FOC) Exchange of payload SRL5 SRL7 SRL8 (IOC) SRL9 (FOC) data
Hand-over to SRL4 SRL7 SRL8 (IOC) SRL9 (FOC) participating forces Theatre dependant SRL3 SRL7 SRL8 (IOC) SRL9 (FOC) flight autonomy Local deployment SRL3 SRL7 SRL8 (IOC) SRL9 (FOC) and recovery
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-79
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Table E-26
Figure E-18 provides the estimated time-based evolutionary approach fo technology insertion in the MUM-T architectures.
Item T-13 includes the following sub-categories:
• ESA Antenna Advancements;
• Null Steering;
• Millimeter Wave Components;
• Hybrid Networking Protocols;
• LPI/LPD/AJ Waveforms; that are described in ANNEX G.
.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-80
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Figure E-18
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-81
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Level Technology Readiness Integration Readiness System Readiness Level Manufacturing Readiness Level Definition Level Definition Definition Level Definition TRL IRL SRL MRL 1 TRL1 Basic principles IRL1 Interface between SRL1 Basic principles MRL1 Basic manufacturing observed and reported technologies identified with observed and reported implications identified sufficient detail to allow characterisation of the relationship 2 TRL2 Technology concept IRL2 There is some level of SRL 2 System concept MRL2 Manufacturing and/or application specificity to and/or application concepts identified formulated characterize the Interaction formulated. between technologies through their interface 3 TRL 3 Analytical and IRL3 There is Compatibility SRL 3 Analytical studies MRL3 Manufacturing proof experimental critical (i.e. common and experimentation on of concept developed function and/or language) between system elements. characteristic proof of technologies to orderly and concept efficiently integrate and interact. 4 TRL4 Component validation IRL 4 There is sufficient SRL 4 Sub-system in laboratory environment detail in the MRL4 Capability to produce components integrated in a Quality and Assurance of the technology in a laboratory environment. the integration between laboratory environment.
technologies. 5 TRL5 Component validation IRL5 There is sufficient SRL 5 System tested in a MRL5 Capability to produce in relevant environment Control between simulated environment. prototype components in a technologies necessary to production relevant establish, environment. manage, and terminate the integration. 6 TRL6 System prototype IRL6 The integrating SRL 6 System MRL6 Capability to produce demonstration in a relevant technologies can demonstrated in a a prototype system or environment Accept, Translate, and simulated operational subsystem in a production Structure environment, including relevant environment. Information for its intended interaction with simulations application. of external systems. 7 TRL7 System prototype IRL7 The integration of SRL 7 Demonstration of MRL7 Capability to produce demonstration in an technologies has system prototype in an systems, subsystems or operational environment. been Verified and Validated operational environment, components in a production with including interaction with representative sufficient detail to be external systems. environment. actionable. 8 TRL8 System completed IRL8 Actual integration SRL 8 System proven to MRL8 Pilot line capability and qualified through test completed and work in the operational demonstrated. Ready to and demonstration. Mission Qualified through environment, including begin low rate production. test and integration with external demonstration, in the systems. system environment. 9 TRL9 System proven IRL9 Integration is Mission SRL 9 Application of the MRL9 Low Rate Production through successful mission Proven system under operational demonstrated. Capability in operations. through successful mission mission conditions. place to begin Full Rate operations. Production. 10 MRL10 Full Rate Production demonstrated and lean production practices in place. Table E-27
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-82
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
6 Outline Technological Demonstration Program (TDP)
Although the execution of a MUM-T experimental demonstrations (from Year 2020 to Year 2030) is not part of this task, a description of the envisaged capabilities is provided as a part of a HVT (High Value Target) Exercise, where the following architectures could be demonstrated and evaluated:
7) C1: Control of UAS from a helicopter 8) C2: Small UAS launched for a door of a helicopter 9) C3: Small UAS launched from a pylon from a helicopter 10) C4: Large UAS launched from a helicopter 11) C5: UAS recovered to a helicopter (fixed wing UAV) 12) C6: UAS recovered to a helicopter (Multirotor UAV)
With the support of NATO helicopter operators and under the Military Airworthiness Certification (MAC) rules, limited to the exercise time.
Figure E-19
Figure E-19 above provides a graphical view of a typical OV-1 describing the HVT operation, where the MUM-T packages will be used with different levels of operations, addressing both the vertical separation and the fire separation distances.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-83
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Given the envisaged timeline (Year 2020 to Year 2030) of the demo exercise and the foreseen asset availability, it is proposed to perform the following test cases: • MUM-T/1, composed by an AH teamed with a RUAS element for target engagement (C1) as AWT (Attack Weapon Team); • MUM-T/2, composed by UH as UWT (Utility Weapon Team), tasked with the execution of the C2 and C4 conditions, used for establishing the LOP (Local Operation Procedure) in support of the AWT; • MUM-T/3, composed by CH as CWT (Cargo Weapon Team), tasked with the execution on the C5 and C6 conditions, in support of the UWT operations.
The AMC (Airborne Mission Commander) will be based on the UH asset, which will also provide the gateway communication (LOS/BLOS) with the ExD (Exercise Director).
Should the C3 asset exists and be compatible either with a BRU-14 or a 2.75” 7-tube launcher unit, supporting Mil-Std-1760 interface with SA/GPS/IR capabilities, a dedicated AWT will be used to deploy and test the C3 in support of the UWT mission tasks.
Figure E-20
Figure E-20 above provides a graphical view of the required safety distances that will be used to test and declare the performances parameters that the UAS shall implement.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-84
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
Figure E-21
Figure E-21 above, provides a graphical view of MUM-T packages and their interactions with the deployed Air Assault Assets (AAA).
The following capabilities shall be provided, tested and scored for each MUM-T packages in the scenario illustrated by Figure E-22:
MUM-T/1
• Advanced recce on en-route to target allowing higher speed execution • Recce on approaching route to target, allowing early warning related to OPFOR presence/movements • Surveillance on potential OPFOR strong hold/oupost around target area • Diversion on possible moving targets • AWT target designation • AWT target engagement • UAS hands-off to other assets as needed (forward MEDEVAC or QRA/QRF) • Advanced recce on en-route to FOB allowing higher speed execution • Relay station
MUM-T/2
• UAS air-launch operations and ground troops hand over • AMC operation for tactical air space management • AWT coordination and diversion • Securing area of operation with airborne resources/personnel
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-85
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
MUM-T/3
• Ground recovery of UAS • Local area engagement • Recovery of deployed assets/personnel.
Figure E-22
The scope and values of TDP 2020 – 2030 will be to demonstrate how the envisaged COTS key technologies could be used in a multi MUM-T environment in a tactical environment and to identify the operational gaps required to be implemented to support the fully integrated NGR based modular solution. Table E-28 below defines the evolutionary deployment and verification of the proposed MUM-T configuration (for both the manned and the unmanned components) over the Year 2020 – 2030 timeframe.
TDP 2020 - 2030 MUM-T/1 MUM-T/2 MUM-T/3 NOTES TECHNOLOGY Exchange of MANET/MIMO MANET/MIMO MANET/MIMO Modular kit command & control with MCS kit with MCS kit with MCS kit installed on all data air vehicles Year 2030 Integrated Integrated Integrated NGR capable MCS/DL MCS/DL MCS/DL HMI facilities TPED S/W on TPED S/W on TPED S/W on Common VSM
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-86
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
TDP 2020 - 2030 MUM-T/1 MUM-T/2 MUM-T/3 NOTES TECHNOLOGY AH UH CH S/W on TPED Year 2030 Integrated Integrated Integrated NGR capable CDS CDS CDS Exchange of Encoder Encoder Encoder H.264/KLM payload data interfaced with interfaced with interfaced with basic DL DL DL dissemination Year 2030 Integrated Integrated Integrated Deep Learning MCS/DL MCS/DL MCS/DL Capable Hand-over to Via TPED Via TPED Via TPED Common VSM participating forces VSM S/W VSM S/W VSM S/W S/W on TPED Year 2030 Integrated Integrated Integrated NGR capable MCS MCS MCS Theatre dependent UAS MCS UAS MCS UAS MCS Pre- flight autonomy S/W S/W S/W programmed decision points Year 2030 Integrated Integrated Integrated NGR capable MCS MCS MCS Local deployment Via TPED Via TPED Via TPED Common VSM and recovery VSM S/W VSM S/W VSM S/W S/W on TPED
Year 2030 Integrated Integrated Integrated NGR capable MCS MCS MCS Table E-28
7 Conclusions and Recommendations
Although the present constrains of SG-227 contract have not allowed to carry on a detailed assessment of the NATO required capabilities to identify the proper technical solutions, the SG-227 joint sessions and available documentation have highlighted some key critical elements that are driving the following Conclusions and Recommendations.
7.1 Conclusions
C1 - A modular multinational interoperable architecture to support MUM-T operations has been identified for legacy and future platforms.
C2 - Open system standards including Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA) will be required to support high-speed processing and modular construction for legacy and NGR platforms.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-87
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX E
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV)
C3 - Data link technologies with suitable performance / bandwidth to enable concurrent multiple data streams in the range of 100 Gb/s will be required.
C4 - Unmanned platforms release and recovery is a major technical challenge, including the performance differences of the manned aircraft involved
C5 - AI (machine learning, “deep learning”, image analysis etc..) will be required to fully exploit the UAV functionality and provide the necessary autonomy and capability of the UAV system(s) when operating either automatically or in close MUM-T cooperation.
7.2 Recommendations
R1 – High Priority: A modular multinational MUM-T subsystems architecture developed in this study should be demonstrated by simulation or demo
R2 – High Priority: Implement/mature the use of AI algorithms and data.
R3 - Common C2 architecture is required for connectivity with ground forces. .
NATO UNCLASSIFIED E-88
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Annex F
Implications on Human Machine Interface and Automation Development
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Executive Summary ...... 2 2. Introduction ...... 5 3. Realising MUM-T: The Human Factor ...... 9 4. Realising MUM-T: HMI Technology Road Map ...... 20 5. Realising MUM-T: Automation Technology Road Map ...... 27 6. Summary and Conclusion ...... 35
TABLE OF REFERENCES 1 NATO Standard, ATP-49, Use of Helicopter in Land Operations, Edition G, Version 1, March 2017 2 Robert S. Gutzwiller & John Reeder; Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centre Pacific, San Diego, USA, “Huma I ac iv Machi L a i g f T us i T ams f Au m us R b s” 3 NIAG study 219 on Concepts for Operations and Equipment for Next Generation Vertical Lift Operations, DOCUMENT NIAG-D(2018)0001 AC/225(VL)D(2018)0001, dated 2 May 2018. 4 Wickens, C.D. "Processing resources in attention", in R. Parasuraman & D.R. Davies (Eds.), Varieties of attention, New York: Academic Press, 1984. 5 Hui-Min, Huang und Elena, R. Messina, Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework, Volume I and II, dated 2007 and 2008. 6 Durst, Phillip J. und Gray, Wendell. Levels of Autonomy and Autonomous System Performance Assessment for Intelligent Unmanned Systems, US Army Corps of Engineers - Engine Research and Development Centre, 2014. 7 Cummings, Mary, et al. Task Versus Vehicle-Based Control Paradigms in Multiple Unmanned Vehicle Supervision by a Single Operator, 2014. 8 International Civil Aviation Organizatio , “Rul s f h Ai ”.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-1
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
1. Executive Summary
This document details the systems engineering and platform integration issues with respect to legacy, current generation and future rotorcraft, addresses the human factors impacts on pilot workload when operating in a manned/unmanned teaming environment, and highlights autonomy as a critical area of developmental focus. In addressing these objectives, recommendations are made with respect to human interraction to address both the command and control of unmanned systems, and for the rapid interpretation and exploitation of information provided by the unmanned systems.
MUM-T provides tactical and operational gains by increasing the availability of effects (sensors, weapons, comms, jamming, counter- measures, etc) that can be delivered by the team. However, this increase comes at a price in the form of workload intensive operations that cannot be performed without evolutionary improvements to existing interfaces and available autonomy technologies. Future cockpit designs will need to consider HMI advancements in visualization techniques in order to present off board sensor data to the operators as well as deliver reductions in crew workload. Additionally, future MUM-T operators will need low workload methods and autonomy management decision aids to rapidly task and re-task teams of unmanned assets.
Challenge: Advanced MUM-T will only be realised with advancement in both Human Machine Interfaces and Autonomy
The introduction of MUM-T technology into the cockpit of legacy and/or current generation rotorcraft will result in an increased level of mission management, and the existing architecture of the proposed manned platform will have an impact on the ability to integrate a MUM-T capability. Therefore, given that the introduction of a MUM-T will require modification of the existing HMI it is considered impractical to attempt to retro-fit early generation aircraft with a MUM-T capability.
Additionally, the increased workload associated with the introduction of MUM-T must not exceed what is deemed a safe or acceptable level. Therefore, any decision to integrate a MUM-T capability into legacy and/or current generation rotorcraft needs to be cognisant of current aircrew workloads such that the overall effect is close to workload-neutral.
Challenge: Integration of a MUM-T capability must also ensure that aircrew workload levels remain balanced, and within acceptable limits.
An optimized cockpit HMI will be a critical to realizing the full utility of a MUM-T capability. Whilst the visual sense will remain the critical conduit, this will be enhanced by the
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-2
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
provision of monaural and binaural audio cues to enable crew to utilise fused sensor imagery from both onboard and off board sensor resources, overlaid with accurately displayed color-coded symbology, thereby delivering enhanced situational awareness information in an intuitive and timely manner. The HMI must enable rapid and accurate management of platform resources, including sensor and weapons, and the capability to share command and control information in multi-platform operations in a very dynamic operational environment without adversely impacting pilot workload. Specific HMI optimization will include the use of techniques such as Color Symbology, Perspective view (or 3D) conformal symbology, 3D audio cues and Head/Eye/ Iris tracking.
Head down displays will be used to provide wide area situational awareness and enable effective mission planning and monitoring, with Helmet Mounted Displays used provide enhanced situation awareness. By combining these technologies multimodal interaction technologies shall provide a solution that allows the operator to utilize individual modalities based on mission context and operator’s available resources rather than saturating a single modality. Moreover, this technology will enable coupled control schemes that improve decision making and operational effectiveness.
However, the human segment in the MUM-T will quickly suffer from information overload without introduction of automated decision support technologies, and future autonomy capabilities and decision aids will need to emphasise explainable autonomy techniques, that expose algorithmic decision-making processes to the operator, in order to build trust between the human and automation.
Automation will adapt to and control the workload of human participation to a level that is sustainable and doesn’t risk mission success, however automation will also be critical to realising an increased level of situational and environmental awareness across the entire battlespace, and this is equally applicable to both the manned and unmanned segments, which will require automatic processing of payload data in real time.
Command of a teamed UAS will differ significantly from the direct (remote) control associated with legacy UAS. The design aim being to deliver a UAS that behaves exactly the same as a manned element within a MUM-T formation.
With respect to the “control task” the automation shall be capable of solving simple problems on its own, whilst keeping the “human in the loop” when considering those issues that influence mission progress / efficiency or require operator decisions with respect to overall mission effectives or success
To achieve the required abstraction level of controlling the Unmanned Segment, task- based guidance will be required. Command and Control will be executed by the operator
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-3
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
addressing a command to the “network”, with the overarching “automated network intelligence” assessing the task and providing a solution to fulfil the operator tasks.
Maintaining safe separation between the manned and unmanned segments dictates that the UAS behaviour needs to be semi predictable, but conversely the UAS also needs to avoid setting predictable patterns therefore the UAS behaviour will need to be rule based on an abstract level on the first hand; multiple sources must be considered to provide input for these rules, such as the ICAO Rules of the Air4 and local Rules of Engagement. However, autonomy in the unmanned segment will also need to enable a deviation detection system, which is able to compare the current situation with the expected mission plan and propose or execute amendments.
