Lloyd George and Churchill

David Lloyd George and were the two most important political figures in twentieth- century British political history, a status that derives substantially but not wholly from their positions as war leaders.1 Comparing their experiences in the First and Second World Wars raises questions which go beyond the matter of who had the greater personal leadership ability. It n Britain, there has already failing to articulate this view them- provides us a lens with been published a flood of books selves. In fact no such consensus Isurrounding the hundredth does exist. Given that fact, the Brit- which to examine anniversary of the war’s outbreak, ish government may well have been and there has been a great deal right to insist that the officially key issues such as state of public discussion. Gary Shef- sponsored centenary events should capacity, civilian– field has claimed: ‘Like all wars, it involve commemoration but not was tragic, but it was certainly not interpretation. military relations, futile.’2 Max Hastings has argued: Nevertheless, it is true that the ‘The [British] Government has not Second World War tends to be the relationship uttered, and apparently does not seen in Britain as ‘the good war’, between parliament plan to utter, a word about the vir- in contrast with the First World tue of Britain’s cause, or the blame War, which, even if it is not viewed and the executive, and that chiefly attaches to Germany exclusively negatively, is certainly for the catastrophe that overtook much more contested. On this the construction of .’3 These historians seem basis it is hardly surprising that, in historical memory. By to suggest that there is a historical Britain, Churchill is viewed over- consensus that the Germans were whelmingly positively whereas . chiefly at fault in 1914 and the gov- Lloyd George fails to benefit from ernment is being pusillanimous in having been ‘The Man Who Won

42 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 Lloyd George and Churchill as War Leaders

the War’. Undoubtedly, First World Lloyd George and Churchill were George’s failure to protect him. War revisionists are correct that the already closely associated with According to the diary of Lord ‘lions ’ caricature is one another in the public mind Reading, ‘W. says [he] has always unsatisfactory. Still, there a risk in on account of their political alli- supported L.G. through thick & going too far in the opposite direc- ance that developed after Churchill thin but L.G. has now made his tion. An understanding of the war joined the Liberals from the Con- dispositions in such a way as to based on the works of the poets servative in 1904. To their political bring Winston down’.7 Around this Robert Graves and opponents during the Edward- time Churchill wrote to a friend: is obviously insufficient. But a per- ian , they were ‘Between me & Ll G tout est fini.’8 spective that simply discounts their peas in a pod – dangerous quasi- Another telling comment was viewpoint is obviously wrong too. socialists determined to stir up class made by Churchill in January 1916, It is quite right to point out that hatred for their own political ends. when he was serving on the West- millions of people in 1914 regarded Long after they had gone their dif- ern Front, having temporarily the conflict as a fight for national ferent ways politically, they were withdrawn from politics but hop- honour, but that does not mean that still lumped together by those ing to make a comeback. He wrote we, too, are bound to accept that who distrusted them. Talking pri- to his wife that, although Lloyd verdict, which at any rate oversim- vately in 1937, , George would not be sorry if he, plifies the way the public related the Conservative prime minister, Churchill, were killed, he would to the war. Vocal patriotism could repeated with approval a saying he find it politically inconvenient. combine with subtle acts of resist- had heard: ‘L.G. was born a cad and Therefore, even though her own ance to authority. never forgot it; Winston was born a severe criticisms of Lloyd George’s This article’s comparison of gentleman and never remembered personal disloyalty had much merit, Lloyd George and Churchill as it’. In the same year Neville Cham- she should stay in touch with him war leaders will consider firstly berlain referred to them as ‘These all the same – because he stood to their interactions with one another two pirates’.5 be useful in the future. Yet at other throughout their careers, but par- But in spite of the perception moments the claim that political ticularly during the two world that they were thick as thieves, the conflict had never descended into wars, and secondly their capaci- relationship between the two men personal acrimony was politically ties as military strategists and their was not always warm and com- convenient for both Lloyd George attempts to enforce civilian control fortable. They themselves created and Churchill; hence, in part, their of the military. a powerful mythology that sug- displays of comradeship and protes- ‘L.G. was gested that, as Lloyd George put tations of mutual devotion. it in 1936, ‘in spite of the fact that This does not mean that we The personalities of Lloyd born a cad we have fought against each other should treat their relationship cyni- George and Churchill on many occasions there has never cally. Rather, we must be alive to We may begin by noting that the and never been an occasion when I could not its paradoxes. After Lloyd George two men had very different per- call Mr. Winston Churchill my succeeded Asquith as prime min- sonalities. Lord Hankey, the most forgot it; friend and I think that he could do ister in 1916, he brought Church- influential civil servant of the age, Winston the same’.6 In fact, Lloyd George ill into his summarised the difference between and Churchill did not always feel as soon as he judged it politically Lloyd George and Churchill as fol- was born a affection towards one another, and safe to do so. As minister of muni- lows: ‘Imagine the subject of bal- at crucial moments the relation- tions, he may not have shown as loons crops up. Winston, without gentleman ship broke down. One such crucial much originality and flair as Lloyd a blink, will give you a brilliant moment came when Churchill’s George had previously done in hour-long lecture on balloons. and never career hit the rocks in 1915 as the the same role. But Churchill did L.G., even if he has never seen you Gallipoli disaster unfolded. After demonstrate both efficiency and before, will spend an hour finding remembered Asquith demoted Churchill from creativity and, furthermore, he out anything you know or think his position at the Admiralty, the demonstrated a growing political about them.’4 When war broke out, it’. latter complained bitterly at Lloyd maturity. He largely kept his head

