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University of Florida Training Reactor Facility License R-56, Docket No

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University of Florida Training Reactor Facility License R-56, Docket No UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA Nuclear Facilities 202 Nuclear Sciences Center Department of Nuclear and Radiological Engineering P.O. Box 118300 Gainesville, Florida 32611-8300 Tel: (352) 392-1408 Fax: (352) 392-3380 Email: [email protected] July 25, 2002 Attn: Document Control Desk Changes to Support UFTR U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Relicensing Application: Washington, DC 20555 Technical Specifications University of Florida Training Reactor Facility License R-56, Docket No. 50-83 Completely reformatted Technical Specifications are enclosed as Chapter 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to support the relicensing request for the University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) R-56 License. Most of the requested changes to the Technical Specifications are considered to be minor; however, because of the number of changes and reorganization, the changes are not marked with the usual vertical line in the margin. Nevertheless, the following paragraphs provide a summary of the more significant requested changes where all the section and paragraph designations refer to the new reformatted and reorganized Technical Specifications generated as part of Chapter 14 of the FSAR to support relicensing. First, in Section 3.2.1, "Reactor Control System," Paragraph (3), a clarification is added to allow the reactor to be operated without the autocontroller function available provided the autocontroller is not needed and not used for the operation. This change is justified in that there are many times, especially when operating at low power levels or for relatively short periods of time for training, irradiations or other operations, when the autocontroller function is neither needed nor used. Except for lengthy runs at constant power, the autocontroller function is primarily a convenience versus a necessary safety-related feature. There have been occasions in the past when the autocontroller has been out of order and despite not being needed, the reactor is then unavailable. Therefore, this change is supported as not reducing safety but assuring more efficient use of resources. This change also affects the second item in Table 3-3. Second, in Section 3.2.1, "Reactor Control System," Paragraph (4), the control blade drop time is changed from not exceeding 1.0 seconds to not exceeding 1.5 seconds from initiation of blade drop to full insertion. This change will prevent unnecessary unstacking and entry into the core to make repairs to assure the 1.0 second limit is met. The 1.5 second limit in conjunction with other control system actions, especially the continuing limiting condition for operation (LCO) requiring that a 2.0% Ak/k shutdown margin exist even with the most reactive control blade stuck fully out, assures control system operability and effectiveness. The other LCOs on reactivity assure that 1.5 seconds for the drop time is more than acceptable. The change simply lengthens the time before the unstacking and refurbishment of the control blade shaft system would be needed, especially to prevent extra core area entries to minimize radiation dose commitment in agreement with ALARA considerations and to assure efficient utilization of resources. Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Institution USNRC -2- July 25, 2002 Third, in Section 3.6, "Limitations on Experiments," Paragraph (4), "Explosive Materials," the previous requirement that such materials not be irradiated is eased to allow limited quantities of such materials to be irradiated provided the experiment has been reviewed and approved by the Reactor Safety Review Subcommittee. This change will allow reactor usage for radiographing, beam transmission checks or irradiation of small samples of such materials in core, all subject to assuring proper protection of the reactor, personnel and the public. The quantities here in all cases would be small enough to preclude the possibility of safety significant damage to the reactor; this will be assessed by the experiment review and approval process. Fourth, in Section 4.1, "Reactor Core Parameter Surveillance," the surveillance interval for the reactivity checks in Section 4.1 (1), for the temperature coefficient of reactivity in Section 4.1(2), and in Section 4.1(8) for the annual "power" calibrations all remain the same but the allowable interval is changed to 15 months for all as a standard surveillance interval maximum to allow easier tracking. Fifth, in Section 4.7(3), the surveillance interval for evacuation drills is changed from quarterly at intervals not to exceed 4 months to semiannually at intervals not to exceed 8 months. In the past, the results of drills have shown no significant problems and extending the drill interval will provide for more efficient use of resources, both in not disturbing facility and building activities and in reducing commitment of personnel time to plan and conduct drills. One drill will continue to be a large drill involving outside agencies and the requirement