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Crude Nukes on the Loose? Preventing Nuclear Terrorism by Means of Optimum Nuclear Husbandry, Transparency, and Non-Intrusive Fissile Material Verification

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[664] Paper Crude Nukes on the Loose? Preventing Nuclear Terrorism by Means of Optimum Nuclear Husbandry, Transparency, and Non-Intrusive Fissile Material Verification Morten Bremer Mærli No. 664 – 2004 Norwegian Institute Norsk of International Utenrikspolitisk Affairs Institutt Utgiver: NUPI Copyright: © Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2004 ISSN: 0800 - 0018 Alle synspunkter står for forfatternes regning. De må ikke tolkes som uttrykk for oppfatninger som kan tillegges Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Artiklene kan ikke reproduseres - helt eller delvis - ved trykking, fotokopiering eller på annen måte uten tillatelse fra forfatterne. Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the author. Besøksadresse: C.J. Hambrosplass 2d Addresse: Postboks 8159 Dep. 0033 Oslo Internett: www.nupi.no E-post: [email protected] Fax: [+ 47] 22 36 21 82 Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00 Crude Nukes on the Loose? Preventing Nuclear Terrorism by Means of Optimum Nuclear Husbandry, Transparency, and Non-Intrusive Fissile Material Verification Morten Bremer Mærli Preface This is a thesis even more timely than I expected it to be. One year after I commenced my doctoral work, stunned TV audiences across the globe were shocked by live footage of the devastating attacks on lower Manhattan. The terrorist assaults of 11 September 2001 dramatically altered our per- ceptions of security. But they did more. Under the rubric of “War on Terror- ism”, a jagged political focus on international terrorism and a massive hunt for so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was soon instigated. Never be- fore have more resources, political prestige, military power, and human los- ses gone into the fight against terrorists. It is in this heated environment and action-packed context this thesis as- pires to voice some suggestions on how to best deal with the threat of nu- clear terrorism. The thesis came through during a four-year period starting August 2000. It builds naturally on my book Atomic Terrorism (1999). The research was made possible through a grant graciously provided by the Norwegian Re- search Council. This assessment of nuclear terrorism has also been a journey on the per- sonal level, where many of my interests and fields of professional expertise have converged in somewhat unexpected ways. My background in nuclear physics and previous work at the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority to assist in securing and protecting fissile material in Northwest Russia, has helped me to understand the technical aspects of the new nuclear threat. Likewise, my experience in radiation protection and my studies in media science and risk communication have deepened my understanding of the po- tential of “atoms” as strong tools of terrorist coercion. The efforts of domes- tic and international NGO communities have showed me the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as essential means towards genu- ine nuclear security. The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) provided me with a unique chance to merge and further develop these issues into an inter- disciplinary research portfolio, in a highly qualified and exciting environ- ment. I am thankful for the opportunities given to me, and I would like to express my gratitude to all my friends and colleagues at NUPI. This thesis is my own work and views – and so is of course the responsi- bility for any inaccuracies or errors of analysis of facts. I am, however, in- debted to a great many people. Without wishing to leave anyone out, the fol- lowing persons should particularly be mentioned: Sverre Lodgaard, for al- ways being ready to explore the boundaries of nuclear security wisdom and the inherent opportunities of nuclear arms control. Sverre also served well as my principal advisor. Tore Bjørgo, for familiarising me with the intricacies of contemporary terrorism – and for introducing me to NUPI in the first place. Both of them joined in on the reference group for the doctoral work, where also Knut Gussgård, Steinar Høibraaten, Ole Reistad, Jon B. Reitan, vi Morten Bremer Mærli Terje Strand, and Arnfinn Tønnessen participated. I am very grateful to you all. I would also like to extend special thanks to my co-authors of some of the underlying research papers for the thesis: Annette Schaper, Frank Barnaby, and Roger G. Johnston. Thanks for your willingness to think creatively to further the nuclear terrorism debate and for making nuclear risk assessments and nuclear arms control exciting issues. Many