AUTOMATICITYPROCESSES

CHAPTER 34

C€ Automaticity in Goal Pursuit

PETERM. GOLL\TITZER IOHN A. BARGH

-fh. incersectionof competenceand moti- scious attention is divided and in short sup- I vation involves the ability to attain one's plv. goals, to accomplishwhat one sets out to Two main forms of unconsciousgoal pur- do. Both modern and classictheory and re- suit have been featured in our research:one search on goal pursuit have focused mainly (automaticmotivations) a long-term,chronic on the conscious and deliberate ways that form that develops out of extended experi- people strive toward desired end states.In ence; the other (implementation intentions) this chapter,we focus on the role played by a temporary and strategic form by which automaticor unconsciousmotivations in the one sets up intended actions in advance, so competent pursuit of one's important goals. that they later unfold in an automatic fash- How can such unconsciousgoal pursuit add ion. Before describing these two lines of re- to a person's competenciesin a given do- search,we begin with some historical back- main? \ü/eshow that unconsciouslypursued ground on the concept of uRconscious goals are especially effective in keeping a motivation as it has come and gone within "on person task" and moving in thought psychology over the past century. and action toward the desired goal, even when the consciousmind is distracted or fo- cusedelsewhere. Automatic or unconscious HISTORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS motivations respond immediately and effort- MOTIVATION CONCEPT lessly to environmental conditions (triggers) that promote or support the goal in ques- The unconscioushas had a long and bumpy tion, such as in recognizing and acting upon ride through the history of psychology.Few, opportunities that otherwise might have if any,other psychologicalconcepts have in- been missed.And the efficient nature of un- stigated this much contention and polariza- consciousmotivation makes it an especially tion of opinion. William Jamesconsidered it effective means of goal pursuit in complex "a tumbling ground for whimsies," and and busy social environments in which con- Jean-PaulSartre railed againstit as a way to

624 J4. Automaticityin Goal Pursuit 675 abdicatepersonal responsibility for one'sac- Broadbent,Treisman, Norman, and others, tions. SigmundFreud, of course,champi- which showed how stimuii could be ana- oned the unconsciousas a causal force in lyzed for meaningprior to the person'scon- human thought and behavior,yet his medi- sciousawareness of them, made the idea of cal and therapeutic perspectiveled him to early motivational screeningof environmen- focus as well on the unconscious'snegative tal stimuli much more plausiblethan it had effects.Many modern-daymotivational psy- been in the 1950s (seereview by Lachman, chologists conrinue to hold this negarive Lachman, & Butterfield, 1979). opinion (Bandura 1986; Locke & Latham, Thus, the idea of unconsciousinfluences 7990; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996). on perceptiongained a great deal of traction In their treatments,unconscious influences from the cognitive revolution and soon are characterizedas rigid, undesirablehabits flourished in social and clinical psychology of thought or behavior that must be over- as well. It is now completelyuncontroversial come by consciousacts of will. in mainstream psychology. But what hap- Freud'sdynamic unconscious was primar- penedto the conceptof unconsciousmotiva- ily motivational in nature, driving behavior tion? It did not reap the benefitsof the cog- to expressand fulfill deep-seatedneeds and nitive revolution; rathe! within social wishes, and guarding and defending con- psychology,one of the consequencesof that sciousexoerience from unoleasantmemories revolution was an attempt to eliminate moti- of the p"it or threateningstimuli of the pre- vational explanations for as many phenom- sent.Following Freud'slead, the early work enaas possible (e.g., Nisbett & Ross,1980). on unconscious influences within experi- Unconscious motivation, as a scientific mentalpsychology also focusedon the motr- concept within social psychology, thus vational properties of the unconscious.This had to overcome two seDarate historical "New was the classic Look" perceptionre- resistances-the long-standing one to the searchby Bruner and Postmanand their col- unconsciousas an exolanatorvvariable. and leagues (see reviews by Allport, L955; the more recentorr.'ro motivational expla- Bruner, 1.957;Erdelyi, 1.974).The idea of nations as well. But just as researchon the perceptualdefense involved motivational in- unconscious snuck back into respectability