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 43 lloyd george and churchill as war leaders down and got on with the job at problem in the summer of 1940 itself to save the world’. In contrast, hand, and there were fewer flare- was the upsurge of popular anti- he makes a persuasive case that in ups with Lloyd George than there Chamberlainite feeling, but when fact Britain was ‘a first-class power’ had been previously. Still, Church- he wanted to – as a quid pro quo for with impressive technical and sci- ill resented his exclusion from the getting Chamberlain’s agreement to entific capacity and a position as ‘an , and during the four Lloyd George entering the war cabi- industrial giant which remained years of the post-war coalition the net – he could pull strings to get the at the heart of the world’s trade’ relationship again showed its char- press campaign stopped, ‘like turn- – the idea that she was pacificistic acteristic alternation between con- ing off a tap’.10 and poorly prepared was a myth. flict and cooperation. Key issues To a much greater extent than He also makes a convincing effort included the , the Churchill, Lloyd George was to show why it was that the opti- conflict in Ireland, British policy obliged to improvise his own mistic narratives that accompanied in the Middle East, and the 1922 machinery of government. The the end of the war were in time Chanak crisis (which triggered Ministry of Munitions has already supplanted by ‘declinist’ ones that Lloyd George’s fall from power). been mentioned. After Lloyd suggested that Britain had at best After the collapse of the coali- George entered muddled through against its more tion the two men’s paths diverged there was a further wave of inno- technically sophisticated German politically and, during the , vations. These included the intro- opponents.13 Lloyd George was of consider- duction of a prime ministerial Here we may digress for a ably less political relevance than secretariat, a small executive war moment to reflect on two diary Churchill was, even though cabinet, and an array of new min- descriptions, one of Lloyd George both were ‘in the wilderness’. As istries under ‘men of push and go’ in the First World War, and one of Churchill campaigned against the such as Sir Joseph Maclay, the ship- Churchill during the Second World dangers of , Lloyd George ‘Lloyd George ping controller. There was also now War. The second of these is well made the gross error of visiting a gradual move towards an efficient known but the first is not. It is from Hitler and showering him with was find- system of food rationing. Some the journal of Cecil Harmsworth, fulsome praise. In spite of clear dif- of these developments had been a Liberal MP, who was the brother ferences between the two men, ing his way anticipated under the previous gov- of Lords Northcliffe and Rother- Churchill was still tainted in ernment, and did not all take place mere. In his entry for 22 , some people’s minds by his past through an overnight. There were further cri- Harmsworth reflected his experi- links with Lloyd George. In his ses to come. Yet, as Churchill later ences working in Lloyd George’s novel Men at Arms, Evelyn Waugh untried field’, wrote, the ‘vehement, contriving, prime ministerial secretariat: recounts the hero’s reaction to the resourceful, nimble-leaping Lloyd political changes of 1940: ‘Guy noted Walter George seemed to offer a brighter Those anxious who knew of Mr Churchill only as a Layton, who hope, or at any rate a more sav- have imagined Ll.-G. as domi- professional politician, a master of age effort’ than the staid Asquith nated in Cabinet by the reaction- sham Augustan prose, a Zionist, an had been a regime.11 The era of ‘wait and see’ ary – Curzon, Milner advocate of the Popular Front in was at an end. & Bonar – have been strangely Europe, an associate of the press- Ministry of ‘’, it should be said, mistaken. On the few occa- lords and of Lloyd George.’9 was not a fact but an aspiration, sions that I have been present at Munitions which was arguably never fully Cabinet the Wizard has ruled realised, even by 1918. (The fail- the roost with no appearance The experience of the two official dur- ure to implement of challenge from any quarter. world wars in Ireland is clear evidence of When, too, he has been absent in Let us now turn to what Lloyd ing the First this.) Nonetheless, the achieve- or elsewhere it has been George and C did as war leaders. ments were considerable; during interesting to observe from the To understand this fully we should World War. the Second World War Church- Cabinet ministers how many compare the strengths and weak- ill was able to benefit from lessons decisions have been deferred nesses of their respective positions. ‘Winston that had previously been learned. “until the Prime Minister They both succeeded once-popular ‘Lloyd George was finding his way returns”. He is in truth the life figures who appeared to have failed Churchill was through an untried field’, noted & soul of the party in no merely to prosecute the war with sufficient Walter Layton, who had been a conventional meaning of the vigour. Although they were both applying the Ministry of Munitions official dur- expression. His vivid personal- still distrusted by significant sections ing the First World War. ‘Winston ity prevails in the Cabinet room of opinion, in both cases their pre- lessons of Churchill was applying the les- as in the world outside. […] miership appeared more or less inev- the first war sons of the first war and adapting An easier chief to work with itable. Both then had to deal with a a highly developed apparatus of in some respects it would be dif- predecessor viewed by loyalists as and adapt- government.’12 ficult to find. He is wholly unaf- the ‘king over the water’ – although This coincides with the argu- fected & unspoilt by enormous in this respect H. H. Asquith was ing a highly ments that David Edgerton has success. I knew him slightly in more problematic to Lloyd George made in recent years. He argues the dark days of the Boer War than was to developed that the now-dominant view of when he was certainly the most Churchill. Chamberlain of course Britain’s role in the conflict is one unpopular man in . I see remained in Churchill’s cabinet, apparatus of that suggests that the country was no change in his manner now whereas Asquith insisted on stay- ‘a faltering power in 1940, which in when he is, I suppose, the most ing outside. Actually, Churchill’s government.’ one last heroic gesture bankrupted popular man in the whole great

