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CRIDER; ELIZABETH FORTUNATO ITAIO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1922-1942,

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, PH.D., 1978

University Microfilms International 300 n. zeeb road, ann arbor, mi 48io6

© Copyright by Elizabeth Fortunato Crider 1978 ITALO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD, 1922-1942

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Elizabeth Fortunato Crider, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1978

Reading Committee:

Dr. Sydney N. Fisher

Dr. Harold J. Grimm

Dr. Marilyn R. Waldman I dedicate this work to my Mother and Father who left Fascist Italy in 1938 in search of a better life. PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study is essentially an overview of Italo-Egyptian relations in the interwar period. There are presently no specific published works on Italo-Egyptian relations and this topic is usually given a cursory treatment in the many volumes dedicated to Anglo-Egyptian relations. Britain's role in Egypt in the interwar period— indeed between 1882 and 1954— is easily definable as the most important European influence in that country. There were, however, other

European influences in Egypt, and in the interwar period

Italian influence readily competed with the presence of

Great Britain.

Egypt's relationship with Italy during the interwar period may well be considered a case study of her foreign policy. It illustrates the manner in which the government of Egypt after 1922 was to be influenced and limited by the

British definition of independence. It reveals the conflict of the Great Powers over Egyptian waterways, and it indi­ cates individual problems in relations with a Capitulatory state. Furthermore, border settlements, Blue Nile control as an aspect of the Ethiopian conflict, and neutrality and security of the Suez Canal reflect areas in which the

Egyptian government was relatively powerless to exercise control because of its military and material weakness and, accordingly, a lack of diplomatic independence.

The author has chosen to tailor the dates of this study to those which suit Italo-Egyptian relations rather than the traditional dates of the interwar period. Therefore, this study begins with 1922 because both Fascist rule under

Mussolini in Italy and Egypt's technical independence from

Britain began then. This work closes with 1942 because it is the last year of real Italian Fascist sovereignty and

British intervention in Egypt had caused that country to lose whatever independence in foreign policy she had acquired with the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty.

The author relied heavily upon newspapers, published documents, and contemporary journals of the period. There were also some memoirs, autobiographies, and diaries used.

Only a selected number of the vast amount of secondary literature consulted is included in the bibliography.

The one archival source used was the Italian captured files available on microfilm at the United States National

Archives. This collection of over 300 rolls of film is a virtual repository for Italian documents in the interwar period. Unfortunately, the fact that these documents remain unindexed limits their practical usage.

Of the published documents consulted the Italian and

German collections were most useful for this study. The

Italian journal, the Oriente Moderno, was extremely useful

iv in finding appropriate articles on Italo-Egyptian relations from the Egyptian press. The Times (London), The Egyptian

Gazette, and the Corriere della Sera proved to be excellent sources of information. Unfortunately, since both The

Egyptian Gazette and the Corriere della Sera remain unindexed it is tedious to read them on microfilm. The Egyptian

Gazette was read in its entirety for the period except when issues were missing or lost by the Library of Congress. The recent acquisition of al-Ahram by the Library of Congress made its use impractical for this study.

Because of the twenty-year time span of this topic,

limited financial means, and stringent time limitations, the author was unable to use the Public Record Office in Great

Britain or similar collections in Egypt. Hopefully, a more definitive look at Italo-Egyptian relations in this period will be forthcoming. Because of the enormous amount of

historical literature (both published and unpublished,

primary and secondary) that is available, however, the author

feels justified that her research was substantial enough for

the first work of its kind.

I wish to thank all those who have helped me during the

research and writing of this dissertation. Most particularly

I wish to thank Dr. Sydney N. Fisher, my adviser, who kindly

has read this paper and made suggestions for its improvement.

Furthermore, I wish to thank all the librarians who have assisted me both at The Ohio State University and the Library of Congress. Lastly, to my husband and children I wish to

offer thanks for their patience and understanding during the

entire process of research and writing this study.

vi VITA

April 7, 1945 ...... Born, Atlantic City, New Jersey

1967 ...... B.S. in Education, West Chester State College, West Chester, Pennsylvania

1969...... M.A. in History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1969-1971; 1972-1975 . . . Research Assistant, The Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Teaching Associate, Department of History and Department of International Studies, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Modern Middle East Dr. Sydney N. Fisher

Medieval Islam Dr. Sydney N. Fisher

Renaissance and Reformation Europe Dr. Harold J. Grimm

Medieval Europe Dr. Franklin J. Pegues

vii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

VITA ...... vii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... x

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION...... * ...... 1

Italy and the Egyptian Question, 1879-1882 7 Italo-Egyptian Relations Under the British Occupation and Protectorate ...... 11

II. NEGOTIATING THE EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN FRONTIER, 1922-1925 22

Historical Background ...... 23 The Climate for N e g o t i a t i o n s .... 29 The Course of Diplomatic Activity .. . 31 The Treaty and Its P rovisions.... 49 Political Implications for Italy and E g y p t ...... 53

III. EGYPTIAN REACTION TO THE ITALIAN PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA, 1926-1936 ...... 7 0

Historical Background ...... 71 Egypt and the Nile Before World War I . 73 European Agreements ...... 75 Egypt and the Nile After World War I 79 Italy and Egypt, 1926-1934 83 Egyptian Reaction to the Italo- EthiopianDispute, 1935-1936 . . . . 93

viii IV. ITALO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS APPROACHING WORLD WAR II, 1937-1942 ...... 122

The Pre-World War II Years, 1937-1939 . 124 Italy, War, and Egyptian Non- Belligerence, 1940-1942 ...... 146 Italy's Plans to Attack Egypt ...... 154

V. CONCLUSION ...... 193

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 200 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page Figure 1. Italy's Colonial Empire in 1920 ...... 28

2. Conventions and Treaties Relating to the Libyan Border ...... 51

3. The Italian Conquest of Cyrenaica ...... 55

4. Irrigation Projects on the N i l e ...... 76

5. Italian Transport Bound for East Africa, November, 1935 ...... 97

6. The Western Desert Campaign, 1939-1943 . . 172

x CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: EGYPT AND ITALY, 1805-1922

Egypt came into direct contact with modern Western technology and culture as a result of the French invasion of

1789. It created, furthermore, a sufficient state of political flux in Egypt to bring new enlightened leadership to the country in the person of Muhammad Ali (1805-1849).

An Albanian soldier who came to recapture Egypt from the

French for his Ottoman sovereign, Muhammad Ali defeated the

French; he established political control, and eventually the

Ottomans recognized him as hereditary governor of Egypt.

Muhammad Ali was to set in motion a series of Westernizing reforms that were to have a profound influence upon the future of Egyptian political, economic, and social culture.^

Muhammad Ali and his successors freely invited

Europeans to settle and to bring with them their technical and professional skills. Italians, who had had strong com­ mercial relations with Egypt since the Middle Ages, were among those who made substantial contributions toward

Egyptian modernization. In the very early years of the reign of Muhammad Ali, Italian influence was said to be stronger than that of either France or Great Britain. After the 1820's, however, French political influence became predominant until the 1880's when the British occupied Egypt.

Thereafter, even though the Italians were the most numerous in population, the British maintained de facto political control until the 1920's, and French cultural influence 2 remained the strongest.

The failure of Italians to maintain a stronger influence in Egypt was the result of a combination of factors. On the one hand, the French domestic political situation impelled many skilled emigres to seek positions in both military and health fields in Egypt in the mid-1820's. This gave the

French great influence with Muhammad Ali. On the other hand, decline in Italian influence in Egypt was inevitable between the 1820's and 1370's because Italian resources were being taxed domestically with the creation of a united modern

Italian state. Still, Italians continued to exert consider­ able influence in Egypt mainly because of a familiarity born of the largest European resident population, and the fact that Italy throughout most of the nineteenth century posed 3 no serious direct imperialist threat to Egypt.

Italian advisers, in addition to British and French, took an active role in the modernization of the Egyptian military. Italians from Tuscany helped to construct a modern military arsenal in Alexandria in 1826, and Italians from the Piedmont founded a cannon factory in Cairo as well as several other munitions factories. Italians also were military instructors for Muhammad Ali's troops teaching modern techniques of warfare and preparing these troops for successful expeditions to Crete, Syria, the Anatolia, and the Sudan. Italian, furthermore, was the first foreign language taught to military officer cadets in the early 4 Citadel School erected by Muhammad Ali.

Numerous Italians served as civil servants in the

Egyptian government in the nineteenth century. In 1882,

1,325 Europeans and Americans served in the Egyptian govern­ ment, and of these Italians had the highest number with 348, surpassing both France and Britain with 326 and 268 respec­ tively. For example, the Egyptian postal service, founded by two Italians from Bologna, remained under Italian super- 5 vision until 1865.

Italy's commercial interests in Egypt were second only to those of Britain and France. Italians who came to settle in the nineteenth century, pursued, as they had in the

Middle Ages, the import-export trade. They also invested in local enterprises, particularly the textile industry and trade, after 1860. During the nineteenth century, further­ more, Italy had a thriving trade with Egypt, importing cotton and other materials in exchange for exporting raw and manufactured silk, building materials, oil, wine, liquors, and machinery.6

Before 1820, Italian was the most commonly used foreign

language in Egypt and served as the language of diplomacy.

Consequently, the very first Egyptian students sent abroad under Muhammad All's educational missions programs in 1809 and 1813 went to Florence,- Rome, and Leghorn (Livorno) . One major focus of these missions was to train Egyptians in the art of printing. In 1822, as a result of these efforts,

Egypt began to operate its first printing press at Bulaq? the first book published that year was an Italian-Arabic n dictionary prepared by Father Rafael Zakhur.

By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, French and English had begun to supersede the use of Italian in

Egypt. Italian, nevertheless, continued to be sufficiently important that many Europeans residing in Alexandria in the

1870's complained that they had to address their servants in

Italian. Popular publications for the large Italian resi­ dent population further helped to maintain the use of the language in Egypt. Lo Spettatore Egiziano, founded in 1845, was one of the first periodicals of its kind published in

Egypt, and the Messaggero Egiziano d'Alessandria, founded in Q 1876, lasted well into the twentieth century.

Schools built by Italians in the nineteenth century were one important way to maintain their cultural influence in Egypt. The College at Alexandria opened in 1862, and two more Italian private schools opened their doors in 1889. The most important foreign day school in Egypt, the College at

Alexandria, opened during the reign of Said Pasha (1854-

1863) and received a large grant from the Egyptian govern­ ment. Later, Khedive Ismail (1863-1879) donated a large 5 tract of land to the institution. The College at Alexandria, furthermore, ranked as an Italian "national college" whereby 9 it received subsidies from the Italian government.

Cultural contributions by Italians in Egypt were signi­ ficant in the* nineteenth century and were readily reflected in several architectural structures. Muhammad Ali and his successors had helped to make Cairo and Alexandria Mediter­ ranean cities modeled after those of Genoa and Naples; plazas, for example, closely resembled those of Italian cities. Italian architects, moreover, built splendid edifices to grace Cairo and Alexandria. The Livornese archi­ tect, Pietro Avassani, completed the Cairo Opera Theater in

1869. Inaugurated with the performance of Verdi's

"Rigoletto," the theater hosted the first performance of his

"Aida" which Khedive Ismail had ordered to celebrate the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.10

By 1875 there were some 100,000 foreign nationals in

Egypt, most of them Europeans, and among these Italians com­ prised the largest group. These foreigners, who had come to live and invest in Egypt first under Muhammad Ali and later under Khedive Ismail, had brought with them the expertise which supported the technical and cultural transformation of nineteenth century Egypt. The result of this could be seen in the construction of the Suez Canal, the building of rail­ ways, roads, telegraph lines, educational institutions, and industries— and the adoption by Egyptians of European forms in government and society.^

Indeed, because of their large numbers and variety, foreign nationals created such legal difficulties that it became impossible to adjudicate their cases. In 1873, a conference in Istanbul authorized a system of Mixed Courts for Egypt. Foreign and Egyptian judges presided over these courts (which became legally responsible for foreigners).

The Mixed Courts used French law and the languages of

Arabic, French, and Italian. In the first ten years, prior to the British occupation, French and Italian lawyers domi­ nated in representing the interests of the Egyptian govern­ ment and in preparing new legislation, in fact the building housing the Mixed Courts at both Alexandria and Mansura bore the inscription "Palazzo de Guistigia" showing the prece­ dence that Italian had over the French at the time of the 12 founding of that institution.

Although Muhammad Ali created the basis for the modern state of Egypt, Khedive Ismail's efforts led to the consoli­ dation and augmentation of the necessary changes to secure the Westernization of the country. Unlike his predecessors, however, Khedive Ismail was unable to manage his debts with

European creditors. His extravagances forced him to declare bankruptcy in 1876, and thus he precipitated direct European interference in Egyptian domestic affairs. Continued fail­ ure to pay his debts by 1879 resulted in the imposition of an Anglo-French Dual Control over Egypt's finances. Subse­

quently, in that year the British and French forced the

abdication of Ismail in favor of his son Tawfiq (1879-1892).

Anglo-French management of the budget continued until 1882, 13 making these foreigners the de facto rulers of Egypt.

Italy and the Egyptian Question, 1879-1882

By 1870, Italy had completed the physical process of

unification, and aspired to become the sixth great European

power. A latecomer to nation-state status, Italy began to

assess her national interests in strategic foreign affairs.

The Mediterranean and the Red Sea readily became prime

concerns. Pragmatic aspirations involving colonial expan­

sion and the historical traditions of Roman imperialism made

such emphasis inevitable. That Italy should become inter­

ested in Egyptian affairs in the 1870's reflected the fact

that Italians comprised the largest resident European popu­

lation and maintained substantial commercial and cultural

interests in Egypt that were second only to England and 14 France.

In 1878, the Italian government expressed its first

objective to the course of events that had transpired in

Egypt since 1876. The Italian Consul-General in Cairo

informed the Egyptian government of Italy's displeasure with

the preference shown to England and France, and with the

selection of Englishmen and Frenchmen as Cabinet advisers during 1876. The Italians, fearing that their interests in

Egypt were in jeopardy, thereafter approached both England and France to secure the appointment of an Italian represen­ tative to the Egyptian Cabinet. Their proposal failed because the British and French feared it might lead other 15 countries to make similar demands.

In 1879, when it was clear that Khedive Ismail could not pay his debts, he was asked to abdicate by the French and British. The Italian government openly opposed the deposition of the Khedive, and sought to organize other

European powers in opposition to Anglo-French control.

Accordingly, it sought the creation of an international commission to solve the Egyptian problem. Italy's efforts delayed Ismail's abdication but did not stop it. Anglo- 16 French Dual Control went into effect on November 15, 1879.

In June 1879, Khedive Ismail had set sail from

Alexandria to a residence in Naples. His ten year old son,

Fuad, who would later become the Egyptian Sultan in 1917 and constitutional monarch in 1923, accompanied him. Ismail and his son were well received by the Italian King Victor

Emmanuel II (1849-1878) and by the latter's son, the future

Umberto I (1878-1900). The young Egyptian prince Fuad received his first years of education as an emigre in

Geneva. At the age of fifteen, he attended the Military

Academy at Turin where he took courses in the School of

Practical Artillery and Military Engineering. Receiving the commission of Lieutenant from King Victor Emmanuel, Fuad joined the Thirteenth Regiment of the Field Artillery which was part of the garrison of Rome. There he continued to serve in the Italian army until he was twenty years old.

Because of his pleasant youthful experiences in Italy, Fuad 17 remained an Italophile for the rest of his life.

Meanwhile, during 1880-1881, the status of Tunis con­ sumed the interests of the Italian government. In May 1881

France imposed a protectorate over Tunis which neither recognized longstanding Italian cultural and commercial interests nor the separate identity of the large Italian population. A blow to Italian imperialist plans in the

Mediterranean, the Tunisian affair had hardly passed when conditions in Egypt became critical because of domestic unrest in opposition to the ruling government and foreign control. The Italian government soon turned its attention to Egyptian disturbances in the hope of regaining prestige 18 in the Mediterranean after the Tunisian affair.

Between 1879 and 1882, the British and French used their Dual Control to reduce the foreign debt by exerting substantial influence over the operations of the Egyptian government. They soon became unpopular with Egyptians when various groups suffered from severe cuts in government expenditures. Opposition arose from the religious, journal istic, and bureaucratic intelligentsia. But the most 10 violently opposed to Dual Control proved to be an army group 19 lead by Colonel Ahmad Urabi Pasha.

In the winter of 1881, a coalition of Egyptian nation­ alists, led by Army Colonel Urabi, forced the Khedive to accept a government in which the nationalists took part.

The Urabi coup d'etat created a civilian government allied with the army and the Egyptian press to destroy foreign control. Fearing the erosion of their authority in Egypt,

Britain and France demanded of the Khedive that the Urabists be dismissed, and finally sent naval squadrons to Alexandria in May 1882. Mobs of Egyptians protested such demands from the Western powers, and nationalist excesses ensued against 20 Europeans during the months of June and July.

From November 1881 through July 1882 the Italian government had worked to ensure that British and French troops did not act alone to impose a solution in the

Egyptian crisis. Italian diplomats offered a variety of proposals including, among others, intervention by British,

French, and Italian troops, a solution through the Concert 21 of Europe, and even an intervention using Turkish troops.

The June and July 1882 riots in Alexandria served as a final pretext for British unilateral intervention. Such action taken by Great Britain was the result of a change in the position of a new French government and the reticence of the Italian government to join in the military action when asked. Great Britain sent troops in July 1882, and 11 overthrew Urabi and his supporters by September. Urabi Pasha was exiled to Ceylon, and a Legislative Council of thirty members— fourteen nominated by the Khedive and sixteen elected— was created. From 1882 to 1922, the control of 22 Egypt became the sole responsibility of the British.

Several factors kept Italy from joining Great Britain in the occupation of Egypt. Despite serious interest in such a course of action, Italy, which had joined Germany and

Austria in the Triple Alliance in May 1882, did not receive approval from her allies for such a venture. Italian public opinion, moreover, favored the nationalist movement of Urabi

Pasha who was seen as the "Garibaldi of Egypt." The Italian

Couilsul in Cairo, Signor de Martino, had even advocated a policy of alliance with Urabi and the nationalists against

Anglo-French Dual Control. Lastly, the Italian government . was willing to tolerate a unilateral British occupation.

Fearing a repetition of the Italian humiliation suffered in the Tunisian affair in 1881, Italy's real objections were 23 against any direct French intervention in Egypt.

Italo-Egyptian Relations Under the British Occupation and Protectorate, 1882-1922

Egypt remained nominally under the sovereignty of the

Ottoman Empire until the British government declared the country a protectorate in 1914. Although the Khedive remained the hereditary ruler of Egypt, the British High

Commissioner was the de facto ruler and correspondingly 12 oversaw both domestic and foreign affairs. Hence, whatever foreign relations Egypt conducted were monitored by the

British, with some nominal recognition of the interests of 24 the Ottoman government prior to 1914.

Relations with Italy throughout this period, for the most part, remained a series of cultural and economic exchanges with some discreet political and diplomatic exchanges such as the visit to Egypt in 1888 of the Prince of Naples (the future Victor Emmanuel III). Italian inter­ est in Egypt never waned, but the presence of the British thwarted any direct political influence— an option the

Italian government never again entertained until the inter- war period.• 25

Italians, therefore, focused their colonial ambitions elsewhere in Africa. By the outbreak of World War I Italy had acquired Libya on the Mediterranean, and Eritrea and

Somaliland on the Red Sea.

British control in Egypt met with little resistance under the reign of Khedive Tawfiq. His son, Khedive Abbas

Hilmi II (1892-1914) was, however, decidedly anti-British.

He attempted to increase both French and Italian influence in Egypt to counter British control. In 1893, Abbas Hilmi II recalled from exile his cousin Fuad to become his aide-de- camp with the rank of general. This was a provocative act, since the British had been responsible for exiling Fuad's 13 father, Ismail, and, moreover, Fuad, as noted above, had 26 become an ardent Italophile.

Fuad remained aloof from direct participation in

Egyptian politics. He maintained visibility, however, by becoming involved in numerous projects to improve Egyptian cultural and intellectual development. For example, he encouraged exchanges with foreign countries, particularly

France and Italy. He also personally financed the studies of numerous Egyptian students in both countries. In 1906, he helped to found the Egyptian University in Cairo and remained its president until 1913. In response to Fuad's request, in 1906 the--I-taJ.iarn government helped create the

University by sending Italian scholars who remained until

1912. For example, Ignazio Guidi and Carlo Alfonso Nallino taught Arabic literature and Davidi Santillana taught Arabic philosophy. From this University and from its school for

Shariot judges emerged a group of young men who were to create the political and intellectual climate of Egypt in the 1920's.27

The outbreak of World War I had a considerable impact upon the status of Egypt. When the Ottomans joined the

Central Powers Britain declared war upon the Ottoman Empire and subsequently imposed martial law and declared a protec­ torate over Egypt. The pro-British Husayn Kamal (1914-1917) took the title of Sultan as the British government deposed

Abbas Hilmi II (who, at the time, was vacationing in Turkey). 14

Husayn Kamal died in 1917, and the Italian educated Ahmad op Fuad (1917-1936) became Sultan of Egypt.

The intensification of the British presence in Egypt during World War I and the promises of self determination after the war generated by the speeches of President Wilson were catalysts for the eruption of Egyptian nationalism.

The main spokesman who emerged for the nationalist movement was Saad Zaghlul, a former minister of education and future leader of what would become the Wafd Party, representative 29 of Egyptian nationalists.

After the war, Zaghlul led a Wafd delegation to ask the

British to permit the group to attend discussions in London concerning a program for independence. Despite the refusal of this request by the British, Zaghlul thereafter sought an invitation to the Paris Peace Conference to be held in

January 1919. The British again denied his request and deported Zaghlul and the members of his delegation. In direct response to this action, there were a series of spontaneous violent Egyptian insurrections which cut across class lines. In the latter months of 1919, the British government sent a commission headed by Lord Milner to Egypt to study the situation. The Milner Report, completed in 30 1920, recommended Egyptian independence.

The Egyptians, on their part, were successful in proving that there was a serious independence movement. The results of the Milner Report spurred attempts to negotiate a 15 treaty between the two countries. For two years the British government worked for a treaty agreement, but negotiations- proved unproductive since a compromise could not be reached.

This impasse led the British to make a unilateral declara- tion of independence on February 28, 1922. The British reserved four points that were to be negotiated in a future treaty. These included Great Britain's hegemony in Egypt over security of communications, defense, the protection of foreign interests and minorities, and all affairs concerning the Sudan.^

Meanwhile, Italy, which had renewed the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria in 1902, had entered the war in

1915 on the side of the Entente Powers after signing the

Treaty of London. The promise of territorial acquisition both in Europe and Africa was a lure to the liberal but 32 imperialist Italian government.

The war in Europe consumed the balance of Italy's resources, and the focus in North Africa immediately after the war was the pacification of Libya (which Italy had acquired from Turkey in 1912). The postwar period, however, with its virulent outbreak of Egyptian nationalism, precipi­ tated Italian attentions and sympathy. Italycontinued to maintain substantial economic interests in Egypt, and there were some 35,000 Italian residents in the country. Several

British observers of the period feared that Italian Fascists 33 were influencing the Egyptian Nationalist Movement. 16

Popular Italian sentiment as expressed in its news­ papers tended to support the Egyptian independence movement.

Italian nationalists such as Gabriele d'Annunzio and Benito

Mussolini readily acknowledged their sympathy with the

Egyptian revolutionary movement. The rhetoric of their speeches, moreover, revealed an interest in an Egypt without

British influence that could pave the way for Italian domina- 34 tion over the Eastern Mediterranean. In an editorial written in March 1922, in Il_ Popolo d 1 Italia, Mussolini expressed such sentiments while discussing Egypt's status after Britain's unilateral declaration of independence.

Written eight months before he came to power in Italy,

Mussolini stated that the four reserve areas retained by the

British negated Egyptian sovereignty, particularly those concerning the country's defense. He continued, furthermore, by stating that Britain's possible withdrawal offered Italy an opportunity for increased influence in Egypt that would help make the Mediterranean an Italian lake as it once was 35 during the days of Rome and Venice.

In October 1922, following the famous march on Rome, the Italian government came under Mussolini's Fascist Party rule. The trappings of a constitutional monarchy remained, but Mussolini through his Fascist Party held absolute power until 1943. Until the late 1920's, Fascist foreign policy remained essentially similar to that of the Liberal 17 government it replaced. Thereafter, Fascist foreign policy 36 departures were more tactical than substantial.

Italian domination of the Mediterranean, a goal of

Italian foreign policy since unification, has been consis­ tently thwarted by both British and French presence in the eastern and western portions of the Sea. Egypt's strategic position in the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Red

Sea made it a natural target of Italian concern, particu­ larly when one considers the importance of these waterways for Italian access to the colonial possessions of Libya,

Eritrea, Somaliland, and eventually Ethiopia. British presence in Egypt since 1882 had limited any real influence there, but Britain's partial withdrawal after 1922 renewed . 37 Italian aspirations.

Egyptian nationalists welcomed Mussolini's arrival in power in 1922 because they thought Fascist Italy might become an ally against Britain. It soon became clear that despite Italian sympathies with Egypt's position vis-a-vis

Britain, Italy wanted Egypt to cede territory to Italian colonialists in Liyba— territory promised to Egypt by

Britain before independence. This peculiar set of circum­ stances led Egypt to negotiate with Italy her firstmajor diplomatic venture over the settlement of her western 38 frontier with Libya. NOTES

^"Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East; A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1968. (First published in 1959), pp. 284-285.

2 P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 96-97. 3 Ibid.; Vatikiotis deals with the question of why Italy lost ground to France in Egypt by the 1830's. His citing influential French advisers in Egypt as one reason is valid. Nevertheless, he fails to recognize that Italians were in a period of domestic conflict over unification from the 1820's to the 1870's. This kept Italy from developing any formal policy toward Egypt.

4 Ettore Rossi, "Gl'Italiam in Egitto," E^itto Moderno (Roma: Edizioni Roma, 1939), pp. 79-80; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 95.

^Rossi, loc. cit., p. 81; George Louis Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923), p. 339; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 97.

8 J. C. McCoan, Egypt As It Is (New York: Peter Fenelon Collier & Son, 1900), pp. 160, 163, 169; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 97; Arthur E. Crouchley The Economic Development of Modern Egypt (New York: Longman's, Green and Co., 1938), p. 36. Before the 1870's, records of Italian trade with Egypt are difficult to calculate because each individual city-state kept separate records prior to complete unifica­ tion in the 1870's.

7 Rossi,loc. cit., p. 84; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 95; Yaqub Artin Pasha, L*Instruction publique en Egypte (Paris: E. Leroux, 1890), p. 69.

8Mabel Caillard, A Lifetime in Egypt, 1876-1935 (London: Grant Richards^ 1935), p. 266; McCoan, op. cit., p. 284; Rossi, loc. cit., p. 84.

18 19

9 Rossi, loc. cit.; McCoan, op. cit., pp. 221-222.

^Fisher, op. cit., p. 285; Rossi, loc. cit., p. 82.

1 1 McCoan, op. cit., p. 35; Fisher, op. cit., p. 289.

12 Fisher, Ibid.; McCoan, op. cit., p. 284; Jasper Yeates Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. First published in 1930), p. 33; The Times (London), February 22, 1933, p. 13.

13 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 88-89, 131-132; Lucien E. Roberts, "Italy and the Egyptian Question, 1878-1882," The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (December 1940), pp. 314-316.

14 C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940 (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 28, 34; Roberts, loc. cit., p. 314; Crouchley, op. cit., p. 256

15 Roberts, loc. cit.; Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., p. 28.

16 Roberts, loc. cit., p. 315; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 144; Ismail left Egypt to live in exile in Naples until his death in 1895.

17 Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, Fuad: King of Egypt (London: Herbert Jenkins, Limited, 1936), pp. 26-27.

18 Roberts, loc. cit., pp. 316-317.

19 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 139; Fisher, op. cit., pp. 288-289.

20 Ibid., p. 322; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 322.

2 1 Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., pp. 28-29; Roberts, loc. cit., pp. 317, 320-321.

2 2 Fisher, op. cit., p. 290.

9 3 Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., pp. 30-31; Carlo Zaghi and P. S. Mancini, L 1 Africa E~ll" Problems Del Mediterraneo 1884-1885 (Rome: Gherardo Casini Editore, 19560, p. 13. 20

2 ^Fisher, op. cit., pp. 290-292; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 240.

25 Lowe and Marzari, op. cit./ pp. 35, 40; Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914-1937 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 277-278.

2 S Rossi, loc. cit., p. 74; Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 188-190; All Shah, op. cit., p. 27.

27 Ali Shah, op. cit., pp. 66-67, 70; Rossi, loc. cit., pp. 83-84; Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, The Intellectual~Origins of Egyptian Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).,. p. 57.

28 Fisher, op. cit., p. 448; Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 242-244, 247.

29 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 256-262; Fisher, op. cit., pp. 449-451.

■^Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 262-263; Fisher, op. cit., p. 450.

31 Fisher, op. cit., p. 451; Vatikiotis, op. cit., .pp. 263-264.

32 Fisher, op. cit., pp. 369-370; Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., p. 150.

33 Edward Evan Evans-Pntchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 104; Nicola A. Ziadeh, Sanusiyah: A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), pp. 68-69; Beer, op. cit., p. 381; Ali Shah, op. cit., p. 147; Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer, 2 Vols. (London: Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1934), I, p. 35.

34 Ion S. Munro, Through Fascism to World Power: A History of the Revolution in Italy (London: Alexander Macmillan & Co .", 1933) , pp. Ill, 113, 165. Munro credits Mussolini in a May 1919 speech with the following: "We [Italy] must give every possible aid to the revolutionary movement in Egypt— that ancient Roman colony, the natural 21 granary of Italy. ..." Gabriele d'Annunzio in an invec­ tive against England noted the rebellion of the spirit by both the Sinn Fein of Ireland and the Egyptians. He con­ tinued by implying that the British could threaten Italy "just as in Egypt it [England] was not ashamed to massacre insurgents, who were armed with nothing more than sticks."

35 Benito Mussolini, Opera Omnia, edited by Edouardo & Duilia Susmel, 35 Vols. (Florence: La Fenice, 1951-1961), XVIII, pp. 76-78.

3 6 Marcartney and Cremona, op. cit., pp. 12-13; Alan Cassels, Fascist Italy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1969), p. 82; Norman Kagan, The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 32-36.

37 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

38 Alan Cassels, Mussolini1s Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 289. CHAPTER II

NEGOTIATING THE EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN FRONTIER,

1922-1925

The first important foreign policy decision of the newly independent Egyptian government occurred over the question of the delineation of the western border with

Italian-occupied Libya. Actually, Italy had nearly finished negotiating a settlement with Great Britain when in 1922 the

British government abolished its protectorate and declared

Egypt's independence. Although informing foreign govern­ ments that there was no change in the legal and diplomatic status quo in relationship to other powers, the British government indicated to both Egypt and Italy that the matter of the Egyptian-Libyan frontier was one of direct negotia­ tions between the two governments.'1'

Anxious to conclude a treaty, the Italian government contacted the Egyptian government shortly after the public declaration of independence in March 1922. Thereafter negotiations between the two governments were drawn out for some three years mainly because of severe instability in the domestic political situation in Egypt. Finally, on

December 6 , 1925, Egypt and Italy signed the treaty delimi- 2 ing a new Egyptian-Libyan border.

22 23

Historical Background

Long before Italy had directed her colonial ambitions toward Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopia, successive generations of patriots had viewed Libya as a promising field for Italian expansion. Libya's strategic location on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa, between British- occupied Egypt and French-occupied Tunisia, made its acquisi­ tion a cardinal objective of Italian foreign policy. Fur­ thermore, Italian nationalists could recall the ancient

Roman Libya which had become the two vilayets (provinces) of 3 Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under the Ottoman Turks.

In 1901 and 1902, Italy exchanged diplomatic notes with both France and Britain and received their recognition of her special interests in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Italy, thereafter, pursued a policy of peaceful colonization and economic penetration. Turkey, however, eventually came to consider this activity as dangerous to her sovereign interests and sought to counter Italian influence by offer­ ing economic privileges in the two North African provinces to firms from other countries. Fearful of the loss of her favored position in Libya, the Italian government, after issuing an ultimatum, declared war on Turkey in September

1911.4

By November 1911 Italy had declared Tripoli and

Cyrenaica annexed, and renamed the two Ottoman provinces

Libya after her old Roman colony. The war continued, 24

however, until Turkey, fearing complications would erupt in

the Balkans, capitulated in October 1912 and through the 5 Treaty of Lausanne gave Italy sovereignty over Libya.

