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Thomas Hobbes' Response to the Fool: Justice and Magnanimity

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Thomas Hobbes' Response to the Fool: Justice and Magnanimity Syracuse University SURFACE Philosophy - Dissertations College of Arts and Sciences 12-2011 Thomas Hobbes' Response to the Fool: Justice and Magnanimity Andrew James Corsa Syracuse University Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/phi_etd Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Corsa, Andrew James, "Thomas Hobbes' Response to the Fool: Justice and Magnanimity" (2011). Philosophy - Dissertations. 67. https://surface.syr.edu/phi_etd/67 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy - Dissertations by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abstract I focus on Thomas Hobbes’ response to the moral skeptic – the Fool – who claims it is sometimes reasonable to break valid covenants (contracts). The Fool maintains that, in some circumstances, violating a covenant will be in a person’s best self-interest, and it will be reasonable to violate when it is. I interpret Hobbes to respond that it will never be reasonable for anyone to break a valid covenant, even in the state of nature (prior to society). In fact, everyone is obliged to keep all of his valid covenants, and it is always both reasonable and in each person’s best interest to keep them. Individuals who deliberately break their valid covenants for the sake of personal benefit run the risk of acquiring the vice of injustice. Such a vice would prove disadvantageous to them, and possibly even put their lives at risk. Further, people can only acquire the virtue of justice if they consistently endeavor to keep their valid covenants. Finally, it is incredibly advantageous to any person to acquire this virtue, because only those who possess it can achieve the greatest possible felicity (happiness), which every person greatly desires. Because everyone loves felicity and justice is necessary for it, justice is always in anyone’s self-interest, and thus, for Hobbes, reasonable as well. I focus on passages suggesting that it is always reasonable and beneficial to perform on valid covenants (i.e., L: 15.5), and I consider Hobbes’ suggestion that only a genuinely just person, who endeavors to keep all of his valid covenants, could ever be perfectly reasonable (L: 15.10). I also examine Hobbes’ claim that we are obliged to the laws of nature in foro interno even in the state of nature (i.e, DC: 3.27, L: 15.36, and L: 30.30). According to Hobbes, if a person possesses the vice of injustice, his peers will eventually discover it and treat him terribly, potentially killing him. I then change tracks and focus attention on Hobbes’ conception of magnanimity (i.e., L: 6.27 and EL: 9.20). By discussing the relations between magnanimity, justice, and felicity, I explain why, according to Hobbes, the virtue of justice is necessary for anyone to achieve the greatest possible felicity. Since everyone highly prizes this great felicity, it must be reasonable for anyone to pursue the virtue of justice, and it is always unreasonable and contrary to benefit for anyone to endeavor to violate a valid covenant. THOMAS HOBBES RESPONSE TO THE FOOL: JUSTICE AND MAGNANIMITY by Andrew J. Corsa B.A. Vassar College, 2004 Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Syracuse University December 2011 Copyright 2011 Andrew J. Corsa All rights Reserved Table of Contents Part 1 --- The Fool Pages 2-29: Chapter 1. Introduction to Part 1: The Fool 1.1: The Fool 1.2: Response to the Fool 1.3: The Just Man 1.4: The Argument From Revealed Disposition 1.5: Hobbes on Virtue 1.6: Hobbes’ Other Response to the Fool 1.7: Conclusion 1.8: Looking Forward: Hobbes’ Ransom Example, A Case in Point Pages 30-48: Chapter 2. Reason, Covenants, and the State of Nature 2.1: Pasquale Pasquino 2.2: Reason and Obligation In Foro Interno 2.3: Obligation In Foro Interno 2.3.1: The laws of nature always oblige in foro interno, even in the state of nature 2.3.2: If a law obliges in foro interno, then a person must act according to it unless he honestly believes that his actions would put his life at risk 2.3.3: Even in the state of nature, a person cannot honestly believe that performing a valid covenant would put his life at risk if the covenant’s other party has already performed 2.3.4: The Argument Overall 2.4: Reason and Obligation 2.4.1: A person has a right to do something if and only if it is reasonable 2.4.2: If a person is obligated to perform an action, then it is unreasonable for him to do otherwise. 