44 Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 lloyd george and churchill as war leaders

Alliance. I have often spoken to very able, but felt under no obliga- It might be shadow. But by the same token him more directly than I dare to tion to tell anyone else what he was he was able to learn from him, my brother N. [Northcliffe] &, doing. The earlier ‘Curragh inci- better to say although without imitating him whether he has agreed with me or dent’ (of March 1914), for example, slavishly. not, he has never resented any- was symptomatic of a wider crisis that Church- thing I have said. The experience of civil–military relations which […] of the other members of the Churchill simply did not face. ill was the Conclusion Secretariat has been the same.14 When Churchill perceived that Lloyd George’s executive man- generals such as Claude Auchinleck greater geo- agement of the war effort was in Contrast that with the second of were underperforming or failing to many ways very successful but this our entries, written by General Sir communicate he simply got rid of political (not was combined with a ‘presidential’ Alan Brooke, Chief of the Impe- them. We may do more than haz- military) political style that tended to mar- rial General Staff (CIGS) from ard that Lloyd George’s problems ginalise parliament.17 Churchill 1941 onwards, who repeatedly in this regard were connected to strategist, undoubtedly found criticism very denounced Churchill’s behaviour the Irish issue, which in itself was irritating but to his credit he did in his diary. In 1944 Brooke wrote: also much more problematic for the but that not attempt to run away from it. British government as a whole dur- He made a point of answering par- He [Churchill] knows no details, ing the First World War than dur- Lloyd George liamentary questions even when has only got half the picture in ing the Second. However irritating he could have delegated the task to his mind, talks absurdities and and inconvenient Irish neutrality had a more others. His willingness to answer makes my blood boil to listen was in 1939–45 it was nothing com- ‘as humbly as if he had been the to his nonsense. I find it hard to pared to the problems caused by the creative and youngest of Under-Secretaries’ remain civil. And the wonderful 1916 rebellion and its aftermath. endeared him to MPs: he carried thing is that ¾ of the population During the worst periods of the inventive out the task ‘dutifully, carefully, of the world imagine Winston Second World War, Churchill was subserviently’.18 Unlike Lloyd Churchill is one of the great repeatedly urged to take the Lloyd vision of the George during the First World Strategists of History, a second George small war cabinet model War, he did not isolate himself from Marlborough, and the other ¼ as his own. In April 1941, Lloyd power of the Commons but took pains to have no conception what a pub- George argued in the House of present himself as its servant. lic menace he is and has been Commons for a ‘real War Council’. the wartime But if in some ways Church- throughout this war. […] With- Churchill, he said, was ‘a man with ill’s war leadership was superior out him England was lost for a very brilliant mind – but for that state. to that of Lloyd George, it was a certainty, with him England very reason he wanted a few more Lloyd George’s own experience has been on the verge of disas- ordinary persons to look after him’, and efforts that helped make that ter time and again. […] Never independent people who would possible. It seems impossible to say have I admired and despised a stand up to him. Churchill resisted which of the two men faced