Fall Readings Joint Doctrine Development F-117A Classification -A5,500 ( A (

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col John B. Sams, Jr.

Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editor Capt John J. Doherty

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin VV. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst. Art Director and Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the offi- cial sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. Editorial 2 Air Power Thinking: “Request Unrestricted Climb" Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd, USAF Lt Col Charles \1. WestenhofT, USAF 4 Cracks in the Black Dike: Secrecy, the Media, and the F-117A Jim Cunningham 1 6 Joint Doctrine: Progress, Prospects, and Problems Lt Col William F. Furr, USAF 3 6 Framework for START II Lt Col Elwood C. Tircuit, USAF 4 6 Sex, Power, and Ethics: The Challenge to the Military Professional CMSgt Robert D. Lewallen. USAF 5 7 A Revolution in Air Transport: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter Roger D. Launius Betty R. Kennedy 6 8

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 8 8 Notams Notices of Interest 9 3 Contributors 95 EDITORIAL

Snorkeling and Historical Surges

NORKELERS familiar with Hanauma change. Rapid changes in Eastern Europe Bay on Oahu will remember three par- and the reduction in Soviet strength have allelS reefs that guard it from the open led to significant changes in the way we ocean. In the reef closest to the beach is a view the world. That world view has led narrow break perhaps six feet wide and 35 to hopes for reduced military force struc- feet long. As waves roll in, they push tures and an attendant peace dividend. water over the reef, which acts as a reser- Along with the defense budget, the num- voir and retards the water’s return to the ber of people serving in the US armed open sea. However, the backwash rushes services is being significantly reduced. through the break in the reef as through Rather than hollow out the old force struc- the spout of a funnel. ture as was done in the past during lean It is quite easy to go with the flow when times, our leaders are searching for ways snorkeling out through the break, but com- to restructure the Air Force so it will be as ing in the other direction can teach one a efficient and effective as possible—despite lesson in patience and endurance. Swim- its reduced size. Proposed changes to the ming against the current, the snorkeler unified command structure, new major finds that progress is made in surges. command structures, and ideas like the While the backwash is rushing through the composite wing are moves in that break, the snorkeler must exert significant direction. effort just to maintain position. Then, As demonstrated in Desert Storm, tech- when the backwash stops, the snorkeler nological advancements in areas like ord- surges forward. Normally it takes several nance precision and lethality; stealth cycles of maintaining position and moving characteristics; intelligence gathering; forward to reach the end of the break and command, control, and communications; enter the calm waters inside the reef. and navigation are pushing aerospace Those new to this phenomenon can power forward in this historical surge. become concerned when they are swim- Along with restructuring and tech- ming with all their strength and not mak- nological advancements there is also a ing any forward progress. However, if they need for new ways of thinking to take full are patient and continue swimming, con- advantage of the current surge in historical ditions will change. It is, of course, very events. A new basic doctrine manual important to take full advantage of the designed to capture our current thinking intermittent opportunities to move on the best way to employ aerospace forward. power should soon be published. New While each day is unique and has its concepts to involve airmen in a career- own value, historical events also seem to long study of the profession of arms are come in surges. Perhaps this is one of being considered as well. those times in history when all the condi- Historical surges amplify the value of tions are right for rapid progress. Having ideas. They offer opportunities to consoli- maintained relatively the same position for date gains, to forge ahead, and to venture over four and a half decades in our con- into uncharted regions. Such times mag- tainment policy toward the Communist nify the effect of both the best and worst bloc, we now see a strong tide of political ideas, thereby placing a premium on rea-

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- In late 1987, Lt Col Stephen C. Hall brought spondence should be addressed to the Editor, to our attention the existence of "an amazing Airpower Journal. Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, unanimity of concern” that “our young officers Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the are far more militarily conservative than one right to edit the material for overall length. would have ever expected, and they want far more military in their lives, not less.” This four-time aircraft maintenance squadron com- PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT mander and his younger officers developed a Please extend my compliments and congratula- company grade officer training program which tions to Lt Col Bruce L. Ullman for his excep- he took on the road to over 1,500 officers across tional article in the Fall 1990 issue entitled the country. Perhaps Colonel Ullman missed "Officer Professional Development for Lieuten- this Fall 1987 Airpower Journal article— ants.” His selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award “Shortchanging Our Young Officers: Military winner for that issue was especially gratifying Traditions Denied"—but it provided additional because it suggests continued recognition of support for his conclusions and recommenda- concerns voiced for way too long about the tions regarding a mandatory lieutenants' profes- state of institutional training and acceptance/ sional development program. assimilation of military ideals and standards in I wish I had known of the e x is te n c e of the the Air Force. various programs Colonels Hall and Ullman For example, the Air Force director of per- mentioned when I was a squadron commander. sonnel plans admitted in a March 1983 Air I agree with Colonel Hall’s claim that “failure Force Magazine interview entitled "New Stand- to teach one's subordinate officers everything ards and Leadership: New Emphasis on Old needed for a productive Air Force life should Topics” that we had "drawn away from some be viewed as nothing short of dereliction of basics__ And adherence to standards is what duty” (page 56). As a result. I developed my defines an institution.” Maj Gen Kenneth L. own officer development program based on, Peek, Jr., was setting the stage for the 4 May inter alia, the previously mentioned AFR 30-1, 1983 publication of a revised AFR 30-1, a AFP 35-49, our oath of allegiance, military his- pocket-sized guide that probably few Air Force tory, and speeches/articles by Air Force leaders. officers have ever seen or used—yet its title is Unfortunately, many of my officers would Air Force Standards. He then went on to say, return from extended TDYs both overseas and "When you have supervisory responsibilities in CONUS expressing confusion over the same because of position or rank, you are in a leader- “ mixed signals” that Colonel Ullman talks ship position, and you have to exercise the about: junior officers who augmented us during responsibilities that go along with that.” exercises also regularly registered their surprise Another pocket-sized primer to help one deal at our adherence to military standards. 1 truly with these responsibilities was published 1 hope more leaders—not just commanders, but September 1985—AFP 35-49. Air Force Leadership. continued on page 84 son while appeals to authority and prece- Our Air Force is on the leading edge of dent are of reduced value. This is one of this historical surge. Wisdom would sug- those rare times when a key catalytic idea gest we take full advantage of the oppor- could galvanize the institution we serve so tunity to go forward while conditions it can better serve our nation and its peo- permit. We will probably have to remain ple. The pages of this journal are dedicated in whatever place we attain for a good long to promoting that kind of thought and time—working hard to just stay in place providing a place for the free exchange of and awaiting the next historical those ideas. surge. RBC

3 AIR POWER THINKING: “REQUEST UNRESTRICTED CLIMB”

Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd, USAF Lt Col Charles M. W est enhoff, USAF

he Air Force is nearing the end of A Note from Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd: an extensive effort to refine its basic This article evolved from an oral presenta- doctrine. Consisting of two books, tion I made at an air power conference in the new edition will even look dif- March 1991 at Canberra. Australia. Much of Tferent from all previous editions. One vol- the chore of putting it in publishable form ume is a thin, bare-bones summation of fell to Colonel Westenhoff. He therefore Air Force thinking, while the other is a deserves equal credit in the endeavor. collection of essays that explain Air Force Having said that, I would hasten to add reasoning, based on the record of air that the ideas contained here are my own power in war.1 and that I alone accept responsibility for Although airmen have not been famous them. for reading history, they now have lessons AIR POWER THIN KINO 5

from the past 80 years, and most of them me make clear that I use the term uir have been paid for in blood. There is no power in its most comprehensive sense of way to calculate an adequate cover price air and space power. Such inclusive air for that kind of knowledge. I am confident power values every role and mission, as that most Air Force professionals not only well as all the support, services, and — will read our new doctrine with care, but most importantly—all the people the Air will devote themselves to making it better Force needs to be a fully capable service. in the future. My purpose in this article is 1 submit that air power will play the to suggest some directions that our think- leading role in our response to the security ing might take in the near future. challenges of the uncharted future. It will One of the institutional strengths that in some circumstances be the only engag- has best served the Air Force has been its ing form of military power and in others unswerving interest in the foreseeable the form upon which successful surface future. Given that background, the Air operations depend. My reasoning in sup- Force should consider the dynamic events port of this assertion has two main points. of the present time as an undeserved and The first deals with the maturity of air unasked-for gift, keeping in mind that power within the context of modern war- unsolicited good fortune imposes a fare. The second concerns the nature of weighty responsibility.- Like it or not. the this potentially dangerous new world and world is changing, the place of air power the consequent importance of time. Be- is changing, and it is air power’s day in the cause these points enrich our understand- heat of the spotlight. ing of the new place that air power is Just when the threats we have under- likely to take in national security policy, stood for decades appear to have dimin- each one deserves some discussion. ished. the international security structure has entered a less stable phase. This al- most paradoxical situation constitutes a The Growth of Air Power novel challenge for the United States. For and the Nature of those of us serving in the Air Force, the future demands a surer, more comprehen- Modern Warfare sive, and more penetrating understanding As we look to the future, airmen must be of air power and its uses. In that regard, let the first to admit that the history of air 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

power is replete with promises of too much too soon. The early prophets of air power—notably Gen Giulio Douhet (1869— 1930), Gen William (“ Billy”) Mitchell (1879-1936), and Air Marshal Hugh Tren- chard (1873-1956)—based their visions on the very limited air power experience of World War I. I believe that their visionary reach exceeded their technological grasp v m h — M V * by many decades. As a result, they seemed —^ 1 1 ^ to promise quick, cheap victories from the air.3 This was certainly true of General Douhet, who insisted that achieving “com- mand of the air” would not only be neces- sary but also sufficient for victory. Let there be no doubt that he was certain of himself:

"Airmen owe it to their countrx to take the lead and use their expertise in understanding and applying air power's special capacities." Below, opening-day formalities for a class at the Air Corps Tactical School (Maxwell Field. Alabama) in the 1930s. Top. members of the first class of the Sclu>ol of Advanced Airpower Studies (Maxwell AFB. Alabama). Right. Air Command and Staff College students review options during a war game. AIR POWER THINKING 7

In spite of the close reasoning by which I Maj) Harold (“ Hal” ) George on air power have arrived at these affirmations, I am sure in war is a notable example: they will seem extravagant to many. That does not affect me in the least— Such stub- Whether air power can. by and of itseli, bornness leaves me absolutely unaffected, accomplish the whole object of war is cer- because I have the mathematical certainty tainly an academic question; but that the air that the time will come when air forces of phase of a future war between major powers nations everywhere will conform exactly to will be the decisive phase seems to be the concepts described above.4 accepted as more and more plausible as each year passes.*

Douhet was not an ambivalent man. For Of course, many assumptions and the most part, neither was General promises of the air power prophets, of Mitchell, especially after his court-martial whatever persuasion, fell short. That is not in 1925. The dramatic claims of the air to suggest that there was anything wrong pow'er visionaries overshadowed the less with their prophecies—as prophecies go. provocative work of other air power advo- Technological shortcomings regarding car- cates, such as Sir John Slessor and many of rying capacity, materials and fuels, speed, the Air Corps Tactical School staff, a group range, weapons accuracy, target intel- that has been termed the “air-first moder- ligence, precision navigation equipment, ates.’’3 Recent history appears to confirm and so forth took their toll. But so did a the more tempered views of the moderates lack of experience in applying air power. even more than those of the better-known Airmen had to learn how to determine, visionaries. The perspective of Gen (then find, and attack the enemy’s vital centers, 8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

how to conduct an effective interdiction Only 34 hours after receiving deployment orders, the first coalition squadron arrived in Saudi Arabia from the United campaign, how to organize, train, equip, States. This type of responsiveness provides policymakers command, and control air assets—along with attractive options in times of crisis. Here. F-15s with learning how to take best advantage prepare for takeoff in support of Operation Desert Storm. of emerging technology and. more impor- tantly. how to drive and channel the pur- suit of new technology. (A century ago, Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great expo- all the classic characteristics of war that nent of sea power, energized military Clausewitz described. study of how technical changes influenced Shortcomings in both technology and history. Airmen learned that they could go experience meant that victory in World one step further. Instead of harnessing the War II came neither quickly nor cheaply. achievements of independent inventors, As one result, many soldiers and sailors, they underwrote major developments, as well as some of our civilian leaders, experiments, and even basic research, the came to view the history of air power results of which subsequently helped as a series of unrealized—perhaps change the world, giving us computers, unrealizable—dreams. Airmen, in short, telecommunications, satellites, and air- paid a price in credibility for the expan- liners.) Airmen also had to learn that the sive and premature visions of the early enemy had a capacity to interfere with air prophets. Yet, I am not sure that modern operations and that air war also involved airmen have been mentally prepared to friction, fog, uncertainty, and ambiguity— accept, much less to take advantage of. the AIR POWER THINKING 9

sudden consensus that the early air power face ships armed with cruise missiles in prophets were basically right (although projecting power through the air. decades premature). Perhaps we have been Air power’s attributes provide ways to floating on the stream of history but need fight asymmetrically and to exert leverage. to begin paddling, as did the air power The latter quality applies at varying scales, prophets. from grand strategy to the individual In truth, the history of air power has engagement. Further, it applies to fighting been a gradual maturation process over a different types of forces, as well as to con- period of some 80 years. Gradual might ducting different forms of warfare: even be too hard a word. Compare the cen- turies required for gunpowder weapons to • In what has been called the low- supersede the sword and pike or the de- intensity conflict environment, air power cades required for motorized vehicles to provides the few advantages available to outnumber horses in modern armies.7 modern surface forces engaged with Today, after 80 years of experience enemies using guerrilla tactics. Specifi- extending across the spectrum of conflict cally, these advantages are mobility, aerial and after stunning technological develop- reconnaissance, and quick-response ments that have largely solved many prob- firepower. lems that previously limited air power, we • In conventional war, only air power are in a far better position to make the case can be rapidly applied simultaneously to that air power will normally dominate every type of target—strategic, operational, modern warfare. Consider the following: and tactical. Targets in Operation Desert Storm, such as military command centers • Surface forces have great difficulty in Baghdad, the bridges near Basra, and operating in the face of strong, hostile air Iraqi tanks, illustrate these categories power—if indeed they can operate at all. clearly. After seeing the litter along the road from • Aerospace power is, of course, the Kuwait City to Basra. Iraq, the whole sine qua non of strategic nuclear war. world now has an image of how difficult it In short, it seems clear that armies and is to do anything—even to run away— navies must increasingly appreciate that when an opponent commands the skies. their capabilities and roles are determined • When augmented by strong, friendly by the existing air power situation. At the air power, surface forces have a variety of same time—and to a greater extent than is opportunities open to them which would generally acknowledged—air power otherwise be denied. As Gen George S. retains its capacity to operate indepen- Patton's Third Army sped across France, dently of surface forces. This combination air power protected its southern flank and of factors leads quite naturally to the con- its “overhead flank.”8 One could even say clusion that air power—especially in its that Patton’s audacious reliance on air extended form as aerospace power—has power set the pace for his army’s offensive come to dominate warfare. drive. Although defensive operations In truth, we are only beginning to frame relinquish much of air power’s advantage how air power can dominate modern in using the initiative, the United Nations’ warfare—that is, how air power’s tremen- defense of South Korea's Pusan perimeter dous leverage creates conditions for other in the summer of 1950 depended on air forces to fight, shapes campaigns, opens power, as did the defense of Khe Sanh, up options, and denies the enemy not just South Vietnam, in 1968.9 battle and campaign choices, but whole • Modern navies have capitalized strategies. Professionals from all the ser- heavily on the strength of naval air vices will increasingly study air power as power—witness the role of the carrier as a catalyst and prerequisite to other mili- queen of the fleet and the new role of sur- tary means, just as policymakers will view 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

air power as a key that opens and closes these respects, this very progress opens up the doors of many strategy and policy major new challenges on which to focus. options. An airman could, with equal ease, assume any role in this effort: that of amused bystander, critic, cheerleader, pliant respondent to others’ applications, The Role of Time in the or leader in this art form. To my mind, air- men owe it to their country to take the New World Order lead and use their expertise in understand- 1 suggested earlier that my second point ing and applying air power’s special had to do with time. One reason that the capacities. time factor has assumed increasingly crit- None of this should be taken to deny the ical significance is that the threats to importance of surface forces, for whom American vital interests are much more many tasks remain, some of which (e.g., diffuse in our brave new world: occupying territory and maintaining an • We no longer have the luxury, as it extended presence) air power cannot now were, of preparing for the well-defined, and almost certainly never will achieve. Rather, the emergence of air (and aero- space) power as the vanguard for all our Used with much success during Operation Desert Storm, forces requires new ways of thinking about “smart" weapons may lead many people to dismiss the warfare and new planning paradigms, as chance of error that is inherent in any weapon and to well as new ways of organizing, structur- confuse reliability with certainty. The Air Force cannot afford to generate a false expectation that its weapon ing. and commanding our forces.10 The systems have achieved "mechanistic perfection." Here, results of Desert Storm suggest that while ground crew members load a Maverick missile onto an A-10 we have made considerable progress in in preparation for a mission during Desert Storm. AJH POWER THINKING 11

worst-case scenarios that characterized the advance is that response time will often be bipolar world. (As known threats shrink, the most important factor in deterring a so will our forces, and forward-deployed threat or attempting to contain a crisis forces are likely to shrink the most. The situation. magnitude of the foreseeable changes in Recent events in the Gulf region provide funding indicates that we can no longer a thought-provoking example of how air continue business as usual [i.e.. shrinking power's responsiveness complements the all things equally]. We will need to sepa- developing security picture. For example, rate the essential from the less important in the months leading to Iraq’s invasion of and adopt new ways of doing things. For Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's verbal attacks example. Desert Storm affirmed the critical were not confined to Kuwait but extended value of bases. The first ground forces into to neighboring Gulf nations. His Pan-Arab the Arabian Peninsula during Desert rhetoric assumed an ominous tone before Shield were charged with the security of Iraqi armies moved. (Monday-morning key military airfields and ports, reminis- quarterbacks now suggest that Saddam’s cent of Gen Douglas MacArthur’s classic swift attack against Kuwait could have use of ground forces to support his air been anticipated. But no nation, as far as campaigns. To consider an extreme exam- we know, believed that an Iraqi attack was ple, if—hypothetically—our forward- imminent. Saddam surprised everybody.) deployed forces in NATO were reduced to. Once Iraq’s forces moved, they secured say. 10.000 troops, might not airfield and their first objective in Kuwait very harbor defense missions be the most quickly, and they then—whatever their important role they could assume?)11 intentions—certainly had the capability to • The general relaxation of East-West resume their march in a short time. (By the tensions could well encourage regional end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Iraqi aggressors of all sorts. These nations have forces demonstrated that they could increasingly dangerous military capa- launch successive attacks in less than a bilities: the ability to move quickly, month.) Iraq thus had the capability and achieve an objective, and consolidate gains opportunity to extend its gains, had before any but the quickest forces can declared a motive for doing so, and was respond with positive effect (as we have so organizing its means when the coalition recently seen!). Triggers for such even- responded. tualities are legion: they include age-old Thirty-four hours after it was ordered to ethnic and religious hatreds, attempts to deploy, the first coalition squadron arrived monopolize markets or resources, irreden- in Saudi Arabia from the United States. In tism. religious fervor, dreams of greater the Desert Shield buildup, airlift dupli- power and glory for individuals and/or cated the movement of the 400-day Berlin nations, and so forth. Such threats could airlift every 40 days or so. It did this five arise almost anywhere and could involve times without pause.12 Fortunately, the formidable foes. The very distribution of United States had the capability to the threat picture requires a reexamination respond rapidly with air power. This of how we think and plan and suggests quick response threw the Iraqis off balance that we need forces tailored to these new and provided a deterrent and a breathing circumstances (i.e., forces trained, space until the US could deploy a full equipped, and postured for a faster- array of forces and the coalition could moving world). We surely need no further deliberately plan a method for rolling back instruction about how quickly events can the aggression. Air power not only cur- move. tailed many Iraqi options, but even • The where, when, and by whom are reshaped the regional power balance— among the crucial unknowns regarding almost overnight. fut ure threats. What can be known in The global spread of near-instantaneous 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

information highlights the requirement to rest. The idea that "because our equipment adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, is sophisticated, it therefore is unlikely to something which air power does so well. work" has been thoroughly discredited.14 Iraq’s Scud campaign was televised as it Our institutional bias, as airmen, to "lead occurred, with unforeseen political turn" events and technology has been impact. Although that campaign had no validated. military value in the narrow sense, its 2. Low-observable (LO) technology is great political potential demanded that it here to stay. We have demonstrated our be dealt with immediately. The rapidly long-standing goal of penetrating enemy improvised “Great Scud Chase" and the defenses safely without unwieldy force swift marriage of Patriot missiles to rapid packaging. The capability to put any fea- surveillance and cueing systems again ture of the enemy at risk—which includes showed air power’s advantages in flex- the ability to threaten every asset an ibility and responsiveness, as well as its enemy possesses with unprecedented unique capabilities to secure politically probability of target engagement and low desirable military aims.13 risk of interference, loss, or capture— Air power’s responsiveness brings our provides not just tactical but strategic policymakers distinct capabilities, dis- leverage. criminating means, and desirable options 3. Precision guided munitions (PGM) for rapid response. We need to see air work. Furthermore, if some ideas still on power and its components in just such the drawing board or in early development terms, and we need to explore their mean- are any indication, PGMs will reach new ing for the future. To punctuate the point, heights of capability. The marriage of we must note that when time is of the PGMs to LO platforms provides enormous essence—as it is increasingly in this leverage, especially in terms of the level(s) world—air power will be the only means of force required to attain specific objec- by which our armed forces can t i v e s . 15 T h i s m a r r i a g e a l s o h e l p s u s w i t h another problem—the fact that the Ameri- • go directly from the United States to can public is loathe to accept high casualty any location in the world within hours; rates, whether among its own sons and • deliver massive firepower upon daughters or the enemy civilian popula- arrival: and tion. u’ Precision munitions are an enor- • deliver surface forces anywhere in the mous help in holding down both types of wrorId within hours—witness the air casualties. bridge that linked the US and Saudi Arabia early in the Iraq crisis. Above all. PGMs connect political objec- tives to military execution with much Future Applications greater reliability than ever before. The political leader can have far greater confi- of Air Power dence that discrete objectives can be met When one combines my two main and can thus gain broader latitude in for- points—the maturity (and its corre- mulating the overall objective. This is not sponding increase in utility) of air power just a change in air power or even in mili- and the significance of time (i.e., tary power: it is a fundamental change in responsiveness)—it should be clear that warfare. the results of Operation Desert Storm In past air campaigns, the random ef- provide several strong hints about the fects of ballistic weapons often created application of air power in the near future: ambiguity and uncertainty as to intent. We 1. Technology works and saves lives, on can now expect enemies to rapidly assess both sides. The long-lingering debate over the pattern of targets attacked by PGMs in quality versus quantity should be put to an effort to predict future attacks. This AIR POWER THINKING 13

suggests that vve need to contemplate the Air power’s adroitness seems par- second-order effects of force application— ticularly useful in a time of increasing human responses and target system uncertainty. It also suggests future direc- responses—rather than just the immediate tions for thinking about air power. The effects vve intend to achieve. Under- flexibility and responsiveness of air power standing what up to now have been “unin- have long been a two-edged sword; be- tended effects” is just a first step; airmen cause of its many capabilities, there has need to plan and perhaps even devise been a constant struggle between compet- strategy around them. All the processes of ing aims, roles, and target sets, and a con- adjusting to air attack (e.g., dispersing, dig- sequent temptation to disperse air power. ging in, moving, reorganizing) cost the The need to concentrate air power on spe- enemy something and may deserve consid- cific objectives and the effort to define eration as campaign objectives in those objectives best served by air power themselves. have been at the core of air power doctrine Of course, airmen need to be aware that and should remain our principal concerns. the public—even policymakers—may now However that may be, I do want to apply expect all attacks to be precise and may a necessary flash of speedbrake to my not understand or tolerate the small emphasis on time and our capability of degrees of random error inherent in any responding rapidly in the emerging weapon, no matter how precisely it is security picture. In doing so, I again call to aimed. We certainly need to guard against my assistance the late Air Vice-Marshal creating a popular expectation that air Wrigley, who warned us that in all we do, power has attained some form of mecha- we must be on guard to “foresee the possi- nistic perfection. Every single sortie is an ble danger that the precipitate use of the effort that can be described in terms of air force may bring about a war |emphasis probabilities—not certainties—of launch, added].” As the editors of his papers note. refuelling, ingress and navigation, defeat- ing the defenses, acquiring the target, This is a significant observation. In the mid- attacking the target, fuze and weapon func- dle of his discourse on the causes of war. tioning. and egress recovery. I think that Wrigley notes that the immediate trigger of a the example of Douhet’s inflated proph- conflict may not truly represent the underly- ecies provides adequate warning of the ing causes, and, in that context, sounds a warning that the careless use of air power dangers of oversimplifying the tremendous could lead to “ precipitate” hostilities. advances we have made and of the hazard Wrigley's logic for that judgment is central of confusing reliability with certainty. to doctrines of air power employment, for it Nevertheless, a primary aspect of preci- arises from the aircraft’s singular speed, flex- sion weapons that should shape our future ibility and capacity to concentrate force. thinking is their ability to achieve politi- One of his major themes, recurrent and cally desirable military aims quickly and firmly stated, is that of the three forms of with ever-increasing reliability. The combat power, the air is the most suited to capabilities of air power have increased offensive action. An air force which is forced vastly in the 60 years since Air Vice- to defend tends to disperse and react: one Marshal H, N. Wriglev of the Royal Aus- which is on the offensive can concentrate, tralian Air Force explained that the poten- control and initiate. Wrigley warns that such tial of each sortie to create immediate a weapon must be handled with care. 1H political effects required every airman to understand the broad aspects and policy 1 could not agree more and hope that my a i m s o f t h e w a r a t h a n d . 17 T h e p r e c i s i o n emphasis on providing a capability for and speed that air power now brings to rapid response is not taken to imply any force application increase the need for air- casualness of thought regarding the impli- men to understand war in even broader cations of providing such a capability. terms. Although we must guard against being too 14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

quick off the mark, we must be careful not Our recent revision of Air Force doctrine to be too late. To argue otherwise would be presents our understanding of how air tantamount to dismissing judgment from power has worked best in war and sup- the art of war. In today’s world—subject to ports that view with comprehensive his- the above caveat and given continuing torical evidence. But, as Abraham Lincoln advances in precision (above all, put it, ‘‘The dogmas of the quiet past, are selectivity)—“air power [can] be a ubiq- inadequate to the stormy present__ uitous arm of the first hour, and thus As our case is new, so we must think escape the need to be employed as a anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall weapon of last resort.”19 ourselves.”20 I expect that the publication of our Conclusion revised basic doctrine—the first docu- My intent has been to suggest that the mented doctrine we have ever had— will emerging security picture and recent stir debates and challenges, reexamination trends in world events indicate that we of the evidence, and new reasoning. I have will likely earn our paychecks the hard proposed some directions that our future way at some time in the future. 1 have thoughts might take. But what I really look emphasized that the other services, forward to seeing are those new national decision makers, and our country- directions—or even broader horizons— men expect more of the Air Force than that have escaped my view. □ ever before.

Notes 1. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine tecting |Third US Army's] southern flank to XIX (Tactical Air of the United States Air Force. 2 vols. (forthcoming). Command]." Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds.. The 2. In 890 A.D., Alfred the Great, a remarkable military Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 3. Europe: ARGU- leader and one of the foremost scholars of his day. expressed MENT to V-E Day (1951: new imprint. Washington, D.C.: the obligations of good fortune (in the form of position or Office of Air Force History, 1983), 247. rank| this way: "If, when such power is offered them, they 9. Gen Walton H. Walker, commander of the US Eighth refuse it. it often happens that they are deprived of the gifts Army, characterized air power's effectiveness this way: “T which God bestowed on them for the sake of many men, not will gladly lay my cards right on the table and state that if it of them alone." Alf I. Mapp. |r.. The Golden Dragon: Alfred had not been for the air support that we received from the the Great and His Times (Lanham. Md.: Madison Books, Fifth Air Force we would not have been able to stay in 1991), 109. Korea.'" Quoted in Robert F. Futrell. The United States Air 3. See David Maclsaac. "Voices from the Central Blue: The Force in Korea, 1950-1953. rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Office Air Power Theorists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From of Air Force History. 1983), 146. Machiavelli to the' Nuclear Age. ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, 10. For new USAF thinking on these matters, see Gen Mer- N.I.: Princeton University Press. 1986), 624-47. rill A. McPeak, “For the Composite Wing." Airpower Journal 4. Ciulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino 4. no. 3 (Fall 1990): 4-12. Ferrari (1942; new imprint. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 11. This is not to relegate American ground forces to port Force History. 1983), 129. or airfield security as their raison d'etre; rather, it suggests 5. See Stephen B. (ones, "Global Strategic Views," in The that a new paradigm for warfare in a new era will require Impact of Air Power, ed. Eugene M. Emme (Princeton, N.J.: imaginative and creative use of all forces at the disposal of D. Van Nostrand Co.. Inc., 1959), 118-28. the joint forces commander. 6. Maj Harold Lee George, "An Inquiry into the Subject 12. News briefing. Department of Defense. Gen Merrill A. 'War'." undated lecture notes, c. 1936. USAF Historical McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, subject: Operation Desert Research Center, Maxwell AFB. Ala., file 248.11-9, page 9. Storm, 15 March 1991, 1-2. 7. For example, when the vaunted Panzer armies of the 13. Speaking of hunting and attacking Scud missiles. Gen- Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, they eral McPeak noted that "we put about three times the effort took with them 750,000 horses and only 600,000 motorized that we thought we would on this job." Ibid., 5. vehicles. Robert Goralski. World War II Almanac: 1931-1945, 14. In World War 11. after a lengthy maturation of mainte- A Political and Military Record (New York: G.P. Putnam's nance and supply practices, the US Army Air Forces Sons. 1981), 164. achieved an in-commission rate of 55 percent: in Desert 8. As the Allies gathered momentum after the Normandy Storm the US Air Force maintained a 93 percent in- invasion. Gen George S. Patton "turned over the task of pro- commission rate. In other words, oul-of-commission rates of AIR POWER THINKING 15 the comparatively simple and far less potent World War II mand (TAC) during Desert Storm was about eight aircraft per aircraft exceeded modern rates by over six times. Edward H. 100.000 flying hours. In my days as a lieutenant. TAC lost Rolcum. "Gulf War Reinforces Value of U.S. Stealth Tech- 14.6 aircraft per 100.000 flying hours just by doing peacetime nologies." Aviation Week 6- Space Technology. 18 February training. Central Command air forces lost one aircraft every 1991. 40; Craven and Cate. vol. 6. Men and Planes (1955; three days in Desert Storm, whereas in the days of the F-86, new imprint. Washington. D C.: Office of Air Force History. we lost one aircraft a day—every day—for three years, just in 1983). 396. training. 15. Two figures suggest the leverage that low-observable 17. "If commanders fail to keep the national policy in aircraft using precision weapons can apply, in combination view when planning their operations, they are wrong. Arid in with other force multipliers: (1) F-117s comprised a mere 2.5 order to understand this policy, they must look at the war percent of coalition aircraft involved in air attacks but from the broadest aspect. This applies especially to the case accounted for 31 percent of the targets on the first raid; their of the Air Force, because even a junior officer may have to targets were generally centers for air defense operations, make grave decisions as to the nature of the target he is going communications, and command and control; (2) total coali- to bomb." Air Vice-Marshal H. N. Wrigley. The Decisive Fac- tion combat losses in the air effort of 109.876 sorties were 42 tor: Air Power Doctrine, ed. Alan Stephens and Brendan aircraft. The paralysis of Iraq's command and control struc- O'Loghlin (Canberra. Australia: Australian Government Pub- ture can be seen in the coalition's ability to fly combat lishing Service. 1990). 11. sorties—many at night and many in adverse weather—yet 18. Ibid.. 6. 8. keep losses to a level that, a few years ago. would have been 19. M. J. Armitage and R. A. Mason. Air Power in the normal (or better) for peacetime training (see also note 15). Nuclear Age (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press. 1983). .VlcPeak briefing, 4. 6, 9-10. 12. 257. 16. Reduction in the risk to human life as a result of better 20. "Annual Message to Congress. December 1, 1862," in technology and sound practices is one of air power's great Abraham Lincoln. Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 (New success stories. The combat loss rate of Tactical Air Com- York: Library of America/Viking Press. 1989). 415

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Jim Cunningham

N NOVEMBER 1988 a decade of the program has moved out of the “black" secrecy was lifted from one of the (secrecy) realm, it is possible to review the most enigmatic aircraft projects of all reports on the project, assess their time: the Lockheed F-117A stealth accuracy, and discuss whether or not they Ifighter. In the 10 years since the program compromised the aircraft’s technology or was officially announced by the Carter operational capabilities. administration, numerous reports have been published in both the technical and popular media about the aircraft. Now that Stealth before the F-l 1 7A Stealth, or low-observable technologies, Author's note: This article was written entirely with were in development long before the unclassified sources. While every effort was made to ensure that information was the most current and accurate available, stealth fighter ever flew. The first stealth the secret nature of the subject matter leaves open the pos- aircraft flew in the early 1900s—a German sibility that incomplete or inaccurate data was used in prepa- aircraft equipped with transparent wing ration of this article.