others have provided useful inputs and comments along the way. Here let me single out Amund Solvi Bremer, as well as Gunnar Arbman, Nils Bøhmer, Ståle Eskeland, Charles Ferguson, Daniel Heradstveit, Alistair Millar, Inga-Britt Mærli, Pernille Rieker, Erik Riul, Andreas Selliaas, Jørn Siljeholm, Heidi Toft, Stein Tønnesson, Lars van Dassen, and Lars Weisæth. Great appreciation is due to Finn Ingebretsen, for helping to bring back my interdisciplinary research to the spheres of physics at the University of Oslo, where, I hope, it may promote further research and education on nu- clear security. I am indebted to Susan Høivik for her highly professional and swift copy- editing work. Vibeke L. Sand and Liv Høvik are to be thanked for kind lay- out assistance. Ole Dahl-Gulliksen and Ivar Windheim assisted in getting some of the figures into shape. Jan Risvik has helped by providing useful semantic clarifications. The generous support shown by the librarians at NUPI has been invaluable: Dagfrid Hermansen, Hazel Henriksen, Tore Gus- tavsson and a team of conscientious objectors were always ready to process my literature requests. A grant from the US–Norway Fulbright Foundation for Educational Ex- change enabled me to experience new professional and political environ- ments, and to explore the linkages of technology and security. This triggered a deep interest in the prospects of fissile material verification and allowed me a glimpse into US nuclear security thinking and priorities. Two years in the United States have not only shaped my thinking on international nuclear security relations, including issues related to the threat of nuclear terrorism. They have also given my professional career a boost – and a range of inter- national friends and contacts. Let me take this opportunity to thank the Fulbright Foundation, as well as friends and colleagues at the Center for International Security and Coopera- tion (CISAC), Stanford University, and Sandia National Laboratory, Cali- fornia, for those exciting, inspiring and knowledge-packed years. My thanks to all of you for accommodating me and allowing me to talk, repeatedly, about the benefits of cooperative nuclear security and arms control. It is my hope that the thesis can contribute to diminishing the threat of nuclear terrorism, fuelling a discussion on the role we would like to give nu- clear material and nuclear explosives in the 21st century. Oslo, 24 March 2004 Morten Bremer Mærli Table of Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... v Executive Summary.................................................................................... 11 Chapter 1: Objectives and Scope of the Thesis........................................ 13 1.1 Introduction...................................................................................... 13 1.1.1 Supply-Side Nuclear Security ................................................ 13 1.1.2 The Line of Least Nuclear Terrorist Resistance..................... 14 1.2 Research Questions.......................................................................... 15 1.2.1 [Q1]: On “Nuclear Terrorism Feasibility”.............................. 15 1.2.2 [Q2]: On “Optimum Nuclear Husbandry”.............................. 15 1.2.3 [Q3]: On “Nuclear Transparency and Verification”............... 16 1.3 Structure........................................................................................... 16 1.4 Terminology..................................................................................... 17 1.4.1 Definitions.............................................................................. 18 1.5 Scope Limitations ............................................................................ 19 1.5.1 What is In?.............................................................................. 20 1.5.2 What is Out?........................................................................... 21 1.6 Research Papers ............................................................................... 25 1.6.1 [P1]: “Relearning the ABCs” ................................................. 25 1.6.2 [P2]: “The Characteristics of Nuclear Terrorist Weapons”.... 26 1.6.3 [P3]: “Managing Excess Material In Russia”......................... 26 1.6.4 [P4]: “Safeguarding This and Verifying That”....................... 27 1.6.5 [P5]: “International vs. Domestic Nuclear Safeguards”......... 27 1.6.6 [P6]: “US–Russian Naval Security Upgrades”....................... 28 1.6.7 [P7]: “Transparency and Non-Intrusive Verification” ........... 29 1.6.8 [P8]: “Deep Seas and Deep-Seated Secrets” .......................... 29 Chapter 2: Setting the Nuclear Terrorism Stage.................................... 31 2.1 Conditions of Nuclear Terrorism ..................................................... 31
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