DOCSLIB.ORG

Sudan's Changing Relations with Its Neighbours and The

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Sudan's Changing Relations with Its Neighbours and The SUDAN’S CHANGING RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR AND PEACE By John Young∗ ‘For a majority of weak African states, regions are sources of authoritative foreign policies, places where power is displayed and exerted. They are also the closest and generally most salient threat to regime survival, thereby warranting particular attention.’ (Khadiagala and Lyons, 2001) Introduction: Critical to understanding the course, dynamics, and nature of Sudan’s civil war and assessing the prospects of peace is an appreciation of regional relations in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, support by neighbouring countries for one another’s armed dissidents dates almost from Sudan’s independence and is a critical element in regional relations. In the more recent period Khartoum’s facilitation of Tigrayan and Eritrean revolutionaries from Sudanese territory proved crucial in the overthrow of the military Derg in Addis Ababa, the coming to power of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and the establishment of an independent state in Eritrea under the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF). Likewise the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was actually established in Ethiopia and given state support as a counterweight to the Government of Sudan’s acceptance of Ethiopian and Eritrean rebels operating from its territory (Young, 1997). Subsequently the post-Derg regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea provided support for the SPLA and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in response to assistance by the National Islamic Front (NIF) to a host of Islamist groups attempting to overthrow the EPRDF and EPLF. A similar pattern was at work in Ugandan-Sudanese relations where Kampala’s support for the SPLA led to, or was due to, Khartoum’s support for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Countries of the region have likewise played a critical role in Sudan’s peace processes. Churches from the region, combined with the mediation efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie, produced the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended the first civil war. And the premier peace process during the second civil war is being pursued by the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and another initiative led by neighbouring countries, Egypt and Libya has also attempted to bring peace to the war- weary country. Against this background, the following article will simply provide a perspective on changing relations by briefly reviewing Khartoum’s relations with its major neighbours in 1997 and then again five years later in 2002. These dates are not arbitrary: in 1997 there was region-wide political and military opposition to the NIF, while in 2002 this opposition had almost completely dissipated. Clearly the changing fortunes of the regime and its opposition have major implications for war and peace in Sudan and this is the essential point I want to make in this overview. ∗ Research Associate, Institute of Governance Studies, Simon Fraser University Historical Primer: The coming to power of the military under Omar Beshir in 1989 was cautiously accepted by most countries in the Horn and even warmly welcomed by Egypt which saw the in-coming regime as similar in character to its own (Abdel Salem, 1996). And this was the case even when the Islamist orientation of the regime and the critical role played by Hassan El Turabi became apparent. For its part the regime, seeing the inevitable collapse of the Derg, gave assistance to the Eritrean and Ethiopian dissidents who subsequently came to power in 1991. This clearly favoured positive relations with these two countries. To the south where suspicion of the Arabs and identity with the southern Sudanese was more developed, there was greater distrust of the NIF. But initially while the regime consolidated its hold on power and undermined or eliminated its opponents, relations between countries in the region and Khartoum were restrained. This early phase did not, however, last long and by the early 1990s the NIF was pursuing an aggressive Islamist-based foreign policy parallel to its domestic policies. Indeed, while virtually all Sudanese regimes have had Islamic orientations, particularly in their efforts to Arabise and Islamise the southern Sudanese, the NIF stood out by its efforts to export its vision of political Islam to the countries of the region, and in particular Eritrea and Ethiopia with their large Moslem populations. Relations with Asmara and Addis Ababa thus rapidly deteriorated. The incursion from Sudanese territory of a multinational group of Islamist guerrillas into the Sahel region of Eritrea in December 1994 proved pivotal in the decline in relations between Khartoum and Asmara (Cliffe, 1997). And the counterpart with respect to both Ethiopia and Egypt was the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak on the streets of Addis Ababa in June 1995, which both countries concluded involved support from elements of the Government of Sudan (Middle East Times, 10-09-95). While Kenyan-Sudanese relations never reached such a low ebb, they became increasingly tense as Khartoum objected (in one instance violently with an aerial bombing of northern Kenya) to Nairobi’s logistical assistance of SPLA political and humanitarian operations. On the Ugandan border tension also led to tit for tat support for one another’s dissidents. The fate of the peace process largely mirrored these political developments. In the wake of the collapse of Nigerian mediation efforts as represented by Abuja I and Abuja II, President Beshir approached the countries of IGAD in the early 1990s and proposed its intervention (Abdelwahab El-Affendi, 2001). And with relations between Khartoum on balance generally positive with its neighbours (particularly Eritrea and Ethiopia) he and his government assumed that were IGAD to take up the challenge that Khartoum would get a sympathetic hearing. And indeed