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Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond

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Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond United Nations University Press is the publishing arm of the United Nations University. UNU Press publishes scholarly and policy-oriented books and periodicals on the issues facing the United Nations and its peoples and member states, with particular emphasis upon international, regional and transboundary policies. The United Nations University was established as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution 2951 (XXVII) of 11 December 1972. The United Nations University undertakes a wide range of activities focused on knowledge generation (basic and applied re- search, and foresight and policy studies), education and capacity develop- ment (developing human and organizational capabilities), and knowledge transfer and sharing (communications, dissemination and outreach). The University operates through its institutes and programmes located throughout the world, and its planning and coordinating centre in Tokyo. Fixing Haiti The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) is an inde- pendent, non-partisan think tank that addresses international governance challenges. Led by a group of experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI aims to anticipate emerging trends in international gov- ernance and to strengthen multilateral responses to the world’s most pressing problems. CIGI advances policy ideas and debate by conducting studies, forming networks and convening scholars, practitioners and policymakers. By operating an active program of publications, events, conferences and workshops, CIGI builds capacity to effect change in international public policy. CIGI was founded in 2001 by Research In Motion (RIM) co-CEO and philanthropist Jim Balsillie, who serves as CIGI’s chair. CIGI is advised by an International Advisory Board. www.cigionline.org Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and beyond Edited by Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson © United Nations University, 2011 The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not nec- essarily reflect the views of the United Nations University. United Nations University Press United Nations University, 53-70, Jingumae 5-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-8925, Japan Tel: +81-3-5467-1212 Fax: +81-3-3406-7345 E-mail: [email protected] general enquiries: [email protected] http://www.unu.edu United Nations University Office at the United Nations, New York 2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-2062, New York, NY 10017, USA Tel: +1-212-963-6387 Fax: +1-212-371-9454 E-mail: [email protected] United Nations University Press is the publishing division of the United Nations University. Cover design by Mea Rhee Cover art by Stivenson Magloire, Sans titre, acrylic on cloth © 1990. Printed in the United States of America ISBN 978-92-808-1197-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fixing Haiti : MINUSTAH and beyond / edited by Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-9280811971 (pbk.) 1. Haiti—Politics and government—21st century. 2. Failed states—Haiti. 3. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. 4. United Nations— Peacekeeping forces—Haiti. 5. Peacebuilding—Haiti—International cooperation. 6. Economic assistance—Haiti. 7. Technical assistance—Haiti. I. Heine, Jorge. II. Thompson, Andrew S. (Andrew Stuart), 1975– F1928.2.F5 2011 972.9407'3—dc23 2011021069 To the memory of Gerard Le Chevallier and all those who died in Haiti on 12 January 2010 Endorsements “Library shelves sag under the weight of books on Haiti. Many are truly exceptional studies probing and dissecting the causes of Haiti’s repeated failures at sustaining development and good governance: French colonial- ism, European racism, US failures to plumb its ‘culture of poverty’, eco- logical devastation – and repeatedly and often mindlessly – the laying of historical blame on what is invariably called ‘the Haitian elite’. All this, of course, is useful preface to understanding contemporary Haiti which is presently at yet another of those terrible political impasses. The well-documented economic complexity and labyrinthine nature of the island’s politics have now been magnified by a devastating earth- quake, multiple killer hurricanes, and virtually out-of-control urbanization. The presence of the UN military peacekeeping and election monitoring contingents is struggling to keep the peace. Such conditions require fresh analysis, a multifaceted focus by an array of hands-on experts. This is pre- cisely what this book offers in a straight and unvarnished fashion. Noth- ing presently in print equals it in terms of analytical depth and breadth. Its contents will most probably leave you thinking that solutions are not yet within our reach. This is as it should be if