Despite the treaty, Italy faced in Libya a protracted

war against the native Arab tribes which lasted, with inter­

missions, until 1932. With the withdrawal of the Turks,

resistance came under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad

al-Sharif, the leader of the Sanusi, a puritanical Islamic

sect whose power base was in Cyrenaica. Because of the

savage resistance of the Sanusi, by mid-1914 the Italians

had succeeded in occupying only the area comprising the

coast and the immediate mountain ranges, and effective g Italian authority barely extended outside the towns.

World War I further eroded Italy's position in Libya

because, when Italy joined the Entente, she withdraw a large

number of her forces from that colonial battlefield. In

fact, it was left to Britain to defend the Libyan-Egyptian

Frontier. The Turks and their German allies in 1915

succeeded in convincing Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to launch an

attack on Egypt from Cyrenaica. This initiative proved to be a failure, and led to the withdrawal of Sayyid al-Sharif

from the political and military leadership of the Sanusi,

and eventually to his replacement by Sayyid Muhammad Idris

in 1918.7

In the period after the Great War, Italy tried first to

reconquer Libya by pacific collaboration with native chiefs 25 and elected representatives. This was implemented through a

series of accords, among them the Regima Accord of 1920.

The latter -recognized Sayyid Idris, the head of the Sanusi order, to be an independent Emir ruling Jarabub and other O oases on behalf of Italy.

By 1923, Sanusi resistance led Italy to renounce the

Regima Accord, and in the early months of that year to implement a strong military policy to subjugate them in

Cyrenaica. For this policy to succeed, however, it was necessary to conclude a border treaty with Egypt. The

Jarabub Oasis, which Italy wanted Egypt to cede, was the center of Sanusi activity, and was a sacred city in which 9 the tomb and mosque of their founder was located.

The question of the delimitation of the Egyptian-

Libyan border had a long historical precedent. Egypt's modern history regarding the Libyan-Egyptian border dates to the year 1841 when the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Mejid recognized

Muhammad Ali and his descendants to be the permanent governors of Egypt. At that time a map delimiting the borders of Egypt was included in the proclamation from the

Ottoman Sultan. The map showed a straight line drawn some

265 kilometers east of Solium.

The question of the Egyptian-Libyan border became an issue in 1904 when discussions about the two provinces of

Tripolitania and Cyrenaica took place. Since Great Britain occupied Egypt, the discussions included Britain, Turkey, 26 and Italy. Nothing serious came of these talks, but reportedly Egyptian authorities then claimed that they could not locate the maps detailing the 1841 boundary, possibly believing at the time that the maps could prove unfavorable to their interests.^

The next set of discussions concerning the Egyptian-

Libyan border took place between Italy and Great Britain in

1906 and 1907. As a result of these talks between British

Foreign Secretary Edward Gray and Italian Ambassador to

London, Signor San Giuliano, a secret exchange of notes occurred on August 20 and December 21-24, 1907. Through these diplomatic notes, they agreed to establish the

Egyptian frontier at the Bay of Solium and assigned the

Oasis of Kufra to Cyrenaica and those of Jarabub and Siwa to Egypt. Hence, these memoranda made a claim for shifting 12 the frontier to the west of Jarabub.

Italian interest in controlling the Jarabub Oasis came only after the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912 when, as noted above, Italy was engaged in a serious colonial war with

Sanusi tribesmen. Therefore, when Italy decided to enter

World War I on the side of the Entente powers, rectification of the Egyptian-Libyan frontier was one issue which the

Italians made sure was addressed broadly in Article XIII of 13 the Treaty of London of April 1915.

Italy's shortage of manpower during World War I led the

British to extend Egypt's frontier in reaction to a Sanusi 27

attack at the border in December 1915. It took British

troops until March 1916/ marching over 150 miles, to take

Solium, leaving the British masters of the whole coast.

Thereafter, the British moved south, taking the Oases o f

Siwa and Jarabub. The Sanusi had been defeated, with a

portion of their Cyrenaican frontier within Egyptian borders.

The Italian forces remained stationed at Marsa Suleiman, 14 some 30 kilometers to the west of Solium.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Italian

delegation proposed a new boundary to the west of Libya that

ran almost directly from Ghadames to Ghat, cutting off the

French wedge between these two places. From Ghat, the line

then proceeded roughly along the ninth degree east longitude

to Nigeria. On the east, the proposed Cyrenaican-Egyptian

boundary began at the Bay of Solium, passing south along the

25th degree of east longitude so as to include the Oasis of

Jarabub and the Heights of Ennedi to Lake Chad.^ (See

Figure 1, page 28.)

By April 1920, Britain and Italy had worked out the basis for delimiting the Egyptian-Libyan frontier in what became known as the Milner-Scialoja Accord. The text of

this accord was never divulged openly duringthe period of

negotiations between Italy and Britain and even later with

Egypt* The crux of the agreement was that Italy would cede

the Jarabub Oasis if the entire Bay of Solium fell under

Egyptian sovereignty. After 1920, the question of the PLEASE NOTE:

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Figure 1. Italy's Colonial Empire in 1920a

The Times (London), January 6 , 1920, p. 9. 29

Egyptian-Libyan frontier took second place to reaching general agreements on other Anglo-Italian questions left over from the Paris Peace Conference. Before the conclusion of discussions on the topic in 1922, Britain abolished its 16 protectorate and declared Egypt independent in February.

The Climate for Negotiations

The Italian government's eagerness to negotiate a

Libyan border settlement with Egypt was exceeded only by

Egypt's lack of preparedness and enthusiasm to do so.

Despite continuous Italian overtures to work for a treaty settlement beginning shortly after Britain's declaration of

Egypt's independence, serious negotiations between Egypt and 17 Italy did not take place until 1925.

A major factor that explained Egypt's reluctance to negotiate on this issue was that deep domestic political divisions plagued the fledgling Egyptian nation during these early years. In the three years that intervened between independence and the signing of the border treaty, Egyptians experienced the fall of six different governments. In the first year alone there were three caretaker governments prior to the promulgation of the Constitution in April 1923.

Thereafter Saad Zaghlul returned from exile in September.

In January 1924, Saad Zaghlul and his Wafd Party scored an impressive victory. Zaghlul's term in office, however, lasted only until November 1924 when the assassination of 30

Sir Lee Stack, Governor General of the Sudan, by Egyptian extremists caused a Cabinet crisis and the resignation of

the Wafd leader. It was left to the following government, under Ahmad Ziwar Pasha— former first President of the

Senate— to sign the border treaty under great pressure from 18 the Italian and British governments.

Another complicating factor on the Egyptian side was that negotiating a treaty for complete independence consumed much of the energy and time of Egyptian diplomats even though during the period only one set of negotiations took place between Saad Zaghlul and Ramsay MacDonald1s Labor 19 government— and these talks were stalemated.

Lastly, the question of Italians waging war in Libya against the Sanusi, religious brethren of the Egyptian

Muslims, left little popular sentiment for signing away what was considered to be Egyptian land. Egyptians were harboring

Sanusi refugees and running guns to the "rebels." In fact, when the Ziwar government signed the treaty, all three opposition parties (which included the Wafd) signed a joint 20 manifesto m protest.

Mussolini's Fascist government devoted considerable attention to colonial problems in its early years. The first substantial African matter to which Mussolini turned, in October 1922, was the question of the delineation of the

Libyan-Egyptian border. The truce between the Italian government and the Sanusi had been broken by the time 31

Mussolini assumed power in October 1922. The former Italian government had followed a course of pacification. The

Fascists gradually implemented a military solution to the problem, and by March 1923 declared war on the Sanusi.

Writing in the 1930's, Mussolini described the situation as he then saw it:

The Libyan Colony— which includes Cirenaica and Tripolitania— was reduced during the war to the occupation of the coast and some principle cities. Fascism, on assuming power, found grave •conditions. . . . Our policy of military occupa­ tion, and of course economic penetration, had assured us full and uncontested domination of Cirenaica as far as Giarabub, and of Tripolitania as far as the border recognized by treaties of international character. 2 1

Domestic pressures for Italy to resolve the question of reconquering Libya were very strong because of the cost of the war to an Italian economy which already was faltering badly (during and after the war). The Fascist government, as had its predecessor, desired to effect a political victory at home by pacifying Libya and opening it to coloni­ zation by Italy's surplus population— a rationale for the

Tripolitan War of 1911-1912. Mussolini, who had been imprisoned for opposing that war, found himself supporting 22 the military conquest and colonization of Libya.

The Course of Diplomatic Activity

On March 15, 1922, Great Britain officially declared

Egypt independent. The following May, the Italian govern­ ment sent Marquis Negrotto Cambiaso as Minister 32

Plenipotentiary to Egypt. At this point, however, it was not absolutely clear with whom the Italians would negotiate since Great Britain had made it clear that in regard to foreign relations with other states Egypt would not have 23 complete freedom of action.

In June 1922, this question was clarified when the

Italian Foreign Minister Signor Schanzer met with the

British Foreign Minister, Lord Balfour, in London. The agenda for discussions of Anglo-Italian problems included

Jubaland and Palestine as well as the Cyrenaican frontier.

Britain's approval for direct Italo-Egyptian negotiations on the Libyan frontier question was made clear by Lord 24 Balfour during the London talks.

By early July the Italian government had already officially contacted the Egyptians, and tentative plans were made for the beginning of negotiations in the fall between the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Italian legation in Cairo. The Italian envoy, Cambiaso, departed from Egypt in mid-July to spend his time until September in consultation with his government. Before departing, he gave an interview to a correspondent of Popolo d 1Italia stating • . .... 2-5 that he expected little tension over future negotiations.

Meanwhile, an Egyptian caretaker government assumed power in March 1922 under Abd al-Khalek Sarwat Pasha who held both posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign

Affairs. The Italian diplomatic initiative in July found 33 the fledgling Egyptian government quite unprepared. The

Egyptian Foreign Ministry was in a state of confusion as to what its role would be in relationship to the new British position in Egypt. Editorials in the Egyptian press in

May of that year were filled with suggestions concerning the creation of a new Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the train­ ing of young men to be diplomats. British domination of

Egyptian foreign affairs since 1882 had indeed whittled away any independence in that area and a complete recon­ struction was necessary. The Egyptian press voiced heavy opposition to the appointment of an Englishman, Mr. Keown

Boyd, as Secretary General to the Egyptian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. This appointment, however, made it doubly clear to Egyptians that their freedom in foreign affairs 26 would continue to be restricted by Great Britain.

In response to the Italian initiative, the Egyptian government did, however, create on July 24 a commission to study the border question. Later, the Minister of War,

Fathy Ibrahim Pasha, accompanied by one civilian and two military colleagues, left to visit the Cyrenaican frontier area. He visited the port of Solium and the Oases of

Jarabub and Siwa. He furthermore met Italian and Egyptian frontier officials. No negotiations took place at these 27 meetings and Fathy Ibrahim Pasha returned on September 5.

The Egyptian press evinced an optimistic tone in editorials concerning prospective negotiations between Egypt ' 34 and Italy after the return of Fathy Ibrahim Pasha. At that time it was thought that negotiations might begin in mid-

October. Apparently, no such action took place between

Egypt and Italy. The Egyptian government failed to initiate any action in October, and in fact for the next two years the Egyptian government carefully avoided the issue.

Egyptian domestic political turmoil left no single political 28 leader capable of negotiating seriously during this period.

The Italian government at this juncture was also in a state of domestic political uncertainty. The Fascist March on Rome took place on October 27, 1922, and Mussolini was made Prime Minister on October 30. The Fascist seizure of power precipitated a period of confusion as Mussolini began to establish his own priorities for his foreign policy initiatives. One of his very first moves was his attendance at the Peace Conference at Lausanne where the final treaty 29 with Turkey was being negotiated.

The Egyptians had hoped that Great Britain would give them independent representation at the Conference. The

Egyptian press spent the rest of October and November dis­ cussing the possibility of Egyptian attendance. The British notified both Italy and France of their intention to nominate Egypt for official attendance. Although Zaghlul and other Wafd members did attend, Egypt never sent an official delegation primarily because the Sarwat government, newly in power, was innundated with domestic concerns and 35 failed to follow up its own initiative for official partici­ pation. The Italian Lausanne delegation reported to

Mussolini the British intent to nominate Egypt, and the dele­ gation suggested that the Egyptian nomination be approved since this might mean that Italy could increase her repre­ sentation with the addition of Libya.

During the conference a special article in the Watan, the Wafd party newspaper, discussed the attitude of Italy toward Egypt. Citing an anonymous Italian official, the

Watan correspondent stated that "Italy sympathizes with the

Egyptian movement on the condition that the sympathy does not disturb her relations with England." The article later stated that Italy would never abandon her privileges in

Egypt; rather, she "still demands the modification of the

Libyan border in her favor." The article then asked where 30 was Italian sympathy for Egypt.

The year 1923 passed with little direct reference to the border dispute between Egypt and Italy either in the newspapers of both countries or in any real diplomatic activity. There was, however, diplomatic activity in regard 31 to the status of all Libyans living in Egypt.

The citizenship of all Libyans— both Tripolitan and

Cyrenaican— residing in Egypt before the Italian occupation remained unclear until 1923. In order to remedy the ambiguity of the status of Libyans in Egypt, an Italo-

Egyptian Agreement which guaranteed Italian nationality to 36 all Libyan-born individuals in Egypt (provided they regis­ tered with the Italian consulate) was drawn in Cairo on 32 April 15, 1923. The agreement would recognize m the

future all Libyans who entered Egypt to be Italian citizens.

This Italo-Egyptian Agreement tacitly recognized Italy's right of occupation in Libya, and it set the stage for

Italian claims of extradition of Libyan political refugees 33 m Egypt.

The influx of political refugees from Libya posed an extradition problem with Italy which saddled the new Zaghlul government in January 1924 with the first major clash in

international law between an independent Egyptian government and a European state. This specific question came to the

fore when in early January the Italian Legation in Cairo asked the Egyptian government to release to Italian authori­

ties ten Sanusi political refugees being held on the Western 34 frontier for entering Egypt without passports.

The Italian government regarded these men as Italian

subjects, and claimed that under the Capitulations it had

the right to request the Egyptian government to arrest them

and release them to the nearest Italian consul. The

Egyptian government claimed that the nationality of the men

had not been established and that, in any case, since they were political refugees they could not be handed over to the 35 authorities from whom they were fleeing. 37

The response of the Italian government to this line of thought was that the Libyans were wanted for civil, not political crimes, and it reiterated its request that they should be returned. The Egyptian government responded that before complying with this request it wished to see the

3 6 dossiers concerning them.

The Egyptian press severely criticized the government of Yehia Ibraham Pasha for his handling of the dispute and for his complacency toward the Italian government. The new

Egyptian government, which came to power under Saad Zaghlul in January 1924, was urged to take a stronger stand on the issue, that is, to release the Libyans to stay in Egypt or 37 to proceed elsewhere.

The whole question of the extradition of the Libyan refugees was finally settled in February when the Egyptian government agreed to release the refugees to the Italian legation. The incident, however, temporarily established a negative tone between Egypt and Italy. The Egyptian press was hostile to Italian extradition demands, in part because of sympathy for the Sanusi as fellow Muslims but also because it vividly reminded the Egyptians of the ambivalent status of their independence and the fact that they were still under the provisions of the hated Capitulations in 38 regard to European powers.

Interestingly, during the debate over the fate of the

Libyan refugees, there was a propaganda war taking place between the Egyptian and Italian presses. In early January, al-Ahram particularly commented on statements in the Italian press criticizing the Egyptian government's treatment of

Italian officials working for the Egyptian government. Four days later, al-Ahram commented upon what it considered to be an absurd article in the French newspaper Le Temps claiming that Italians encouraged Fuad I of Egypt to accept the title of Caliph and move the Caliphate from Istanbul (where

Ataturk was about to abolish the institution) to Cairo.

Nevertheless, al-Ahram implied that if Britain and France were to have no influence in Egypt, the Fascist Italian government should have a great deal less. This article was prompted by an announced tour of Europe to be made by Fuad.

The Italian government took it seriously enough to deny it publicly. Also, the Italian paper Idea Nazionale discussed the anti-Italian propaganda in Egyptian papers and called for the end of this type of adversary relationship between 39 Egypt and Italy.

As for negotiations over the Egyptian-Libyan border, there was no hint of movement toward formal talks until

July 1924. On the part of Egypt, the new government under

Saad Zaghlul was saddled with several domestic questions and future treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Italy, on the other hand, was busy negotiating with the new Labor government of Ramsay MacDonald over delimitation of the

Jubaland frontier, for the expansion of Italian Somaliland, 39 and the recognition of explicit sovereighty over Rhodes,

Castelrosso, and the Dodecanese. The Jubaland question was settled through a treaty on July 6 , 1924, and the others when Britain signed the Treaty of Lausanne on August 6 of 40 the same year.

With the question of Jubaland settled, the Italian government in early September 1924 turned its attention once more to the question of delimitation of the Libyan border with Egypt. Wishing to discuss the matter with Zaghlul

Pasha away from Egypt, the Italian government chose to bring up the issue while Zaghlul stopped in Paris on the way to formal talks with the British government over a treaty settlement. The talks were conducted with the Italian and

Egyptian ambassadors to France, Romano Avezzana and Fakri

Pasha, and included Saad Zaghlul during one set of discus­ sions. The initial results proved favorable in that Zaghlul sent Mussolini a telegram from Paris promising an examination of the question upon returning to Egypt after negotiating 41 with Great Britain.

Meanwhile, discussions between the Egyptian foreign ministry and the Italian legation were taking place in Cairo in preparation for negotiations. There had been also two working conferences on the question of the delimitation of the frontier between the Egyptian commander at Solium and a 42 member of the Italian Legation. 40

At one point it appeared that the official negotiations might begin before the end of the month of September because

Zaghlul appeared to have cancelled negotiations with the

British government. However, by mid-September it became clear that the MacDonald-Zaghlul negotiations would take place in London, and that they would continue into the month of October.^

Mussolini's Fascist government, hoping to gain the influence and respect of others and embark upon its expan­ sionist policy in the Mediterranean and North Africa, recog­ nized that it would first have to show it was capable of defeating the Bedouin of Libya. Since the onset of renewed hostilities in 1923, however, the progress of the Italian 44 army in subjugating Libyan guerrilla fighters was poor.

The Italian government was concerned that if it were to attain a victory in Libya it was absolutely necessary to settle the border question, thereby gaining control of the historic and religious center of the Sanusi— the Jarabub

Oasis. Egyptian sympathizers, led by Sayyid Idris and other

Sanusi elements, did indeed arrange for caravans to bring supplies to Cyrenaica through the Oasis of Jarabub. In

July 1924, the Italian government began making charges that

Egyptians were aiding the Sanusi rebels. Accompanying the charge was a rumor, possibly planted directly by Italy, that she would seize Jarabub by force on the grounds of colonial 41 security if progress toward a settlement were not forth- 45 coming.

Throughout early September 1924, all of the major

Egyptian newspapers were publishing articles condemning so- called Italian threats to settle the border question by force. The alarm was based upon the Egyptian government's reports of observations of unusual Italian troop movements in the area of Solium near the frontier. The Italian minister in Cairo vociferously denied the veracity of claims in the Egyptian press and the Italian press also indignantly rejected such allegations. Although the Italian government failed to achieve a settlement by implanting such rumors, the entire question of force impelled the Egyptian govern­ ment to issue an official statement openly declaring its interest in negotiating a treaty with Italy, and promising to attempt the cessation of Egyptian contraband shipments 46 to the Sanusi.

During September both Italian ambassador to France,

Romano Avezzana, and Gabriele Preziosi, Italian Charge in

London, were instructed by Mussolini to continue discussions about the border question with the Egyptian Premier Zaghlul

Pasha. Both men feared that Zaghlul Pasha was using delay­ ing tactics by responding to their questions with vague 47 promises of negotiations at some future time.

Despite the September 18 release of an official communique declaring the serious prospect of future talks, 42

Mussolini wrote Preziosi in London that more specific nego­ tiations must be set, and that Italy had certainly assured

Egypt of her intent not to secure the border by force.

Italian denials of the use of force eventually backfired, leading Egyptians to believe that Italian pledges meant that the maintenance of the status quo was satisfactory. This led Mussolini to suggest to Preziosi that Zaghlul should be told that Italy would exercise her option to use force if no movement were forthcoming.4^

Overall, Italian threats and intrigues to move the

Egyptians to the negotiating table were unsuccessful, since the prospects of an Italian attack on the Oasis of Jarabub became unlikely as the Mussolini regime appeared to be faltering over the Matteoti Affair. Furthermore, as Romano

Avezzana reported, Zaghlul was also confident that Italy at this time would not choose to defy a British veto on a 49 unilateral occupation of Jarabub.

In late September, Italy turned to Britain to obtain greater support in persuading the Zaghlul government to reach a settlement. The Italian foreign ministry was aware that in foreign affairs Egyptian independence from Great

Britain was "more formal than substantial."Although direct approaches continued to be made to Zaghlul, an appeal to the

British government was also being made. The Labor government of Prime Minister MacDonald was sympathetic, and Sir William

Tyrrel, Deputy Undersecretary at the British Foreign Office, 43 gave explicit assurances that Britain would honor the Milner- 50 Scialoja Accord.

In late 1924, however, there was little evidence that

British pressure was having any real effect. The reason behind this had more to do with Anglo-Egyptian relations and the domestic situation in Egypt than with the specific ques­ tion of the frontier delimitation with Italian Libya.

The MacDonald-Zaghlul negotiations proved abortive in

October. As noted above, Sir Lee Stack had been assassinated in Cairo. Consequently, High Commissioner Lord Allenby delivered an ultimatum to the Egyptian government demanding that an indemnity be paid. He ordered, moreover, that

Egyptian units be withdrawn from the Sudan and that

Egyptians would be made to pay economically when Britain increased Sudanese cotton cultivation. Zaghlul signed the indemnity check, but unable to accept the attached clauses, resigned on November 23, 1924. King Fuad appointed the first President of the Senate, Ahmad Ziwar, as Premier, and he accepted all terms of the ultimatum.^

Italian fortunes in negotiating with Egypt began changing for the better when in early November the Conserva­ tive British government of Sir Stanley Baldwin came to office, with Sir Austin Chamberlain as Foreign Secretary.

Eager to gain Fascist Italy's acceptance of the British position in European matters, and in particular,

Mussolini's signature on the Locarno Pacts, Chamberlain was 44 willing to work toward amicable Anglo-Italian colonial

settlements. The first of these proved to be the Egyptian-

Libyan frontier question.5 2

On the occasion of the murder of Sir Lee Stack,

Chamberlain commented to Signor Della Torretta, Italian

Ambassador to London, that the Western Powers must stand

together against the growing tide of anti-colonialism. In response Della Torretta suggested that it might be in this context that Britain could work toward preventing Egyptian

support of the Sanusi revolt in Libya. Further discussion of the frontier question took place between Mussolini and

Chamberlain in December 1924 while the British Foreign

Secretary attended a session of the League of Nations in 53 Rome.

The Rome meeting proved fruitful for the realization of Italian ambitions. Two weeks later Egypt offered to negotiate the details of the Jarabub cessions, and, duly appreciative, Mussolini promised to keep Chamberlain 54 informed of the progress of the negotiations.

The backing of Sir Austin Chamberlain for Italy's position concerning the Libyan border settlement with Egypt made it certain that Mussolini would get his treaty. The nature of the relationship between Egypt and England since

the 1922 unilateral declaration of independence guaranteed

that if Great Britain chose to dictate in matters of foreign

policy the Egyptians had virtually no real negotiating power. 45

The presence of the British army was the guarantor of British sovereignty in this question. Hence/ Chamberlain's guarantee 55 was .to be realized as a treaty in late 1925.

Throughout 1925, Chamberlain made himself the mediator between Egypt and Italy. This, however, did not deter the

Egyptians from procrastinating for most of 1925. Chamberlain wrote Mussolini that patience was needed in the early months of 1925 because of the Egyptian elections to be held in

March. Chamberlain stated that he hoped that Mussolini would recognize the need to save the Egyptian government open embarrassment over any public renunciation of Jarabub, and allow Egypt the pretense that she was not bound by the

Milner-Scialoja Accord despite eventual movement to settle on that basis. Mussolini, trusting Chamberlain, acceded to his request and delayed pressing for the onset of more 56 serious negotiations for the first half of 1925.

Both the Egyptian and Italian newspapers reported in late February 1925 that a postponement of frontier negotia­ tions would take place until after the elections in March and the convening of the new Egyptian Parliament. Mean­ while, Italy continued to seek a rapprochement with Sayyid

Idris in Egypt and the rebel Sanusi chiefs who were encouraging the Egyptian government not to cede the Oasis of

Jarabub and characterizing Italian activity as part of a larger plan eventually to threaten Egyptian security for 57 some future greater territorial gain. 46

By early April the Mussolini government was again becoming restless over what it believed to be foot-dragging by the Egyptian government. Ahmad Ziwar Pasha had created

a new coalition government. Later, when the new Parliament met on March 23, the Wafd majority elected Saad Zaghlul to be Speaker of the House— leading the Ziwar Ministry and the

King to dissolve the Parliament. With the King's backing, moreover, the Ziwar government implemented strong measures

against the Wafd opposition; the ministry manipulated the

electoral system in order to ensure the Wafd Party would not

soon return to power.

On April 13, reacting to what it believed to be a

strong Egyptian government, the Italian Legation verbally

notified the Egyptian government of its desire to settle the

frontier question on the basis of the Milner-Scialoja Accord.

The Italian "friendly" ultimatum reflected the belief that

the political situation in Egypt was favorable since, in the

Italian view, any government possessing sufficient authority

to dissolve Parliament, revise the electoral law, and carry on for an indefinite period without Parliament, should also be in a position to settle a question such as the Egyptian- 59 Cyrenaican frontier.

The Ziwar Ministry responded to the ultimatum (as it was reported by the Egyptian press) amicably but denied its knowledge of any Milner-Scialoja Accord, and mentioned that

the British had asked only for an Egyptian opinion in 1921, 47 which Egypt had refused to provide. Both the press and the

Wafd did their best to harass the Ziwar Ministry concerning any prospective cession of Egyptian land to Italy. Some observers even felt that secretly the Egyptians would have preferred that the Italians use unilateral force to settle 6 0 such an unpopular decision.

In late April Chamberlain veered more closely to the

Italian point of view. He instructed the Egyptian High

Commissioner, Lord Allenby, to pressure Prime Minister Ziwar

Pasha to negotiate. High Commissioner, Lord Allenby, also played the role of mediator between Italian Ambassador to

Egypt, Signor Caccia and the Ziwar Ministry. In response to the British government's intervention in late April, the

Ziwar Ministry dispatched an Egyptian mission to the Jarabub

Oasis on the frontier to gather factual information and to present it to the Egyptian cabinet to prepare for negotia­ tions. On the Italian side, the Mussolini government again agreed to a brief delay but not an unlimited one. In July,

Italian and Egyptian negotiators met and agreed that both sides would observe a free zone principle. Later, in

August, Ismail Sidky, a newly appointed Chairman of the

Jarabub Commission, visited Mussolini in Rome as a cordial 61 gesture to set the tone, for final talks in October.

Lord Allenby resigned in May with Lord Lloyd's replacing him as High Commissioner in Egypt, and he inherited the responsibility of keeping negotiations between Egypt and 48

Italy moving. On entering into the situation in the early fall of 1925, Lord Lloyd stated:

. . . The points of issue had, by the time of my arrival in Egypt, narrowed themselves down to the vexed question of the oasis of Jaghboub [Jarabub]. Although it was quite impossible to adduce any convincing proofs of the fact, the Egyptian people as a whole had easily persuaded themselves that Jaghboub was by rights a part of Egyptian territory. The Italians, on the other hand, claimed that Jaghboub formed, and had always formed, a part of Cyrenaica, and this view was borne out by such authorities as existed on the subject, as well as by the investigation made by Lord Milner.62

Lord Lloyd was anxious to bring the talks to a rapid conclusion fearing that Italian restiveness at this point might force unilateral action involving Great Britain "in a 63 quarrel with a friendly power" on Egypt's behalf.

The meeting of Italian and Egyptian experts began in

October and lasted about two months. For Egypt, Ismail

Sidky Pasha, former Egyptian Ambassador to Italy, headed the

Egyptian Commussion and Count Negrotto Cambiaso, former

Italian minister to Egypt, headed the Italian delegation.

As negotiations moved into November the general climate of student strikes rallied by the Wafd against the suspension of the Egyptian Parliament threatened to disrupt the talks.

Furthermore, Sidky Pasha proved "stubbornly opposed" to the

Italian government's claim based on the Milner-Scialoja

Accord of 1920. He reasoned, on the one hand, that Egypt as an independent nation had the right to dispose of her own territory. On the other hand, he rightly claimed that in 49

1906 Great Britain had recognized Egypt's sovereignty over the disputed territory. Lastly/ despite his close relation­ ship with the Italian royal house. King Fuad had refused to be drawn into the volatile issue of the border negotiations, and failed to give any instructions to the Egyptian delega- 64 tion.

Lord Lloyd, therefore, paid a visit to the King, and warned him that he personally would be held responsible if the negotiations failed. The King fully appreciated the nature of the warning, and immediately issued orders to the

Cabinet to desist in creating obstacles to productive nego­ tiations. He then reshuffled the Cabinet. In just a few days the negotiations were concluded, and an agreement between Egypt and Italy was signed on December 6 , 1925.

The Treaty and Its Provisions

The Italo-Egyptian Treaty signed in December 1925 provided for two Mixed Commissions (one to deal' with the border itself; the other to deal with population displace­ ment) and a Court of Arbitration to settle in detail the general principles outlined in the treaty. The negotiations which took place under the Commissions encountered difficulty during the summer of 1926. At one point (in late August) the negotiations were suspended over Egypt's insistence that the Sanusi inhabitants of the Jarabub Oasis be given

Egyptian citizenship even though they would be technically 50 located in Italian territory. By November 1926, the nego- 6 6 tiations had resumed and a compromise had been reached.

On November 10, 1926, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs issued an official communique announcing the signing of a Protocol based upon the Italo-Egyptian Treaty of

December 6 , 1925. It affirmed the work of the Mixed Commis­ sions in drawing up an agreement dealing with the detailed delimitation of the Egyptian western frontiers, questions of legal jurisdiction in the western zones, the rights of pasture, the customs system, and the nationality of the inhabitants in the zone located to the west of Solium and 67 the zone of the Jarabub Oasis.

The border settlement provided for an agreement sub­ stantially similar to the Milner-Scialoja Accord of 1920 except for a more regular line drawn around the territory of the Jarabub Oasis. (See Figure 2, page 51). The demarcation line begins at Beacon Point on the coast north of the port of Solium. It moves westward before turning southward on the caravan route which includes Jarabub. South of this oasis, the line proceeds from the frontier at 25 degrees east longitude down to the twenty-second parallel of north lati­ tude which marks the northern limit ofthe Anglo-Egyptian 68 „Sudan. .

The Treaty guaranteed that both sides would ensure open access for the caravan trade between Solium and Jarabub.

The problem of making fresh water available to the port of 51

46 £

Jo v Gijrabvb o os/ov

2 Z A Af Cv/rj o

y otu mmu Ctirfaof Squ • y^i <•*- 4

i*f n

TiBtsri Uanunijdv^

Birr^a o

CON VENZIONI E TRATTATl RELATtVt At CONFIN DELLA LIBIA

Sc A LA .» 1 . 1 5 OOO OOO

Figure 2. Conventions and Treaties Relating to the Libyan Border3

aBiagio Pace, La Libia Nella Politica Fascista, 1922-1935 (Milano: Casa Editrxce Guiseppi Principato, 1935) , p. 38. 52

Solium (in Egyptian territory) was solved by allowing the port residents to use water from the wells of Ramlah (in

Italian territory). The Mixed Commissions provided both land and sea access to the well in Ramlah. This agreement also clearly pointed out Egypt's sovereign rights in the 69 zone of the well and other zones assigned to Egypt.