fluenceson the initial perception and aware- through the sheep'sclothing of "attention nessof environmental stimuli. Many studies research"(Broadbent, 1958), motivation re- showed, for example, that significantly lon- searchmade its comebackunder the coverof "task ger tachistoscopicpresentation times were goals" (Srull&'Wyer, 1986;Anderson neededfor a participant to recognizetaboo & Pichert, L978). Social cognition research- words or other stimuli (e.g.,swastikas, spi- ers had shown that the outcome of informa- ders) likely to produce negativeemotional tion-processingactivities-such as organiza- reactions,compared to the recognition of tion of material in memory and ease of emotionally neutral or positive stimuli. retrieval-varied as a function of the oartic- But the New Look ideasconcerning moti- ular task goalsassigned to participants(e.g., vational influences on perceptual recogni- memorizing behavioral information vs. tion and identification had difficulty gaining forming an impression based on ic; Hamil- acceptanceinto the then-mainstreamof psy- ton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980). chological science.Erdelyi's (1974) hisrori- Accordingly, by about 1990, it had be- cal analysisand review of the New Look in- come clear that any complete modei of so- dicatesthat 1950s psychologywas just not cial cognition had to take into account the ready for the idea of preconsciousinfluences individual's task or processinggoals. The on stimulus recognition. But this all changed goal conceptbegan to be included in social "cognitive with the so-called revolution" in cognition models, mainly by assumingthat psychology of the 1.960s.Neisser's (L967) goals were representedmentally in a similar influential book, Cognitiue Psychology, for , way as was known for other classesof social example, reviewed experimental evidenceof stimuli, such as types of social behavior, preattentive or preconscious perceptual roles, and groups (Bargh, 1990; Kruglanski, analysis (e.g., pattern recognition, figural 1,996). The auto-motive model (Bargh, synthesis).Most notably,the classicresearch 1,990;see below) grew out of this idea: If and theory on attention allocation of goals were represented mentally just like 626 VI. SELF-REGULATORY PROCESSES other varietiesof socialconcepts (e.g., ste- stance,then the stereotypeeventually would i'eotypes),then the sameproperties that had becomeactive automatically upon the mere beenfound to hold for other socialrepresen- presencein the environmentof a member of tations-slrch as ti-recapability of becoming that group (Bargh,1989; Breweq 1988). activatedoutside of consciousa\,vareness- Under the assumptionthat goals,too, are should hold for goals as well. And so the representedmentally, and becomeautomati- conceptof unconsciousmotivation made its caily activatedby the sameprinciples, then "un- return to scicntrficpsychology: It was goal representationsshould be capable of conscious" becauseit was automatic in the automatic activation by featuresof the con- senseof beingtriggered and guided by exter- texts in which thosegoals have been pursued nal stimuli instead of an act of conscious often and consistentlyin the past. If a given choice and subsequent conscious control individual always competed with his or her "motivarion" (Bargh,1,994), and it was be- siblings,then the goal of competitionshould causegoai representationswere the particu- become automatically activated upon just lar cognitive concepts being automatically the mere presence of a sibling. In other activated. words, it should becomeactive even though the person may not intentionally and con- sciouslychoose to competeat that time and AUTO.MOTIVE THEORY: in that situation. AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION The auto-motive model further assumes AND PURSUIT OF PERSONAL GOALS that, once activated in this unconscious manner, the goal representationwould then The auto-motive model of unconsciousso- operate in the same way as when it is con- cial motivations built upon the researchof sciously and intentionally activated; that is, the 1970s, and especiallythe 1980s, that the model predicts that an automatically ac- demonstratedthe automatic activation capa- tivated goal would have the sameeffects on bility of social mental representations,such thought and behavior as when the person as trait concepts (e.g., honest, aggressive), consciouslypursues that same goal (i.e., as attitudes,and group stereotypes(see reviews when the goal is activated by an act of con- by Bargh, L989; Brewer, 1988; Wegner & scious will). In essence,then, the original Bargh,1,997). This researchshowed that fre- auto-motive model (Bargh, 1,990) derived