16 coverings intended to make the airplane bombing campaigns in the Vietnam War. more difficult to spot from the ground.1 Bomber losses were high, and the US Air The Germans were also the first to incor- Force needed to design its later bombers in porate radar absorbent material (RAM) into a way that would reduce losses. (The B-70 an aircraft. Production models of their Valkyrie bomber project was canceled Horten Ho IX were to incorporate charcoal before the B-52 raids and did not incorpo- and other primitive RAM. Only prototypes rate stealth technology.) of the design were ever constructed, and A variety of small, obscure experimental these were not fitted with stealth features.2 aircraft were tested to determine the feasi- At the conclusion of World War II, the bility of stealth features. Among these United States developed RAM that was were modified sailplanes and a variant of only marginally effective and very heavy. the Windecker Eagle, which incorporated The added weight of the RAM, known as composite airframe materials as well as MX-410, was considered prohibitive, and internal RAM technology.7 the substance was never used opera- The results of these tests were never tionally.3 The 1950s design specifications openly published. Whatever the final out- of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft included come was, it was sufficient to propel a preference for a low radar cross section, stealth technology into full development. which is a fundamental stealth characteris- In June 1975, the Defense Daily carried a tic.4 Some experiments with a type of report that a small stealth fighter was RAM known as Salisbury Screen were also being developed for the Air Force Flight conducted on the U-2.5 Considerable effort Dynamics Laboratory.8 In an article on the was put into making the U-2’s successor, genesis of the advanced tactical fighter the SR-71, a stealthy aircraft. The SR-71 (ATF) published in January 1976, Aviation used blended body shaping as well as Week 8r S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y reported that a various types of RAM to make radar detec- high priority was being given to the incor- tion more difficult. Stealth was not. how- poration of stealth technology into the ever. a primary design concern of either fighter designs. The article further stated the U-2 or SR-71 programs.6 that Lockheed and Northrop (which went Interest in stealth technology increased on to develop the F-117A and B-2 stealth in the late 1960s and early 1970s, partly in aircraft) were being given funding for response to lessons learned from the B-52 design studies on the inclusion of stealth

17 gram. This article listed the engines of the prototype (General Electric J85 turbojets) and revealed that C. L. (“Kelly”) Johnson, who had been the leading man in the U-2 and SR-71 programs, was involved with the project as a consultant. Like the fane’s entry, the article indicated that the first flight of the “Stealth Fighter Demonstra- tor” was to be conducted later in the year.12 Photographs and technical informa- tion on prototypes, known as “Have Blue,” were finally declassified in April 1991.13

The Stealth Fighter Hits the Spotlight Stealth hit center stage—as many high- tech weapon systems often do—in the political arena in an election year. In some ways similar to the SR-71 before it, the Lockheed stealth fighter was destined to become a political football. The military capability of the United States was a major issue of the 1980 presi- dential election. The “defeat” of the United States in Vietnam and the more In August 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown held recent feeling of the country being what would become a controversial press conference to “pushed around” by nations such as Iran clarify recent "leaks" concerning stealth information and to officially confirm DOD's participation in the secret led many to believe that this country program. needed a larger defense budget and that the Carter administration was neglecting the matter. (President Jimmy Carter had characteristics in the ATF because of their canceled the B-l bomber program in 1977.) experience with low-observable tech- In August 1980. during the height of nologies in their stealth fighter programs candidate mudslinging, word of stealth already in progress at the time.9 In August technology was leaked and immediately 1976 Aviation Week Er S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y picked up in all the media, technical and carried a brief story that the development popular alike. (Until then the popular contract for the stealth fighter demonstra- media had ignored stealth.) The leaks and tor had been won by Lockheed.10 The rhetoric that followed made an extremely 1977-78 edition of Jane’s All the World’s muddled picture from which it is all but Aircraft marked the debut of the stealth impossible to fully determine exactly what fighter in that famous work. A one- happened. paragraph entry under the Lockheed Cor- During the week of 10 August, Aviation poration mentioned that a “small” stealth Week Er S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y , the Wash- fighter was being built and was expected ington Post, and ABC News all carried sto- to fly in 1977.11 ries about stealth. The items were based on In June 1977 Aviation Week Er Space information from unofficial sources and Technology published another brief article stated that stealth technology was being that listed additional details of the pro- developed for a variety of aircraft (includ-

18 CRACKS IN THE BLACK DIKE 19

ing bombers). The reports also explained stealth had been out in the open during what stealth technology was. what it might public testimony for initial contract do. and vaguely described what such fea- assignment until his administration classi- tures would consist of: RAM and curved fied the program in 1977. The leaking of surfaces. (The latter, of course, proved to information about the program was inevi- be entirely inaccurate with regard to the table, he claimed, given that thousands of F-117A.) workers were involved with the project.16 On 22 August Secretary of Defense The breaking of stealth information Harold Brown held a press conference to drew attention from the House Armed clarify the stealth “leak.” At the con- Services Committee, which prepared a ference. Brown confirmed the details pub- report that was released in early February lished in the media. The purpose of 1981. The origin of the report is probably confirming the leaks. Brown insisted, was linked to the fact that the committee was to create a "firebreak” and prevent further specially briefed on stealth technology two information about the program being days before the media revelations, was revealed. Unsurprisingly, official confir- given less information than was later mation of a supposedly secret program leaked, and was told that the matter was was seized upon as an ideal political highly secret. The report questions the weapon by Republicans, who accused the official executive branch explanation for Carter administration of revealing secret military technology to rebuff their own claim that President Carter had neglected defense matters.14 By the latter half of the 1980s, the mysterious stealth fighter Gen Richard H. Ellis, then commander had increasingly become a source of fascination to the media of the Strategic Air Command, said in a and public. letter to Gen Lew Allen, Jr., USAF chief of staff at the time, that the release of such information, the announcement of a possi- ble stealth bomber in particular, "brought the hair up on the back of my neck.” He indicated that the reports gave the Soviets years of advance warning of the projects and time to prepare countermeasures that would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the systems.15 These remarks seemed to ignore the reports on stealth published in earlier years that gave more detailed infor- mation than was leaked in 1980. Given the emphasis placed on such technical media as Aviation Week Sr Space Technology in the aerospace community, as well as the ability of Soviet intelligence organizations to gain information on other "black” pro- grams. it seems unlikely that the Soviets first learned about the existence of stealth programs from the 1980 leaks. President Carter responded to the crit- icism by downplaying the degree of detail revealed and in turn criticized his oppo- nents for not classifying stealth when the program entered development under the Ford administration. Carter claimed that 20 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991 revelation of stealth data. Of particular no later than 21 August, one day before interest was testimony by Benjamin Secretary Brown's press conference on Schemmer, then editor of Armed Forces stealth.17 Journal, who withheld publication of an Further damaging testimony was given article on stealth in 1978 at the request of by Adm Elmo R. Zumwalt. Jr., former chief the Department of Defense. In August of naval operations. Zumwalt testified that 1980. he was approached by Under Secre- the president had decided to deliberately tary of Defense for Research and Engineer- leak information on the stealth program as ing William J. Perry, who encouraged him an excuse to officially announce its exis- to publish a modified version of the article tence and take credit for it. Furthermore,

Although it looked nothing like the real thing, the 1985 release of the speculative "F-19" plastic airplane model of the stealth fighter generated understandable concern among officials not privy to the actual design of the aircriift. (Courtesy ofTestor Corporation and Squadron Mail Order)

T^is CRACKS IN THE BLACK DIKE 21

Zumwalt named the alleged leaker of the closure was undertaken for political information: Deputy Assistant to the Presi- purposes by the Carter administration.20 dent for National Security Affairs David L. Not all of the media reporting of the Aaron. Aaron filed an affidavit with the events was of sparkling quality. Newsweek subcommittee which denied that he re- ran a story in which stealth aircraft were leased any such information but he re- described as being equipped with fused to testify before the committee under “electronic jamming devices to reduce oath due to a dispute with the White ‘radar echo’ aircraft normally give off.” House over executive privilege.18 Such a system, of course, would be of an Testimony given by Secretary Brown in active electronic nature and would call which he explained his justification for more attention to the aircraft than its nor- the official announcement of stealth was mal radar return. The article was accom- deemed flimsy by the committee. Brown panied by an artist's rendering from CBS indicated that there were three options of News of what a stealth fighter would look dealing with the leaked information: the like. The aircraft depicted in the drawing government could refuse comment on the bore no resemblance to what engineers leaks entirely, deny and discredit the theorized such an aircraft would look like story, or confirm the reports. The first at the time nor to the F-117A’s actual con- option was discarded, Brown testified, figuration as we know it today. Instead, because it would encourage media atten- the rendering resembles an F-8 Crusader tion and additional leaks of possible tech- with the aircraft’s engine intake atop the nical information. (Given the predict- fuselage. Two oddly bent curved wings ability of the degree of attention paid to and a flat-tipped nose were also featured.21 the program following its official If this report was one of the pieces that the announcement, this explanation seems government was so concerned about pro- unplausible.) The second option, dis- viding sensitive information to the Soviets, crediting the story, ran against the post- there was no cause for alarm. Watergate political climate of the time. Thus, the third option, official revelation, was chosen as a way of preventing further The Stealth Fighter leaks. How focusing on the press con- in the Early ference about stealth technology would limit such attention on the matter was and Middle 1980s never fully explained by Secretary Brown. The philosophy of the Reagan admin- The committee also had difficulty in deter- istration, which took the reins from the mining how this “damage-limiting tactic” Carter administration in early 1981, had a was supposed to operate.19 much more conservative slant. For stealth The conclusions of the committee were projects this meant moving them “into the cutting. Neglecting the fact that stealth black” where they did not officially exist. technology had been written about in the While this proved all but impossible for technical media for several years, the programs like the stealth fighter, which report concluded that the official an- were publicly acknowledged before the nouncement did “serious damage...to transition of power, it was done neverthe- the security of the United States and our less. Information available to the public on ability to deter or to contain a potential stealth technology all but dried up. but the Soviet threat.” Similarly, the findings of technical media kept rather accurate track the committee based on testimony given of the programs anyway, although details by Zumwalt and Schemmer, combined were lacking and were occasionally in with a reluctance to testify by a key error. Reports in the popular media about administration official and a flimsy the aircraft usually surfaced when an acci- explanation by Secretary Brown, sup- dent occurred. ported the belief that the official dis- In 1981 considerable study was being 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

undertaken by the Pentagon on the direc- Northrop that was expected to have its tion for the nation’s strategic weapon pro- first flight “soon.”22 grams. Proposals for reviving the canceled It is not known if this aircraft was an B-l as a stopgap measure until an attempt to compete with Lockheed for the advanced-technology stealth bomber could production of the stealth fighter or if it was be designed were being scrutinized and an experimental demonstrator for testing the fundamental aspects of these programs stealth technology to be applied to the were in public view. Questions of stealth advanced-technology bomber (now the technology applied to a new bomber led B-2) or the F-23 advanced-technology back to the stealth fighter. fighter then under development by North- A report in a June 1981 issue of Aviation rop. Given the differences in stealth design Week S- Space Technology regarding techniques in the F-117A and B-2 aircraft, bomber proposals mentioned some inter- the vehicle mentioned was probably a esting facts about the stealth fighter. The demonstrator. (Recent reports indicate that report mentioned that the Lockheed security was so tight during testing that demonstrator was currently flying against teams from the various contractors were Soviet equipment, presumably in Nevada. The aircraft were described as physically Sixteen months after the release of the initial, hazy “rounded.” A Pentagon official, who was photograph of the airplane, the Air Force revealed not named, described the technology as additional photographs and information about the stealth working “better than we have a right to fighter. From a respectable distance, crowds view the expect.” The article also made reference to F-J17A on display at the May 1990 Joint Services Open a fighter-sized stealth aircraft designed by House at Andrews AFB. Maryland. CRACKS IN THE BLACK DIKE 23

not allowed to view each other’s aircraft Aviation Week 8r S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y for some time.)23 continued to obtain and print reports of A demonstration of just how far the Rea- the stealth fighter’s progress despite the gan administration was willing to go with new official line of the aircraft’s nonexis- keeping stealth technology secret can be tence. Nearly three months after Secretary seen in statements by Air Force Secretary Orr’s denial, a report in the magazine’s Verne Orr in July 1981. Contradicting what “Washington Roundup” stated that pro- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had duction for the stealth fighter had been stated the year before and disregarding funded with $1 billion for the 1983 fiscal reports of several years in the technical year for 20 aircraft. The report also stated media. Orr called the stealth bomber a that the planes were to be C-5 transport- “paper airplane” and “wishful thinking.” able and had a planform similar to the He also expressed doubt that American space shuttle.25 industry could handle such a “rush pro- A report in the Wall Street Journal in gram,” when in fact the F-117A was March 1982 revealed more details of the developed in record time.24 stealth fighter than had been done pre- viously in the popular media. The report mentioned that the stealth fighter was due to go into production that year, was to be In June 1991. the Air Force hosted "Stealth Week" at produced in small numbers, and would Andrews AFB, which allowed visiting congressmen to view best be employed in the surprise attack up close the F-117A. the B-2. and the F-22 advanced tactical role against heavily defended targets. It fighter. also discussed the stealth bomber and cruise missile projects. The report, while The heavy security classification of the F-l 17A in the 1980s had a corollary effect of protecting the highly successfid mostly factual, did include some preten- program from, depending on one's point of view, either tious statements. According to the author, dissection in the political arena or thoughtful public review. one experiment performed by the United States Navy involved a missile boat coated with RAM, which made the vessel “ un- detectable by surface radar.’’26 This was the aircraft completely concealed. The pro- almost certainly an exaggeration. gram was kept fully classified, however, at With the desire on the part of the Reagan President Ronald Reagan’s request.29 administration to keep stealth black, little In 1985 the stealth fighter made head- more was published about the stealth lines and national news in the form of a fighter until later in the decade. Even the plastic model kit (which turned out to 1984-85 edition of Jane's All the World's have almost nothing in common with the Aircraft, which included a very brief entry real thing). At the request of his boss, John on the aircraft, made no new revelations Andrews at the Testors Corporation about the aircraft except that it believed its created a speculative model of what the designation was F-19.27 This designation “F-19" might look like. The design was was widely believed accurate for several well thought-out, complete with curved years, although at least one report surfaces, inwardly canted rudders, and uncovered the fact that the designation blended engine intakes. Technical data was inaccurate.28 was obtained from unclassified sources such as those used in preparation of this article and a government study likely used in producing the F-117A, the Radar Cross The Last Years of Section Handbook. The only truly unusual source used was a thumbnail sketch by a Classification pilot who claimed that he saw an unusual The last years of the 1980s saw the aircraft over the desert one day.30 stealth fighter move back into the popular Release of the model caused a political and technical media spotlights. Crashes, and media uproar. The kit was spread over missing documents on the aircraft, and, newspapers and network news programs. oddly enough, a plastic model kit all An assembled copy of the kit was even focused attention on the program. In fact, passed around a hearing in the House so much information about the airplane investigating missing stealth documents. was leaking that some officials felt that One representative demanded to know there was little point in attempting to keep how a secret aircraft that even congress- CRACKS IN THE BLACK DIKE 25

men were not allowed to see could be 1986 in California on a night training mis- r e p r o d u c e d b y a m o d e l c o m p a n y . 31 T h e sion. The drastic security measures taken government was particularly disturbed by during the incident attracted media the fact that the kit was a best-seller, attention. especially among Lockheed workers at The aircraft crashed at approximately 2 Palmdale, California (where the F-117A A.M. on a night training flight and started a was built), which seemed to lend cred- fierce brushfire near Bakersfield, Califor- ibility to the model’s configuration.32 nia. The fire was so severe that it took In the end, however, the model was some 16 hours to extinguish.38 The crash merely an intelligent guess. In many ways, site was proclaimed a national security the Testors kit looks more like what a area, which made overflights within five stealth fighter should look like than the miles at altitudes less than 8,500 feet ille- F-117A does: its surfaces are gracefully gal. The ground area was also sealed off to curved and it has a forward fuselage re- the point that fire fighters were not sembling an SR-71. Only one of the kit’s allowed into the immediate area.39 While features was accurate: the triangular, the Air Force refused to comment on what wedge-shaped nose tip. The model de- type of aircraft the pilot had been flying or signer knew this configuration was correct where the flight originated, there was no because he had connections to the contrac- doubt in anyone’s mind what had crashed. tor that manufactured them.33 In the final Aviation Week & Space Technology ran analysis, one can only imagine the frustra- detailed articles on the incident, including tion and perhaps amusement of top Lock- an analysis of local airways and military heed and Pentagon officials who knew that operations areas. The article revealed that the kit bore no resemblance to the real the F-19 designation was incorrect but also fighter but could not say so in public. stated that the aircraft used thrust vector- Congressional questioning about missing ing, which it did not.40 A follow-up article stealth documents during the same hearing the next week examined some of the oper- in which the model was passed around ations that were taking place at the crash were less amusing. In June 1986 two Lock- site, including the use of explosive charges heed employees working on the stealth to remove embedded aircraft sections.41 fighter program brought to light that hun- (Reports later declassified indicated that dreds of documents, tapes, films, and pho- the crash was so severe that “structural tographs dealing with the aircraft were breakup was almost absolute.’’)42 missing from the company’s files. Repre- In a fashion typical of the popular sentative John D. Dingell (D-Mich.J, who media, Newsweek ran a story that con- later chaired an investigation into the tained several serious inaccuracies. The problem, indicated that there was evi- report indicated that over 72 stealth dence that Lockheed had falsified audits to fighters were in operation and that any conceal the problem.34 In one instance, an debris from the crash could be analyzed employee allegedly removed blueprints of and information obtained that “the the aircraft in a rolled-up newspaper. The Kremlin would love to get its hands on.” employee then supposedly showed them As a result of this, the article claimed, Pen- to his ex-wife and girlfriend, who turned tagon officials “wondered if they’d have to him in.35 As a result of the lax document keep the entire area cordoned off— security, payments for the aircraft were forever.”43 withheld until the situation was cor- In fact, the area was not kept cordoned rected.36 Some officials complained that off forever but rather for several weeks. A the hearings and publicity associated with television crew investigating the site after them had led to the program being un- the Air Force departed found numerous necessarily compromised.37 aircraft fragments, the largest of which was Further publicity about the stealth about two and a half inches square. The fighter resulted when one crashed in July pieces were turned over to the Air Force, 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991 which indicated that the remaining debris licized). A short item in Aviation Week Sr was not a security threat. Aviation author Space Technology called the aircraft a Bill Sweetman, when contacted about the “Nighthawk” and listed the quantity of scraps, indicated that they were probably aircraft as approximately 50.48 unimportant.44 In his new book about the A report in the Las Vegas Sun was more F-117A. Sweetman indicates that the Air revealing, listing the accident location as a Force scattered fragments of a wrecked section of the heavily restricted nuclear F-101 Voodoo before leaving the crash proving ground. The account stated that s i t e . 45 T h i s i s mo s t l i k e l y wh a t wa s f o u n d. the fire fighters employed at the test site Several detailed articles on the stealth were not permitted to respond to the fighter appeared in the popular media crash. Official statements were vague, as shortly after the accident. These pieces they were in previous accidents involving were more detailed and accurate than stealth aircraft. An Air Force spokesman many previous reports published in either would only indicate that the crash was the technical or popular media and re- under investigation and would not iden- vealed data that made the further con- tify the type of aircraft involved in the cealment of the program of questionable accident. The article also stated that the utility. crash occurred during Red Flag exercises On 22 August 1986 the Washington but did not list a source for this Post, quoting "informed defense sources,” information.49 wrote that approximately 50 aircraft were Scarcely a month later, the stealth operational and combat-ready and listed fighter was back in the media, this time the cost of the program as $7 billion. (Offi- from a peripheral perspective. An A-7D cial figures eventually released specified Corsair crashed into a hotel in Indi- the cost at $6.56 billion.) The report also anapolis, Indiana, killing 10 people. Media specified that the F-19 designation was curiosity arose when it was discovered incorrect and described the aircraft’s shape that the pilot of the A-7, Maj Bruce Tea- as “ ‘ugly’ because of its bulging, nontradi- garden, was assigned to the 4450th Tacti- tional shape.” The article also discussed cal Training Group—the same unit that the the operation of stealth technology as well pilot of the 1986 Bakersfield crash had as basing arrangements of the aircraft.46 been assigned to. The report indicated that The following day, the Sacramento Bee the unit probably did something unusual, ran an article that described facilities at as it operated the only remaining A-7Ds in Tonopah, Nevada, where the F-117As the active forces.50 were based. Operations at the base were This information led to a wealth of spec- divulged, including the daily transfer of ulation. much of it accurate. Theories put technicians from Nellis Air Force Base. An forth by various experts based on the infor- account from a civilian pilot flying a mation indicated that the A-7s were being restored P-51 Mustang who mistakenly used to sharpen daytime attack flying landed at the base and was interrogated at skills since the stealth aircraft were only length was published, as was a report by a flown at night to avoid detection. It was charter pilot who intruded on the re- also suggested that the A-7s could be mod- stricted airspace and was intercepted by ified to carry some stealth avionics either an armed OV-10. which escorted him out in the existing aircraft or externally. (It is of the area.47 now known that the A-7s were not modi- In October 1987 another stealth fighter fied in any way.)51 Other analysts the- crashed, this time at Nellis. Because the orized that the A-7s were used as Soviet accident occurred inside military territory, interceptor aircraft against which the the extreme security measures that had stealth aircraft flew practice missions. The called attention to the crash the previous article carried one grossly inaccurate fig- year were not needed (this could be a rea- ure: the stealth fighters were specified as son for the later crash not being as pub- costing $150 million each.52 CRACKS IN THE BLACK DIKE 27

The photograph was run on the front The F-1 1 7A Moves page of nearly every major newspaper the Out of the Black following day and astounded most people in that the aircraft was not configured Little more was written about the stealth as most of the conjectural drawings had fighter prior to its official unveiling in late indicated. Apart from the configuration, 1988. Hints of the aircraft being de- however, the official announcement was classified began circulating in October of a disappointment. It gave little new that year. With the stealthy B-2 and the information. ATF programs about to come under some Perhaps the story was most anticlimactic public scrutiny, the incentive to continue in Tonopah where the F-117As were to invest great amounts of effort and fund- based. The front page of the Tonopah ing to keep the stealth fighter under wraps Times-Bonanzci proclaimed, “Surprise, was lessening. surprise—it exists.”51’ In mid-October, various news services While many of the media reports on the announced that the Pentagon was about to F-117A's unveiling were virtually identi- reveal some information about the fighter, cal due to the limited amount of informa- only to be contradicted bv official sources tion released, some reports included who indicated that there were no plans to unofficial information obtained by other release any information for "the foresee- sources. U.S. News fr World Report, for able future.” Reports also indicated that example, ran an accurate account of the consideration was being given to revealing unveiling, but also included accounts of the program by Pentagon sources rather security measures taken to ensure secrecy. than in upcoming court cases involving The article also claimed that the F-117A Lockheed employees who alleged that they had been flown near the Soviet border had suffered injury while working on the undetected and that the Joint Chiefs aircraft.53 decided not to use the aircraft in the 1986 Perhaps the main reason for the delay in Libyan air strike for fear of the enemy releasing information was the concern that gaining information about it.57 doing so would be seen as a political ploy. The article in the 14 November 1988 Conceivably recalling the uproar caused in edition of Aviation Week fr Space Tech- the 1980 election, members of the Senate nology included more analysis than most Armed Services Committee requested that other accounts. The standard information the release of information be delayed until from the release was provided, along with after the November election. The delay technical explanations about the unique was also used to assess the potential stealth-faceting contouring. Estimated effects on arms negotiations and to brief dimensions were also provided.58 US allies.54 The indistinct nature of the single The official unveiling finally happened released photograph of the F-117A pro- on 10 November 1988. A single vague and duced some interesting conjectural draw- hazy photograph of the aircraft was re- ings of the aircraft. Even Jane’s All the leased. along with various details on the World's Aircraft, known for its accuracy program including the aircraft’s correct even in speculation, fashioned a rendition designation. Quantities of the F-117As in that was incorrect. The F-117A pictured in service and on order were given, and acci- a two-view drawing is compressed in dents involving the aircraft, most of which length, being only slightly longer than the had been reported widely in the media aircraft’s wing span. The result is a squat, over the years with considerable detail and stubby airframe supported by a brawny accuracy, were briefly listed. No informa- landing gear. Curiously, however, the tion was given, however, about the air- shape of the gear doors shown in this craft's measurements, performance, or drawing are correct but were not shown in cost.55 the initially released photograph.59 Either 28 AIRPOYVER JOURNAL FALL 1991 the individual who prepared the drawing various answers depending on which pres- made an intelligent guess or had access to idential administration is examined. some information not officially released. As discussed previously, the amount of With the F-117A now flying during the information considered acceptable for day, stealth buffs and aviation photogra- public consumption by the Carter admin- phers started making trips to Tonopah istration was considerably greater than hoping to see the famed aircraft. Some suc- that released by the Reagan administra- ceeded. and in several cases their photo- tion. Given the fact that the Carter admin- graphs were published in such publi- istration announced the existence of cations as Aviation Week fr Space stealth programs that the Reagan admin- Technology and fane's Defence Weekly. In istration kept silent, reports published most cases the photos were taken from about the F-117A over the years that did quite a distance and often showed only the not reveal sensitive aspects of the aircraft’s aircraft’s underside. Most of the photos operations or construction would likely were blurred bv distance. have been deemed acceptable by that As the B-2 project began to encounter administration’s standards. In fact, some cost difficulties and was being thrust into believe that the F-117A would have been the spotlight in attempts to gather public revealed to the public much sooner had support, there were fewer and fewer rea- Carter been reelected.62 Under these stand- sons to keep the F-117A secluded. In early ards, then, the classification program can April 1990. the Air Force revealed a great be considered a success. deal more about the aircraft, including The evaluation of the secrecy of the pro- costs, dimensions, detailed color photo- gram is very different if viewed from the graphs, and motion picture footage. Avia- stance of the Reagan administration. As tion Week fr Space Technology ran a one author points out, the stealth fighter highly detailed and technical article ex- became a classic example of the more con- plaining the aircraft's history, workings, servative approach of the administration: and operations.60 when in doubt, classify: if doubt remains, Despite these revelations and the air- upgrade the classification.63 craft’s popularity at air shows, a fair If the goal of the administration was degree of secrecy still shrouds the plane. indeed to keep the aircraft’s very existence Crews of KC-135Qs refueling F-117As on completely secret, the classification pro- the first stage of their journeys to the Mid- gram failed. By the tight standards applied dle East during Operation Desert Shield to the program, each and every one of the were not given refueling data on the reports discussed earlier in this article was airplane.61 damaging. But was the objective to keep the aircraft completely secret? Given the degree of publicity surrounding the program before Did the Classification the Reagan administration clamped down on the subject, along with the continued Scheme Succeed? reports in the technical media made by With all the publicity given to the experts in the field as well as the diffi- stealth fighter over the years, can it be said culties with missing documentation of the that attempts to keep the aircraft’s exis- aircraft, it seems unlikely that the objec- tence secret succeeded? The exact objec- tive was to keep the project completely tives for keeping the program secret have hidden. Instead, it seems probable that the never been publicly stated. In theory, suc- intention was to keep the quantity and cess would mean keeping data that could depth of information revealed to minimal have been used to counter or duplicate the levels. A lack of official information on the F-117A secret, but what type of informa- aircraft also gave additional credence to tion would that be? That question has rumors and reports of questionable ac- CRACKS IN THE BLACK DIKE 29 curacy that would have been discounted budget. In 1981 black programs made up .5 in the face of authoritative data. If viewed percent of the defense budget; by 1988 this from this perspective, the world was number had risen to 7.3 percent.65 There indeed kept guessing about the aircraft. seems to be little agreement on a balancing For every accurate report about the stealth point between secrecy needed for national fighter published, several inaccurate ones security and disclosure needed for public were produced, although seldom were any accountability. completely inaccurate. (This trend con- tinues today despite the declassification of the program.) The wild card variable in this analysis is Did Published Reports on the Soviet intelligence community. Given the Stealth Fighter the thoroughness with which that machine Compromise Its penetrated other black programs (most notably the Rhyolite reconnaissance satel- Operational Capability? lite program), combined with the fact that Did all of the articles and books pub- many documents on the F-117A program lished about stealth technology over the disappeared, suggests that the Soviets may years enable potential adversaries to inter- have learned a great deal about the aircraft fere with the aircraft or copy it? This is despite the extreme security measures doubtful for many reasons. which surrounded it. One of the primary features of stealth Security concerns regarding the stealth aircraft is their shape; configuration of the fighter are not limited to the Soviet Union, aircraft’s surfaces determines the degree however, as recent events in the Middle and direction of radar reflectivity. Know- East have demonstrated. The tight security ing a stealth aircraft’s shape can assist in measures may not have kept the Soviets detecting it.66 Until the official unveiling from learning about the aircraft, but other of the F-117A in November 1988, no accu- potential adversaries may well have been rate rendering had ever been published, kept in the dark about the aircraft and how although some accounts had indicated that to defeat it. the aircraft was not a curved, blended There are other dimensions to the classi- design as most reports had made it out to fication equation; these are not matters of be. The closest guess came from yet national security but of domestic politics. another Testors model kit, this time of a Details of black programs like the F-117A hypothetical Soviet stealth fighter, the are known only to select officials, thus MiG-37, The kit marked the first public making the projects less prone to political release of a faceted stealth design.67 The criticism and cancellation. Some critics precise configuration of the faceting of the have charged that the number of black pro- F-117A. which had to be known in order grams under the Reagan administration to compute even a rough estimate of an was excessive and that the motivations for aircraft’s radar cross section, was never making them black were to hide them from revealed. There is little evidence to sup- political rather than military adversaries. port that even the release of that informa- In 1982 Sen Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) tion would cause any real harm to the headed an effort to bring more details of program. The US Air Force gave some of black programs, particularly costs, more its analysts, who did not have any knowl- into the open. Citing the problems with edge about the F-117A other than what the B-l's integration into operational sta- had been revealed in the media, plan tus. Senator Boxer indicated that better views of the aircraft and asked them to track needed to be kept of programs like compute an estimate of its radar cross sec- the F-117A.M This position was bolstered tion. The resulting estimates were far by a potential alarming increase in the higher than the actual figure, and the con- number of black programs in the defense clusion was that the revelation of the air- 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