Questions surrounding the fate of the nomadic popula­ tions near the border were regulated by the Mixed Commission.

Both sides pledged to maintain the security of their respec­ tive zones from the illegal incursion of bedouins. In regard to incidents occurring in the western Egyptian zones, whether criminal or civil, legal jurisdiction was given to local Egyptian legal authorities. The problem of pasture rights was decided in a manner that guaranteed the continua­ tion of the old practices of the region within convenient administrative arrangements. Although decisions over the customs issue proved to be largely unsuccessful, the Italians received an agreement at their insistence that the export of

Libyan livestock to Egypt be curtailed until Libyan supplies 70 were sufficient to warrant export.

Lastly, the protocol signed on November 10, 1926, speci­ fically mentioned that the decision regarding the nation­ ality of the inhabitants of the Jarabub Oasis would be placed before a Mixed Court for arbitration. By far the most sensitive issue, this compromise was reached in order to enable continued movement toward completing the rest of 53 the treaty. The Egyptians, using the logic that they were at that time the foremost Muslim protectors of Islam, declared the Jarabub Oasis to be an important Muslim holy place significant to all of Islam, not just the Sanusi sect.

They demanded, moreover, Italian recognition of the fact that this gave Egypt the right of protection over the inhabitants of the Jarabub Oasis. It is uncertain why the

Egyptian negotiators pressed this point except as an attempt to counter domestic criticism of the treaty. The Egyptians were very aware that the Italians would never agree to this since acquisition of the Jarabub Oasis and making its inhabitants Italian citizens was foremost in Italian military minds as a means to the destruction of the Sanusi rebellion m• „Cyrenaica. • 71

Political Implications for Italy and Egypt

Given permission by the Egyptian government to take possession of Jarabub without having to wait for the

Egyptian parliament's ratification, Mussolini lost little time in preparing for the takeover in early February 1926.

According to the account of the London Times, the actual peaceful occupation of the Jarabub Oasis by Italy took

place on February 7 with a contingent of some 2,000 men using two tanks, two light artillery batteries, machine gun companies, a squadron of armored cars and twelve airplanes.

The Mussolini government did its best to parlay a small 54

"political success" into triumphant victory for Fascist colonial ambitions. Mussolini even visited Libya in mid-

April 1926 to attract the attention of the Italian people and foreigners to the fact that Libya now could be the place 72 for Italy's surplus population.

Pragmatically, the border treaty with Egypt almost com­ pleted the entire question for Italy concerning Libya's borders. In 1919 an Italo-French Agreement had established

Libya's borders with French territory to the south and west.

The agreement was later extended and formalized in a treaty in 1935. There remained, however, a small strip of terri­ tory between the Sudan and Libya. In 1934, Italy signed a border treaty between herself, Egypt, and Great Britain.

The process of stabilization of Libya's borders, was com- 73 pleted by 1935. (See Figure 2, page 51.)

Despite the intense propaganda campaign which followed the signing of the border treaty, the Italian government was unable either to subdue the Sanusi rebels or to settle a larger number of Italian colonists in Libya until the late

1930's. The border delimitation failed to stop the passage of Egyptian contraband to Libya, and in spite of the incor­ poration of the Sanusi religious center of Jarabub, hostili­ ties between Italian troops and Sanusi guerrillas in

Cyrenaica did not cease until 1932. (See Figure 3, page 55.)

Subsequently, the lack of security associated with guerrilla warfare discouraged intensive colonization of Libya by 55

Talmaltha,

Benghazi

Q.am!nidu

Scale 0 SO 100 ZOQkms.

Figure 3. The Italian Conquest of Cyrenaicaa

aEdward Evan Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 184. 56

Italians. By 1939 there were no more than 50,000 Italian colonists of all kinds, and only about 15,000 of these were engaged in agriculture (while the rest lived in the security 74 of the towns).

The treaty had no real chance of being readily accepted in Egypt. First of all the Ziwar Ministry (which had suspended the parliament in 1924) was an unpopular govern­ ment perceived as unrepresentative of the views of the

Egyptian population. Secondly, no Egyptian government would be able to ward off criticism for giving away to a Western power Egyptian territory which included a holy center of a

Sufi Muslim sect. Britain's success in coercing the Ziwar government depended precisely upon the fact that it was not 75 an elected but an appointed government.

In November 1925, the suspended parliament convened at the Continental Hotel in Cairo, elected Saad Zaghlul as

President of the Lower House, and declared that it was a parliament in session. On December 13, Mustafa al-Nahhas

Pasha, the then Secretary of the Wafd, delivered a fiery speech before this group, citing that it had been one year since the parliament had been disbanded and an unconstitu­ tional ministry (the Ziwar government) created. He pro­ ceeded to enumerate the vicissitudes of this situation declaring the cession of Jarabub along with the 1924 electoral law as two of the ultimately "vicious" acts of the current government. 57

Finally, Nahhas ended by declaring that the Wafd would protest the cession of Jarabub and the unconstitutional new election law with all its strength and energy. Later, in

January 1926, an opposition coalition made up of the members of the Zaghlulist Wafd, the Liberal-Constitutionalists, and the Nationalists, pledged its opposition to the Government, its new electoral law of December 8 th, and the new Italo-

7 6 Egyptian border treaty.

In February 1926, the Government, under pressure, assented to direct elections being held in May, in which the

Wafd won the majority of seats, and Zaghlul was again elected Speaker of the House, and Adli Yeken Pasha appointed

Prime Minister. In its first session this parliament abrogated all legislation passed since December 1924 when it had not been in session. This of course spelled trouble for the final ratification of the treaty by the Government.

Anticipating such problems, the Ziwar Ministry had the

Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs publish a Green Book giving the text of the Italo-Egyptian Agreement, including three maps one of which was the long missing map showing the frontiers of Egypt as laid down in the Ottoman firman of investiture in 1841. As mentioned above, in 1909, when the

British had asked the Egyptians for the map it was claimed it could not be found. In the Italo-Egyptian negotiations the map again could not be found— but it apparently was resurrected for publication in the Green Book. Comparison 58 of the maps of the 1925 Italo-Egyptian Accord and the firman of 1841 reveals that the 1925 accord pushed the western border some 250 kilometers to the west of the line legiti­ mately conferred in 1841 by the Ottoman Sultan. It appears that the Egyptians were wise to lose their 1841 map— in so doing they gained by allowing the Italians to rely upon the 77 Milner-Scialoja Accord of 1920.

Despite the Egyptian government's attempt to create a more positive light concerning the treaty through publishing the Green Book/ the negative climate set by both the

Egyptian press and the opposition coalition to the Ziwar

Ministry caused ratification by the parliament to be poli- 78 tically untenable until seven years later.

In the realm of diplomacy and foreign relations/ the

Italo-Egyptian Treaty was significant to both Egypt and

Italy. It was Egypt's first diplomatic venture with a major western power since the British occupation of 1882. On the other hand, it was Fascist Italy's first diplomatic venture in dealing with one of the newly independent Muslim states after World War I. Britain's intervention at Italy's behest in the negotiating process was a humiliating experience for the Egyptians who had expected a free hand in the negotiating process, trying to deny an association between former Anglo-

Italian accords and their negotiations during 1925.

Lord Lloyd's interjection into the process underscored even more strongly to the Egyptians the facade of 59 independence from Great Britain in which they operated.

Fascist Italy also found it somewhat uncomfortable to have to depend upon Britain's assistance in Egypt when Italy's influential community within the country, ties with the

Egyptian royal house, and economic interests were not suffi­ cient to be convincing on negotiating a border treaty.

During the British Occupation and Protectorate, many

Egyptians could find solace in turning to France and Italy for moral support. After World War I, Egyptians felt that the Italians would support their independence against Great

Britain. The new Fascist Italy, however, was beginning not to seem as benevolent an ally against Great Britain.

Mussolini's threat of occupying Jarabub by force may have been a bluff, but it generated an ingrained distrust in

Egyptians concerning Italian motives, as did the stepped-up war Italy was fighting against fellow Muslims in Libya.

Recognizing that other Muslim states were watching

Fascist Italy's posture in negotiating with Egypt, Mussolini was persuaded by his diplomatic advisers to remain patient, not use force so as not to jeopardize Italy's future over­ tures to other Muslim states. Furthermore, in the late

1920's Mussolini began to increase Italy's political, economic, and cultural penetration in Egypt and other Muslin states in an effort to neutralize British and French influence and increase Italy's presence and prestige in the

Mediterranean and the Red Seas. 60

Italy's colonial ambitions in Libya had created the need for Italy and Egypt to negotiate a border treaty.

Fascist Italy's increasing appetite for colonial expansion created situations into the mid-1930's that would continue interaction between the two countries while focusing upon the question of Italy's interests in Ethiopia. NOTES

Virginia MacLean, "Domestic and Foreign Factors in Egyptian Foreign Policy," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1955), pp. 153-154. 2 Ibid., p. 228; Alan Cassels, Mussolini1s Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 289. 3 Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy1s Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914-1937 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 279; Ronald S. Cunsolo, "Libya, Italian Nationalism, and the Revolt Against Golitti," The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2 (June 1965), p. 186. 4 C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940 (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 80- 81, 86-87; Cunsolo, loc. cit., pp. 186-193. 5 Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., p. 118; Rene Albrecht- Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958), pp. 276-277. g Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 104; Nicola A. Ziadeh, Sanusiyah: A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), pp. 68-70. 7 Ziadeh, bp. cit., p. 70. Q Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

g Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., p. 70; Italy, Ministero Degla Affari Esteri, I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, 1922-1925, Series 7, Vol. II, No. 7 (Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1952-1960), p. 4 (henceforward, these documents will be cited as DPI with appropriate series, volume, number, and page); a communique to the Ambassador in Cairo from Mussolini cites Sanusi violence as the cause of

61 62

Italy's renunciation of the Regima Accord with Sayyid Idris. See Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 156.

^ " 1 1 confine fra l'Egitto e la Cirenaica," Oriente Moderno, Vol. II (1922), pp. 332-333; Biagio Pace,. La Libia Nella Politica Fascista, 1922-1935 (Milano: Casa Editrice Giuseppi Principato, 1935), p. 46.

Albrecht-Carrie, "Italian Colonial Policy, 1914-1918," The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (June r946), pp. 12T-129; the first volume of a two-volume publi­ cation of the Italian Colonial Ministry was available to Mr. Albrecht-Carrie. The second volume, filled with maps, was a secret edition with only fifty copies made. Unavail­ able to this author, those two volumes would be very inter­ esting to examine. The following is cited by Albrecht- Carrie: Ministero de Colonie, Affrica Italiana: programma minimo de sistemazione dei possedimenti~~italianT nell' Affrica orientale e settentrionale (Romef Tipografiadel Senato, 1917).

13 George Louis Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), pp. 391-392; Beer quotes Article XIII from the Treaty of London of April 1915:

'In the event of an extension of the French and British colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great Britain recognize to Italy in principle the right of demanding for herself certain compensations in the form of an extension of her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, Libya, and the colonial Districts bordering on French and British Colonies.'

•^The Egyptian Gazette, September 17, 1924, p. 5; Raoul Aglion, War in the Desert: The Battle for Africa (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1941), pp. 88-93; the British fought a guerrilla war against numerous small groups of Sanusi forces until they reached the port of Solium. Fighting with the British regulars were Indians, Sikhs, and New Zealand forces.

^Beer, op. cit., pp. 393-394; DDI (1918-1922), Series 6 , Vol. I, No. 799, pp. 455-457. The Libyan border 63 with French territory to the south and west had never been formally defined. There was, however, an Anglo-French Convention in 1899 which delimited the Sudan from present- day Chad and another such convention in 1919 which corrected this line. The Cyrenaican border with Egypt had a precedent for delimitation in the Ottoman firman of 1841, but it was not recognized by international law. Therefore, the borders of Libya were relatively fluid for Italian demands at the Peace Conference (see Figure 3, page 55).

16 Cassels, op. cit., p. 218; Pace op. cit., pp. 44-45; Amadeo Giannini, "L'Accordo Italo-Egiziano per le Frontiere della Cirenaica," Oriente Moderno, Vol. VI (1926), p. 2.

17 The Times (London), January 5, 1924, p. 9; MacLean, loc. cit., p. 229; The Egyptian Gazette, October 1, 1925, p. 3.

18 P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 26 S-YTS.

20 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 272-276.

21 Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt 1 s Liberal Expen- ment: 1922-1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 83-89.

22 Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 156; Benito Mussolini, My Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1928), p. 259; "L'Emiro Sanussi in Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. II (1923), p. 560.

23 Dennis Mack Smith, Mussolini1s Roman Empire (New York: The Viking Press, 1976), p. 1; Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 185-186.

^ The Egyptian Gazette, March 14, 1922, p. 4; Gouverne- ment Egyptien, Table des Documents Officiels Annee 1922 (Le Caire: Imprimerie Nationale, 1919-1941), pp. 119-120.

25The Egyptian Gazette, July 7, 1922, p. 4; Corriere della Sera, June 28, 1922, p. 6 . 64

26 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 240? The Egyptian Gazette, May 13, 1922, p. 4? IbicTTT"July 25, 1922, p. 4; IbldTl August 21, 1922, p. 4? "Un direttore inglese del Ministero degli Esteri," Oriente Moderno, Vol. II (1922), p. 332. The position of Mr. Keown Boyd as Secretary-General of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was negotiated between Prime Minister Sarwat Pasha and Lord Allenby. Other advisory positions in the Egyptian government maintained by British officials included the Ministries of Justice and Finance. The latter point was deeply resented by Egyptian political leaders. Of course, British military officers remained in charge of the Egyptian armed forces as part of the provi­ sions of the four reserved points held back in the unilateral declaration of independence of 1922; Table des Documents Officiels Annee 1925, loc. cit., pp. 214-217? the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reorganized, and a law was passed to do so in December 1925.-

27 Oriente Moderno, loc. cit., Vol. II (1922), pp. 332- 333; The Times (London), September 6 , 1922, p. 9? The Egyptian Gazette, September 9, 1922, p. 4.

28 The Egyptian Gazette, September 9, 1922, p. 4.

29 Gilbert, op. cit., p. 187? Cassels, op. cit., pp. 14- 16.

30 DPI, Series 7, Vol. I, No. 74, p. 36? The Egyptian Gazette, October 16, 21, 24/ 26, p. 4; November 4, 16, 17, 22, 23, p. 4.

31 The Egyptian Gazette, August 7, 1923, p. 4? there were however, during this time the publication of several letters from the Libyans, one of which al-Akhbar published, that described the bitter resentment of Libyanstoward the Italian occupation.

32 The Times (London), January 9, 1924, p. 17; The Egyptian Gazette, January 10, 1924, p. 3 ? Corriere della Sera, June 9, 1924, p. 2.

33 Ibid.? "Dichiarazioni della Legazione Italiana a proposito dei capi Libici ribelli rifugiati in Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. IV (1924), p. 128? Tommaso Tittoni, Questione de giorno (Milano: Fratelli Trenes Editori, 1928), p. 13. 65 34 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 273; The Egyptian Gazette, January 8, 1924, p. 3; The Times (London), February 16, 1924, p. 4.

35Ibid.

36Ibid.

37Ibid.

38 The Egyptian Gazette, February 26, 1924, p. 3; "Fine della questione dei fuorusciti libice rifugiati in Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. IV (1924), p. 279; several Egyptian newspapers wrote sympathetic editorials favoring the refugees. Al-Ahram even published an open letter from one Sanusi refugee begging the support of the Egyptian govern­ ment to allow passage through Egypt rather than extradition to Italian authorities.

39 The Egyptian Gazette, January 7, 1924, p. 4; January 10, 1924, p. 3.

40 The Times (London), January 4, 1924, p. 9; September 18, 1924, p. 11; Cassels, op. cit., pp. 223-225; 289.

41DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 483, pp. 285-286; "Communicato ufficiale sulla questione dei confini della Libia," Oriente Moderno, Vol. IV (1924), p. 659.

42 Ibid.; The’ Times (London), September 3, 1924, p. 12.

4 7, Ibid.; DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 497, pp. 293-294.

44 Evans-Pntchard, op. cit., p. 157.

45 .... "Dichiarazioni del Ministero delle Colonie italiano intorno al confine cirenaico-egiziano," Oriente Moderno, Vol. IV (1924), pp. 764-765; Evans-Pritchard, op. cit. , p. 170, DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 418, p. 242; Ibid., No. 390, p. 222; Ibid., No. 505, p. 298; Corriere della Sera, September 18, 1924, p. 5.

A £ The Egyptian Gazette, September 16, 1924, p. 5; Ibid., September 17, 1924, p. 5, Ibid., September 18, 1924, p. 4; 66

Ibid., September 19, 1924, pp. 3, 5; Corriere della Sera, September 18, 1924, p. 7.

47 Cassels, op. cit., p. 290; DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 509, p. 303; Ibid., No. 520, p. 313, Ibid., No. 522, p. 316.

48 Cassels, op. cit., p. 290; DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 520, pp. 312-313, Ibid., No. 525, pp. 317-318.

49 Cassels, op. cit., pp. 290-291; DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 509, p. 303.

50DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 518, pp. 300-301; Raffaele Guariglia, Ricordi, 1922-1926 (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1950), p. 37; Cassels, op. cit., p. 291.

51 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 276; Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

52 Cassels, op. cit., p. 288.

53Ibid., p. 291; DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 633, p. 382.

54 Cassels, op. cit., p. 292; DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 661, pp. 405-406; Ibid., No. 633, p. 382; Ibid., No. 725 p. 454.

55 MacLean, op. cit., pp. 153-155.

Cassels, op. cit., p. 292; DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 725, p. 455; Ibid., No. 740, p. 467.

57The Egyptian Gazette, February 27, 1925, p. 4; Corriere della Sera, February 27, 1925, p. 1; DDI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 637, p. 385; Ibid., Vol. IV No. 128, pp. 96- 97; The Egyptian Gazette, February 28, 1925, p. 4. Al-Ahram published a letter written by a Sanusi military leader which the Gazette published also. The Sanusi leader stressed the strategic value of the Jarabub Oasis not only to the Sanusi of Cyrenaica but also to Egypt. He implied that Italy had designs on additional Egyptian territory and would use the oasis as a springboard to future acquisitions. 67

CO Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 277.

59 The Times (London), April 16, 1925, p. 11.

60 Ibid.; The Egyptian Gazette, April 17, 1924, pp. 3-4.

61PPI, Series 7, Vol. Ill, No. 834, pp. 547-548; The Times (London), April 28, 1925, p. 14; Ibid., May 18, 1925, p. 15; Cassels, op. cit., pp. 282-293; The Egyptian Gazette, July 7, 1925, p. 3; Ibid., August 24, 1925, p. 4.

^Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 277; DDI, Series 7, Vol. IV, No. 62, p. 48; Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer (London: Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1934), II, pp. 149-150.

63 Lord Lloyd, op. cit., II, p. 150.

64 Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op. cit., p. 88; Lord Lloyd, op. cit., II, pp. 149-150; MacLean, op. cit., pp. 228-229.

6 5 Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op. cit., p. 88; The Egyptian Gazette, December 8, 1925, p. 3.

6 6 Table des Documents Officiels Annee 1925, loc. cit. , pp. 232-236;. Italy, Ministero degli affair esteri, Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati, Vol. XXXV (Rome: La Libreria della Stato, 1865-1958), pp. 538-544; Giannini, loc. cit., pp. 1-6; "Accordo italo- egiziano le dicembre 1925 por il confine fra la Cirenaica e l'egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. VI (1926), pp. 10-13; Pace op. cit., p. 47; The Times' (London), July 6, 1926, p. 13; Ibid., August 27, 1926, p. 9.

^The Egyptian Gazette, November 11, 1926, p. 3; The Times (London), November 10, 1926, p. 13; Pace, op. cit., p. 47.

Table des Documents Officiels Annee 1925, loc. cit., pp. 232-233; Trattati . ~ . , loc. cit., pp. 533-539; Giannini, loc. cit., pp. 2-3.

69 Table des Documents Officiels Annee 1925, loc. cit., p. 233; Trattai . . ., loc. cit., pp. 540-541; Giannini, loc. cit., p. 4; The Egyptian Gazette, November 11, 1926, p. 3. 68 70 Table des Documents Officiels Annee 1925/ loc. cit./ p. 234? Trattati . . ./ loc. cit., pp. 541-542? Giannini/ loc. cit./ p. 4? The Egyptian Gazette/ November 11, 1926, p. 3.

71 Table des Documents Officiels Annee 1925, loc. cit., pp. 235-236? Trattati . I loc. cit., pp. 543-544? The Egyptian Gazette, November 11, 1926, p. 3. The Egyptian assertion to be recognized as the protector of this Muslim holy place must be seen within the context of the dissolu­ tion of the Caliphate by Ataturk in 1924. For a time, Fuad seriously believed that he might take the title and restore the Caliphate to Cairo from whence the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) had abducted the Caliph in 1517, taking him to Istanbul where he was allowed to die— and was never replaced. Eventually, under Suleiman, the title of Caliph became synonymous with that of the Ottoman Sultan.

72 The Times (London), February 9, 1926, p. 14? Cassels, op. cit., pi 293? Guariglia, op. cit., pp. 40-42? The Times (London), April 13, 1926, p. 14? Ibid., April 19, 1926, p. 14? Ibid., April 12, 1926, p. 14? Howard R. Marraro, "Italy's Program of Empire," Current History, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (July 1926), p. 550.

73 J. L. Miege, L 1Imperialisme Colonial Italien de 1870 a Nos Jours (Paris: Societe d'Edition d^Engeignement Superieur, 1968), pp. 346-347? 356-357? in the annexes of his work the author includes a copy of the initial Italo- French Agreement dated September 12, 1919, and a copy of the final 1935 Italo-French Treaty: Great Britain, Treaty Series No. 21 (1934), "Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government and the Italian Government respecting the Boundary between the Sudan and Libya, Rome, July 20, 1934"

74 Smith, op. cit., pp. 39-42? Evans-Pntchard, op. cit., pp. 189, 218-220.

75 "Proclama del 'Wafd* contro la politica ministeriale verso 1'Italia ed all'interno,"Oriente Moderno, Vol. VI (1926), pp. 47-48? Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op. cit., pp. 88-39.

76 "II Libro Verde egiziano sull'Accordo per el-Giaghbub," Oriente Moderno, Vol. VI (1926), pp. 165-166? The Times (London), February 24, 1926, p. 13. 69

^Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 278? Pace, op. cit., p. 46.

7 8 MacLean, op. cit., p. 230.

I CHAPTER III

EGYPTIAN REACTION TO THE ITALIAN PRESENCE

IN ETHIOPIA, 1926-1936

Egypt's relations with Italy between 1926 and 1934 remained relatively calm and even cordial except for inci­ dents related to Italy's continuing war in Libya with Sanusi rebels. However, Italy's skirmish with Ethiopian troops at

War Wal in 1934 aroused serious concern. Egyptians recog­ nized that any Italo-Ethiopian conflict would bring into question the control of Lake Tsana, headwaters of the Blue

Nile and a source of irrigation for both Egypt and the

Sudan. Furthermore, despite British control of the Suez

Canal, Egyptians would inevitably become involved in a military conflict if Italian use of the Canal to attack

Ethiopia were challenged by Britain.'*'

The outbreak of war between Italy and Ethiopia in

October 1935 raised the spectre of a potential Italian encirclement of Egypt and the Sudan by Italian forces sta­ tioned both in Ethiopia and Libya. The increase of Italian troops in Libya along with large troop movements through the

Suez Canal on the way to Ethiopia disquieted the Egyptians.

There was, moreover, the possibility of subversion from

Egypt's large resident Italian population in the major

70 71

cities, a fact even more troublesome to the British who o remained responsible for Egypt's defense.

Egyptian response to the turmoil raised by the Italo-

Ethiopian conflict was to join with the members of the

League of Nations in placing financial sanctions upon Italy

even though Egypt was not a member. Egyptians also sent

medical assistance to Ethiopia. Lastly, the threat of

future Italian aggression finally brought both Egypt and 3 Britain to conclude a military treaty in 1936.

Historical Background

Egyptian modern history involving the Sudan and

Ethiopia begins with the search for slaves and mineral

resources by Muhammad Ali in the 1820's; subsequently,

Egyptians founded the city of Khartum in 1822 and placed an

Egyptian governor in the Sudan in 1830. Later, Khedive

Ismail sought to extend Egypt's power southward into terri­

tory traditionally part of the Christian Empire of Ethiopia.

By 1875, the Egyptians had subdued the Ethiopian province of

the Harar, but two years later the Ethiopian Emperor

stopped any further progress. A peace treaty with Ethiopia 4 pushed the Egyptians back to the port of Massawa.

Preoccupied by financial problems and the British occupation in the early 1880's Egypt lost control of the

Sudan to a self-proclaimed Mahdi who conquered Khartum in

1885. Both Egyptian and British troops withdrew from the 72

Sudan and the area technically reverted to the Ottoman

Sultan while the Mahdi became the de facto ruler during this period.^

Encouraged by the British, who with the fall of Khartum were looking for support against the Mahdists, Italy sent troops in February 1885 to occupy the former Egyptian port of Massawa. By 1890, Italy had expanded enough territori­ ally on the Red Sea coast to designate her possession as the colony of Eritrea. Meanwhile, in 1889, Italy had concluded a treaty with the new Emperor Menelik in order to facilitate

Italian expansion inward from the coast and establish

Italian influence at the Ethiopian Court. The Treaty of

Uccialli recognized not only Italy's occupation of Massawa and large portions of the inland highlands but also the right to conduct all of Menelik's foreign affairs. Later, in 1891, British-Italian agreements led to the designation of large portions of Ethiopia to be in respective spheres g of influence, with Lake Tsana to be an Italian sphere.

Menelik's renunciation of the Treaty of Uccialli in

1893 was a reaction to Italy's gradual penetration of the

Ethiopian hinterland and control over the caravan routes to

Massawa. Eventually, this expansion precipitated the out­ break of hostilities with the Italian Army's meeting

Menelik's forces at Adowa in March 1896. This startling loss forced Italy to recognize Ethiopia's independence and sovereignty in the Treaty of Addis Ababa. It reopened, 73

moreover, the competition among the British, French, and

Italian governments for influence in the country. Menelik

and his successors, henceforward, adopted the policy of 7 playing one European power against another.

Italian territorial designs and increasing French

influence in Ethiopia spurred British concern in regaining

control of the Sudan by 1899 and resulted in the creation of

an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. British leaders at this time were becoming more aware of the importance to Egypt of

irrigation from the Nile, whose sources stemmed from the g White Nile in the Sudan and the Blue Nile in Ethiopia.

Egypt and the Nile Before World War I

In order to understand Britain and Egypt’s preoccupa­

tion with safeguarding the sources of the Nile, it is neces­

sary to explain the process of irrigation from the Nile.

The two main confluents of the Nile, the White and the Blue

Nile, meet at Khartum. The White Nile comes mainly from

heavy rains falling on the forests, swamps, and Great Lakes

of Central Africa. Comparatively free from silt at all

seasons, this river flows more or less constantly. The

Blue Nile rises in the highlands of Ethiopia. The Blue

Nile carries substantial silt, and when it reaches a high

crest, it causes a short intense flood. The waters of the

Blue Nile are in flood prior to those of the White Nile. At

the confluence of the two rivers the former, during high 74

floods, blocks off the latter river; hence, the silt-laden waters flow to the sea, leaving the clear water of the White

Nile for storage. Thus, the waters for irrigation come chiefly from the Blue Nile during the flood seasons, and 9 from the White Nile in the low-water season.

Planned irrigation was an integral part of the nine­

teenth century agricultural revolution initiated by Muhammad

Ali. The British continued by expanding the conversion of

Lower Egypt from the basin system of irrigation to the

perennial system whereby the land was able to yield nearly

two crops each year. The large-scale production of cotton, which required a long growing season and carefully regulated amounts of water, was the lucrative result of the agricul­

tural revolution.

Shortly after the establishment of the Condominium over Sudan, the governments of Egypt and Great Britain became concerned about the more effective use and control of the Nile, and an irrigation policy was developed for both

Egypt and the Sudan. These plans included a program to build a dam at Aswan (completed in 1902 and heightened in

1912 and again in 1930). Later, plans were approved in 1914 by the Egyptian government to build a dam on the White Nile at Gebel Aul.ia near Khartum (delayed by the World War and,

therefore, not completed until 1925). Lastly, plans to construct a dam on Lake Tsana in Ethiopia go back to 1902 when the Emperor Menelik signed a treaty with Great Britain 75 in which Ethiopia agreed not to alter the flow of the Blue

Nile except in agreement with the British and Sudanese governments. The Emperor Menelik even approved an Egyptian petition to study the technical aspects of building a dam on Lake Tsana (however, nothing more came of this latter project until after World War I).1"** (See Figure 4, p. 75.)

European Agreements

In 1906 Britain, France, and Italy concluded an agree­ ment to prevent an uncontrolled grab for Ethiopia in the event of the death of the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik.

Britain, in the name of Egypt and the Sudan, wanted security for an unimpeded flow of the Nile's sources while France wanted the inviolability of a particular railroad strip inside Ethiopia. Italy was given a potential sphere of influence in the north, south, and east of Ethiopia as required to preserve and enhance Italy's position in

Eritrea and Somaliland along with the right to a territorial connection between these two colonies. Lastly, each of the signators agreed to protect each other's interests and to 12 conduct any military intervention jointly.

Menelik died in 1913, and a civil war erupted in

Ethiopia which lasted until 1916 when Ras Tafari (the future Haile Selassie) came to the throne as regent and heir. World War I kept Ethiopia free from direct foreign intervention during this time. However, during the War and ; ••••V'.v . ; •J a ian.tg<.v ~IRRtCATtON PROJECTS j

2tra Sam{t| Uj-Oella'V^aSuK -

Asttut

K u e rv o ir

jennir£«rti tocnwv // TiaUJ ana1? & jKestrvdtr © (proposed) ishodj HC32A. Ac£)Am

2* j^O-Albe / j r (M Singli* Cfrupoaod) / jSS3T2A -0 •^/yXc&s

^ 'TK'Ti^ahrsapL^'jss^l Figure 4 Irrigation Projects on the Nilea

William L. Langer, "The Struggle for the Nile," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (January 1936), p. 264. at the Paris Peace Conference, Italy sought to improve her position in Ethiopia. In early 1919, the Italian Colonial

Minister, Gaspare Colosimo, drew up a list of claims he

hoped would be granted to Italy as part of the general peace

settlement. In regard to Ethiopia, Colosimo's program envisioned the annulment of the tripartite treaty of 1906,

thereby giving Italy a free hand in Ethiopia. The Italian

Prime Minister Orlando did not press for Colosimo’s compre- 13 hensive plan, and it was not put forward.

Italy, instead, proposed a more realistic plan to

Britain concerning Ethiopia in November 1919. Basically,

the proposal offered Britain the concession to construct a dam on Lake Tsana within the Italian sphere of influence if

Britain would in return recognize Italy's right to construct

a railway connecting Eritrea and Somaliland and recognize her exclusive right to the exploitation of Western Ethiopia.

The British government did not accept the Italian proposal because of strong objections within the British government

to having any foreign power establish control over the head- 14 waters of the Nile.

The entire question of European influence in Ethiopia

fell into a period of quiescence until the mid-1920's. All

three powers that signed the 1906 agreement were preoccupied with other pressing foreign and domestic issues after the

Paris Peace Conference. In the interim period, moreover,

the status of Egypt, the Sudan, and Ethiopia had changed. 78

Egypt received independence from Great Britain, the Sudan remained an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (whose fate was one of four reserved points to be settled between Britain and

Egypt in a future treaty) and Ethiopia's sovereighty was recognized by the League of Nations when she was admitted in

1923.

Despite the new status of the African states involved,

Britain and Italy proceeded to negotiate concerning the question of Lake Tsana in northern Ethiopia when British overtures to Ras Tafari to review a concession for Lake Tsana failed with what was believed to be French influence upon the Regent. By the summer of 1925, both Britain and Italy were challenged in East Africa by Ras Tafari's successful appeal to the League for a relaxation of arms controls on

Ethiopia. This led Italy and Britain to agree to an arrange­ ment over Ethiopia during the summer and to formalize it in

December with an exchange of notes between Sir Ronald 15 Graham, British Ambassador in Rome, and Signor Mussolini.