quently used mental representations will, the historicalnotion of unconsciousmotiva- over time, become active upon the mere tion from the basicprinciples of modern-day presenceof relevant information in the per- cognitive psychology. son's environment. For stereotypes, this Such theoretical derivations are all well would be easily identifiable group features and good, but more was neededto establish such as skin color, gender, speech accent, the mundanereality of unconsciousmotiva- and so on. For attitudes,the environmental tions in social life than logical or theoretical triggerwould be the merepresence of the at- arguments. Accordingly, experimental re- titude object in the environmenr (Fazio, searchwas conductedto test the model em- 1986). For trait conceprs,it would be fea- pirically. This research focused on three tures of observed social behaviors corre- main questions:Can we observegoal attain- sponding to the trait in question (Ureman, ment effects on thoughts, feelings, and be- Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). haviors by implicitly activated (primes) The principle underlyingall of thesecases goals? Once activated, can unconscious of automatic processdevelopment was that goals keep operating outside of conscious automatic associationsare formed between awareness?And is automatic goal pursuit the representationsof environmental fea- characteÄzedby the samefeatures as is con- tures (e.g.,attitude objects,or common situ- sciousgoal pursuit? ations and settings) and other representa- tions (e.g., evaluations or stereotypes, Goal Attainment Effects of Implicitly respectively)to the exrentthat they are con- Activated Goals (Goal Priming) sistentlyactive in memory at the same time (Hebb, 1948).If one repeatedlyand consrs- The first question to be addressedwas tently thinks of membersof a particular so- whether goäls could be activatedoutside of cial group in stereotypical ways, for in- consciousawareness. The standardmethod J4.Autonraticirv in Goal Pursuit 671 usedwithin social cognition researchto test those in the previous study: participants in such a hypothesisis the priming or unre- the impression-formationgoal-priming con- Iated-studiespaiadigm (Bargh& Chartrand, dition both recalled more behaviors and 2000). In this design, the concept under showed greater thematic organization of study is first primed by causingthe partici- them in memory compared to those in the pant to think about or use it in some way memorlzatron-goal-prlmrngconortlon. that is unrelatedto the focal task that comes These findings suggestthat goals can in- next in the experiment. For example, to deed be primed, and then produce the same prime or passivelyactivate the concept of outcomesas when consciouslypursued. Sub- honesty,the participantmight be exposedto sequent studies found similar effects with a some synonymsof honesty in the courseof variety of other goals.For example,priming working on a sentence construction task, the goal of achievement(i.e., to perform the sentencetest devel- well) causesparticipants to score higher on such as scrambled'Wyer oped by Srull and (1979). The use of verbal tasks than do control group partici- the concept in this first task should causethe pants (Bargh & Gollwitzeq L994; Bargh, concept to becomeactivated. It is assumed Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & that such activation persists for some time Trötschel, 2001), and priming the goal of after the use of the concept, even though cooperationcauses them to make more co- participants do not reahze it (Higgins, operativeresponses in a negotiation task in Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985). Thus, the still- which they were free to compete or cooper- active concept can have an influence on in- ate (Barghet al., 2001.,Study 2). formation processingin the next experimen- Although these studies primed goal con- tal task (e.g., forming an impressionof a tar- cepts rather directly, by presenting partici- get person),without the personbeing aware pants with words synonymous with the of this inflüence. goal, goals can also become automatically Chartrand and Bargh (1996) used this activated indirectly, through their strong as- paradigm to test whether goal representa- sociation with certain situational features tions could be primed in the same manner. that are primed instead.Indeed, this is closer In one study, participants completed a to the way that the auto-motive model as- scrambledsentence test that contained either sumesthat goals becomeautomatically acti- somewords relatedto the goal of impression vated in the real world-that is, by the pres- "judge," "evaluate") formation (e.g., or to enceof