craft’s basic configuration would not cause craft would be vulnerable to detection in any significant harm.68 the frequency of its onboard radar, if an The external shape of the aircraft is only adversary knew what that frequency was.69 the beginning of the list of stealth features Again, no official report has been released on the F-117A. Most reports on the air- as to what type of radar, if any, the F-117A craft. especially those of the popular is equipped with. media, emphasized only external config- If there is a threat of an adversary uration radar stealth features and ignored obtaining information about RAM, it is other aspects such as internal and external probably not from stealth aircraft pro- RAM and other low-observable tech- grams. Information on RAM was and is nologies in areas such as visual and in- available from a variety of sources other frared masking. than stealth aircraft, if anyone chooses to Radar signals bounce not only off the research the subject. One example of RAM aircraft’s surface skin but also off internal is manufactured by Rockwell Interna- structures, most notably engine compo- tional. Known as radar interference ghost nents. Reports published over the years eliminator (RIGEL), the material is used at occasionally mentioned these problems airports to cover structures that cause clut- and listed various means of solving them ter on radar screens.70 In Japan, bridges by using a variety of techniques and mate- were coated with a ferrite-based RAM rials. None, however, described how the paint that allows operators on ships to interior of the stealth fighter is actually detect other vessels in the water without configured. the interference the bridge structures A variety of RAM is available to reduce would cause.71 radar signature, including such materials As already stated, little or nothing was as Fibaloy, Kelvar 49, and Spectra-100 to ever published about thermal stealth tech- name a few. No definite reports of which nology. There was a great deal of informa- of any these are used in the F-117A were tion on the technology available (RAM, for published. Without knowing which mate- example) from sources not related to rials are used, an adversary would not stealth projects. Infrared masking and know which radar frequencies the F-117A reduction systems, which come in a vari- is vulnerable to (if any) and therefore ety of forms, have been available and in would be restricted in attempts to counter service for a number of years on a variety the aircraft. To have the best chance of of aircraft including helicopters and fixed- countering such technology, an adversary wing. would have to make an attempt to cover The greatest heat signature of an aircraft every possibility, an exercise that would is created by its power plant. This can be be a massive and expensive undertaking. reduced by covering the engines in special In addition, the composition of subsequent material and by cooling the exhaust plume stealth aircraft (which includes virtually of the airplane. all future fighter and bomber types) will Substances used for encasing engines to probably differ considerably in types and reduce their heat signature include a vari- quantities of RAM used, which will give ety of ceramics and carbon-carbon similar them different characteristics. to that used on the space shuttle's exterior Another radar reflectivity problem of a as thermal shielding. Many of these are stealth aircraft is its onboard radar dish. also RAM.72 No definite reports on which The dish is by its nature a good reflector of substances are used or how they are ar- radar energy and therefore greatly in- ranged in the F-117A have been published. creases the stealth fighter’s radar cross sec- Masking engine exhaust can also be ac- tion. One solution to this problem would complished with a variety of techniques. be to construct a radome transparent only Primary methods involve using bypass air to the stealth fighter’s radar frequency. The to cool down the hot airflow from the weakness of this solution is that the air- engines. The resulting mixture is cool CRACKS IN THE BLACK DIKE 31

enough to make acquisition by sensors adversary to counter or duplicate them. sensitive to the infrared (IR) range a diffi- The most damaging information re- cult prospect. This system is used on a vealed for military purposes gave the variety of aircraft. Another system uses a quantity of planes produced and alerted series of baffles to cool the exhaust.73 A the Soviets that the United States had a more recent development is the use of 2-D weapon against which they had no ade- nozzles to mask the plume.74 Some reports quate defense. Given the fact that stealth erroneously indicated that this system was technology was being extensively re- in use on the stealth fighter. Full details of searched for decades before the F-117A the exhaust system used on the F-117A flew, this is information they likely al- have still not been revealed, but the sys- ready had, and their intelligence services tem appears to use vanes in the exhaust may have very well obtained more. While nozzles to disperse the exhaust quickly exact details have yet to be published, pre- over a wide area.75 None of the published liminary results have indicated that the reports have ever indicated what the air- F-117A performed superbly in Operation craft’s exhaust characteristic would be. An Desert Storm against formidable air de- adversary would then have to estimate this fenses of an enemy who was fully aware of value to optimize his chances of detecting the aircraft’s existence, deployment, con- the aircraft. figuration, and capabilities. A thorough infrared masking would have to be undertaken to dampen the air- craft's overall thermal signature as well. The Price of Keeping One possible method of accomplishing this would be to use a “closed-loop” cool- the Program Secret ing system, which would divert excess The cost of keeping the F-117A a com- heat to various segments of the aircraft plete secret for nearly a decade must have where it could be bled off harmlessly. The been enormous in both human and finan- SR-71 is said to have dissipated heat into cial dimensions. The entire facility at its fuel to accomplish this.76 To date, no Tonopah, Nevada, where the F-117As are incontrovertible reports that the stealth based until they are scheduled to be fighter is equipped with such a system moved in 1992, was constructed for the have been published. stealth fighter program. Until the F-117As In summation, none of the published arrived, the only buildings there were reports on the aircraft seem to have com- those of an old World War II training facil- promised its operational capability. Popu- ity.77 Great expense was also incurred lar reports emphasized concepts as con- when Lockheed personnel commuted figuration, quantity, cost, and the basics of daily to the facility from the company’s the stealth fighter mission but did not dis- plant in Burbank. California.78 These are cuss any of the technical details an adver- but a few of the types of expenses involved sary would need to detect or duplicate the in keeping a major program under wraps. aircraft. Reports in the technical media The extreme secrecy of the program had went further than those in the popular human costs as well. To keep the number media, but even these were largely spec- of personnel assigned to the F-117A units ulator and often contradictory. At best as small as possible, pilots were made to these reports gave clues as to the types of carry out functions that otherwise would technologies that might have been incor- have been handled by a separate staff. This porated into the aircraft. Photographs have was likely a leading cause of fatigue revealed the F-117A's true appearance— among pilots flying the aircraft, which led one of its key stealth features—but nearly to accidents that otherwise might have all of the aircraft’s other stealth features been avoided. Additional contributing fac- are internal and would require extensive tors to fatigue and accidents included examination and analysis to enable an radio silence orders and the constraint of 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

flying the aircraft only during night hours from flying the types of missions it was to avoid detection.79 One report by a designed to accomplish. If the very exis- retired Air Force general indicates that the tence of the aircraft is to be protected at pilots of F-117As were all but ordered to the expense of using it, what is the pur- die with their aircraft if it became neces- pose for having such a weapon? The fear sary to come down in any unsecured loca- of the Soviets obtaining information from a tion: “If you can’t bring it home, then you downed stealth aircraft has been dis- auger it in...even if you have to go in with counted by the Air Force itself, which has it.”8° pilots flying in Red Flag exercises at indicated that the Soviets would learn nearby Nellis were supposed to have been ‘“near zero’ about how to counter stealth “ forced down” if they got too close to a by poring over a captured U.S. plane.”83 stealth aircraft and refused orders to move The missing documents on the F-117A away.81 that disappeared may have done more Secrecy restrictions had implications on damage than this. the operational aspects of the aircraft as The secrecy surrounding the F-117A well. In 1986 the United States executed appears to have been more of a philosophi- an air strike on Libya, a mission for which cal than practical decision. Military bene- the F-117A would have been ideal. The fits of keeping the program highly reason the airplane was not used in that classified were outweighed by costs in operation, reports indicate, was concern some areas. As one writer has noted, the by the Joint Chiefs that the classified classification is partly a matter of military aspects of the aircraft might have been tradition and a tradition in the highly suc- revealed whether or not any were shot cessful management style practiced at the down. Furthermore, using them in the raid Lockheed “skunk works” where the air- would have made denial of their existence craft was designed, developed, and pro- more difficult. Similar concerns canceled duced in record time.84 The heavy their use in a planned but unexecuted classification also protected the aircraft strike on Syria in 1983 and perhaps other from political fighting, which might have missions.82 killed this successful program. Costs involved with the F-117A were so high that the number of aircraft ordered had to The Doctrine of Secrecy be diminished from 100 to only 59.85 Gen- eral knowledge of this would have at- and the F-1 1 7A tracted political opponents like a magnet, Were security restrictions of this magni- and much unfounded criticism from unin- tude necessary to keep the aircraft’s suc- formed individuals would have resulted. cessful operations from being com- More recently the Navy’s A-12 attack promised or to keep the Soviets from aircraft program has provided an example copying the technology? There is little evi- of what excessive “blackness” of a pro- dence to support that the extreme meas- gram can do. Shortly after Secretary of ures taken were required. As has already Defense Richard (“Dick”) Cheney been discussed, most key stealth tech- announced that the program was on nologies cannot be revealed without course, contractors revealed that the pro- knowledge of the aircraft’s interior compo- gram was behind schedule and over nents and configuration. Operating the air- budget.86 Accusations were exchanged craft during daylight hours would not have between government, military, and con- compromised any of these systems, nor tractor personnel in placing blame, but, would have conducting operations at due to the program’s “black-’ nature, such Tonopah in a more open fashion. accusations were difficult to prove or dis- The holding back of the F-117A in the prove. In short, the extravagant classifica- Libya raid suggests that the degree of tion measures eroded accountability. secrecy assigned to the aircraft impeded it To prevent this and other problems from Tear Out and Remove '.v Miller."Advanced TacticalFighter Studies i. 43. i. sckheed California Co. Is Developing a Small aSmall Is Co.Developing California sckheed tagon Unveils Lockheed Stealth Fighter." Defense Fighter." UnveilsLockheed tagon Stealth : 60 19. Aircraft. Jlman. Stealth Sweetman. Sweetman. ;rnational. 1986). 14 1986). ;rnational. November 1988. 66. November 1988. jliller. jliller. ;>e Summit.Pa.: 1. TabBooks. 1989). Inc.. •fax.3.1990). Inc.. ‘ Richardson. ‘ Richardson. >.es. Stealth Technolog}':The Art llogies could be kept secret. The The llogiesbe keptsecret. could gies," Aviation Week & Space Technology. 2 Week Technology. gies," & Aviation Space •aled as such aspects while special nd very generalinformation would fighter wouldhavean been ex- •cts thatdo not need tobe corn- 76, 11 tion Week :be questionsshouldinaddressed " politicalconsiderations. The fol- tended to Demonstrate Stealth, or Low Signature Low or Signature Stealth, to Demonstrate tended ; the to determine be help developed lat information would allow poten- delines: 1 loing guidelines programs, future in s of the systemsinvolved? herwise) outweigh the benefits outweigh herwise) the benefits versaries toduplicate the tech- din keeping the program black? n to be compromised to the degreeto the n to be compromised iat informationwould cause the what point would costs(financial would be jeopardized? a "gray” statusin their which exis- of classification requiredindepen- of classification hidden couldthen be allowedto ability toitsaccomplishpurpose/ Detach one of these cards, fill it out, and mail it along with a check, a with it along mail and itfill out, cards, of these one Detach Lockheed & Stealth ■ Space Stealth F-117 Stealth Fighter (Arlington, Aircraft (Osceola, Wis.: Motor- Wis.: (Osceola, Aircraft Technology', Want a Subscription to the the to a Subscription Want (New York: Orion Books. Orion York: (New 19 January1976, of Black Airpower Journal? ~ll Visa, or Number Mastercard to: Washington, DCWashington, 20402 Superintendent ofDocuments US Government PrintingOffice US Government Magic Thew F-117A both and opponents ofproponents secret The The aircraftis still ahighly sensitive topic, tially dangeroustially programs run unchecked. poten- and dangerthe ofexpensive letting and otherswill claim that it demonstrates speaks well for justifying military secrets, conceivably claim that this ambiguity aspects of this articlewill doubtlessly take scheme of this type. cellent candidatefor aclassification programs. programs. about thestealth fighter over the yearshas Much ofconclusions. what was written from well-respected sources, are often programon theresearch and conducting is story on the willbe F-117A fully known. their place with observersSome them.will June 1991 issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology (p. Technology Week & Space of Aviation issue 1991 June proven andto inyears be future erroneous, result,it is difficult to drawany definitive highlyAs and speculatory acontradictory. difficult.Reports and evenaccounts, those 20) about a Northrop tactical reconnaissance stealth aircraft, aircraft, stealth reconnaissance abouta20) Northrop tactical 10 in the wentto there published press, were reports article the TR-3A. which is believed to have first flown in 1981. The tois 1981. have in believed which flown the first TR-3A. (Osceola. Wis.:Motorbooks As1990), 27. International. this Aviation Week 6- Space Technology,1 June 18, 1981. 22. "Unveiling a Ghost Newsweek,Plane." 1 September1980, Aviation Week Aviation 7. 30, Print Committee 23. tion, 2. Information—Stealth Information—Stealth 23. Bill Sweetman and Bill Sweetman 23. James Goodall. Near." Choices A. Clarence Robinson.Jr.,"Bomber 22. Lindsay, ). and J.John Cook, William Beck. Melinda 21. 20. Ibid.. 20. 6. 19. Ibid. 18. Ibid.. 4. 16. "Carter Clarifies Position on Stealth Aircraft Leaks," Leaks," Aircraft Stealth on Position Clarifies "Carter 16. 17. House. Leaks of Itbewillsome time before the entire ~ O. CRACKS IN THE BLACK DIKE (r Space Technology, 15Space 1980. 23. September □ ill become ill become a case cited by Aircraft. Classified National /\ ( F )r tr ti ti • tr )r F ( /\ 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1981, 1981, sess., 2d Cong., 96th r /-vn+n rw Defense Informa- Defense Lockheed F-117Lockheed A 33

32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991 flying the aircraft only during night hours from flying the types of missions to avoid detection.79 One report by a designed to accomplish. If the ve: retired Air Force general indicates that the tence of the aircraft is to be prote pilots of F-117As were all but ordered to the expense of using it, what is t die with their aircraft if it became neces- pose for having such a weapon? 1 sary to come down in any unsecured loca- of the Soviets obtaining informatior tion: ‘‘If you can’t bring it home, then you downed stealth aircraft has be* auger it in...even if you have to go in with counted by the Air Force itself, wb it.”8o pilots flying in Red Flag exercises at indicated that the Soviets wouL nearby Nellis were supposed to have been “‘near zero’ about how to counter “forced down’’ if they got too close to a by poring over a captured U.S. pi stealth aircraft and refused orders to move The missing documents on the ) away.81 that disappeared may have don Secrecy restrictions had implications on damage than this. the operational aspects of the aircraft as The secrecy surrounding the '• well. In 1986 the United States executed appears to have been more of a phil an air strike on Libya, a mission for which cal than practical decision. Militar the F-117A would have been ideal. The fits of keeping the program reason the airplane was not used in that classified were outweighed by c operation, reports indicate, was concern some areas. As one writer has no’ by the Joint Chiefs that the classified classification is partly a matter of . aspects of the aircraft might have been tradition and a tradition in the higJ revealed whether or not any were shot cessful management style practice' down. Furthermore, using them in the raid Lockheed “skunk works" where would have made denial of their existence craft was designed, developed, a more difficult. Similar concerns canceled duced in record time.84 The their use in a planned but unexecuted classification also protected the strike on Syria in 1983 and perhaps other from political fighting, which mig missions.82 killed this successful program involved with the F-117A were • that the number of aircraft ordered The Doctrine of Secrecy be diminished from 100 to only 59 eral knowledge of this would h and the F-11 7A traded political opponents like a Were security restrictions of this magni- and much unfounded criticism fro! tude necessary to keep the aircraft’s suc- formed individuals would have res cessful operations from being com- More recently the Navy’s A-12 promised or to keep the Soviets from aircraft program has provided an e copying the technology? There is little evi- of what excessive “blackness" o: dence to support that the extreme meas- gram can do. Shortly after Secrt ures taken were required. As has already Defense Richard (“Dick” ) ( been discussed, most key stealth tech- announced that the program \ ' • - t. L — —■ - . J • _____ 1. J a 1. t CRACKS IN THE BLACK DIKE 33

developing in future programs, guidelines cellent candidate for a classification should be developed to help determine the scheme of this type. degree of classification required indepen- It will be some time before the entire dent of political considerations. The fol- story on the F-117A will be fully known. lowing questions should be addressed in The aircraft is still a highly sensitive topic, the guidelines: and conducting research on the program is difficult. Reports and accounts, even those • What information would cause the from well-respected sources, are often program to be compromised to the degree highly speculatory and contradictory. As a that its ability to accomplish its purpose/ mission would be jeopardized? result, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions. Much of what was written • What information would allow poten- about the stealth fighter over the years has tial adversaries to duplicate the tech- proven to be erroneous, and in future years nologies of the systems involved? aspects of this article will doubtlessly take • At what point would costs (financial their place with them. Some observers will and otherwise) outweigh the benefits conceivably claim that this ambiguity involved in keeping the program black? speaks well for justifying military secrets, Projects that do not need to be com- and others will claim that it demonstrates pletely hidden could then be allowed to the danger of letting expensive and poten- exist in a “gray” status in which their exis- tially dangerous programs run unchecked. tence and very general information would The F-117A will become a case cited by be revealed while aspects such as special both opponents and proponents of secret technologies could be kept secret. The programs. □ stealth fighter would have been an ex-

Notes 1 J. Jones. SteaJth Technology: The Art of Black Magic Information—Stealth Aircraft. 96th Cong.. 2d sess., 1981, (Blue Ridge Summit. Pa.: Tab Books. Inc.. 1989). 1. Committee Print 30. 7. 2 Jay Miller. Lockheed F-117 Steolth Fighter (Arlington. 16. “Carter Clarifies Position on Stealth Aircraft Leaks," Tex.: Aerofax. Inc.. 1990). 3. Aviation Week Sr S p a c e T e c h n o lo g y . 15 September 1980, 23. 3. Jones. 43. 17. House. Leaks of Classified National Defense Informa­ 4. Bill Sweetman. Stealth Aircraft (Osceola. Wis.: Motor- tion, 2. books International. 1986). 14. 18. Ibid.. 4. 5 Doug Richardson. Stealth (New York: Orion Books. 19. Ibid. 1989). 44 20. Ibid.. 6. 6. Sweetman. Stealth Aircraft. 19. 21. Melinda Beck. William J. Cook, and John J. Lindsay, 7. Ibid.. 60. "Unveiling a Ghost Plane," Newsweek. 1 September 1980, 8. "Pentagon Unveils Lockheed Stealth Fighter." Defense 23. Daily. 14 November 1988. 66. 22. Clarence A. Robinson. Jr., "Bomber Choices Near.” 9 Barry Miller. “Advanced Tactical Fighter Studies Aviation Week Sr Space Technology, 1 June 1981, 18. 22. Set."Aviation Week & Space Technology'. 19 januarv 1976. 23. Bill Sweetman and James Goodall, Lockheed F-117 A 16-17. (Osceola, Wis.: Motorbooks International. 1990). 27. As this 10. "Lockheed California Co. Is Developing a Small article went to press, there were reports published in the 10 Fighter Intended to Demonstrate Stealth, or Low Signature June 1991 issue of Aviation Week Sr S p a c e Technology (p. Technologies." Aviation Week 6- Space Technology. 2 20) about a Northrop tactical reconnaissance stealth aircraft, August 1976. 11 the TR-3A. which is believed to have first flown in 1981. The 11. John W. R. Taylor, ed., fane’s All the World's Aircraft, Northrop aircraft described in this article could very well 1977-78 (London: Jane's Yearbooks, 1978), 326 have been a prototype of the TR-3A. 12. First Flight of Lockheed's New Stealth Fighter 24. Richard Halloran. "Air Force Chief Calls the Stealth a Demonstrator Being Built by the Company's Skunk Works'." 'Paper Plane Far From Reality'," New York Times, 23 July Aviation Week Sr Space Technology. 20 June 1977. 11. 1981, Al. 13. "Declassified Photos Show 'Have Blue’ F-117A Prede- 25. "Stealth Projects," Aviation Week & Space Technol­ cessor." Aviation Week Sr Space Technology. 22 April 1991. ogy. 12 October 1981. 17. 30. 26. Walter S. Mossberg, "Pentagon May Use Stealth Tech- 14. Peter C. Stuart. "Stealth—an Invisible Aircraft with nology in Several Weapons Besides Bomber." Wall Street High Political Visibility." Christian Science Monitor, 5 Sep- Journal. 17 March 1982, 6. tember 1980, 5. 27. fane’s All the World's Aircraft. 1984-85, 431. 15. House Committee on Armed Services, Investigations 28. George C. Wilson, "Air Force Plans to Hide Secret Subcommittee. Leaks of Classified National Defense Fighter." Washington Post, 21 March 1987. Al. 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

29. Ibid.. A6. 56. Quoted in Mary Hynes, "Reaction to Stealth Fighter 30. Paul Ciotti. "Tempest in a Toy Box," Los .Angeles Difficult to See in Tonopah," Las Vegas Review Journal. 11 Times Magazine. 19 October 1986. 24. November 1989. D ll-12. (Located in NewsBank [Microform|, 31. Ibid.. 27. International, 1989. 99:Dll-12, fiche.) 32. Ibid. 57. "Top of the Top Guns," U.S. News Sr World Report. 28 33. Ibid.. 26. November 1988, 25. 34. "Lockheed Lost Secret Papers, Dingell Says." Los 58. Morrocco, 29. Angeles Times. 18 June 1986, 2. 59. Jane's All the World's Aircraft. 1988-89. 435. 35. "Stealth Fighter Not Quite Invisible." Economist. 30 60. Michael Dornheim, "Fly-by-Wire Controls Key to Pure August 1986. 28. 'Stealth'," Aviation Week Sr Space Technology, 9 April 1990. 36. George C. Wilson. “50 'Stealth' Fighters in Operation," 36. Washington Post. 22 August 1986. B12. 61. Michael Dornheim, "F-117A Uses Conventional 37. Ibid. Refueling Techniques for Mideast Deployment." Aviation 38. "USAF Aircraft Destroyed in Crash Believed to Be Week Sr Space Technology. 27 August 1990. 25. Stealth Fighter." Aviation Week Sr Space Technology. 21 |uly 62. Bill Sweetman. "What You Don’t See Is What You 1986. 22. Get," Washington Post. 18 Mav 1986, Fl. 39. Ibid 63. Ibid. 40. Ibid.. 23. 64. Wilson. "Air Force Plans to Hide Secret Fighter," Al. 41. "Security Restrictions Continue at California Crash 65. Ibid. Site," Aviation Week & Space Technology. 8 July 1986, 21. 66. "USAF Defends Stealth Programs." International 42. Mark Thompson. "Fatigue, Disorientation Dog ‘Stealth- Defense Review, May 1988. 518. Fliers." St. Paul Pioneer Press-Dispatch. 4 June 1989. 67. Richardson. 22. (Located in NewsBank (Microform|. International. 1989, 68. Sweetman and Goodall, 67. 62.A7, fiche.) 69. Sweetman. Stealth Aircrajf, 57. 43. |ohn Barry. "A Top-Secret Jet Goes Down,” Newsweek, 70. James Grambart, “The Stealth Secret." The Progressive. 21 July 1986. 19. December 1980, 35. 44. David Holley. "TV Crew Finds Debris at AF Jet Crash 71. Jones. 48. Site." Los Angeles Times. 12 August 1986. 17. 72. Ibid.. 24. 45. Sweetman and Goodall. 82. 73. Ibid., 23. 46. Wilson. "50 Stealth Fighters." B12. 74. Sweetman. Stealth Aircraft, 53. 47. Ted Bell, "Stealth’s the Word for Desert Secret." Sacra- 75. Dornheim, 41. mento Bee, 23 August 1986. (Located in NewsBank (Micro- 76. Sweetman. Stealth Aircraft. 54. form], International. 1986. 79:E13. fiche.) 77. Sweetman."What You Don't See Is What You Get." Fl. 48. "Air Force Aircraft Crashes at Nellis," Av'iation Week 78. Sweetman. Stealth Aircraft. 63. Sr Space Technology, 26 October 1987, 25. 79. Thompson, A7. 49. Mary Manning. “Nellis Pilot Dies in Crash of Stealth," 80. Jones. 74. Las Vegas Sun, 16 October 1987. (Located in NewsBank 81. Sweetman and Goodall, 28. [Microform!. International. 1987, 168:C6, fiche.) 82. Jay Miller, 11. The 10 June 1991 issue of Aviation 50. David Remondini and George Stuteville. "Jet Used as a Week Sr Space Technology (p. 20) indicates that intelligence 'Test Bed' for Stealth?" Indianapolis Star. 11 November from the TR-3A during Operation Desert Storm was limited, 1987. (Located in NewsBank [Microform|, International, possibly to keep the aircraft's existence secret. 1987. 168:C7, fiche.) 83. David J. Lynch. "No Gain to Soviets from Captured 51. Jay Miller. 10. B-2,” Defense Week. 11 June 1990. 3. 52. Remondini and Stuteville. C7. 84. Sweetman, “What You Don't See Is What You Get." 53. John D. Morrocco. "USAF Unveils Stealth Fighter: Fl. Black Weapons Probe Likely.” Aviation Week Sr S p a c e Tech- 85. Wilson, "Air Force Plans to Hide Secret Fighter." A6. nology. 14 November 1988. 28. 86. John Boatman. "A-12 Overruns, Delays Revealed." 54. Ibid. Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 October 1990, 613. 55. Ibid. Summer 1991 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNERS

Capt Peter C. Bahm, USAF Capt Kenneth W. Polasek, USAF

for their article Tactical Aircraft and Airfield Recovery

Congratulations to Capts Peter C. Bahm and If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Kenneth W. Polasek for their selection as the Eaker Award, submit an article of feature Ira C. Eaker Award winners for the best eligi- length to the Airpower Journal, Walker Hall. ble article from the Summer 1991 issue of the Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. The award is for Airpower Journal. Captains Bahm and Polasek the best eligible article in each issue and is receive a $500 cash award for their contribu- open to all US military personnel below the tions to the Air Force's professional dialogue. rank of colonel or equivalent and all US gov- The award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker and is ernment civilian employees below GS-15 or made possible through the support of the equivalent. Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of Winches- ter. Massachusetts.

35 JOINT DOCTRINE PROGRESS, PROSPECTS, AND PROBLEMS

Lt Col W il l ia m F. Furr, USAF

Wi th limited forces, nearly everything that hap­ OCTRINE has been described as pen« nowadays is a joint operation. No one the “software of defense.”1 This mrvice plays a paramount role. software, as well as its related —Lord Mountbatten “hardware” (force structure), has D historically been developed along individ- ual service lines. However, as operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today’s world make the JOINT DOCTRINE 37

integration of individual service capa- Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark bilities a matter of success or failure, life legislation significantly expanded the or death. The software that binds the serv- authority and responsibility of the chair- ices together as an integrated fighting force man. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this is joint doctrine. Joint doctrine helps us expanded authority and responsibility was capitalize on the synergistic effects of the requirement for the chairman to interservice coordination and cooperation. develop “doctrine for the joint em- Joint doctrine is not a new phe- ployment of the armed forces.”10 nomenon.- However, a congressional man- One of the first actions resulting from date has given it new emphasis and im- this mandate was a change to JCS Pub 2. portance. Prior to 1986. the Joint Chiefs of This change incorporated the new Staff (JCS), while recognizing the need for authorities and responsibilities and set out joint doctrine,3 were not committed to the procedures for the development of joint development of a comprehensive body of doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and doctrine to guide the conduct of joint oper- procedures (JTTP).11 These procedures ation. The responsibilities for developing included the requirement for all joint doc- joint doctrine were unclear; there was no trine and JTTP to be approved by the standard joint doctrine development sys- chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and for tem; the combatant commands4 were not service doctrine to be consistent with joint required to participate in the development doctrine.12 DOD Directive 5100.1, Func- process; and there was no requirement for tions of the Department of Defense and Its consistency in joint, combined, and serv- Major Components, was also changed to ice doctrine.5 In fact, the JCS had require the chairman to “ develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the published no how-to-fight doctrine at joint employment of the Armed Forces” all....Instead, the JCS. in UNAAF [JCS Pub and “promulgate Joint Chiefs of Staff pub- 2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)j lications (JCS Pubs) to provide military and in their interpretation of the statute guidance for joint activities of the Armed [Title 10, United States Code], hold the Serv- ices responsible for the development of Forces.”13 essentially all operational doctrine, with To carry out these responsibilities, the provisions for coordination between the chairman created a new Joint Staff direc- Services and for referring disputes to the JCS torate (J-7, Operational Plans and Inter- for resolution.h operability) as the “focal point for interoperability with responsibility for In 1985 a Senate Armed Services Com- joint doctrine, exercises, and operational mittee staff report on the organization and plans.” 14 This new directorate included a decision-making procedures of the Depart- Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training ment of Defense (DOD) identified “poorly Division that was specifically responsible developed joint doctrine” as one of the for managing the joint doctrine program.15 nine major “symptoms of inadequate uni- Joint Pub 1-01, Joint Doctrine and Joint fied military advice.”7 This report went on Tactics. Techniques, and Procedures to say that “the joint operational effective- Development Program, ness of military forces is dependent upon the development of joint doctrine and suf- ficient joint training to be able to effec- tively employ it.”8 sets forth the principles, guidelines, and conceptual framework for initiating, validat- Armed with the findings in this staff ing, developing, coordinating, evaluating, report, numerous other studies,9 and approving, and maintaining joint doctrine intensive public hearings. Congress man- and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures dated far-reaching changes in DOD organi- (JTTP) approved by the Chairman, Joint zation and responsibilities in the Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.,R 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

Factors That Inhibit the Joint Doctrine Development Process

• A lack of consensus on the meaning of the term doctrine.