Automation must also support the processing of UAS payload data such that the task associated with derivation of the tactical information out of the payload data is also automated and will also require real-time decision-based support to implement an understanding of the changing environmental model, incl. terrain, weather and tactical data.
In the longer term, UAS behaviour might develop by machine learning technologies during the on-going mission. Integrating MUM-T in such operations will require a powerful explanation component where the unmanned segment communicates derived intent to the manned segment in real time.
Developing Artificial Intelligence systems that are able to react within dynamic scenarios will require the system to have a thorough understand of the overall operational environment and will require the Artificial Intelligence to Comprehend the environment, Perceive its progress towards achieving the mission and Project the current temporal situation into the future.
4 Rules of the Air. s.l. : International Civil Aviation Organization, 2005. BDL-00002-000-15-E-P.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-4
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
2. Introduction
2.1 Background
The NATO JCG VL is the sponsor of a series of studies into a Staff Target/Requirement for an enhanced/ future operational and survivable rotorcraft, with the aim of contributing towards the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) rotorcraft Long Term Capability Requirements (LTCR’s) process. This paper forms part of the NIAG Study Group 227 report on rotorcraft Manned/Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T). The scope of the SG227 study is to evolve a technical architecture to support advanced MUM-T and identify and document the technology challenges that would impact capability implementation.
This document details the systems engineering and platform integration issues with respect to legacy, current generation and future rotorcraft, addresses the human factors impacts on pilot workload when operating in a manned/unmanned teaming environment, and highlights autonomy as a critical area of developmental focus.
2.2 Objectives and Scope
The objectives for this subsection of the NIAG 227 study into MUM-T are to:
i) Identify and document the technical architecture required to incorporate the manned/unmanned advanced teaming capability into the “command” rotorcraft platform. ii) Identify and define the specific human factors issues associated with the incorporation of advanced manned/unmanned capabilities in single or dual piloted command platform. iii) Identify and define human-machine interface concepts to command and control the unmanned systems, and to rapidly understand and interpret the information they provide. iv) Conduct an analysis of the aircrew workload associated with the addition of the manned/unmanned capability. Identify methods or alternatives to reducing any workload increases.
In addressing these objectives, this paper also makes recommendations for concepts for human machine interraction to address both the command and control of unmanned systems, and for the rapid interpretation and exploitation of information provided by the unmanned systems.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-5
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
2.3 Mission Tasks
The NIAG SG227 Study and Tasking Request directs this study to consider those missions detailed in ATP-495 as the baseline operational scenarios. These scenarios have been examined in detail at Chapter 2/ Annex D in order to distil the following 5 core missions: i) Reconnaissance, ii) Attack, iii) Transport - Air Mobile, iv) Transport - Aero Medical Evacuation, v) Specialized Tasks - Personnel Recovery – CSAR.
However, whilst the operational scenario and vignettes all differ in mission complexity, threat type and number of players, examination and analysis of the operational vignette as detailed in Chapter 3/ Annex E has proposed the following “best 3 types” of Unmanned Airborne System (UAS) for application of the MUM-T capability:
i) Escort UAS, ii) Tactical Effector UAS, iii) Mid-range Tactical Effector.
2.4 MUM-T Enhanced Mission Execution
Supplementary to the Mission Tasks, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for MUM-T are also described in detail at Chapter 2/Annex D. In summary, it is envisaged that integrating MUM-T into existing Mission Tasks will enhance current helicopters operations through providing the manned segment by:
i) Utilising the UAS as detached sensor / effector and thereby increasing separation between manned platforms and hostile forces (increased survivability). ii) Provide additional and enhanced ISR capabilities (multi access / bi-static detection etc). iii) Extending / bridging traditional mission communication capabilities, by utilising UAS as a communications relay node.
5 NATO Standard, ATP-49, Use of Helicopter in Land Operations, Edition G, Version 1, March 2017, page 1-8.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-6
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Colloquially, these types of mission can be summaries by transferring those tasks that are “Dull or Dangerous” to an Unmanned Segment within a MUM-T.
2.5 Derived Tasks
By analysing and cross-referencing the Mission Scenarios from Chapter 2/Annex D with the identified types of UAS from Chapter 3/ Annex E, reveals four core tasks where the UAS would support the manned rotary platform during the execution of the Mission. i) Support Situational Awareness: In order to support situational awareness (including DVE), the UAS will need to deploy both radar and electro optic sensors. ii) Offensive Tasking: As well as acting as a traditional kinetic weaponry holder, the UAS would utilise various Electronic Support Measures (ESM) payloads in support of the manned segment to deliver Suppression of Enemy Air Defence, Offensive Electronic warfare and traditional Jamming techniques. iii) Defensive Tasking: The UAS would support and deliver off-board Defensive Electronic Warfare/ Electronic Support Measures payloads and Counter Measures in order to enable bistatic geolocation, improved counter IED and seduction capabilities far excess of those feasible through single platform mounted capabilities. iv) Mission Support Tasks: Delivery of Air to Air Refuelling and acting as individual segments in an airborne Communications Relay array are considered obvious missions for Unmanned Airborne Systems.
2.6 Information Exchange Requirements
Whilst the exact force mix of each UAS type will be different for each of the different operational scenarios, analysis of the likely UAS tasks and associated source sensor types allows us to derive the following headline Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) between the Manned and Unmanned segments: i) The manned aircraft needs to be able to receive and display imagery and video derived from both EO/IR and imaging radar sensors in real/ near-real time. ii) Two-way exchange of positional / track-based information and bearing data derived from off-board radar, EO/IR, IFF, and ESM sensors. iii) Two-way exchange of tabular data such as EW parametric, IFF and ESM database to facilitate data and intelligence fusion, and identity matching.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-7
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
iv) The unmanned systems need to be able to receive and process Command and Control information such as changes in mission parameters and intentions. v) Two-way exchange of Counter Measures status and threat direction. vi) Two-way exchange of traditional communications: Traditional Audio/Voice channels as well as data link initiation and maintenance. vii) A shared Navigation solution is required or accurate georeferencing and positioning.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-8
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
3. Realising MUM-T: The Human Factor
MUM-T provides tactical and operational gains by increasing the availability of effects (sensors, weapons, comms, jamming, counter- measures, etc) that can be delivered by the team. In these operations, the human operator has many responsibilities that include supervisor command and control input of the autonomy, coordinating mission assets and payloads, maintaining battlespace situational awareness (SA), and communicating with the mission command chain. This tasking, however, will result in workload intensive operations that cannot be performed without evolutionary improvements to existing interfaces and available autonomy technologies.
In the longer term, MUM-T operations will extend NGR capabilities but at a cost of increased aircrew workload. The introduction of MUM-T operations will challenge operator’s resource management, decision making, and ability to perceive and comprehend dynamic changes in the environment. This results in a variety of human factors challenges that must be addressed to ensure MUM-T operators have the appropriate tools to manage increased workload and maintain mission wide situational awareness (SA).
3.1 Crew Workload
One of the key considerations in defining crew complement remains aircrew workload, and this key constraint is unlikely to change with the introduction of manned-unmanned teaming. Early generation aircraft (both fixed and rotary wing) were typically single pilot platforms. However, the introduction of sophisticated aircraft subsystems increased the demand on operators to interpret and synthesize high volumes of information while simultaneously managing platform safety and the mission. This additional workload quickly challenged a single operator’s resource management and led to a trend in dual pilot aircraft and operations.
In the latest generation of fixed wing aircraft, such as F35, increased levels of automation has reduced crew workload to the level that a single person is able to manage the mission and operate the aircraft; however in order to deliver the required increased level of automation, the greatest step forward has been in reducing the workload associated with the platform (flying and monitoring) such that the single pilot can focus on fighting the platform to a greater extent. Although the application of automation of the flying task is equally desirable in the Rotary Wing sphere, it is less applicable in the near term because the RW role requires normal operation at low level altitudes (often nap of the earth), and frequently involves dynamic manoeuvring by the pilot to avoid CFIT and obstacles.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-9
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
3.2 Crew Compliment
Given that the workload associated with the introduction of unmanned technologies is predominantly focused on the mission execution cockpit tasks, it is a safe assumption that the twin pilot configuration will remain the norm (as the scope of the flying task has not changed). Indeed, it is envisaged that during complex operational scenarios, control of the UAS Segment may require the support of a ground-based controller for certain flight phases (e.g. UAS take off/landing and control of off nominal or UAS failure conditions)
Therefore, without significant advances in automation of the dynamic low-level flight control rotorcraft operations, enabling the crew to simultaneously control the aircraft and manage the mission (including the interaction with multiple types of MUM-T platforms) will still require a minimum of a twin pilot crew configuration. Given that it is impractical to retro fit this type of automation in current or legacy platforms, Single Pilot MUM-T operations are not envisaged until the introduction of NGR type avionic architectures.
Single crew MUM-T operators would require more sophisticated autonomy and autonomous teaming decision making capabilities due to the additional workload constraints faced by single crew. Comparatively, dual crew MUM-T operators may be capable of specifying more detailed mission constraints (spatial, temporal, resource), and will likely rely more heavily on explainable autonomy features to manage mission objectives. Additionally, single crew operator platforms will require advanced adaptive automation and physiological monitoring capabilities to ensure mission success.
3.3 Cockpit Technologies
MUM-T operations will increase the volume of intelligence data available to aircrew and enable intelligence data collection over a more expansive area of interest. However, current cockpit Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) typically have limitations with regards to: i) Overstimulation of operators in visual and audio modalities, ii) Insufficient SA data and sensor fusion, iii) Limited decision aids for tactical decision making.
Conversely, the additional human factors challenges associated with management and utilisation of a MUM-T capability include: i) Additional demands on aircrews for tasking teams of unmanned vehicles. ii) Managing multiple aircraft sensor, weapon, and/or other UAS subsystems. iii) Monitoring teamed aircraft status and mission progress. iv) Responding to off nominal conditions involving teamed aircraft & own-ship
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-10
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
v) Interpreting and responding to an increased volume of intelligence and surveillance data. vi) Managing own-ship and teamed aircraft safety and the dynamic mission responsibilities.
Therefore, supporting, controlling and utilising supporting MUM-T capabilities will require development of an HMI that both optimises the display of existing (own-ship) sensors and integrates and fuses UAS derived sensor data. Therefore, the HMI will need to include a situational awareness display that allows the operator to visualise the battlespace from multiple sensor positions (i.e. both onboard and off-board) and also enable the operator to dynamically task teamed assets.
The human factors challenges associated with operating a number of UAS whilst simultaneously managing SA over the MUM-T enhanced area of interest will require significant data fusion to synthesize and compare alternative data sources; displaying only the most pertinent and critical information to operators. Future cockpit designs will therefore need to consider advancements in battlespace visualization techniques such as both enhanced head-mounted technologies and advanced head down displays in order to present off board sensor data to the operators in both 2D or 3D visualisations as well as options to reduce existing crew workload such as integration of advanced decision support technology and automation.
Proposed technology roadmaps to develop and implement the in-aircraft HMI and Automation requirements to support a MUM-T capability in legacy, current and future rotorcraft are described in subsequent chapters.
However, it must be noted that Human Operators are limited in their ability to directly oversee unmanned vehicles. Future MUM-T operators will need low workload methods and autonomy management decision aids to rapidly task and re-task teams of unmanned assets. In order to minimize the workload associated with MUM-T operations, the autonomous assets will need to be capable of consuming supervisory command and control inputs from manned operators and be equipped with autonomous teaming algorithms to optimize user specified mission objectives.
Challenge: Advanced MUM-T will only be realised with advancement in both Human Machine Interfaces and Autonomy
3.4 Matching Rotorcraft Avionic Architecture
The introduction of MUM-T technology into the cockpit of legacy and/or current generation rotorcraft will result in an increased level of mission management associated with the
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-11
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
utilising the MUM-T capability. Therefore, the existing architecture of the proposed manned platform will have an impact on the ability to integrate a MUM-T capability.
Mirroring the System Classification categories developed in NIAG SG 167 (DVE), the varying degrees of platform avionic architecture identified across the wide variety of legacy, current and future rotary wing platforms have been brought forward into a family of solutions, and assigned different classifications as shown in Figure F-1.
Figure F-1: MUM-T Indicative Platform Avionic Architecture
Class 4: This is the baseline system and the least capable. It consists of analogue/legacy cockpit systems, with limited or no system level integration. Any additional MUM-T capability would require retrofit and most likely provide limited increase in teaming for significant increase in cockpit workload. As a baseline this might consist of a processing unit, simple datalink (capable of “one-to one” operations) and interactive display unit. Any UAS activities would be limited to a simple, single remote sensor (such as EO device) type
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-12
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
capability that is controlled by line of sight with no automation. Example platforms include H3/S61 Sea King.
Class 3: Non-integrated MUM-T capability with modern HMI. This class would include a Multi-Function Display (MFD) to provide SA, but no fused/integrated avionics (fused by coincident use of screen). In addition to the baseline of Class 4, this system would include a datalink to support “1 to Many” operations, and a higher level of HMI and autonomy for supervisory command and control of the unmanned segments. The class 3 architecture is considered the minimum input standard for integrating a MUM-T capability in a legacy platform. Example platforms include Merlin HC Mk 3/ UH60-B.
Class 2: Integrated HMI (current generation “glass cockpit” systems with advanced HMI standards). In addition to the Class 3 baseline, multiple datalinks are included to enable “1 to mixed” operations. The considerably higher operating workload of such a system would need to be offset with increased decision aiding for the mission manager as well as a higher level of sensor fusion and a greater degree of autonomy for pilotage. Head tracked Head Mounted Display System would be necessary to visualise the battlespace and facilitate greater SA. The key capability enabled by this system is the ability to interact and utilise the payloads of multiple UAS on demand with greater link redundancy. Example platforms include NH90 / Merlin HC Mk 4.
Class 1: This class of system would be capable of “1 to Network” operations utilising task- based requests published to the network. All the capabilities of Class 2 architecture are present in Class 1 with the added capability of interoperability between the multiple UAV with an autonomous C2 network. The mission manager would request an effect from the network. Next generation cockpit display systems are required to provide the greatest level of SA and intuitive multitouch/gesture HMI. The increased level of autonomy and decision aiding would potentially allow for single pilot operations with the pilot selecting autonomous or manual system operation. Linking autonomous cues to the flight control system will require a great deal of cooperation between the system designer/user and the aircraft manufacturer. An example platform might be Future Rotor Craft or NGR.
Whilst the introduction of MUM-T technology is expected to enhance overall mission success, there is an associated increase in crew workload associated with the mission commander / mission management role, and without specific focus it is highly likely that integrating a MU&M-T capability will result in an increased cockpit workload. This is especially likely when integrating MUM-T in legacy or current generation aircraft.
Therefore, given that the introduction of a MUM-T capability in support of current generation manned rotary wing platforms will require modification of the existing HMI (to optimise system displays and introduce data fusion in order to offset the additional workload) whilst also integrating UAS payload and platform control data links, it is
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-13
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
considered impractical to attempt to retro-fit early generation / Class 4 aircraft with a MUM- T capability.
Constraint: Class 3 architecture is the recommended minimum baseline configuration for implementing a MUM-T capability in legacy platforms.
Another critical differentiator between integrating a MUM-T capability in current/legacy (class 2 or 3 platforms) and a class 1 platform (such as the NGR) will be the level of autonomy support provided to the manned operators. Specifically, the technology readiness level of autonomy and communication services available in the near term (as opposed to that technology associated with the NGR) reveals that the level of supervisory control of the UAS (high level tasking of the UAS instead of commands via waypoints), sensor/data fusion techniques, and autonomy decision aids (such as aided target recognition) are unlikely to be available.
Similarly, the aircrew workload (and hence crew complement) is also inextricably linked to the level of maturity of the HMI and autonomy subsystems; initially MUM-T operations will likely require dual pilot crew management due to system limitations and the expected incremental improvement roadmap to field advanced HMI and autonomy. However, for NGR, it is envisaged that a switch to single pilot operations is possible through focused maturation of autonomous capabilities which shall allow for automating the flying pilot role (freeing the single pilot to predominantly focus on mission management and execution).