for two drills per year assures proper awareness of response procedures, especially since the instructional training requirements for building occupants, facility staff and the University Police Department remain in place as does staff practical training on emergency equipment. Sixth, in Section 5.5.1, "Reactor Control System," the control blade insertion time under trip conditions, as in Section 3.2.1, is stipulated to be less than 1.5 seconds versus the previous 1.0 seconds per the previous explanation. Also in Section 5.5.1, the regulating blade reactivity worth is referenced better as being about 0.8%-1.0% Ak/k versus the previous 1.0% Ak/k to represent the current and likely range of conditions more accurately. Seventh, in Section 5.2.2, "Secondary Cooling System," an always understood situation is clarified to note that operability of the city water cooling system is not a limiting condition for operation. This system is frequently unavailable and almost never used. This clarification simply formalizes the situation. Similarly, the trip on the city water system has no delay versus the - 10 second delay on the well water system. The city water system does have, and always has had, an initial - 10 second delay on reaching the 1 kW power level after which the trip is prompt. This condition is now also made explicit in this section. Eighth, in Section 5.5.2, "Reactor Safety System," Paragraph (4), "Linear Neutron Channel and Automatic Flux Control System," a sentence is added indicating the automatic flux controller is not required to be operable for reactor operations where it is not needed and not used, to match the change in Section 3.2.1 as explained previously. Ninth, Section 6.3.1, "As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)," is moved into the main part of the Technical Specifications, where previously it was Section 7.0 of the specifications, but is essentially unchanged. USNRC -3- July 25, 2002 Tenth, in Section 6.8, "Records," added to the list of allowable forms included for record keeping purposes is "computer storage media" to recognize efficient, convenient and easily accessed modern means of record keeping. Eleventh, in Figure 6-1 UFTR Organization Chart, the organization is updated to reflect the fact that the University of Florida has recently, on July 1, 2001, converted to operation under a Board of Trustees to whom the UF President reports versus the previous Board of Regents. The University's Office of General Counsel indicates that this is now the proper way to present the UFTR Organization Chart though the Dean of the College of Engineering remains the effective Level I administrator for overseeing the reactor. Twelfth, in Section 6.7.1, "Operating Reports," the requirement for submittal of the routine annual report covering the activities of the reactor facility during the previous calendar year is changed from being within six (6) months following the end of the prescribed year to being within nine (9) months following the end of the prescribed year. This change is administrative in nature to allow sufficient time after the end of classes in early May each year to produce a quality report in a timely manner. Finally, in Section 6.7.3, "Other Special Reports," Paragraph (1), the requirement to report changes in facility organization involving Level 1, 2 or 3 personnel is changed to exclude only changes in the University of Florida Board of Trustees since this board consists of a number of individuals who will change periodically. Attempting to report all these changes as they are made would be a nonproductive use of resources, especially since the UF President remains the individual who administers all University of Florida affairs and the Dean of the College of Engineering remains the effective Level I administrator for overseeing the reactor and reporting to those above this position only as necessary. In addition to the previously mentioned changes, there are many changes which are considered to be minor in nature and many additional changes simply from reformatting and reorganizing the Technical Specifications in standardized form or even clarifying wording in many cases. In Section 1.1, a number of definitions are added including Blade-Drop Time, Certified Operator, Confinement, Reactor Operator, Blade-Drop Trip (versus Rod-Drop Trip), Reference Core Condition, Senior Reactor Operator and Shutdown Reactivity. These definitions are all considered standard definitions defined to be specific for the UFTR to make the Technical Specifications more complete. In Section 3.5.1, a clarification is added at the end of the paragraph noting that more conservative setpoints are allowed. Such conservatism has always been allowed but is specifically noted here. In Section 3.5.3, Paragraph (3), the periodic analysis of air flow is no longer required but allowed on the basis of investigating significant changes. Since the periodic interval was never specified, this requirement is not really relaxed since the only time when such analysis would be warranted would be for changes but, since the effluent is the only concern here, even this is not needed since the requirement for measurements to assure meeting Part 20 requirements continues in place.
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