• A question as to who should write joint doctrine.

• A cumbersome coordination process that dilutes joint doctrine.

• A simultaneous development of “keystone” and “supporting” joint publications that frustrates both writers and reviewers.

• A limited distribution of joint test publications

It also describes the Joint Doctrine Publica- assigns a primary review authority to tion System shown in figure 1. This pub- research, write, and coordinate an initial lication system includes a Joint Pub 0 and final draft. Comments on the final series of “Capstone Joint Warfare Doc- draft are incorporated as appropriate, trine," which retains the Unified Action unresolved issues are identified, and a Armed Forces (UNAAF), now Joint Pub revised final draft is submitted to the lead 0-2, “to provide the basic organization and agent who attempts to resolve any remain- command and control relationships ing issues. After one last coordination with required for effective joint operations of the services and Joint Staff, the Joint Staff/ the forces of two or more Services.”17 Fol- J-7 publishes the revised final draft as a lowing traditional Joint Staff lines of test publication. Unresolved differences of responsibility as much as possible (e.g., opinion, if any, are included as an appen- the 2 series for intelligence, the 3 series for dix to the test publication.20 operations), it also includes a keystone The test publication is then subjected to manual as the first publication in each a 12-to-18-month evaluation.21 This series.18 evaluation, defined in a formally coordi- Joint doctrine is now produced in nated evaluation directive, normally accordance with a formal doctrine includes testing of the concepts and proce- development process (fig. 2) that begins dures during joint exercises and may with the submission of a project proposal include interviews and questionnaires. by one of the services, combatant com- The evaluation report, which includes rec- mands, or Joint Staff directorates. After the ommended refinements to the publication proposal is approved, a program directive if appropriate, is coordinated with the is developed and staffed for the formal services, combatant commands, and Joint approval of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on this report, the test pub- Staff.19 The designated lead agent then lication is revised, coordinated, and JOINT DOCTRINE 39

ultimately approved as formal joint doc- own degree the fact that the United States trine by the chairman, loint Chiefs of Staff. is at the same time a maritime power, an The process is designed to take 35 to 43 aerospace power and a continental months to complete. power.”25 On the surface, the process just The existence of differing service per- described appears to be a logically con- spectives leads to the second inhibiting structed, methodical approach. However, a factor of who writes joint doctrine. Since number of factors inhibit the development one of the major thrusts of the 1986 DOD process. The first of these is a fundamental Reorganization Act was a redressing of the issue of what doctrine is. The term doc- imbalance between service and joint inter- trine was first defined by the JCS in the ests, it was clearly the intent of Congress, 1968 edition of JCS Pub l,22 and that defi- although not specifically stated as such, nition has not changed as of the latest edi- for joint doctrine to be written by individ- tion. The term joint doctrine, on the other uals working in the joint arena. However, hand, was not defined until a 1984 change of the first 24 new joint doctrinal projects to JCS Pub 1, and that definition has approved by the chairman, Joint Chiefs of changed twice, albeit not in substance, Staff, 13 were assigned to one of the serv- since its introduction. In spite of these def- ices for development. Of the 52 publica- initions, some or all of the participants at tions in the Joint Pub 3 series (operations), nearly every meeting concerning joint doc- 32 were assigned to one of the services.26 trine find it necessary to discuss and With such heavy reliance on the services debate what doctrine means in terms of its to produce joint doctrine, there is a need purpose and degree of specificity before for some method to ensure that the writing they can proceed with the task at hand. process reflects a joint perspective. After Complicating these debates are various all, service perspectives are shaped by opinions concerning the difference service doctrine, which “stems from the between joint doctrine and joint tactics, particular logic and experience of the techniques, and procedures. thinkers and policy setters of that Service To some people, doctrine consists of and from their interpretation of the theory broad principles that reflect “the way in and experience of war.”27 However, there which the organization and its members is no requirement for joint education or ex- think and respond to events.”23 To others, perience as a prerequisite for writing joint doctrine tells them specifically how to doctrine. In addition, neither the services fight.24 As a result of these different expec- nor the combatant commands were pro- tations, doctrine is viewed as either too vided any additional resources to produce specific and limits options or too general the assigned doctrine. As a result, the and says nothing useful. Because of this assignment of joint doctrine writing re- lack of mutual understanding, the process sponsibilities, which often become an has produced such vastly different docu- additional duty, is based on personnel ments, in terms of level of detail and over- availability instead of experience and abil- all thrust, as the Air Force-developed, 38- ity. The poor quality of many of the initial page final draft of Joint Pub 3-03, Doctrine drafts produced so far reflects this for Joint Interdiction Operations, and the situation. Navy-developed, 456-page initial draft of The third inhibiting factor, closely Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphib- related to the issue of who writes it, is the ious Operations. While the Joint Staff/J-7 coordination process. The 1985 Senate has attempted to come to grips with this Staff Report on DOD Organization cited issue, different perspectives persist. This “Service logrolling” and the “cumbersome is because the individuals who participate staffing process” as resulting in products in the process are products of their service, “that have been ‘watered down’ to the and the services are a diverse lot, “none lowest common level of assent.”28 While clearly predominant, each reflecting to its the current doctrinal development process J- I NAc2MISS?* i o AIRPOVVER JOURNAL FALL 1991 FALL JOURNAL AIRPOVVER g UNAA* %, IL s JI

IIIIU IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII llllllllllllllllll : aOtUK5CNCC = opcr/HONS lO G fSTIC S : z -0 4-0 i 'vr 11111111111,U lllllllll U LUUiiiinnm i

= CAWa'AXiN = Planning = imriinnniiiiiirr1-00 ! jif planning V-O02

AOMNi INTELi OPNSi i LOG PLANSr SYSTEMS

(Join! Ad/ninfatrativa PubBead on S y i!*m )

(O rganization and Functions of *>a Jo in ! C hfafs of Staff)

(Jo in! Offlear M anagamant)

Source: Joint Publication 1-01, Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 15 April 1988). V-2. Figure 1. The Joint Publication System JOINT DOCTRINE 41

provides for “Service differences of opin- which were developed simultaneously ion” and makes the chairman of the Joint with the development of the keystone pub- Chiefs of Staff the final approval lication. While the Joint Staff/J-7 has authority.29 the emphasis is on the resolu- attempted to manage this situation, simul- tion of issues before they reach that level. taneous development has presented frus- In addition, not all of the players have an trating challenges to both the writers and equal voice in each step of the process. the reviewers of these publications. The emphasis on issue resolution occurs The timing of the draft publications has at two levels. First, draft publications have also created a significant work load for the to be coordinated and approved for release reviewers. The Joint Staff/J-7 has by the writer’s bureaucracy, which may attempted to spread out this work load by not include anyone with joint experience staggering the completion dates of the ini- or perspective. If this bureaucracy is one of tial and final drafts. However, this the services, coordination and approval approach has had limited success. A are filtered through that service’s doctrinal March 1989 General Accounting Office perspectives tempered by a reluctance at report found some combatant commands each level to admit an inability (failure) to were not able to meet joint doctrine solve unresolved issues. This same reluc- development and coordinating require- tance occurs even when a service is not ments with their existing staffs.32 The far- responsible and is reinforced by the pro- reaching effects of joint doctrine demand a cess itself, which requires the lead agent to rigorous, in-depth examination of the con- “make every attempt to resolve any re- cepts and procedures being proposed. maining outstanding issues.”30 While the Such an examination takes time, and, if lead agent and the Joint Staff are attempt- the services and combatant commands do ing to resolve issues, not all of the players not have the time to devote to this critical are given an equal voice. After the revised examination, the result will likely be inap- final draft is released by the lead agent to propriate or inadequate joint doctrine. the Joint Staff J-7, the subsequent coordi- The final inhibiting factor is the limited nation does not include formal combatant distribution of the test publications. Joint command participation. As was the case test publications are not distributed with Joint Test Pub 3-0. Doctrine for Uni- through the formal joint and service pub- fied and Joint Operations, this procedure lication distribution systems. Instead, Joint can result in significant changes being Pub 1-01 states, “Normally, 10 copies will made without anyone outside of the Pen- be sent to each combatant command and tagon seeing them until the test publica- Service and 15 copies to the evaluation tion is received. agency.”33 Further distribution is deter- The fourth inhibiting factor is the timing mined by the service and combatant com- of the development process. As would be mand. As a result, the distribution of test expected, the first 11 top priority develop- publications is at best a haphazard process ment projects included the five “keystone” that does not ensure the widest possible publications. Each of the series (except the exposure for these documents. For exam- 0 and 1 series) begins with a keystone pub- ple, copies of all the test publications were lication that constitutes the doctrinal foun- not available at Air University Library dation of the series.31 Therefore, the until October 1990, and an admittedly development of supporting publications in unscientific sampling of Air University a series would ideally wait until the key- students revealed most had never seen a stone publication is approved, at least as a joint test publication.34 Such limited dis- test publication. However, this has not tribution does not promote the vital dis- been the case. Also included in these 11 cussion and debate necessary to ensure projects w'ere three Joint Pub 3 series joint doctrine is valid and reflects the best (operations) projects (low-intensity con- possible wisdom and inspiration needed flict. special operations, and interdiction). to prepare for the challenges of the future. 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

PROCESS INITIATE INITIATE DISTRIBUTE DISTRIBUTE TO PUBLISH FINAL PROGRAM INITIAL DRAFT FINAL DRAFT AS TEST COORDINATION DIRECTIVE FOR COMMENT FOR COMMENT PUBLICATION PROCESS

J-7 PUBLISH COMMENTS COMMENTS PUBLISHES PROGRAM FINAL DUE ON DUE ON AS TEST CJCS DIRECTIVE INITIAL DRAFT FINAL DRAFT PUBLICATION APPROVAL

2M0S. | 5-7 MONTHS 3M0S. | 2M0S. 3MOS. | 2M0S 3MOS. | 12-10 MONTHS 3M0S f DEVELOP INITIAL DRAFT f DEVELOP FINAL DRAFT ^ ♦ AN OUTLINE MAY HAVE TO BE A WORKING CONFERENCE EVALUATION DEVELOPED AND STAFFED MAY HAVE TO BE CON­ AND AN INITIAL WORKING DUCTED TO RESOLVE OUT­ CONFERENCE CONDUCTED STANDING ISSUES DURING DURING THIS STEP. THIS STEP.

Source: Joint Publication 1-01. Figure 2. Steps in Developing a New Joint Doctrine Publication

In spite of the inhibiting factors dis- Development of Aerospace Doctrine, are a cussed above, the joint doctrine process step in the right direction, but only if the has taken on a life of its own and con- thinking about and development of these tinues to spew forth ever-increasing vol- doctrines do not wait for the related joint umes of material on subjects ranging from doctrine to be published. The new docu- nuclear operations to religious support. It mented approach to Air Force basic doc- is unlikely that the process can or will be trine being developed by the Air significantly changed in the near future. University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, However, there are a number of things that Research, and Education is also a step in can be done to improve the quality of the the right direction. doctrine being produced. Another positive contribution could be Probably the most significant positive made by using the experience and exper- contribution that can be made is to ensure tise of Air War College and Air Command that Air Force inputs are based on a solid and Staff College students to evaluate joint foundation of well thought-out air power doctrine drafts or, if time does not permit, doctrine. Yes, the UNAAF does require to at least evaluate the test publications. service doctrine to be consistent with joint This is not a totally original idea. Air Uni- doctrine, but this occurs only after the versity students have a long history of par- applicable joint doctrine is formally ticipating in the development and approved by the chairman, Joint Chiefs of critiquing of concepts and doctrine.35 The Staff. While joint doctrine is being written benefits of such an approach are manifold. and while the test publications are being The development process benefits from evaluated, the Air Force needs to actively the rigorous practical and intellectual cri- examine and update, if necessary, related tique that can be produced by professional air power doctrine. The Air Force should military education (PME) students. The not wait for joint doctrine to point the students themselves benefit through the way. The new Air Force basic, operational, insights and internalizing that occur as a and functional doctrines specified by AFR result of producing such a critique. 1-2, Assignment of Responsibilities for |Finally, the PME institutions benefit as a JOINT DOCTRINE 43 result of enhanced student perceptions process. This approach has been used by regarding the relevance of the curriculum the Army-Air Force Center for Low Inten- and their contribution to real-world sity Conflict, which has hosted “outlining problems. conferences” and has actively solicited A final positive cont ri but i on coul d be inputs in developing JTTPs for foreign realized if the writing of joint doctrine internal defense and for peacekeeping. If were done with more broad-based par- each potential participant devotes the ticipation. The organizations responsible required time and effort, the result can for the actual writing should actively seek only be a more coherent, comprehensive, inputs from and participation by each of and useful product. the services and combatant commands Joint doctrine is here to stay, and “the early in the conceptualization and writing filling of the joint doctrinal void will be an iterative process with lots of feedback among strategy, roles, missions, and joint Joint doctrine helps US forces capitalize on the synergistic effects of interservice coordination and cooperation. d o c t r i n e . ” 36 A s mo r e a n d m o r e j o i n t d o c - Operations such as Urgent Fury prove that the coherent trine is developed, it will touch every integration of individual service capabilities is vital to a aspect of military operations and will have successful war-fighting effort. a significant impact on any future restruc- 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991 turing of the armed forces, including the Notes Air Force. With the increasing emphasis 1. Brigitte Sauerwein, "Military Doctrine: The Software of Defense." International Defense Review 23 (May 1990): 501. on joint operations and the establishment This article summarizes the discussions at the Conference on of the joint specialty officer, joint doctrine Security and Cooperation in Europe Seminar on Military has become, and will continue to be, an Doctrines, held in Vienna from 16 January to 5 February 1990. important part of both joint and service 2 Lt Col William C. Smith. “The United States Needs PME and will shape the way we think Joint War-Fighting Doctrine" (Army War College study proj- about war. □ ect, Carlisle Barracks. Pa.: 5 April 1988), 4. 3. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 2 (now Joint Pub 0-21, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAFj (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1974). 12. 4. A combatant command is defined in Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1 December 1989), 73, as "one of the unified or specified com- mands established by the President." Heightened emphasis on joint operations and the 5 Briefing, Joint Doctrine and Allied Interoperability Divi- sion, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7/ establishment of the joint specialty officer highlight the fact IDAID). Washington. D.C., subject: Joint Doctrine Develop- that joint doctrine is here to stay. Once the factors inhibiting ment. 1990. (Hereinafter referred to as 1-7/JDAID briefing.) the development of joint doctrine are overcome, we will have See also F. C. Moen and D. T. York. Compendium of Joint the most effective armed service possible in a time of Publication Abstracts (Norfolk Naval Air Station, Va.: Joint decreasing resources. Doctrine Center, December 1990). JOINT DOCTRINE 45

6. John H. Cushman. Command and ControJ of Theater 19. Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Memoraadii* of Forces: Adequacy (Washington. D.C.: AFCEA International Policy No. 9. Policy on Action Processing. 27 February 1988, Press. 1985). 83. 1, “provides for two types of implementing documents: tboae 7 Senate Committee on Armed Services. Defense Organi- signed by or on behalf of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, zation The N'eed for Change. 99th Cong.. 1st sess , Commit- and staff documents used for staff-to-staff communications." tee Print (S. Prt. 99-86). 16 October 1985. 163-65. 20. The only two examples of published service dif- (Hereinafter Senate. Staff Report.) ferences of opinion to date are Air Force concerns expreseed 8. Ibid.. 165. in appendix B to Joint Test Pub 3-03.1. Doctrine for loint 9. For example, the 1960 Symington Report, the 1970 Blue Interdiction of Follow-on Forces. 16 June 1988. and appendt* Ribbon Defense Panel, the 1978 Steadman Report, the 1982 E to Joint Test Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Opera- Chairman’s Special Study Group, and the 1986 Blue Ribbon tions. 1 January 1990. ___ Commission on Defense Management Report. Defense reform 21. The evaluation of joint doctrine and JTTP is conducted has been the subject of much debate and study since 1945. by the Joint Doctrine Center. Norfolk Naval Air Statiea. For a good overview of the defense reform movement, see Virginia. Asa Clark, ed.. The Defense Reform Debate (Baltimore. Md.: 22. JCS Pub 1. Department of Defense Dictionary of United lohns Hopkins University Press. 1984|. States Military Terms and Associated Terms (Washington. 10. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza- D C.: Government Printing Office. 1 August 1988), 73, tion Act of 1986. Public Law 99-433. 1 October 1986. sec. defined doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the 201. para. 153(a)(5). military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in sup- 11. The definition of joint doctrine and joint tactics, tech- port of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires niques. and procedures has changed over the past four years. judgment in application." The latest edition of loint Pub 1-01 defines joint doctrine as 23. Cushman. 85. follows: 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid.. 86. See also chapter 3 of Col Thomas A. Cardweil Fundamental principles that guide the employment of III. Command Structure for Theater Warfare: The Quest for forces of two or more Services in coordinated action Unity of Command (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Press. 1984). for an in-depth discussion of the differences in Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the service doctrine concerning the employment of theater- other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. assigned assets. It defines joint tactics, techniques, and procedures as 26. Joint Pub 1-01. VI-1 to VI-21. 27. Cushman. 90. For an interesting discussion of how dif- the actions and methods which implement joint doctrine fering service perspectives interact in the joint arena, see Col and describe how forces will be employed in joint opera- T h o m a s A. C a r d w e l l 111. “ Ho w I n t e r s e r v i c e I s s u e s A r i a e , " A i r tions They will be promulgated by the Chairman. Joint University Review 37. no. 4 (May-June 1986): 76-81. Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of 28. Senate. Staff Report. 177. the loint Chiefs of Staff. 29. Joint Pub 1-01, 11-1 and 111-4. 12 JCS Pub 2. 1 December 1986. 3-68. Change 2 (1 lune 30. Ibid.. II1-3. 1990) to Joint Pub 1-01. Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics. 31. Ibid., IV-l. Techniques, and Procedures Development Program, retitled 32. General Accounting Office. "Defense Reorganization. all JCS Pubs as Joint Pubs. Progress and Concerns at JCS and Combatant Commands." 13 DOD Directive 5100.1. Functions of the Department of Report B-230535 (Washington, D.C.: United States General Defense and Its Major Components. 3 April 1987. 5 and 7. Accounting Office. 1 March 1989), 28. 14 Don M S n i d e r . DOD Reorganization: Part I. New 33. Joint Pub 1-01, 111-4. Imperatives." Parameters 17. no 3 (September 1987): 92. 34. Of 25 Air War College and Air Command and Staff 15 T he loint D octrine. Education, and Training D ivision College students surveyed on 10 January 1991, two stated has been renam ed the loint D octrine and A llied Inter- they had seen a joint test publication. operability Division. 35. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Rosie 16. Joint Pub 1-01. 1-1. 7’ funking in the United States Air Force 1907-1988, vol. 1 17. Ibid.. V-l. (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, 1989). 385-488 18 Ibid.. IV-i 36. Don M. Snider, "DOD Reorganization: Part II, New Opportunities." Parameters 17, no. 4 (December 1987): 55. FRAMEWORK FOR START II

Lt Col Elwood C. Tir c u it , U S A F

very US president has advocated echoed his concern and commitment for effective nuclear arms control since arms control: the use of a nuclear weapon by the We want an agreement that allows us to United States against Japan in coexist with the Soviet Union in an E1945.1 Although the chance of nuclear war atmosphere of mutual trust, security, and between the superpowers is low today, understanding. If we fail in our efforts to even the possibility of such a war is still reach an arms reduction agreement today, the world's greatest concern. In 1985 Presi- we will he back at the negotiating table dent Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader tomorrow and the day after that, for as long Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that “a nuclear as it takes.3 war cannot be won and must never be On 31 July 1991, the leaders of the two fought.”* President George Bush has nuclear superpowers signed the initial

46 FRAMEWORK FOR START 11 47

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) National Security Interest treaty. With that round of negotiations The 1990 edition of the National Security complete, it is time to consider a frame- of the United States notes that our first work for future START discussions. The national security interest is the “survival task of constructing an effective and of the US as a free and independent enduring arms control agreement is nation, with its fundamental values intact founded on a basic goal. That goal is to and its institutions and people secure.’’ increase our nation’s security by limiting Simply, we seek to “protect the safety of and reducing the military threat of poten- the nation, its citizens, and its way of tial adversaries. Arms control is not in life.”7 National security objectives are conflict with, or a substitute for, military focused on protecting this interest. preparedness. Arms control seeks to com- plement military preparedness by increas- ing security at lower levels and creating more stable conditions.4 Therefore, the National Security Objectives United States, the Soviet Union, and other nuclear nations must design agreements to Following are some key national security constrain and manage nuclear weapon objectives applicable to arms control: confrontations. • Deter any aggression that could Arms control will continue as a key ele- threaten security and, should deterrence ment in US security strategy for the fore- fail, repel or defeat military attack and end seeable future. Ultimately, the challenge conflict on terms favorable to the US, its for the United States is not only to work interests, and its allies. for a more secure world through effective • Improve strategic stability by pursuing arms control agreements, but to advance equitable and verifiable arms control with caution lest we proceed to make our agreements, modernizing our strategic country and world more insecure. deterrent, developing technologies for stra- tegic defense, and strengthening our con- ventional forces. • Prevent the transfer of militarily crit- ical technologies and resources to hostile The Framework countries or groups, especially the spread of weapons of mass destruction and asso- A framework for effective future START ciated high technology means of delivery.5 negotiations originates from the president defining US national security interests and then deriving national security objectives. He also provides the national security National Security/Military Strategy strategy or ways to reach those objectives, National security strategy integrates dif- arms control being one way to help secure ferent instruments of power to attain our US interests.5 For effective arms control national security objectives. It provides the agreements, arms control objectives and general ways the nation will obtain its subsequently START II objectives are objectives and protect its interests. required to give clear US direction for Because arms control is only one way of negotiations. Paralleling this structure, the attaining the security objectives of the military leadership forms national military United States and its allies,9 it is therefore objectives and strategy to guide military a strategy—not an end in itself. Through participation in arms control agreement arms control, our nation aspires to reduce development.5 If the START II framework military threats to US interests, to inject is established and direction is well defined greater predictability into military rela- at each level, the nation should attain its tionships, and to channel force postures in security objectives and national interests. more stabilizing directions.10 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

OFFICIAL US NAVY PHOTOGRAPH

National Military Objectives Arms control initiatives should advocate mobility of strategic nuclear arms. Mobile basing options, epitomized here by the National military objectives directly appli- ballistic missile submarine USS Georgia (SSBN-729), cable to the arms control framework are as increase the survivability of the weapon and reduce the fear follows: of losing one's ability to retaliate. • Deter military attack by the Soviet Union, its surrogates, or any other nation • Increase US influence around the against the United States, its allies, and world. other important countries: and ensure the • Halt the transfer of militarily signifi- defeat of such attack should deterrence cant technology and resources to the fail. Soviet Union and other countries or • Reduce our reliance on nuclear entities whose actions are inimical to US weapons and nuclear retaliation by pursu- interests. ing technologies for strategic defense, • Retard the proliferation of nuclear, negotiating equitable and verifiable arms chemical, and biological weapons.11 control agreements, and maintaining strong conventional forces. Arms Control Objectives • Encourage and assist US allies and friends to defend themselves against inva- I believe that clear and definitive arms sion, armed insurgencies, terrorism, and control objectives have been a missing link coercion. in US efforts to attain national security FRAMEWORK FOR START II 49

objectives. There must be clear and defini- against potential adversaries. We should tive arms control objectives for the Air also seek to extend understanding and Force and other agencies to effectively cooperation to our potential adversaries. develop coordinated and coherent objec- By doing so, we reduce fear of aggression tives and initiatives within specific nego- and decrease the likelihood of mis- tiations. These objectives incorporate calculation.12 guidance for all arms control negotiations. Arms control agreements should also I believe that US arms control objectives enhance the international position of the should be as follows: United States as a world leader. From its position as a world leader, the United • Reduce the risk of war. States can influence the international • Establish weapon system/warhead environment to increase its security. restrictions that prevent an unacceptable Finally, arms control agreements should military advantage and improve military contribute to stemming the proliferation of predictability. nuclear, chemical, and biological • Obtain verifiable agreements. weapons, and the systems necessary for • Protect emerging US technologies. their delivery. The more nations that pos- • Decrease our dependence on nuclear sess weapons of mass destruction and the weapons. capability to deliver them, the higher the • Protect the security of our allies and risk that these weapons will be used. improve arms control consultations with them. • Promote a spirit of understanding and cooperation between the United States and START II Objectives the USSR and other adversaries. START II objectives are another key link • Enhance the international position of in the framework needed to develop an the United States. effective strategic nuclear arms agreement. • Retard the spread of weapons of mass Some potential START II objectives destruction and their delivery systems. include: The United States desires arms control agreements that ensure our security by reducing the risk of war. We must design • Increase crisis stability. agreements to maintain military balance • Reduce the incentive for a strategic and to improve the predictability of poten- nuclear first strike. tial adversaries. Even if the desired mili- • Ensure equitable strategic nuclear tary balance is established, agreements are arms capability. of little value if not verifiable. The United • Reduce the number of strategic States must obtain sufficient verification to nuclear warheads consistent with enhanc- ensure effective agreements that lead to ing stability. greater stability and diminish the risk of war. However, these agreements must pro- • Ensure sufficient verification proce- tect our capability to pursue technology dures to gain compliance with treaty necessary to protect our global interests. provisions. Technology is also one of the key means to • Protect options to develop and deploy attain the objective of decreasing our US technology. reliance on nuclear weapons for the • Seek a stable mix of strategic nuclear security of our nation. offensive and strategic defensive systems. Since our security is based on allied • Enhance multilateral consultations partnership, arms control agreements must with other nuclear nations. protect the security of our allies. Con- • Foster a closer relationship between sultation with our allies in negotiations the United States and USSR through more will enhance the combined security effort openness/transparency of our militaries. 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

The prime objective for START II is to increase crisis stability. The United States and the USSR still maintain the concept of mutual deterrence—seeking to deter each other from nuclear attack through their ability to inflict an unacceptable level of damage even after receiving a massive attack. Crisis stability is the condition achieved between adversaries by reducing a nation’s pressure and incentive for using its strategic nuclear weapons due to fear the weapons would be lost before they could be used.13 If mutual deterrence per- sists, even in a crisis, the strategic relation- ship is “stable.” During a crisis, real or perceived vulnerability of a nation’s nuclear forces might be an incentive to attack.14 Therefore, negotiators should direct their labor toward increasing crisis stability as the main objective in the arms control process. A second and closely related objective is to reduce the incentive for a strategic nuclear first strike. START II negotiation efforts should strengthen and make the

The first Pershing II is destroyed under the provisions of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty of 1987. First, the solid rocket fuel is expelled in a static firing (bottom), and then the motor stage is crushed as treaty officials witness the event (left). FRAMEWORK FUR START 11 51

One method to enhance equitable nuclear capability and balance stability occurs when potential promote "slow-response weapon systems" such as the bomber is to limit strategic air defenses. The Soviets would adversaries can maintain the military probably oppose such limitations, hut the initiative is capability needed to preserve mutual consistent with the need to balance strategic capabilities to deterrence and a stable strategic nuclear allow mutual deterrence. arms relationship.15 For example, if a side breaks out of the START II treaty, the opposing side must have a force posture concept of mutual deterrence more effec- capable of effectively responding or tive. Instituting procedures in the agree- restructuring to deter the new threat. ment that discourage either side from Another element of this objective is attacking will decrease the probability that improving predictability of an adversary’s a strategic nuclear war will be initiated. military capability. START II initiatives A third objective of START II is to need to channel strategic nuclear arms ensure equitable strategic nuclear arms competition in a manner that constrains capability. Fear and mistrust have caused the threat. Limiting each side’s military the United States and the USSR to attempt options diminishes the uncertainty of the to acquire a favorable military advantage. threat and the actions of a side to gain an One element of this objective is to increase unacceptable military advantage in strate- force balance stability in START II. Force gic nuclear arms. 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

A fourth objective of START II is to tive transition to a balanced strategic pos- reduce the number of strategic nuclear ture including strategic defenses.18 warheads consistent with enhancing sta- Likewise, START II must address this bility.16 I believe that START II, as its issue to reduce strategic nuclear offensive name implies, should seek further reduc- weapons to an appropriate and stabilizing tions in nuclear offensive arms. Specifi- level consistent with strategic defense cally, the numerical ceiling on warheads development. should be reduced. Reductions in nuclear In START II. the significance of further warheads will safeguard stability and reductions requires the United States to enhance the nation’s security However, as enhance multilateral consultations with we move to reduce arms, we must proceed other nuclear nations. As the USSR and with caution since reducing nuclear arms the LJnited States reduce their strategic to extremely low levels is destabilizing nuclear forces, the strategic nuclear and is a detriment to our security as wrell capabilities of other nations become more as the security of the rest of the world. threatening and potentially destabilizing. Reducing nuclear weapon levels “too low” Progress in START II will be closely tied threatens US ability to maintain crisis sta- to these nations’ thoughts, ideas, and bility and force balance. agreements regarding their strategic Building on the initial START treaty. nuclear arms capabilities. Also, establish- START II should include sufficient ver- ing close consultations with other nuclear ification procedures to ensure compliance nations in START II will provide a basic with treaty provisions. Political dif- structure for formally including these ferences and mutual distrust between the nations in follow-on negotiations. United States and the USSR demand suffi- Finally, the United States should foster a cient and effective verification procedures. closer relationship between the United Even though there are warming relations States and the USSR through more between the superpowers, the United openness/transparency of our militaries. States should not let its guard down and Prudent and more frequent contact with allow an imbalance in military capability. our adversary through START II activities A verifiable START II agreement adds to will improve our mutual understanding. the trust of the nations and to stability Ultimately, transparency of our militaries with each other regarding their strategic will lead to better cooperation, less ten- nuclear arsenals. sion, and less chance of miscalculation of A sixth START II objective should be to intent in both peacetime and crisis.19 protect options to develop and deploy US technologies. Future agreements have the potential of capturing and limiting tech- nology for modernization of both nuclear Implications for START II and conventional forces. Reduced nuclear From a comprehensive and coherent force levels will put a premium on a mod- START II framework, the United States ernized. balanced triad with the flexibility can effectively formulate negotiation ini- and survivability to maintain mutual tiatives for START II to realize its objec- deterrence. Within the constraints to pro- tives and protect its security interests. mote predictability and force balance sta- Many of the initiatives suggested below bility. technology must be safeguarded to are applicable for reaching multiple objec- modernize aging strategic nuclear forces tives. However, in some cases, we must and strengthen conventional capability. make careful trade-offs between initiatives START II should seek a stable mix of for objectives that may be counter to other strategic nuclear offensive and strategic objectives. The following proposals from defensive systems.17 In the defense and the START II framework are not all- space talks, the United States has pro- inclusive but serve as examples of initia- posed a more stable and secure basis for tives that proceed from guidance that is deterrence in the future through a coopera- carefully linked together. FRAMEWORK FOR START II 53