The British government accepted the identical Italian proposals it had rejected in 1919, and recognized them as being in agreement with the Tripartite Agreement of 1906.

The notes mutually recognized support in acquiring the consent of the Ethiopian government for the construction of a dam at Lake Tsana and an access road. It specified that the concession to Great Britain would be made inside the

Italian zone of influence.^ 79

In exchange, the British government undertook to support Italy in constructing a railway line from Eritrea across Ethiopian territory to Somaliland. It furthermore pledged to recognize "an exclusive Italian economic influence" in the remainder of Ethiopia and in the whole of the territory to be crossed by the above mentioned railway.

The Italian government, on its part, would "recognize the prior hydraulic rights of Egypt and the Sudan, engage not to construct on the headwater of the Blue Nile and the White

Nile and their tributaries and affluents any work which 17 might seriously modify their flow into the main river."

Egypt and the Nile After World War 1^

By the end of World War I, the problem of irrigation from the Nile waters, having been essentially a technical question since the British occupation, became a highly politicized issue. The emergence of Egyptian nationalist aspirations, the increase of cotton agriculture in both

Egypt and the Sudan, and the rapid growth in population 18 highlighted the political aspects of irrigation.

A Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Egyptian government in 1920 reported on the physical data of the plans, allocation of increased water between Egypt and the

Sudan, and the apportionment of costs. The Commission reviewed three major facets: 1) the White Nile Project in the Sudan, 2) the Lake Tsana plan in Ethiopia, and 3) a 80 technical agreement with Great Britain guaranteeing Egypt 19 her share of the Nile waters.

As a result/ in the 1920's there was a renewal of interest in Egypt in using the sources of the Blue Nile. In the early part of the decade, an expedition traveled to the

Lake Tsana region and reported favorably upon the greater 20 use of the water of the Lake.

The 1925 Anglo-Italian exchange of Notes over Ethiopia, including the Lake Tsana provision, proved frustrating to the Egyptians who had had absolutely no voice in the matter.

Britain chose to define Egyptian interests by leaning upon the precedent of the reserved points enumerated in 1922.

Furthermore, when in 1924, in reaction to the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, Lord Allenby had presented his ultimatum for the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the Sudan, it became clear that the unity of the Nile was in danger, and the formal demands of Saad Zaghlul that the Sudan revert to

Egypt appeared unattainable. Many Egyptians even feared that Britain would in the future put Sudanese interests before Egyptian when it came to questions of control of the

Nile. 21

Meanwhile, in order to clarify its position and to alleviate Egyptian fears, Britain signed a Nile Waters

Agreement with Egypt in 1929. It guaranteed Egypt the right to a necessary amount of water needed for irrigation. It also had the effect of recognizing the separateness of the 31

Sudan from Egypt. The agreement received much criticism within Egypt, but the Muhammad Mahmud government's decision to accept the Agreement reflected the urgency of securing

Egypt's irrigation needs. 2 2

Egypt was not included in conferences regarding Lake

Tsana until 1933. Prime Minister Ismail Sidky claimed that his predecessors had been ignorant of decisions made by previous conferences. He believed that the Egyptian govern­ ment should take advantage of progress made toward a possible irrigation project in Ethiopia because of Egypt's future agricultural needs. At the time, however, there was serious opposition to this Ethiopian arrangement from both politicians and the press. Many believed that it was a

British scheme to have Egypt pay for a project that would largely benefit Sudanese cotton growers. An important aspect of Egyptian fears was the fact that the Sudan and 23 Egypt no longer had a unified irrigation authority.

Ismail Sidky argued that the Sudan would not need water from the Lake Tsana Dam for twenty years, whereas Egypt would need additional water within ten years because of the second heightening of Aswan and the construction of the

Gebel Aulia Dam. He pacified the opposition with the assur­ ance that Egyptian delegates to the conference at Addis Ababa 82 had no authority to sign any agreement. The conference ended on February 22, 1933, after the Ethiopian government had accepted proposals of the Egyptian and Sudanese delegates that additional surveys be made with details being left for future discussion.2^

In May 1935 the Ethiopian government called another conference inviting delegates from Egypt, the Sudan, and

Great Britain. The latter did not accept because the

British government did not wish to aggravate what was then a brewing controversy between Italy and Ethiopia. The

Egyptian government also declined the invitation because the conference proposed was less than a month (June 1) from the date of the invitation. They believed that the Sudanese and Egyptian governments should first reach an agreement regarding the distribution of water to be stored in the Dam.

On September 4, the Egyptian Council of Ministers approved a draft agreement in which Egypt and the Sudan agreed on the subdivision of waters from the proposed Lake Tsana dam: the

Sudan was to receive ten percent of the waters for an annual payment to Egypt with the future right to increase her share up to fifty percent according to her future needs. Negotia­ tions proceeded no further basically because of the Italo-

Ethiopian conflict which created new strategic considera­ tions which overshadowed the question of a reservoir for

Lake Tsana. 2 5 83

Italy and Egypt, 1926-1934

Relations between Italy and Egypt were conditioned not only by Egyptian political instability but even more so by

Britain's position in Egypt. Between 1926 and 1936,

Egyptians witnessed the rise and fall of eleven governments, three of them with Wafd majorities and the rest Palace- backed. The Wafd governments were all short-lived, and led by Nahhas Pasha (former Secretary of the Wafd party) having taken leadership after the death of Saad Zaghlul in 1927.

King Fuad tampered heavily with the Egyptian parlamentary system. In 1928, he postponed elections and dissolved parliament. Later, in 1930, Ismail Sidky formed a pro-

Palace government in which the King supported the abolish­ ment of the 1923 Constitution and the drafting of a new one along with a new electroal law. The Sidky government, which was very autocratic, lasted for three years primarily because of Sidky's ability to manage the difficult economic problems in Egypt generated by the world-wide economic depression. 2 6

Egypt's relations with Great Britain remained central to Egyptian political life. Four sets of negotiations toward a treaty settlement ensued prior to 1936. The murder of Sir Lee Stack in 1924 led to the tightening of British control over Egyptian foreign and domestic policy, especially until 1930. An example of this can be seen in the lack of 84

Egyptian participation in 1925 in the Anglo-Italian Agree- 27 ment concerning Lake Tsana.

Italy remained politically and economically stable throughout most of the ten years of this period. However, many believe that Mussolini's war in Ethiopia in 1935 was designed, in part, to divert public attention from political and economic difficulties growing out of the Great Depres­ sion. Italian foreign policy had developed a distinctively aggressive tone by 1930. For the Middle East, Mussolini backed a forward policy. There was, for example, a concen­ trated effort to penetrate the Levant with Italian propa­ ganda. In Yemen, a more direct involvement of arms and financial aid in a conflict against Great Britain had been 28 underway since 1923.

Italo-Egyptian relations, however, appear to have undergone two distinct phases. Between 1924 and 1929, the

Anglo-Italian Colonial Entente between Mussolini and

Chamberlain resulted in Italy's not working aggressively to upset Britain's position in Egypt. Conversely, the period between 1930 and 1934 was one in which the Italians pro­ gressively intensified anti-British propaganda during and 29 after the invasion of Ethiopia.

In the early period, between 1924 and 1929, Mussolini had already begun his attempt to organize the Italian resident population in Egypt. Interestingly enough, a unique document in 1926 reviewed the state of the Italian 35

Fascist Movement in Egypt at that time. It characterized the Italian Fasces in Egypt, especially in Alexandria and

Cairo, as being unsuccessful in attracting a large member­ ship because of the well-organized Masonic Movement among

Italians in Egypt. The document suggested that one way to compete with the Masons was to build hospitals, schools, and recreational facilities for Italian residents with Fascist funds. This particular suggestion was readily adopted by

Mussolini and such a program was implemented in Egypt. By

1927, the Italian Fascists had initiated the construction of the Benito Mussolini Hospital at Alexandria, and in 1928 the Italian stadium at Port Said.^

Mussolini also encouraged the already cordial relation­ ship between the Italian and Egyptian royal houses. In 1927, when King Fuad took a European tour, his visit to Italy in early August lasted a week. The newspapers of both countries gave the visit extensive coverage. Among his other numerous activities, King Fuad's visit included an impressive parade through the streets of Rome with King Emmanuel, a private discussion with Mussolini, and a private audience with the

Pope. Fuad's visit to Italy received wide coverage in the

Egyptian newspapers, with most papers, including al-Ahram, and al-Siyasa, both of which stressed Italy's long political and economic and cultural ties to Egypt, praising his tour.

In February 1928, Italian Crown Prince Umberto visited Egypt 86 on a non-official trip hosted by King Fuad. He received a good reception in the press, and left a positive image of 31 the Italian royal house with the Egyptian populace.

Mussolini's Italy had impressed Fuad during the

Egyptian King's visit. When King Fuad announced the suspen­ sion of Parliament and the Constitution for a period of three years in July 1928 he communicated to Signor Paterno,

Italian Ambassador to Cairo, that he hoped Egypt would follow in Italy's footsteps. He further communicated that he appreciated the favorable Italian press coverage of his suspension of parliamentary government. Later, Mussolini communicated his pleasure with King Fuad's action through his Italian Ambassador in Cairo. Mussolini's approval of

Fuad's political intervention expressed itself further with the dedication of a monument of the King's father, Khedive 32 Ismail, in Alexandria by the Italian colony of that city.

More serious political and diplomatic relations between

Egypt and Italy centered upon the Libyan frontier question, issues surrounding the privileges of European powers in

Egypt and the subject of Italian citizenship in Egypt for

Dodecanese residents. As discussed in the above chapter the

Italo-Egyptian Libyan Frontier Treaty was not finalized until 1933. This in itself proved to be frustrating for

Italy because the Egyptian parliament vetoed the Treaty in

1926 and again in 1929. Furthermore, Italy was deep into a guerrilla warfare confrontation with the Sanusi and 87 concerned over the question of contraband from Egypt and the problem of a constant stream of military deserters to Egypt.

In January 1928, the Italian legation in Cairo and the

Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed an accord that 33 would guarantee the return of Italian deserters from Libya.

The system of Capitulations and the Mixed Courts growing out of the nineteenth century had not been nullified by the

British declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922. This question remained a constant theme of discontent exploited by Egyptian politicians and the Egyptian press. During the

1927 royal visit of King Fuad to Italy, the Egyptian press made appeals to the Italian government to help abolish the

Capitulations and Mixed Courts. In fact a dispatch in

January 1929 written from Mussolini to the Italian

Ambassador in Cairo, Signor Paterno, took note of the calls

for the Abolition of Capitulations and foresaw the guadual

removal of these foreign privileges in Egypt and the need

to move to create transitional organs that would transfer

the power and functions to Egyptian institutions. Mussolini

concluded, however, that discussions of the elimination of

foreign privileges in Egypt was premature, and that Italy had to recognize that other foreign powers had identical

interests in the matter and therefore Italy should possibly 34 let the initiative come from one of them.

One further development was an Italo-Egyptian Accord

in 1928 recognizing the Italian citizenship of those from 88 the Dodecanese Islands residing in Egypt. The Dodecanese were officially recognized as Italian in the Treaty of

Lausanne in August 1923. Egyptian recognition of Italian citizenship for Dodecanese inhabitants was an important diplomatic victory for Italy because both France and Greece heavily opposed it. In the case of Greece, Egyptian officials upon signing the agreement had to cope with internal disapproval from the largest foreign community in 35 Egypt.

In this period between 1930 and 1934, Italo-Egyptian relations followed the same pattern as the previous four years until 1934 when Italian designs on Ethiopian territory shaped a changing policy toward Egypt. By that time, furthermore, the quid pro quo terms of the Anglo-Italian working relationship had dissolved, particularly with the long tenure of the Labor government between 1929 and 1935.

The question of the Libyan frontier continued to be a discordant topic between Italy and Egypt between 1930 and

1933. In June 1930, th'ere was a meeting between Italians and Egyptians in Cairo to address Egyptian government com­ plaints of Italian intrusion into Egyptian territory in search of Sanusi guerrillas. The intrusion appearedto be an attempt to harass the Egyptians into finalizing the 1925 border agreement. This meeting took place shortly after

Ismail Sidky became Prime Minister. Sidky had been a major party to the original 1925 border agreement, and he was now 39 in an ideal situation to influence the passage of the

Italian-Egyptian-Libyan Border Treaty. In July 1932/ Sidky made a tour of Europe in an effort to appeal the recognition of Egypt's entrance into the League of Nations. During his two-day visit he and Mussolini discussed the border issue.

Evidently, they agreed to settle the issue because in the following year both Egypt and Italy formally ratified the

Accord. ^

Between 1930 and 1934, world economic depression had the most serious repercussions in Egypt. In the sphere of tariff policy Egypt had little independence prior to 1930.

For the greater part of the nineteenth century these matters were (as part of the Capitulations) controlled by the

Ottomans until 1889 when Egypt concluded a most-favored nation commercial treaty with Britain and subsequently with the other major powers. In 1902, an agreement with France limited most imported goods to an eight percent tariff, and this automatically applied to all other foreign powers based on the most-favored nation agreement. This particular agreement lasted until 1930 when it so happened that Egypt's commercial treaty would end when the last agreement with 37 ... Italy would expire.

In June 1930, Italy signed a new commercial accord with

Egypt mutually granting the most-favored nation treatment, the same agreement was made with other countries. Import duties naturally moved upward, with the average increment t

90 'i less than thirteen percent, and the heaviest not exceeding

thirty percent. Egyptian tariff policy became protectionist

in following the general world trend and the process of 38 underdeveloped nations attempting industrialization.

Among other problems, economic depression caused Egypt

difficulty in 1933 with the repayment of its Public Dept

‘(Caisse de la Dette) in gold coupons to France, Italy, and

Britain. The Egyptians had offered to pay the debt in paper,

but both French and Italian governments, speaking for their

countries1 respective bondholders, demanded repayment in

gold. In September 1934, Italy sent a letter to the Egyptian

government stating that it would be willing to receive paper

payment if France and Britain agreed. Egyptian editorial

comments concerning this letter suggested that the Italian

gesture was an obvious but insincere attempt to improve

Italy's image with Egypt and the Middle East at large. Some

editorialists, moreover, suggested that if Italy were a true

friend she would have accepted paper payment without making

it contingent upon French and British agreement. By

October 1934, Italy and Britain were in accord but France

refused to accept paper payment and Egypt was bound to the

...39 ...... decision to pay in gold.

Ties between the two royal houses continued to develop with the visit to Egypt of the Italian King Victor

Emmanuel III and his wife Queen Elena in mid-February 1933.

King Fuad hosted the visit along with Italian notables from 91

Alexandria. According to one British observer, the visit of

"the King and Queen of Italy was celebrated with a pomp and magnificence unseen since the palmy days of Ismail Pasha . .

. The Times of London, which covered the royal visit, pointed to the political implications. Mussolini continued to encourage the good ties between the two royal houses when, on the death of Fuad in 1936, he presented an eloquent eulogy to the Italian House of Deputies. He reminded Italians of

Fuad's early training in Italy and fluency in the Italian language. He praised Fuad's attempts to guide Egypt politically during its very stormy beginning years. He then 40 sent his good wishes to young King Faruk.

Egypt's bad experience over the Public Debt with the

Capitulary Powers openly offended the Egyptian sense of sovereignty, and it led to the increase of agitation for their abolition along with the Mixed Courts. In October 1934, the Egyptian government sent the Capitulatory Powers, other than Great Britain, a note requesting acceptance of the

Egyptian viewpoint regarding the recognition of the right of

Egyptian judges to preside over the Mixed Courts and the acceptance of the use of the Arabic language in giving judg­ ments. The British government had already given its assent, and the Italian government replied positively in February

1935. Long expected by the Italians, the Egyptian govern­ ment note began the move for the final abolition of foreign privilege.^ 92

Italian Fascist activity to organize Italian residents in Egypt continued during this period. For example, in 1930, the Fasces of Alexandria offered annual scholarships for a winning monograph written about Italian-Egyptian cultural, economic, and scientific relations. Furthermore, during

1933, a domestic society known as Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatah) espousing Fascist and nationalistic ideals, was founded under the leadership of Ahmad Husayn, a law graduate and young journalist. It is believed that the organization received financial backing and encouragement from King Fuad and his advisers, and several of the minority parties in

Egypt. Strangely enough, the Green Shirts (as they were called) vigorously attacked Italy's Middle Eastern policies in general and its activities in Libya in particular. Ahmad

Husayn visited Italy in August 1934 and returned to write a series of articles in the party's journal al-Sarkhah? they were highly critical of Fascist Italy, and called the claims of the founding of a glorious new Roman Empire sheer propa­ ganda. The Italian Embassy reacted strongly against the articles and brought charges of slander. In the mid- to late 1930's, however, Young Egypt became on occasion more 42 sympathetic to Fascism in Italy and Germany.

From 1926 to 1934, Italo-Egyptian relations portrayed a mixed picture. The royal visits had enormous positive political appeal to both countries as did the occasional favorable Italian decisions in the case of the Public Debt 93 issue or the Mixed Courts. The Libyan frontier treaty with

Egypt ratified in 1933, and the Sudan-Libyan Frontier Agree­ ment signed in 1934 were on the other hand highly disliked by the populace at large and heavily opposed by the Wafd of

Nahhas Pasha. It was clear, furthermore, to any astute

Egyptian political observer, that Italy strongly supported

Britain's general position in Egypt during this period— in part because Italy's occupation of Libya was even more vulnerable to attack for its blatant imperialism than was

Britain's occupation of Egypt.

Egyptian Reaction to the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute, 1935-1936

A clash between Ethiopian and Italian troops at Wal Wal on the undefined frontier between Italian Somaliland and

Ethiopia occurred on December 5, 1934. This skirmish acted' as a catalyst for both sides. In the exchange of notes by the two countries between December 6 and 11 it was obvious that Ethiopia as a sovereign member of the League saw the chance to challenge the legitimacy of Italian occupation before the League of Nations. Italy, on the other hand, recognized the opportunity to assert her territorial claims and, if necessary, use the Wal Wal incident as justification for* war. 43

Italy attempted to set the diplomatic stage for her planned aggression in Ethiopia by negotiating with the other two signers of the 1906 Agreement over Ethiopia. By the end 94 of January 1935, Mussolini had acquired the promise of a free hand in Ethiopia from French Foreign Minister Pierre

Laval, in return for joining a united front against a resur­ gent Germany. Both Britain and France, additionally, had by this time persuaded Ethiopia to abandon her appeal to the

League in favor of arbitration on the basis of the 1928

Friendship Treaty which Italy claimed Ethiopia had vio- 44 lated.

The unwillingness of the Italians to begin serious arbitration finally led Ethiopia to bring the problem to the

League on March 17, 193 5. The announcement by Hitler of

German repudiation of the disarmament provisions of the

Versailles Treaty on March 16 caused Britain and France to ignore the question of Ethiopia. At the Stresa Conference in April Mussolini was allowed to qualify the phrase "in

Europe" in the customary pledge to uphold peace and the status quo. Later, in June 1935, Italy felt that Britain would adhere to the earlier 1925 agreement with Italy because of a secret British government report available to Italian intelligence. The report stated that British interests in

Ethiopia were not so vital as to warrant any British resis- 45 tance to an Italian conquest.

When the League met in September 1935, Britain's

Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, speaking to the

Assembly, found himself caught between appeasing Mussolini and satisfying British public opinion. Hoare's speech to 95 the League implied to the members that Britain would support

League action against any Italian Fascist aggression.

However, the next day, Laval told Mussolini that Hoare would not contemplate military sanctions. On October 3, after the customary justifications had been made to the League,

General de Bono, without the benefit of a declaration of war, 46 and on Mussolini's orders, attacked Ethiopia.

Egyptian reaction to the Italo-Egyptian dispute took approximately six months in which to crystallize. This delayed reaction was primarily the result of a serious

Egyptian constitutional crisis which began in November 1934 when King Fuad ordered the repeal of the 1930 Constitution and the dissolution of the June 1931 Parliament. It was the

King's intent not to restore the 1923 Constitution, and he announced that he would assume all power for a transition period of unspecified duration. This crisis ended, however, when Fuad, with the advice of his newly appointed Prime

Minister Tawfiq Nasim Pasha and in the face of the creation of a united front composed of most of Egypt's parties, agreed to the return of the 1923 Constitution in December 1935.

Subsequently, elections in May of the following year led to a large Wafd victory and the resumption of treaty negotia­ tions with Great Britain (which resulted in large part because of the international crisis created by the Italo- 47 Ethiopian war). In early June 1935, The Egyptian Gazette reported that the constitutional crisis was now relegated to the back­ ground and the Italo-Ethiopian dispute in the forefront in all Arabic newspapers and in political circles in Cairo.

The article then proceeded to quote the Egyptian Prime

Minister1s statement that the

. . . government of Egypt is following the matter [the Italo-Ethiopian dispute] with great interest and is considering all the circumstances of the situation so as to be able to safeguard Egypt's interests and recognized rights in Lake Tsana.48

Italian military activity surrounded Egypt. Italian troops were sent to Libya on the Mediterranean, and those being sent to Eritrea and the Italian Somaliland on the Red

Sea throughout 1935, made Italy the second largest user of the Canal in that year. For example between February 1 and

October 2 of 1935, approximately 193,000 Italians went south through the Suez Canal. Only 8,000 went north in the same period, with a large number of them Somali troops replacing

Eritrean battalions in Libya. As a precautionary measure, between late August and late September, Britain strengthened its Mediterranean forces at Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez. The entire British Mediterranean fleet was moved from Malta to Alexandria so that it would be in the path of

Italian forces bound for East Africa through the Suez Canal.

(See Figure 5, page 97*) 97

?? ■•>•*■ &v

Figure 5. Italian Transport Bound for East Africa (November, 1935)a

aThe Times (London), November 9, 1935, p. 16. 98

Throughout the summer of 1935 Egyptian newspapers faith­ fully reported Italian troop activity and on several occa­ sions noted the- flight of Italian military aircraft over

Egyptian territory. Several Egyptian newspaper editorials speculated on the consequences to Egypt should Italy attack

Ethiopia. Al-Ahram suggested that Egypt follow the lead of the United States in declaring its neutrality in any Italo-

Ethiopian war. An al-Ahram editorial writer reasoned that

Egypt was not as threatened by the Italian occupation of

Ethiopia (and thereby the headwaters of the Blue Nile and

Lake Tsana) as the Sudan. Egypt had sufficient water from the White Nile through the Gebel Aulia Dam's nearing comple- 50 tion and through the enlargement of the Aswan Dam.

More typical of the editorials, however, were those showing concern over the effect that an Italo-Ethiopian war might have on Anglo-Egyptian relationships. Some editorials suggested that Britain might use the pending international crisis as an excuse to impose a British protectorate on

Egypt similar to that imposed prior to World War I. On the other hand, some newspaper editorials expressed the idea that

Egyptian leaders should make use of the pending international crisis to extract concessions from the British government.

Prince Omar Tusan, King Fuad's cousin, published a letter in which he stated that Egypt had one of the lowest proportion of men under arms of any of the Middle Eastern countries.

He underscored Egypt's dependence upon Britain for defense 99 against any planned Italian aggression— a fact which he 51 clearly lamented.

In early August, Prime Minister Nasim Pasha stated that in the event of an Italo-Ethiopian war the "Egyptian govern­ ment had not yet decided its attitude but that in every way it will conform with that of the British government." Nasim

Pasha accurately characterized the Egyptian position as being highly dependent upon Britain for its foreign policy and defense as outlined in the four reserved points. The

Egyptian press was very critical of the Prime Minister's statement because it appeared to imply that a virtual British 52 protectorate over Egypt remained.

In late August 1935, the German political Charge d'Affaires in London wrote to the German foreign ministry that it was "perfectly well-known in London that the Italians were striving in every possible way to increase their influence in Egypt and were laying out vast sums in bribes for this purpose." He continued by stating that

Mussolini's far-reaching aims in foreign policy in East Africa represented a serious threat to the vital interests of the British Empire, particularly since there are held to be certain signs that Mussolini will not be content with the conquest of Abyssinia but will try to extend his influence to Egypt and indeed to the Sudan. Yesterday, as if at a word of command, the British press, in telegrams from Cairo and editorial comment at home, printed news about extremely active Italian agitation in E g y p t53 . 100

The Times (London) continued throughout September and

October 1935 to complain bitterly of what it perceived to be an anti-British Italian propaganda barrage in Egypt. The main source of this propaganda was the special branch of the

Italian news agency, Stefani, which was headquartered in

Alexandria, next to the Italian Consulate. This service was available to any Egyptian newspaper, and, as The Times com­ plained, it presented Italy as "strong, united, resolute, and her critics as inept.

This special Italian news service also included articles and commentary in the Arabic and local foreign press calculated, reportedly, to play on Egyptian suscepti­ bilities. For instance, suggesting the incompatibility between Britain's sympathy for Ethiopia sovereignty and her refusal to grant Egypt real independence was designed to play upon Egyptian nationalist sentiment and anti-British feeling. Lastly, there was an Arabic broadcast from the

Bari Radio Station on the Adriatic coast which daily trans­ mitted strong criticism of British policy in the Near East 55 and particularly m Egypt.

In mid-September 1935, a leading Italian official charged in the Italian newspaper Voce d 1 Italia that serious unrest in the Cyrenaican portion of Libya was being fomented by Sanusi refugees from Egypt assembling at the frontier.

The Italian official went on to blame both the British and

Egyptian leaders for encouraging and organizing this 101 activity. The Egyptian Prime Minister issued an official communique denying any Egyptian involvement and the British press refuted the allegation as simply Italian paranoia.

Given the discordant tone of such an allegation when Italy was courting Egyptian good will it is likely that British and Egyptian military officials had indeed encouraged Sanusi rebels to harass ^— ilian officials in Libya. Britain, particularly, was concerned for the security of Egypt with

5 6 the stationing of at least one new division in Libya.

The gathering of some 144 British warships in the area of the Mediterranean and Red Seas by late September 1935 did result in a certain Italian apprehension. At one point,

Mussolini ordered his generals to prepare plans for a land attack on Egypt and the Sudan from Libya and Eritrea. The

Italian General Staff, however, noted Italy's vulnerability to the British fleet and concluded that war with Britain had at all costs to be avoided. Pierre Laval, however, relayed to Mussolini that the British naval buildup was purely pre­ cautionary and that Britain would not employ military force and close the Suez Canal. This set the final stage for Italy 57 to attack Ethiopia on October 3, 1935.

The Italian invasion of Ethiopia brought on a natural wave of sympathy from Egyptians for Ethiopians as fellow victims of European imperialism. Although Egyptian-

Ethiopian political and economic ties were not necessarily strong at the time, Egypt had been negotiating with Ethiopia 102 concerning the Lake Tsana reservoir project since 1933. In fact# Egypt had reached an understanding with the Sudan, and was ready to negotiate with Ethiopia in September 1935 when the ever present Italian threat of aggression jeopardized C p any progress on the topic.

Egyptian-Ethiopian cultural ties, however, predated modern Egyptian history. Egypt had some fifteen million

Muslims and approximately one million Coptic Christians while

Ethiopia was predominantly Coptic with a substantial Muslim population. Moreover, the Ethiopian Coptic Church was sub­ ordinate to the Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria and the

Patriarch of the Ethiopian Church was chosen traditionally from among the Coptic monks in Egypt. In addition, most

Ethiopian tribes speak Amharic or Gheez which, like Arabic, 59 are Semitic languages.

Egyptian sympathy for Ethiopia expressed itself in charitable and medical contributions of personnel and money throughout the duration of the war. The Coptic Church, for example, undertook efforts to organize and coordinate

Egyptian assistance on behalf of Ethiopia. The Young Men's

Muslim Association undertook a similar effort. On October 7, the above group had organized an ambulance service of

Egyptian doctors and nurses to be sent to Ethiopia. By early

November 1935, Egyptians had sent their third medical . . 60 mission. 103 The major form of protest that the Egyptians enlisted against Italian aggression in Ethiopia was the use of economic sanctions (following the lead of Great Britain and of the League of Nations). As early as October 12, 1935, al-Ahram predicted that the Egyptian government would be tied to whatever British policy might be in regard to the imposition of economic sanctions against Italy. Prime

Minister Tawfiq Nasim Pasha issued an official communique on

November 2 stating Egypt's determination to conform to what­ ever sanction the League of Nations might impose upon Italy.

On October 30, the Council of Ministers had already met to form a commission including the Ministers of Finance,

Justice, and Commerce to consider specific potential 61 Egyptian actions.

The Italian Ambassador in Cairo protested strongly against Egypt's decision. He noted Italy's support of Egypt in such questions as the Public Debt and the Mixed Courts.

He continued by stating that Egypt's decision to impose 6 2 sanctions against Italy appeared to be unjustified.

It was not until November 27 that the Egyptian Council of Ministers approved the work of their special commission regarding sanctions. This was nine days after the League of

Nations' members had applied them. Egypt decided to ban all

Italian imports and all Egyptian exports to Italy that fell under the League's guidelines except for cotton. Since cotton had the most strategic value of all Egyptian exports 104 and constituted the principal cash value import from Egypt, the sanctions imposed minimal sacrifices for both Egypt and

Italy. 6 3

Throughout October and November Italian military activity generated considerable apprehension in British circles regarding the protection of their position in Egypt.

Not only had the Italians reinforced the Cyrenaican frontier but by mid-November they had also reinforced Libya's border with the Sudan. There was, moreover, concern that the

50,000 to 60,000 Italian residents in Egypt would be prone to seditious political activity. British fears were inten­ sified when the Italian government asked for 500 volunteers from its foreign colony in Egypt and received immediate response as 82 Italian residents left Alexandria for war service shortly after the Italian invasion. Throughout the following month, furthermore, Italian residents of Alexandria continued, albeit in small numbers, to volunteer for the

Ethiopian campaign. As a result, during this time the

British government used its considerable influence in Egypt to increase surveillance of the activities of Italian residents.^

In the fall of 1935 Egyptians were more concerned about the consequences that the international crisis would have upon Anglo-Egyptian relations than any direct threat of invasion by Italy. Egyptians were fearful that Britain might take advantage of the international situation to 105 impose a protectorate upon Egypt similar to that imposed in

1914. On the other hand, British official circles expressed concern that Egypt would take advantage of circumstances to obtain concessions from Great Britain in any negotiations 6 5 toward a treaty settlement.

In early December 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare, British

Foreign Secretary, was unwilling to negotiate a treaty with

Egypt because of Britain's preoccupation with the continuing international crisis. It became clear by December 1935 that economic sanctions were having little effect on Italy because they were being half-heartedly enforced by.the proponent countries. Also, oil was not included on the economic sanctions list, and there was no decision to close the Suez Canal to Italian ships. During this time, Hoare and Laval, the French Foreign Minister, met to discuss strategy to keep Mussolini within the anti-German front by offering him two-thirds of Ethiopia. Known as the Hoare-

Laval Plan, the proposal was totally discredited when it appeared in the European press. With the Hoare-Laval appeasement effort sabotaged, Italy launched a major offen­ sive in Ethiopia in 1936. On May 5, 1936, the Italians captured Addis Ababa and the Ethiopian Emperor fled into exile. On May 9, the King of Italy assumed the title of

Emperor of Ethiopia and the following July the League lifted economic sanctions against Italy, thereby implicitly recog­ nizing Italy's occupation of Ethiopia.*56 106

Meanwhile, all Egyptian parties, having declared them­ selves a United Front in mid-December 1935, presented the

High Commissioner, Sir Miles Lampson, with a request for a statement by the British government indicating its willing­ ness to conclude a treaty based on the 1930 Nahhas-Henderson talks. The High Commissioner forwarded the request.

Sir Samuel Hoare, having resigned over the abortive Hoare-

Laval Pact, was replaced by Sir Anthony Eden. In January

1936, the new British Foreign Secretary declared his

Government's willingness to enter into negotiations with a 6 7 constitutional Egyptian government.

Domestic political conditions in Egypt were optimal for finally negotiating a treaty with Britain. Constitutional government had returned in December 1935 with free elections scheduled for May 1936 while a caretaker government presided until then. On February 13, an Egyptian delegation, includ­ ing Nahhas Pasha, was formed, and negotiations began in the beginning of March under the leadership of Sir Miles Lampson.

Negotiations adjourned in April, however, primarily because of the hesitancy of the Egyptians. The Palace politicians were Italophiles, and desired to wait until Great Britain and Italy were on better terms. Nahhas Pasha, on the other hand, wanted to wait until after the May elections when he 6 8 would be Prime Minister.