a more man simultaneously to the same such calls: difficult job as prime minister – extent. Never have such oppo- which in turn makes it inappropri- site extremes been combined in My right hon. Friend spoke ate to ask which was the greater war the same human being. of the great importance of my leader, as though this were a ques- being surrounded by people tion that could be settled by award- The diary, it should be stressed, was who would stand up to me and ing marks out of ten. The orthodox written in the heat of the moment, say, ‘No, No, No.’ Why, good view is encapsulated in the phrase, and after the war Brooke conceded gracious, has he no idea how ‘Lloyd George was the abler politi- that he had made insufficient allow- strong the negative principle is cian, Churchill the greater states- ance for Churchill’s difficulties. ‘I in the constitution and work- man.’19 This may seem superficially thank God I was given an oppor- ing of the British war-making persuasive but it is perhaps too tunity of working alongside such a machine? The difficulty is not, I glib. It might be better to say that man,’ he wrote.15 assure him, to have more brakes Churchill was the greater geopoliti- Arguably, Churchill was luck- put on the wheels; the difficulty cal (not military) strategist, but that ier than Lloyd George in his com- is to get more impetus and speed Lloyd George had a more creative manders. Brooke and many others behind it. At one moment we are and inventive vision of the power may have been driven up the wall asked to emulate the Germans of the wartime state. by Churchill’s behaviour but they in their audacity and vigour, were not contemptuous of politi- and the next moment the Prime Richard Toye is Professor of Modern cians as a class, in contrast to the way Minister is to be assisted by History at the . He that Henry Wilson, as CIGS dur- being surrounded by a number is the author of three books on Winston ing the First World War, dismissed of ‘No-men’ to resist me at every Churchill, the most recent of which is them as ‘the frocks’ (a reference to point and prevent me from mak- The Roar of the Lion: The Untold their frock coats). Lord Kitchener’s ing anything in the nature of a Story of Churchill’s World War appointment as war secretary in speedy, rapid and, above all, pos- II Speeches (2013). His edition of 1914 was symptomatic of a problem itive constructive decision.16 the Cecil Harmsworth diary, edited that was in evidence well before jointly with , will Lloyd George became prime min- This reminds us that up until this be published next year. ister. Kitchener commanded huge point, if not beyond, Churchill had respect, and was in many ways been operating in Lloyd George’s concluded on page 60

Journal of Liberal History 87 Summer 2015 45 A Liberal Democrat History Group evening meeting catastrophe the 2015 election campaign and its outcome

The 2015 election is the most catastrophic in the history of the Liberal Democrats and its predecessor parties; in no other previous election has the party lost such a high proportion of its votes and seats.

Entry into coalition with the Conservative Party in 2010 meant that the party always knew it would lose a good number of those who had voted for it in 2010, but Liberal Democrats hoped that they could replace at least some of them with new supporters who had not previously believed the party had a realistic chance of power. The party also assumed that the incumbency factor would save many of their MPs even though the national vote was falling. Neither of these things happened, despite a campaign that was generally recognised as well organised and well funded.