the SPLA’s initial reluctance to participate in the IGAD Initiative made clear that the movement shared this perspective. However, the Khartoum government misread the regional dynamics and contrary to the assumption of unquestioning support, the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia were not at all well- disposed to a neighbouring regime based on political Islam and they gave strong support to secularism and to the demand of the SPLA for self-determination. Thus under the influence of Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia and to some extent President Issias of Eritrea, and with the support of the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti, an IGAD Peace Initiative was formulated that gave high value to secularism and self- determination in its Declaration of Principles (DOP). The government of Sudan’s 2 forceful rejection of these proposals in 1994 was another formative step in the deterioration of relations with its neighbours. Thus the NIF’s aggressive attempts to export political Islam in the region, the resistance of the region, and the stymied peace process, together galvanised the countries of the Horn, and in particular Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda, to launch a military campaign against Khartoum. And while the initiative clearly came from the region, the United States provided military assistance to these three countries and hoped that it would produce, together with the actions of the SPLA and the NDA which it strongly endorsed, sufficient momentum to overthrow the regime in Khartoum. The ultimate objective of this military campaign by the countries of the region, however, was more mixed. In Eritrea it was anticipated that the campaign would lead to the overthrow of the Sudanese regime, while in Ethiopia the military actions carried out seemed to have the lesser objectives of punishing the NIF and strengthening the SPLA. There is no doubt that President Museveni would have liked to see the NIF regime overthrown, but given his other commitments in Rwanda and the Congo during this period it is not clear whether his army even had the capability of entertaining such far-reaching objectives. But at the least Museveni hoped to end LRA terrorism and create a cordon sanitaire between Uganda and the Arab Islamists of the north. 1997: the Region versus the NIF: Thus early 1997 saw a high degree of unity and commitment by the countries of IGAD, and even Egypt, to seriously confront the NIF. Indeed, Egypt had joined with Ethiopia to co-sponsor a Security Council resolution with strong US support for an embargo against Sudan. Egypt had thus moved from initially urging the international community to accept the NIF to making clear at the highest levels its revulsion of the regime. This was not only based on the attempted assassination of Mubarak, which Cairo was convinced had NIF support, but also its conviction that the regime was assisting the Egyptian Moslem Brothers. Cairo was also aggrieved at the confiscation of state properties in Khartoum and alarmed at Turabi’s assumption of a leading role in the internationalist Islamist movement, Sudan’s growing relations with Iran, which Cairo saw as its major challenger for dominance in the Middle East, and of its endorsement of Iraq in the Gulf War. With all of these grievances in mind Egypt deliberately intensified the conflict over the long contentious Halib area along Sudan and Egypt’s joint border near the Red Sea and endeavoured in both the Arab world and in international forums to isolate the NIF. Although Cairo could not follow IGAD in accepting self-determination for southern Sudan, its hatred of the Khartoum regime and desire to see it replaced was not very different from that of the IGAD countries. Indeed, largely to counter southern demands for self-determination, Egypt and Libya proposed a peace initiative that involved the various parties to the conflict coming together and establishing a transitional government. The emphasis was on achieving consensus of the country’s major political forces, but it was widely seen as an attempt to reach agreement among the northern political parties since it pointedly did not include the right of self-determination for the southern Sudanese, the key principle of the IGAD Initiative.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ethiopia and India: Fusion and Confusion in British Orientalism
    Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review 51 | 2016 Global History, East Africa and The Classical Traditions Ethiopia and India: Fusion and Confusion in British Orientalism Phiroze Vasunia Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/314 Publisher IFRA - Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique Printed version Date of publication: 1 March 2016 Number of pages: 21-43 ISSN: 2071-7245 Electronic reference Phiroze Vasunia, « Ethiopia and India: Fusion and Confusion in British Orientalism », Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review [Online], 51 | 2016, Online since 07 May 2019, connection on 08 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/314 Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review Global History, East Africa and the Classical Traditions. Ethiopia and India: Fusion and Confusion in British Orientalism Phiroze Vasunia Can the Ethiopian change his skinne? or the leopard his spots? Jeremiah 13.23, in the King James Version (1611) May a man of Inde chaunge his skinne, and the cat of the mountayne her spottes? Jeremiah 13.23, in the Bishops’ Bible (1568) I once encountered in Sicily an interesting parallel to the ancient confusion between Indians and Ethiopians, between east and south. A colleague and I had spent some pleasant moments with the local custodian of an archaeological site. Finally the Sicilian’s curiosity prompted him to inquire of me “Are you Chinese?” Frank M. Snowden, Blacks in Antiquity (1970) The ancient confusion between Ethiopia and India persists into the late European Enlightenment. Instances of the confusion can be found in the writings of distinguished Orientalists such as William Jones and also of a number of other Europeans now less well known and less highly regarded.