Meanwhile, Italo-Egyptian relations appeared to be improving since their low point with the Egyptian imposition 107 of economic sanctions against Italy in November 1935. An improvement of relations in the spring of 1936 was in the interest of both nations. Italy, also, was attempting to keep Egypt from signing a treaty with Britain that would give overly generous military terms. On the other hand,

Egypt was encouraging Italian good relations as a ploy to create a favorable negotiating position with Britain. In regard to the Egyptian sanctions on Italy, in February the newspaper al-Gihad complained that despite the exclusion of cotton the sanctions had seriously damaged the Egyptian balance of trade and that Great Britain should reimburse

Egypt for her losses in having to follow the British lead in this decision. Later, in mid-April, after the postpone­ ment of negotiations with Great Britain, Egypt rescinded most of its economic sanctions against Italy. Al-Balagh justified the Egyptian governmental action as being realistic concerning Egypt's interests and recognizing that Italy was now the certain master of Lake Tsana; furthermore, the 69 writer noted, Egypt was not even a member of the League.

The general improvement in. the tone of Italo-Egyptian relations continued in late March with the appointment of a new Egyptian Ambassador to Rome. Then, al-Ahram released a news brief stating that Italy and Egypt were working toward a signing a non-aggression pact. Later, in response to the article in the Egyptian press, Signor Suvich, Italian

Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made an open 108 declaration of Italy's profound friendship for Egypt and how

Italy had no aggressive intent toward Egypt. Also, he claimed that Italy was always willing to come to an under­ standing with Egypt in order to guarantee the maintenance of 70 common frontiers.

On April 6 , Ali Maher Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt, invited the Italian Ambassador for a conference in order to inquire as to Italy's intentions concerning the waters of the Blue Nile and Lake Tsana. This move on the part of the

Egyptians angered the British government since Britain was still bound to speak for Egypt on the question of Lake Tsana 71 based on the 1925 Anglo-Italian Agreement.

The death of King Fuad on April 28, neutralizing palace opposition, seemed to be a turning point for Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for a treaty. The British were now eager to come to an understanding with the Egyptians, particularly with the increasingly good relationship developing between

Egypt and Italy. The strong victory of the Wafd Party in the early May election, furthermore, gave Nahhas Pasha a 72 freer hand domestically m the treaty negotiations.

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed on August 26, 1936.

The Treaty resolved only one of the Four Reserved Points.

This was the question of the protectorate of foreign and minority interests in Egypt. As for the defense of Egypt against aggression, an Anglo-Egyptian twenty-year military alliance replaced the British occupation. It stipulated the 109 maintenance of a British garrison of ten thousand men in the

Canal Zone to ensure the security of British imperial com­ munications. Concerning the Sudan, the Treaty specified that the Sudanese themselves could eventually choose between national sovereignty and an allegiance to either Egypt or

Britain.^

The Treaty did formalize Egypt's complete independence by giving her freedom in the conduct of her diplomatic rela­ tions. The British High Commissioner became His Majesty's

Ambassador to Egypt, and the Wafd government proceeded with the "Egyptianization" of the leadership positions in the

Egyptian armed forces and civilian government posts. As a consequence of the Treaty, Capitulations came to an end, and

Mixed Courts were to come to an end by 1949. Also, Egypt received concessions in regard to the Suez Canal Company in which it was provided that an Egyptian would serve on the

Board of Directors, Egypt would receive increased revenues, and would be guaranteed that a certain percentage of the 7 4 work force would be Egyptian.

The period 1926 to 1936 was distinctly important to both

Egypt and Italy in that it brought to completion a phase in the history of both countries which had begun with new directions in 1922. For Italy, the conquest of Ethiopia in

1936 seemed to lend credibility to Mussolini's much-desired

Italian Empire. Egypt, on the other hand, signed a treaty with Britain in 1936 that had been pending since 1922. The 110

treaty technically recognized Egyptian sovereignty, particu­

larly in the sphere of the conduct of foreign policy. For both countries, the events cited above were the most signi­

ficant to happen to each of them in the ten year period.

Italy's invasion of Ethiopia directly lead to the

finalization of a treaty between Britain and Egypt. Egyptian

apprehension over the Italian preparation for an eventual

invasion of Ethiopia was that it would adversely affect

Anglo-Egyptian relations by giving Britain the rationale to reinstate a Protectorate over Egypt. The fear of an Italian

invasion of Egypt was a secondary concern to this main issue.

This is not generally the view expressed in the British press of that period but it is the one expressed in the

Egyptian press.

British domination over Egyptian foreign policy of this period was complete. The High Commissioners Lord Lloyd,

Sir Percy Loraine, and Sir Miles Lampson left little inde­ pendence in this area, having the confidence that the

British Army in Egypt could be employed. Italian influence

in domestic policy was noticeable in the late 1920's through influence on King Fuad, but when the King's health began to fail in the early 1930's this influence was signi­

ficantly curtailed. Even Italy's anti-British propaganda assault in Egypt proved to have little impact upon Egyptian leaders after 1934. Ill

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, despite the generous military terms (to the British), brought sufficient change in the status of Egypt’s ability to conduct an independent foreign policy so that Italy was to exert a decidedly stronger counterweight to Britain in Egypt in the pre-World

War II years. NOTES

Virginia MacLean, "Domestic and Foreign Factors in Egyptian Foreign Policy/" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation; Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1955), pp. 231-232; Hugh Joseph Schonfield, The Suez Canal in World Affairs (London; Constellation Books, 1952), p. 8 6 .

2 Ibid.; Raoul Aglion, War in the Desert; The Battle for Africa (New York; Henry Holt and Company, 1941), pp. 103-104.

3 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt's Liberal Experi- ment, 1922-1936 (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1977), pp. 180-181. 4 P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 6 8 ; Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, translated by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960) , p. 372. (first published in German in 1932) 5 Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), pp. 292-293. (first pub­ lished in 1959)

^George W. Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1^67), pp. 1-3; C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy 1878-1940 (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 30, 57. 7 Baer, op. cit., pp. 4-5; Baer suggests that Menelik was generous in allotting territory to the Italians in order to keep the idea of an outside threat as an incentive to his subordinates for keeping his Empire unified. g Fisher, op. cit., p. 293. Q MacLean, op. cit., p. 172; William L. Langer, "The Struggle for the Nile," Foreign Affairs, XIV, No. 2 (January 1936), pp. 264-266. 112 113

Egypt, Ministry of Public Works, Nile Control, by Sir Murdoch MacDonald (Cairo: Government Press, 1921), p. 9; basin irrigation is the system in which a winter crop, primarily cereals, depends upon the annual flood between August and October, This caused many difficulties in high and low flood years; Langer, loc. cit., p. 266.

■^Great Britain, Treaty Series No. 17 (1929), "Report of the Nile Commission, 1925" (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1929); MacLean, op. cit., p. 180.

12 Baer, op. cit., p. 6 ; Canada, Secretary for External Affairs, Documents Relating to the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict (Ottawa: J. O. Patenaude, ISO, 1936), pp. 32-35; the latter contains a reprint of the 1906 Agreement.

13 Baer, op. cit., p. 9; Alan Cassels, Mussolini1s Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 294; Italy, Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, 1918-1922, Series 6 , Vol. I, No. 798, pp. 455-457. (Henceforth, this series will be cited as DPI.)

^Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy 1914-1937 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 289-290.

15 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., p. 290; Cassels, op. cit., pp. 296-298; DPI, Series-7 C1922-1935), No. 211, p. 155; Ibid., No. 252, p. 180; Ibid., No. 267, pp. 190-191. After the 1925 Anglo-Italian Agreement over Lake Tsana, Ethiopia complained bitterly to both countries and many members of the League of Nations. The rationale offered Ethiopia was that this agreement was more relevant to the Italian economic sphere recognized in the 1906 Agreement rather than political and territorial questions.

^ Ibid.; Raffaele Guariglia, Ricordi, 1922-1946 (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1950), p. 4TI Britain's decision to seek an agreement with Italy concerning Lake Tsana in 1925 had apparently caught Italian diplomats off guard. Guariglia states that "it feel like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky;" Great Britain, Treaty Series No. 16 (1926), "Notes Exchanged between the United Kingdom and Italy respecting Lake Tsana," (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office), pp. 2-3, 3-9; the Italo-British Agree­ ment to support each other over Ethiopia was highly disturb­ ing to France, and did little to improve their hostile 114 relations. Italians resented French influence in Ethiopia and believed France the only one to have neglected the benefits of the 1906 Agreement by eventually building a rail­ road. See Muriel Innes Currie, Italian Foreign Policy, 1918-1932 (London: Ivar Nicholson and Watson, Ltd., 1932), pp. 1 8 1 -1 8 2 .

•^Treaty Series No. 16 (1926), loc. cit., pp. 3, 9, 11.

18 MacLean, op. cit., p. 181.

1 9 Ibid., p. 184.

20 Egyptian Government, Ministry of Public Works, The Problem of the Upper Nile, by F. Newhouse (Cairo: Government Press, 1929), p. 43.

21 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 280; MacLean, op. cit., p. 188; Lieutenant-Colonel P. G. Elgood, The Transit of Egypt (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1928), pp^ 294-296; The Times (London), November 7, 1927, p. 4; Langer, loc. cit., p. 271; Ethiopia consulted with a New York engineering firm to negotiate a contract to construct a dam on Lake Tsana in 1927; this elicited some concern on the part of both Great Britain and Egypt. However, in 1930 the Ethiopian government invited Sudanese officials to participate in discussions with the New York-based firm.

22 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 280; Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1934) , II, pp. 285-290. Lord Lloyd states that the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement "went . . . a long way in the direction of a practical settlement of one of these points [reservation], for it deprived of all real effectiveness the agitators often repeated the cry that Great Britain was prepared to coerce Egypt by cutting off her water supply."

23 MacLean, op. cit., p. 186; Langer, loc. cit., p. 271.

2^The Egyptian Gazette, January 17, 1933, p. 3; Langer. loc. cit., pp. 267, 271; Egypt would have sufficient water because of other projects but summer water was needed (that is, from Lake Tsana) to develop her land and irrigation projects to the limit.

25 The Egyptian Gazette, September 4, 1935, p. 4; Langer, loc. cit., p. 272. 115

26 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 278- 286; Al-Sayyid- Marsot, op. cit., p. 139; A. Hulme Beamon, "The Political Situation in Egypt," The Contemporary, CXXXII, No. 739 (July 1927), pp. 15-23.

2 7 Ibid.

28 Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini1s Roman Empire (New York: The Viking Press, 1976) , p. 33.

9 Q DPI, Series 7, Vol. V, No. 208, p. 212; a dispatch written by Mussolini and dated May 19, 1927, explicitly reveals Italy's sympathy and collaboration with Britain in Egypt at the time; Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Mussolini: A Study in Power (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1964), pp. 166-167. Despite Mussolini's personal affection for Arthur Chamberlain and other British Conservatives, he basically distrusted the British.

3n DPI, Series 7, Vol. IV, No. 281, pp. 200-202; "Iniziativa dei Fascisti Italiani in Egitto per le costruzione di un ospedale ad Alessandria," Oriente Moderno, VII (1927), p. 513; Ibid., "Inauguarazione di uno Stadio Italiano a Porto Sa'id," Oriente Moderno, VIII (1928), p. 80.

31 The Egyptian Gazette, August 4, 1927, p. 3; Ibid., February 4, 1928, p. 4; “il sorrizorno del Re Fu'ad A Roma," "La Visita al Papa," "Articoli di giornali arabi egiziano en occasione della visita del Re Fu'ad a Roma," Oriente Moderno, VII (1927), pp. 380-383; Ibid., "La visita del Principe Ereditario d'Italia in Egitto," "Commentti dei gior'nali egiziani alia visita del Principe Ereditario d'Italia in Egitto," "Saluto di studenti egiziana al Principe Ereditario d'ltalia," Oriente Moderno, VIII (1928), pp. 79-80.

3 2 DDI, Series 7, Vol. VI, No. 501, pp. 438-439; Ibid., No. 515, p. 452; Ibid., No. 527, p. 469; "Un monumento al Khedive Isma'il Pascia offerto dalla Colonia italiana alia citta di Alessandria," Oriente Moderno, IX (1929), p. 140.

33The Egyptian Gazette, April 12, 1929, p. 4; DPI, Series 7, Vol. VII, No. 204, p. 231; "Accordo tra Egitto e Italia per la consegna dei disertori," Oriente Moderno, VIII (1928), p. 81. 116

M M "Articola di giornali arabi egiziani in occasione della vista del re Fu'ad a Roma," Oriente Moderno, VII (1927), p. 381. This specific reference was published in al-Muquattam See also DDI, Series 7, Vol. VII, No. 203, PP. 230-231. 35 "Accordo italo-egiziano per il reconoscimento della cittadinanza italiana dei Dodecannesini," Oriente Moderno, VIII (1928), pp. 368-369.

36 "II Presidente dei Ministri, che ha referito nel consiglio sui presidenti suoi colloqui con il Ministro d'Italia al Cairo, . . .," Oriente Moderno, X (1930), pp. 640-655? Ibid., "Viaggio del Presidente dei Ministri in Europa," XII (1932), p. 387; Ibid., "L'Accordo per Giaghbub e i confini tra Egitto e Cirenaica approvato dal Parlamento Italiano," XIII (1933), p. 152; MacLean, op. cit., p. 230? also, in 1934, there was a rectification of the Libyan- Sudanese Border; The Egyptian Gazette, March 12, 1934. Quoted in the Gazette was an al-Ahram editorial discussion of the fact that Italy had closed the border in 1931 because of increased smuggling problems with the Sanusi. Ibid., July 25, 1934, p. 5.

37 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 283-284; Egypt, Ministry of Finance, "History of the Customs Regime in Egypt," Annual Statement of Foreign Trade, 1933 (Cairo: Government Press, 1935), pp. 5-6.

3 8 Italy, Ministero degli affari esteri, Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri~stati, V o l . XLI (1930) (Rome: La Libreria della Stato, 1865-1958), pp. 820- 823? MacLean, op. cit., pp. 236-238; The Egyptian Gazette, February 1, 1930, p. 2.

39 The Egyptian Gazette, June 28, 1933, p. 5; Ibid., December 5, 1933, p . 3; Ibid., September 18, 1934, pp. 4,8; Ibid., September 21, 1934, p. 4; MacLean, op. cit., p. 210. ' 4o" "Sul viaggio dei Sovrani italiani in Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XIII (1933), pp. 146-147? The Times (London), February 22, 1933, p. 13? The Egyptian Gazette, February 8 , 1933, p. 5; Ibid., February 20, 1933, p. 9; Mabel Caillard, A Lifetime in Egypt, 1876-1935 (London: Grant Richards, 1935), p. 266; Benito Mussolini, Opera Omnia, edited by E. and D. Susmel (Florence: La Fenice, 1951-1961), XXVII, pp. 262-263, 117

^1The Egyptian Gazette, October 20, 1934, p. 5; Ibid., February 23, 1935, p. 7.

^"Un concorso per una monografia, sui rapporti tra l'ltalia e l'Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. X (1930), p. 39; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 28 6 ; James Paul Naknowski, "The Young Egypt Party and Egyptian Nationalism 1933-1945," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1967), pp. 22, 41; James Paul Jankowski, Egypt1s Younc; Rebels "Young Egypt": 1933-1952 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), p. 20.

43 Alan Cassels, Fascist Italy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1969), pp. 83-84; Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., p. 253; Germany, Auswartiges Amt, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry^ Series C (1933-1937), Vol. Ill (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959), No. 402, 403, pp. 759-760. When approached after the Wal Wal incident the German Ambassador was instructed to maintain a strict neutrality and when the Ethiopian Emperor asked for arms the Germans refused him not wishing to antagonize Italy and send her closer into the anti-German camp.

44 Cassel, Fascist Italy, pp. 84-86; Lowe and Marzari, p. 260.

45 Cassels, op. cit., pp. 85-86; Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., pp. 262-263, 271; in June 1935, Anthony Eden went to Rome to offer Mussolini a piece of Ethiopian territory for which Britain would compensate Ethiopia out of British Somaliland. Mussolini refused the offer. The British government was facing a new election, and public opinion favored the League. British leaders could not openly give Mussolini carte blanche.

46 . Cassels, op. cit., p. 87; Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., p. 283. 47 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 284-286; The Egyptian Gazette, June 10, 1935, p. 5.

48_. . , Ibid.

^ Muhmud Y. Zayid, Egypt's Struggle for Independence (Beirut: Khayat's, 1965), p. 148; The Times (London), 118

October 15, 1935, p. 13? The Egyptian Gazette, August 26, 1935, p. 5? Anthony Jacob Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace 1915-1940 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 69-70. Sir Miles Lampson [Lord Killearn], The Killearn Diaries 1934- 1946, edited by Trefor E. Evans (London: Sedewick and • Jackson, 1972), pp. 3, 50-52? Lord Killearn had arrived in Egypt in January 1934, replacing Sir Percy Loraine as British High Commissioner. Newly married to the daughter of an Italian medical specialist, Lord Killearn received his father-in-law on May 21, 1935, while going through Suez to inspect Italian medical facilities in Somalia and Eritrea. On his return ten days later, his father-in-law stopped again to see Lord Killearn, and clearly stated that Italy meant war but that Lake Tsana would not be touched by Italy.

^The Egyptian Gazette, February 23, 1935, p. 7? Ibid., February 25, 1936 , p” 5? Ibid., August 22, 1935, p. 4.

51 The Egyptian Gazette, July 30, 1935, p. 7? Ibid., July 31, 1935, p. 4? Ibid., August 1, 1935, p. 4? Ibid., September 20, 1935, p. 5? "II Principe Omar Tusan Chiedi un aumento dell 1 esercito egiziano e parla delle asperazioni italiane nell'Africa Orientale," Oriente Moderno, XV (1935), pp. 405-406. Prince Omar Tusan cited Turkey with 9.54% of the population under arms, along with eight percent for Greece and 3.65% for Iraq. On the other hand, Egypt had only 0.79% of its population under arms, approximately 1 0 , 0 0 0 men in the armed forces concentrated mainly in twelve batallions and two tank squadrons.

52 "Dichiarazioni del Presidente del Ministri sull' atteggiamento del Governo egiziano in caso di guerra tra l'ltalia e l'Ethiopia," Oriente Moderno, XV (1935), p. 406.

53 Germany, Auswartiges Amt, Documents in German Foreign Foreign Policy 1913-1945, Series C (1933-1937), Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Press, 1962), No. 278, pp. 600-602.

. 5 4 Zayid, op. cit., p. 142? The Times (London), September 18, 1935, p. 10.

55 Ibid.

5^Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., p. 283? The Egyptian Gazette, September 18, 1935, pT ia? Ibid., September 17, 119

1935, p. 7; Marder, op. cit., p. 74; at the height of the crisis in late October 1935, the existing situation resulted in 56,000 Italian troops in Libya and 15,500 British in Egypt in contrast to the normal figures of 20,000 and 11,000 respectively.

57 Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., pp. 282-283; Marder, op. cit., p. 74; Lampson, op. cit., p. 53; on October 1, 1935, two days before the Italian attack on Ethiopia, Lord Killearn flew over the harbor at Alexandria and commented upon the "magnificent sight. Stuffed with British warships. A really good show." See George Martelli, Italy Against the World (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930), p. 190.

58 Zayid, op. cit., p. 151; "L'Egitto e la controversia italo-etiopica,Tl Oriente Moderno, XV (1935), pp. 406-407.

59 Ibid.; Aglion, op. cit., p. 103.

6 0 The Times (London), October 2, 1935, p. 13; Ibid., October 8 , 1935, p. 13; "La terza Missione medica egiziano per l'Etiopia," Oriente Moderno, XV (1935), p. 671.

61 The Egyptian Gazette, November 4, 1935, pp. 7-8; Ibid., November 28, 1935, p. 5; "Gl'Inglesi vorrebbero costringere 1 'Egitto a participare alle sanzion contro l'ltalia," Oriente Moderno, XV (1935), p. 538; Ibid., "II communicato ufficiale del Governo egiziano a proposito dell' adesione alle sanzioni," p. 609; "Protesta italiana per l'adesione alle sanzioni," p. 609; "Protesta italiana per 1'adesione alle sanzioni," pp. 609-610.

62 "Commenti italiano all'adesione egiziana alle sanzioni economiche," Oriente Moderno, XV (1935), p. 160.

6 3 The Egyptian Gazette, November 28, 1935, p. 5; The Times (London), November 18, 1935, p. 14; Angelo Piero Sereni, The Italian Conception of International Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), p . 320; the League of Nations exacted sanctions on November 18, 1935. Italy reacted by denouncing economic and financial agreements with the states which applied sanctions. Credits of their citizens in Italy were frozen. When sanctions were revoked in July 1936 Italy made new economic and financial agreements with these states. See Emilio de Bono, Anno XIIII [XIV], The Conquest of an Empire (London: The Crescent Press, Ltd., 1937), p. 78. Despite the general consensus that the 120 economic sanctions were ineffectual General de Bono comments that Italian commercial attaches found Egyptian and Sudanese officials to be obstructionist in obtaining food supplies.

64 Zayid, op. cit., p. 148; The Times (London), October 4, 1935, p. 5; Ibid., October 5, 1935, p. 12; "Aumentata sorveglianza sugli Italian! in Egitto," Oriente Moderno, XV (1935), p. 538; Ibid., "Preparativi militari verso la Cirenaica, ed istituzione de una 'zona vietata' nel Deserto Occidentale," p. 670; interview with Mr. Luigi Fortunato, Italian Army Private who participated in the Ethiopian invasion, July 20, 1978; Mr. Fortunato recalls his passage through Suez in early October 1935, and the boarding of Italian residents of Egypt at Port Said.

G 5 Zayid, op. cit., p. 15; John A. Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1956 (Hamden, Conn.: Arbor Books, 1965), p. 95 (first published in 1954); Lampson, op. cit., p. 71; in his memoirs, Lord Killearn recounted, on June 5, 1936, a meeting with British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden concern­ ing the Anglo-Egyptian problem. Eden asked him whether he did not believe that ultimately the "only fundamental solu­ tion of the problem was the inclusion of Egypt in the British Empire?" Lord Killearn answered that the same question had been on his mind from the first moment he had reached Egypt in the summer of 1934.

6 6 Marlowe, op. cit., p. 295; al-Sayyid-Marsot, op. cit., pp. 175-176; Cassels, Fascist Italy, pp. 87-88; The Times (London), November 30, 1935, p. 12; The Times reported that the Anglo-Egyptian oil refinery at Suez liberally con­ tinued to sell oil to Italians to fuel warships going through the Suez Canal toward the Port of Massawa; Luigi Federzoni, "Hegemony in the Mediterranean," Foreign Affairs, XIV, No. 3 (April 1934), pp. 387-397; Gaetano Salremini, "Can Italy Live at Home," Foreign Affairs, XIV, No. 2 (January 1936), pp. 243-258.

67Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op. cit., pp. 176-177; Marlowe, op. cit., p. 296.

6 8 MacLean, op. cit., p. 150; Marlowe, op. cit., p. 297.

G9 "Effeti delle sanzioni sulla balancia commerciale egiziana," Oriente Moderno, XVI (1935), p. 171; The Egyptian Gazette, April 17, 1936, p. 4. 121

70 "Smentita a trattative segrete italo-egiziana per un patti di non-aggressione," Oriente Moderno, XVI (1936), p. 227; The Times (London), April 1, 1936, p. 15; The Times initially claimed that this was a ruse planted by Italian propaganda. See also The Egyptian Gazette, April 7, 1936, p. 5.

71 The Times (London), April 6, 1936, p. 12; Ibid., April 20, 1936, p. 14; "Richiesta egiziana di assicurazioni italiane riguardo al Lago Tana," Oriente Moderno, XVI (1936), pp. 227-228; Ibid., "L'Egitto sospende ogni decisione intorno al progetto di serbatoio del Lago Tana," XVI (1936), p. 476; in early July, Egypt officially announced the suspension of all plans in regard to Lake Tsana because of the unstable situation in Ethiopia.

72 The Egyptian Gazette, May 6, 1936, p. 5; Marlowe, op. cit., pp. 297-298; "Commemorazione del re Fuad alia Camera italiana dei Deputati," Oriente Moderno, XVI (1936), pp. 282- 283.

73 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 287; Marlowe, op. cit., pp. 300-302; The Egyptian Gazette, August 20, 1936, pp. 3-4; The Times (London), January 26, 1937, pp. vii-viii. Full texts were published in both newspapers.

74 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 287-288; Randolph Gherson, "The Anglo-Egyptian Question," The Middle East Journal, VII, No. 4 (Autumn 1953), pp. 476-477. CHAPTER IV

ITALO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS APPROACHING

WORLD WAR II, 1937-1942

After the brief period of good will in the spring pre­ ceding the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Italo-

Egyptian relations were to take a deep plunge in 1937 when

Italy, ignoring the role of the Coptic Patriarch of

Alexandria in choosing the head of the Ethiopian Coptic

Church, unilaterally appointed a new Patriarch. Italy barely offset bruised Egyptian sensitivities in 1937 when the sign­ ing of the Montreux Convention providing for the abolishment of the Mixed Courts and Capitulations and supporting

Egyptian entry into the League of Nations.^"

In the following year, however, official relations improved, and Egypt recognised the King of Italy as the

Emperor of Ethiopia and the government of Mahmud Pasha joined Britain and Italy in adhering to sections of three agreements in which Egypt was concerned. One agreement provided for an exchange of information on armed forces of the contracting parties in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, the Gulf of Aden, Egypt, and the Sudan. Another provision called for additional guarantees to abide by the Convention of 1888 providing for free use of the Suez Canal. In a 122 123 third agreement, Italy gave assurances to the Egyptian government regarding Lake Tsana. At the same time a bon voisinage (Good Neighbor) agreement of the three powers con­ tained written assurances for the furtherance of good rela­ tions on the frontiers of Italian East Africa, the Sudan,

2 Kenya, and British Somaliland.

The above agreements, made in 1937 and 1938, were some­ what feeble attempts to maintain the status quo in the

Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Both Italy and Britain violated the agreements, particularly by reinforcement of troops in Libya and Egypt. Italy's attachment to the Axis became semi-official in November 1937 when she signed the

Anti-Comintern Tripartite Treaty with Japan and Germany. In the next month, Italy's dramatic withdrawal from the League signalled further estrangement from the Allies. Finally, in 1939, the Pact of Steel with Germany placed Italy squarely 3 in the Axis camp.

When Italy entered the War in June 1940, the Egyptian government, legally bound to Britain by Article VII of the

1936 Treaty, declared martial law and eventually sequestered and deported Italy's Embassy officials. A succession of

Egyptian governments, however, refused to declare war on

Italy unless directly attacked. Even when Egypt was attacked by Italy, Egyptian leaders hesitated to declare war and continued to maintain the position of non-belligerence until 1945 when Egypt declared a defensive war against the 124 remaining Axis Powers, Germany and Japan. Italy had signed a separate armistice with the Allies in 1943.^

The Pre-World War II Years, 1937-1939

This very crucial period in Italo-Egyptian relations continued to be conditioned by the Egyptian domestic poli­ tical situation and the continued British presence. The

Wafd, which came to power under Nahhas Pasha in May 1936, was responsible for negotiating the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in that following August. With the 1936 Treaty bringing

Anglo-Egyptian relations temporarily to the background, the power struggle became concentrated in the opposition between the King and the Wafd.^

The young King Faruk, who had inherited the throne from his father under a Regency Council in April 1936, assumed full constitutional powers in July 1937. The new King turned to his father1s trusted friend Ali Maher to serve as

Chief of the Royal Cabinet. Faruk combatted the Wafd with tactics used by his father— such as manipulating the budget, controlling religious institutions, and commissioning army officers. He sought the support of the Azharites, univer­ sity students , and the extreme right wing (Fascist) organi­ zation, Misr al-Fatah (Young Egypt). Known as the Green

Shirts, this youth organization tended to support the King's forces against the Wafd and its Blue Shirts (who had been 125 founded to mobilize party members and the masses as well as g to intimidate and terrorize the opposition).

The British presence in Egypt during the pre-World

War II years took on a different tone from that which had permeated Anglo-Egyptian relations since the 1922 unilateral declaration of independence by Great Britain. The 1936 treaty had made the British High Commissioner an Ambassador, and Sir Miles Lampson acted accordingly until World War II.

Less direct interference in domestic affairs could be noticed, but in the conduct of foreign affairs the British military presence was too intimidating to be ignored.

However, the point must be made that in the realm of the defense of Egypt, British and Egyptian interests generally 7 corresponded.

On January 2, 1937, Italy and Great Britain signed an agreement in regard to the Mediterranean popularly known as the "Gentleman's Agreement." It called for a "status quo as regards [to the] national sovereignty of territories in the Mediterranean." It further stated that the two powers would "respect each other's rights and interests in that area." Specifically, the British hoped the agreement would encourage Italy to suspend assistance to the Franquistas in the Spanish Civil War which had begun in 1936— but it proved to have very little effect. More importantly, in regard to

Egyptian territory, the agreement implied that Italy would 125 founded to mobilize party members and the masses as well as

g to intimidate and terrorize the opposition).

The British presence in Egypt during the pre-World

War II years took on a different tone from that which had permeated Anglo-Egyptian relations since the 1922 unilateral declaration of independence by Great Britain. The 1936 treaty had made the British High Commissioner an Ambassador, and Sir Miles Lampson acted accordingly until World War II.

Less direct interference in domestic affairs could be noticed, but in the conduct of foreign affairs the British military presence was too intimidating to be ignored.

However, the point must be made that in the realm of the defense of Egypt, British and Egyptian interests generally 7 corresponded.

On January 2, 1937, Italy and Great Britain signed an agreement in regard to the Mediterranean popularly known as the "Gentleman's Agreement." It called for a "status quo as regards [to the] national sovereignty of territories in the Mediterranean." It further stated that the two powers would "respect each other's rights and interests in that area." Specifically, the British hoped the agreement would encourage Italy to suspend assistance to the Franquistas in the Spanish Civil War which had begun in 1936— but it proved to have very little effect. More importantly, in regard to

Egyptian territory, the agreement implied that Italy would 126 not increase troop strength in Libya if Britain followed a o similar course in Egypt.

The sincerity of both partners to the "Gentleman's

Agreement" might be questioned when one considers the events of 1937 that followed its signing. Britain appeared to be buying time as did Italy. The announcement of a reorgani­ zation of the Egyptian army with the help of a British military mission appeared in the Egyptian press in mid-

January. The British military mission, offering British- made arms, suggested the enlargement of the air force, the addition of tanks and armored cars to modernize the army, and the upgrading of artillery for coastal defense as a project for all three services. The mission also suggested that British experts be allowed to help the Egyptians manu- 9 facture small arms and munitions whenever possible.

Almost as if to reassure the Egyptians of Italy's benign intentions contemplating the upgrading of their armed forces, Mussolini visited Libya in mid-March making many conciliatory speeches toward the Arab states. While visiting the Egyptian-Libyan frontier, he made friendly references to Egypt to a group of Egyptian journalists claiming that Italy harbored no aggressive designs toward

Egypt or the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Nearing the end of his trip on March 21 Mussolini reportedly stated that "Italy will always be the friend and protector of Islam throughout the world. 127

Nevertheless, despite these friendly overtures to the

Arab states and the "Gentlemen's Agreement," by early

October 1937, Italy had dispatched an entire corps of troops to Libya. The Italian government made open assurances to the Egyptian government that the ingress of troops was not cause for alarm, and that the international situation had caused the need for reinforcement.^

Italian reinforcements in Libya were taken seriously by the British. Sir Miles Lampson, on a visit to London in late October, discussed the need for anti-aircraft guns for

Egypt with Sir Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary.

Eden confided that he was concerned with the policy of doing nothing to provoke Italian susceptibilities. On the other hand, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was more inclined not to discourage Italian overtures at that point. Sir

Miles Lampson stated that the need to prepare for any future attack on Egypt appeared of the utmost importance to those

British serving in Egypt. Later, in a second discussion with Eden, Lampson asked if it were possible to reinforce

British troops in Egypt at this juncture; however, Eden replied that it would be impossible without invoking a state of serious international conflict— the only justification for military reinforcement according to the 1936 Anglo- 12 Egyptian treaty.