3.5 Impact on the Human Machine Interface
This increased workload could potentially increase crew workload beyond what is deemed a safe or acceptable level for continuous operations. Therefore, any decision to integrate a MUM-T capability into legacy and/or current generation rotorcraft needs to be cognisant of current aircrew workloads and aim to balance the additional tasks by also optimising the current HMI technologies, so that the overall effect is close to workload-neutral.
Challenge: Integration of a MUM-T capability must also ensure that aircrew workload levels remain balanced, and within acceptable limits.
Ideally, the proposed HMI subsystem could be reused for single pilot or dual crew aircraft to enable MUM-T mission management. MUM-T operators in both dual crew and single crew aircraft will rely heavily on task-based mission planning techniques to monitor and command unmanned assets. These operators will utilize low workload, naturalistic pilot vehicle interfaces to monitor the battlespace and dynamically response to mission needs.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-14
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
3.6 HMI Development
Irrespective of the exact type of unmanned assets allocated for a specific MUM-T enabled operation, the objective MUM-T HMI system interface used to task and interact with the three-core class of UAS should be identical. The MUM-T operator will provide supervisor command and control input to the team, specifying high level mission objectives and allowing the autonomy to formulate collaborative teaming behaviours. In support of this philosophy, it is envisaged that HMI design methodology will directly relate to the type of UAS in use: i) Escort Role6: HMI interface and workload associated is the same as working with a manned escort (i.e. existing Comms channels/ TDLs). Autonomous assets report the same types of information and at the same frequency as manned teammates. ii) Tactical Effector7: UAS is likely to be reliant on manned platform to provide tasking (and potential platform control) hence HMI/Workload likely to be a burden on manned segment. Manned platform will specify the type of information and frequency for the unmanned to report back to the manned operator. iii) Mid-Range Tactical Effector8: Low degree of additional HMI/Workload associated with operation of the UAS. Manned platform “subscribes” to an information service or capability delivered from the UAS. It is envisaged that the required effect would be delivered to the manned operator via existing mission interfaces (e.g. as surveillance type information fused into existing displays/ HMI).
The HMI design methodology associated with MUM-T operations are illustrated pictorially at Figure F-2.
6 Platform has broadly the similar capability as the manned platform and is dedicated (in direct support) to the “manned” mission. The UAS launches and recovers as part of the mission package. 7 Small, short duration, tactical UAS that are carried along with the package and deployed when recovered. Once the tactical effect is delivered the UAS can be recovered of released/ destroyed. 8 Larger, long range and long endurance UAS (including space-based platforms) that are providing mission effect to the area of operations.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-15
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure F-2: MUM-T Human Machine Interface Design Methodology
The resultant HMI concept strives to enable command and control of UAS, and the rapid interpretation and exploitation of information provided by UAS. The HMI subsystem will need to rely on use of low workload, multi-touch head down displays to monitor teamed assets status, behaviour, and mission progress, whilst operator worn technology such as Head/Helmet Mounted Displays (HMDs) will provide enhanced SA and enhanced understanding of spatial relationships between teamed assets.
3.7 Integrating MUM-T in Legacy/Current Generation Rotorcraft
When considering integrating MUM-T technologies in legacy/ current generation rotorcraft (including those available within the next decade) we are focusing on Class 2 and 3 aircraft. Therefore, it is recognised that the underpinning HMI technology available to support MUM-T integration will inherently limit the full MUM-T potential, and development of the MUM-T capability will be realised through evolution of the existing technologies (as opposed to revolutionary).
In legacy and current generation rotorcraft MUM-T operations will be the responsibility of the “non-flying pilot” who is acting as the tactical mission manager. Furthermore, it is considered that the ability for MUM-T operations to extend to multiple UAS in a One (Manned) to Many (UAS) ratio is considered highly unlikely due to limitations on the manned segment being able to successfully manage the additional workload without the
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-16
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
use of sophisticated autonomy services which are currently at TRL incompatible with the timescales associated with Legacy/Current generation Rotorcraft9.
3.8 Next Generation Rotorcraft: Full Realisation of MUM-T
The NIAG SG-219 study into Next Generation Rotorcraft10 identified a list of critical high payoff technologies applicable to Future Rotorcraft design. Analysis of these identified technologies highlights a number that will have direct impact to introduction of MUM-T capabilities, as shown at Table F-1 which categorises cost as a metric required to reach TRL8-9:
Impact on TECHNOLOGY/ TRL COST11 achieving Link to MUM-T capabilities CAPABILITY capabilities1213
Degraded Visual 6 Low High / Very MUM-T can be an enabler: Environment System High Data from unmanned assets can be used for enhancing situational (DVES) awareness of the manned platform. Automated Threat 5-6 Low High MUM-T can be an enabler: Response (AI) Data from unmanned assets can be used for automated threat response or the unmanned platform can cope with the threat itself Augmented Reality 6 Low High MUM-T can be an enabler: Data from unmanned assets can be used for enhancing situational awareness of the manned platform. Dynamic Mission 5-6 Low Medium Critical technology for enabling MUM-T: Management (AI) Dynamic Mission Management will be needed to reduce pilots’ workload to an acceptable level. Multi-vehicle, and multi- 6 Low – High Critical technology for enabling MUM-T: sensor fusion Medium Fusion will be needed to cope with the amount of incoming data and reducing the workload for the human operator. Teaming: Interoperability, 5 High High / Very Critical technology for enabling MUM-T Communication High Technologies Optionally manned 6 High Very High Critical technology for enabling MUM-T: rotorcraft Manual to full autonomy - 2-1-0 pilotage, is an enabler to shift capabilities from the pilotage of the aircraft to mission tasks.
9 A One to Many MUM-T configuration is envisaged in line with Class 1 /NGR development, when autonomy capabilities, decision aids, and integrated HMI technologies have reached suitable levels of development to support these enhanced capabilities (including single crew operations). 10 NIAG study 219 on Concepts for Operations and Equipment for Next Generation Vertical Lift Operations, DOCUMENT NIAG-D(2018)0001 AC/225(VL)D(2018)0001, dated 2 May 2018. 11 Low cost implies an investment f b 10 M€ a d 50 M€, M dium impli s an investment of between 50 to 250 M€ a d High f c s s impli s an i v s m f b 250 M€ a d 500 M€. 12 The impact of a technology on achieving a specific capability is seen as Medium if it enables or supports a desired capability, High if it is critical for enabling the desired capability and Very High if it is essential for achieving the desired. 13 NIAG study 219 on Concepts for Operations and Equipment for Next Generation Vertical Lift Operations, DOCUMENT NIAG-D(2018)0001 AC/225(VL)D(2018)0001, dated 2 May 2018.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-17
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Impact on TECHNOLOGY/ TRL COST11 achieving Link to MUM-T capabilities CAPABILITY capabilities1213
Cognitive Decision Aiding 5 Medium High Critical technology for enabling MUM-T: and Making Agents Cognitive Decision Aiding and Making Agents with AI will be needed to reduce pilots’ workload to an acceptable level. Cyber 2 High High Critical technology for enabling MUM-T: Cyber security will be an essential building block for MUM-T communication. MUM-T: Technologies for 4 High High High level referenced from SG-219 to the technologies discussed in Workload Reduction this study, including innovative HMI, AI, deep learning, neural network solutions. Table F-1: NGR Critical High Pay-Off Technologies Applicable to MUM-T
Advanced HMI concepts for NGR will integrate advanced technologies, like speech recognition, advanced displays, and sophisticated autonomy capabilities into a harmonized suite to effectively manage workload and situational awareness in order to fully realise the top tier benefits associated with MUM-T. This will require a level of system integration that needs to be conceived and embedded as part of the future rotorcraft design process and will include new and intuitive human-machine interfaces that reflect state of the art situational awareness displays, augmented reality, and Artificial Intelligence assisted interaction with mission management systems.
3.9 Decision Support and Autonomy
The human segment in MUM-T will quickly suffer from information overload without introduction automated decision support technologies and other autonomy management decision aids to rapidly task and re-task teams of unmanned assets. In order to minimize the workload associated with MUM-T operations, the autonomous assets will need to be capable of both actioning supervisory command and control inputs from manned operators and be equipped with autonomous teaming algorithms to optimize user specified mission objectives (i.e. the unmanned segment shall be able to operate under the control of both a human operator or another unmanned system that is itself under manned control).
Current autonomous capabilities are limited by machine learning techniques that result in black box algorithms that yield highly effective results, but with little visibility/ comprehension of how the result was obtained14”. Future autonomy capabilities and decision aids will need to emphasise explainable autonomy techniques, that expose algorithmic decision-making processes to the operator, in order to build trust between the human and automation. This in turn will reduce workload and maximize the benefits of human autonomy teaming.
14 Robert S. Gutzwiller & John Reeder; Space and Naval Wa fa Sys ms C Pacific, Sa Di g , USA:” Huma I ac iv Machi Learning for T us i T ams f Au m us R b s”
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-18
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
3.10 Threat Capability
In addition, it is worth considering that the introduction of new and niche capabilities is not only restricted to “blue forces”. Technological advancement and the introduction of MUM-T is equally applicable to potential adversary Orders of Battle (Orbat). Therefore, whilst a “do nothing” option with respect to developing a MUM-T capability is always available, this option actually risks falling behind adversarial capability.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-19
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
4. Realising MUM-T: HMI Technology Road Map
Next generation rotorcraft cockpit environments will optimize intuitive interaction between man and machine through multiple modalities (touch, haptics, and speech-based interaction). Any modification of the NGR cockpit to realise a MUM-T capability should also employ operator state monitoring to assess operator workload and adapt the information flow and autonomous decision aiding capabilities based on operator state and mission context. These concepts will be critical to realise the ability to achieve mission objectives at reduced workloads.
An optimized cockpit HMI will be a critical to realizing the full utility of a MUM-T capability. Whilst the visual sense will remain the critical conduit, this will be enhanced by the provision of monaural and binaural audio cues to enable crew to utilise fused sensor imagery from both onboard and off board sensor resources, overlaid with accurately displayed color-coded symbology, thereby delivering enhanced situational awareness information in an intuitive and timely manner. This will include information concerning all elements of the Manned-Unmanned Team, such as platform state, location, local environment, terrain and battlespace tactical situation. The HMI must enable rapid and accurate management of platform resources, including sensor and weapons, and the capability to share command and control information in multi-platform operations in a very dynamic operational environment without adversely impacting pilot workload. Specific HMI optimization will include the use of:
• Color Symbology (presented as both conformal and non-conformal visual information, using appropriate color coding) is an intuitive means of enhancing user’s ability to assimilate information in day and at night. 15 • Perspective view (or 3D) conformal symbology enables the representation of visual flight/landing cues in sparse visual environments (such as in DVE) and in some application the presentation of true stereoscopic information will enhance spatial awareness. • 3D audio cues (or audio symbols) will provide an alternative low burden means of providing information. • Head/Eye Tracking using an integral low latency head and eye sensing capability enables sensor and weapon cueing and enables the precision placement of all conformal information (sensor, symbolic and audio cues) and is also a key enabler for monitoring of aircrew workload and state. • Speech Recognition using methodologies and technologies that enables the recognition of spoken language
15 As with many aspects of HMI design and development, the application of colour imagery must be carefully managed to maximise the benefits of colour coding of information across the full dynamic range of ambient visual conditions. Significant human factors research is ongoing to provide guidelines on the use of colour in cockpit systems.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-20
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
The resultant HMI subsystem will leverage intelligent planning systems, optimized workflows, and real-time decision aids to assist operators in workload management, and will include:
iv) Innovative Head Down Display Pilot Vehicle Interfaces v) Advanced Helmet Mounted Display Technology vi) Multimodal Display Input and Interaction Schemes
4.1 Head Down Displays
Head down displays will be used to provide wide area situational awareness and enable effective mission planning and monitoring; the so called “Gods Eye View”. In current/legacy implementations these displays will still utilise traditional flat panel displays optimised for the task at hand. For effective MUM-T operations, head down display PVI should display primary flight information, subsystem statuses, and provide interfaces to interact with the autonomous teammates. A large battlespace management surface will allow the operators to maintain situational awareness and monitor teamed asset status and progress. The head down display interface aircrew should allow aircrew to:
i) Visualize symbology and adaptive display content responsive to mission context, ii) Visualize friendly, foe, teamed entities, mission plans, tracks, and routes for SA, iii) Enable egocentric, exocentric, or top-down views of the battlespace for enhanced SA, iv) Provide interfaces for visual sensor fusion, v) Allow aircrew to visualize and interact with a 4-dimmensional mission planner, vi) Provide interfaces to monitor UAS mission progress & task status, vii) Allow aircrew to monitor own-ship and UAS subsystems (sensors, weapons, payload, aircraft systems).
When considering the head down displays elements of NGR, the delineation current generation heads up and heads down technologies will blur. The NGR Pilot Visual Interfaces (PVI) will consist of tightly coupled with multi-modal interaction schemes and head worn display technologies to allow for efficient and optimized MUM-T HMI. This dynamic and configurable PVI will allow NGR operators to tailor the display system based on personal preferences and mission objectives. Multi-touch head down displays will allow operators to interact with display content via touch screen features or tactile controllers which will minimize pilot workload and task time. Furthermore, multi-touch display
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-21
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
technology using standard interaction methods, like pinch-to-zoom and pan-to-scroll on a map interface will further enhance intuitiveness of the PVI.
4.2 Helmet Mounted Display Technology
The inherent capabilities delivered of HMD (or other wearable head devices) to reduce high workload situations are a critical enabling technology in the provision of enhanced Situation Awareness, which in turn will enable mission managers more capacity to monitor and control deployment of MUM-T autonomous systems.
The current generation of high capability aviation helmet mounted display (HMD) product families are mature fully integrated design in volume production and used on multiple fixed wing and rotary wing platforms worldwide. Although sharing some of the attributes of consumer and industrial Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) headsets the design and development of such high capability HMDs for aviation applications is significantly more challenging.
HMDs embrace a wide range of technologies; capabilities include high-performance low- mass optical systems, high-resolution high-luminance colour display technology, integrated image processing, head/helmet tracking, anthropometrics (human) factors, physical protection, information management, audio communications, night vision sensors and many others. The combination of these features enables a core design concept to be developed to enhance the demand of current generation rotary wing applications and also visualise the development path required to support integration of a MUM-T capability.
These top level needs for HMDs are summarised in Fig F-3 which partitions them into top level mission capability needs (those capabilities required to enable mission task to be safely performed) and the core physical protection capabilities of the aviators helmet and life support system.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-22
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure F-3: Capability Demand for Future HMDs Current Industry research and development is focused on delivering against these capabilities, and Figure F3 provides an indicative capability timeline that maps development and delivery of these capabilities from the near term through to the middle of the century. Whilst only indicative, this provides a summary view of those capabilities which are currently fielded, or that are considered to be core or baseline for the next generation of HMDs.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-23
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure F-4: HMD Capability Demand Timeline
HMD core technology development programs are focused on delivering technology “building blocks” that can be realised through modular (spiral) upgrade paths. Specific example development areas include:
vi) Larger / wide field of view optical solutions, vii) Enhanced digital night vision sensor technology, viii) High Integrity (safety critical) HMD system architectures, ix) Advanced helmet tracking, x) Integrated eyeball/ iris tracking, xi) Compact and powerful display processing solutions, xii) Innovative 3D conformal symbology, xiii) Digital active noise reduction & integrated 3D audio, xiv) Bidirectional Wireless transmission of high bandwidths imagery and data between unmanned platform and HMD.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-24
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
4.3 Multimodal Display Input and Interaction Schemes
The full potential of a symbiotic MUM-T operational will truly be realised when the manned element is able to task the unmanned element in such a manner that the tasking is equal to or preferably less labour intensive than utilising multiple manned. At the basic level, unmanned assets could be controlled via generic commands, e.g. attack, reconnoitre, return to base etc. However, the very nature of these generic commands means they are too prescriptive for the dynamic operational environment. To adapt these commands to a specific scenario requires additional information and constraints to be passed and understood. In current operations commands are typically passed by voice, via a mixture of tactical data link and voice
For example, a simple mission to “reconnoitre a landing site” could easily be passed via J series “Command” message, but the clarifying details and mission constraints “until attack helicopter formation “Ugly” arrives” are nominally passed by voice.