    [Show full text]
  • The Eastern Front and the Struggle Against Marginalization
    3 The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization By John Young Copyright The Small Arms Survey Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves © Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2007 as the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms and First published in May 2007 as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activ- ists. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Depart- permission in writing of the Small Arms Survey, or as expressly permitted by ment of Foreign Affairs, and by contributions from the Governments of Bel- law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organi- gium, Canada, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should United Kingdom. The Survey is also grateful for past and current project-spe- be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address below. cific support received from Australia, Denmark, and New Zealand. Further Small Arms Survey funding has been provided by the United Nations Development Programme, Graduate Institute of International Studies the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Geneva 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland International Academic Network, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impacts of GERD on Egypt and Ethiopia: Slides For
    Responding to the Crisis of the Filling of the GERD : An International Insurance Approach ? Prof. Kenneth Strzepek Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, UNU-WIDER Research Scientist MIT Adjunct Professor Kennedy School of Government, Harvard World Institute for Development Economics Research Outline of Presentation • Overview of Nile Hydrology • The Crisis of GERD Filling • A Primer on Hydropower • Uncertain Future of Nile Flows – Natural Variability – Impacts of Filling Policies • Modeling Approach • Engineering Impacts and Risks • Economics Impacts and Risks • Sharing the Risks: A Case for Insurance Nile Hydrology Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam • The GERD (the 8th largest reservoir on Earth) will soon join • Egypt’s High Aswan Dam (3rd largest) in the unprecedented combination of • two major, multipurpose dams operating on the same river system with • no agreement for coordination in place. Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam • At 6,000 MW, the dam will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed, as well as the 8th largest in the world. • No IRRIGATION JUST HYDROPOWER • The reservoir at 70 billion cubic meters will be one of the continent's largest. Able to hold the 1.4 times he mean annual flow of the Blue Nile with is 75% of Nile flow reaching Egypt and Sudan. • According to the Ethiopian government, as of Summer 2016, the dam is 70% complete. Could start filling in less than a year !!!!!!! Why is it a CRISIS ? The GERD’s Location High Aswan Dam Filling the GERD with IMPACT EGYPT BUT HOW AND BY HOW MUCH? GERD BLUE
    [Show full text]
  • East and Central Africa 19
    Most countries have based their long-term planning (‘vision’) documents on harnessing science, technology and innovation to development. Kevin Urama, Mammo Muchie and Remy Twingiyimana A schoolboy studies at home using a book illuminated by a single electric LED lightbulb in July 2015. Customers pay for the solar panel that powers their LED lighting through regular instalments to M-Kopa, a Nairobi-based provider of solar-lighting systems. Payment is made using a mobile-phone money-transfer service. Photo: © Waldo Swiegers/Bloomberg via Getty Images 498 East and Central Africa 19 . East and Central Africa Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda Kevin Urama, Mammo Muchie and Remy Twiringiyimana Chapter 19 INTRODUCTION which invest in these technologies to take a growing share of the global oil market. This highlights the need for oil-producing Mixed economic fortunes African countries to invest in science and technology (S&T) to Most of the 16 East and Central African countries covered maintain their own competitiveness in the global market. in the present chapter are classified by the World Bank as being low-income economies. The exceptions are Half the region is ‘fragile and conflict-affected’ Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Djibouti and the newest Other development challenges for the region include civil strife, member, South Sudan, which joined its three neighbours religious militancy and the persistence of killer diseases such in the lower middle-income category after being promoted as malaria and HIV, which sorely tax national health systems from low-income status in 2014.