Despite the obvious failure of the January 1937

Gentlemen's Agreement, British Prime Minister Neville 128

Chamberlain actively sought to formalize an Anglo-Italian status quo in the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. During negotiations in February, the Egyptian government let its interest in the Anglo-Italian negotiations be known and hinted that it wished to be represented. In early March,

Sir Miles Lampson informed the Egyptian Prime Minister of the progress of the Anglo-Italian talks and stated that 13 Egypt would be consulted on all relevant decisions.

As the negotiations between Italy and Britain were drawing to a close, the Egyptian Ambassador to Italy,

Mustafa Sadat Bey took part in signing those items of the agreement which affected Egypt. On April 15, Sir Miles

Lampson submitted to Egyptian Prime Minister Mohammad

Mahmud Pasha a copy of that portion of the draft Anglo-

Italian agreement which concerned Egypt. The Wafd party of

Nahhas Pasha, then out of power, was exceedingly critical of the fact that Egypt was kept out of the negotiations until the very end. Nahhas also stated that the Wafd would not consider the clauses in regard to Egypt as binding 14 should they prove detrimental to Egyptian interests.

The final agreement signed in Rome on April 16, 1938, by Italian Foreign Minister Count Galleazzo Ciano and

British Ambassador Lord Perth possessed two parts. The

first part involved Great Britain and Italy while the second included Egypt. Those parts of the Agreement having to do with Egypt specifically included a bon voisinage note 129 committing all three powers to friendly relations in East

Africa. Also, Italy pledged to respect her earlier agree­ ments regarding Lake Tsana and all three powers agreed to uphold the 1888 Convention in regard to the Suez Canal

(which guaranteed its free use to all nations).^

Portions of the agreement between Italy and Britain directly affected Egypt. The first was the reaffirmation of the January 2, 1937, "Gentleman's Agreement" in regard to the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean.

Secondly, there was an agreement to exchange military infor­ mation concerning any major change in the distribution of their respective armed forces in the Mediterranean, Red Sea,

Gulf of Aden, and territories in Africa. Both parties, furthermore, pledged not to use propaganda in order to injure the interests of the others. Finally, the last por­ tion of the agreement with relevance to Egypt involved the

Italian government's pledge to remove troops in Libya at the rate of 1 , 0 0 0 per week until a peacetime strength was reached.^

The Anglo-Italian Agreements of 1937 and 1938, were a major factor governing Italo-Egyptian relations. There were, however, other issues in which Italy and Egypt had direct contacts. Two of these involved.the abolition of

Capitulations and Mixed Courts and Egypt1s entry into the

League. 130

In mid-January, Egypt sent a note to the Capitulatory

Powers inviting them to a conference at Montreux in

Switzerland on April 12. Later, in early February, the

Egyptian government sent an outline of the essential princi­ ples for the establishment of a transitional governing plan to transfer the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts including the modifications to be followed in the Mixed Courts 17 system.

In March, Prime Minister Nahhas Pasha received a unanimous vote of confidence in the Egyptian Parliament.

This enabled him to carry to Montreux a draft convention for the abolition of the Capitulations and a revised charter for the organization of the Mixed Courts concerning the condi­ tions that would underlay their operation during a transi­ tion period the duration of which was left to be deter­ mined.

Fifteen delegations, including an Italian one, met at

Montreux between April 12 and May 8 , 1937. Great Britain had pledged support to Egypt's cause as had Italy. The

Egyptian delegation, highly organized and determined, found little opposition to its proposals. The resulting treaty with the individual Capitulatory Powers, including Italy, provided for the immediate transfer to the Mixed Courts of the greater part of the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts and for their eventual disappearance along with the closing 131 of the Mixed Courts by 1949. All other vestiges of foreign 19 privileges under the Capitulatory regime were abolished.

The British invitation for the Egyptian government to apply for membership in the League of Nations came in late

February 1937. Both the abolition of foreign privileges and entrance into the League were agreed upon by the British in the 1936 treaty. Egypt received membership in the League of Nations on May 26, 1937. As in the case of the Montreux

Convention, the Italian government readily gave its approval 20 to Egypt's entrance into the League.

In early June 1937, Italy began to implement a strategy toward the Ethiopian Coptic Church which was seriously to offend the Egyptian Coptic Church and Egyptians in general.

The head of the Ethiopian Church, Abuna Kyrillos, at this time went to Rome to discuss the organization of his Church within the new Italian Empire. The Coptic community in

Egypt voiced its fears at this time that Italian pressure had caused Abuna's journey to Rome. The Egyptian Coptic community feared that this was a prelude to a declaration 21 of the independence of the Ethiopian Church from Egypt.

By early December, the Italian government had replaced the Egyptian-born and appointed Abuna Kyrillos because of his refusal to agree to Italian interference in the tradi­ tional process of appointing the head of the Ethiopian

Church. As a result the Italians nationalized the Ethiopian 132

Church by appointing an Ethiopian-born Archbishop, Abuna 22 Abraham.

The Coptic Church of Egypt was swift in registering its opposition against Italian action. The Copts succeeded in having the Egyptian government make a formal diplomatic inquiry. The result was that the Italian Charge d'Affaires visited the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs officially stating that the Italians had separated the Coptic Church of Ethiopia from the Egyptian Patriarchate. The Egyptian

Coptic Church excommunicated the new head of the Ethiopian

Church. The entire episode aroused Egyptian public opinion against Italy. Furthermore, it brought to the surface again

Egyptian general disapproval of the Italian occupation of

Ethiopia.^

The "nationalization" of the Ethiopian Coptic Church in December 1937 brought Italo-Egyptian relations to its lowest ebb since the Italian invasion. The Coptic crisis coincided with the Italian withdrawal from the League of

Nations— an event which confused but did not surprise the

Egyptian public. These factors together with serious

Egyptian concern generated over the continuous reinforce­ ment of Libya with Italian troops throughout 1937 did little to improve Italo-Ethiopian relations. The real turnaround came with the April 1938 signing of the Anglo-Italian-

Egyptian bon voisinage agreement. In the following November

Egypt recognized the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. Near 133 the end of the month of November, furthermore, relations had improved sufficiently that Egyptian newspapers reported 24 a possible Italo-Egyptian non-aggression pact.

One very interesting phenomenon that must be addressed at this time was the growth in importance in Egypt of pseudo­ fascist youth groups. Young Egypt had existed since 1933 and in early 1936 the Wafd party, with Nahhas Pasha's encouragement, created a competing paramilitary youth group, the Blue Shirts (Al-Qumsan al-zarqa) to counter Young Egypt which was heavily supported by top Palace politicians. In

June 1936 Nahhas Pasha accused the Young Egypt organization of being in the pay of a foreign power. The truth of the statement was never substantiated, but open violence broke out between the two groups because of the charge. Through­ out the last six months of 1936 Young Egypt's activities were severely curtailed by the Nahhas government, but at the very end of the year the Green Shirts (Al-Qumsan al-khadra) regained some freedom of activity, and at this time the 25 society formally became a political party.

Young Egypt's closest political ties in the later

1930's were with the Egyptian Palace and with the Royal advisors,in particular with one of the most powerful

Egyptian politicians prior to World War II, Ali Maher. His

financial support for the movement is documented in the writings of the founder and leader of Young Egypt, Ahmad

Husayn. However, the question of foreign support for the 134

Green Shirts during these years has never been documented.

There is an indication, nevertheless, from the head of the

party's publishing activities, Muhammad Salah, that Young

Egypt had approached Mussolini for support but that the

Italian Prime Minister turned them down because Italy had 2 6 just signed the Anglo-Italian Pact of April 1938.

The Young Egypt Party was never a propaganda mouth­ piece for Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. However, in 1938

the Party's literature became openly hostile to the Egyptian parliamentary system. This trend coincided with the objec­

tive of the Palace politicians to increase the role of the monarchy at the expense of the political parties, particu­

larly the Wafd. In 1937, the Green Shirts were in large part responsible for the downfall of the Nahhas Pasha 27 government and takeover of King Faruk and his ministers.

European fascism was a growing influence on the Young

Egypt movement paralleling the disenchantment with parlia­ mentary government in Egypt. In 1934, Ahmad Husayn had offered scornful comments in regard to Italy after his brief, trip, and in 1937 Fathi Radwan's biography of Mussolini was most insulting in regard to Italian economic and social progress. By 1938, however/considerable admiration for the achievements of the European fascist regimes appeared

in Young Egypt publications. In fact, in mid-1938, Ahmad

Husayn traveled to Germany and wrote complimentary articles

identifying European fascism as a proper example for Egypt 135 to emulate. In October 1938, furthermore, Ahmad Husayn sent Mussolini a telegram congratulating him for the role he took in peacefully settling the question of the Sudeten- land at Munich. However, these laudatory statements gave way to open criticism of German and Italian aggression with 28 the developing international crises in Europe by 1939.

Egyptian public opinion registered little response to the German annexation of Austria in March 1938, but charac­ teristics of appeasement apparent in the Munich Agreement in the fall of 1938 left Egyptians with the vague realiza­ tion that Anglo-French influence in the Arab world might be on the wane. There was, however, no panic on the part of the average Egyptian who did not anticipate the imminence 29 of war.

The Munich crisis, nevertheless, did elicit a response from members of the Egyptian government as exemplified by a speech made to the Egyptian parliament by the former Prime

Minister Ismail Sidky Pasha on December 20. Sidky addressed the question of Egypt's legal responsibility in entering a

European conflict with Britain in relation to the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Sidky Pasha had long con­ cerned himself with Egypt's being drawn into a war, and in

August 1937 he had urged.Nahhas Pasha to enter into a non­ aggression pact with Italy, feeling that such an arrangement 30 would not violate the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. 136

By early 1939/ Italy had already violated the April

1938 Anglo-Italian agreement specifically in regard to the withdrawal of troops to peacetime levels in Libya. As early as late June 1938 the German Ambassador in Rome reported that after withdrawing 1 , 0 0 0 troops a week for eleven weeks, the Italians had stopped. In early February

1939, Lord Perth, British Ambassador to Rome, approached the

Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano in order to register the concern of his government over the sending of fresh

Italian troops and German military specialists to Libya.

Later, in mid-February, Lord Perth again discussed the sending of new troops to Libya and Count Ciano stated that

Italy had not violated the April 1938 agreement as claimed by Britain because the new troops were sent to balance 31 increased French presence in Tunis.

Aware of the growing tension between Britain and Italy by early 1939, the Egyptian King made his first overtures to the Italian government in late February. The Egyptian

Ambassador to Berlin, Murad Pasha, approached the Italian

Ambassador there, Signor Attolico, stating that King Faruk

"hates the British," and asking whether in the event that

Egypt should proclaim its neutrality and Great Britain should attempt to intervene directly or indirectly, the

Axis would be ready to support the position of King Faruk.

Attolico's instructions from Ciano and Mussolini were to 137

cultivate conversations with the Egyptian Ambassador as a 32 means of helping to weaken ties between Egypt and Britain.

Britain's response to Italian troop increases in Libya was to increase Egyptian military exercises in late February

and early March 1939. These included an artillery demon­

stration, Anglo-Egyptian exercises in the Suez Canal zone,

and Anglo-Egyptian maneuvers on the Libyan-Egyptian border.

Furthermore, Husayn Sirri Pasha, Minister of National

Defense, announced in late April that the British military mission would be increased and members distributed through- 33 out the entire Egyptian military.

Meanwhile, Italian policy was also working against the

status quo agreement in the Mediterranean with a renewal of

Italian colonization of Libya along with reinforcement of

the military garrison. Furthermore, the Italian government was insisting upon a reduction in fees for passage through

the Suez Canal and representation on the board of the Suez

Canal Company. Italians, since the Ethiopian conflict, had become second in the use of the Canal, and were having difficulty in meeting the payment of dues. This initiative was rejected by the Company, which included British, French, 34 and Egyptian members.

The German annexation of Bohemia-Moravia in mid-March

1939 and the Italian annexation of Albania in early April

punctuated the spring of 1939 with the successful aggression of the Axis Powers and corresponding ineptitude of the West 138 to prevent it. For the Italians, the invasion of Albania was an overt violation of the Anglo-Italian agreement to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean. Italy, however, seemed less concerned with the reaction to the annexation of Albania by the European powers than by the reaction of the Arabs. The presence of many Muslims in

Albania brought a swift critical response from Arabs through­ out the world. It made Mussolini's claim to be the Protector 35 of Islam appear ludicrous.

In fact, in a conversation with field Marshal Goering in the presence of Count Ciano in Rome in mid-April,

Mussolini expressed the belief that Italy's Albanian venture had certainly made the Arabs rather doubtful of his role as

Protector of Islam. He also voiced some doubt in regard to

King Faruk's being anti-British. He then proceeded to express the view that the Axis Powers could probably achieve a state of tension but not revolution among the Arabs with the use of anti-British propaganda. He stated that, in the event of war, prospects of fomenting an Arab uprising would

3 6 be more favorable.

Obviously concerned that the annexation of Albania and the military reinforcements sent to Libya had created anxiety in Egyptian leaders, Mussolini sent Marshal Balbo, the Governor-General of Libya, on a visit to Cairo on May 9 and 10. During his visit, Marshal Balbo met with King Faruk and attended a public dinner with Prime Minister Muhammad 139

Mahmud Pasha. Although his visit was not an official one,

Marshal Balbo was charged with the task of discovering the opinion taken toward Italy by the Egyptian government and by the large Italian colony in Egypt. The purpose of Marshal

Balbo's visit was believed widely to be an attempt to garner 37 a non-aggression pact with Egypt.

Marshal Balbo gave a long interview in al-Ahram in which he gave an eloquent defense of Italian colonization of

Libya. He justified a large troop presence in Libya because of that country's being an excellent training ground, and stressed Italy's non-aggressive intent toward Egypt. Later,

Prime Minister Muhammad Mahmud.Pasha reported the results of his talks with Marshal Balbo to the Egyptian Chamber of

Deputies. He reassured the Chamber that Italo-Egyptian

3 8 relations remained cordial.

An al-Balagh editorial on May 5, which predated the Balbo visit, showed a very sophisticated analysis of Egypt's posi­ tion vis-a-vis the Axis Powers. A portion of the al-Balagh editorial noted that

whether Italy has designs on Egypt or not we [Egyptians] must face certain facts. These are that Egypt cannot escape attack in the case of war between the two dictatorial and democratic camps as is demonstrated by the large forces Italy has gathered in Libya on the Egyptian and Tunisian frontiers. The particular interest Germany and Italy take in this field is proved by the visit to Libya of notable Germans who had inspected Italian forces and plans for defense and attack. These two notables are Marshal Goering, the man who comes next to Herr Hitler, and General von Brouchitsch, head of 140

the German military staff and an expert in mechanical warfare. It is easy to understand the interest Germany and Italy take in Egypt because of . . . . the Suez Canal which separates the Italian colonies in the Red Sea from Italy. . . .

Clearly, the al-Balagh editorial underscored the fact that many Egyptians were far from naive in regard to Axis intentions toward Egypt. The signing of the Pact of Steel on May 22, 1939, may have received little more than a cursory pronouncement and analysis in Egyptian newspapers but the

Italian Legation in Cairo reported that signs of official reaction could be readily seen in the treatment of Italians in Egypt. The Egyptian Ministry of Interior since the 1936

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty had increasingly "Egyptianized" posts formerly held by Europeans. Italian Ambassador Count

Serafino Mazzolini reported on May 26 that the number of

Italians being replaced in official government positions had dramatically risen so that their unemployment might neces- 40 sarily call for their repatriation.

The summer of 1939 proved to be a lull before the storm begun by German aggression toward Poland in mid-August.

Despite Italian propaganda denying interest in an attack on

Egypt from the Libyan border, the Egyptian army, still heavily influenced by the substantial British presence, con­ tinued to train and prepare for an attack. The cities of

Cairo and Alexandria practiced blackout exercises along with combined military exercises from May through August. 141

Furthermore, by early September, Britain had sent Indian 41 troops to Egypt in order to reinforce the British garrison.

One major event which caused Italy public concern was the visit of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Abdul Fattah

Yahya Pasha, to Turkey in late June in order "to strengthen friendly relations and cooperation." Italian newspapers made the claim that Britain wished to use Egypt in the move­ ment of encirclement of the Axis Powers. Italian fears were additionally confirmed in late July with the announce­ ment of an Egyptian military mission visit to Turkey in late

August. The Egyptians tried to allay Italian concern in early August by having the new Egyptian Ambassador to Turkey speak to the Italian Ambassador there. He assured the

Italian Ambassador that Egypt's visit was purely one in which the military mission hoped to learn something about the creation of an efficient military organization. The

Egyptian Ambassador stressed that his country was interested in developing its relations with the other Asian powers. In any future conflict between the Great Powers he made it clear 42 that Egypt would choose neutrality.

Egyptian neutrality would begin to be tested beginning on September 1 when German troops marched into Poland.

Throughout the month of August tension grew with German demands escalating ih regard to Danzig and the "Polish

Corridor." On August 23, a Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact was signed, and on August 25 an Anglo-Polish alliance was 142 formalized, setting the stage for the outbreak of World

War II. Shortly after the German invasion Mussolini's attempted conference suggested on August 30 was scuttled when Germany refused to withdraw from Polish territory. By

September 4, 1939, Britain, France, and Poland were at war with Germany. On September 1 Mussolini had declared non- belligerence for Italy in the impending conflict. Italy's military unpreparedness left Mussolini little choice but his declaration left open the decision between neutrality and intervention.43

With the unfolding of the crisis in Europe in August

1939, the Egyptian press took increasing interest when it became clear that Britain might declare war on Germany, thereby calling into question Egyptian cooperation in the war effort because of Article VII of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty. In the final days of August, an increasing number of newspaper articles appeared in regard to Egyptian military preparation to defend the civilian population in the event of war. As the crisis became more severe, the Egyptian press tried to determine Egypt's position in any future

European conflict. Al-Muquattam predicted that Egypt would join Britainto take advantage of financial aid toacquire armaments for the Country. Ahmad Husayn of the Young Egypt

Party called for the defense of Egyptian territory against an Italian or German force even if this meant cooperating with Great Britain. The tenor of most of the Egyptian press 143 at that time, including al-Ahram and al-Muquattam, was that

Egypt was ready and willing to enter the impending war if 44 necessary.

The news of the German invasion of Poland precipitated a series of official consultations within the Egyptian

Cabinet on September 1. On the same day, Sir Miles Lampson, the British Ambassador to Egypt, met with King Faruk and

Ali Maher, the new Prime Minister appointed by the Egyptian

King to replace Muhammad Mahmud in mid-August. The consul­ tations resulted in the Ali Maher government's confirming

Egypt's adherence to the provisions calling for support of

Great Britain short of adopting Britain's declaration of war 45 on Germany.

The Egyptian government severed diplomatic and commer­ cial relations with Germany, sequestered German property, and interned all German subjects who could not establish an anti-Nazi record. They proclaimed partial martial law making the Prime Minister the Military Governor, and placed

Egyptian ports under British naval control. Furthermore, with British participation, the Egyptian government imposed a strict censorship of posts, telegraphs, telephones, and the press. Lastly, a royal decree called for creation of a 46 territorial army of some 300,000 men.

The Egyptian press received the news of Italy's non- belligerence with some relief and approval. Al-Balagh proved the most cynical in regard to Italy's real intentions 144 for declaring this form of neutrality. Al-Ahram, more repre­ sentative of the Egyptian press, declared Italy's neutrality to be sincere. Meanwhile, throughout October, November, and

December, Count Mazzolini, Italian Ambassador in Egypt and members of the Italian Legation in Cairo, carried on exten­ sive conversations with King Faruk, Prime Minister Ali Maher, 47 and Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Aziz Ali al-Masri.

In conversations with the Prime Minister, Ali Maher,

Count Mazzolini received assurances from the Egyptian that his country would not be obligated to declare war unless directly attacked. Even if Italy entered war on the side of Germany he assured Mazzolini that Egypt would remain neutral unless attacked. Ali Maher confided that he was deeply unhappy with the traitorous Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which continued to allow foreign troops and foreign power within his country. He hoped that Egypt could liberate herself from this foreign occupation. The Prime Minister clearly made his point concerning the continuation of 48 friendly relations with Italy.

In mid-October, Mazzolini had an audience with King

Faruk in which the Egyptian King stated his agreement with

Mussolini's policy of non-belligerence— "a policy which would do the least amount of damage for all the Mediter­ ranean." Faruk confided that he and his Prime Minister were in accord in their common distaste for the British. However, he continued, the British were aware of this, and for that 145 reason were suspicious of Prime Minister Ali Maher. Faruk stated that he would likely be forced to replace Ali Maher soon. The only acceptable person in his estimation would be

Hassanayn Pasha. Lastly, Faruk confided to Mazzolini that should the situation become intolerable in Egypt he would leave for Europe. Mazzolini replied that he was not certain that the King should depart and deprive Egypt of his consid- 49 erable influence.

In December 1939, Mazzolini talked with the Armed Forces

Chief of Staff, Aziz Ali al-Masri. The conversation appeared to be not too dissimilar from those previously held with the King and Prime Minister in regard to Egyptian attitudes toward the British. Al-Masri mentioned that while in the post of Inspector General of the Egyptian army under Muhammad

Mahmud he encountered obstructionism from British officials.

He returned to his home before his appointment ended and waited for Ali Maher to take power. In August, Ali Maher appointed him to be Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Mazzolini reported that he prudently remained silent while al-Masri told of his difficulties with the British and that he remained encouraging when the Armed Forces Chief of Staff 50 offered to keep in frequent contact m the future.

The year 1939 ended with the Egyptians technically adhering to provisions of the 1936 treaty while they were highly resentful of the large contingent of British troops in Egypt. This resentment caused Egyptian leaders to leave 146

their options open toward the Axis and at this point, toward

Italy in particular.

In the months of November and December both Britain

and Italy maintained active training and inspections on the

Libyan-Egyptian border. Despite open declarations of

friendship for Italy by Britain the military activity on the

border was a realistic expression of their mutual distrust.^

Italy, War, and Egyptian Non-Belligerence, 1940-1942

Despite the official claim of a policy of non-

belligerence, astute observers could recognize Italy's

preparations to enter the war as early as February 1940.

Mussolini called a meeting in early February of his Supreme

Defense Committee in which the kind of subjects discussed

included questions of military, civil, and industrial mobilization and economic self-sufficiency arising in the

event of war. Mussolini called up two conscription classes,

1919 and 1920, in all, an estimated total of 400,000 men to

enter military service. Furthermore, the Italian government

implemented elaborate plans for the organization of Italian 52 railways for military transport.

Britain's recognition that the war would spread to the

Middle East in the near future was also evident in February.

In the early part of the month Count Ciano informed Sir

Percy Loraine, then British Ambassador in Italy, that war

materiel ordered by Britain would not be delivered nor would 147 new orders be taken. Count Ciano noted that "Italo-British 53 relations are moving into a period of sharper tension."

This situation reflected onto British activity in the

Middle East During February. In mid-March Sir Anthony Eden, now Secretary of the Dominions, visited Egypt and Palestine.

His mission in Egypt was to rally loyal support from the

King and examine the British military and diplomatic situa­ tion. Sir Miles Lampson recorded that Eden "distrusts the young Monarch whom he thinks assertive and a difficult customer to handle. The Prime Minister Ali Maher he has 54 pretty well sized up too."

The British government's policy at this time with regard to the Egyptian forces was that they should be developed into efficient modern forces capable of cooperating with British forces in the defense of Egypt. In the event of war, the Egyptian army would be placed, subject to the agreement of the Egyptian government, under the command of

British troops in Egypt. Since Egypt had not declared war, the command of the Egyptian army had not been transferred and liaison between the British and Egyptian forces continued to be maintained by the British Military Mission. The

Mission's advice was not always welcomed by the Egyptian

Chief of Staff, Aziz Ali al-Masri, and the Prime Minister reluctantly removed him in early February 1940, by placing him, ostensibly, on three-and-a-half months of sick leave.

Egyptian opinion, however, was not deceived by al-Masri's 148 removal. For example, one deputy of the Egyptian Chamber asked in Parliament what steps the Egyptian Cabinet had 55 taken to defend the sovereignty of the Country.

Speculations as to Italy's intentions to join Germany in the war became more frequent in the Egyptian press in the month of April. In mid-April, while publishing European press articles which suggested that Italy would join

Germany, al-Ahram reported that many in certain diplomatic circles in London were disinclined to believe that Italy was either willing or prepared to enter war on the side of

Germany. Earlier in the month al-Ahram reported that Ali

Maher had had an audience with Count Mazzolini who assured the Prime Minister of Italy's friendship for Egypt and the

5 6 hope that the war would remain limited to the North.

German successes in Northern Europe starting in early

April resulted, by mid-May, in the conquests of Norway, the

Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. By this time,

Mussolini had decided that he would enter the war by mid-

June. Correspondingly, in the early days of May, sensing the immediacy of war in the Mediterranean, Britain and

France sent a combined fleet to the area. The increased tension in the Mediterranean caused a flurry of meetings between British officials in Egypt and the Egyptian Cabinet.

The Egyptian Prime Minister also met with the Italian

Ambassador before releasing a press statement stating that the situation was undoubtedly dangerous with always the 149 possibility of surprises. He continued by saying that "This 57 is why we are taking necessary precautions. . . ."

Egyptian precautions throughout May and early June included new laws to control espionage activities. No one would be allowed to enter or leave Egypt without a new visa from competent Egyptian authorities abroad or the Ministry of Interior in Egypt. All those owning firearms or explo­ sives without license had to register them at the nearest police station with heavy penalties to those who did not comply. These moves were defended because in spite of the internment of Germans, there was a large foreign population in• Egypt. r . 4. 5 8

British and Egyptian troops received authorization from the Prime Minister as Military Governor to evacuate the civilian population from the Egyptian-Libyan frontier if and when necessary. In fact, with prodding from the British military the Egyptian government had asked the Italian government to withdraw their Consul at Solium (just on the border of Libya). Already, by mid-May, there were reports that Italian residents of Egypt were drawing money from 59 Egyptian banks.

Prime Minister Ali Maher was also keeping close contact with the Italian Ambassador throughout mid-May and through early June. Ali Maher assured Count Mazzolini that Egypt would not declare war on Italy, although because of Treaty obligations with Britain it might be necessary to break off 150 diplomatic relations. The request for closure of the

Italian Consulate in Solium upset Count Mazzolini who approached Ali Maher to ask if Egypt had changed her policy but again was assured that Egypt would not declare war if

Italy did not attack. Meanwhile, Murad Sayyid Ahmad,

Egyptian Ambassador to Italy, spoke to Count Ciano on May 30, on his own responsibility, about an eventual proclamation 6 0 of neutrality by the Egyptian government.

The Egyptian press speculated in early June concerning what Egypt would do in the event of a war. Al-Ahram, al-Misri, and al-Muquattam, among others, appeared in general to agree with the Prime Minister that Egypt ought not to enter the war unless directly attacked. Ali Maher, in his last conversation with Count Mazzolini, four days before

Italy entered the war, clearly stated again that it was his hope that Italy would not attack Egypt. Mazzolini noted in his report to Ciano, moreover, that he had learned that

British authorities were prepared to arrest both the Prime

Minister and the Chief of Staff in case the situation should 61 worsen between Italy and Britain.

Mussolini, in his speech on June 10, 1940 in which he announced Italy1s entry into the war, declared that Italy had no aggressive intentions toward Egypt. On the same day, the Italian Ambassador visited the Egyptian Prime Minister

inquiring as to Egypt's attitude. Ali Maher made clear that

Egypt would break off diplomatic relations and ask the Italian diplomats to leave. On June 12, the official declaration of the rupture in diplomatic relations took place after the Egyptian government communicated the

following Parliamentary resolution to the Italian government

Egypt will adhere to her alliances with Britain, will respect her obligations and will undertake within her territory to furnish her ally with all the aid and facilities for which she asks.

Egypt will not take part in the war unless she is attacked by Italy in one of the following ways: if Italian troops take the initiative by invading Egyptian territories; if Italy destroys Egyptian towns by bombardment; if she carries out air attacks on Egyptian military objectives.62

Italian naval and air raids took place on Solium and other Egyptian border outposts as early as June 15. Two days later Ali Maher (taking into account the fall of France to the Germans) explained that he regarded these frontier incidents negotiable through diplomatic means. On June 19 he informed the Parliament that Egyptian troops had with­ drawn from the frontier to avoid involving the Country in a war before the Government and Parliament had dictated a decision. To allay Egyptian fears of British intentions to force Egypt to enter the war in the absence of a direct attack by the enemy, Prime Minister Ali Maher stated that

"the nation will have no other policy than that of safe­ guarding its independence and rights while at the same time II fulfilling all its obligations. The Parliament received 152 the entire presentation of the Prime Minister with loud applause.^

Lord Wilson captured the British perspective of the situation in the following remarks:

The Egyptian Government adopted a very different attitude over the internment of Italians and the taking over of banks and business premises as compared to the previous September when dealing with Germans. . . . During the preceding year our security service had been able to mark down certain meeting places and the most active Italian agents. Though the police were most co-operative and often acted on our requests the greatest difficulty was experienced in getting the Egyptian Government to function. One met with interminable delays, and oft times was faced with releases and the order of a Minister without reference or consultation. How much of this was due to the bad news from France or the close integration between a large number of Egyptians socially, financially, and economically with Italians both in Italy and Egypt, it is hard to assess.64

Anti-British propaganda campaigns by both Axis radios and Axis sympathizers within Egypt spread rumors that

Britain would repeat policies from the first World War.

These included the conscription of a labor corps and the requisition of food and supplies. This tended to create resentment from the poorer Egyptian masses. The Italian legation also continued to remain in Ciaro after Egypt had severed diplomatic relations. Official Italian political and economic matters in Egypt were being funneled through the Swiss Embassy. Also, Italian diplomats continued to meet with Egyptian officials. Lastly, the British suspected contacts between Ali Maher and Murad Sayyid Ahmad Pasha, 153 the Egyptian Ambassador in Rome, who refused to return to G 5 Egypt after Italy's entry into the war.

British pressure on Faruk to seek a solution to the difficult circumstances generated by Ali Maher as Prime

Minister led to a government crisis. The King held a meeting of all Egyptian party leaders on June 22, 1940, at the Palace to discuss the formation of a national government, but Nahhas Pasha of the Wafd refused for obvious political reasons. The King accepted Ali Maher's resignation on

June 23 and on the same day the Italian Ambassador and his 6 G entire staff left Egypt.

Hasan Sabry (an Independent) former Egyptian Ambassador to London and Defense Minister in 1938, formed a new govern­ ment which appeared to satisfy the British. Changes in the

Government included dropping Aziz Ali al-Masri, who remaining on "sick leave" until May 31, was placed on pension in ear.ly

August and replaced with a pro-British General. The Oxford- educated Ahmad Hassanayn Pasha took the important post of 6 7 Chief of the Royal Cabinet.

During August and September Britain was able to secure better cooperation with the Egyptian government in regard to internal security and military matters. A considerable number of Italians of military age were interned during the period and some Egyptian military units became part of the defense of the Western Desert, Alexandria, Mersa Matruh and vulnerable points in the Nile Delta. Officially, however, 154

Egypt's non-belligerent status remained what it was under

Ali Maher. The re-emergence of British intervention in

Egyptian internal affairs made Egyptian nationalists con­

scious more than even before that the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian 6 8 Treaty had not secured for them complete independence.

Italy's Plans to Attack Egypt

Italy's favorable trade balance with the Middle East countries, especially Egypt, became as important as strategic considerations by the late 1930's. The Middle East supplied

Italy with more than half its oil and a fifth of its iron and cotton. Italian exports to the Middle East, principally

textiles sold to Egypt, were a major factor in the trade balance. During the interwar period, Italy had increased

its economic penetration of the Middle East by increasing maritime and air services as well as investments in banking and insurance. Mabel Caillard, a long time British resident

in Egypt, noted in her book in the mid-1930's that

Since England had lifted her hand from the admin­ istration of Egyptian affairs, the foreign ele­ ments that were formerly in evidence have begun to reassert importance, and Italy is looking to her laurels. Her dream of restoring her ancient empire in the Near East is taking shape and her aspirations in Egypt are undisguised. She is busy with propaganda. Schools, hospitals, banks, and other fine buildings in prominent positions point to her efforts of peaceful penetration. Italian contractors are again to the fore. Italian steamers have secured the passenger traffic that used to be in the hands of the British companies.69 155

An invasion of Egypt in order to replace the British

in the Middle East was very tempting for Mussolini. At the

time of entry into the war in June 1940 Italy appeared to have an overwhelming superiority to the British forces in the Middle East and East Africa. There were over 215,000

Italian troops in Libya and over 200,000 in Italian East

Africa. In contrast, General Wavell, appointed British

Commander-in-Chief of British forces in the Middle East in

July 1938, had some 85,000 men in his scattered command which then included East Africa. Although the British navy could easily blockade supplies to Italian ports it was also true that British troops were poorly equipped in guns and armament and outnumbered in the air. A coordinated serious

Italian attack from Libya and East Africa could have resulted 70 xn a successful pxncer movement upon Egypt.