Discuss why everything went wrong with Phil Cowley (Professor of Parliamentary Government, University of Nottingham and co-author of The British General Election of 2010) and Baroness Olly Grender, Paddy Ashdown’s second-in-command on the ‘Wheelhouse Group’ which ran the Liberal Democrat election campaign. Chair: Lord Wallace of Saltaire.

6.30pm, Monday 13 July Room, , 1 Whitehall Place, SW1

This study is not without Lloyd George and Churchill , Lloyd Machine: Weapons, Resources and merit, but it is far from ‘scin- as war leaders George Papers, LG/G/208/4. Experts in the Second World War tillating’ as the book jacket concluded from page 45 7 Lord Reading diary, 27 May 1915, (London, 2011), pp. 1–2. claims. Waterhouse is too ready India Office Library, Lord Read- 14 Cecil Harmsworth diary, 22 to defend a man he clearly 1 For the full history of their rela- ing Papers, MS Eur/F118/152. May 1918, University of Exe- admires and is unwilling to tionship, see Richard Toye, 8 Winston Churchill to Archibald ter Special Collections, Cecil mete out criticism. Grey’s con- Lloyd George and Churchill: Rivals Sinclair, 9 June 1916, in Mar- Harmsworth Papers. duct during , his fail- for Greatness (London, 2007). tin Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. 15 Alex Danchev and Daniel ures in wartime diplomacy, his 2 Gary Sheffield, ‘A pitiful war, Churchill: Companion Volume IV, Todman (eds.), War Diaries, failed mission to the America but not a pity’, , 18 Part 1 (Boston, 1978), pp. 5–6. 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord after the armistice and his work Jun. 1913. 9 Evelyn Waugh, Men at Arms Alanbrooke (London, 2001), pp. rate should all have been thor- 3 Max Hastings, ‘Sucking up to the (London, 1952). 590, 713 (entry for 10 Sept. 1944, oughly interrogated. It is to be Germans is no way to remember 10 Neville Chamberlain to Ida and post-war comment). hoped we don’t have to wait our Great War heroes, Mr Cam- Chamberlain, 8 June 1940, in 16 Hansard, HC (series 5), vol. 371, another forty years for a fresh eron’, , 11 June 2013. Robert Self (ed.), The Neville cols. 880, 937 (7 May 1941). assessment of Grey’s life and 4 C. P. Snow, Variety of Men (Lon- Chamberlain Diary Letters: Volume 17 Kenneth O. Morgan, ‘Lloyd career. don, 1967), p. 94. 4, The Downing Street years, 1934– George’s Premiership: A Study 5 Thomas Jones diary, 11 Jan. 1940 (Aldershot, 2005), p. 538. in “Prime Ministerial Govern- Dr Chris Cooper was awarded a 1937, National Library of , 11 Winston S. Churchill, Great Con- ment”’, Historical Journal , vol. PhD by the University of Liverpool Thomas Jones Papers, Class Z. temporaries (London, 1937), p. 115. xiii, no. 1 (Mar. 1970), pp. 130–57. in 2013. He has lectured at a number 6 ‘Rough notes taken of speeches 12 ‘Commemoration of the Cente- 18 to Ben and of higher education institutions and delivered on the occasion of a nary of the Birth of David Lloyd Nigel Nicolson, 21 Sept. 1943, he has published a number of journal private dinner given by Messrs. George, 17th January, 1863: in Nigel Nicolson (ed.), Harold articles covering a variety of themes Ivor Nicholson & Watson at the Prichard-Jones Hall, University Nicolson, The War Years: Dia- of modem British political history. on Thursday, Octo- College of North Wales, Ban- ries and Letters 1939–45 (London, He currently teaches History and ber 29th 1936 in honour of the gor, Saturday, 30th March, 1963’, 1967), p. 320. Politics at St Anselm’s College, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George O.M. Trinity College, Cambridge, 19 , Sixty Years of . M.P., on the occasion of the com- Walter Layton Papers, Box 7/39. Power: Some Memories of the Men pletion of his “War Memoirs”’, 13 David Edgerton, Britain’s War Who Wielded It (London, 1966), p. 38.