    [Show full text]
  • ERITREA Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem (M), Aged 21, Army Soldier Estifanos Solomon (M), Army Driver Two Male Army Officers (Names Not Known)
    PUBLIC AI Index: AFR 64/001/2005 07 January 2005 UA 03/05 Forcible return / Fear of torture or ill-treatment / Detention without charge or trial ERITREA Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem (m), aged 21, army soldier Estifanos Solomon (m), army driver Two male army officers (names not known) Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem, Estifanos Solomon and two army officers were reportedly forcibly returned from Djibouti to Eritrea on 28 December 2004. They are being detained without charge at an unknown location and are at risk of torture or ill-treatment. Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem is a member of the Afar ethnic group which inhabits areas in both Djibouti and Eritrea. He was born in Djibouti, although his family live in Eritrea. On 26 December he and the three other men drove from the southwest Eritrean town of Assab to Obock town in Djibouti, where they were detained by the Djiboutian army. Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem was refused permission to stay in Djibouti, despite being a Djiboutian citizen. The three other men reportedly requested asylum in Djibouti but were summarily handed over to Eritrean military officers on 28 December, who forcibly returned them to Eritrea the same day. The three were denied the right to have their asylum application properly determined or to contact the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Djibouti. Mahmoud Ahmed Chehem was unlawfully conscripted into the Eritrean army as a child soldier in 1997 when he was 14 years old. He had unsuccessfully applied recently to be demobilized on medical grounds after receiving eye injuries and shrapnel wounds during the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethiopia and Eritrea: Border War Sandra F
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Richmond University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science 2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea: Border War Sandra F. Joireman University of Richmond, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications Part of the African Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Joireman, Sandra F. "Ethiopia and Eritrea: Border War." In History Behind the Headlines: The Origins of Conflicts Worldwide, edited by Sonia G. Benson, Nancy Matuszak, and Meghan Appel O'Meara, 1-11. Vol. 1. Detroit: Gale Group, 2001. This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ethiopia and Eritrea: Border War History Behind the Headlines, 2001 The Conflict The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea—two of the poorest countries in the world— began in 1998. Eritrea was once part of the Ethiopian empire, but it was colonized by Italy from 1869 to 1941. Following Italy's defeat in World War II, the United Nations determined that Eritrea would become part of Ethiopia, though Eritrea would maintain a great deal of autonomy. In 1961 Ethiopia removed Eritrea's independence, and Eritrea became just another Ethiopian province. In 1991 following a revolution in Ethiopia, Eritrea gained its independence. However, the borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea had never been clearly marked.
    [Show full text]
  • History, External Influence and Political Volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR)
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies Economics Department 2014 History, External Influence and oliticalP Volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR) Henry Kam Kah University of Buea, Cameroon Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/jade Part of the Econometrics Commons, Growth and Development Commons, International Economics Commons, Political Economy Commons, Public Economics Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons Kam Kah, Henry, "History, External Influence and oliticalP Volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR)" (2014). Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies. 5. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/jade/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies 2014 Volume 3 Issue 1 ISSN:2161-8216 History, External Influence and Political Volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR) Henry Kam Kah University of Buea, Cameroon ABSTRACT This paper examines the complex involvement of neighbors and other states in the leadership or political crisis in the CAR through a content analysis. It further discusses the repercussions of this on the unity and leadership of the country. The CAR has, for a long time, been embroiled in a crisis that has impeded the unity of the country. It is a failed state in Africa to say the least, and the involvement of neighboring and other states in the crisis in one way or the other has compounded the multifarious problems of this country.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Role in the Horn of Africa
    Russia Foreign Policy Papers “E O” R’ R H A SAMUEL RAMANI FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE • RUSSIA FOREIGN POLICY PAPERS 1 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Author: Samuel Ramani The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy- oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities. Eurasia Program Leadership Director: Chris Miller Deputy Director: Maia Otarashvili Editing: Thomas J. Shattuck Design: Natalia Kopytnik © 2020 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute July 2020 OUR MISSION The Foreign Policy Research Institute is dedicated to producing the highest quality scholarship and nonpartisan policy analysis focused on crucial foreign policy and national security challenges facing the United States. We educate those who make and influence policy, as well as the public at large, through the lens of history, geography, and culture. Offering Ideas In an increasingly polarized world, we pride ourselves on our tradition of nonpartisan scholarship. We count among our ranks over 100 affiliated scholars located throughout the nation and the world who appear regularly in national and international media, testify on Capitol Hill, and are consulted by U.S. government agencies. Educating the American Public FPRI was founded on the premise that an informed and educated citizenry is paramount for the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • History in Twentieth-Century Ethiopia: the 'Great Tradition'