Therefore, when it comes to defining and passing a mixture of dynamic and geographically task information will require a mixture of interface technologies, and the Command and Control of future MUM-T operations will require development of enhanced multi modal input technologies that allow the manned segment to exchange quickly assimilate, act upon and then disseminate command and control intentions. The aim of these multi nodal interface intuitive interfaces being to optimize human-machine interaction and reduce operator workload.
Any interface which combines speech-based interaction, tactile/haptic feedback, eye-gaze, and gesture-based controls should enable operators to support complex operations whilst maintaining operator workload at sustainable levels. It is envisaged that multimodal interaction technologies shall provide a solution that allows the operator to utilize individual modalities based on mission context and operator’s available resources rather than saturating a single modality (Wickens16, 1984). Moreover, this technology will enable coupled control schemes that improve decision making and operational effectiveness.
Technologies to provide assisted interaction with mission management systems include: i) Speech Recognition System that provide an intuitive interaction method and significant workload reduction through reduced control input. Speech recognition systems shall be designed to support complex, concatenated commands that simultaneously execute numerous actions. Additionally, the system shall offer a flexible grammar set that reduces errors by allowing
16 Wickens, C.D. (1984). "Processing resources in attention", in R. Parasuraman & D.R. Davies (Eds.), Varieties of attention, (pp. 63– 102). New York: Academic Press.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-25
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
operators to use different variants of the same command and shall be tailored to specific operations. ii) Vibrotactile Actuators, for the purpose of alerting or cueing through haptic feedback. Vibration frequency, amplitude, and pattern can provide context sensitive cues to enhanced operator SA, alert the operator of specific actions or task completion, or interrupt/ alert the operator of undesirable cognitive states. Multiple vibrotactile applications are feasible in the operational environment including embedding actuators in seating, and body worn haptic sensors. iii) Eye Gaze provides a natural method of cursor control, and can be used for designating displays, display features and user cueing etc. Eye tracking metrics will also be used to monitor physiological state and workload. iv) Touch-Based Gesture Controls on multi-touch HDD, including pinch-to- zoom, pan, rotate, etc. will all be used to reduce task time. Fielded, certified touch-enabled primary flight displays have been proven to lower workload and increase operator effectiveness. v) 3D Audio will be used to develop Pilot alerting and methods to guide the Pilot’s attention to a specific location based on an audio cue. These alerting schemes will provide enhanced SA; for example, 3D audio would be an excellent method to alert the Pilot of the relative position of threats within their area of operations.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-26
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
5. Realising MUM-T: Automation Technology Road Map
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) sponsored working group on defining the Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems17 (ALFUS) aims to formalise a framework for characterising an unmanned systems autonomy by defining a Contextual Autonomous Capability (CAC) Model for unmanned systems.
This study characterises unmanned systems CAC by the complexity of the missions that the system is capable of performing (Mission Complexity), the environments within which the missions are performed (Environmental Complexity), and Human Independence that can be tolerated when executing the mission. The aspects of ALFUS CAC are illustrated pictorially at Figure F4. Each of these aspects can then be marked in order to provide a measurement of the CAC for a particular unmanned system.
Figure F-5: The Three Aspects for ALFUS
This CAC model enables characterisation of unmanned systems from the perspectives of requirements, capability, and levels of difficulty, complexity, or sophistication. The model provides a methodology to characterise unmanned systems autonomy level. The three axes can also be applied independently to assess the levels of Mission Complexity, Environmental Complexity and Human Independence for a given unmanned system.
The resultant CAC autonomy level refers to the Human Independence aspect or axis, with the other two axes providing the context. The autonomy level can be applied to the overall unmanned system capability or applied dynamically in the context of system capability to
17Hui-Min, Huang und Elena, R. Messina. Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework, Volume I and II. 2007 and 2008.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-27
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
meet a specific element of mission execution depending on the changing environmental and operating conditions:
i) Highest CAC: Completes all assigned missions with highest complexity; understands, adapts to, and maximises benefit/ value/ efficiency while minimising costs and risks across the broadest scope of environmental and operational changes; capable of total independence from operator intervention. ii) Mid-Level CAC: Plans and executes tasks to complete an operator specified mission; limited understanding and response to environmental and operational changes and information; limited ability to reduce costs/ risks or increase benefit/ value/ efficiency; relies on about 50 % operator input. iii) Lowest CAC: Simple remote control for simple tasks in a simple environment.
These definitions are illustrated pictorially in Figure F5. At the leftmost indication, an unmanned system may operate at the lowest CAC when the unmanned system performs a simplest mission using remote human interaction 100 % of the time in a simplest environment. The general trend may be that CAC increases when the levels of Mission Complexity, Environmental Complexity and Human Independence increase, as shown when moving from left to right in the chart.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-28
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure F-6: ALFUS Contextual Autonomous Capability Levels
Applying ALFUS to the airborne environment, analysis of the application of ALFUS to Unmanned Airborne Systems18 defines that an ALFUS range of above 7 (high level) will be required in order to derive the full operational benefit out of a MUM-T concept. Nevertheless, if this level cannot be achieved, restrictions on the operational envelop still shows an operational benefit from the use of MUM-T when compared to traditional (legacy) operations.
5.1 Application of Autonomy in MUM-T
Within the context of this study, there are three separate strands where automation is relevant to integrating a MUM-T capability; those are the autonomy applied within the manned rotorcraft, the autonomy applied within the Unmanned Segments, and the autonomy applied as a “virtually layer” that sits across both the manned and manned and unmanned platforms and delivers the capability required to fulfil the “networking” / subscription to services concept of future MUM-T Operations. In the context of this study, the first two applications of Autonomy will be considered as part of this section, whilst “Networking Autonomy” is covered in Chapter 5.
In the context of both the manned and un-manned segments, automation will be required to adapt and control the workload of human participation to a level that is sustainable and doesn’t risk mission success. As previously highlighted, the workload in legacy helicopter cockpits is already high and the MUM-T design challenge is to aim to not increase the existing crew. Therefore, a number of existing tasks within the human workload will need to be supported by automation in order that there is “workload headroom” for the crew to able to cope with additional UAS derived tasks (both with respect to control of the UAS and the processing of data delivered by the UAS).
However, automation is not only used to reduce crew workload; automation will also be critical to realising an increased level of situational and environmental awareness across the entire battlespace, and this is equally applicable to both the manned and unmanned segments, which will require automatic processing of payload data in real time.
18 Durst, Phillip J. und Gray, Wendell. Levels of Autonomy and Autonomous System Performance Assessment for Intelligent Unmanned Systems. s.l. : US Army Corps of Engineers - Engine Research and Development Centre, 2014. ERDC/GSL SR-14-1.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-29
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Command of a teamed UAS will differ significantly from the direct (remote) control associated with legacy UAS. The design aim is to deliver a UAS that provides the functionality of an “Unmanned Wingman” which behaves exactly the same as a manned element within a MUM-T formation. The workload associated with the “command task” to be realised by the operator will be limited to providing task descriptions to the involved UAS as opposed to direct control or passing of low-level description metrics such as a waypoint list.
With respect to the “control task” the automation shall be capable of solving simple problems on its own, whilst keeping the “human in the loop” when considering those issues that influence mission progress / efficiency or require operator decisions with respect to overall mission effectives or success. Conversely, restricting the scope of the automation should not impact the possibilities to use the UAS.
5.2 Autonomy in the Manned Segment
To achieve the required abstraction level of controlling the Unmanned Segment, task- based guidance19 is required. When considering the “One-To-Network” model for MUM-T, workload issues alone will preclude the human from executing direct command and control over multiple unmanned systems. Command and Control will be executed by the operator addressing a command to the “network”, with the overarching “automated network intelligence” assessing the task and providing a solution to fulfil the operator tasks. This includes the application of task decomposition and task allocation algorithms such as hierarchical task networks. Further enhancements could be achieved by applying AI based algorithms to cope with complex tasks or task fulfilment in dynamic situations.
In order to effectively execute Command and Control over multiple UAS in a MUM-T operation, the human element will rely heavily on task-based mission execution, utilising low workload, naturalistic pilot vehicle interfaces to monitor the battlespace and dynamically response to mission needs. The following worked example details the steps required to achieve modular task-based command and control of teamed UAS.
At the top level, the Human level interaction should enable the mission to be simplified to lowest level in order to describe the required output:
“Reconnoitre, Engage, Transport, Protect, Supply, Return, Land”
These tasks are then analysed in order devolve the individual implied task elements associated with the separate elements of the UAS systems. Derived tasks include:
19 Cummings, Mary, et al. Task Versus Vehicle-Based Control Paradigms in Multiple Unmanned Vehicle Supervision by a Single Operator. 2014.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-30
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
i) Platform: The derived position, direction, location and timeline information will be used to generate a navigation flight plan and mission schedule. ii) Payload: Mission Type will inform a payload plan, describing when to switch a specific payload on or off, or detail and restrictions such as not to use a specific payload. iii) Communication Plan: What to communicate, when to communicate, how to configure the communication assets
These derived requirements can be represented in one plan only or split up in several; each plan can be defined pre-mission or updated during the on-going mission. The plans are aggregated via several levels of abstraction, depending on the level of automation achievable. Each task (or plan) can be restricted by constraints:
i) Spatial constraints: Allowing/permitting specific 3D-areas, altitudes, e.g. to avoid threats. ii) Temporal constraint: Demanding to do something at a specific point in time or for a specific duration. iii) Resource constraint: Usage of a specific payload for a specific task. iv) Performance constraint: e.g. Limiting lift rate
Constraints will also need to be updated dynamically, either via human intervention/ design or through automation e.g. by an updated model of the environment or by introducing new threats which should be avoided. This allows dynamic and reactive behaviour to optimise mission execution. In addition, it offers a conduit to feed coordination information to the Unmanned segments e.g.:
i) Perform reconnaissance on the landing site, ii) Protect formation, iii) Fly to XXXXX, at altitude and speed, iv) Break left (interpreted as a spatial constraint)
Constraints might also include additional parameters, including access rights to modify or delete a specific constraint.
The autonomous management of mission parameters, derived tasks, and mission constraints will need to be managed by both sides of the manned-unmanned boundary in order that all members of the team remain appraised of their part of the overall mission.
5.3 Autonomy in the Un-manned Segment
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-31
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Safety constraints associated with the human inhabited platform with dictate that the UAS behaviour shall be predictable with respect to the other MUM-T entities, however from a tactical point of view, the UAS should behave in a random manner to avoid setting predictable pattern and potentially expose the location of the overall team.
In order to deliver this capability, the UAS behaviour will need to be rule based on an abstract level on the first hand. Multiple sources must be considered to provide input for these rules, such as the ICAO Rules of the Air20 and local Rules of Engagement. In line with normal aviation principles, these procedures can be divided into normal operating procedures and abnormal/emergency operating procedures. Finally, regression strategies are required to react to the latter failure condition.
Autonomy in the unmanned segment will also need to enable a deviation detection system, which is able to compare the current situation with the expected mission plan and propose or execute amendments as applicable to the complexity of the task. This includes changes to the environment weather, tactical situation, and on-board technical systems. Algorithms will need to derive an estimate of the impact of a deviation to the mission success, with subsequent deviations reported to the human segment using a simplified graded approach: i) Nil Response: Everything is sensed as expected, ii) Inform: Feedback information about issues solved by the UAS, influencing the mission progress / efficiency, iii) Action: Request operator decision if mission effectives/success cannot be accomplished while applying previously defined constraints.
In the longer term, UAS behaviour might develop by machine learning technologies during the on-going mission. Integrating MUM-T in such operations will require a powerful explanation component where the unmanned segment communicates derived intent to the manned segment in real time.
Normal operating procedures are defined pre-mission, and whilst there are typically a variety of options which can be tailored to each mission scenario, the options are semi- predictable based upon shared Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). These SOPs include: i) Join-Up and Breakaway when entering / leaving a formation ii) Following / intercepting waypoints iii) Aerodrome operations
Automation will follow these procedures. This will be achieved by implementing pre- defined rules as “overall” constraints to the system.
20 Rules of the Air. s.l. : International Civil Aviation Organization, 2005. BDL-00002-000-15-E-P.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-32
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Abnormal operating procedures cover situations where it is not possible to apply by SOPs due to some additional external factor or factors. These include (but are not limited to): i) Violation of safety margins due to third party actions. ii) Contact with enemy (if the UAV is not designed for enemy engagement). iii) Technical issues on-board manned platform. iv) Technical issues on-board unmanned platform.
Once abnormal activities are recognised, the methodology applied to the situation shall again mirror traditional (manned) operations. That is to both maintain safe control of the situation (including gain/re-gain control of the platform if the situation is resultant of a technical malfunction) and contain the magnitude of the departure from SOPs (in order to minimise the effect on other second or third parties). Once this “recognise, control, contain” methodology has been safely applied the subsequent actions will be aimed on a return to normal operation (which can itself be an SOP e.g. a pre-defined regression plan). Depending of the UAVs capabilities (e.g. sense and avoid), multiple flight plans and alternate landing sites must be defined during mission planning to provide safe routes to recover the UAV.
Regression strategies will be applied as a result of two distinct scenarios: Failure of the UAS or failure of the Command and Control component. The overall MUM-T system of systems (incl. the manned platforms) must provide regression strategies to deal with these events; suitable regression strategies include: i) Kill the UAS ii) Send the UAS back to base iii) Continue with limitations / degregations / condition based operations iv) Transfer to other UCS in case of HMI / NGR failure
5.4 Artificial Intelligence: Technology Gaps and enabling Technologies
In the longer term involving any platform loss would then be compensated by an over watching intelligence (network intelligence), which is able to re-task alternative platforms in real time. Such a capability would result in team based self-healing capabilities.
Automation must also support the processing of UAS payload data such that the task associated with derivation of the tactical information out of the payload data is also automated and will also require real-time decision-based support to implement an understanding of the changing environmental model, incl. terrain, weather and tactical data. For example, artificial Intelligence based image processing technologies such as neuronal networks and machine learning could be applied to electro-optic based data. In addition, the solution algorithm will need to consider self-diagnosing capabilities in order to estimate resultant levels of accuracy.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-33
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
The dynamic nature of airborne operations will inevitable frequently lead to situations where communications between individual MUM-T elements are restricted or lost due to link lost situations, radio silence phases, or due enemy jamming. Automation must deal with such situations. Therefore, automation of the data management component will be required in order to manage selection and matching of a transmission medium to data type, configuration of system parameters to enable transmission (e.g. adaption of transmission power) and prioritisation and storage of data to be transmitted. It is considered that this task could be ideally managed through application of Artificial Intelligence, which could be used to predict the datalink state and to take decisions about how to adapt the link configuration to provide optimal communication coverage.
Developing Artificial Intelligence systems that are able to react within dynamic scenarios will require the system to have a thorough understand of the overall operational environment and will require the Artificial Intelligence to Comprehend the environment, Perceive its progress towards achieving the mission and Project the current temporal situation into the future.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-34
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX F
ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
6. Summary and Conclusion
6.1 Conclusions
C1 The additional workload associated with advanced MUM-T capabilities can be mitigated by: • Inclusion of improved multimodal HMI technologies, decision aids and data fusion capabilities. • Task based interaction with UAS, using natural voice commands • Standard HMI that whilst optimised for a particular platform will be common to any UAS that the platform is to be teamed with ie HMI that is agnostic of the UAS. C2 The additional workload associated with advanced MUM-T capabilities can be negated by the additional inclusion of • Explainable autonomous/AI capabilities in the UAS • and explainable autonomous capabilities within the manned platform. • and explainable AI capabilities in the UAS network. C3 If the workload is sufficiently reduced, single pilot MUM-T operation is achievable. C4 MUM-T capabilities can be provided in legacy platforms; however, the level of capability and complexity of operation will be lower due to workload safety constraints.