The United States' primary focus in START II should be to increase crisis sta- bility. Increased crisis stability can be attained through several initiatives. First, protecting the triad is a high priority since the concept complicates an adversary's attack and defense planning and protects \ survivability if a portion of our nuclear forces are negated by such factors as weapon systems deficiencies and tech- nological breakthroughs. Weakening a por- tion of the triad decreases the chance of survivability and increases the pressure to launch weapon systems in a crisis before they are lost. Second, arms control initia- tives should protect and advocate mobility of strategic nuclear arms. Mobility increases weapon system survivability and reduces the fear of losing one’s ability to retaliate. The United States should pre- serve and advance the deployment of nuclear arms in mobile basing options such as submarines, bombers, and mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Another means of promoting crisis sta- bility is to reduce the concentration of warheads. Concentration of warheads on ICBMs and submarines makes these deliv- ery vehicles valuable and tempting targets to eliminate in a crisis before they can be used. Thus, downloading reentry vehicles from ICBMs and submarine-launched bal- listic missiles (SLBM) will reduce warhead concentration, as would eliminating the number of SLBMs per submarine. A Redwing the risk of nuclear war improves national security, related initiative is to prohibit new testing but there is a point at which reductions in the strategic nuclear force become destabilizing. Negotiators must and development of multiple warhead realize at which level the force must be maintained to assure systems. deterrence and limit the possibility of war. Crisis stability can also be enhanced through strategic defenses. Deployment of limited ballistic defenses will ensure sur- potentially destabilizing. The other side vivability of a minimum retaliatory force may fear its adversary is building a first- while keeping intact the concept of mutual strike capability by deploying a wide- deterrence. Limited defenses will reduce spread system and may deem a first strike Soviet fears of a US incentive for a first necessary before the defenses are in place strike during a crisis and provide the to render the adversary's offensive United States with a system that can weapons ineffective. In addition, a wide- expand to counter a Soviet breakout. Dur- spread deployment of these defensive sys- ing a crisis with a third-world nuclear tems may result in treaty breakout or nation that has ballistic missiles, the attempts to find a counter to the defenses defenses could aid in the deterrence and in order to maintain mutual deterrence.21 escalation control of a conflict.20 Wide- START II initiatives should also pro- spread and effective strategic defenses are mote slow-flying weapon systems. These 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

systems enhance crisis stability because ilarly, extremely low force levels would be they do not threaten a first strike that may more vulnerable to technological break- eliminate a retaliatory response. Therefore, throughs and weapon system deficiencies I advocate incentives such as the bomber or breakdowns.23 In light of the political weapon-counting rules to encourage reality to quickly establish a START II emphasis in areas that increase stability.22 level of weapons before the suggested reas- Also, 1 advocate other initiatives such as sessment of deterrence can be accom- banning short-time-of-flight (STOF) plished. I believe the appropriate level of systems—for example, the capability of accountable weapons ranges from 4,000 to nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub- 5,000 weapons. This range represents a marines (SSBN) to launch near an adver- substantial reduction from the initial sary's shore—to ensure available tactical START treaty, yet ensures that we have warning or reaction time for the system sufficient weapons for deterrence. In addi- under attack. STOF systems are destabiliz- tion, estimates by prominent national ing because they encourage strategies such security authorities and initial analyses as launch on warning bv an adversary to indicate that this range of weapons is an protect key deterrent systems. appropriate level. A key ingredient to a START II treaty is To ensure that the United States main- the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, tains equitable strategic nuclear capability, but not at the expense of stability with the we should pursue initiatives to help pre- USSR and third-world nuclear nations. clude an unacceptable force balance The United States must remember that we advantage. One initiative is to resist sig- conduct arms control negotiations to nificant reductions in strategic nuclear improve our national security. There is a delivery vehicles (SNDV). Allowing a sig- level of weapons at which continued nificant number of SNDVs while reducing reductions destabilize and undermine our warheads helps maintain proper force bal- national security. Prior to embarking on ance by reducing target value and increas- START II, we must first determine what ing the number of warheads needed to deters aggression by the Soviet Union and destroy SNDVs. Also, since procuring the other potential nuclear nations. The delivery system is the long-lead item in United States and its allies cannot assume responding to an expanded threat, the that its current deterrence strategy and tar- United States should retain as many geting of adversaries will remain the same SNDVs as economically possible by down- in the new strategic environment. This loading weapons to provide a response to crucial reassessment of deterrence will a Soviet nuclear weapon breakout. For provide the basis for determining force example, downloading SLBMs and ICBMs levels and capabilities that the United and keeping the maximum number of States must protect in START II. Failure to launchers will increase stability- vet allow maintain the right level of weapons to a relatively short-term means of restoring hold at risk those targets deemed neces- capability if needed. sary for destruction, increases the risk of Although difficult, the United States war. should continue to seek verifiable mea- In addition to the inability to hold crit- sures to promote essential congruence in ical targets at risk, low nuclear weapon as many measures of merit areas as possi- levels threaten the US ability to maintain ble. For example, the US should continue crisis stability and force balance. to pursue congruence in ICBM and SLBM Extremely low numbers of forces con- throw weight. In addition, we should stitute an easier target for a preemptive advocate prohibition of testing new gener- attack. Also, low force levels make the ations of ICBM and SLBM systems with reward for cheating greater since even a multiple independently targeted reentry small number of concealed forces would vehicle (MIRV) systems. This initiative have a large impact on the balance. Sim- will help restrict breakout in the number FRAMEWORK FOR START II 55 of weapons and increase military maintained as spares, tests assets, and for predictability. other uses. Another initiative to enhance equitable As in initial START treaty negotiations, nuclear capability and promote slow the Soviets may try to limit US technology response weapon systems such as the applications through START II. The bomber is to limit strategic air defenses. United States must protect technologies to Although opposition from the Soviets is modernize its nuclear forces and offset expected, the initiative is consistent with potential Soviet military advances. In the need to balance strategic capabilities to addition, agreements regarding nuclear allow mutual deterrence. Also, essential systems must not foreclose promising equivalence could be enhanced by impos- areas where technology can be suc- ing verifiable limits on all nondeployed cessfully used in conventional areas. In ICBMs and SLBMs used for spares, test this regard, the design of new weapon sys- assets, and other purposes. tems must include verification measures to The question of restricting, limiting, and discriminate strictly conventional weapon reducing the nuclear forces of other systems from nuclear ones. A difficult bal- nations—the United Kingdom, France, ance must be struck between protecting China, India, and others—will continue in technology development and maintaining START II as a major issue. Progress in this essential force capability. area is important for progress in other START II negotiations present a forum START II areas. For example, as the that the United States and the USSR United States and the USSR attempt to fur- should use to enhance understanding and ther reduce their nuclear forces, the num- cooperation. We should advocate bers and types of weapons developed and confidence-building measures that include deployed by other nuclear nations have professional military education exchange significant impact on the security of the officers, participation in exercises, round- superpowers. Therefore, negotiations table discussions of nuclear issues, liaison should incorporate multilateral discus- offices at key locations, and US Arms Con- sions and consultations to enhance treaty trol and Disarmament Agency representa- progress and form a structure for strategic tive exchanges. Gaining and sharing nuclear arms negotiations after START II. information with a potential nuclear A multilateral agreement to cap smaller adversary will enhance military predict- nuclear powers must be developed if ability and reduce the fear of aggressive superpower nuclear forces are reduced to a intent and the likelihood of miscalculation level that the security of the superpowers in the nuclear arena. is threatened by a smaller nuclear power or combination of nuclear nations. Verification procedures from the initial Conclusion START treaty must be continued and Arms control negotiations will continue strengthened. A primary means of to hold a prominent place in our attempt strengthening verification procedures and to enhance our nation’s security by reduc- resolving differences is through the par- ing the risk of nuclear war. With the initial ticipation of a neutral country, potentially START treaty now signed, the framework through the auspices of the United outlined in this paper provides a coherent Nations. In addition to verification regimes roadmap to initiate and develop an effec- administered by the parties of the treaty, tive START II treaty. It links various levels the neutral country could serve as an inde- of national guidance to ensure that the pendent inspector and a member of the United Sates establishes a consistent and Joint Compliance and Inspection Commit- logical path for helping attain our nation’s tee (JCIC). We can also enhance START II fundamental goal of preserving the sur- verification procedures by verifying all vival of the United States as a free and nondeployed ICBMs and SLBMs that are independent nation. □ 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

Notes

1. Arms Control and National Security: An introduction 15. Briefing. Lt Col Richard Layman. Strategy Division, (Washington. D.C.: The Arms Control Association. 1989), 19- Deputy Chief of Staff. Plans and Operations (AF/XOXWS), 37. subject: [Deterrence). August 1990. 2. Ibid.. 6. 16. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. /oint 3. Ibid.. 35. Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space 4. Ibid.. 10. Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability (Wash- 5. President George Bush. National Security Strategy of ington. D.C.: Office of Public Affairs. June 1990). the United States (Washington, D.C.: The W hite House. 17. Department of Defense. Strategic Modernization March 1990). 15. Issues. Washington, D.C., July 1990. 19. 6. loin! Chiefs of Staff, National Military' Strategy Docu- 18. Baker Spring, "Four Key Questions Facing SDI." in ment. FY 92-97. Washington. DC., September 1989. (Secret) Critical Issues— SDI at the Turning Point: Readying Strategic Information extracted is unclassified. Defenses for the 1990s and Beyond, ed. Kim R. Holmes and 7. Bush. 1-2. Baker Spring (Washington. D.C.: Heritage Foundation. 1990). 8. Ibid.. 2 10. 9. Ibid.. 15. 19. Joint Statement on Future Negotiations. 10. Department of Defense. Defense Planning Guidance, 20. Keith B. Payne, "Strategic Defense and U.S. Military FY 1992-1997, appendix A. "The Chairman's National Mili- Strategy." in Holmes and Spring, 13-17. tary Strategy," August 1989, 5. (Secretl Information extracted 21. David A. Ochmanek and Edward L. Warner HI. Next is unclassified. Moves: An Arms Control Agenda for the 1990s (New York: 11. Ibid.. 2. Council on Foreign Relations. 1988), 67-69. 12. Bush. 19. 22. Issues Brief. US Arms Control and Disarmament 13. National Security Research, "Stability, War Avoidance, Agency, subject: Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet and Strategic Weapons," USAFACSC Contract: ICBM Mod- Proposals (Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Affairs). 22 Jan- ernization Issues, March 1990 (amended )une 1990), 2-3. uary 1990. 14. Arms Control and National Security, 11. 23. Ochmanek and Warner. 61-62.

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CMSgt Robert D. Lewallen, USAF

Ethics Are Nice. But They Can Be a Handicap, Some Executives Declare —Headline, Wall Street Journal 8 September 1987

N 1986 THE US Department of Jus- tice’s Public Integrity Section reported that 1,027 public officials had been convicted of crimes. This included I596 federal officials indicted for criminal activity.1 Problems with ethics plague our society and make blaring headlines on a regular basis. The military is not exempt from such problems. Major studies of ethics in the Air Force in 1983 and 1988 showed that over one-third of Air Force personnel are convinced that integrity is a 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

problem, and the lower the rank of the per- bedevil us? Have we not moved beyond sons polled, the more convinced they are those sexual and racial tensions of the of the problem’s existence.2 Military pro- 1960s and 1970s when equal opportunity fessionals are public officials and often and treatment, affirmative actions, and executives. Due to the weight of their sexual-harassment training reoriented our responsibilities, they frequently face tre- actions but left us both fearful and resent- mendous challenges to ethical behavior. In ful? Of course, society is not perfect: there no areas are such challenges more difficult will always be unreconstructed bigots and than in those involving the potentially vol- chauvinists. atile equation of sex and power. Look at While it is true that we have come a long the following example: way as a society, and outward forms of Nine people work for a senior NCO [non- sexual or racial discrimination may have commissioned officer] supervisor who is by diminished, the problem has also under- their own admission their hero—a truly fine gone a subtle metamorphosis. Power has person and a consummate professional. One now assumed a far more prominent place day, while this paragon is on leave, his in the equation; and power, a key ingre- assistant, in his zeal to help his boss, opens dient in the effectiveness of the profes- the mail on his desk and discovers a letter sional supervisor, makes the equation from a young airman in a nearby work center itself far more volatile. As Dr Peter Rutter expressing how much she enjoyed the sex- ual encounter they had experienced a few days previously. So what does his assistant do? Tell everyone else and discredit the man? Confront the boss with a sermon on his sinful ways? Sim- ply adjust to a shattered image? And, if the latter choice is elected, so what? Has the operational mission suffered in any way? A valid question is, So what? Only three people know of the lapse of professional- ism and the violation of Air Force stan- dards in this case, and two of them certainly will take great pains to act as if nothing has occurred. But what has occurred? A volatile, potentially explosive mixture of sex, supervisory power, and unethical behavior has been brewed. Its has recently written in a landmark study effects may be nothing more than a shat- of sex and professional relationships, tered role model—or an eventual career- “Sexual violation of trust is an epidemic, destroying, mission-blighting expose. The mainstream problem that reenacts in the intertwined subjects of sex, power, and professional relationship a wider, cultural ethics demand the honest attention of power imbalance between men and every military professional in the mixed- women.”3 gender Air Force of the 1990s. Nothing is Obviously, a power imbalance exists more pertinent to operational effectiveness between any supervisor and subordinate. than morale: nothing destroys morale more Sex differences within a professional rela- quickly and completely than unethical tionship add a troublesome new dimen- sexual behavior. sion to the nature and use of power by a supervisor. And this problem seems to be but one aspect of a far larger and very The Scope of the Problem damaging ill plaguing American society—a Can relations between the sexes in the lapse of ethics. We’ve been barraged with progressive workplace of the 1990s still examples of questionable ethics in recent SEX, POWER, AND ETHICS 59

years, from Lt Col Oliver North to evange- question of sex within professional rela- list Jim Bakker to Speaker of the House Jim tionships has been emphatically answered Wright to candidate Gary Hart—the list in the negative within all professions. The seems endless. But the problem is by no Hippocratic oath of the fourth-century B.C. means restricted to national figures. A forbade sex between physicians and recent study on college campuses indi- patients; Air Force Regulation (AFR) cates that perhaps 40 percent of the stu- 35-62, Policy on Fraternization and Pro- dents have cheated on tests or assign- fessional Relationships, by implication ments, and one university administrator forbids sex between supervisors and sub- notes that campuses “are becoming a ordinates: “Unduly familiar relationships breeding ground for the white collar crimi- between members of different grades or nals of the future.”4 In our own profession, positions...are almost always unprofes- a Tactical Air Command lieutenant general sional.”7 AFR 30-1, Air Force Standards was relieved from his position in Novem- (Pocket Size), forbids personal relations ber 1990 for “inappropriate actions and that breach the bounds of propriety and relationships with women, including warns that these become of official con- subordinates.”5 cern if they affect discipline, morale, or The popular television drama “ L.A. performance.8 Law" features an attorney who seems to spend as much time in bed with his clients as he does in defending them, which reflects a growing concern in the legal pro- Sex and Relativistic Ethics fession over “emotional advantage” taken Hippocrates lived 25 centuries ago, how- of a client.6 That phrase perfectly de- ever, and despite AFR 35-62 or the Uni- scribes the subtle power equation between form Code of Military Justice, we practice supervisor and subordinate. our professional responsibilities in the lib- Attorneys are members of a calling uni- erated and highly sexualized 1990s. Have versally designated as a profession. the standards of professional conduct Unethical sexual relations certainly trou- changed? This question can be answered ble the bar and afflict other professions, in two ways. First, if society’s standards including the profession of arms. Two tele- (or values or morals) have changed, this vision series have recently dealt with the does not necessarily imply that the mili- Vietnam conflict: “Tour of Duty” and tary’s standards must also change. In fact, “China Beach.” In the former, a continuing much of what unifies our profession and story line featured a platoon sergeant dat- links us to our predecessors is an ing a major: in the latter, enlisted-officer adherence to an unchanging code of duty, sexual relations enlivened more than one honor, and country—and that word honor beach scene. And in the eternally popular packs a real wallop in terms of ethical con- “M.A.S.H..” Major Houlihan and Captain duct. Second, even in the sex-drenched Pierce enjoyed a sexual encounter that 1990s, have expectations of professional affected performance and unit morale. But conduct really changed? A 1987 survey of that’s just TV sensationalism, right? Unfor- psychotherapists revealed that ”85 percent tunately. it also occurs in the real world. of the respondents considered sexual inti- In any profession that brings men and macies with clinical supervisees to be women into close daily working relation- always unethical, no matter what the cir- ships, there is a key question that must be cumstances.”9 Proscription of sex with cli- asked: Can a professional relationship be ents still characterizes the formal codes of sexualized and still retain its integrity and ethics for the medical profession, for effectiveness? In our particular profession, teachers, for psychologists, and for mili- effectiveness translates into the ability of tary professionals. In short, it was wrong our people to execute critically important in ancient times, it is wrong now, and we operational missions. Historically, this know it is wrong. 60 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

client, supervisor and subordinate. Through the instruments of evaluation and through uncounted formal and informal ways, supervisors hold subordinates’ lives in their hands. Supervisors (like lawyers, doctors, educators, and military profes- sionals) are people with power. Yet we have ambivalent attitudes about power. Every military professional should know Situational ethics nevertheless gained a Lord Acton’s dictum on the corrupting certain following in the permissive, influence of power. The British writer rebellious 1960s. While it is true that cir- Malcolm Muggeridge echoed that view in cumstances must at least be acknowledged a televised interview on “Meet the Press” when determining right and wrong, situa- on 19 March 1968. when he observed that tional ethics can lead us step-by-step into “power is evil, and everything that belongs ethical anarchy, particularly in questions to power belongs to the devil.” of sexuality. Regulations simply cannot Sex and power combined make a vol- give us all the definite principles to govern atile, potentially destructive combina- conduct that may apply in dealing with tion—hardly a secret in the video age. For people in every situation.10 Where do we example, we have long recognized that derive those first principles on which law sexual harassment involves a person moti- and regulations are built? vated by power—power over another per- Is there a sense of right and wrong—an son’s life. We know that much sexual ethical sensibility—innate within the harassment goes unreported in profes- human consciousness? And if so, who or sional life because of a person’s fear of a what was its architect? God? Religion gen- tormenter’s power.12 Yet power is an erally holds that there is a Supreme Being essential attribute of a supervisor. Reduced who stands for morality, who demands to its simplest terms, power is the ability right behavior, and who judges us against to influence people. This distinguishes immutable standards. The only alternative power from authority, which is the per- is to give to each person the right to decide mission to influence. Leaders must have what is good and what is evil—which may power—they must have the ability to again invite us to ethical anarchy.11 Anar- influence people to cause the right events chy is unacceptable in our profession. (the mission) to happen.13 But power can From somewhere we derive standards of be very subtly wielded, and its abuse— right and wrong. Perhaps God provided particularly where sex is involved—can be them, perhaps society created them and extremely hard to quantify. The US ascribed them to God. Ultimately, we want Supreme Court has stated that “for sexual to be held accountable, and accountability harassment to be actionable, it must be is certainly a state that the military profes- sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the sional can relate to! Whether or not our conditions of employment and create an behavior matters to God. it must matter to abusive working environment.’’14 The us. In no area is this more critical than in supervisor today knows these limits and the exercise of supervisory power in avoids transgressing them; nevertheless, mixed-gender relationships. power can be used delicately to elicit a certain desired behavior without an obviously “abusive working environment ever existing. The supervisor can abuse The Power Factor many elements of the supervisor- A power differential is built into all pro- subordinate relationship—power, depen- fessional relationships—educator and stu- dency, vulnerability, and trust being the dent, doctor and patient, lawyer and more prominent—for sexual purposes. SEX. POWER, AND ETHICS 61

Such abuse is not compatible with opera- ethical standards of his profession.’’20 tional effectiveness.15 It is simply an unde- Failure to do this in the very personal rela- niable fact that “superior status brings tionship between supervisor and subordi- with it not only greater prestige and nate means betrayal of trust, abandonment greater privileges, but greater power."16 of responsibility, and the creation of an This is true whether the supervisor is male exploitative relationship. A person in a or female, and although a good majority of position of power becomes an ad hoc supervisors in the military profession are parental figure and incurs the ethical male, the abuse of power for sexual pur- responsibility for setting the example in poses can certainly work for the female behavior and conduct because our subor- supervisor as well as for the male. dinates learn from us the meaning of right Professional military education (PME) and wrong as defined by our institution. for both officers and enlisted members Our problems with male-female relation- constantly emphasizes the importance of ships in the 1990s are for the most part far leadership by example. We study great more subtle than they have been in the leaders of the past with a view to analyz- past. Sexual harassment is out, and a more ing their traits and emulating them. PME pernicious, more difficult to define prob- embraces Gen Sir James Glover’s dictum lem is in—and it involves power, that that "character is a habit. The daily choice "ability to influence." Just as a psycholo- of right and wrong. It is a moral quality gist, a doctor, or a te ac he r is a which grows to maturity in peace and is professional—a mentor—with incalculable not suddenly developed in war."17 Ethical (if subtle) power over peoples’ lives, so is behavior is critical to leaders of national the military supervisor whether that super- stature—but no less critical to supervisors visor be an officer or an enlisted person. at any level in a corporate or military hier- Just as a patient looks to a psychologist or archy. As Dr Norman Vincent Peale has doctor for help, or a student to a teacher, observed. “A manager...affects the ethical so do our people look to us for help. We experience of his employees and affects the happiness of their lives; therefore, he mustn’t let them do a wrong thing if he c a n h e l p i t . " 18 G e n M a t t h e w B . R i d g w a y has stated. “Character is the edifice on which the whole structure of leadership rests."19 The supervisor—the person in the posi- tion of power—can best keep subordinates from doing “a wrong thing" by setting the example of upright behavior. The pos- sibilities inherent in a position of power are legion, and when biological desires are thrown in, the allure of a forbidden zone are trusted professionals, and, as Dr Rutter relationship—a term coined by Dr Peter concludes, “Trusted professionals hold Rutter—can be overpowering. Do those inordinate power over peoples’ lives pre- involved in such a sexual relationship cisely because they offer as much hope as know it’s wrong, unethical? Of course they they do.”21 do! The person in power has no right to ever allow sexual misbehavior to take place. If there is any statement that cap- Biology and the tures the heart of sexual ethics for the mili- tary professional, it is Dr Rutter’s Question of Right statement that "the professional in power The biological urges that help drive has the complete obligation to uphold the human behavior are neither inherently evil 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

nor socially unacceptable, but they can that are ethical and right, we must look for become so within professional relation- help in doing so. As we have seen, dis- ships. Where one party has power—that covering what is right is usually not so ability to influence—and another party is very difficult; doing what is right presents dependent, reliant, and trusting, biology the challenge. Three sources of guidance can become a powerful motivator to wrong are worth exploring. The first of these is behavior.22 It is useless to wish this were friendship. not so. As rational human beings, we must Socrates sang the praises of friendship control our desire to give in to such 24 centuries ago—and the value of a behavior. As Peter Abelard discovered in trusted friend remains unequalled for the twelfth century, “It is vicious to give in today’s professional in a position of to our desires; but not to have any desires power. We need a person to whom we can at all is impossible.”23 Given the fact that talk without restraint—an intellectual we have desires, as professionals we must comrade who provides inspiration, who shape our conduct so that our actions can can give us balance by providing alterna- never offer even the slightest hint of tive viewpoints, and who can point out impropriety. This is essential not only for both our virtues and our blind spots. A operational mission accomplishment but friend can be a critically important person also for our own psychological health and to us in questions of sexual ethics—where that of the people who work for us and our own judgment may be warped by biol- with us. ogy, by poorly understood needs, or by the There are several principles to keep in temptations of power.26 There are several mind about the biological magnetism natural candidates for this role—your dep- between men and women. First, such an uty, your assistant noncommissioned attraction is normal; it should not inspire officer in charge, perhaps in some cases guilt or attempts to rationalize it away. your boss, and in rare cases even a subor- Second, individuals have a choice in dinate. How fortunate if we are connected deciding whether or not this attraction to people in several of these roles who can will lead them into unethical conduct. qualify as our friends; how regrettable if Third, refraining from unethical conduct is we have none at all. However, several an absolute professional imperative.24 obvious caveats should be mentioned. Cer- While doing the right thing and behaving tainly we must be wary of friendships ethically is not easy, it is based on a sim- within the chain of command that become ple formula: giving serious, honest thought too close; we need to ensure that those we to the problems of human conduct and trust with our innermost thoughts merit sexuality. We do not suffer from a majority that trust; we must surround ourselves of people determining to do wrong. Such with true friends, not a circle of sy- people have very short military careers. cophants or disciples. But given these sig- Instead, we suffer from too much indif- nificant qualifications, it is undeniably ference to doing right, just as does civil true that a good friend can save us from society. Justice and right are not items the inextricable morass of difficult ethical stored on a dusty law shelf but are active questions involving sex and power. If we principles that must be lived daily by real prize integrity in our friends and associ- people. “One bent on wrong never lacks ates, they will in turn help reinforce it in an excuse; and one seeking to do right can us, regardless of the temptations we may commonly find the way.”25 be exposed to. As Cal Thomas eloquently observed in commenting on the ethical sit- uation in American society, Solving the [In the military, our challenge becomes to] Sex-Power-Ethics Equation surround ourselves with advisors and Given our professional obligation to friends who hold the same values as we do, shape our conduct and behavior in ways [so] we will be able to be honest with them SEX. POWER. AND ETHICS 63

and ourselves and more likely to maintain really touch the heart of our current prob- our integrity....We must value integrity in lem. They are fine generalizations, but others—in our staff members, our families, they ignore the often painful immediacy of even among ourselves. How often do we biological needs in a situation where one focus on the quality of work our staff mem- person holds power over another. There is, bers produce instead of the quality of their however, growing societal awareness of characters.27 this problem and efforts to deal with it. Our friends and associates can help us The relationship between faculty and establish boundaries—a key procedure in students—an inherently tempting power maintaining professional relationships inequality—has led many universities to where sexuality is involved. While regula- explicitly state codes of sexual ethics. The tions and moral codes may describe or pre- University of Iowa’s written policy recog- scribe boundaries, the final decision to nizes that “faculty members exercise observe them is an individual choice. Men power over students" and that where a fac- and women can be friends, coworkers and ulty member has professional respon- professionals together if boundaries exist sibility for a student, sexual relationships and are observed. A trusted friend and are simply wrong, even if there is willing consent in the relationship.30 This state- ment clearly recognizes that important power factor that is extremely significant in the supervisor-subordinate relationship in the military. We too can benefit greatly from sensitively written yet frankly ex- plicit guidelines in our own workplaces— guidelines that command authority backs to the hilt. Simply restating old prohibi- tions against sexual harassment is not enough; we must recognize and respect the “psychologically based power dynamics” of sexual relationships in an equation of power inequality.31 Developing a code of ethics—a state- associate who is honest with us can see ment that includes sexual ethics— is an where these boundaries are threatened and excellent exercise if done right. But such can remind us of the potential profes- codes will have greater impact and more sional, emotional, and physical con- staying power if developed jointly by the sequences of transgressing those limits.28 supervisor (the person in power) and the A second source of guidance and assis- coworkers (the weaker partners in the tance in defusing the sex-power-ethics power equation) and if they are published equation involves written ethical codes. and displayed prominently. A group of Certainly we in the military are well cov- people can learn a great deal about them- ered by such codes. The Uniform Code of selves and develop a greater sense of com- Military Justice is an all-embracing exam- mitment to professional values through ple, as are the provisions of the United writing a code of ethics they all agree to States Code cited in attachment 3 of AFR support. As an in-service training exercise, 30-30. Standards of Conduct. House Con- an NCO Leadership School faculty was current Resolution 175, passed in July asked to draft up a simple code of ethics, 1958. states a code of ethics for all govern- and a class of 40 junior NCO students was ment employees; it requires "loyalty to the asked to do the same. The two codes pro- highest moral principles" and reminds us duced were almost identical; the results that "public office is a public trust.”29 Yet were the same in six subsequent classes. these statements, while laudable, do not The broad ethical statements produced 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

included these principles: (1) do the right chief.”35 Professional military education thing 24 hours a day: (2) state what is right and training for all supervisory grades and live by it always; (3) be open and hon- must reach this same conclusion for us to est with others; and (4) get the job done begin to deal effectively with the sex- but do it in a way that makes you feel good power-ethics equation in the Air Force of a b o u t y o u r s e l f . 32 T h e n , w h e n s u c h a s t a t e - the 1990s—a force in which we are in- ment or document is written and agreed creasingly seeing males supervising to, post it! Make it part of the professional females and vice versa, and a smaller force milieu of the work center. that can ill afford the operational impact of Such a deliberate, conscious act of writ- abuses of power by untrained supervisors. ing ethical codes leads to the third avenue The 1983 and 1988 studies of ethics both for managing the sex-power-ethics revealed over two-thirds of our personnel equation—education and training. These believe we should teach integrity, and over ingredients are an essential part of our pro- half say to do so by formal training and fession. We spend huge blocks of time personal contact.36 The study recom- receiving both training and education. mended that “ethics and integrity stan- However, we devote much too little time dards should be emphasized during in covering certain areas of supervisory professional military education courses responsibility and virtually none to train- and during command information peri- ing in sexual ethics. Our profession is not ods.”37 The unethical supervisor has failed alone in shortchanging this area. Amidst us and deserves punishment; we have growing concern over sexual relationships failed the uneducated supervisor, and we between ministers and members of con- deserve censure. gregations, the church has begun to ask if The shape this training in ethics in gen- pastors are adequately trained to deal with eral, and sexual ethics in particular, questions of sexual ethics. The answer is should take must be left to specialists. As a clear. Pastors recognize the danger signs of general guideline, it must begin in basic sexual misconduct only “by feeling, intui- military training and precommissioning tion. and instinct.”33 Those tools are not courses and should be reinforced at all lev- good enough to ensure mission accom- els of both officer and NCO professional plishment in the highly stressful opera- military education. Specifically, this tional environment. Professionals need instruction should include basic princi- training to confront the ethical issues that ples of ethics and guidelines on making taunt us in supervisor-subordinate rela- sound ethical decisions. Such training tionships. As Gen Creighton Abrams must not be afraid to include open discus- noted. “The object of teaching is to enable sion about the really tough sexual choices the young man or woman to get along and temptations offered by the 1990s without their teachers.”34 American busi- workplace. ness management is beginning to face the need to teach ethics so that upcoming young managers can handle ethical issues. Peter Madsen, director of the Center for Conclusion the Advancement of Applied Ethics, Talking about and acknowledging the Carnegie-Mellon University, has said that sex-power-ethics equation is the key to “only by educating managers and future controlling it. We must always remember managers about ethics and about strategies that one of many roles the military profes- for resolving moral mazes” can the current sional plays is that of teacher. We may crisis in ethics be properly resolved. “Only teach others by classroom instruction, by education can prepare a manager for the one-on-one training, and by example, but moral tests that occur in the workplace, teach we do, and “teachers are responsible and only education can help the manager for nothing less than the next generation’s see the folly of his/her contemplated mis- code of ethics—a heavy weight to bear.”38 Tear Out and Remove PLEASE PRINTPLEASE PLEASE PRINT FEEL LIKEUP?FEEL SPEAKING Fill out one of the attached comment cards and and cards comment of attached out the Fill one card to comment cardtoissue on this comment We are always interested in hearing trom our readers. Please usePlease inWethis readers.our tromhearing are alwaysinterested COMMENT CARD AIRPOWER JOURNAL COMMENT CARD AIRPOWER JOURNAL card to comment onissue card tothis comment We are inalways interested hearing Pleasefromour usereaders. this RartvTibe First name Initial Last name Last Initial name First RartvTibe Street city State-Country Zip Code RankTme First name initial Last Last name initial First RankTme name Si-eer CUy Si-eer State Country Zip Code drop it in any mail box. it mail drop in any ______