    This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Cambridge University Press in The Journal of African History: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-history/all-issues Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24350/ History in twentieth-century Ethiopia: The ‘Great Tradition’ and the counter-histories of national failure SARA MARZAGORA, SOAS UNIVERSITY OF LONDON ABSTRACT Drawing from both fictional and non-fictional sources, this article traces the way history was conceptualised in twentieth century Ethiopia by secular educated elites, charting out the changing power relations between Ethiopia‘s hegemonic historiographical paradigm, and the alternative historical visions that challenged this ‗Great Tradition‘ over the course of the century. While the Great Tradition extols Ethiopia‘s past and future glories, the counter-histories focused instead on the country‘s failure to develop and democratise. Against the interpretation that the counter-histories supplanted the Great Tradition in the late 1960s, the article examines them in terms of complementarity. The intellectual interventions of young student radicals in the late 1960s constitute a break, but not a drastic paradigm shift, from the past. The Great Tradition had already been put into question by older generations of intellectuals, even if they proved unable or unwilling to translate their disillusionment in political action. INTRODUCTION1 The interpretation of the Ethiopian past has been largely dominated, from the nineteenth century to the present, by a specific historiographical framework, variably called the ‗Great tradition‘, ‗Grand tradition‘, ‗Ethiopianist tradition‘, ‗Ethiopianist nationalism‘, ‗Church and State tradition‘, 1 There are no surnames in Ethiopian naming conventions and individuals are identified by their first name.
    [Show full text]
  • Eritrea: Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 25 March 2009
    Eritrea: Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 25 March 2009 Is there any evidence that since 1998 all males in Eritrea (apart from the elderly and sick) have been permanently contracted by the army and that they have continuously worked for the ministry of defence since 1998 to this day with only a small holiday of about 10 days every year? Are those drafted to the Eritrean Army paid a salary? If so, how much do they receive per month approximately? According to a report from War Resisters International taken from the Broken Rifle it refers to national service being extended indefinitely and notes: “Thousands of young men and women fled Eritrea and sought asylum in neighbouring countries like The Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia and other countries in Europe and the United States. This even increased after Eritrea's war with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000 and the open repressive acts of the present government in Eritrea. Such massive running away of young men and women is part of an effort to avoid conscription or necessary after deserting from the army. According to a proclaimed regulation, national service, compulsory for all men and women aged between 18 and 40, has been extended indefinitely from the original 18 month term instituted in 1994. Besides excessive violations of the human right of draftees, national service consists of military service and labour on army-related construction projects. The right to conscientious objection to military service is not recognised by the Eritrean authorities. There are frequent round-ups to catch evaders and deserters.
    [Show full text]
  • The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan1 - Summary and Analysis
    [DRAFT] [NOT FOR CIRCULATION] International IDEA The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan1 - Summary and Analysis - 1. Executive summary ....................................................................................................................... 2 2. Context .......................................................................................................................................... 3 (a) This Paper ............................................................................................................................. 3 (b) The Agreement ..................................................................................................................... 3 (c) The Parties ........................................................................................................................... 6 3. Content of the future constitution ................................................................................................ 8 (a) Federalism ............................................................................................................................ 8 (b) Financial issues and revenue sharing .................................................................................. 13 (c) Individual and the state ...................................................................................................... 15 4. Transitional issues ....................................................................................................................... 16 (a) Transitional period.............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan: International Dimensions to the State and Its Crisis
    crisis states research centre OCCASIONAL PAPERS Occasional Paper no. 3 Sudan: international dimensions to the state and its crisis Alex de Waal Social Science Research Council April 2007 ISSN 1753 3082 (online) Copyright © Alex de Waal, 2007 Although every effort is made to ensure the accuracy and reliability of material published in this Occasional Paper, the Crisis States Research Centre and LSE accept no responsibility for the veracity of claims or accuracy of information provided by contributors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. Requests for permission to reproduce this Occasional Paper, or any part thereof, should be sent to: The Editor, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 1 Crisis States Research Centre Sudan: International Dimensions to the State and its Crisis Alex de Waal Social Science Research Council Overview This paper follows on from the associated essay, “Sudan: What Kind of State? What Kind of Crisis?”1 which concluded that the two dominant characteristics of the Sudanese state are (a) the extreme economic and political inequality between a hyper-dominant centre and peripheries that are weak and fragmented and (b) the failure of any single group or faction within the centre to exercise effective control over the institutions of the state, but who nonetheless can collectively stay in power because of their disproportionate resources.
    [Show full text]