Mussolini thought the war in Europe was over with the

fall of France in June 1940, and he and Count Ciano presented

Hitler with Italian plans for the reorganization of the

Middle East. The outline of this plan included an Italian takeover of Britain's politico-military and judicial posi­ tions in Egypt and the Sudan, the abolition of the Suez

Canal Company, and the creation of a special regime for the

Canal area. Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan would receive independence, but Italy would occupy strategic points through an exclusive treaty which would also include economic privileges. Aden, Perim, and Socotra would be 156 under military occupation. Lastly, British Somaliland and

Jibuti would be ceded to Italy. Iraq and Iran were not mentioned because they were to fall within the German sphere 71 of interest.

Despite Mussolini's enthusiasm for an attack on Egypt in the summer of 1940, many responsible Italians, particu­ larly military men, were hesitant. In fact, as early as

June 2, 1940, eight days before the Italian declaration of war, Marshal Italo Balbo, Governor-General of Libya, told

Count Ciano that he did not believe "that the war will be quick and easy." Balbo's death a month later, as a result of being shot down from an airplane by his own countrymen, 72 was a bad omen for Italy's fate in North Africa.

On July 11, 1940, Ciano recorded that Mussolini was in good spirits over the result of an aero-naval engagement with the British and optimistic about approaching action in

Egypt. As Italian preparations in late July and throughout

August took place, Mussolini's own military men opposed the attack upon Egypt. General Graziani reported his opposition to the offensive in Egypt consistently throughout this period and in late August sent Mussolini a copy of a report in which all his generals declared themselves against the offensive in Egypt. Ignoring the advice of his military field commanders, however, Mussolini ordered the Italian offensive on Egypt to take place on September 13, after 73 having made at least three postponements. 157

Meanwhile# for Egypt, Italy's entry into the war had closed the Mediterranean to all but the most essential convoys and Egypt's position on the Red Sea made navigation complicated on that route as well. Consequently, an economic collapse of Egypt's economy appeared likely if the entire

1940 cotton crop could not be sold. In early August, the

British government bought the entire crop at top prices in part as a good faith gesture in return for the greater cooperation of the Hasan Sabry government in the war effort. 7 4

Italian preparations to attack Egypt were clearly noted by Egyptian politicians and the Egyptian press throughout the late summer of 1940. They continued to debate the technical question of belligerence versus neutrality. In late August former Prime Minister Sidky Pasha asked then

Prime Minister Hasan Sabry to clarify Egypt's position toward the war, because of confusion generated by the speeches of other Egyptian politicians, in particular

Dr. Ahmad Maher, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Sidky Pasha's question resulted in a session of the Chamber of Deputies which devoted its time primarily to redefining

Egypt's position in the event of unprovoked aggression. The

Prime Minister replied to Sidky Pasha's question by saying that "nothing has occurred which calls for any modification of the Government's policy as stated in Parliament when it took office." He reiterated that it was the Government's 158 policy to maintain cordial relations with foreign powers while at the same time carrying out the provisions of the 75 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

As part of the debate upon Egypt's position vis-a-vis the entry into the war, both the famous Egyptian author

Taha Husayn and Hafez Afifi Pasha, a former Foreign

Minister, exhorted their countrymen to enter the war.

Taha Husayn wrote in one article that

the time has gone for pondering and weighing over the various issues. One consideration must over­ weigh everything else, and that is that on no account may a foreign army invade this country.

Hafez Afifi Pasha's address to the Egyptian people finished with the statement that "at this time of crisis we must look to the future of our Country. The victory of Germany and

Italy would mean the end of liberty, the end of Egyptian

7 6 independence and freedom."

Italian forces crossed the Egyptian frontier on

September 13, 1940. The Egyptian government had no reaction, in part fearing the consequences should the British fail to check the invasion. Egyptians reasoned that the Italian advance was not a real attack on Egypt but rather a tactical maneuver. Italian propaganda after the attack on Egypt tried to claim that Italy was not fighting Egyptians but instead helping to liberate them from the British. Apparently, the

Italian propaganda was successful because in a September 21

Cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Hasan Sabry proclaimed it 159 more prudent to wait until concrete intentions toward Egypt were better known. The Egyptian legal position of non- belligerence was firmly established at this point for the 77 remainder of the war.

The Italian advance reached Sidi Barrani on September 16 and then reached a standstill because of supply shortages.

There developed a pause in the war in Egypt so much so that

Hitler sent General von Thoma to Libya to report on the situation. Hitler offered Mussolini a German armored divi­ sion for the Western Desert campaign in early October.

Mussolini declined, however, until the third stage of the projected advance, that from Mersa Matruh to Alexandria.

Instead of pressing the attack further into the Western

Desert, by late October Mussolini embroiled Italy in an 78 invasion of Greece which proved to be a disastrous failure.

In the meantime, a new session of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies opened on November 4 at which Prime Minister

Hasan Sabry collapsed and died while- delivering a speech.

On the following day a new Cabinet came into being with

Husayn Sirri, a well-known non-party civil engineer, who had successfully held several government cabinet posts in 79 the past.

The new Prime Minister, in delivering his maiden speech to the Egyptian Senate and Chamber of Deputies told them that Egypt could serve her own and British interests by formally remaining a non-belligerent power. In early 160

December, Husayn Sirri's adherence to non-belligerence was given a real test because there was an increase in Italian air raids upon Alexandria. Air raids had begun in late

June, killing 155, injuring 423, while completely destroying

95 and badly damaging 102 houses. The Egyptian government provided aid to the victims and had even considered using 8 0 Italian funds for partial compensation.

Under the direction of General Wavell, the British began a counteroffensive on December 9, 1940, that culmin­ ated in the expulsion of Italians from Egyptian territory and the capture of Benghazi on February 6 , 1941. On

December 12, 1940, Mussolini told Ciano that "in Libya we have suffered a real defeat." The next day, the Italian

Foreign Minister recorded that unlike Mussolini he believed that "the British will not stop with ejecting the Italians from Egypt and stop at the frontier for they have more far- 81 reaching objectives."

Sir Miles Lampson wrote in his diary for December 9,

1940, that Hassanayn Pasha, Chief of the Royal Cabinet, telephoned him about the outcome of the British counter­ offensive in the Western Desert. Sir Miles Lampson recorded that Hassanayn intended to inform Faruk. The magnitude of

Italian losses could be gauged by the British Ambassador's entry on December 1,2 in which he mentioned that over 20,000

Italian troops were prisoners of war including one Corps

Commander and at least three Divisional Generals. Lampson 161 closed with his characteristic pepper by saying that "it looks as though the Italians had cracked good and proper. 8 2 Serve the brutes damn well right too."

The British counteroffensive's successes were short­ lived, however, as the Germans joined the Italians in the spring and summer of 1941. During this time, the Egyptian government's economic situation deteriorated seriously while the Allied position in the Western Desert became pre­ carious. The Germans had invaded and occupied mainland

Greece in April 1941 and Crete soon afterward. The German

Afrika Korps moved into North Africa and Axis raids into

Egypt increased. There developed a food shortage which created anxiety and led to hoarding by the Egyptian popula- 83 tion.

By mid-April the British were driven back to the

Egyptian frontier. Despite reassuring statements from

Egyptian Prime Minister Husayn Sirri Pasha, the steep decline in prices on the stock exchange was a reflection of anxiety in Egypt. Ismail Sidky Pasha pressed the Chamber for a declaration to Germany that Egypt was independent and non-belligerent and had done little more than meet her obligations to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. On April 17, the

German Foreign Ministry announced the following:

The Government of the Reich observes with great interest the attitude of the Egyptian Government, which is seeking to follow a policy intended to keep Egypt, as state and nation, out of the complications of war. The Government of 162 •

the Reich has no intention of making the policy of Egypt in this connection more difficult than necessary. It is, however, known to all that we shall destroy the British forces wherever we find them, and consequently in Egypt also.84

In May 1941, the Axis forces were at the Egyptian western frontier in Solium and Mersa Matruh. At the same time, a pro-Axis military coup in Iraq led to the establish­ ment of an anti-British government in Baghdad led by Rashid

Ali al-Geylani. Furthermore, Syria and Lebanon were still in the hands of Vichy French forces. Lastly, the Germans invaded Russia. To the Egyptians the Axis appeared to be

8 5 closing in on all sides.

These adverse developments for Britain had serious repercussions in Egypt. With the introduction of German armored divisions under Rommel in March 1941, there developed the realization that the Germans, not the Italians, were likely to occupy Egypt. Consequently, contacts between

Germans and the Palace on the one hand, and Army groups on the other hand, took place beginning in the spring of 1941, 8 6 and continued sporadically until late 1942.

The first of these attempts to contact the Germans grew out of a relationship that developed in 1940 between the retired Armed Forces Chief of Staff Aziz Ali al-Masri and a small group of junior officers, the most notable, the present President of Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat. These young officers were prompted to anti-British intrigue because of the British presence and their attempt to disarm Egyptian 163 army units on the Western frontier in late 1940. Failing to make contact with Ali Maher, Sadat and his circle were put into contact with al-Masri through shaykh Hasan al-Banna, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, an extremist religious political movement with a rigid orthodox Muslim view of

8 7 society and politics.

With the help of this small group of junior officers, al-Masri attempted to leave Egypt by airplane three times in order to join German forces. After an abortive attempt to meet a German plane in early May, Aziz Ali al-Masri and two junior officers crash landed in late May trying to fly out of Egypt in an Egyptian plane, and they then went into hiding in a Cairo suburb. They were apprehended on June 6 , one day before they were to meet a German airplane. This ended certain Egyptian military attempts to contact the Germans until the end of 1941.®^

The Palace group also had their contacts with the

Germans, beginning in the Spring of 1941. The most important contact was that of Dr. Samir Zulficar Bey, who approached the German envoy at Tehran in the name of King Faruk. The

King and his nation, Zulficar stated, would like to see

Germany's liberating troops in Egypt as soon as possible.

When the Egyptian Ambassador was questioned in regard to

Egypt's attitude toward Italy, Zulficar Pasha replied that since German soldiers were now in North Africa fighting, the Egyptians felt certain that the Germans were coming as 164 liberators and not as mere oppressors like the Italians.

Faruk was obviously aware of the increasing role the Germans were taking in the -Axis offensive on Egypt and wished to be prepared for a possible German occupation. Faruk, however, continued to maintain his connections with the Italian government and was known to have had a two-way radio trans­ mitting between Rome and C a i r o . 89

On June 7 and 8 , Axis air raids in Alexandria caused

650 deaths and were followed by a panic exodus from the city of approximately forty percent of the population (nearly

300,000 persons). Slow progress in rescue operations caused the Government to receive criticism so that after a bitter attack from the Wafd, the Prime Minister expressed hopes that Germany and Italy would understand that Egypt was not a belligerent. Several proposals by Egyptian members of

Parliament to have the British navy evacuate Alexandria and

Cairo made an open city with British troops evacuated gained impetus until the early fall of 1941 when enemy air raids on Egyptian towns subsided and the question dissolved as an 90 issue.

During the summer and autumn, British forces succeeded in stopping the Axis advance upon Egypt. The British thrust into Libya in mid-Ncvember prompted Ciano to state that he was "especially fearful of the lack of supplies and the insufficiency of our aviation" which had suffered serious losses during the initial attack. The large numbers of 165 prisoners of war taken by the British and interned in Egypt during late November and December caused the Italian govern­ ment embarrassment. Ciano protested to the Papal Nuncio about the publication in the Osservatore Romano of some photographs showing that Italian prisoners in Egypt were having a great time— with football games and concerts. In an effort to neutralize the implications of the good treat­ ment of Italian prisoners in Egypt, the Italian press pub­ lished an article in late December complaining of inhumane treatment of Italians taken prisoner by the British in North

Africa.^

Despite the British victories throughout the fall of

1941, domestic conditions in Egypt remained critical.

Living costs rose sharply, and were associated with a scarcity in basic food commodities and ordinary cloth. The black market thrived despite Government efforts to develop a scheme of rationing. The Wafd and other opposition parties blamed the British and the Government. By January of 1942 bread was so scarce that the poor in Cairo were raiding 92 bakeries.

In early January 1942, the Egyptian Prime Minister, on the urging of Britain, suspended diplomatic relations with

Vichy France. In a memorandum given to the press on

January 8 , the Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to the actions of Vichy government officials as jeopardizing the security of British forces in Egypt. This brought criticism 166

from the opposition in Parliament led by Ismail Sidky Pasha.

Two cabinet ministers resigned in protest. The King, more­ over, who was on a tour of Upper Egypt when the decision was taken, showed his annoyance over not being consulted.

By early February 1942, the Egyptian government under Prime

Minister Husayn Sirri Pasha was facing a full-fledged ministerial crisis, continuing economic difficulties, and in

January a new counteroffensive led by Marshal Rommel was 93 underway.

King Faruk no longer supported Husayn Sirri Pasha and

it is believed that the Palace group, including former Prime

Minister Ali Maher and the rector of Al-Azhar University,

Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi, helped to organize mass

student demonstrations against the Sirri government. Demon­

strations by students had begun in late January and continued

into early February, even after they had caused Prime

Minister Husayn Sirri Pasha to resign on February 2, 1942.

Sir Miles Lampson recorded information in his diary for

February 4 that the students were demonstrating at the

University shouting "Long live Rommel"; "Long live Faruk"

and "Down with the English." Meanwhile, Faruk contacted the

Germans during this crisis period through diplomatic posts

in Ankara and Sofia. Obviously believing that Rommel and

the German Afrika Korps were soon to occupy Egypt, Faruk was

attempting to convince the Germans to retain him as King.

He took credit for the anti-British demonstrations 167 and informed the Germans that Ali Maher was preparing to take over the leadership while shaykh al-Maraghi would give 94 Rommel a reception greater than that given to Napoleon.

Sir Miles Lampson was determined to settle the minis­ terial crisis with a choice that would guarantee British security in Egypt. After the resignation of Husayn Sirri

Pasha, the British Ambassador visited the head of the Royal

Cabinet, Hassanayn Pasha, telling him that the King must call Nahhas Pasha of the Wafd to form a new government. The

Wafd, out of power since 1937, overtly appeared to be hostile toward the British, having submitted the famous Memorandum of April 1940 to the British Ambassador. The Memorandum expressed the demand that the British withdraw their troops from Egypt and recognize Egyptian rights in the Sudan; in essence, the Wafd was demanding the abrogation of the 1936 treaty which it had negotiated with the British. However, despite their outward opposition to Britain, there is evidence that the Wafd approached the British Ambassador in

June 1941, shortly after Germany invaded Russia, to ask that

Nahhas Pasha be made Prime Minister through intervention.

Sir Miles Lampson had refused at the time, but in February

1942 he decided that Nahhas Pasha was important to the 95 stability he believed the British needed in Egypt.

Sir Miles Lampson was suspicious of King Faruk and his entourage, and had come to believe that Faruk*s abdication would be the best course of action. The British Ambassador, 168

some forty years the senior of the young Egyptian monarch,

had a tendency to lecture and talk down to Faruk, causing

tension between the two. Not only did the British Ambassador

dislike many of the King's official advisers at the Palace

but also his private entourage. Faruk's closest confidants

were Italians who were granted Egyptian nationality by royal

decree in 1937. Sir Miles Lampson had a deep dislike for

the continued favored treatment of these Italians at Faruk's

court. In fact, on February 5, after Nahhas Pasha was

installed as Prime Minister, the British Ambassador specifi-

.cally warned Nahhas that a prime objective was the removal

of the Palace Italians along with others who exercised 9 6 influence upon the young King.

On February 4, 1942, Sir Miles Lampson phoned his

ultimatum to Hassanayn Pasha that Nahhas Pasha be summoned,

and he stated: "Unless I hear by 6 p.m. today that Nahhas

has been asked to form a Government His Majesty King Faruk

must accept the consequences." The King called a meeting

at the Palace at 3 p.m. inviting all major political

leaders, but the result was that Nahhas Pasha refused to

form a coalition government. About 6 p.m. the British

Ambassador received the following message from Hassanayn

Pasha:

On receiving the British ultimatum the King convoked the persons mentioned in the attached list (this included all party leaders amongst them 169

Nahhas himself) who submitted, after discussing the British ultimatum, the following decision:

That in their opinion the British ultimatum is a great infringement of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and of the independence of the country. For this reason and acting on their advice His Majesty cannot consent to an action resulting in an infringement of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and of the country.97

Sir Miles Lampson told Hassanayn Pasha that the situa­ tion was serious and that he would return to see the King at

9 p.m. that evening. The British Ambassador arrived at the

Palace with General Stone, Commander of the British troops in Egypt, and in his own words "an impressive array of specially picked stalwart military officers armed to the teeth. . . . Whilst we waited upstairs I could hear the rumble of tanks and armoured cars, taking up their positions around the palace. ..." In the meeting between Faruk and

Sir Miles Lampson, the British Ambassador chastized the young King and called for his abdication. Had not his adviser, Hassanayn Pasha, intervened in Arabic Faruk would have signed the letter of resignation. Instead, he suggested that he call Nahhas Pasha to form a new government of his 98 choosing.

The Wafd won an overwhelming majority in the March 1942 elections. Nahhas Pasha then proceeded to heed Sir Miles

Lampson's advice in early April by having Axis sympathizer

Ali Maher placed under house arrest and General Salih Harb,

Minister of Defense under the Maher government, was exiled to the Egyptian countryside. In May 1942, Rommel's Afrika

Korps began a new offensive against the British forces in the Western Desert moving toward the capture of Alexandria.

Their advance remained unchecked until July. Meanwhile, the Axis propaganda machine was at work to try to sabotage the British war effort in Egypt. The Italians were anti-

Wafd ever since the Party had committed Egypt to a treaty with Great Britain in 1936. So the Stefani agency published the news of the events of February third and fourth in a

Lisbon newspaper in mid-February. The Germans, not as familiar with Egyptian internal politics, expressed pro-Wafd sentiment in the German press. The Germans eventually began to adopt officially Italy's attitude toward the Wafd but continued to seek contact with the Egyptian government. The question of the Wafd government aside, German and Italian propaganda in the summer of 1942 promised liberation of the

Near and Middle Eastern peoples from British "imperialism."

In regard to Egypt in particular, on July 4 the Italian press agency, Stefani, reported a joint Italo-German 99 declaration of support for the independence of Egypt.

Other than contacts by Faruk in 1942, there were a series of attempts by the Egyptian military to contact the

Germans in July 1942. One such attempt known as Operation

Salaam succeeded. Two German agents were able to make their way to Cairo from the Western Desert and establish a wireless unit on the Nile. They relayed military information to 171

Rommel's forces, and reestablished contacts with Aziz Ali al-Masri (who had been released from internment in March

1942) and young Colonel Anwar al-Sadat. In July 1942, the two agents were apprehended and because of his contacts with them Anwar al-Sadat was also seized and incarcerated, remaining in prison until late 1944.^^

After the Battle of al-Alamain when the British checked the Axis advance, there were no more known attempts by either the Palace group or the Egyptian military to make contact with either the Germans or the Italians. In

November 1942 General Bernard Montgomery moved eastward against the Italian and German forces under Field Marshal

Rommel while American and British forces landed on the coast of western North Africa. By the end of May 1943, all of

North Africa was in the hands of Allied Forces.(See

Figure 6 , page 172.)

The loss of Italy's East African territories by the spring of 1941 had made it even more important to Mussolini to keep North Africa exclusively an Italian sphere of influence. However, Mussolini finally had to ask for German forces to join the North African campaign. By 1942, German forces were playing an increasingly greater role on the

African front and Italian forces fought under Field Marshal

Rommel who was Commander-in-Chief of the campaign to conquer

Egypt (technically, Rommel was subordinate to the Italian

North African command headed by Marshal Bastico). Mussolini 5563000880

A***' Jo**' . = T o b n jk Bejw

CAIRO 1 ^ qjrre/M 4? c?^ DCPfl£SSIOft$ ,s?

Front from I Sept 1939 to 13 Sept 1940 lb Sept 1940 to 9 Dec 1940 7 Feb 1941 to 31 Mor 1941 II April 1941 to 17 Nov 1941 7-21 January 1942 4 Feb. 1942 to 2b May 1942 I July 1942 to 2 Nov. 1942 A*i» surrender in Tunisia 13 May 1943

Figure 6 . The Western Desert Campaign, 1939-194 3'

aGeorge Kirk, The Middle East in the War (New York: Oxford University Press, 172 1953), p. 32. 173 became increasingly suspicious of Hitler's motives and 102 feared he had political designs upon Egypt.

The Germans, despite their espionage and intrigue in

Egypt (which they kept secret from the Italians) appeared to recognize Italy's prior claim to Egypt and the Suez. On this basis, Rome became the center of propaganda destined for Egypt and the Arab lands in general. For instance, on

July 2, 1942, in an Axis declaration on Egypt, the Nazi leaders accepted Mussolini's draft without changes. The declaration expressed the Italian viewpoint, and did not contain any formula for complete independence and full . . 103 sovereignty.

Throughout late 1942 and early 1943, the Italians pro­ posed the political solution in regard to a possible Italo-

German occupation of Egypt. Mussolini suggested that Rommel head the occupation army, but that the latter continue to be under the Italian African Command. The civil government, however, was to be in the hands of an Italian political delegate. Count Ciano preferred to give the post to Count

Serafino Mazzolini, Italy's former Ambassador to Egypt. The

Germans apparently agreed to this arrangement after an initial negative response.

Having received agreement on the political arrangements of an Italo-German occupation of Egypt, Mussolini submitted his economic proposals. Italy wanted the occupation of

Egypt to be a model regime with no economic plundering 174 because Mussolini believed the Egyptian situation would influence the whole Arab world where Italy then felt its prestige to be rather low.^^

The Italians appeared to have few recorded contacts with Egyptian leaders after 1941. However, contacts between

Italians and Egyptians undoubtedly continued in various countries where both kept diplomatic legations. Italians, moreover, maintained contacts with Egyptians living in

Europe. There was, for example, the Egyptian National

Society in Europe supported by the Italian government with

Naser al-Tayyib as president. Naser al-Tayyib became a propaganda tool of the Italian government. Probably the most important Egyptian personality living in occupied

Europe was the ex-Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi II, whom

Britain had dethroned in 1914. His ties were strongest with the Germans, and there is reason to believe that he was con­ triving to renew dynastic claims that he had renounced in

1931. It is believed that King Faruk's contacts with the

Germans in early 1942 were intended to reassure the Axis of his sympathy. Italy and Germany, however, had no intention 106 of replacing Faruk, whatever the latter's fears.

The Axis threat to Egypt was completely eliminated after the decisive battle of November first and second. The destruction of the Afrika Korps, 450 of 600 Axis tanks, the loss of 10,000 Italian and German soldiers, the toll of

15,000 wounded men, and the taking of 30,000 prisoners 175

constituted a total defeat, and the debacle led to the

forced resignation of Mussolini in late July of the succeed­

ing year. In his stead King Victor Emmanuel III appointed

Marshal Pietro Badoglio. Badoglio submitted to an armistice

and accepted unconditional surrender in early September, and

on October 13 Italy declared war upon the Germans and as co­ belligerents joined the Allies in battle. Mussolini became

the leader of a puppet German government in northern Italy

until German defense lines fell in April 1945, and the

Germans accepted unconditional surrender on April 29. The

previous day, Italian partisans executed Mussolini by firing

squad. Mussolini's Roman Empire (which would have included

Egypt) never came to pass. The Egyptians for their part did

not declare war on the Axis Powers until 1945 when King

Faruk signed a royal decree declaring a defensive war against

Germany and Japan as a prerequisite for entering into the 107 peace negotiations and the new United Nations.

Italy's entrance into World War II on the Axis side and

its subsequent attack on Egypt proved to be disastrous to

the fate of both monarchies. The Italo-German army began a

fatal retreat after the loss of the Battle of al-Alamein in

Egypt to the British in November 1942. By May 1943 the Axis

forces were destroyed in North Africa and, consequently, the

Mussolini government crumbled after twenty-one years in

power. Despite the fact that it was King Victor Emmanuel III who demanded Mussolini's resignation in 1943, the stigma of 176 his close association with Mussolini resulted in a plebiscite in 1946 which abolished the Italian Monarchy and established a republic.

The Egyptian monarch's decline in the eyes of his sub­ jects began on the day of February 4, 1942, when the British

Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, presented his ultimatum with the threat of deposition, demanding that the Wafd form a new government. Sir Miles Lampson described the political con­ stellation in Egypt as being like a "three-legged stool— the

Palace, ourselves [Britain] and the Wafd." Sir Miles ...

Lampson, however, created the proper atmosphere to destroy all three legs of the stool. The King was humiliated, the

British were hated even more intensely, and the Wafd was discredited, being seen as a traitorous organization.

Egyptian society became polarized and radicalized after­ ward. The ultimatum was one of the major events that led to the nationalistic young junior officers known as the

"Free Officers" deposing Faruk in July 1952 and abolishing 108 the Egyptian Monarchy in favor of a republic in 1953.

Symbolic of the irony of Italo-Egyptian relations in the interwar period— King Victor Emmanuel III died in exile in Alexandria on December 28, 1947, and King Faruk died in exile in Rome, on March 18, 1965. NOTES

Virginia MacLean, "Domestic and Foreign Factors in Egyptian Foreign Policy 1919-1939," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1955), p. 232; Gaspare Ambrosini, I Problemi del Mediterraneo (Roma: Istituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista, 1939), pp. 93-99.

“Ibid.; Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini1s Roman Empire (New York: The Viking Press, 1976), p. 127.

3 C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940 (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 307, 334; Smith, op., cit. , pp. 127-128; Alan Cassels, Fascist Italy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1969), pp. 93- 94. 4 P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 344-355.

5 Ibid., pp. 280, 286; John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956~TLondon: The Cresset Press” 1954) , p. 303.

^Marlowe, op. cit., p. 312; in 1936 there was a Royal Cabinet created to serve as liaison between the monarch and the elected government; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 238; Ella Marston, "Fascist Tendencies in Pre-War Arab Politics," The Middle East Forum, Vol. XXV (May 1959), p. 19. 7 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 290; Marlowe, op. cit., pp. 305, 308.

Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1950), p. 515; Germany, Auswartiges Amt, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series C (1933-1937), Vol. IV (London: Her *Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1959), No. 545, pp. 980-981 (hereafter cited as

177 178

DGFP); the German Charge d'Affaires in Italy wrote the German Foreign Ministry, concerning the 1937 Anglo-Italian Agreement that "the final British objective is thought to be to compel Italy to conclude a Mediterranean Pact in which Italy would have little to say and would find herself isolated in the face of a strong coalition by Britain."; Great Britain, Foreign Office, Treaty Series, No. 14 (1937), "Declaration by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government regarding the Mediterranean, 1937" (London; His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), p. 2; Ambrosini, op. cit., pp. 164-169.

9 "Afrivo della missione militare inglesi," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVII (1937), p. 13; The Egyptian Gazette, January 18, 1937, p. 5; Ibid., February 4, 1937, p. 3; Ibid., February 27, 1937, p. 5.

10The Times (London), March 15, 1937, p. 13; The Egyptian Gazette, March 23, 1937, p. 5; "Commento egiziano alle dichiarzioni di simpatia di Mussolini verso il mundo musulmano," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVII (1937), p. 70.

11The Times (London), October 9, 1937, p. 12.

12 Sir Miles Lampson [Lord Killearn], The Killearn Diaries, 1934-1946, edited by Trefor E. Evans (London; Sedgwick and-Jackson, 1972), pp. 85-87; The Times (London), November 4, 1937, p. 8 ; Ibid., November 16, 1937, p. 9; on two occasions in November 1937 Italian reinforcements in Libya were a subject of open concern in the House of Lords in a parliamentary review of Mediterranean security.

13 The Times (London), February 26, 1938, p. 11; "L 'Inghiiterra consultara l'Egitto nelle questione che lo toscassero durante le trattative con 1'Italia," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVIII (1938), p. 143.

14 The Times (London), April 8 , 1938, p. 15; Ibid., April 16, 1938, p. 11; "Presa di posizione del 'Wafd' contro le trattative anglo-italiane e i lors riflessi per l'Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVIII (1938), p. 249.

^^The Times (London), April 18, 1938, p. 6 ; "Protocollo Anglo-Italiano del 16 Aprile 1938. . . .", Vol. XVIII (1938), pp. 213-222; Great Britain, Foreign Office, Treaty Series, no. 31 (1938), "Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Italy. . . . and Bon Voisinage Agreement and Exchange of 179

Notes Between the United Kingdom, Egypt and Italy, 1938" (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp. 2-39.

16 Ibid.; Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), II, p. 403; the BBC had been monitoring Italian and German radio broadcasts. The Foreign Office had been doing it for Italian news broadcasts in Arabic since late summer 1937. The British Arabic Service was inaugurated in January 1938.

17 Jasper Yeates Brinton, The Mixed Courts of E^ypt (New York: Yale University Press, 1966, first published in 1930), p. 194; The Egyptian Gazette, January 18, 1937, p. 5.

18 Brinton, op. cit., p. 195; The Times (London), March 19, 1937, p. 15.

19 Brinton, op. cit., pp. 196-197; The Egyptian Gazette, May 8 , 1937, p. 7; Italy, Ministero Degli A f f a n Esteri, "Montreux: Convenzione concernente l'abolizione delle capitalazione in Egitto stipula fra 1'Italia e vari Stati," Trattati E Convenzioni Fra II Regno D'Italia e Gli Altri Stati, Vol. V (Roma: Tipografia del Ministero degli affari esteri), pp. 184-225; Italy ratified the treaty on September 25, 1937, while Egypt did so on September 4, 1937, and Great Britain ratified on October 12, 1937.

20 Pierre A. Gargour, Etapes de 1 1independence egyptienne apercus d'histoire diplomatique (Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1942), pp. 198-203; "Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVII (1937), p. 276; The Times (London), February 22, 1937, p. 13; Ibid. , May 27, 1937, p^ TIT; The Egyptian Gazette, May 28, 1937, p. 7.

^ The Times (London), June 3, 1937, p. 13.

22 The Egyptian Gazette, December 4, 1937, p. 7.

^The Times (London)/December 8 , 1937, p. 15; Ibid., December 29, 1937, p. 9; The Egyptian Gazette, December 13, 1937, p.. 11.

^ The Egyptian Gazette, July 20, 1937, p. 8 ; Ibid., August 2'6,' 1937, p. 7; ibid., October 5, 1937, p. 5; Ibid., October 9, 1937, p. 7; Ibid., October 14, 1937, p. 5; Ibid., October 18, 1937, p. 5; on October 18, 1937, The Egyptian Gazette recorded that there were four divisions comprising 180 some 5,000 white Italian troops in Libya; The Times (London), November 14, 1938, p. 11; Ibid., November 30, 1938, p. 13; "l'Egitto reconosce l'Impero italiano in Ethiopia," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVIII (1938), p. 679.

25 James Paul Jankowski, "The Young Egypt Party and Egyptian Nationalism, 1933-1945," (Unpublished Ph.D. disser­ tation, University of Michigan, 1967), p. 104; The Egyptian Gazette, January 7, 1936, p. 5; James Paul Jankowski, Egypt1s Young Rebels "Young Egypt": 1933-1952 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), pp. 24-25; "Arresto di membri dell'Associazione 'Giovane Egitto 1 e querela di Ahmad Husein contro en-Nahhas Pascia," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVI (1930), pp. 475-476.

2 6 Jankowski, Egypt1s Young Rebels, pp. 32-33, 58; Jankowski, The Young Egypt Party and Egyptian Nationalism, 1933-1945," pp. 180, 199.