6.2 Recommendations
R1 Next generation aircraft should be designed to include advanced MUM-T requirements from their conceptual stage. R2 The combination of multimodal HMI technologies, decision support tools, data fusion capabilities and autonomous behaviour requires further development to provide an optimised mix for changing conditions, including system failure cases. R3 Single pilot MUM-T operations should be supported by Pilot physiological monitoring and adaptive autonomy. R4 Extensive and realistic simulation should be utilised, with progressively more complex and sophisticated scenarios in order to develop trust in the advanced MUM-T autonomy concepts. R5 Standard HMI concept to be developed to support advanced MUM-T. R6 Future architectures and HMI need to be sufficiently modular and flexible to support evolving teaming concepts.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED F-35
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Annex G Report on Networking / Cyber/EW
Content 1. Introduction 2. Scope / Assumptions 3. Cyber/EW 4. Data link 5. Antenna 6. Network 7. Conclusions 1. Introduction This section addresses the “critical enabling technologies, technical architectures, requirements and technology challenges that would enable the implementation of rotorcraft manned/unmanned team concepts” in the framework of Cyber/EW, Data Link, Antenna and Networking 2. Scope / Assumptions The scope of this annex is to define the technical requirements of an over-the-air network that supports the operational concepts illustrated in Team 1 annex D. This leads to: - A MUM-T network that includes both manned and unmanned platforms (also depicted in the Team 1 output). - A network with the following properties: 1. Secure 2. Reliable (and therefore resilient) 3. Supports the IERs at all times (refer to Team 1 output) a. Data rate b. Range 4. Mobile 5. Ad-hoc 3. Cyber/EW (Cyber Electronic Warfare) 3.1 Introduction: Importance of Cyber/EW A review of US government security audits conducted from 2012 to 2017 found that “almost all of the U.S. military’s newly developed weapons systems suffer from mission- critical cyber vulnerabilities, suggesting military agencies have rushed to computerize new weapons systems without prioritizing cybersecurity”. In a letter addressed to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.), GAO researchers said
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-1
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
functions such as powering a weapon on or off, maintaining a pilot’s oxygen levels, guiding a missile to its target or simply flying an aircraft may now be vulnerable to manipulation from state-sponsored hackers. (Ref 14,15)
3.2 Definitions/Concept At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO Allies recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations – just like air, land and sea. NATO has an approach on Cyber defence summarized in ref. 11, but no definition/concept on CYBER/EW in the context of this study has been found in NATO documents, justifying the investigation of DOD/MOD documents.
The most recent and appropriate source was the Pamphlet dated January 2018 on “US Army Concept for Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations” (Ref. 1). In this document, cyberspace operations include information network operations, defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) and offensive cyberspace operations, while electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) operations (EMSO) holistically includes all aspects of EW and Spectrum Management Operations (SMO). EW consists of Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protection (EP), and Electronic Support (ES).
Other consulted MOD/DOD documents are in the reference list found at the end of this section (in particular ref. 11 FM 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic activities, dated Feb. 2014). In summary Cyber EW consists of the following three activities: cyber electronic attack (cyber EA), cyber electronic protection (cyber EP), and cyber electronic warfare support (cyber ES). These three activities are defined as follows: Cyber electronic attack (cyber EA) The use of electromagnetic energy to attack an adversary’s electronics or access to the electromagnetic spectrum with the intent of destroying an enemy’s ability to use data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures. This includes techniques such as: • Jamming • Intrusion • Interception and Detection • Denial of service attack, • Network sniffing, • Packet spoofing Cyber electronic protection (cyber EP) Any means taken to protect electronics from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of cyber EW that destroys ability to use data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures. This includes techniques such as: • Robust EMI practices • Techniques to reduce electronic signature • Active cancellation of RF interference • Avoidance of EM disruptions
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-2
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Cyber electronic warfare support (cyber ES) Any action to locate sources of electromagnetic energy from networked systems for the purpose of immediate threat recognition or conduct of future operations. This includes techniques such as: • Energy Detectors • Structure Detectors • Feature Detectors • Radio Direction Finders • Angle of Arrival Detection Systems
This study is focused on cyber EP in support of countering adversarial cyber EA and cyber ES threats.
3.3 Battlespace Communication/ Electromagnetic Spectrum Issues The availability of electromagnetic spectrum (EM) is critical for MUM-T operations. The EM spectrum is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands (JP 3-13.1). (See figure G-1) (Ref: 10)
Figure G-1: Electromagnetic Spectrum
Although the electromagnetic spectrum represents an enormous range of frequencies, not all the frequencies are suitable to purposes of communications. At the very low end of the
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-3
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
spectrum are signals that would be traveling at 30Hz (that is, at 30 cycles per second). One of the benefits of a very low frequency is that it can travel much farther than a high frequency before it loses power (that is, attenuates) but its bandwidth is very small. At the high end of the electromagnetic spectrum, signals travel over a band of 10 million to trillion Hz. This end of the spectrum has phenomenal bandwidth, but it has its own set of problems. The wave lengths are so miniscule that they're highly distorted by any type of interference, particularly environmental interference such as precipitation. Furthermore, higher-frequency wave forms such as x-rays, gamma rays, and cosmic rays are not very good to human physiology and therefore aren't available for us to use for communication at this point.
Very high frequency (VHF), ultra-high frequency (UHF), high frequency (HF), and super high frequency (SHF), radios and associated cryptographic equipment constitute the primary” normal‟ means of battlespace communication. The STANAG 7085 waveforms, commonly used in ISR applications to move sensor data around the battlespace and the most applicable waveform as a reference for this study, operate in the X and Ku Bands. These radio sets are vulnerable to EMI, jamming, and intrusion by the enemy, as well as saturation by own forces.
In contrast to these traditional radio frequencies, two new frequency bands are suggested: Ka Band (SHF) and E-Band (EHF). These frequency bands have the advantage of moving away from currently congested C, X, and Ku bands to relieve radio spectrum saturation while simultaneously providing wider bandwidths to support the growing data needs of next generation sensors. Another benefit to cyber EP is a lack of fielded equipment focused on these bands, making it easy to hide where no one is looking.
It should be mentioned that this study investigated two areas of evolving research into Terahertz band and laser technologies. Due to their lack of maturity and operational limitations in support of the MUM-T mission, the study group concluded their timeline to a viable technical solution was beyond our needs, but an overview is provided below. a. Terahertz Band (0.1–10 THz) communication is envisioned as a key technology to satisfy the increasing demand for higher speed wireless communication. THz Band communication will alleviate the spectrum scarcity and capacity limitations of current wireless systems and enable new applications both in classical networking domains as well as in novel nanoscale communication paradigms. It still has technical challenges to overcome in the generation and modulation of coherent electromagnetic signals in this frequency range ceases to be possible by the conventional electronic devices used to generate radio waves and microwaves, requiring the development of new devices and techniques. Moreover, Terahertz radiation has limited penetration through fog and clouds, however potential uses exist
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-4
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
in high-altitude telecommunications, above altitudes where water vapor causes signal absorption: aircraft to satellite, or satellite to satellite. b. Laser technology uses frequencies in the infrared (IR), visible and ultraviolet (UV) ranges (among others depending on type) It has a tremendous cyber EP advantage of being extremely LPD and not being susceptible to EMI. The other great asset of laser technology is the vastly larger amount of data that can be transmitted, with estimates ranging from 10 gigabits per second to 100 terabits per second depending on application. However, the technology still has distance to travel to become an asset throughout the battlespace. Lasers have difficulty with atmospheric turbulence, water droplets, haze, heavy cloud cover and aircraft vibration. (Ref.5)
In summary the advantages of Terahertz Band communication and laser technologies should be further researched, developed, tested and incorporated as a path to fight in cyberspace, but as possible means to achieve high altitude or intra- satellites communications only, since the rapid attenuation by atmospheric conditions of Thz and/or laser communications would preclude any other usage of these frequencies.
3.4 Data Link / Waveform The data link, with it’s free-space RF interface, is a point of vulnerability for Cyber-attack and plays an important role in maintaining the security posture of the platform. To that end, the data link’s first line of defence is to maintain a minimal electromagnetic signature to operate undetected by an adversary. This is known as having a low probability of detection or LPD. Varying levels of Jam-Resistance and Low Probability of Intercept and Detection (LPI/LPD) are provided by use of the most advanced technologies. These can include Spread Spectrum Techniques, Frequency Hopping, Error Detection and Correction, Data Interleaving, and robust Synchronization Techniques, and tightly controlled closed loop power control.
Concerning LPI/LPD, research and testing has shown that simply lowering the power does not make them LPI/LPD. The detection of LPI/LPD signals will most likely be performed with highly specialized advanced detectors, and not simple radio systems. These advanced detectors mostly fall into a category known as feature detectors. As the name implies, feature detectors target certain highly detectable features of the LPI/LPD waveform such as the carrier, chip rate, hop rate, etc. Research at the Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance Centre, RDT&E Division Detachment Warminster, PA (NRaD Detachment Warminster) has centred on the development of waveforms that are not detectable using either energy detectors or feature detectors. NRaD has sponsored corporate research and development, as well as performed in house research and development of communication waveforms that are intended to defeat various types of feature detectors to deal with these threats, waveform technologies are evolving to be
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-5
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
adaptive for operation in contested or denied operational environments. These LPI/LPD and Anti-Jam (AJ) waveforms have enhanced covertness and jam-resistance in the presence of sophisticated adversaries who are attempting to detect, exploit, and/or deny the communications link. The trade space to evaluate waveforms for LPI/LPD performance should include the three main categories of feature detectors: 1) Energy detectors 2) Structure Detectors and 3) Imperfection Detectors.
Energy detectors search for RF energy and includes the common spectrum analyser, radiometer, and the interferometer (a.k.a. correlative radiometer).
Structure detectors are optimized to look for structural features in the transmitted signal. This category of detectors is designed to find frequency hopped, ultra-wideband, time- bursted or time-hopped, and direct sequence signals. Imperfection detectors attempt to identify imperfections in the transmitted signal. These imperfections include the Local Oscillator (LO) bleed through detector, the harmonic detector, the non-suppressed carrier detector, and the I/Q imbalance detector. Carefully designed covert waveforms can still be easy to detect if the RF equipment used to transmit them is not well designed.
Effective countermeasures against these detectors include direct sequence spreading, near-real-time closed loop power control, and fast acquisition. Waveforms with low detectability are likely to employ direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) to reduce the spectral flux density (SFD) presented to an enemy detector. In addition, rapidly adaptive rate control and near-real-time closed-loop power control can greatly help to minimize SFD preventing it from illuminating a hostile area.
In addition to providing covertness, the waveform needs to be robust against jamming. Jammers can generally be classified into two major categories: cognitive jammers, and non-cognitive (constant, periodic or pseudo-random) jammers. Cognitive jammers include Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) where non-cognitive jammers include wideband, narrowband, tone, chirp, hopped, and pulsed jammers, among others.
Features to be considered to defeat these jammers should include frequency hopping, strong FEC coding, interleaving, closed loop power control, closed loop rate/processing control, and fast acquisition blocks.
Jamming equipment comes in various configurations that range from ground based (either static or mobile), airborne, manpackable, and expendable versions. Simple jammers in most cases are modified communication equipment, but technological advances have enabled access to more advanced and sophisticated intelligent jamming equipment. In the presence of ECCM (Electronic Counter Counter Measures) radio equipment, simple single
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-6
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
carrier jammers are ineffective. ECCM which include Frequency Hopping and/or Spread Spectrum technology can completely resist the effects of ECM jamming equipment.
Modern technology has led to the development of more robust jamming equipment employed in today's tactical environment. This new breed of equipment is capable of employing such techniques as wide-band RF spectrum transmitters, and various audio tones to jam or to spoof receiving equipment and their operators. Other more sophisticated systems are comprised of frequency tracking receivers and transmitters and utilize several large directional antenna arrays that permit directional jamming and create deep nulls towards the "friendly area" to minimize the effects of the jamming. Most jammers feature several modes of operation and several modulation types. Operational modes range from hand keying, random keying, periodic keying, continuous keying and the more sophisticated look through mode. In the latter, a special transceiver or a separate receiver/transmitter arrangement is used to selectively control the keying of the transmit circuit. The look through mode can be configured to hard key the transmitter at full power output upon detection of a received signal and periodically hard switch the transmitter RF power to off (unkey) while the receiver "looks through" to see if there is still a carrier present or, after the transmitter has hard keyed to full output power, the RF output of the transmitter is gradually slewed down to a lower level while the receiver "looks through" to detect any carrier activity on the frequency. The previous chapter has been adapted from www.milspec.ca (Richard Lacroix´s Military Communication Homepage).
More on Data Links can be found in Section 4.
The data link/waveform’s resiliency to jamming can be further enhanced by null steering and adaptive antenna techniques which are designed to achieve more survivable communications systems. Null steering is a technique that cancels RF energy coming from a known direction which masks the radiation pattern to nullify the effects of jamming and improve the signal-to-jamming ratio. (Ref 17)
More on Antennas can be found in Section 5.
3.5 Network Major threats today on network are: -Denial of service attack: The fundamental technique behind a DoS attack is to make the target system busy. A DoS attack exploits server resources limitation, by tweaking TCP packets to make the server respond to malicious, fabricated network requests. TCP packets can be forged, or modified to disrupt the basic handshake process, in order to create unexpected network responses. This ultimately results in exhausting all the server resources, which when overwhelmed, stops responding. Distributed DoS attack (DDoS) combining multiple attackers using various techniques can result more rapidly in catastrophic failure. A good combination of Intrusion Protection System (IPS devices),
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-7
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
unified threat management (UTM) firewalls and application layer security can help stop these dreaded attacks.
-Network Sniffing: Sniffing involves capturing, decoding, inspecting and interpreting the information inside a network packet on a TCP/IP network. The purpose is to steal information, usually user IDs, passwords, network details, etc. Sniffing is generally referred to as a “passive” type of attack, wherein the attackers can be silent/invisible on the network. This makes it difficult to detect, and hence it is a dangerous type of attack. The sniffing process is used either to get information directly or to map the technical details of the network in order to create a further attack. Sniffing can be done for a longer time without getting caught and can range from the OSI Layer 1 through Layer 7. The very first step to protect from sniffer should be to design a tight perimeter defence system while creating network architecture. There are a few methods (software tools) that could be deployed to make the infrastructure less sniffer prone. In particular IPSec encryption can be used for token-based packet security in the network infrastructure, if the data is of a confidential nature.
-Packet spoofing: Spoofing, by definition, means to imitate or trick someone. This technique is based on a priori knowledge of the network (see network sniffing) configuring firewalls, switches and routers is an important step to prevent networks from spoofing. Implementing IPS devices certainly helps in getting control over the IT network infrastructure security.