2.5: Reason and Obligation in the State of Nature Pages 49-76: Chapter 3. Hobbes and the Just Man 3.1: The Just Man 3.2: The Just Man and Obligation In Foro Interno 3.3: Dispositions, The Just Man, and Obligations In Foro Interno 3.4: The Just Man and the Fool 3.5: The Fool and the Argument From Revealed Dispositions 3.6: The Rule Egoist Interpretation v 3.7: Conclusion 3.8: Looking Forward: The Just Person and Obligations In Foro Externo Pages 77-112: Chapter 4. Hobbes and the Just Man – Equivocally Contractarian 4.1: The Contractarian Interpretation, Hobbes’ Texts 4.2: The Natural Obligations Interpretation, Hobbes’ Texts 4.3: Equivocally Contractarian 4.4: Responding to Possible Objections 4.4.1: Genuine Laws as Commands 4.4.1.1: Better Understanding of Reason and Obligation 4.4.2: Moral Subjectivism 4.4.2.1: Why Satisfying the Natural Obligations Is A Common Good 4.4.2.2: The Argument In Perspective 4.4.2.3: Looking Ahead --- Even the Most Unreasonable People . 4.5: In Conclusion Pages 113-143: Chapter 5. Why Not Be A Fool?: Thomas Hobbes, Habit, and Justice 5.1: Thomas Hobbes on Habit and Virtue 5.1.1: Thomas Hobbes and the Crossbow 5.1.2: Virtues and Habits 5.2: Thomas Hobbes on Virtue and the State of Nature 5.2.1: Hobbes on Shortsightedness 5.3: Looking Forward: Equilibrium or Pareto Optimal? 5.4: Conclusion: Thomas Hobbes, Habit, and Virtue 5.5: Looking Forward: Extreme Justice Part 2 --- Magnanimity Pages 144-173: Chapter 6. Introduction to Part 2: Hobbes On Magnanimity 6.1: Achilles and Socrates, An Introduction To Hobbes’ First Definition 6.2: Thomas Hobbes’ First Definition of Magnanimity 6.2.1: Two Kinds of Glory 6.2.2: First Definition Of Magnanimity, Achilles and Socrates 6.2.3: The First Definition of Magnanimity and Leviathan vi 6.2.3.1: In Defense of Premises 6.3: Achilles and Socrates, An Introduction To Hobbes’ Second Definition 6.4: Thomas Hobbes and A Different Sort of Hero 6.5: Thomas Hobbes’ Second Definition of Magnanimity 6.5.1: Thomas Hobbes’ Long Definition of Magnanimity 6.6: Thomas Hobbes and The Ancient Magnanimity 6.7: Conclusion and Beyond Pages 174-201: Chapter 7. Why The Just Person is the Magnanimous Person 7.1: Textual Evidence, Magnanimity and Justice 7.2: Why Are They Identical? 7.3: Competition, Power, Virtue, and Magnanimity 7.4: Each Individual Most Desires His Own Self-Preservation 7.4.1: Responding to Objections 7.4.2: Apparent And Real Desires 7.5: Why Magnanimity Is Not Pride 7.5.1: Vainglory is Pride 7.6: Conclusion Pages 202-204: Addendum to Chapter 7. Magnanimity Versus Power, Honor, and Injustice Pages 205-228: Chapter 8. Why Be Just?: Justice, Magnanimity and Felicity 8.1: Felicity and Justice, An Introduction 8.2: Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined 8.3: Felicity and Justice, An Argument 8.4: Magnanimity, Justice, and The Successful Acquisition of Goods 8.5: Why Magnanimity is Necessary for the Greatest Felicity 8.6: Felicity and Self-Preservation 8.7: Conclusion, and Hobbes’ Ransom Case Pages 229-259: Chapter 9. Thomas Hobbes and The Reasonable Man 9.1: Thomas Hobbes and A Higher Standard Of Reason 9.2: Justice, The Real Good 9.3: The Magnanimous Man 9.4: Reason and Obligation In Foro Interno 9.5: Reasonable Without A Sovereign 9.6: Unreasonable People and The Sovereign 9.7: Out of the State of Nature 9.8: Costly Enforcement Mechanisms vii Pages 260-280: Chapter 10. Hobbes on Just People and Egoism 10.1: The Reasonable, Just Person is Not An Egoist 10.2: Thomas Hobbes and Other-Regarding Desires 10.3: Felicity, the Reasonable Person, And Why Hobbes is Not a Virtue Theorist 10.4: Addressing An Objection, The Role of Pleasure in Hobbes’ Theory of Action 10.5: Game Changer, The Utility of Virtues 10.6: The Magnanimous Man Pages 281-290: Bibliography Page 291: Biographical Data viii 1 PART 1 THE FOOL 2 Chapter 1. Introduction to Part 1: The Fool Many Hobbes scholars are particularly drawn to a few paragraphs in Chapter 15 of Leviathan, in which Thomas Hobbes describes the philosophical position of a “Fool,” and then attempts to explain why this Fool is mistaken. The Fool suggests that, on some occasions, it will be reasonable to break valid covenants and act unjustly. In particular, the Fool suggests that it would be reasonable for a person to break valid, or obligatory, covenants whenever he reasonably believes that doing so would be genuinely conducive to his ends. That is, the Fool suggests that whenever it is in a person’s best interest to break a valid covenant, it would be reasonable to break it.
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