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To bear this weight successfully, to dis- sexual ethics. Written ethical codes can charge our responsibilities as teachers, and provide us a framework for measuring our to ensure operational effectiveness and conduct, and we can develop written mission accomplishment, we must rein- codes for our units. Finally, training in force ethical perspectives in our profession ethical behavior can help us confront the and in our society. Sex, power, and ethics ethical issues inherent in a position of are inextricably tied together for the super- power. visors of the 1990s. We must recognize the Ultimately, we come back to the opera- imbalance of power between supervisor tional necessity behind sex-power-ethics and subordinate, and the sexual tempta- questions—the necessity for mission tions such an imbalance can present. We accomplishment. Without unimpeachable must understand that rigid ethical stan- conduct by our people, without an irre- dards are a must in our profession, and proachable example from our leadership at that we possess power as supervisors that every level, morale suffers and the opera- must be used ethically. Justice and right tional mission suffers or fails. As Air Force behavior are active concepts that must be Pamphlet (AFP) 35-49, Air Force Leader- lived to be real, but we must admit that in ship, rightly observes, “ Lack of self- questions of sexual conduct, doing right discipline in a leader destroys the unit’s may be a most difficult task. cohesion and, ultimately, impairs its abil- Fortunately, three sources of help are ity to perform the mission.”39 Whether this available to us if we cultivate them. Our failure occurs in the stateside workplace or friends—honest, sincere associates who in the deserts of the Middle East, mission are our intellectual companions—can help failure is the one thing we cannot us preserve our perspective in questions of stand. □

Notes 1. Cal Thomas. The Death of Ethics in America (Waco. 14. Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 Tex.: Word Books Publishers. 1988). 26. (1986), cited in Burleigh and Goldberg, 48. 2. Ethics in the Air Force: 1988 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air 15. Jerry Edelwich and Archie Brodsky. Sexual Dilemmas University Press). 1990. 64. 66. 75. fo r the H elping Professional (New York: Brunner-Mazel, Inc.. 3 Peter Rutter. Sex in the Forbidden Zone (Los Angeles: 1982). 210. Jeremy P Tarcher. Inc., 1988). 2. 16. Nancy Henley and Jo Freeman. Women: A Feminist 4. "Colleges Train White Collar Criminals," Omaha Perspective (Palo Alto. Calif.: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1975), World-Herald, 21 January 1990. G-l. 393-94. (Note that this closely echoes the language in several 5. Julie Bird. "3-Star Relieved of Command." Air Force Air Force directives.) Times. 19 November 1990, 4. 17. Quoted in Robert A. Fitton, ed.. Leadership: Quota- 6. "Sleeping with Your Lawyer: Is Sex with the Client tions from the Militaiy Tradition (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Inherently a Conflict?” Newsweek. 26 March 1990. 62. Press, 1990), 34. 7. AFR 35-62. Policy on Fraternization and Professional 18. Kenneth Blanchard and Norman Vincent Peale, The Relationships. 16 April 1990, 2. Power of Ethical Management (Escondido. Calif.: Blanchard 8. AFR 30-1. Air Force Standards (Pocket Size). 4 May Training and Development. Inc.. 1988). Sound Cassette. 1983. 20. 19. Fitton. 37. 9. Kenneth S. Pope. "Teacher-Student Sexual Ethics." in 20. Rutter. 25. Sexual Exploitation in Professional Relationships, ed. Glen 21. Ibid.. 50. O. Gabbard (Washington. D.C.: American Psychiatric Press. 22. Pope, 211. 1989). 171. 23. Quoted in A Treasury of Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. 10. Chaplain (Col) Samuel D. Maloney. "Ethics Theory for Runes (New York: Grolier, Inc... 1955), 174. the Military Professional." Air University Review 32. no. 3 24. Edelwich and Brodsky, 210. (March-April 1981): 63—71. As proof of this fact, observe the 25. Borden Parker Bowne, quoted in Runes. 174. deliberately vague language in AFR 35-62. 26 Pope, 135-36. 11. Harold Kushner. Who Needs God? (New York: Summit 27. Thomas, 154-55. Books. 1989). 71-72. 28. Cathy Ackerlund. "Drawing the Line on the Job." Air 12. Nina Burleigh and Stephanie B. Goldberg, "Breaking Force Times, 29 January 1990, 49. the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Law Firms.” ABA /ournal, 29. AFR 30-30. Standards of Conduct, 26 May 1989, August 1989. 51-52. attachment 3, 1: also see H. Concurrent Resolution 175. 85th 13. This definition is currently taught in the enlisted pro- Cong.. 2d sess.. 1958, Congressional Record. 13556. fessional military education curriculum of the SAC NCO 30. Rutter. 163. Leadership School at Offult AFB. Nebraska. 31. Ibid.. 164. 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

32. These general statements were developed by the staff 35. “Moral Mazes Trouble Managers," Omaha World- of the SAC NCO Leadership School at Offutt AFB from Janu- Herald. 24 June 1990, S-l. ary through August 1990. 36. Ethics in the Air Force. 85-86. 33. "Testers Struggle with Sexuality,” Omaha World- 37. Ibid., 162. Herald. 10 June 1990, G-l. 38 Sherry S. Cohen, Tender Power (Reading. Mass.: 34. Fitton. 161. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.. Inc., 1989), 66. 39. AFP 35-49. Air Force Leadership. 1 September 1985, 9.

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67 A REVOLUTION IN AIR TRANSPORT ACQUIRING THE C-141 STARUFTER

Roger d . Launius B et t y R. Kennedy

HE NATION’S leaders are in- from 1948 to 1966, has long been involved creasingly challenged by the diffi- in aircraft development and acquisition as cult task of managing shrinking the Department of Defense’s (DOD) single defense dollars more efficiently manager for airlift services. A study of the Tthan at any time since the end of thecommand’s efforts to acquire the C-141 Korean conflict. Deft handling of political, Starlifter, the strategic airlift workhorse economic, technological, and managerial currently operated by MAC,2 illustrates the issues is required to provide future genera- difficult road presented by even the most tions with an Air Force sufficiently capa- successful acquisition programs. Changing ble to meet threats that are only vaguely requirements and approaches, political discernible at the present time. In testi- priorities and apparatus, defense strategies mony before Congress in April 1990, Sec- and perceived threats, and the social and retary of Defense Richard B. Cheney acknowledged this problem when he remarked that the weapon systems cur- rently being developed will probably be flown by pilots not yet born and ordered into action by a president not yet old enough to vote.1 The necessity for quality weapon systems, therefore, becomes in- creasingly important with every passing moment. Military air transports, like other USAF weapon systems, have always been closely related to evolving aviation technologies. Consequently, the history of military airlift includes the eternal search for larger, more advanced, and increasingly more capable fe/. aircraft systems. The Military Airlift Com- ** * mand (MAC), previously designated the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) DEVOLUTION IN AID TRANSPORT 69

economic climates all play key roles in appeared more appropriately to belong to this process. Analyzing a past airlift the private sector, especially when MATS acquisition program recenters the present pilots flew essentially the same routes as debate over how much and what kind of the commercial carriers. Intense competi- airlift most rationally meets the needs of tion among the scheduled and supplemen- the United States’ national security inter- tal carriers3 in the uncertain airline market ests. Comparison also highlights the evolu- had created a situation by the mid-1950s tionary development of military airlift and that appeared threatening to even the most offers insights into future airlift financially sound airline. The heads of the acquisitions. commercial carriers saw a lucrative market with DOD and therefore wanted a much larger slice of its airlift business. More- over, there was great public interest in reducing the expenditures and size of the Political Context federal government, and a move from an The acquisition of the C-141 transport organic to a contract airlift system for DOD followed directly the course of strategic could yield potentially extraordinary and economic priorities of the cold war savings. era. As airlift activities wound down fol- In this environment. Congress showed lowing the Korean conflict, MATS found sustained interest in the relationships itself embroiled in a life-threatening between military and civilian air transport debate with segments of the commercial operations, and the C-141 eventually aviation industry and members of Con- sprang from this interest. The first formal gress over the role of military airlift in congressional discussions were the 1956 peace and war. To many, the command's hearings conducted by a subcommittee of strategic airlift system of fixed routes the House Defense Committee on Appro- priations. Disturbed by the Army’s in- ability to deploy its stateside strategic forces to foreign theaters, as well as by questions raised by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) on military air transport activities and their possible infringement on civil carriers, Congressman Daniel Flood (D-Pa.) chaired a series of airlift hearings. During the pre- sentations, Congressman Flood criticized MATS’s use of C-118 Liftmaster and C-121 Super Constellation aircraft. As militarized versions of civilian aircraft, they simply had not been designed to accommodate During the 1950s the Air Force's airlift fleet consisted of converted commercial aircraft. The C-118 (top) was based on the DC-6A commercial freighter, the C-121 (middle) was a modified Lockheed Constellation, and the C-135B (bottom) was built on a Boeing 707 airframe. Pressure from Congress, especially from Rep Mendel Rivers, eventually influenced the Air Force to procure a jet-powered aircraft designed specifically for military airlift missions.

the Army's air transport requirements. What was needed, in his view, was a large, modern aircraft designed solely for mili- tary use. It would be capable of transport- ing the Army’s troops and heavy equip- ment together, thereby ensuring the timely arrival of cohesive fighting forces.4 Although MATS leaders objected to Congressman Flood’s criticism, they found his statements on modernizing air trans- port most acceptable. It gave added weight to a command proposal dating from the early 1950s to replace its aging World War II fleet with two types of turboprop air- craft. These leaders sought a purely cargo aircraft capable of carrying 50 tons a dis- tance of 3,500 miles and a passenger/cargo aircraft capable of transporting 15 tons or 100 passengers over the same distance. The long-range capability for the two air- craft was based on the realization that many en route air bases would in all prob- ability not be available in wartime. Influ- encing the MATS plan was a Rand Corpo- ration report which concluded, after reviewing some 1,000 aircraft designs, that transport aircraft with turboprop engines would have lower operating costs than those with standard reciprocating engines. Moreover, most military air transport offi- cials were not overly concerned about higher altitudes and speeds that came as a result of the turbojet revolution; hence they did not seriously consider jet trans- ports as possibilities at that time. Their views oriented the command toward an evolutionary upgrade in airlift capabilities. Not until the Boeing 707 appeared in the latter part of the 1950s, demonstrating so well the potential of jet transports, did MATS leaders become excited by the pros- pect and redirect acquisition efforts.5

70 Plans for modernizing the MATS fleet did not come to fruition until after the continued attention of Congress forced senior Defense Department officials to con- sider the problem anew. In January and February 1958. Rep Chet Holifield (D- Calif.), chairman of the Military Opera- tions Subcommittee of the House Commit- tee on Government Operations, led an investigation into all air cargo and pas- senger transportation. Not initially con- cerned with MATS’s force modernization, the subcommittee addressed the issue as it proceeded. During the hearings, the presi- dent of the Air Transport Association, St uar t T i p t o n , o u t l i n e d a pl an for a national airlift program that utilized to a much greater extent the civil carriers to meet wartime airlift requirements.6 Through an elaborate formula, Tipton essentially proposed that DOD look to the civil carriers first to meet its wartime air- lift requirements and then allocate any remaining requirements to MATS. Tipton clearly envisioned commercial carriers taking the lion’s share of DOD’s airlift business with MATS limited specifically Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara exerted strong to “hard-core” military airlift missions pressure on the Air Force to move forward on the that required specialized aircraft for out- acquisition of the C-141. He and John F. Kennedy, the sized or exceptionally heavy cargo, newly elected president, viewed a mi>dern airlift capability unusual security measures, or direct sup- as a key element in their conrept of flexible response. port of tactical combat units.7 This concept drew a pointed response from Dudley Sharp, the assistant secretary of the Air mended that MATS concentrate on airlift- Force for materiel, who argued that the Air ing outsized and special cargo, leaving the Force needed to maintain a strong trans- passenger and conventional cargo business port force that could provide an instant to the commercial carriers. Consistent with response capability. Moreover, Sharp this division of airlift, the subcommittee maintained that commercial airlift was also directed that the Air Force take action complementary, not equivalent, to military to modernize the MATS fleet—which pri- airlift. Sharp further refuted those who marily consisted of aircraft designed for claimed that the airlift capability of MATS commercial use—by procuring a large, was more than a by-product of peacetime long-range cargo aircraft. Such an aircraft, training.8 built specifically to carry the military’s Recognizing that the arguments of each hard-core cargo and without a genuine side had merit, the Holifield subcommittee passenger capability, would ensure that concluded that MATS had turned the fly- military transports did not compete with ing hours allocated to the command for the commercial airlines for DOD dollars. wartime training into a peacetime trans- Thus, by directing the procurement of a portation system that could be regarded as completely different type of aircraft for competing with the commercial carriers. MATS, Congress would in effect remove Thus, the subcommittee’s report recom- the command from the passenger arena—

71 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

K77S

which was the bread and butter of com- The first C-141 Starlifter taxis in its first move under power mercial operations.9 afler being rolled out from the Lockheed-Georgia factory. The new fan-jet airlifter could reach any spot in the world This directive to modernize the MATS with only one refueling stop. fleet received additional support during the months that followed. For example, Sen A. S. (“Mike”) Monroney (D-Okla.). chairman of the Commercial Aviation Sub- forces. At a minimum, the Rivers subcom- committee. held hearings that reinforced mittee advocated procuring Douglas DC-8, the recommendations of the Holifield sub- Boeing 707, Douglas C-133, and Lockheed committee. 10 More important, Cong L. C-130B aircraft for this purpose.11 These Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.) of the House hearings also designated that specific Armed Services Committee presided over funds be made available for modernizing an investigation by a subcommittee whose military airlift along the course set bv the findings mandated a radical moderniza- Holifield subcommittee report.12 tion program for MATS aircraft. Rivers advocated the procurement of jet aircraft as the ideal for MATS so that it could keep up with the turbojet strike forces it sup- The USAF Response ported. This modernization program was Responding to the congressional recom- necessary, he believed, because the United mendations. DOD officials stated their States was entering a new age that concurrence on modernizing the MATS demanded a conventional intercontinental airlift fleet provided it was not placed assault capability. The slow shift in the ahead of other military procurement pro- late 1950s from a nuclear deterrence strat- grams. In 1958, as at present, air transport egy to one requiring flexible response in a modernization was not at the top of the variety of contingency environments Air Force’s procurement list. Defense offi- increasingly necessitated the interconti- cials. however, did show a moderate com- nental airmobility of conventional military mitment to the congressional recoin- REVOLUTION IN AIR TRANSPORT 73

C-I41s plaxed a crucial role in airlifting troops arid materiel cycle. Once again, the issue of moderniz- to the Southeast Asia theater during the Vietnam conflict. ing MATS aircraft arose in a roundabout This C-I4I helped transport elements of the Army's 25th manner. In 1959 the Holifield subcommit- Infantry Division to Pleiku. South Vietnam. tee, holding follow-up hearings, listened to a far-reaching airlift plan presented by the head of the new Federal Aviation Agency, mendations. They made ongoing plans to Elwood R. Quesada, a retired USAF gen- retire the MATS piston-engined C-54 Sky- eral and former Lockheed executive. master and C-97 Stratofreighter aircraft Quesada envisioned building an “air mer- and to introduce the C-133 Cargomaster, at chant marine” by developing a fleet of all- that time the largest turboprop transport in cargo transports that would form the com- the Air Force. Headquarters MATS and mercially operated National Air Cargo USAF planners also studied future airlift Fleet. This action would effectively dis- requirements and recommended acquiring establish the Civil Reserve Air Fleet of pri- both Lockheed's C-130B Hercules and a vate carriers under contract to DOD for swing-tail cargo jet aircraft, the C-135 wartime airlift. It would also significantly Stratolifter, to complement the C-133. The reduce MATS since Quesada’s new com- most important action to come out of the mercial fleet would be able to satisfy the Air Force's 1958 modernization plan was Army’s request for airlift sufficient to the decision to begin developing from move an entire division.14 According to scratch a cargo jet to be fielded in the Quesada's plan, a minuscule MATS would 1966-70 time frame. This aircraft became move only the purely military or hard-core the C-141 Starlifter. perhaps the most sig- items required by the Army. The National nificant transport aircraft brought into the Air Cargo Fleet would airlift everything USAF inventory to date.13 else.15 Quesada found strong support for The C-141 program gained impetus his plan from a wide range of respected toward realization as a result of congres- people and organizations, even among sional activities during the 1959 budget senior officials in DOD. 74 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL FALL 1991

Quesada’s plan resulted in Congress The C-141 prcrved its value again when the Air Force flew the 101st Airborne Division to Vietnam. Troops deplane rejecting the Air Force’s budget request to during a layover at Elmendorf AFB. Alaska (above), and purchase 10 jet transports during fiscal disembark from a C-141 after their arrival at Bien Hda AB. year 1960, not because Congress as a South Vietnam (right). whole opposed the modernization of the MATS fleet but because the Air Force wanted to buy essentially commercial DC-8 or Boeing 707 aircraft. Congressman In addition. Headquarters USAF did not Flood, for example, argued that the Air help its bid for this acquisition money by Force airlift modernization initiative at several almost laughable miscalculations that time was an expensive vehicle that raised the ire of key congressmen. designed to give MATS nothing more than First, required to report annually on initia- the same type of jet aircraft capabilities as tives concerning MATS, the Air Staff sent those maintained by commercial airlines. a lieutenant colonel instead of the Senator Monroney expressed fears that the expected general officer to accompany the modernization package as presented by assistant secretary of the Air Force for DOD would stifle the development of a financial management. This created a genuine reserve cargo fleet by placing negative impression in Congress about the MATS in even more competition with USAF’s support for modernizing its airlift commercial carriers than in the past.16 fleet. Second, the Air Force had failed to REVOLUTION IN AIR TRANSPORT 75

spend the $140 million appropriated for efforts to rescue the air transport procure- fiscal year 1959 airlift modernization. That ment dollars. With the assistance of Sen omission caused House committee mem- Howard Cannon (D-Nev.), the Air Force bers to conclude that the Air Force could began seeking $50 million for a supple- simply do without. Also, influenced by the mental appropriation for fiscal year 1960. contention of certain airlines that the Air In a letter to Cannon, Secretary Douglas Force would use any new jets to compete indicated that $30 million of the USAF with passenger airlines, Congress re- request was to continue research and mained unconvinced that the service development (R&D) work on new jet should have its own way in a MATS mod- engines that would benefit both the mili- ernization program. These reasons, as well tary and commercial airlines. This feature as others of a less tangible nature, made it was very attractive to many members of possible for Senator Monroney to get the Congress, but when Cannon presented the Air Force’s modernization proposal voted supplemental request before the appropri- down despite a concession by Secretary of ations committee, he failed to make that the Air Force James H. Douglas that the point. Instead, the committee got the Air Force would limit its acquisition to 50 impression that the money was for an Air jet transports and that there would be no Force plan to fund three different trans- additional transport purchases until after ports: the all-cargo military jet or its their arrival.17 equivalent, 50 C-133s to carry outsized These adverse actions prompted Head- cargo and missiles, and several hundred quarters USAF to make some last minute civil-military cargo transports. Using his 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

influence, Monroney got the matter voted of airlifting a tactical airborne assault force down only to learn later about the jet- of two and two-thirds divisions and one engine R&D effort. During the conference other division to potential combat theaters session on the budget, Cong Albert worldwide. Tonnage requirements per Thomas (D-Tex.) refused to reinstate the division were placed at 5,000 for move- $30 million and got the item passed over ment to established facilities and at 11,000 pending a new study on the airlift issue for austere locations. Just to deploy 5,000 during the next congressional session.18 tons of equipment earmarked for one of The net result of the budget deliberations these divisions was estimated as requiring for 1960 was that neither the Air Force 272 C-133-type aircraft.21 During the (which now lacked funds to modernize Rivers hearings, Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, strategic airlift) nor the airline carriers the Army chief of staff, restated the Army’s (which now with congressional meddling request for this capability and asked for had intensified the competition among the sufficient airlift to move the combat ele- various segments) were happy. ment of a division within 14 days and two divisions within four weeks.22 It quickly became apparent to Rivers that the Air Force could neither support these require- ments nor did it have any realistic plans Pivotal Actions, 1960—61 under way to reach that goal. The result The quest for what became the C-141 was a stinging rebuke to both the Joint took a new turn in 1960-61 with three crit- Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the ical actions. The first involved a study Air Force for failing to create enough conducted at the direction of President capability in MATS to meet potential Dwight D. Eisenhower. He asked Defense contingencies. Secretary Neil McElroy to examine the role In discussing what kind of airlift it of MATS in all environments. Completed needed during the Rivers hearings, Army in February 1960, The Role of Military Air officials advocated the development of an Transport Service in Peace and War con- aircraft that could perform many bat- tained the first national policy statement tlefield tasks: strategic and tactical airlift, on airlift. Essentially the report’s nine airdrop, and low-level flights were only a provisions directed that commercial car- few of the desired capabilities. Because it riers through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet was already in production and had many program would augment the military’s of the desired characteristics. Army need for airlift: MATS, in turn, would leaders were willing to accept a modified provide the hard-core airlift. The provi- C-130 for this role. Viewing the airlift sions further stipulated that MATS would problem somewhat differently, Lt Gen undergo modernization to fulfill its mili- William H. Tunner, the MATS com- tary requirements and proposed joint civil- mander, proposed the procurement of 45 military development of a long-range, swing-tail jets to support deployments by turbine-powered cargo aircraft.19 the Strategic Air Command; 49 other The second action arose when Cong Carl swing-tail aircraft as an interim solution to Vinson (D-Ga.), chairman of the House the Army’s needs: 50 C-133s for outsized Armed Services Committee, asked Con- cargo requirements: and 188 additional jet gressman Rivers to head a special subcom- aircraft especially designed to support mittee to look into the Army’s Army requirements, which would become requirements for airlift in support of the the C-141. Tunner estimated the cost of increasingly important flexible response this modernization package at approx- strategy.20 As early as 1951, the Army’s imately $2 billion. Unfortunately. DOD leadership had been harping on the need and USAF officials clearly opposed acquir- for a strategic airlift deployment capability ing so many new transport aircraft. But and had asked the Air Force to be capable MATS maintained that its future rested on REVOLUTION IN AIR TRANSPORT 77 those jets, basing its rationale on the need for improved performance and reliability features to meet the rapidly advancing flexible-response strategy.23 Faced with these service differences, the Rivers subcommittee forged a compromise that also took into consideration prior con- gressional directives on modernizing air- lift. Rivers asked the House Appropria- tions Committee to approve $337 million for 50 C-130Es and 50 modified jets. While the House Appropriations Committee reduced Rivers’s request by $100 million as it revived the Quesada plan and gave priority to the procurement of the C-130s, the Senate Appropriations Committee dis- agreed and sought to redress the military’s overall neglect of airlift. Congress subse- quently passed Public Law 86-601 on 7 July 1960, allocating $310.7 million for air- lift. specifically $140 million for C-130Es, $60 million for modified jets, and the remainder for C-130Bs and the C-141 development program. The congressional conference report further stipulated that MATS use its jets for both Army and Air Force requirements.24 The lasting value of the Rivers subcommittee hearings was to convince Congress of the great need for modern airlift resources to support the growing air mobility of conventional forces.25 The third critical action occurred during the presidential election campaign of 1960 Gen Howell M. Estes. Jr. General Estes was the commander when Sen John F. Kennedy (D-Mass.) of the Military Airlift Command when the C-141 first entered the Air Force inventory. He recognized that the acquisition made the airlift issue part of his presiden- of the C-141 made possible a quantum leap forward in airlift tial campaign. Indeed, his embrace of the capabilities. doctrine of flexible response for the nation's defense strategy required the abil- ity to project military power throughout outside the Department of Defense. While the world. He even spoke of the need of certain Army leaders were advocating air- developing “additional air transport lift, they perceived it largely as a means of mobility—and obtaining it now’’ in his deploying paratroopers, and special State of the Union address in January assault troops still regarded surface trans- 1961. Accordingly, rapid mobility became portation as the primary mobility system. a key element of the Kennedy administra- Likewise, the Air Force as an entity was tion's posture of deterring the full spec- not committed to airlift, with the general trum of warfare.26 Support for a MATS exception of officers in the Military Air airlift modernization program had never Transport Service or airlifters who had been more certain. moved to other positions throughout the It should be added, however, that the Air Force. The reasons for this lack of con- support for airlift had come largely from cern were complex. Although airlift was 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

officially considered one of the primary tion into transport configurations, and the missions of the service, most Air Force purchase of 13 additional C-135s. The officers still did not accept it as coequal command would use the new C-130 and with missions performed by fighter and C-135 aircraft to fill the void until the bomber aircraft. arrival of the proposed C-141.2« Airlift, in essence, did not really fit into The interim solutions in McNamara’s the scheme for the optimal use of air plan were acceptable to most Air Force power. It remained a stepchild—an auxil- officials. Only airlift planners at Headquar- iary force—not contributing directly to the ters MATS raised questions about the quest for air superiority or strategic bom- viability of the turboprop C-130 Hercules bardment. Although airlift was important, for the command’s strategic airlift opera- perhaps the impression that it was closely tions.29 The C-130 was originally designed tied to an essentially unglamorous logisti- for the Tactical Air Command as a short- cal effort reinforced its stepchild position. range transport to support the Army’s air In addition, the perception that airlift was assault operations, and it was a superb air- tied to the Army probably determined the craft for this purpose. It was quite rugged importance it was assigned in Headquar- and dependable, especially for intratheater ters USAF circles. The divorce from the operations where its airborne, short-field Army in 1947 had been a difficult one, and landing, and truck-bed loading height the Air Force had sought to show how it capabilities were especially valuable fea- had a mission and a si gni fi cance beyond tures.30 Although the E model to be pro- that of supporting ground operations.27 For cured for MATS had a longer range, had air transport acquisitions to be successful, more payload capability, and was service- therefore, sufficient congressional and key able as a strategic airlifter, MATS officials executive branch interest had to be did not regard it as very suitable for long- developed to counteract the pervading range missions. While the E model’s per- apathy of most USAF leaders. formance was an improvement upon that of both the C-119 and C-123. the aircraft it The Flexible-Response was designed to replace, its 18- to 23-ton payload could not compete with the cargo- S tra te g y and the C - 141 carrying capability of aging C-97. C-121, The difficult task of mobilizing interest and C-124 aircraft. Moreover, from the per- for an aircraft program received a major spective of MATS airlifters, the C-130 was boost during the Kennedy administration still a propeller-driven aircraft (although it when the rapidly rising defense strategy of was a turboprop), and its cruising speed of flexible response in both nuclear and con- approximately 300 miles per hour did not ventional arenas gained preeminence significantly improve upon what was cur- among the nation’s leaders. An able advo- rently in the MATS inventory. Command cate of flexible response, Secretary of officials plainly regarded the C-130 as a Defense Robert S. McNamara pressed stopgap measure to meet airlift require- forcefully for the C-141’s acquisition, ments until the C-141 was developed.'31 sometimes facing opposition and always The other interim aircraft, the C-135 experiencing a subtle sense of apathy from Stratolifter, was simply a military version Headquarters USAF. Even with the of the Boeing 707. First configured for the development of the C-141 in the offing, the military as the KC-135 tanker aircraft for rapid change in the national security pos- the Strategic Air Command, it was then ture had made an interim modernization adapted to transport requirements. MATS program for MATS of utmost importance. received its first Stratolifter in June 1961. As a result, McNamara worked first for an Capable of flying at 600 miles per hour increase in the procurement of the longer- and carrying 87,000 pounds, or 43.5 tons, range C-130Es from 50 to 99, the modifica- it represented a great advancement in mili- tion of 17 KC-135 tankers under produc- tary airlift. For example, in 1962 during REVOLUTION IN AIR TRANSPORT 79