Because NATO started new activities in Cyber (see introduction) , it is recommended to follow the activities of the new NATO Cyber Operations Centre and to be sure that Airborne network is also taken into consideration
More on network can be found in paragraph 6
3.6 Cryptography Because cryptography is an important way of achieving data confidentiality, data integrity, user authentication and non-repudiation, it is critical in MUM-T operation
In terms of cryptographic technologies, Have-Quick (HQ) and devices such as KY-57‟s and KY-58‟s provide layers of protection for radio systems. These types of devices work to ensure security of radio transmissions against jamming and information compromise through frequency-hopping (HQ) and the encoding of audio tones (KY). While they do add layers of security in protecting information, their transmissions are still subject to the EMI and (in small part) jamming/deception limitations by the enemy.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-8
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
On the NATO side, the JCG on ISR has developed, in 2007, a NATO Staff Requirement for a NATO capability for wideband ISR data link encryption (Ref: 12). The design of an interoperable, encrypted ISR data link is based on three elementary functionalities: a. Interoperable data link architecture; For NATO, this architecture has already been defined by NATO in STANAG 7085 (see par. 4.4) b. Interoperable wideband encryption systems: This is the topic for a new NATO Standard still under consideration by NATO (Ref.12) c. Encryption key maintenance and security controls: Encryption key maintenance and control is defined by the relevant policies and procedures as implemented within the NATO HQ Encryption Office of the International Military Staff
For the long terms it is suggested to investigate in new encryption technologies such as quantum encryption. Indeed, in recent years, there has been a substantial amount of research on quantum computers – machines that exploit quantum mechanical phenomena to solve mathematical problems that are difficult or intractable for conventional computers. If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to break many of the cryptosystems currently in use. This would seriously compromise the integrity of digital communications. The goal of quantum-resistant cryptography is to develop cryptographic systems that are secure against both quantum and classical computers and can interoperate with existing communications protocols and networks. (Ref. 6) In the same context it is worth to mention current work on Satellite-Based Quantum Key Distribution (Ref. 8) in the larger framework on Quantum Cryptography Telecommunication System considered by the QUARTZ Consortium21. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method for secret key agreement based on optical communication with quantum signals. It is fundamentally different from classical cryptography and is currently the only known method that will be provably secure against attacks from future quantum computers, but its inner principles rely on quantum entanglement (the spooky action at a distance). It is still a challenge to create and maintain particles in a coherent state, so there should be some future work dedicated to this technology.
3.7 Cyber resiliency It is simply impossible for any computerized system to be completely immune from cyberthreats. Instead, we need to focus on making our systems resilient enough to repel or fight through attacks.
US Homeland Security PPD-21 defines resilience as the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.
21 QUARTZ Consortium: The members of the consortium are: SES(Coordinator), AIT Austrian Institute of
Technology GmbH, German Aerospace Center (DLR), ID Quantique, itrust consulting, Ludwig-Maximilian University, Lux- Trust, Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light, Palacky University, Tesat- Spacecom, and TNO.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-9
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
The future operational environment will be more unpredictable, complex, and potentially dangerous than today. For instance, Directed Energy Weapons such as high-power microwave and laser systems are becoming increasingly effective against digitized, miniaturized and integrated circuits.
There are many researchers working in this area. For example, BAE Systems (Ref.9) has defined a cyber resilience hierarchy applicable to military platforms. For each level an approach is proposed. Ultimately, the levels of the cyber resilience hierarchy guide the discussion of what is feasible and best for both new and legacy military platforms. Also, worth mentioning the MITRE white paper (Ref. 7) providing information on cyber resiliency techniques for systems engineers and architects. Specifically, it identifies potential interactions (e.g., dependencies, synergies, conflicts) between techniques, depending on the implementation approach. It also identifies potential effects that implementations of cyber resiliency techniques could have on adversary activities throughout different stages in the cyber-attack lifecycle.
3.8 Additional Comments Other elements have an impact on cyber security such as: - Strict procedures. Indeed, cybersecurity vulnerabilities could arise from carelessness or negligence on the part of those using the systems. This call for better resiliency (Par. 4.7) but also for new identification systems such as biometric identifiers - Design: Bolting on cybersecurity late in the development cycle or after a system has been deployed is more difficult and costlier than designing it in from the beginning. Considering cybersecurity in the earliest phases of system design is also a key issue highlighted in the GAO report on cyber security. (Ref.14 and 15)
4. Data Link The data link gives the rotorcraft the ability to disseminate its sensor products as well as provide the MUM-T command and control link to a UAV. Advancements in technologies have helped facilitate the consolidation of modern data links to evolve from many LRUs with a large Size, Weight and Power (SWaP) impact to the platform to a highly integrated, compact, low SWaP system. A common for Data Link architecture in airborne applications these days is made up of three assemblies: a modem, an RFE, and an antenna. This is arrangement of LRUs usually driven by a combination of factors driven by environmental and architectural constraints. There are many features which can drive the data link SWaP. Some of these critical features for the data link have been identified in the context of this study for further discussion are:
- Video Compression Technologies - Frequency Spectrum Usage and Component Maturity - Ka and E-Band Components and Antennas
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-10
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
- Waveform
Video Compression Technologies As sensor technologies improve, the demand for higher bandwidths has continuously increased. Current EO/IR sensor products generating high definition full motion video (FMV) can generate bandwidth needs of several Mbps using H.265 video compression while SAR sensors can generate up to ~40 Mbps for raw uncompressed I/Q data. As part of an ad-hoc network mesh, the data link would have to support traffic from multiple users simultaneously, further driving up bandwidth needs. Depending on the size of the mesh and the sensor products passing through the network, it is conceivable for the bandwidth load on the data link to reach 100 Mbps or more as technologies continue to evolve to generate more data. These bandwidths are achievable with current technologies, but high bandwidths come at increased costs with negative impacts to performance (i.e. reduced range, higher detectability) and platform SWaP as it drives the data link hardware and antenna footprint. For this reason, it is strongly recommended that data compression techniques beyond current standards such as H.265 be considered to reduce the bandwidth burden on the data link requirements. This is particularly important if any sensor data is intended to go over SATCOM for BLOS operations, where wide bandwidths are less available and more expensive.
Another solution considered to address large bandwidths was the use of Laser/Optical communications, which in addition to allowing very large bandwidths, are have the added benefit of being immune to EMC effects. They also are LPI/LPD thanks to their intrinsic properties (directionality, etc.). However, Laser/Optical communications are very sensitive to atmospheric conditions (humidity, rain, etc.) and will degrade rapidly in less-than-ideal conditions. Laser/Optical communications have unpredictable performance even in good weather due to scintillation effects. This unpredictable behaviour is often addressed by augmenting the Laser Comm system with an RF system as a backup. This type of Hybrid Optical-RF System was used in prototype demonstrations done by DARPA in their ORCA and HORNET programs. Given the foreseen conditions under which the manned and the unmanned platforms will be operated, (i.e low altitudes that are affected by terrestrial weather patterns) and the timeline to desired deployment, we do not recommend the usage of laser/optical communications as the cost/benefits analysis does not show enough added value as the technology is not nearly mature enough.
Frequency Spectrum Usage and product maturity Having an understanding of the candidate frequency bands for MUM-T operations is paramount for future designs and has far reaching impacts to antenna design, RF free space performance, data link component availability, aircraft integration, system cost, harmonization with civilian frequencies bands, etc.
Similarly, a Study named Small Scale Study was generated by NATO STO for the needs of the Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) which is supposed to take over
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-11
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
when NATO AWACS retire at the horizon 2035. This study may provide valuable clues about the right frequencies bands to be used, as lots of AFSC functional requirements will heavily rely on smart usage of the RF Spectrum, in benign, permissive or contested /denied environments, and as lots of MUM-T Operational requirements will exploit the RF Spectrum in these conditions.
Below a diagram that shows the atmospheric attenuation because of absorption by water and oxygen. As it can be seen, the absorption profiles are non-linear and vary significantly. This should be considered for frequency selection in support of envisaged missions.
Figure G-2: Average Atmospheric Absorption of millimetre waves
Spectrum allocation is an increasingly difficult obstacle to fielding a new system, If the Over the Air (OTA) network is architected to be Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) in X and Ku band frequencies, such as current STANAG 7085, this can be a particularly difficult challenge for supporting multiple users in an already crowded spectrum. One possible solution to this problem is intelligently managing the available
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-12
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
frequency spectrum using Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) techniques to sense and avoid other users. (Ref. 19)
Another solution is relocating to Ka or E bands and avoiding congested spectrum. Those frequency bands provide sufficient bandwidth in available spectrum while offering good RF performance. There are specific frequencies within those bands that are less affected by atmospheric water absorption that have been used successfully in high bandwidth communication demonstrations. (Ref. 24) These bands have an added benefit of locating away from most currently fielded detectors and jammers. A disadvantage of relocating to new spectrum is the loss of interoperability with legacy systems.
The technology at Ka and E band currently is rapidly evolving but hasn’t reached the level of maturity of Ku or lower bands. The availability of components can be a limiting factor that can drive cost. Further advancements in commoditizing components in this range will be needed to approach price points that rival X/Ku band comparable systems. There is a big push in the Wi-Fi and cellular industry that will help drive technology forward with a big enough market reach to keep costs competitive. Millimetre wave multi-beam devices are being developed to meet the demands for the emerging 5G cellular market. Leveraging these advances, DARPA announced the Millimetre Wave Digital Arrays (MIDAS) program in 2018 with the goal of adapting these devices to create a common digital array tile for Aerospace and Defence applications with a focus on reducing size and power. (Ref 28)
Waveform Today, NATO has standardized two waveforms, neither of which will properly service the MUMT mission: • STANAG 7085 for high speed (274 Mbps) and secure transmission/reception of data for multiple applications, including Remote Video Terminal. However, STANAG 7085 does not meet the networking needs of the MUM-T requirements. It is thus recommended to push for a NATO interoperable data link architecture standard meeting MUM-T network requirement (i.e. network oriented)
• STANAG 4660, a networked, lower speed data link (100 K bps) for robust and secure transmission/reception of data and control of UAS. However, STANAG 4660 also do not meet MUM-T requirements (i.e. more than 5 nodes, not enough bandwidth.) An updated or new waveform is desperately needed to meet future mission requirements. In addition to be a networked waveform with sufficient bandwidths, there is a growing need for more robust waveforms that are LPI/LPD/AJ, or Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection/Anti-jam. The waveform should be able to sense the environment and make intelligent decisions in real time about how to manage the radio and network while seamlessly adapting its waveform and networking characteristics over a wide dynamic range, without dropping bits or significantly interrupting the transmission. The
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-13
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
adaptation can be driven by built-in environmental sensing, and a router that senses the traffic carried and passes quality-of-service and priority meta-data to the radio’s cognitive brain. The radio's adaptation can also be driven based on pre-mission or in-mission policy inputs from a human operator. These inputs might include current needs, policies, intelligence information, or alternatively the brain can be disabled if the operator wishes to take control. The job of the cognitive brain is two-fold. First is to manage the sense-and- react countermeasures to adapt to environmental changes and threats in real time, and secondly to hide the complexity of the waveform and network from the human operator with the goal that it will be significantly easier to run than legacy military radios. It should contain a large library of countermeasures built in to weaken, or in some cases negate, the threats posed by many of the adversary’s detectors and jammers giving it strong anti-jam (AJ), low probability of interception (LPI) and low probability of detection (LPD) characteristics. This library of countermeasures should be a “living library” for expandability to meet future threats. In addition to being useful for forming AJ/LPD communication networks, the waveform should also be able to covertly geolocate platforms without GPS to better than one meter of accuracy for GPS backup, personnel recovery, tagging/tracking, collision avoidance and electronic warfare applications. In addition to providing accurate ranging and geolocation, the waveform can be used to synchronize the clocks of distributed platforms to nanoseconds of accuracy, allowing coordination with friendly jammers to communicate over a channel that is orthogonal to the friendly jamming.
This need is best met with a Software Defined Modem architecture that can be adaptive and reconfigured in real-time. By using a programmable DSP-based modem with parallel processing, it can support higher order modulations such as 64APSK to achieve Gigabit speeds for handling high bandwidth needs. The throughput can then be doubled or even quadrupled by making use of multiple channels in free space using MIMO techniques and orthogonal channels, such as what is being done for DARPA in their 100Gb/s RF Backbone Study. (Ref. 20, 21, 22, 23, 25)
5. Antenna Antenna technologies shall be considered along with RF transmitters/receivers. Antenna and antenna characteristics will aim at a providing a better mechanical integration in the airframe and multi-band capability. The antenna on the Rotorcraft will need 360° azimuth coverage as well as coverage above/below the platform to sufficiently track the UAV as it manoeuvres during operation. It’s a challenge to find a single suitable antenna location that will accommodate the full Field of View (FOV) needed. There is a high probability that the platform will need multiple antennas, likely somewhere between 2 to 4 antennae. The use of a distributed antenna array that uses a coherent beam combing method, such as the one used on DDG-1000 on where one antenna array was located on each of the four faces of the ship’s superstructure, has advantages of maintaining gain while operating towards steep pointing angles and then performing an array-to-array handoff where a single antenna would lose gain and increase axial distortion due to beam squint.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-14
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
At the heart of this architecture to enable these capabilities is an Electronically Steered Array (ESA). Electronically Scanned Array (ESA) technology looks ideal for directional data links and networking. Compared to omnidirectional antennas, which have been the backbone of the DoD communications systems for 60+ years, ESAs offer higher gain, reconfigurable beam patterns, and microsecond beam scanning speeds. Each of these characteristics translates to higher throughput, increased network efficiency, and improved resistance to jamming. One of the historical challenges that have kept ESA technology from seeing widespread adoption for directional networking is the cost of implementation. This challenge is now being overcome and provides ESA technology with capability sets and price points that will enable widespread adoption of next gen directional data links. The advantages of this technology are numerous: • No moving parts at the antenna level compared to mechanically steered antennae • Graceful degradation • Multi-Beam, Multi-function • Fast Beam Pointing Such antennas controlled by software with innovative routing protocols can effectively sustain resilient datalinks by using innovative routing protocols consisting of a series of algorithms to autonomously expand, heal and adapt node topology to improve tactical communications. They can provide dynamic and collaborative mechanisms for nodes to position themselves for link connectivity (i.e. redundant paths for critical data, and key node connectivity), network expansion, network repair, and opportunistic communications based on the current environment and mission needs. It maintains, expands or repairs links by moving to autonomously computed and dynamically updated locations, responding in real time to key mission needs of the network after learning the spectrum dynamics.
ESA designs are typically planar in nature and which will limit the field of view for a single antenna array. A distributed antenna array architecture would likely be necessary to get full 360°-degree coverage around the rotorcraft or NGR. The challenge of a distributed array is ensuring a seamless transition from one ESA antenna array “face” to another. A coherent beam combining modem technology can seamlessly maintain the data link from as the platforms rotate around each other and the beam transitions from face to adjacent face. This coherent beam combing method is based upon a gradient search which allows simultaneous wideband and narrowband processing to coherently combine apertures without using the communications signal to provide tracking information. The coherent beam combining techniques can sum each beam at the intersection of two array faces to offset the loss of Eb/No seen at steeper steering angles, thus preserving sufficient link margin so a null does not exist at the aperture cross-over point. The adaptively post- processed beam patterns generated from summing signals are weighted according to the combining coefficients that are adaptively computed in an iterative manner, which allows
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-15
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
the algorithm to not only coherently combine signals, but to track and reject up to N-1 interferers where N is the number of processed channels. This null steering technique masks the radiation pattern to nullify the effects of jamming and improve the signal-to- jamming ratio in a contested or saturated electromagnetic environment, improving the data links cyber EP posture. (Ref. 26)
Another advantage that an ESA antenna systems brings to the platform is it’s ability to conform with the aircraft surface, making it conformable. This feature has a couple of benefits: 1) reducing aerodynamic drag and 2) not adding to the radar cross section (RCS) of the platform the way a blade antenna or otherwise protruding antenna would.
The use of metamaterials has some potential for antenna design. Let’s first recall what a metamaterial is. A common definition for metamaterial is “a synthetic composite material that exhibits properties of permittivity and permeability not found in natural materials” (see below).