27 Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels, p. 58; Jankowski, "The Young Egypt Party and Egyptian Nationalism," pp. 132, 181.

28 Jankowski, Egypt1s Young Rebels, pp. 58-60. Jankowski, The Young Egypt Party and Egyptian Nationalism," pp. 200-203; "Telegramma del Presidente del Partito 'Giovane Egitto' a Mussolini," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVIII (1938), p . 566.

29 George Kirk, The Middle East in the War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 3.

30 The Times (London), January 3, 1939, p. 7; The Egyptian Gazette, January 2, 1939, p. 4.

31 Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, edited by Hugh Gibson (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), pp. 22, 27-23; DGFP, Series D (1937-45), Vol. I, No. 783, pp. 1141; Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy, Series III (1939), Vol. IV "(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 302- 303.

32 Ciano, Diaries, pp. 32-33; "Aumento del personale della Missione Militare britanniche," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XIX (1939), p. 341; The Times (London), February 9, 1937, p. 16. 181

33 The Egyptian Gazette/ February 24, 1939, p. 5; "Manovre combinate delle truppe egiziane britanniche" and "Corpi volontari di Beduini per la difesa dei confine verso la Libica," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XIX (1939), p. 229.

34 The Times (London), January 11, 1939, p. 9; Ibid., March 29, 1939, p. 15.

35 Smith, op. cit., p. 155; Kirk, op. cit., p. 31; The Egyptian Gazette, April 11, 1939, p. 7.

3 6 DGFP, Series D., Vol. VI, No. 211, p. 262.

37 Kirk, op. cit., p. 33; "Breve soggiorno de Maresciallo Balbo al Cairo," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVIII (1938), pp. 337- 338; Ibid., "Importanti dichiarazioni del Maresciallo Balbo al giornale 'al-ahram' sulla politica islamic dell Italia e sulle relazion con l'Egitto," p. 341; Ibid., "Affirmazioni del Ministero egiziane della Difesa Nazionale in seguito alle dicharazione del Maresciallo Balbo," p. 314; interest­ ingly, the Oriente Moderno became more overtly influenced by Fascist ideology by 1934. In quoting articles concerning the Balbo visit to Egypt in La Bourse Egyptienne the editors state that the newspaper was notorious for espousing Jewish interests.

38 Ibid.; The Times (London), May 12, 1939, p. 15. Marshal Balbo's speech to members of the Italian colony in Cairo reminded them that their Fatherland was nearer than ever since Libya now was united with Rome and standing at the Egyptian frontier. He exhorted the Italian colony to remain attached to the Fatherland during the present diffi­ cult times and reminded its members that "we have not only faith and right on our side, but also strength, because Italy has reawakened as a warlike country and intends to remain warlike for centuries."

39 The Egyptian Gazette, May 5, 1939, p. 8 .

40 The Egyptian Gazette, May 23, 1939, p. 5; Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., pi 2 3 4 ; Italy, Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, 1^ Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Series 8 (1936- 1939), Vol. XII, No. 280 (Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1952-1960), p. 233; hereafter the last source will be referred to as DDI. 182

41 The Egyptian Gazette, June 6 , 1939, p. 5; Ibid., June 1, 1939, p. 6 ; Ibid., August 4, 1939, p. 5; Ibid., June 21, 1939, p. 6 ; French journalist Madame Tabouis, in the newspaper Oeuvre, had written an article regarding Italian designs on Egypt because they were convinced of Britain's vulnerabilities there and the state of Egyptian defenses. Al-Ahram responded to the article by writing that a successful invasion of Egypt would not work since Italy would find itself in a two-front war with the French in Tunisia and the British in Egypt and the Sudan; Ciano, Diaries, p. 115; according to Count Ciano, Indian troops used to reinforce British troops in Egypt irritated Mussolini.

42 The Egyptian Gazette, June 19, 1939, p. 12; "Scambia di missioni militari tra l'Egitto i la Turchia," and "Missione militare egiziano in Turchia," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XIX (1939), p. 484; DDI, Series 8 , Vol. XII, No. 619, pp. 468-470; Ibid., No. 78X7 p. 584.

43 Lowe and Marzari, op. cit., p. 247; Albrecht-Carrie, op. cit., pp. 536-540; Ciano, Diaries, p. 130; DDI, Series 8 , Vol. XIII, No. 308, p. 197; on August 26, 1939, Sir Percy Loraine, British Ambassador in Rome, relayed a message from Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, to Count Ciano that British precautionary measures in the Mediterranean were not to be interpreted as hostile toward Italy. In so doing, the British were hoping to keep Italy out of any impending conflict.

44 "L'attegiamento della stampa egiziana durante la crisis european;" "II partito 'Giovane Egitto' vuol combatteri a fiano dell'Inghilterra per 1 'independenza dell'Egitto e dei paesi Arabi," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XIX (1939), p. 512; Ibid., "Rottura della relazioni diplomatici tra l'Egitto e la Germania," "Instituzione di un exercito territoriale di reserva," "Soddisfazione egiziane per l'attegiamento italiamento," p. 552; The Egyptian Gazette, September 1, 1939, p, 8 .

"'45 The Egyptian Gazette, September 2, 1939, p. 5; Muhammad Mahmud resigned because of ill-health. Ali Maher had served as Prime Minister for four months earlier. Since 1937, he had served as head of the Royal Council, a position secondly only to the Prime Minister in power.

4 6 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 343; Kirk, op. cit., p. 34; The Egyptian Gazette, September 4, 1939, pp. 1, 5; Ibid., 183

September 18, 1939, p. 1; Gouvernement Egyptien, Table des Documents Officiels Annee 1939 (Le Caire: Imprimerie Nationale, 1919-1941), pp. 373; Raoul Aglion, War in the Desert; The Battle for Africa (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1941), pp. 109-110.

47 "Soddisfazione egiziana per l'attegiamento italiani," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XIX (1939), p. 552; The Egyptian Gazette, October 5, 1939, p. 5; United States, National Archives, Microfilm Series T-586 (Personal Papers of Benito Mussolini, Together with Some Official Records of the Italian Foreign Office and the Ministry of Culture, 1922- 1944), Roll 409, File 4(1939-1940), "Conversations with the Egyptian King, President of the Council and the Head of the General Staff, from the Italian Legation, Rome"; Howard McGaw Smyth, Secrets of the Fascist Era (Carbondale, Illinois; Southern Illinois University, 1975), pp. 164-248. The author gives a detailed review of the complexities of using the Personal Papers of Benito Mussolini. One major problem is the lack of any workable index to the collection of well over 300 rolls of film.

48 United States National Archives, loc. cit., Roll No. 409, File 4, Stack I; Marcel Colombe, L'Evolution de L'Egypte 1924-1950 (Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve et Cie., 1951), pp. 86-87.

4 9 Ibid.

5 0 Ibid.

51 The Times (London), December 15, 1939, p. 7; The Egyptian Gazette, November 4, 1938, p. 5; Ibid., December 1, 1939, p. 1; Italy, Ministero degli affari esteri, Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Speech in the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations: "An Account of the International Situation in Recent Years," Rome, December 16, 1939 (Rome: Novissima, 1939), p. 43. After a review of Italy's foreign policy Count Ciano officially reaffirmed Italy's policy of "non-belligerence."

52 The Times (London), February 16, 1940, p. 7.,

53 Ciano, Diaries, pp. 205, 207. 54 Lampson, op. cit., p. 117. 184

55 . . Kirk/ op. cit., p. 36? James Heyworth-Dunne, Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt (Washington/ D.C.: Published by the author/ 1950)/ pp. 25-26.

c / r The Egyptian Gazette, April 7, 1940, p. 5? Dichiarazioni del Ministro d 1Italia a Cairo," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XX (1940), p. 245.

57 Ciano, Diaries, p. 242; The Times (London), May 3, 1940, p. 5.

58 The Times (London), May 7, 1940, p. 5; Kirk, op. cit., p. 37.

59 The Times (London), May 14, 1940, p. 5; Ibid., May 16, 1940, p. 5; Lampson, op. cit., p. 118.

6 0 DDI, Series 9 (1939-43), Vol. IV, No. 42, pp. 364- 347; Ibid., No. 460, pp. 378-379; Ibid., No. 501, p. 400? Ciano, Diaries, p. 257.

61 "Discussioni nella stampa egiziana sull1attegiamento dell'Egitto in caso di entrata in guerra dell Italia," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XX (1940), pp. 340-341; Great Britain, Foreign Office, Treaty Series, No. 6 (1937), "Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty, in respect of the United Kingdom, and His Majesty the King of Egypt, 1936," (London; His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), p. 5; Article VII of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 reads; "Should. . . either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. The aid of . . . the King of Egypt in the event of war . . . will consist of furnishing to . . . the King and Emperor in Egyptian territory, in accordance with the Egyptian system of administration and legislation, all the facilities and assistance in his power including the use of his ports, aerodromes, and means of communication. It will accordingly be for the Egyptian Government to take the administrative and legislative measures, including the^ establishment of martial law and an effective censorship, necessary to render these facilities and assistance effec­ tive ."

6 2 Kirk, op. cit., p. 38; The Egyptian Gazette, June 13, 1940, p. 1? The Times (London), June 13, 1940, p. 6 ; "Come 185 il Governo egiziano communica all'Italia la rottura della relazioni diplomatic! e defini il suo attegiamento per l'avvenire," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XX (1940), p. 342; Lampson, op. cit., p~. 119; Lord Killearn recounts the meet­ ing between Count Mazzolini and Ali Maher in June 12, 1940. He adds in regard to the Prime Minister's performance; "On the whole Ali Maher was not unresponsive but I feel we have to watch him all the time."

63 The Egyptian Gazette, June 17, 1940, p. 1; Ibid., June 18, 1940, p. I; ibidTT June 20, 1940, p. 1; Kirk, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

64 The Times (London), June 19, 1940, p. 5; Field Marshal Lord Henry Maitland, Eight Years Overseas 1939-1947 (London; Hutchinson, 1950), p. 39.

6 5 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 345; Kirk, op. cit., p. 39; The Times (London), June 19, 1940, p. 5; "Gli interessi italiani in Egitto consulati dalla Suizzera," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XX (1940), pp. 342-343; Ibid., "Dismissioni del Ministro d*Egitto a Roma," p. 347; Jacques Berque, Egypt; Imperialism and Revolution, Translated by Jean Stewart (London; Faber & Faber, 1967), p. 564.

66 The Times (London), June 26, 1940, p. 5; "Dismissioni del Presidente dei Ministro Ali Maher Pascia," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XX (1940), p. 343; Ibid., "La partenza dei rappresentanti diplomatici egiziani da Roma," p. 344; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 346; Kirk, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

67 The Times (London), July 4, 1940, p. 3; Kirk, op. cit., p. 40; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 346.

6 8 Kirk, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

69 United States, Tariff Commission, Italian Commercial Policy and Foreign Trade, 1922-1940, Second Series, Report No. 142 (Washington, D .C .: Government Printing Office,-■■■■ 1941), p. 131; Italy's leading sources of raw cotton imports was the United States which, in 1938, supplied 60 percent of Italian imports. Egypt supplied about 17 percent and British India some 19 percent. Since then, the Italian share of cotton purchased from Egypt materially increased; Decio Buffoni, "Aspetti Attuali Del'Economia Egiziana," Egitto Moderno e Antico, Edited by Achille Vogliano (Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1941), 186 pp. 84-85; Smith/ op. cit./ p. 115; Howard M. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East/ 1936-1954 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf/ 1972) / p. 42; Elizabeth Monroe, The Mediterranean in Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 253; Mabel Caillaro, A Lifetime in Egypt (London: Grant Richards, 1935), p. 266.

70 R. J. Collins, Lord Wave11 (1883-1943): A Military Biography (London: Hodder & Staughton, 1948), p. 249; Kirk, op. cit., pp. 41-42; Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War 1939-45: A Strategical and Tactical History (London: Eyre & SpottiswoocTe, 1^48), pp. 31-92.

71 Lenardo Simoni, Berlino: Ambasciator d 1Italia 1939- 1943 (Rome: Migliaresi, 1946), July 7, 1940; Kirk, op. cit’., p. 42.

72 The Egyptian Gazette, July 1, 1940, p. 5; Ciano, Diaries, p. 259.

73 Ciano, Diaries, pp. 275, 281-287, 291; on July 13, 1940, Count Ciano recorded "that the real controversy in the matter of naval conflicts is not between us and the British but between our aviation and our Navy. Admiral Cavagnari maintains that our air action was completely lacking during the first phase of the encounter but when it finally came it was directed against our own ships, which for six hours withstood the bombardment of our airplanes." He continues by referring to his dismay over Mussolini's believing the obviously fabricated accounts of Italian victories.

74 The Times (London), July 29, 1940, p. 3; Ibid., August 8 , 1940, p. 3; Kirk, op. cit., pp. 193-194.

75 The Egyptian Gazette, August 7, 1940, p. 5; Ibid., August 14, 1940, p. 6 ; Ibid., August 21, 1940, p. 4; ibid., August 22, 1940, p. 1; Ibid., August 23, 1940, p. 1.

7 6 The Egyptian Gazette, August 23, 1940, p. 6 ; Ibid., August TTT 1940, p. T~.

The Ecr Gazette, September 21, 1940, p. 1; The Times ______p. 195; Jean Lugol, L'Egypte et la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale (Le Caire: E. & R. Schindler, R. Schindler, 1945), p. 124; "Proclamazione della levye marziale," Oriente Moderno, 187

Vol. XX (1940), p. 502; Ibid., "L'ltalia in Egitto entende combatare unicamente contro gl'Inglesi," p. 501; Ibid., "Nuove dichiarazione ufficiose sulle intenzioni pacifiche dell'Italia verso 1'Egitto," "Dismissoni di quattro Ministro Su'desti favorevali all'immediati intervento in guerra contro l'ltalia, Prudente risposta del Presidente dei Ministri," p. 502. The Saadists were a splinter group of the Wafd who broke away in 1937-1938. Seth Arsenian, "Wartime Propaganda in the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, Vol. II, No. 739 (October 1948), p. 428; the author suggests that German and Italian propaganda was more popular than that of the Allies to the Middle Eastern peoples because it was highly colored and emotional, being geared to the common tastes and beliefs of the masses.

78 Kirk, op. cit., p. 196; Ciano, Diaries, pp. 297-298; Mussolini actually had wanted to attack Mersa Matruh but received resistance from both General Badoglio at home and General Graziani in the field; both felt that action should be delayed in October in order to make the proper logistical preparations prior to an attack. Freya Stark, The Arab Island: The Middle East, 1939-1943 (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1945), p. 89; in the summer of 1940 Sayyid Idris, Sanusi religious leader, exiled in Egypt, helped enlist four Sanusi battalions under British officers in the Western Desert. They helped guide raids and furnished intelligence against the Italians in Libya.

79 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 346. Both the Wafd and the Saadists .refused to join in the Coalition. Kirk, op. cit., p. 196; The Egyptian Gazette, November 28, 1940, p. 1; Albert Viton, ”Britain and the Axis in the Near East," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (January 1941), p. 379; at the end of the month of November, Egypt's Defense Minister died of a heart attack. Since both the dead Prime Minister and Defense Minister had opposed Egypt's entry into the war, Axis propaganda claimed that the British had killed both of them.

8 0 The Egyptian Gazette, November 26, 1940, p. 1; The Times (London), November 24, 1940, p. 5; Ibid., December 3, 1940, p. 3; "La risposta italiana alia protesta egiziana contro il bombardamenti aerei," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXI (1941), p. 82.

81 The Egyptian Gazette, December 17, 1940, p. 1; Ciano, Diaries, pp. 322-323. 188

2 "Lampson, op. cit., pp. 140-141; Sir Miles Lampson also reported his interpretation in that Hussanayn, being violently anti-Italian, had made no secret of his delight at the reported discomfiture of the Italians; "Dichiarazione ufficiale sull'allusione all'Egitto nel discorso di Churchill," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXI (1941), pp. 80-81; General Egyptian relief atthe British successful counter­ offensive was tainted by a phrase in Sir Winston Churchill's broadcast to the Italian people on December 23, 1940, in which he asked: "Where was the need to invade Egypt, which is under British protection?" The phrase irritated Egyptians. The Prime Minister of Egypt demanded a clarification, and Sir Anthony Eden had to disclaim that it carried any implication of a British protectorate.

8 3 Vatikiotis, op. cit. , p. 346; Kirk, oip. cit. , p. 346; "La riconquista italo-germanica della Cirenaica," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXI (1941), pp. 191-192.

84 "Dichiarazione del Presidente del Consiglio sulla situazioni e le relazioni con l'Ingliterra a meta di aprile," "La posizione del Reich verso l'Egitto precisata a Berlino," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXI (1941), p. 267.

Q C Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 346-347; Barrie St. Clair McBride, Farouk of Egypt: A Biography (New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, 1968), p. 108.

8 6 Kirk, op. cit., p. 200; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 347.

87 [Colonel] Anwar el-Sadat, Revolt on the Nile (London: Allan Wingate, 1947), pp. 26, 29-30, 43; between the end of 1940 and early 1941, the secret military organization "Free Officers" which eventually launched the Revolution of 1952, tried to form an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. Jankowski, The Young Egypt Party and Egyptian Nationalism, 1933-1945, pp. 225-226, 315-316; the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by its leader Hasan al-Banna in 1928, by 1938 emerged as a militant force in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries. At the close of World War II, they presented an alternative based on Islamic traditions to the secular politicians with their European models of society and govern­ ment. Christina Phelps Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood (London: Mouton & Co., 1964), pp. 180-181. 189

8 8 McBride, op. cit., p. 109; Kirk, op. cit., p. 200; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 347; Jankowski, op. cit., p. 226; Colombe, op. cit., p. 92.

o g DGFP, Series D. Vol. XII, No. 350, p. 559; Lukasy Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p. 233; Jankowski, op. cit., pp. 223; Sachar, op. cit., pp. 160-161; Oliver Lyttleton Chandos, Memoirs (London: Bodley Head, 1962), p. 270.

90 The Times (London), June 16, 1941, p. 3; Kirk, op. cit., p7"2 0 1 .

91 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 347; The Times (London), November 20, 1941, p. 4; Ibid., December 5, 1941, p. 6 ; "Inumano trattomenti dei prigionieri di querra italiani," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXII (1942), p. 21; Ciano, Diaries, pp. 409, 413; Ciano recorded that "Mussolini is concerned about it [the article in Osservatore Romano]. It is a known fact," he says, "that they tItalian soldiers] are inclined to let themselves be taken prisoner. If they see that their comrades are having such a good time over there, who can hold them back?"

92 Kirk, op. cit., pp. 201-205; Vatikiotis, op. cit.,

93 Lugol, op. cit., pp. 304-305; "Dismissioni di Husein Sirri Pascia Nuovo Mmistero Wafdista scioglimento della Camera," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXII (1942), p. 75; Ibid., "Egitto," p. 95; Kirk, op. cit., pp. 209-210.

94 Lampson, op. cit., pp. 198, 209; The Times (London), February 3, 1942, p. 4; Jankowski, op. cit., p. 224; Hirscowicz, op. cit., pp. 236-237, 248-249.

95 . Lampson, op. cit., p. 202; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 343; Gabriel Warburg, "Lampson's Ultimatum of-Faruq, 4 February 1942," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XI, No. 1 (January 1975), pp. 27, 29; Berque op. cit., p. 565.

^Lampson, op. cit., pp. 198, 217, Tom Little, Modern Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 8 8 ; Sir Miles Lampson was vulnerable to the return criticism from the Palace in regard to his demand to Faruk 190 that the letter's Italian cronies leave, since his own wife, the former Jacqueline Castellani, was the daughter of the Italian Army's Surgeon General; McBride, op. cit., pp. 100, 106. Faruk's Italian cronies accompanied Faruk to night clubs, and Antonio Pulli often acted as procurer of feminine favors from entertainers for the young King. Other Italians included Ernesto Veruni and Pietro Garo; Michael Stern, Farouk (New York: Bantam Books, 1965), p. 16.

97 Lampson, op. cit., pp. 207, 211; Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 348-349; Warburg, loc. cit., p. 29.

98 Lampson, op. cit., pp. 211-214; Warburg, loc. cit., p. 29; Laurence Graf jftey-Smith, Bright Levant (London: John Murray, 1970), p. 138; a British Foreign Service Officer, Smith, as consular officer in Egypt, wrote that Sir Miles Lampson was physically and temperamentally incapable of giving a convincing impression of change [in Egypt]."

99 The Times (London), April 9, 1942, p. 4; Ibid., April 11, 1942, p. 3; Ibid., July 4, 1942, p. 4; ibid., July 7, 1942, p. 4; Ibid., August 18, 1942, p. 3; "Dichiarazione italo-tedesco del 4 luglio 1942 per il respetti dell1independenza dell'Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXII (1942), p. 28; Kirk, op. cit., Footnote 3, p. 208; Hirszowicz, op. cit., pp. 237-238; Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 351-352. There is evidence pointing to the fact that the Wafd drafted a letter to Field Marshal Rommel in the event of a German victory. It was, however, never delivered.

1 (^Hirszowicz, op. cit., p. 152; Sadat, op. cit., p. 38; Jankowski, op. cit., pp. 227-228.

^^Kirk, op. cit., p. 227; Jankowski, op. cit., p. 227.

102 Hirszowicz, op. cit., p. 239; Kirk, op. cit., p. 51.

103 Hirszowicz, op. cit., pp. 239-241; "Dichiarazione italo-tedesco del 4 luglio 1942 per il respetti dell' independenza dell'Egitto," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXII (1942), p. 281; the declaration as drafted by the Italians and accepted by the Germans reads as follows:

At the time when their victorious armed forces are marching across Egypt, the Axis states reaffirm their decided intention of respect and ensure the independence and sovereignty of Egypt. The armed 191

forces of the Axis are entering Egypt not as into an enemy land, but for the purpose of expelling the English from Egyptian territory and in order to continue military operations against England and to liberate the Near East from British rule.

The policies of the Axis powers are guided by the principle: Egypt for the Egyptians.

The destiny of Egypt, liberated from the fetters shackling her to Great Britain, for which cause the country has felt the painful effects of war, is to take its place among the independent and sovereign nations.

104 Hirszowicz, op. cit., pp. 246-247.

1 0 5 Ibid., p. 245.

10 s "La situazione dell'Egitto in uno scritto del Presidente Generale dell'Associazione Nazionalista 'Misr' in Europa," Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXII (1942), p. 455. Nasir al-Tayyib regularly wrote about the Egyptian situation in the Association's publication, Misr; Hirszowicz, pp. 234- 235.

107 . Hirszowicz, op. cit., p. 248; Kirk, op. cit., p. 266; Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 346-350; Glen St. J. Barclay, The Rise and Fall of the New Roman Empire (London: Sedgwick•& Jackson, 1973), p. 188; the contributions made to the United Nations by Badoglio's Italy of the Armistice was by no means simply formal: 315 Italian aircraft flew 9,444 missions of combat or supply between September 8 , 1943, and July 1944. The Italian army provided the United Nations with 330,000 men for various duties, including four full combat divisions which reportedly performed impressively at Monte Largo in December and, subsequently, in the campaign of May 1944. Over 17,000 of Italy's 77,500 combat dead fell in the battle of liberation.

1 QO Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 349-350; Lampson, op. cit., p. 218; Muhammed Neguib, Egypt's Destiny (London: U. Gollancz, 1955), p. 14; Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, n.d.), p. 14; Sadat, op. cit., pp. 44-45. Three of the leading members of the "Free Officers," Muhammad Neguib, Gamal Abd-al-Nasir and Anwar al-Sadat mentioned the events of 1942 in their writing since the 1952 revolution. Naguib states that the British 192

Ultimatum of February 1942 was a major factor leading to the July 1952 revolution. Nasir defined the ultimatum as a disaster making the young officers willing to give up their lives to save their Country's dignity. Anwar al-Sadat calls the British Ultimatum "one of the crucial incidents in contemporary Egyptian history." He continues by stating that the result was "to impose upon Egypt two years of dictatorship by the Wafd— two years of nepotism, jobbery, peculation which thoroughly discredited the major nationalist party in Egypt." CONCLUSION

Egypt's foreign relations with Italy between 1922 and

1942 were the most extensive and significant of those with

any country other than Great Britain. Although technically

responsible for the conduct of its foreign policy, the

Egyptian government was influenced and limited by Britain's definition of independence between 1922 and 1936, and there­

after by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Nevertheless relations with Italy during this period touched upon most of Egypt's major foreign policy issues. These included individual problems with a capitulatory state, border settlements,

Blue Nile control as an aspect of the Ethiopian conflict,

the neutrality and security of the Suez Canal, the Anglo-

Egyptian Treaty of 1936, and lastly the question of Egypt's

policy of non-belligerence during World War II.

Italian colonial interests in North and East Africa made Egypt's strategic position in the Mediterranean, the

Suez Canal, and the Red Sea a natural concern. Since 1882,

Britain's occupation of Egypt had curtailed any important

Italian political influence there but Britain's unilateral

declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922 renewed Italian

aspirations. The Fascist dream of recreating the Mediter­

ranean Roman Empire, moreover, depended upon Italy's

193 194 consolidating her position in Libya, and upon her capacity to replace British and French influence in Egypt and the

Levant.

In the 1920's, Mussolini entered into a Colonial

Entente with Britain which served Italy1s near term ambi­ tions. One major benefit was Britain's support in pressur­ ing the Egyptian government into signing a rectification of the Libyan border in 1925. As the Anglo-Egyptian Colonial

Entente began to dissolve in the late 1920's Italy subse­ quently attempted to enhance her image in the Middle East.

In Egypt, Italian political penetration included the crea­ tion of Italian Fascist groups in the major cities to organize Egypt's sizable Italian population. King Fuad, a known Italophile, was cultivated by Mussolini after a state visit to Italy in 1927. King Fuad admired Mussolini and actually sought his approval after one of many of the

Egyptian King's attempts to subvert parliamentary government in Egypt in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

Also, by the 1930's an impressive Italian navy sailed the Mediterranean and showed the Italian flag in Egyptian ports. Italians increased their maritime and air services to Egypt as well as investments in banking and insurance.

Italian exports of cotton textiles to Egypt, furthermore, by the late 1930's had become a very important factor in

Italy's balance of trade with the Middle East where she received all of her oil and a fifth of her iron and cotton. 195

In the mid-1930's, Italian ambitions in Ethiopia seriously jeopardized Italo-Egyptian relations because they touched upon Egyptian concerns over the Suez Canal and the .

Ethiopian headwaters of the Blue Nile. The fear of Italian aggression was a real one but equal fear of the British reimposition of a Protectorate in the event of war caused the Egyptians to sign the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in August

1936. Britain received a favorable military status in Egypt in return for recognition of formal independence/ support for ending special foreign privileges/ and entry into the

League of Nations.

Italy had done her best to prevent the signing of a treaty with generous military clauses for Britain by suggesting a non-aggression pact in the spring of 1936.

Egyptians used the possibility of an Italo-Egyptian pact to gain leverage in their negotiations with Britain, but clearly had little intention of signing such a pact with Italy, for on the subject of the defense of their country Egyptian and

British interests were virtually identical.

The "nationalization" of the Ethiopian Coptic Church in December 1937 at the expense of the sovereignty of the

Coptic Church in Egypt brought forth much anti-Italian public sentiment. This fact together with the continuous reinforce­ ment of Italian troops in Libya brought both countries further apart. There was a marked improvement between the two countries, however, in April 1938 when Egyptians joined 196 with Italy and Britain in the signing of a bon voisinage agreement which reaffirmed an earlier 1937 Anglo-Italian

Agreement guaranteeing the status quo in the Mediterranean.

The most important sections concerning Egypt included the reaffirmation of Italy's adherence to agreements in regard to Lake Tsana and the 1888 Convention concerning the Suez

Canal. In the following November relations had normalized enough so that Egypt recognized Italian sovereignty over

Ethiopia.

The outbreak of World War II in the fall of 1939 created a serious dilemma for the Egyptian government.

Instead of declaring war on Germany as had Great Britain,

Prime Minister Ali Maher chose to interpret Article VII of the 1936 Treaty to mean an activation of security precau­ tions in conjunction with Britain within Egypt but only the

severing of diplomatic relations with Germany. Egyptians, moreover, had received the news of Italy's non-belligerence with relief. To some degree Italy's decision not to enter the war had heavily influenced Ali Maher's decision to do the same.

The Egyptian government's declaration of non- belligerence was the first truly independent foreign policy decision adopted since the British occupation of 1882.

Furthermore, between October and December 1939, King Faruk,

Ali Maher, and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Aziz Ali al-Masri, on their own initiative, carried on high level discussions 197 with the Italian legation in Cairo. All three Egyptian

leaders told the Italian Ambassador that Egypt would remain a non-belligerent as long as the country was free from attack. Once attacked, however, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty would be activated forcing Britain to come to Egypt's defense.

When Italy declared war in the summer of 1940 Egypt broke diplomatic relations but maintained her policy of non- belligerence even when Italian aircraft began bombing

Alexandria and later initiated an unsuccessful offensive against Egypt in the fall of 1940.

Egypt's reluctance to declare war on Italy was a realistic decision. The Egyptians clearly wanted to keep their options open in the event of an ultimate Axis victory.

In fact, between late 1940 and 1942, both King Faruk and various military groups, independent of each other, con­ tacted Germans. By the spring of 1941, when Rommel entered the war in North Africa, the Egyptians recognized that the

Germans, not the Italians, would be the likely occupiers of

Egypt. As the months moved into early 1942, it became clear to the British that even the pro-British successors of

Prime Minister Ali Maher did not intend to declare war on the Axis. The convergence of a government crisis, pro-Axis student demonstrations, and a new Italo-German offensive against Egypt in early February led the British Ambassador 198 to threaten to depose Faruk unless he accepted formation of a Wafd government.

The successful British "coup d'etat" was a desperate move, and it underscored just how serious the British perceived the Axis threat to be to Egypt. The British faced attack from the outside, but more importantly they faced disloyalty inside the country. Egyptian attempts to contact the Axis powers were motivated first, by the realistic fear that the British could not defend Egypt and the need for advance agreements with the possible victors, and secondly, an intense dislike for British officials who, during the war, interfered in Egyptian domestic affairs as if Egypt were still under a Protectorate.

The liberation of Egypt, therefore, the main theme of

Axis propaganda, had a strong appeal. Italy, however, had lost her credibility with most Egyptians after the unsuccess­ ful attack on their country in the fall of 1940. Egyptians had only to look to Libya and Ethiopia to recognize that

Italians under Mussolini were likely to want to replace

Britain but not seriously wish to liberate Egypt. The

Germans, on the other hand, with their impressive victories in the war in Europe and their non-existent record of direct occupation in the Middle East appeared to make them more credible liberators by the spring of 1941.

Fascist Italy appeared compelled to attempt a rectifi­ cation of nineteenth century imperalistic failures. The 199

1935 invasion of Ethiopia was a vindication of the 1896 ignominious defeat. Similarly, the 1940 invasion of Egypt was in effect an attempt to receify the Italian failure to occupy the country with Britain in 1882. If Egypt was strategically and economically important to Italy in the nineteenth century, she had become infinitely more important by the twentieth century to Fascist Italy.

Italy1s attack on Egypt ultimately proved to be a disaster for the governments that ruled both countries in the interwar years. The bitter failure of Italy's North

African campaign and Italy's growing dependence upon Germany caused the Mussolini government to fall in 1943. The

Italian monarchy's close identification with Mussolini's fiasco caused it to be abolished in 1946. The effect that

Italy's attack had on Egypt was equally devastating. It brought increased pressures on the domestic balance of politics that led to the British ultimatum in which both the

Monarchy and the Wafd (the majority party) lost all credi­ bility with the Egyptian people. Ten years later, after a military coup, the Egyptian monarchy was also abolished. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Arsenian, S., "Wartime Propaganda in the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, Vol. II (October 1948), pp. 417- Jl9~.

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Dissertations

Jankowski, James Paul, "The Young Egypt Party and Egyptian Nationalism, 1933-1945," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1967.

MacLean, Virginia, "Domestic and Foreign Factors in Egyptian Foreign Policy 1919-1937," Unpublished Ph.D. Disser­ tation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1955.