Exercise Long Thrust, C-135s completed balanced a worthwhile mixture of advan- the fastest transatlantic troop rotation in tages and disadvantages in terms of history, transporting one Army unit from capabilities, price, durability, supportabil- Kansas to Germany and returning another ity, and quality. The C-141 had a shorter unit to Fort Lewis. Washington, in 45.5 fuselage than either the C-133 or the hours. Clearly, what piston aircraft had DC-8F. With a maximum payload of 34 taken days to airlift, the C-135 moved in tons, it fell below the Boeing 707-300’s hours. Yet, because of flexible response at 44.9 tons and the DC-8F’s 38.7 tons. More- a time when there was great emphasis on over, its maximum range fully loaded was airdrop capability, the C-135 had none. 500 miles less than the B-707 or the DC-8, Nor were its cargo-carrying capabilities, and the C-141 had no outsized cargo especially its side-loading features, well capability like the C-133 or C-124. At a suited to the transportation of military time when other MATS military transports equipment; and the civil carriers, which had speeds of approximately 300 miles per flew essentially the same aircraft, argued hour, however, McNamara was willing to that this created an environment ripe for trade this cargo-carrying capability for direct competition with them. Addi- greater responsiveness. tionally, fatigue analysis had determined In comparing the C-141 against the that these aircraft had an effective service B-707 and DC-8, McNamara willingly life of a mere 10.000 flying hours. Vir- accepted less than ideal range and tually everyone recognized these prob- tonnage-carrying capability for the ability lems. In considering the purchase of to transport more oversized cargo. What additional C-135s during discussions on the military got was a fast jet transport the budget for fiscal year 1963, Defense with good troop-carrying capabilities, Secretary McNamara recognized the excellent cargo capacity, and superb air- C-135's limitations and decided to wait for drop capabilities; all using available tech- the C-141.32 nology of the late 1950s and early 1960s— Believing the near-term need called for a no more, no less.33 medium-sized transport “workhorse,” DOD under McNamara emphasized the consummation of a program that had been Development and Acquisition first started in a very small way in 1959. Events moved rapidly following the rec- With planners working closely with the ommendation of the Rivers subcommittee Army, the C-141 Starlifter was designed to to procure a new medium transport. By carry all but 2 percent of an airborne divi- May 1960, the airplane’s specific opera- sion's equipment a distance of 5,500 nauti- tional requirement document—SOR 182— cal miles at speeds up to 500 miles per was published, and by July initial funding hour. The C-141 revolutionized the MATS for the program was available. In Decem- airlift system in terms of both speed and ber 1960, Boeing, Douglas, Convair, and capability. It was, in part, such a success- Lockheed received the government’s ful aircraft because it represented a middle request for proposal. Indicating the ground of technology. While it was not national importance ascribed to the new simply a military version of a commercial military transport, President Kennedy airliner—past acquisition efforts in that assumed the honors of announcing Lock- direction had always possessed serious heed as the winner of the design competi- drawbacks—it also did not represent the tion for its “Super Hercules” in March most advanced technology. The aviation 1961. More than two years later, in August systems that comprised the C-141 were 1963, the first C-141 rolled out of the Lock- mature and proven. Although there have heed factory, and on 17 December 1963 always been trade-offs in designing mili- the C-141 Starlifter made its maiden flight. tary equipment, the C-141 achieved a suc- In its design and construction phase, the cess uncommon in most aircraft systems. It C-141 program was well executed. The air- 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991 craft exceeded virtually all of the require- transports flew more missions, the C-141 ments established by MATS and fulfilled flights represented a nearly fourfold the needs of the Army except it could not increase in airlift capability. Moreover, the handle outsized cargo.34 C-l41 s completed their missions in one- Of significance, the Starlifter was pro- third the time of the C-124s and C-133s.37 cured under the novel “concurrent Again demonstrating their combat worth acquisition and test” concept versus fol- in November and December 1967, C-141s lowing a standard practice of developing a flew 369 of the 391 missions in Operation prototype aircraft for test and evaluation. Eagle Thrust, moving 10,024 troops, the Under this philosophy, the C-141 entered 101st Airborne Division (minus one bri- the operational force prior to the comple- gade), and 5,357 tons of cargo directly to tion of the Category II Test Program.35 The Vietnam, a distance of approximately rationale behind the concurrent concept 10,000 miles. While the C-133 mission was to have a weapon system become pro- elapsed time ran over 100 hours because of ductive sooner; many believed that testing the need for more en route stops, C-141s a new aircraft in the operational environ- made the trip, averaging between 27 and ment would also enhance the evaluation 30 hours.38 process of the various systems. The press- ing needs of the Vietnam conflict also made this new philosophy attractive. Assessment Although MAC received the C-141 at least There are at least four major conclusions two to three years earlier under this that can be drawn from the development method, it also strained the aircraft’s of the C-141 Starlifter. First, the political planned logistics support and led to a process surrounding the acquisition of the series of modification projects to correct C-141 was exceptionally convoluted. Had deficiencies. These included structural, it not been for congressional and executive avionics, landing gear, flight control, aerial branch interest in the airlift modernization delivery system, and air-conditioning program—some of it because of the problems. By the time MAC acquired the ulterior motive of seeking to remove last of the 284 Starlifters in February 1968, MATS from competition with the commer- the C-141’s deficiencies had been cor- cial carriers—the C-141 would never have rected and consequently had faded as a been built. Throughout most of the 1950s, concern. The main lesson with respect to few people in either the USAF or larger future programs was that while the con- DOD communities, exclusive of people current acquisition and test concept would past or present having served in MATS, field a weapon system faster, it would not cared sufficiently about air transport to eliminate seemingly inevitable system advocate spending significant funds on its problems. Op the other hand, if the modernization. This was especially true weapon system’s design and construction when precious research, development, and is sound, there is no reason to believe that acquisition dollars went into airlift mod- a concurrent acquisition and test program ernization to the detriment of other creates greater numbers of deficiencies acquisition programs. Most USAF leaders than any other procurement strategy.36 at the time of the C-141’s development Two military operations in particular were much more concerned with the silenced what little criticism there was of acquisition of the fighter that eventually the C-141. In Operation Blue Light became the F-4 and preferred to see funds (December 1965-January 1966), MAC air- expended on that program rather than on a craft transported 2,952 infantry troops and transport, suggesting again that the former 4,749 tons of equipment from Hickam was more central to the overall needs of AFB, Hawaii, directly to Pleiku, Vietnam. the Air Force. The new C-141s flew 88 of the 231 mis- Key congressional leaders involved in sions, and while the command’s other defense issues, however, initially focused REVOLUTION IN AIR TRANSPORT 81 attention on the airlift shortfall and even- Estes, Jr., the MAC commander at the time tually prescribed solutions from outside that the C-141 entered the Air Force inven- the Air Force to ensure that the MATS air- tory, perhaps understood better than most lift modernization evolved.39 Their inves- people the revolution in airlift that came tigations were focused in part by the with the acquisition of the C-141. He sug- Army’s demand for a greater USAF com- gested that the revolution really encom- mitment to meet its expanding airdrop and passed two phases. The first, which he air assault requirements because of the believed was nearing general acceptance, flexible-response strategy. This attention was a recognition of the importance of air- elevated the airlift discussion to the high- lift as a tool for executing US foreign- est levels of government, prompting the policy objectives whether in a peacetime president and his top advisors to make it a or contingency environment. He wrote, matter of concern and action. This was “Global military airlift has been shown, clearly seen in the efforts of President Ken- throughout the era of the cold war, to be a nedy and Secretary McNamara in the early principal medium of achieving maximum 1960s.40 However, only after civilian military flexibility.”42 By the time of the leaders interested in defense management Vietnam War, he added, MATS had and strategy emphasized the issue, did the become “the key element in a far-ranging Air Force begin to support the moderniza- change in national policy: to a strategy of tion program. multiple options for flexible, measured Second, the late 1950s and early 1960s response to any situation in the spectrum fostered an environment more conducive of war.”43 He called this linear progress; it to building the C-141 than had any earlier was relatively straightforward with the period in the history of the Air Force. The obvious advantages of airlift outweighing flexible-response strategy greatly increased its limitations for all but the most myopic the importance of maintaining a conven- and obtuse individuals. tional force, especially one that could be Estes perceived the second phase of rev- deployed quickly as was the case during olution as more ethereal and less easy to the Lebanon and Taiwan crises. To accom- conceptualize and understand. General plish this, airlift of a much greater capacity Estes played off the differences between and more responsive nature was needed to technology and airlift in this arena and support the Army. The acquisition of the postulated that only when technology had C-141 fit beautifully into the new strategy eliminated constraints on the possibilities and in essence became a linchpin of its will this phase have been completed. He success. Without capable airlift to move identified nine overlapping limitations on troops to flash points around the globe, airlift technology: speed, range/pavload any conventional capability was a hollow trade-offs, flexibility of employment in a force. The civilian leaders of the nation wide array of scenarios, cubic capacity, and the Army understood this very well, loadability, aircraft self-sufficiency, fuel and by the early 1960s, the Air Force efficiency, direct operating costs, and ter- establishment had also co-opted the phi- minal base requirements. No single aircraft losophy. Of course, MATS leaders were had ever overcome ail of these difficulties, delighted with this new course as it gener- and Estes asserted that probably one never ated both the procurement of the C-141 would. What General Estes did conclude, and a heightened status for military however, was the C-141 had made a quan- airlift.41 tum leap forward by obviating many of the Third, the technology of the C-141 was historic airlift limitations due to its high evolutionary rather than revolutionary, but speed, range/payload options, flexible run- the result was a radical—maybe even way requirements, favorable loading revolutionary—change in the manner in characteristics, and airdrop capability.44 which airlift was regarded and utilized by The realization of the ability to airlift large the American military. Gen Howell M. loads over intercontinental distances into 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

either a combat or nonthreatening environ- grams that resulted in the F-86, B-52, ment in a matter of hours was the revolu- KC-135, C-130, T-38, F-4, U-2, and SR-71 tion that the C-141 fostered. It led to an aircraft.46 entirely new avenue for the employment The C-141 truly represented a brilliant of airlift and its maintenance and logistical airlift concept well executed, with an support systems.45 acceptable purchase price. Coupled with Finally, the C-141 program was a superb an outstanding design, the Starlifter has example of the integration of defense plan- been a workhorse of the airlift fleet for ning and systems acquisition at the highest some 25 years and is projected, at a mini- levels. Richard P. Hallion, the preeminent mum, to be in service until the mid-1990s. historian of aviation technology, recently While the acquisition process was grind- divided several of the aircraft procurement ingly slow, the technology evolutionary, programs of the 1945—65 time period into and the politics at times desperate, the four basic categories: (1) unrealistic pro- result was a revolution in airlift capability posals. (2) disappointments, (3) aircraft the and responsiveness. Military airlift’s USAF learned to live with, and (4) genuine course as exemplified in the acquisition of successes. While Hallion did not discuss the C-141 does much to explain the diffi- the C-141, it was one of the genuine suc- cult birthing process of the future strategic cesses, comparable to the outstanding pro- airlifter, the C-17. □

Noles 1. Secretary Cheney appeared before a subcommittee of Air Transportation: Hearings before a Subcommittee on Gov­ the Senate Armed Services Committee on 26 April 1990 to ernment Operations, 85th Cong.. 2d sess.. 1958. 3-20. discuss major weapon system acquisition programs. See 7. Initially “outsized” referred to the ability to carry bulky "Cheney Cuts Aircraft Buys,” Airman, May 1990. 2-3. and heavy pieces of equipment like tanks, missiles, and 2. Strategic or intertheater airlift is the m ovem ent of per- fighter aircraft. Presently, "outsized" is defined as an item sonnel or cargo over intercontinental distances, such as exceeding 828" by 117" by 105" high. "Oversized” is any item between the United States and Europe, usually in a non- that exceeds the usual dimensions of a 463L pallet (104" bv threatening air environm ent. Tactical or intratheater airlift is 84"). the movement of personnel or cargo within a theater, often- 8. House, Military' Air Transportation, 497-501, 506. tim es in a com bat situation. 9. House, Military Air Transportation: Twenty-eighth 3 At the time, scheduled carriers, as represented by the Report by the Committee on Government Operations. 85th domestic trunk lines and the international carriers, flew set Cong., 2d sess.. 1958, H. Rept. 2011. 2-6, 90, 92. schedules over fixed routes and received a federal subsidy. 10. Senate Committee on Commerce. Study of Military' Air Supplemental or nonscheduled carriers flew based on tempo- Transport Service: Hearings before Subcommittee, 85th rary needs and lacked subsidies. Another important category Cong.. 2d sess.. 1958. passim. was the all-cargo carriers that had grown out of the supple- 11. House Committee on Armed Services. Investigation of mental group. They flew fixed routes and could obtain sub- National Defense: Phase II, 85th Cong.. 2d sess.. Report of sidies. In addition, there were a number of carriers that Special Subcommittee no. 4. 1958. 2-10. provided feeder service or served regional areas like Hawaii 12. Senate Committee on Appropriations. Department of or Alaska. Defense Appropriations for 1959, 85th Cong.. 2d sess.. S. 4. Congressman Flood's colleagues were especially inter- Rept. 1937, 1958. 17-19; Public Law 85-724. sec. 634. 22 ested in the military's wasteful practices and relationship August 1958. with the commercial carriers. Ignoring the need for aircraft 13. Lt Col Charles E. Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell specifically designed for military use. they directed in the AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. 1987). 248—49. Senate and House Appropriations Committees' reports that 14. Established in 1952, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is com- the Air force fully utilize the services of the commercial air- prised of commercial carriers who dedicate a portion of their lines. For instance, in 1957 Sen Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) aircraft fleets to serve the Defense Department's airlift sponsored a law requiring civil air carriers to handle 40 per- requirement in emergencies when the military's airlift cent of the passenger and 20 percent of the cargo transporta- capability is exceeded. In return for enrolling in the Civil tion requirements for MATS in fiscal year 1958. See House Reserve Air Fleet program, the government awards its peace- Committee on Appropriations. Department of the Air Force time airlift business based on the numbers and kinds of air- Appropriations for 1957: Hearings before Subcommittee. craft committed by the carriers. 84th Cong.. 2d sess.. 1956. 1464—65: House Committee on 15. House Committee on Government Operations. Sub- Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for committee on Military Operations, Military Air Transporta­ 1957. 84th Cong., 2d sess.. 1956 H. Rept. 2104. 45^17: Senate tion, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959. 201-7. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense 16. Ibid.; House Committee on Appropriations. Depart­ Appropriations for 1958. 85th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 543, ment of Defense Appropriations for 1960. 86th Cong.. 1st 1957, 13-14. sess., 1959, pt. 1, 85-86. 88: pt. 6. 585-98, 620, 653-54: Sen- 5 History, Military Air Transport Service (MATS). July- ate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense December 1953. 54-57. Appropriations for I960, 86!h Cong., 1st sess., 1959. 1600- 6. House Committee on Government Operations, Military 1601, 1241-42. REVOLUTION IN AIR TRANSPORT 83

17. House, DOD Appropriations for I960, pt. 1, 85-86, 88, the Amazing Hercules Air Assault Transport and Our Revo­ 124-25; Senate Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental lutionary Global Strike Forces (New York: E. P. Dutton and Appropriations Bill for 1960: Hearings before the Subcom­ Co.. 1963). mittee. 86th Cong.. 1st sess.. 1959, 803-20 31. History. Military Air Transport Service (MATS). 18. Congressional Record. 19 August 1959. 15504-6. January-June 1962, 50-57; AFP 190-2-2. 27; Headquarters 19. Department of Defense. The Role of Military Air I rans- MAC Management Information Summary, "Aircraft Perform- port Service in Peace and War (Washington, D.C.: Assistant ance and Characteristics. Tactical Airlift Turboprop." Febru- Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics|. 1960). ary 1990. 20. See Robert C. Owen. "The National Military Airlift 32. AFP 190-2-2. 30; Futrell. 2:47 Hearings of 1960: Doctrinal Victory or Successful Turf Bat- 33. Walter L. Kraus and Jose M. Matheson, C-141 Starlifter tle?" (Unpublished study, Duke University. April 1990). (Scott AFB. 111.: Office of MAC History. 1973). 1-2. 21. House Committee on Armed Services. Hearings before 34. Futrell. 2:627. Special Subcommittee on National Military A irlift. 86th 35. Acquisition testing involves three phases or categories. Cong.. 2d sess.. 1960. 4071; Frederick C. Thayer. Air Trans- Category I consists of the development, testing, and evalua- port Policy and National Security (Chapel Hill. N.C.: Univer- tion of individual components. Although under the oversight sity of North Carolina Press. 1965). 136-39, 196-99: Air of the Air Force Systems Command, the contractor is mainly Force Pamphlet (AFP) 190-2-2. Releasable Data on USAF responsible for these tests. Category II tests and evaluates the Aerospace Vehicles, voi. 3. 1 June 1964. 26. integration of the subsystems as well as tests the complete 22. House, Hearings before Special Subcommittee on system under near operational conditions. This category is National Military' Airlift. 4075-78. primarily an Air Force effort with participation from the con- 23. Ibid.. 4183-93. 4222-84. 4307-10. tractor. Category III determines the capability of the systems/ 24. House Committee on Appropriations, Department of equipment in terms of operational tactics, techniques, doc- Defense Appropriations for 1961. 86th Cong.. 2d sess.. 1960. trines, or standards, lt also determines deficiencies or limita- pt. 7. 328-39; House Committee on Appropriations. Depart- tions and evaluates the logistics system capability. The using ment of Defense Appropriations for 1961. 86th Cong.. 2d command conducts this test phase. sess., H. Rept. 1561. 1960. 16-18; Senate Committee on 36. Kraus and Matheson. 69. 73. 110. Ill, 153-67. 384. Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 410. 1961.86th Cong.. 2d sess.. 1960. pt. 3. 1502-4, 1656-57; Pub- 37. History. Military Airlift Command (MAC). July 1965- lic Law 86-601. sec. 531, 7 July 1960; Congressional Record. June 1966. 429-38. 30 June 1960, 14105. 14106. 38. Mary L. Whittington. EAGLE THRUST ( S c o t t A F B , 111.: 25. The Big Slam'Puerto Pine exercise in March 1960 Historical Services and Research Division. Office of MAC especially convinced Rivers and other congressmen of the History, 1969), 1. 6-8. 43. need for airlift modernization. Designed to test the ability of 39. For insightful discussions of how Congress has MATS to surge and to sustain its wartime aircraft utilization changed the manner in which it deals with defense issues, rate as well as to determine if MATS could transport a large see James M. Lindsey, "Congress and Defense Policy: 1961- Army force from the continental United States to respond to 1986.” Armed Forces and Society 13 (Spring 1987): 371—401: an overseas contingency, the exercise was a fiasco. While Edward A. Kolodziej. The Uncommon Defense and Congress. MATS did move 29.095 troops and 10.949 tons of cargo, it 1945-1963 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1966); did so only by flying 1.263 sorties for a total of 50.496 flying Craig Liske and Barry Rundquist. The Politics of Weapons hours, by using half of the MATS transport fleet and 32.000 Procurement; The Role of Congress (Denver: University of personnel, and by requiring over a year of detailed planning Denver Press. 1974); Raymond H. Dawson, "Congressional to include massive prepositioning of spares, equipment, and Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative personnel The exercise plainly disclosed the obsolescence of Authorization of Weapons Systems," American Political Sci- most of the MATS transport fleet. Newspaper reporters did ence Review 55 (March 1962): 42-57. not fail to note that commercial jets could have flown to 40. Arthur M. Schlesinger. Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Puerto Rico faster than the aging MATS force of C-124s. See Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. presentation by Lt Gen William H. Tunner. MATS com- 1965); Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith. How Much Is mander. before the House Committee on Armed Services, Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-69 (New York: Special Subcommittee on National Military Airlift. Military Harper and Row. 1971); Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Air Transport Service Report on Exercise BIG SLAM and BIG Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper and Row. SLAM/PUERTO PINE. 20 April 1960. Copy in the Office of 1968); William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New MAC History. Scott AFB. Illinois. York: Harper and Row, 1964). 26. Quoted in Miller, 276. 41. Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie. From Crossbow 27. The problems of creating a separate Air Force have to H-Bomb. rev. ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. been detailed in Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing 1973), 281-85; Gerard H. Clarfield and William M. Wiecek, the Postwar Air Force, 1943-1947 (Washington, D.C.: Office Nuclear America: Military and Civilian Nuclear Power in the of Air Force History, 1984). United States. 1940-1980 (New York: Harper and Row. 28. Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas. Concepts. Doctrine: Basic 1984), 232-37: David Schwartzman, Games of Chicken: Four Thinking in the United States A ir Force. 1961-1984 (M ax- Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy (New York: Praeger Pub- well A FB. Ala.: Air University Press. 1989), 2:30. lishers, 1988), 67-99. 29. These aircraft becam e the backbone of the Military' A ir- 42. Gen Howell M. Estes. Jr.. “The Revolution in Airlift," lift C om m and 's tactical airlift force w hen m ission and Air University Review 17 (March-April 1966): 4. resources that had been a part of the Tactical Air Command, 43. Ibid., 6. Pacific Air Forces. United States Air Forces in Europe, and 44. Ibid., 6-9. the Alaskan Air Command were merged into MAC. See 45. Gen Howell M. Estes, Jr., "Modern Combat Airlift,” Air leffrey S. Underwood. Military Airlift Comes of Age: Consol­ University Review 20 (September-October 1969): 12-25. idation of Strategic and Tactical Airlift Forces under the M il- 46. Richard P. Hallion. "Girding for War: Perspectives on itary Airlift Command. 1974-1977 (Scott AFB. ill.: Office of Research. Development, Acquisition, and the Decisionmak- MAC History. 1989). ing Environment of the 1980s," Air University Review 27 30. M artin Caiden. The Long Arm of America; The Story of (September-October 1986): 46-62. 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

Ricochets Both the Army and Marine Corps have the continued from page 3 advantage of placing their lieutenants almost immediately in responsible positions of leader- all supervisors—will emerge from the closet ship; that is, leading men, not just managing and support Colonel Ullman’s recommenda- resources. During this period, the officer’s trials tions. Who can possibly disagree with his con- and tribulations, successes, and failures are clusion that “the Air Force needs to send a experienced at an age and time in his career consistent message”? where this practical experience will prove invaluable to him later on. Additionally, when Lt Col C. J. Bohn III. USAF the inevitable mistakes are made, they will Maxwell AFB. Alabama more often than not be those from which he can recover without undue damage to his future and without any associated stigma attached to I have to admit that I was extremely reluctant to him personally. ever open the cover of another issue of Air- Compare this to today's Air Force where it is power Journal after reading General Smith’s not at all unusual to achieve the rank of captain deeply disturbing article “How to Get Pro- or even major without ever acting as a super- moted'' in the Spring 1990 edition. However, visor or rater, or ever filling out one perform- the large quantity of negative responses you ance report (with the possible exception of received and published confirmed my suspi- one’s own). This has been attributed to both the cion that there is a legion of USAF officers who flying duties of many young officers and to the are not solely careerist-oriented and who resent very technical nature of many of the USAF the implication. The general’s response in officer career fields. Many times it is simply not which he (unsuccessfully) defended the impor- possible to provide this practical leadership tance of good manners in today’s Air Force experience, which arguably cannot be dupli- many of my contemporaries found humorous, cated in any PME course. although I assume it certainly was not intended So, by the time this captain or major with to be. minimal leadership experience is thrust into a I have just finished reading the Fall 1990 commander’s billet, any opportunity is lost to issue of APJ. Perhaps the crowning achieve- properly train and provide feedback on his ment in this edition was [Lt Col Bruce] Ull- leadership abilities in a practical setting. He is man’s outstanding article “Officer Professional now in a position where he must perform in a Development for Lieutenants.” In addition to competent manner, where those in his com- being both enriching and thought-provoking, mand are directly affected by his day-to-day from my perspective it is right on the mark. decisions. The welfare of his people, not to Much needs to be done to develop officers dur- mention the combat effectiveness of his unit, is ing the critical years before promotion to cap- dependent on his ability to properly assume his tain. Colonel Ullman points out how woefully leadership role. inadequate the USAF is in this area compared Are we wrong in assuming a senior captain to the Army and Marine Corps, but I think a or major can immediately take command of a key difference exists between the services that unit without any prior leadership experience? needs to be addressed. Are we causing reluctance on the part of newly I am a 1984 ROTC distinguished graduate. I designated commanders to be decisive because completed Squadron Officer School by both they are ill prepared to make the tough deci- correspondence as a second lieutenant (before sions in a timely manner? Is the Air Force the current grade restrictions) and in residence somehow encouraging a one-mistake mentality by not providing adequate training to future as a captain. Prior to the resident program. I also attended a three-day PACAF-sponsored commanders? lieutenant’s professional development program Capt Marc F. Stratton, USAF (LPDP) in 1989. I found all of these courses Clark AB. Republic of the Philippines informative, and I continue to attempt to relate the course material to my day-to-day duties and decision making. I have been commander of a detachment STEALTH LESSONS composed of 30 enlisted personnel for approx- Concerning Capt James Patton's intriguing arti- imately 15 months. As a third-year captain, I cle “Stealth Is a Zero-Sum Game ..." in the am somewhat of a rarity in today’s Air Force. Spring 1991 issue, who would have thought RICOCHETS 85 you could draw operational parallels between ones, would not be capable of doing it. And the SSN and ATF? I can’t wait to read the let- since 200 miles equates to three and one-half to ters to the editor! Bravo for publishing an intel- four hours behind enemy lines, the V-22 or a lectually stimulating (dogma-shaking) article! heavy-lift alternative may prove to be a more viable alternative because of its speed and Maj Paul D. McVinney, USAF should be revisited again for the future. Tinker AFB. Oklahoma Air Rescue Service has a proud and honor- able history. I’m proud to have served three tours in the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery DESERT STORM RESCUE LESSONS Service (ARRS), but the time has come to look realistically at the limited monies available and I read Capt Ed Westermann’s article on the Air not duplicate or, worse, buy something less Rescue Service in the Fall 1990 issue with capable than we already have today. interest. Having just returned from seven months in Saudi Arabia. I believe Desert Storm Capt Paul R. Harmon. USAF has put air rescue in a new light, and in these Hurlburt Field, Florida times of reduced budgets it would not appear to be a very bright one. With the overwhelming COIN CONSENSUS success of the tactical air forces one must ask if a newly rejuvenated Air Rescue Service is 1 read with great enthusiasm the article in your really warranted or could the mission be per- Spring 1991 issue entitled ‘‘The Other Side of formed by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the COIN: Low-Technology Aircraft and Little spend the money elsewhere? Wars.” Too often over the course of my two- The Special Operations Component of Cen- year tour in Latin America I witnessed nations tral Command (SOCCENT) was responsible for plagued by determined Communist insurgen- combat search and rescue (CSAR) during Desert cies waste precious and extremely limited Shield/Storm. Air Force, Army, and Navy spe- resources on some of the world's most sophisti- cial forces of this joint component were used to cated fighter aircraft totally ill suited to the support the CSAR mission (only pararescue COIN role. Peru, a nation on the verge of specialists and a few staff billets from Air Res- economic collapse, provides a perfect example. cue Service were in theater). At the outset, SOF While the nation is threatened by two separate helicopters were assigned CSAR as their pri- guerrilla armies, the Peruvian Air Force at- mary mission, and as it became obvious that tempts to fly the Mirage 2000. The Peruvians “shootdowns" would be few and far between, have neither the funds, infrastructure, or helicopters and fixed-wing assets were released skilled personnel to keep these aircraft flying, for the other ‘‘traditional" SOF missions. With yet they cling to them as a misguided symbol of only a handful of viable rescue missions. CSAR their prestige despite the absence of any signifi- could perhaps be permanently assigned as one cant external air threat that would warrant their of SOF’s missions and the money saved could continued use. Time and again this story is be spent on revitalizing the rescue world. repeated in nations like Columbia, Bolivia, and Captain Westermann discussed all new Paraguay. These nations would be far better equipment necessary for the rescue vehicle of served were they to heed some of Captain the future. Virtually all that equipment is on Morris’s advice. the MH-53 PAVE LOWs serving in the Middle However. I must point out a number of fac- East and several SOF MH-60s are in the "mod" tual errors the article contained. The El Sal- line for much of it as I write! It all worked as vadoran air force stations its OA-37 fleet at El advertised and was absolutely critical to our Salvador International Airport (Comalapa) and success. Unfortunately for Air Rescue Service, not at Ilopango as was stated in the article. In the Air Force cut the HH-60D Night Hawk five addition, during the rebel offensive of 1989 years ago! Ilopango was attacked several times but was With lessons learned fresh in our memory, never in any danger of being overrun by the perhaps we should look to the future with a guerrillas. I had the opportunity to visit more open mind and combine this mission Ilopango during the rebel offensive and can under SOF and put the money saved into other attest to this firsthand. projects like the V-22 or something more ver- Overall I found the article outstanding and, satile. Several missions necessary for the when coupled with Captain Bateman's article ground phase were flown by helicopters 200 in the same issue on the role of tactical air miles into Iraq. Rescue helicopters, even new power in low-intensity conflict, provides sub- 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

stantial food for thought concerning the United at age 51, in 1831. His most significant and last- States Air Force's role in the "Little Wars" of ing contribution was his book On War. In this the future. work, which has stood the test of time and 1st Lt Robert M. Levinson. USAF study by armies throughout recent history and Scott A FB , Illinois around the world, he wrote the treatise on the subject. In it he discussed the nature and theory of war, strategy, tactics, and war planning. Its LIC CORRECTION secret was that it was a general, theoretical I found Capt Vance C. Bateman’s Spring 1991 work and did not succumb to the prescription article, “The Role of Tactical Air Power in Low- of dogma or strict rules. In the first chapter of Intensity Conflict,” both timely and thought- the first book—the only part of the work provoking. Certainly, as the Air Force force revised to his satisfaction prior to his death structure draws down, we need to objectively from cholera—he presents the primary ele- assess the contribution air power can make to ments of war: violence; the dominant role of our national security in all areas of conflict. rational, political policy in shaping it: and the While LIC is viewed by many as the latest Pen- element of chance. His thoughts on these sub- tagon bandwagon, the Congress has clearly jects have been the grist for the mills of policy- indicated it considers LIC a very real and cred- makers and generals alike for generations. ible threat and has mandated improvements in A main theme, which from all indications the Defense Department’s ability to deal with would have been emphasized in intended revi- this threat. Captain Bateman’s suggestions for sions, was the dual nature of war. As an instru- improving Air Force LIC capabilities are worth ment of the political policy of a nation, war can considering. be pursued to its absolute in the complete Unfortunately, his discussion of the LIC con- destruction of the enemy, or it can be applied cept reflects an all-too-common misconception to attain a more limited concession. This then concerning the Defense Department’s role in leads to the most often-quoted contention of providing support to insurgent groups and to Clausewitz “that [policy] must be made abso- host-nation counterinsurgency (COIN) opera- lutely clear, namely that war is simply the con- tions. The statement "the Department of tinuation of policy by other means.” But, Defense bears the primary responsibility for unhappily, Clausewitz is probably more often insurgency/COIN operations" (page 73) is not quoted than understood or even read. accurate. Both national LIC policy and military In a roundabout way, this brings us to the doctrine state that the US military supports recent situation in Kuwait. Here, one of the other US government agencies in these areas. most powerful armies in history was poised for Support to insurgencies is generally con- the total destruction of the forces of Iraq, only ducted as Special Activities within the mean- to be stopped short by the president. But, if ing of Executive Order 12333, "US Intelligence war, in the ideal, is violence pushed to the Activities.” These activities fall under the absolute and if the military object of war is the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency. complete destruction of the enemy, why would On the other hand, there is no such clear-cut the United States stop? The answer is that Pres- designation of authority for support to host- ident Bush stopped the army when he decided nation counterinsurgency operations. However, the political object of the war was achieved. according to national LIC policy and military This is not to say that the immediate military doctrine, such support should take place object of his commanders there was the same. within the framework of an overall political, But could the president and Clausewitz not economic, informational, and military effort be on the same wavelength as far as the goals of under the oversight of the chief of the US Dip- the war? For explanation, we can turn to the lomatic Mission (ambassador), in consultation pages of On War, which states that “the politi- with his country team. cal view is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the (political] Lt Col William F. Furr, USAF object in our conception." So, according to M axw ell A F B . Alabam a Clausewitz, the military goal should have always been the complete destruction of the armies of Iraq. The political object, in its con- CLAUSEWITZ AND DESERT STORM ception and later in its translation to the reality Carl von Clausewitz was a soldier and writer in of the evolving regional and global situation, the armies of Europe from 1793 until his death, may well have been something different or RICOCHETS 87

even something less. That the military and war. He probably never entertained a second political objectives of a war may not be the thought. same, or may diverge after the war begins, is Any interpretation of General Schwartzkopf's probably intuitive for most. But the furor that statements as to his desires conflicting with the ensues when somebody mentions it, regardless will of the president are misinformed. There is of whom, should and probably did surprise no controversy here and by all accounts from most. the principals, no disagreement either. It The recent statements of Gen H. Norman seemed to be a fully supported consensus deci- Schwartzkopf included comment that he was sion. In the Korean War, there was indeed dis- prepared to sweep over Iraq and destroy the agreement between a president and his leading enemy force completely. He also indicated that commander. There General Douglas MacArthur he was stopped short of realizing this goal only clearly, publicly, and repeatedly voiced dis- by the command of the president. Further, the agreement and displeasure with the policy of president's order to suspend offensive opera- President Harry Truman. He was the general tions allowed the remains of the Iraqi army to and he knew how the war should be planned beat “the mother of all retreats.” In light of the and prosecuted and on what terms it should explanation of General Clausewitz of the rela- end. We all know how that ended; the general tionship between political and military goals was fired. The situation is, however, not analo- and our constitutional subordination of mili- gous here. Any comparison or similarity repre- tary power to civilian control, all is as it should sented is either bad analysis or bad journalism, be. The president made the determination that or possibly both. what was desired had been achieved and fur- Clausewitz makes the following statement in ther prosecution of the war would be excess. It On War: “Policy is the intelligent faculty, war was what the general characterized as a is only the instrument, not the reverse. The “humane and very courageous decision." At subordination of the military view to the politi- that moment, General Schwartzkopf had no cal is, therefore, the only thing possible.” This option but to comply with the same courage is how it is. In history, it may not always have and determination he showed in waging the been the case. But in the United States it cer- tainly is, especially today. Maj Keith P. Hrebenak, USAF Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio net assessment