Figure G-3 Categorization of materials in terms of permittivity and permeability
Metamaterials are engineered to offer unusual - often negative - permittivity and permeability values. In optical materials, if permittivity and permeability are both positive, then the optical wave travels in the forward direction, if they are negative, a backward wave is produced. The same applies for electromagnetic waves, if both permittivity and permeability are negative then backward waves are generated and used to create resonance phenomena and increase the detection beam at the antenna level. Metamaterials-based antennas in fact are antennas that can store and radiate power thanks to these properties. The use metamaterials to control resonator frequency could be applied to ESA elements for a multiband antenna system. (Ref 27)
6. Network
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-16
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Definition of System Boundaries In order to have an exact goal for the activities it deems necessary to define the boundaries of the system and give some basic metrics. This will have a direct influence on the system design. The first step is to define network of the team consisting of manned and unmanned platforms without any interface to the “outside world”. This network (MUM- T network) will have the following tasks: • Full data routing capabilities among all participating aircraft • Data exchange to assure traffic separation and collision avoidance (“safe flight”) among the aircraft that belong to the “inner circle” • Data exchange due to the fact, that specific equipment not available on all aircraft (“Duty sharing”), e.g. high-resolution sensors, satellite communication equipment
In a first step we will consider a moderate number of three unmanned aircraft that team up with one manned platform. As for metrics the following assumptions are made • The distance is assumed not to exceed 10 nautical miles (nm). This assures that we will have a line of sight (LOS) throughout the mission. • A maximum relative speed of 140 knots (kts). This will help to evaluate possible Doppler-effects on communications. • Data rate of 5 Mbps
Putting this together will result in the architecture shown in fig. 7.1 below. It consists of an intra-UAV-network and (augmented by the manned platform) the MUM-T network. The technology that is used in these two networks may or may not be the same.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-17
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure G-4: Components and metrics of the MUM-T network
In this study we assume, that all unmanned platforms are commanded by pilot(s) inside the manned platform. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to provide backup for this function in case the manned platform is not available (e.g. battle damage) or the unmanned platform will have to transit into the area of operation. To realize this function a narrow- band satellite communication terminal (e.g. Iridium) could be integrated into the unmanned platforms.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-18
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure G-5: BLOS communication for command and control of unmanned aircraft
As it is not clear, if the unmanned components will be able to have BLOS (Beyond Line-Of- Sight) communication available on board, it is assumed, that the manned platform will provide this capability to all UAV inside the MUM-T network. For this, BLOS communication of all UAV will be routed through the manned platform.
In a final step we are able to define the boundaries of the scope of NIAG 227.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-19
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure G-6: Scope of NIAG 227
Basic Evaluation of Information Exchange Requirements
In order to design a network, it is necessary to know in advance, the Information Exchange Requirements (IER) that will be handled. According to the NATO Architectural Framework (NAF) these IER are structured as follows: • Supported Operational Task. Specific Missions, Functions, or Activities. • Operational Elements Involved. Information Consuming Node, Information Producing Node. • Description of Information. Element of War-fighter Information. • Typical Required Information Exchange Attributes. Media (text, video, voice, data, etc.), Quality (frequency, timeliness, security, etc.), Quantity (volume, speed, etc.), Capabilities (communications, processing, display, etc.). Inside the Airborne Network there are classes of data which can be characterized quite well. The following table shows representative examples.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-20
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure G-7: Representative Airborne Network Traffic
(Taken from: Stranc, Kenneth. Airborne Networking)
According to other projects the following aspects will have a major impact on the network design and selection of appropriate equipment afterwards. • Distribution of raw sensor data without efficient ways for compression (e.g. EW- data, multiple EO/IR-data streams). • Connectivity to achieve flight safety among own platforms (traffic separation and collision avoidance) depends on the individual level of autonomy. • Communication beyond line of sight (BLOS) Network Design
The following bullets are considered to be the main characteristics for state-of-the-art airborne networks (AN): a. Standards Based: AN system components comply with applicable DoD and AF standards lists. • Leverage commercial investment in COTS-based networks and their evolution wherever feasible • Relax standards only for unique must-have DoD features • Evolve standards to accommodate DoD features • Migrate towards use of open standards
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-21
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
b. Layered: AN system components are functionally layered. • Follows successful COTS Internet model • Minimizes description of inter-layer interfaces • Allows technology evolution of layers for maximum cost benefit c. Modular: AN is inherently modular in nature, capable of being extended and expanded to meet the changing communications service requirements of the platforms needed to support any particular mission. • Components can be continuously added and removed as needed during the time frame of the mission (hours, days), such that the network can be adjusted to fit the mission, during the mission • User capabilities that need to be supported determine the technical capabilities of the network components selected • New network components that provide new operational capabilities can be integrated as needed. d. Internetworked: AN is capable of internetworking using all available commercial and military transmission media (i.e., line-of-sight (LOS) radio communications paths, satellite communications (SATCOM) paths, and laser communications (Lasercom) paths). e. Interoperable: AN is capable of interoperating with other peer networks (e.g., space, terrestrial, and war-fighter networks) and legacy networks (as needed for coalition interoperability and transition operations). f. Implemented as a Utility: AN integrates separate transmission mechanisms with a single common, standards-based network layer (e.g., IPv4, IPv6) for delivery of common user (i.e., mission-independent) network services. g. Adaptable: AN is capable of adapting to accommodate changes in user mission, operating environment, and threat environment. h. Efficient: AN efficiently utilizes available communication resources. i. Autonomous: AN can operate autonomously or as part of a larger inter-network. • Platform network can operate without connectivity to external nodes • AN can operate without connectivity to ground nodes j. Secure: AN supports user and system security. • Multiple independent levels of security • User, operations, management, and configuration data integrity and confidentiality • Identification and authentication. k. Managed: AN is capable of integrating into broader AF and joint network management infrastructures.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-22
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
l. Policy Based: AN is capable of integrating into policy-based management and security infrastructures. This should result in the following functions of the Airborne Network that are required for operation:
a. Inter-node connectivity – How AN nodes (i.e., platforms) interconnect to each other.
AN nodes are capable of establishing connections with one or more other AN nodes, whether airborne, in space, or on the surface, as needed. The transmission paths used to establish the physical connections, may be asymmetric with respect to bandwidth, and may be bidirectional or unidirectional (including receive only). Also, the forward and reverse network connections relative to any node could take different physical paths through the network. The AN connections may be point-to- point, broadcast, or multipoint/multicast.
AN nodes are capable of establishing connections to relay (receive and transmit with the same data formats and on the same media/frequency), translate (receive and transmit with the same data formats but on different media or frequencies), or gateway (receive and transmit with different data formats and on different media/frequencies) information, as needed.
AN nodes are capable of establishing connectivity to other AN nodes based upon a prearranged network design that prescribes inter-node connectivity (i.e., topology) of the network. Also, AN nodes are capable of establishing link connectivity to other AN nodes autonomously, without prearrangements that identify the specific AN nodes, and dynamically as opportunities and needs arise.
With MUM-T Comms, we will see the emerging need for algorithms to automatically expand, heal and adapt node topology to improve tactical communications for MUM-T missions. Such algorithms provide dynamic and collaborative mechanisms for nodes to ensure end-to-end connectivity under various conditions. They will maintain, expand or repair links by moving to autonomously computed and dynamically updated locations, responding in real-time to key mission needs of the network after learning the spectrum dynamics.
Key inter-node connectivity functions include the following: • Backbone Connectivity • Subnet Connectivity • Network Access Connectivity • Routing and Switching • Quality of Service (QoS) / Class of Service (CoS)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-23
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
b. Information Assurance – What security functions are needed and where do they go.
AN IA services include identification, authentication, integrity, confidentiality, availability, non-repudiation, security policy management, and key management. AN IA components will enable or extend access to GIG based security or may organically provide the security services. IA services will be enabled regardless if the AN is connected to other networks that comprise the overall GIG and during periods of connectivity interruption. IA services will be designed to function under constraints such as low-bandwidth, high-latency connections, unidirectional links, or with nodes operating in LPI/LPD modes to include receive-only.
• Key Information Assurance functions include the following: Policy Based Security Management • Data Protection • Key Management • Authentication, Identification, Integrity and Access Control • Attack Sensing, Warning and Response • Protocol Security
c. Link Management – How the network controls and makes use of AN communications links.
AN Link Management enables real-time autonomous management of the resources and services provided by the RF and optical links that interconnect the AN nodes. This includes finding/locating nodes/links, provisioning link bandwidth, admission control, and managing radio and network configurations using the following functions.
• Advertising and Discovery • Establishing and Restoring • Monitoring and Evaluation • Topology Management
d. Network Management – How the network controls its configuration and maintains its integrity. AN Network Management enables operators to plan network resources and equipment configurations, analyze and predict network performance, monitor and display current network status, isolate and resolve faults, and configure network components.
Key Network Management functions include the following:
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-24
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
• Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, Security Management • Network Situation Awareness • Network Resource Planning • Policy Based Network Management • Network Modelling, Analysis and Simulation
e. Network Services – What network services are needed and how are they used. These include the following • Name Resolution System • Dynamic Network Configuration Management • Network Time Service
To make clear, that there is a difference between terrestrial (mostly wired) and airborne networks (wireless) the following table shows a comparison of key parameters and attributes.
Figure G-8: Comparison of Link Attributes in Terrestrial and Airborne Nets
Taken from presentation US Air Force “Technical Challenges in Military Airborne Networking”
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-25
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
As an idea to realize seamless communication (and obeying the laws of physics) a layered approach was chosen. The nomenclature of the layers is similar to the one in “Global Information Grid” which is one of the paradigms to enable networked operations.
Figure G-9: Layered Network approach
Mobile Ad-hoc Networking Architecture In traditional (wired) networking, each user has his individual access. Routing of packets is done in dedicated hardware in a mostly static topology. In wireless networking, with users moving about, topology is changing. Users may leave the radio-range of one router and enter the range of another to keep up the connection. This requires infrastructure.
Ad-hoc networking gets away with the separation into routers and hardware used by the user. Each piece of user hardware does not only provide traditional user functionality but additionally routing services that are not visible to the user. In an environment with a minimal density of users, each user keeps a table of all nodes that he is able to connect to (“Routing Table”). This Routing Table is forwarded to a number of nodes in the vicinity to spread the information.
If, for example, a user tries to contact another user that is not in direct radio range with him, this destination may be known by other users in the net. With the knowledge of the routing tables of each node, a connection can be established. If topology (e.g. position of users and “visibility” of each other) changes, routing tables change. These changes are distributed among the nodes.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-26
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
To reflect the special environment and to distinguish from Mobile Ad-hoc Networking (MANET), the term Flying Ad-hoc Networks or FANET has been created. The main characteristics of FANETs compared to MANETs are presented in following table.
Characteristic FANET MANET Mobility Fast: 30 – 460 km/h (and Slow: 5 – 10 km/h and above) and some movement arbitrary movement pattern Node density Sparse and few nodes Similar to FANET but less sparse Topology change Fast Slow Propagation model LoS (Line of Sight) in most LoS is not feasible some cases times Computational High Medium power Power Needed only when the Always needed consumption network uses mini UAV awareness Localization GPS GPS
Table G-1: Comparison of FANET and MANET
Source : Catalina Aranzazu Suescun, Mihaela Cardei. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Networking Protocols. January 2017.
In order to propagate topology changes today, there are many different protocols available with individual pros and cons
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-27
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure G-10: Topology-based routing protocols for FANET Source: Muhammad Asghar Khan, Inam Ullah Khan, Alamgir Safi and Ijaz Mansoor Quershi. Dynamic Routing in Flying Ad-Hoc Networks Using Topology-Based Routing Protocols. August 2018
A comparison is contained in the following table
Table G-2: Comparison of the various topology-based routing protocols for FANET
Source: Muhammad Asghar Khan, Inam Ullah Khan, Alamgir Safi and Ijaz Mansoor Quershi. Dynamic Routing in Flying Ad-Hoc Networks Using Topology-Based Routing Protocols. August 2018
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-28
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Data flowing inside the network The following figure shows the dataflow from a Sensor (HALE UAV) through the network to the manned platform that is Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) to the HALE UAV. Because of the density of the network nodes (MANET/FANET-nodes) different routes are possible using Line of Sight (LOS) communication equipment. If the route with red arrows is used in the first place (because the number of relay nodes is minimal) and UAV 9 suddenly renders inoperable the routing protocol establishes an alternative route using UAV 10. The number of relay nodes is increased (which has a slight influence on the data throughput) but the connection is (re-)established.
On the other hand, because of the alternate route this is a method to introduce “graceful degradation” of the network performance. The connection between communication partners is not lost completely, only degraded.
Figure G-11: Different routes inside a MANET/FANET
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-29
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
The overall capacity to route data between nodes depends upon the communication equipment (physical layer) of each node. The aim should be to use the equipment with the highest throughput available. This has to be regarded by the routing protocol and its parameters. If the route contains nodes that are not able to route high-bandwidth traffic (e.g. full motion video) an alternative route has to be used. The administration of a MANET/FANET produces overhead information which must be considered (i.e. this amount is not available to the user).
Comparison of Network Topologies There are various possibilities of how a network physically connects its nodes that have evolved in the past. The following table shows a quick comparison between them
Topology Advantages Disadvantages Star Topology Node Failure doesn’t affect the Node Failure doesn’t affect the whole network whole network Mesh topology Highly-Fault Tolerant Mesh topology is very complex Cluster Tree Node Failure doesn’t affect the Beacons must be send to add Topology whole network more nodes Star-Mesh Highest Degree of Mobility and It is very complex and takes Topology Flexibility to rapid changes much effort to handle than any other Topology Ring Topology It is very simple compared to Node Failure affects whole other Topologies network
Table G-3: Comparison of network topologies
(Source: Nirav BHATT. A Survey on Comparative Study of Wireless Sensor Network Topologies. Article in International Journal of Computer Applications. January 2014)
Judging from a very important requirement for airborne networks, i.e. fault tolerance, only two topologies should be considered: Mesh Topology and Star-Mesh Topology. For a final decision the (protocol) overhead to organize the network should be looked at. There Star- Mesh Topology has a big disadvantage. So it is assumed, that the network topology in the case of NIAG SG 227 will be a mesh.
For reasons of interoperability and connectivity a small number of gateways should be considered. These gateways should connect to legacy systems or other communication networks according to the IER.
In order to get general guidance for realization and at the same time be compliant to NATO documents it is recommended to consult the Allied Data Publication 34 (ADatP- 34(J)), NATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles (also: NISP). ADatP-34(J) is
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-30
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
developed by the Interoperability Profiles Capability Team (IP CaT) under the authority of the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (C3B). It is freely available on the internet (https://nhqc3s.hq.nato.int/Apps/Architecture/NISP/). NISP gives guidelines to capability planners, programme managers and test managers for NATO common funded systems in the short or mid-term timeframes. The NISP prescribes the necessary technical standards and profiles to achieve interoperability of Communications and Information Systems in support of NATO's missions and operations. In accordance with the Alliance C3 Strategy (ref. C-M(2014)0016) all NATO Enterprise (ref. C-M(2014)0061) entities shall adhere to the NISP mandatory standards and profiles which are described in a separate volume of NISP.
Security aspects At this early stage it is not possible to exactly construct all pieces of communication equipment. But it is possible to evaluate which architecture is most promising concerning size, weight and power (SWAP). It is assumed, that all communication that is routed through wireless means has to be encrypted. The protection will be done at the “border”, that means everything outside the aircraft is encrypted. Starting from a single communications channel there is an interface, which receives the user-data to be encrypted. In the following step this data is processed (outbound: encrypted, inbound: decrypted) and handed over to the communication equipment through a crypto-interface. From that point on the data is flowing through different layers of the communication equipment. The actual number depends upon the realization of the hardware and the definition of the manufacturer. Finally, at the air-interface, the information is available for other users within the range of the radio.
Figure G-12: Generic layered model of communication equipment
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-31
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Figure G-13: Non-optimized layout of encryption
The difference in the necessary communications equipment is obvious. This equipment will include terminals, antennas and necessary interfaces. It is assumed, that by the time this kind of MUM-T-network is operated, all en- and decrypting will be done by software exclusively. This will require less hardware, as dedicated “crypto-boxes” for each “communication line” are no longer necessary.