we are to join neces- sary caution to an equally necessary hope that a better future is indeed possible.” Anthony P. Maingot, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Florida Inter- national University, and past president, Caribbean Studies Association. “This superb volume reflects the most sophisticated thinking about the challenges posed by Haiti and the international community’s response, including after the devastating earthquake. The first-rate authors have no illusions about the magnitude of the task. Their appraisal of the perform- ance of the UN and key hemispheric players in helping Haiti deal with its profound problems is refreshingly balanced and clear-headed. They chart a way forward that tries to align the capacities of international actors with realities on the ground. For policy officials and decision makers con- cerned about Haiti’s future, this is an indispensable guide.” Michael Shifter, President, Inter-American Dialogue Contents Figures and tables . x Contributors . xi Foreword . xvi Paul Collier Acknowledgements . xviii Abbreviations . xix Introduction: Haiti’s governance challenges and the international community . 1 Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson Part I: Haiti’s governance challenges . 25 1 External shocks to fragile states: Building resilience in Haiti . 27 Amélie Gauthier and Madalena Moita 2 Haiti’s unending crisis of governance: Food, the constitution and the struggle for power . 41 Robert Fatton Jr. 3 The legacy of the 1987 constitution: Reform or renewal? . 66 Mirlande Manigat CONTENTS ix 4 Haiti: Malversive state and teetering nation . 78 Patrick Sylvain 5 Reforming the Haitian National Police: From stabilization to consolidation . 97 Timothy Donais Part II: The United Nations at work . 115 6 The “MINUSTAH experience” . 117 Gerard Le Chevallier 7 Peace operations: On the importance of perceiving versus just seeing . 126 Eduardo Aldunate 8 Latin American peacekeeping: A new era of regional cooperation . 138 Johanna Mendelson Forman 9 UNPKO and the Latin American armed forces . 157 Juan Emilio Cheyre Part III: The hemispheric players . 173 10 Haiti and the regional dynamics of international cooperation . 175 José Raúl Perales 11 Brazil’s mission in Haiti . 191 Marcel Biato 12 Canada and the travail of partnership in Haiti . 205 Stephen Baranyi 13 US policy towards Haiti under the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama . 229 Robert Maguire Conclusion: Fixing Haiti—MINUSTAH and beyond . 247 Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson Index . 258 Figures and tables Figures 9.1 Participation of the Chilean Army in peace operations. 163 9.2 Homicide rates in the Dominican Republic, St Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago, 1999–2005 . 170 Tables 3.1 List of Haitian prime ministers . 72 8.1 Latin American troop contribution MINUSTAH, September 2008 . 140 8.2 Peacekeeping training centres in Latin America. 144 9.1 Percentage of Southern Cone’s contributions to MINUSTAH in relation to Southern Cone’s general contributions to UNPKO . 159 9.2 MINUSTAH troop and police contribution by region. 160 9.3 Chile–Asia trade . 166 9.4 Breakdown of MINUSTAH forces. 167 9.5 Number of homicides in world regions. 170 12.1 Canadian ODA disbursements to Haiti, April 2004 to March 2006. 210 12.2 Estimated distribution of Canadian ODA disbursements to Haiti, 2004 –2006. 211 12.3 Canadian international assistance to Haiti, April 2006 to March 2008. 216 x Contributors Eduardo Aldunate Brigadier General Development Research Centre, (R) Aldunate was an infantry officer Ottawa, Canada and a principal in the Chilean Army. He holds researcher at the North-South master’s degrees in Military History Institute, also in Ottawa. He has and Military Sciences and was published widely on issues at the Professor of Military Strategy and interface of development and History at the Army War College. security. He has written three books on Marcel Biato is the Ambassador of leadership and civil-military Brazil to Bolivia. From 2003 to 2010 relations. Between September 2005 he served in Planalto, Brazil’s and September 2006, he served as presidential palace, as an assistant to Deputy Commander of the UN President Lula’s chief foreign policy Military Forces in Haiti, advisor. A career diplomat for MINUSTAH. His book Backpacks thirty years, he has served as a Full of Hope: The UN Mission in political officer at Brazil’s Embassy Haiti has been published by Wilfrid in London and in the Consulate Laurier University Press (2010). General in Berlin, as well as a legal Stephen Baranyi is Associate Professor advisor to his country’s UN mission. at the School of International In Itamaraty, Brazil’s Foreign Development and Global Studies, Ministry, he has covered Latin University of Ottawa, Canada. Over American and military issues, having the past 15 years, he has worked as a been an advisor to the Brazilian
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