Chappie: America’s First Black Four Star Gen- commander of First Air Force, to his subordi- eral by J. Alfred Phelps. Novato. California nate commanders. These indicate that Hunter 94949: Presidio Press, 1991, 333 pages, demanded that segregation be enforced at all $19.95. costs in order to provoke the black officers to riot so they could be arrested and shot. The jacket for this book says ‘‘that readers Phelps then tells the story of the 1945 mutiny will come to know a great American, and real- at Freeman Field, Indiana, by black officers ize how one person with conviction and cour- who were barred from the officers’ club. While age can effect positive changes.” This is quite this account is fascinating reading, James is an advertisement indeed to entice someone to hardly mentioned. There is good reason for this read about a true American hero and a modern- omission—James was assigned to Walterboro, day Horatio Alger success story. If average South Carolina, during this period. Indeed, readers expect to find nothing more than a good Phelps even admits that James was not in- story about Daniel (‘‘Chappie") James, they will volved in the affair, except for carrying a few not be disappointed. The book is an interesting messages from the arrested officers to news- anecdotal history of the general. However, if papers in Washington. D.C. Yet, the author jus- readers are serious about American biographies tifies going into such detail about the incident with depth and supportive research, they by saying it should be told “if for no other rea- should save their money. The book is filled son than to illustrate the immense obstacles he with unanswered questions, unsupported and his fellow black officers of the time were accusations, and a strong tendency by the required to live with and ultimately overcome” author to rely on a thesaurus more than a (page 146). This subject, however, has already dictionary. been well covered by Alan L. Gropman in The J. Alfred Phelps, a retired (1967) Air Force Air Force Integrates (1978). master sergeant and author of two books on Phelps also introduces another major black blacks in America, begins this work by describ- figure of those turbulent years—Lt Gen ing Chappie James's early life in Pensacola. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. Davis appears in the Florida; his college days at Tuskegee Institute book as a “book officer" who is weak and spo- (Alabama), where he trained with the Tuskegee ken of apologetically for his attempts to main- Airmen; and his entrance into the segregated tain order and discipline in his struggle to Army Air Corps in 1943. Phelps then deviates create good black officers. Phelps intimates that from his biography of James and devotes 10 Davis was a disappointment, failing to do more chapters—over one-third of the book—to writ- than he could have toward fostering desegrega- ing about the segregated Army Air Corps, a sub- tion. Davis's only shining moment in the book ject well covered in previously published is his testimony before Congress, at which time works. He also makes some serious charges he argued that the 99th Pursuit Squadron concerning General James. should retain its black officers. Phelps contrasts Central to this portion of the book is the Davis with General James, praising the latter for racial segregation under which black officers in being “ headstrong, irreverent and mis- the Army Air Corps lived, as well as the con- chievous,” always circumventing the rules. "At flicts and dissension which segregation pro- least he (James) had the guts to be an ‘original' duced. Phelps tells of plots to murder two within an aura of military rules and often- white officers—Lt Col Charles Gavle at Sel- boring regulation" (page 163), while Davis fridge Field. Michigan, in 1943. and Col Robert believed in forcing black pilots to follow the R. Selway at Freeman Field, Indiana, in 1945— rules and regulations to prove their place in the because the black officers could not tolerate Air Corps. their Jim Crow policies. Phelps claims that The most disturbing aspect of this book is James was involved in the aborted plot to Phelps’s lack of sources and documentation for murder Gayle and stood by during an his assertions. Phelps suggests that Gen Hoyt especially ingenious, though unsuccessful, Vandenberg. Air Force chief of staff, changed attempt on Selway's life. Phelps relates tele- his mind on integration simply because James, phone conversations of Maj Gen Frank Hunter, 1i then a first lieutenant, talked with him on an

88 NET ASSESSMENT 89 airplane ride. Then Phelps says that no one dotal biographies have a place: however, this really knows what happened! Moreover, he book offers little or no support for some of its uses telephone conversations and direct quotes accusations. Certainly, this work is nowhere of colonels, general officers, and cabinet near the level of a serious biography. It officials—often involving extreme racial slurs— attempts to tell too much, makes too many mis- to tell of their resistance to desegregation. Not takes. and has too little documentation. General once does Phelps cite his sources for these con- James deserves better. versations. No doubt, these conversations could Capl Phillip L. Osborne, USAF have occurred, but the author should present USAF Academy. Colorado some sort of supporting evidence. When Phelps returns to telling the story of Chappie fames and his rise through the ranks during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, he War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and State- again shares some impressive anecdotes. These craft for the Next Century by Colin S. Gray. include Chappie's standoff with Muammar New York 10020: Simon and Schuster. 1990, Qadhafi at Wheelus AFB. Libya; his ex- 442 pages. $24.95. periences in combat; and his tremendous popu- larity in promoting patriotism around the Now that the idealistic enthusiasms of country during the Vietnam War. However. 1989—the end of the cold war, the “evil Phelps also makes an interesting assertion con- empire," even history itself—have been cooled cerning James’s promotions. Phelps says that by the sobering events on the Arabian Penin- General James actually received his fourth star sula, the painful process of devising a foreign and was appointed commander in chief of policy to protect and promote the legitimate North American Air Defense Command by security interests of the United States resumes. courting congressional influences. Indeed. While most observers have noted the diffi- Phelps indicates several times in the book that culties inherent in creating a stable new world although James was a good officer, he had a order, few have been willing to discuss the role tendency to put himself and his career first. of military strategy in completing this task Phelps relies on personal interviews and successfully. phone calls to tell this anecdotal history of Although this reluctance to think seriously General James. He uses Gropman's work (men- about how to employ—instead of build— tioned above). Alan Osur's book Blacks in the military forces should not surprise us, Colin Army Air Forces during World War II: The Gray argues in his splendid primer War, Peace, Problem of Race Relations (1977). and Robert and Victory that strategy is not (perhaps he Rose's Lonely Eagles: The Story of America’s should have said should not be) " i n d e ma n d Black Air Force in World War 11 (1976) almost solely in times of national peril" (page 9). The exclusively for his chapters on the segregated title is instructive, for while Gray’s principal Air Corps. Not only is Phelps’s book lacking in concern is military strategy—“the bridge true research and depth, but also it is littered between military means and political ends” with inaccuracies, inventive language, and (page 27)—he sees such strategy as essential not unanswered questions. only to gaining victory in any future war. but The story of Chappie James needs to be told also to maintaining the peace. In a wide- in a scholarly, carefully researched, lucid fash- ranging yet closely reasoned work, the author, ion. This book does not fill that requirement. who is chairman of the National Institute for Phelps attempts to tell two stories—the life of Public Policy, examines the components that Chappie James and the desegregation of the Air shape all military strategy—about which, per- Force. He needs to stick to one or the other and haps characteristically, Americans are little find supporting documentation other than concerned. Such phenomena as geography, his- anecdotes and previously published works to tory. and distinctive national cultures— tell it. Besides charging, with little documenta- consigned by most of us. including too many tion. that one of America’s four-star generals Air Force officers, to grammar school or was a conspirator in two murder attempts, the doctoral-level specialization—emerge under author seems to praise the alleged acts. Phelps Gray's vigorous presentation as vital to the also portrays James as irreverent and a career- understanding or formulation of effective mili- ist. while also attempting to present him as a tary policy. A fourth key theme, technology and man who "made a difference through voicing its impact on war (one much more to the aver- passionate beliefs in ideals" (book flap). Anec- age American officer’s taste), receives a rich, 90 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL FALL 1991

multilayered treatment impossible to summa- military, as well as to promote recognition and rize adequately in a brief review. The text does appreciation of the profession of arms. highlight, however, our frequent reliance on Matthews and Brown have pulled together 15 weapons systems to take the place of a carefully articles to discuss the foundations and ethical formulated military strategy. Gray’s fifth over- dimensions of leadership, to define leadership arching theme is the holistic nature of strategy. at various levels of war, and to provide case In his pithy summation, "Everything pertaining studies of combat command and the “larger to strategy relates, or at least might relate, to vision" required of a major general. Each article everything else” (page 14). has been published in Parameters, one of the The author s purpose is not prescriptive but US Army’s professional journals, between 1974 didactic. He holds strong views concerning the and 1989. follies of our most recent arms control initia- Space does not permit a detailed discussion tives, the military’s continued and often mis- of each article, although I will highlight some placed reliance on new weapons systems, and items with the hope of inspiring a complete the relationship between the United States and reading of the book’s 162 pages. If you can’t the Soviet Union—which he sees as essentially find the time, however, I encourage you at least adversarial into the foreseeable future. How- to read the eight-page introduction by retired Lt ever. he seeks not to proselytize, but to compel Gen Walter E. Ulmer, Jr. He superbly captures the reader to think critically about how military the essence of each author’s argument and ties power can be most effectively utilized both in them together into a coherent whole. Addi- maintaining peace or gaining victory in war. tionally, he warns, "It is possible that we study That one should agree with Gray’s positions is too much the giants of military history (who irrelevant: “What matters is that one should may be born rather than made) and too little on learn to reason strategically” (page 13). To nur- the performance of the sergeants, captains, and ture this kind of ability, he provides in nine colonels on whose collective shoulders so rich chapters a survey of some of the most much rests" (page xiv). Not surprisingly, per- important problems facing tomorrow's strate- haps, he reminds us that tailoring leadership gist, including nuclear weapons, the Soviet styles is such a challenge because “military Union, and the "perils and pleasures of coali- leadership remains basically an exercise in tion" formulation and employment (pages human motivation" (page xi). In three years as 245ff.). a squadron commander, I certainly found this War, Peace, and Victory is an important to be true. book, combining impressive research with a The editors’ selection of General of the Army sure grasp of the key issues that must be con- Omar Bradley’s article "On Leadership” to lay sidered in the making of strategy. Gray makes the cornerstone was truly inspired. We should an elegant and erudite contribution to the long- all appreciate Bradley's admonition that “the neglected study of this vital subject. His book test of a leader lies in the reaction and response should be read, both by those who make our of his followers. He should not have to impose strategy now and by those who will make it in authority__ He must make his influence felt by the next century. example and the instillment of confidence in Lt Col Gary P. Cox, USAF his followers” (page 3). Some Air Force readers Maxwell AFB. Alabama may be surprised at General Bradley’s moral to an anecdote about a corporate vice president’s lack of success due to his failure to follow through on things, despite his outstanding The Challenge of Military Leadership edited by planning skills: This individual had been only Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown. a staff officer in the military: thus, he had McLean. Virginia 22102: Pergamon-Brassey’s “never had the advantage of a command job,” International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989. so "his training was incomplete” (page 4). I am This is an excellent, easy-to-read book that reminded here of a similar sentiment expressed should become a part of every serious officer's in Col Roger H. Nye’s outstanding book The professional library. At first blush, some Air Challenge of Command (another vital entry in Force personnel may not recognize the impor- the professional officer's library, previously tance of a book published by the Association of reviewed in the inaugural Airpower Journal in the United States Army’s (AUSA) Institute of 1987). Nye says that "all military officers will Land Warfare, but the institute’s stated purpose perform better in their staff and specialist roles is to enhance professional development in the if they see their work through the eyes of the NET ASSESSMENT 91

commander . . . understanding . . . his respon- its principles clearly transcend service paro- sibilities and needs" (page viii). By knowing chialism. Any successful commander today how we contribute to mission accomplishment must be a student "of people and what moti- (fly, fight, and win), we—as members of the vates them; of weapons systems; of the enemy; aerospace and Department of Defense teams— of tactics; and of military history" (page 53). As should be able to maximize our potential. How- we return to a “peacetime” Air Force and look ever. vital to that success and an "essential for suitable role models in life and in history to qualification of a good leader is the ability to guide our professional development, we should recognize, select, and train junior leaders" reflect on General Ulmer’s penultimate com- (page 5). I'm not so sure we do that very well in ment: "If getting our leadership ducks in the Air Force, especially as we get farther away order—creating climates, expectations, and rou- from the flight line. Nonetheless, understand- tines that will optimize our warfighting ing and sound application of these points will capabilities—is not the absolute first order of contribute to a more cohesive effort. the day, I do not know what is" (page xviii). This outstanding book contains historical This is the key point that the editors are trying anecdotes and illustrative discussions meant to to drive home. It is one that we must never for- be saved, savored, and applied. They are far get while we reduce the force, do "less with more numerous than 1 have space to recount. less,” yet still provide the forces necessary to For example, noted historian Dr Jay Luvaas defend the nation. Amen! provides wonderful insights from Napoleon’s Lt Col C. J. Bohn III art of command. Here is one maxim (of many) Goodfellaw AFB. Texas that most people have heard: “An army of lions commanded by a deer will never be an army of lions.” Clearly, the successful coalition forces and their counterpart Iraqi conscripts and Republican Guards who fought in the Gulf war The Lessons of History by Michael Howard. of 1991 can appreciate the verity of this com- New Haven, Connecticut 06520: Yale Univer- ment when they compare Gen Norman sity Press, 1991, 217 pages, $27.50. Schwarzkopf to Saddam Hussein. Sir Michael Howard, Regius Professor of The thoughtful piece by Lt Col John T. Modern History at Oxford before retirement Nelsen 11 on the origin of mission-type orders brought him the Lovett Professorship of Mili- (loosely termed Auftragstaktik) in nineteenth- tary and Naval History at Yale, is one of the century Germany includes the observation that world's best-known military historians. Others Gen George Marshall "often issued students have written more deeply researched mono- foreign or outdated maps, provided only graphs than he. many have written more popu- sketchy intelligence, and compelled them to lar histories than his, and some have provided make their own decisions by cutting off com- more significant insight into strategic, opera- munications with higher headquarters" (page tional, and civil-military relations than 35). Reflect for a moment on the inevitable cri- Howard. His particular genius is the essay tiques of peacetime exercises and operational filled with insights, bon mots, and entertaining postmortems from operations Urgent Fury. Just asides that delight both the listening and read- Cause, and Desert Storm. Then turn the page to ing audiences. The Lessons of History con- read that an antidote to a commander’s inse- tinues the reputation for excellence he began in curity and overcontrol is a "top-down com- earlier collections of his essays such as Studies mand climate which deliberately tolerates the in War and Peace (1971) and The Causes of possibility of greater tactical error in confident Wars and Other Essays (1983). expectation that the resulting explosion of ini- This volume contains 13 essays written tiative . . . will provide a massive multiplica- mostly during his Regius professorship (1980- tion of combat effectiveness at the operational 89); they deal with two levels of historical level" (page 36). Yet, howr often have we inquiry. The first level concerns theoretical lamented the existence of micromanagement in matters—the lessons of history—which are con- the Air Force? Will "lessons” from Desert tained mostly in the first and last papers (his Shield Storm support or refute the validity of inaugural and valedictory lectures, respec- this hopeful-sounding antidote? tively, in the Oxford chair). The second level Although this book has an Army flavor (12 of concerns analytical matters—the application of the 20 people associated with it are West Point historical tools to the analysis of past events— graduates: 10 are Army War College graduates). which in this case concentrate on develop- 92 A1RP0WER JOURNAL FALL 1991 ments mostly in the nineteenth and twentieth Fred Roger, a bombardier with the US Eighth centuries. Air Force in World War II, has a simple story to Many of the latter deal with large themes tell. He does so in a very straightforward, un- such as the impact of military experiences pretentious manner in Countdown!, an account upon literature, the role of Prussia in European of his 35 daylight missions in a B-17 in late history, and the impact of war on social change. 1944 when the Eighth Air Force was at the peak Others reflect Sir Michael's latest interest in the of its power. intellectual aspects of fin-de-siecle Europe that Basic arithmetic shows that, on the average, led to the outbreak of World War I. Central to he flew only once every five days. This meant this inquiry is his famous essay entitled “Men that he had a lot of time to do other things. against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in Trips to London were at the top of the list of fa- 1914." Whatever the topic of these essays, the vorite pastimes. Of course, much of his time on reader will profit from their literacy and the ground was spent in a nerve-racking wait perspicacity. for his name to come up in the daily flight rota- But it is the "lessons of history” that domi- tion. Roger does an excellent job of pointing nate the entire collection: “Far more than poets out that an aircrew member's life was full of can historians claim to be the unacknowledged fairly routine, often monotonous, activities legislators of mankind: for all we believe about when he was not flying. In this sense, Roger the present depends on what we believe about paints a picture far more realistic and complete the past" (page 13). Such a charge requires the than the sensationalized versions produced by scholar to approach the past with caution. Evi- Hollywood. dence is incomplete and contradictory, the past Although Roger’s pleasure trips to London is a foreign country to which we bring intellec- are certainly colorful, they are not the primary tual baggage that distorts reality, and history reason for reading Countdown!. Roger is at his and historians can be used to create and per- best in describing the anxiety and fear one feels petuate myths that can cause great damage to when facing the prospect of a particularly hor- mankind. rifying death—not once, but 35 times. By late History is not the unfolding of some divine, 1944. the Eighth could put 1,000 heavy nationalistic, progressive, or ideological creed. bombers over Germany day after day with Rather, it is a process, and for the past two cen- heavy fighter escort to protect them. The loss turies it has been a process of modernization rate had dropped from the disastrous levels of that is filled with both beneficial and frightful 1943 to an acceptable plateau. However, ac- consequences. Once we understand. Sir ceptable did not mean no losses—just fewer Michael concludes, that “the real justification losses. As if they were in a crazy game of rou- for the study of history is process,” then we can lette, some men seemed destined to make it proceed to “discover what we have been, what home, and some seemed destined to die. we are, and gain intimations of what we might In the back of the author's mind was always become" (page 199). The end is not necessarily the fear that the next mission would be his last. a happy one; the outcome "depends on our Roger eloquently describes the sense of loss he skill in using that capacity for reason and felt when he returned from London to find that judgement which has already brought us so far: his bunkmates had been shot down in his ab- reason and judgement both educated and cre- sence. His feeling of horror was compounded ated by historical experience" (page 200). Sir by the fact that this was the crew he had orig- Michael's Lessons of History represents assign- inally been assigned to fly with. But for a twist ments that we should all learn and benefit of fate, he would have died with them. from. Readers interested in the air war's big picture David Curtis Skaggs should look elsewhere. Countdown' s strength Bowling Green, Ohio is in describing life at the cutting edge of the air campaign against Germany—days of monotony punctuated by moments of sheer terror. Roger has done a fine job of helping us feel what it Countdown! by Fred Roger. Chapel Hill. North was like to have been there, if only vicariously. Carolina 27515: Algonquin Books of Chapel Maj James C. Ruehrmund, Jr., USAFR Hill. 1990. 183 pages, $18.95. Richmond, Virginia notams

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Air University Review Index research assistants. For more information, con- tact the Office of Admissions, Attn: PAC, Uni- The Air University Press has published a com- formed Services University, 4301 Jones Bridge plete index of the Air University Review (1947- Road, Bethesda MD 20814-4799 or call (202) 87). This reference work contains an author 295-3106. index, a title index, and a cross-referenced sub- ject index. Any Air Force or other government organization, college or university library, or similar organization with a need for this index USAFA Instructor Opportunities can be placed on distribution. Requests for dis- The Military Studies Division at the United tribution and other inquiries should be States Air Force Academy is seeking highly addressed to Capt John Doherty. AUCADRE/RI. qualified captains for instructor duty. This duty Walker Hall. Bldg. 1400, Maxwell AFB AL involves motivating and teaching cadets in 36112-5532. Captain Dohertv can also be con- university-level courses that stress air power, tacted at DSN 493-6629 or (205) 953-6629. Base the art of war, military theory, doctrine, and libraries may contain copies of previously pub- force employment. Since its inception in 1980, lished issues of Air University Review. the curriculum in professional military studies has evolved into one of the most interesting and demanding areas of study at the academy. A master's degree is required of all applicants. Preferred degrees for military studies instruc- Uniformed Services Medical School Training tors are in history, military history, political science, and international relations, or in area The Uniformed Services University of the studies of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, or Health Sciences is seeking students for its med- the Middle East. Experience in tactical or stra- ical training and graduate medical-education tegic operations or in operationally related spe- programs. Medical students are commissioned cialties is highly desirable. The division can as ensigns or second lieutenants and draw full sponsor a few highly qualified applicants with military pay and benefits. There is no tuition, the appropriate background for a master's and all books and equipment are provided. At degree through the Air Force Institute of Tech- graduation, students are promoted to naval nology (AFIT), with a follow-on assignment to lieutenant or captain and have a seven-year the Military Studies Division. Applicants service obligation. Both civilians and military should have three to seven years of commis- personnel with a college degree may apply for sioned service, an outstanding military record, the four-year medical program. Applicants and impeccable military bearing and must be no older than 27 (or 33 with prior mili- appearance. Interested individuals should con- tary experience) when they enter school. The sult chapter 8 of AFR 36-20, Officer Assign- university also has a graduate program in basic ments, for application procedures or write Capt medical sciences open to civilians and military. Jeff Cohen, Headquarters USAFA/CWIS, USAF Civilians are not commissioned into the mili- Academy CO 80840-5421 or call DSN tary. Graduate students serve as teaching and 259-3257/3248.

93 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1991

Historical Research Center Grants (e.g., Khe Sanh and An Loc), it was unable to The United States Air Force Historical Research devise a strategy and doctrine that reflected the Center (USAFHRC) announces the availability nature of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Tilford of research grants to encourage scholars to surmises that the Air Force’s institutional study the history of air power through the use experience and the mind-set of its leadership of the center’s US Air Force historical docu- doomed it from the beginning to expect much ment collection, located at Maxwell AFB, Ala- but achieve little with air power. He points out bama. Applicants must have a graduate degree that the 94-targets list devised by the Air Staff in history or related fields, or equivalent schol- was deeply rooted in the mind-set of the strate- arly accomplishments. Their specialty should gic bombing offensive plan that emerged during be in aeronautics, astronautics, or other World War II. The Air Force leadership firmly military-related areas. Residents of Maxwell believed in the efficacy of that strategy. Air AFB are not eligible. Topics may include—but Force doctrine, rooted as it was in the World are not restricted to—Air Force history, military War II experience and leaders, prevented the operations, education, training, administration, generals from realizing that Vietnam was a far strategy, tactics, logistics, weaponry, technol- different war and that North Vietnam did not ogy, organization, policy, activities, and institu- have a clearly defined center of gravity (i.e., a tions. Preference will be given to those modern industrial and transportation proposals that involve the use of primary infrastructure that supported the war machine sources held at the center. Applicants may of North Vietnam). request an application from the commander, Other recent books and monographs: USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6678. The deadline for submis- ANZUS in Revision: Changing Defense Fea­ sion of application is 31 October 1991. tures of Australia and New Zealand in the Mid-1980s by Lt Col Frank P. Donnini, USAF. 1991 (book). Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Chal­ lenges by Dr Stephen Blank et al., 1991 (book). New Publications from Space Control and the Role of Antisatellite Air University Press Weapons by Maj Steven R. Petersen, USAF, Air University Press announces the release of 1991 (monograph). Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Military Airlift: Turbulence, Evolution, and Why by Dr Earl H. Tilford, Jr. Promise for the Future by Lt Col Thomas E. Dr Tilford, a retired USAF intelligence officer Eichhorst. USAF, 1991 (monograph). takes a critical look at how the Air Force flew To order the above publications contact the and fought in Southeast Asia. He argues that Air University Press, Publication Support although the Air Force effectively applied air Branch, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532 or call power in particular places at particular times DSN 493-6452 or (205) 953-6452. contributors

Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff Jim Cunningham (BA, Northern (USMA) is a military doctrine Illinois University: MS, Univer- analyst at the Airpower sity of Illinois) is' visiting refer- Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd (BA and Research Institute. Air Univer- ence librarian. Founders' MA, University of Kansas) is sity Center for Aerospace Doc- Memorial Library, Northern commander of Air University. trine, Research, and Education Illinois University. DeKalb. He Maxwell AFB. Alabama. A com- (AUCADRE), Maxwell AFB. has previously served as mand pilot. General Boyd has Alabama. His previous assign- research assistant, Arms Con- held previous assignments as ments include standardization trol. Disarmament, and Interna- special assistant to the chief of evaluation flight examiner. tional Security Department, staff. Headquarters Allied Headquarters Ninth Air Force. University of Illinois. Forces Southern Europe. Shaw AFB, South Carolina, and Naples. Italy: chief of the West- forward air control tactics ern Hemisphere Division. Direc- officer, Tactical Fighter torate of Plans, Headquarters US Weapons Center, Nellis AFB, Air Force: assistant director for Nevada. Colonel Westenhoff is joint and National Security the compiler of Military Air Council matters: deputy chief of Power: Trie CAD RE Digest of Air staff for plans and programs. Power Opinions and Thoughts. Headquarters US Air Forces in His articles have appeared in Europe. Ramstein Air Base. Ger- A irpow er lournal, M ilitary many; vice-commander of Review. Fighter W eapons Eighth Air Force. Barksdale Review. Tactical Analysis Bul­ APB. Louisiana: and assistant letin. A ir Scoop, and The M AC deputy chief of staff for plans Flyer. Colonel Westenhoff is a and operations. Office of the graduate of Squadron Officer Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans School, Air Command and Staff and Operations. Headquarters College, the Marine Corps Com- USAF General Bovd is a gradu- mand and Staff College, and Air ate of Air War College. War College.

Lt Col William F. Furr (BBA. University of Mississippi: MS. Air Force Institute of Technol- ogy) is a military doctrine ana- lyst. Airpower Research Institute, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Educa- tion. Maxwell AFB. Alabama. Previous assignments include chief. Support Division. Army-

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Air Force Center tor Low Inten- commandant. Strategic Air sity Conflict, Langley AFB, Vir- Command (SAC) Noncommis- ginia, and faculty instructor at sioned (NCO) Professional Mili- Air Command ana Staff College, tary Education Center, Offutt Maxwell AFB. Alabama. Colo- AFB, Nebraska. His assignments nel Furr is a graduate of Squad- within the information manage- ron Officer School and a ment career field have included distinguished graduate of Air U-Tapao Royal Thai AFB, Thai- Command and Staff College. He land, and Snemya AFB. Alaska. is the author of Joint Pub 3-07, Chief Lewallen is a graduate of Doctrine for /oint Operations in Academic Instructor School and Low Intensity Conflict, October a distinguished graduate of the 1990. SAC NCO Academy and the US Navy Senior Enlisted Academy.

Betty R. Kennedy (BA and MA, Southern Illinois University- Edwardsville) is a historian with the Office of History, Headquar- ters Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB. Illinois. While serv- ing in the US Army, she was an intelligence speciaiist/analyst/ instructor with assignments in Berlin. Federal Republic of Ger- many. and at the US Army Intel- ligence School, Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Ms Kennedy is a graduate of Air Command and Lt Col Elwood C. Tircuit (BS, Staff College and the author of An Illustrated H istory of Scott Louisiana State University; Roger D. Launius (BA, Grace- Air Force Base, Illinois, 1917- MEd, South Dakota State Uni- land College: MA and PhD, versity! is an international 1987, published in 1987 by the Louisiana State University) is Office of MAC History. political/military affairs officer. chief historian of the National Directorate of Plans, Headquar- Aeronautics and Space Admin- ters USAF, Washington, D.C. istration, Washington, D.C. He His assignments have included previously served as command duties in arms control and as a historian of the Military Airlift missile operations squadron Command (MAC). Dr Launius commander. Colonel Tircuit is a has had entries in encyclopedias graduate of Squadron Officer and collected works; and his School, Air Command and Staff articles have appeared in a vari- College, and Air War College. ety of publications such as the Aerospace Historian and Air Power History. He is coauthor with Coy F. Cross II of MAC and the Legacy of the Berlin Airlift, published’ in 1989 by the Office of MAC History.

CMSgt Robert D. Lewallen (BS and MA. University of Tulsa) is BOARD OF ADVISERS Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom, USAF, Retired Brig Gen James L. Cole, Jr., USAF, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Military Airlift Command Col Keith W. Geiger, USAF, Retired Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr.. USAFR, Retired, Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn, Associate Professor of History University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 30-2, is published quarterly. Subscriptions are available from the Superin- tendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC 20402. Annual rates are $9.50 domestic and $11.90 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Air- power Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. Submit double- spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are DSN 493-5322 and commercial (205) 953-5322. Winter Selections

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