Figure G-13: Optimized layout of encryption
Not only communication aspects have to be considered, but also airworthiness certification. This means, that all pieces of equipment must not only satisfy requirements concerning security but also safety.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-32
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
7. Conclusions
7.1 CYBER/EW conclusions and recommendations (Ref Par 4) 7.1.1 In the midterms, it is recommended to push for a NATO wide band crypto standard meeting MUM-T network requirements 7.1.2 In the longer terms, additional STO/NIAG studies should be considered in the following areas: a. b. Modulation techniques/Waveform: Considering waveforms that are not detectable using either energy detectors or feature detectors c. Cryptology: Quantum cryptology should also be further investigated as it is currently the only known method that will be provably secure against attacks from future quantum computers 7.1.3 A NATO standard on cyber resilience hierarchy applicable to military platforms, even at a high level, would eliminate many of the semantic hurdles to realizing military cyber resiliency of military platform commensurate with the modern threat. Plus, it will allow to guide the discussion of what is feasible and best for both new and legacy military platforms. 7.1.4 Cybersecurity should be considered in the earliest phases of system design
7.2 ANTENNA conclusions and recommendation (Ref Par 4) 7.2.1 In the short-term, it is recommended to address the integration of antenna at the very early stage of the unmanned platform design. This is paramount to ensure adequate connectivity between the unmanned platform and the NGR. These considerations must be carried out in sequence after frequencies determination for tactical datalink, since the antenna design (and dimensions) are intrinsically dependent upon used frequencies. ESA antenna technology seem to fulfil the majority of requirements for MUM-T.
7.2.2 In the mid-term, it is recommended to address the challenges of heat dissipation on-board the unmanned aircraft using novel techniques, metamaterials mainly to allow smaller dimensions and ease integration onto the airframe.
7.2.3 In the longer term and similarly to what is described for Frequency spectrum, it is recommended to study the feasibility of antenna operating at very high frequencies in the
7.3 Technical Roadmap
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-33
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Technology 2020 2025 2030 2035 Quantum Crypto TRL3 TRL4 TRL5 TRL7 Thermal Management Techniques TRL4 TRL5 TRL7 TRL8 ESA antenna advancements (cost) TRL6 TRL7 TRL8 TRL9 Null Steering TRL6 TRL7 TRL8 TRL9 Millimeter Wave components TRL6 TRL7 TRL8 TRL9 Hybrid Networking Protocols TRL7 TRL8 TRL9 TRL9 LPI/LPD/AJ waveform TRL7 TRL8 TRL9 TRL9
REFERENCES 1. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-6. US Army Concept for Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations – dated January 2018 2. NIAG Study 185 on “NATO Defensive Aid System (DAS) Open Architecture Assessment”, NIAG-D(2015)0016 dated 8 June 2015 3. NIAG Study 211 on “NATO DAS exploitation “, NIAG-D(2017)0011 dated 11 July 2017 4. NIAG study 206 on “Cyber Defence Situational Awareness”- NIAG-D(2016)0027 (PFP) dated 13 December 2016 5. AU/ACSC/COLE/AY09- Air Command and Staff College Air University Developing Capability: The Use Of Laser Communication Technology To Operate In A Cyber-Denied Environment – April 2009 6. NISTIR 8105 ,Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography dated April 2016 7. MITRE white paper on Cyber Resiliency Engineering Aid – Cyber Resiliency Techniques: Potential Interactions and Effects at https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-14-4035-cyber-resiliency- engineering-aid-techniques.pdf 8. ESD Spotlight N°96, dated August 2018 -page 7 9. Mission- and life-critical cyber resilience for military platforms from BAE systems at http://mil-embedded.com/articles/mission-life-critical-cyber-resilience-military- platforms/ 10. US Army FM 3-38 on “Cyber Electromagnetic Activities”, dated Feb 2014 11. NATO Cyber Defence (dated Feb. 2018) (https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_02/20180213_180 2-factsheet-cyber-defence-en.pdf) 12. AC/224-N(2007)0003, dated 15 June 2007, NATO Staff Requirements For a NATO Capability For Wideband ISR Data Link Encryption (on the portal) 13. Tactical Communications Conference, 1994. Vol. 1. Digital Technology for the Tactical Communicator., Proceedings of the 1994 (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/mostRecentIssue.jsp?punumber=3314)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-34
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
14. Washington Post , dated 14 October 2018 : Defense industry grapples with cybersecurity flaws in new weapons systems https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/defense-industry-grapples- with-cybersecurity-flaws-in-new-weapons-systems/2018/10/14/b1de3bae-ce36- 11e8-a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html 15. GAO Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate on “Weapon Systems Cybersecurity” October 2018 https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694913.pdf 16. Paper from Purdue University, Kim, A, Wampler, B. Gopper, J, and Hwang I. “Cyber Attack Vulnerabilities Analysis for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” 17. “Null steering beamforming for wireless communication system using genetic algorithm” by Md. Rajibur Rahaman Khan and Vyacheslav Tuzlukov published in the 2011 IEEE International Conference on Microwave Technology & Computational Electromagnetics 18. Aviation Week, June 18, 2014, Amy Butler, “5th to 4th Gen Fighter Comms Competition Eyed in Fiscal 2015” 19. “Dynamic Spectrum Access Radio Performance for UAS ISR Missions” by Mark McHenry, Youping Zhao, and Osama Haddadin, presented at 2010 Military Communications Conference 20. S. Sun, T. Rappaport, R. Heath, A. Nix, S. Rangan, “MIMO for Millimeter-Wave Wireless Communications: Beamforming, Spatial Multiplexing, or Both,” IEEE Communications Magazine, Dec. 2014 21. J.C. Koshy, “Low complexity iterative MIMO receiver based on successive soft interference-cancellation and MMSE spatial-filtering,” IEEE Sarnoff Symposium, 2010, vol., no., pp.1-6, 12-14 April 2010. 22. “Demonstration of Multi-Gigabit Per Second Data Rates Through Ka-Band Frequencies,” FLC NewsLink, December 7, 2011. 23. R. Simons, E. Wintucky, D. Landon, J. Sun, J. Winn, S. Laraway, W. McIntire, J. Metz, and F. Smith, “Demonstration of multi-Gb/s data rates at Ka-band using software-defined modem and broadband high power amplifier for space communications,” 2011 IEEE MTT-S International Microwave Symposium Digest, pp. 1-4, 2011. 24. G. MacCartney, T. Rappaport, “73 GHz Millimeter Wave Propagation Measurements for Outdoor Urban Mobile and Backhaul Communications in New York City”, IEEE ICC 2014 – Wireless Communicatoins Symposium. 25. O. Haddadin, L3 Technologies, “Multi-Gigabit Software Defined Modem” presented at Software Radio Summit, 2010 26. O. S. Haddadin, J. R. Lawton, D. G. Landon, P. C. Cherry, L3 Technologies, “Impact of Phase-Shift Beamforming on Wideband Communications Systems, ” presented at MILCOM in 2007.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-35
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX G ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
27. Eli Brookner, “Radar and Phased Array Breakthroughs,” Microwave Journal November 2015 28. David W. Corman, Anokiwave Inc.; Peter Moosbrugger, Ball Aerospace; Gabriel M. Rebeiz, Univ. of California, “5G/Massive MIMO Channel, The Industry’s Next Tipping Point,” Microwave Journal, May 2014.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED G-36
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX H ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
Annex H Acronyms List
A2AD Anti-Access Airspace Denial A2C2 Army Airspace Command and Control AAA Air Assault Assets A/C Aircraft ACT Allied Command Transformation AB Air Base AD Air Defence AFC Automatic Flight Control system AFDX Avionics Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet AI Artificial Intelligence AJ Anti-Jam ALFUS Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems ALE-UAV Air Launched Effector UAV ALM Adaptive Layer Manufacturing AME Aero Medical Evacuation AMRDEC (US) Army Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center AMS Aircraft Management System AOO Area Of Operation AR Augmented Reality ASAT Anti Satellite ATC Air Traffic Control ATO Air Traffic Order ATP Allied Tactical Publication
BDA Battle Damage Assessment BFT Blue Force Tracking BIT Build In Test BLOS Beyond Line-of-Sight BMS Battlefield Management System BPM Back Path Monitoring BRLOS Beyond Radio Line Of Sight
C2 Command and Control C3 Command, Control and Communications CAS Crew Alerting System CAT Category (mostly referring to Instrument Flight Landing) CBM+ Condition-Based Maintenance Plus CDL Common Data Link CDS Cockpit Display System
NATO UNCLASSIFIED H-1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX H ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
C-IED Counter-IED CM Counter Measure CMDS Countermeasures Dispensing System CO Cost COA Course of Action COMAO Composite Air Operations COMINT Communication Intelligence COMJAM Communications Jamming CONOP Concept of Operation COTS Commercial off-the-shelf GSA Global Situation Awareness CSDA Cyber Defence Situational Awareness CSI Computer Software Configuration Item CSAR Combat Search And Rescue Cyber EA Cyber electronic attack Cyber EP Cyber electronic protection Cyber ES Cyber electronic warfare support
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DAS Defensive Aids Suite DCO Defensive Cyberspace Operations DDoS Distributed Denial of Service DET Displaced Equipment Training DID Data Item Description DISN Defence Information Switch Network DMD Digital Map Data DOD (US) Department of Defence DoS Denial of Service DOTMLPF-P Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Education, Personnel, Facilities – Policy DRCM Directed Infra-Red Countermeasures DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum DU Display Unit DUSTOFF Dedicated Unhesitating Service to Our Fighting Forces DVE Degraded Visual Environment DVES Degraded Visual Environment System DRFM Digital Radio Frequency Memory DSA Dynamic Spectrum Access DTE Data Terminal Equipment DT&E Development, Test and Evaluation
EA Electronic Attack EAD Expendable Active Decoy EASA European Aviation Safety Agency Eb/No Power per bit/Noise
NATO UNCLASSIFIED H-2 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX H ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
ECCM Electronic Counter Counter Measures ECM Electronic Counter Measures EDI Electronic Data Interchange EM Electromagnetic EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI Electronic Interference EMP Electromagnetic Pulse EMS Electromagnetic Spectrum EMSO Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations EMT-B Emergency Medical Technician-Basic E/O Electro Optical EO/IR Electro-Optical / Infra-Red EP Electronic Protect ES Electronic Support ESA Electronically Scanned Array ESM Electronic Support Measures E-UAV Escort UAV EW Electronic Warfare ExD Exercise Director
FAA (US) Federal Aviation Administration FAME Forward Aero Medical Evacuation FANET Flying Ad-hoc NETworking FASIR Full Avionic System Integration Rig FCC Federal Communications Commission (US) FCS Flight Control System FEC Forward Error Correction FLIR Forward-Looking Infra-Red (sensor) FM Frequency Modulation F/O Optical Fibre FOB Forward Operating Base FPL Flight Plan FRIES Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System
GAF Ground Attack Force GAO (US) Government Accountability Office GCS Ground Control Station GIC Global Information Grid GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System (generic) GPS Global Navigation System (US) GPU Graphic Processor Unit GSA Global Situational Awareness
HAF Helicopter Attack Force HALE High-Altitude Long Endurance (UAV)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED H-3 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX H ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
HAPS High Altitude Pseudo Satellite HAZMAT Hazardous Materials HC Helicopter HF High Frequency HF Human Factor HFI Hostile Fire Indicator HLZ Helicopter Landing Zone HMD Helmet Mounted Display HMI Human Machine Interface HMSD Head Mounted Sight and Display HQ Have-Quick HQ Headquarter HRC HUMINT Response Cell HRI Human-Robot Interaction HUD Head Up Display HUMS Health and Usage Monitoring System HVT High Value Target HW Hardware
I2 Integration and Interoperability IAWG Industrial Avionics Working Group IAS Indicated Airspeed IDM Improve Data Modem IETM Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals IED Improvised Explosive Device IER Information Exchange Requirements ILS Instrument Landing System ILS Integrated Logistic Support IN Innovation INS Inertial Nav System IPS Integrated Product Support IPS Introduction Protection System IPsec internet Protocol Security ISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance IR Infrared ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations
JAPCC Joint Air Power Competence Centre JCGUAV Joint Capability Group on Unmanned Air Vehicle JCG VL Joint Capability Group on Vertical Lift JISR Joint ISR JTF Joint Task Force
KPI Key Performance Indicators
NATO UNCLASSIFIED H-4 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX H ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
LAD Large Area Display LCC Life Cycle Cost LOE Low Earth Orbit LOI Level of Interoperability LOR Launch, Operation and Recovery LOS Line of Sight LPI/LPD Low Probability of Intercept and Detection LRU Line replaceable Unit LSA Logistic Support Analysis LTCRs Long Term Capability Requirements LWS Laser Warning System
MALE Medium-Altitude Long-endurance (UAV) MANET Mobile Ad Hoc Network MCP Multiple Core Processor M-DPL Multiple-Data Link Processing MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Networks MEDEVAC MEDical EVACuation MERT Medical Evacuation MESH Modelling Environment for Software and Hardware (computer engineering) MFD Multi-Function Display MitM Man in the Middle MMS Mission Management System MOSA Modular Open System Architecture MSD Mission System Display MTF Medical Treatment Facility MUM-T Manned/Unmanned Teaming MWS Missile Warning System
NAF NATO Architectural Framework NDAS NATO Defensive Aids Suite/System NDAS Networked DAS NDI Navigation Display Indicator NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process NET New Equipment Training NGR Next Generation Rotorcraft NGRC Next Generation Rotorcraft Capability NIAG NATO Industrial Advisory Group NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology (US) NOE Nap of Earth NRG Next Generation Rotorcraft
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer OJT On the Job Training OP Openness
NATO UNCLASSIFIED H-5 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX H ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
OPS Operations OPSW Operational Software OPV Optionally Piloted Vehicle OR Operability ORBAT Orders of Battle OS Open System OS-JTF Open System Joint Task Force OT&E Operational Test & Evaluation OTT Over the Target OV-1 Operational View OWS Obstacle Warming System
PBL Performance Based Logistics PFD Pilot Flight Display PFI Primary Flight Indicator PHST Packing, Handling, Storage and Transportation PMDS Program Management Support PoD Point of Delivery PRN Pseudorandom Number PTS Portable Trauma and Support System
QRT Quick Reaction Team QKD Quantum Key Distribution QRT Quick Reaction Team
RCMA Reliability Centred Maintenance Analysis RFI Radar Frequency Interferometer R&M Repair and Maintenance RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System(s) RoE Rules of Engagement ROZ Restricted Operational Zone RWA Rotary Wing Assets RWR Radar Warning Receiver
SA Situational Awareness SAD System Assisted Diagnostic SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar SAT Satellite SE System(s) Engineering SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defences SFD Spectral Flux Density SG (NIAG) Study Group SG Sub-Group SIGINT Signals Intelligence SIL System Integration Lab
NATO UNCLASSIFIED H-6 NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Switzerland ANNEX H ENCLOSURE TO NIAG-D(2019)0015(INV
SMD System Management Display SMO Spectrum Management Operations SOF (NATO) Special Operation Forces SOFWG SOF Working Group SOI System Of Interest SPC Single Core Processor SME Subject Matter Expert SMT Study Management Team SRL System Readiness Level STANAG (NATO) Standardization Agreement STO (NATO) Science & Technology Organization SWaP Size, Weight and Power
TACAN TACtical Air Navigation TADSS Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulation TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol TDP Technical Demonstration Program TE-UAV Tactical Effects UAV TGT Target TL Terrorist Leader TMs Tactical Manual TOC Total Ownership Cost TOE Team of Experts TOP Take-off Point TRADOC (United States Army) Training and Doctrine Command TRL Technology Readiness Level (TRL) TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UAS Unmanned Air System UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UCAV Unmanned Combat Air Vehicule UHF Ultra-High Frequency UV Ultraviolet
VHF Very High Frequency VID Video VOR VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range VSM Vehicle Specific Module V&V Verification and Validation
WCET Worst Case Execution Time
NATO UNCLASSIFIED H-7