Israel Needs a New Map
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LUSTICK: ISRAEL NEEDS A NEW MAP ISRAEL NEEDS A NEW MAP Ian Lustick Dr. Lustick is the Bess W. Heyman Chair Professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. The following is the edited text of his remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on February 26, 2013, sponsored by the Foundation for Middle East Peace and the Middle East Policy Council. n November 2010, I spent a long and I was therefore not surprised at this fascinating evening with a dozen vet- meeting with the Gush Emunim activists eran settlers from the ideological core in 2010 when not a single one of them of the movement previously known was capable of answering that question. Ias Gush Emunim. I was in their settlement One settler declared that — for reasons he to discuss ha-matzav (the situation) with did not explain — the question itself was these Jews, who were living the political unfair. He was actually told by his col- consequences of their ideology every day. leagues, “No, actually, we have to realize At the end of a long evening, I asked them this is a fair question,” but he insisted it a question I’ve asked almost every Israeli was unfair. What was striking was the I have met for the last 15 years: Can you glum realization that none of those pres- describe a future for the country that you ent, usually so voluble and confident on so like and that you think is possible? When I many topics, could describe a future that first began asking this question in the late in its basic outlines they themselves could 1990s, Israeli Jews in the center-left of the consider both satisfying and attainable. political spectrum had little difficulty an- The angst that filled their room that swering with one version or another of the night is part of a larger, oft-commented- two-state solution. On the other hand, apart upon sense of depression, worry, even from those who would simply say they existential dread that has settled upon trusted in HaShem (God) to make things the Jewish state. A revealing sign of this work out, I had very little luck finding Is- abiding mood is the prevalence in Israeli raeli Jews on the right side of the spectrum political discussions of conditional sen- capable of describing a future for the state tences in which the main clause refers and its relationship with the Arabs and the to the survival of the state. For example: region as a whole that they liked and that “If Iran gets nuclear weapons, the state they thought was possible. But by the early will not survive”; “If settlements are not 2000s, it was not only the right that had built, the state will not survive”; “If more difficulty answering this question; few in settlements are built, the state will not the center or left could do so, either. survive”; “If the youth are not brought to © 2013, The Author Middle East Policy © 2013, Middle East Policy Council 25 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XX, NO. 2, SUMMER 2013 believe in the Zionist dream, the state will Israel’s relationship to the Palestinians or not survive”; “If the education system is in its overall predicament. I might note not improved, the state will not survive”; that it’s fascinating to look at the biggest “If the Galilee, Jerusalem and the Negev surprise in that election: the success of are not settled with Jews, the state will not Yesh Atid, which won 19 seats. What does survive”; “If a two-state solution is not the name of that party mean? “There is a implemented, the state will not survive”; Future.” The fact that Yesh Atid wins with “If Israel abandons Judea and Samaria, that name is a fascinating indicator that, as the state will not survive”; “If the Golan is I have suggested, just about everybody is returned to Syria, the state will not sur- asking the question “Is there a future?” vive”; “If aliyah (immigration) does not What is the implication for Israel of a increase, the state will not survive”; “If combination of an abiding sense of numer- Israel remains internally divided, the state ous threats to the state’s very existence and will not survive”; “If hasbara (propaganda) a conviction that the country’s political is not improved, the state will not survive”; system is paralyzed? What is the underly- “If the Haredim (the ultra-orthodox) and ing logic that produces this terrible com- the Arab citizens of the country are not bination of public beliefs? How can this required to assume the full responsibilities contemporary version of “as sheep going of citizenship, the state will not survive”; to the slaughter” be replaced by a healthier, “If Palestinian refugees are given the right vigorous posture toward the challenges to return, the state will not survive”; “If the facing Israel? global delegitimization campaign is not To begin, let us establish the pattern defeated, the state will not survive”; “If the of stagnation in Israel that contributes to Arab peace initiative is not acted upon, the the sense of collective — if not so often state will not survive.” personal or individual — doom. The key In a recent study, Israeli scholar Uriel problem facing the country for the last 45 Abulof presented data showing that in the years is what to do with the West Bank years between 1996 and 2001, an average and its large Palestinian population. On the of 147 articles per year appeared in Haaretz one hand, any reader of the Israeli press is focused on an existential threat to the coun- familiar with the merry-go-round of dead- try. In the next six years following 2001, lines, scandals, protests, career implosions, that average increased from 147 to 244 confrontations, court decisions, demon- articles a year, an increase of 65 percent. strations, new settlement construction, Another refrain — second to the theme partial restraints on settlements, high-level that Israel is in danger and is not going to meetings, settler vigilantism, Palestinian survive, based on any one of a multitude terrorism, rockets on Israel from Gaza, of threats — is just as common, expressing bombings and invasions of Gaza, liquida- and usually bemoaning the impossibil- tions, retaliations, human-rights challenges ity of significant change taking place in and UN votes. Like a carousel, news of the Israeli politics or in Israeli policies on key conflict and the peace process goes on and issues before the country. Even the moder- on, but it goes nowhere. ately surprising outcome of Israel’s recent We can test this claim by a simple elections has led no serious observers to thought experiment. Let’s look at the past, imagine a substantial change resulting in starting from the present, in approximately 26 LUSTICK: ISRAEL NEEDS A NEW MAP five-year chunks. Notice what happens if hyde” for 20 years. The idea, as Weissglass we go back five years. In the five years put it, was to receive a “certificate of no since then, what has changed, if anything, one to talk to” from the international com- in the trajectory of the West Bank and its munity that would protect the West Bank relationship to Israel? In 2007, five years from any diplomatic or political process before the recent war in Gaza, Israel was likely to affect settlements and de facto an- recovering from an attack against Hezbol- nexation. This was achieved by a unilateral lah in Lebanon that developed into a major withdrawal from Gaza, condemnation of political and military debacle, putting an the Hamas government there as a terrorist effective end to the political prospects of organization, and a quarantine/blockade of the relatively moderate, Olmert-led, Kad- that territory. Disengagement from Gaza ima-Labor coalition government. Within was accompanied then by an all-out effort eight months, it would seek unsuccessfully to discredit and destroy Yasser Arafat as to redeem itself with an immensely de- leader of the Palestinians. structive, politically costly in international To continue for one more cycle, five terms but almost casualty-free, war in years farther in the past, consider the status Gaza to punish Hamas for rocket attacks. of the West Bank in 1997. Netanyahu had No serious negotiations were underway in come to power in the aftermath of a hor- 2007 and none are now. The political mood rific series of terrorist bombings and Israeli in Israel was more or less what it is now: retaliations against Palestinians. On the outwardly defiant, inwardly depressed and ground and in the diplomatic arena, Netan- angry. This is the mood that helped bring yahu abandoned any effort to use the Oslo to power a coalition government run by Accords as a partnership with Palestin- the Likud under Benjamin Netanyahu and ian leaders, substituting instead legalistic the hard-right Yisrael Beiteinu party. These exploitation of Oslo’s complex provisions two parties, now merged, are the core of to thwart any progress toward implementa- the new Israeli government. tion of a two-state solution and to destroy As part of our thought experiment, the image of the Palestinian Authority as a let’s push back the clock five more potential partner, all the while expanding years. In 2002, Israel under Ariel Sharon settlements and road construction to inte- launched a major operation in Gaza in grate the West Bank as tightly as possible response to suicide bombings in the second into Israel. Intifada, along with the largest military What can we learn from this exercise operation in the West Bank since the 1967 of going back in time for three chunks of war.