situational featureswithin which the "retain," the goal of memorization (e.g., goal has been frequently pursued in the past. "absorb"). When this task had been com- Situational power is one such feature: prim- pleted,participants were given a second,os- ing the conceptof power causesparticipants tensibly unrelatedtask to complete:to read with sexual harassment tendencies to be- each of a seriesof 16 behaviorsperformed come more atffacted to a female confederate by a target person and then answer some than they otherwise would have been questionsabout them. After participants had (Bargh,Raymond, Pryor, & Strack,1.995).It read all of the behaviors, they weie given a also causespeople to behave more in line surpriserecall task. with their own self-interest,and against the Previousresearch (Hamilton et a1.,1980) interestsof their fellow experimental partici- had used the same procedure, but with ex- pants (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). plicir (conscious)instructions Io participants These findings support the model's assump- either to memorize the presented informa- tion that strong, automatic associationsde- tion, or to form an impression of the per- velop betweensituational and goal represen- son based on the behaviors. That study tations, to the extent that the goal is pursued had found significantly better recall, and frequently and consistentlywithin that situa- also greater thematic organization of the tion. behavioral information in memory, for Another important and common situa- participants in the impression-formation tional trigger for goal pursuit is the presence condition. But in our study, no such explicit of a significant other. These are people such instructions were given; instead, all partici- as our parents, siblings, children, dating pants were given the same (generic)instruc- partners,or spouses,friends, and closecol- tions about answeringsome questionslater leagues-people whom we think about a lot, on. Nonetheless,the resultswere the sameas and interactions with whom yield outcomes 628 VI. SELF-REGULATORYPROCESSES that substantiallyimpact on our moods and can be prompted easily and innocently by life satisfzrction. Fitzsimons and Bargh merely glancing at their photograph on our (2003)assumed that our mentalreDresenta- wall or desk-is sufficient to put into mo- tions of these close others .otrtain within tion those goals one chronically pursues them the goals that we frequently and con- when with that person. So even when they sistently pursue when with them. For in- are not present,one sta,rtsto behaveas if he stance," p.tro., might have the chronic and or she were in their company. long-standinggoals of making her mother A further real-life, implicit activation of proud of her, competing with her brother, goals may occur when r,veobserve the goal- and relaxing and having fun when with her directed actions of others, even non- best friend. Even though there may by peo- significant others. By perceivingother peo- ple who share such goals with respectto ple's goal pursuits, the respectivemental these significant others, other people may goal representationsshould become acti- want to avoid their mothers, to have fun vated in ourselves,with the effect that we with their brothers,and to look up to and start to act on them aswell. This goal-conta- emuiate their best friends. Thus, there gion hypothesis,according to which individ- should be not only commonalitiesin goal uals automatically take on a goal that is im- pursuit acrosspeople but also some degree plied by another's behavior, has recently of individual variation in goals, given the been examinedin a seriesof studies(Aarts, same significant other (e.g., one's mother). Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004). Participants This was confirmed in a preliminary survey were briefly exposedto behavioral informa- of college undergraduates,in which they tion about another person, implying a spe- were asked to list the goals they pursued cific goal (e.g., making money), and were with five different types of significant others. then given the opportunity to act on this Next, in several laboratory experiments goal in a different way and context. Partici- and one field experiment,participants'men- pants' own actions started to servethe same tal representationsof a given type of signifi- goal, and they acquired features of goal- cant other (e.9.,a best friend) were primed directednessin the sensethat they were af- without their awareness,and then partici- fected by goal strength (i.e., were in line pants were given an opportunity to pursue with the participants' personal need for the goal chronically associated with that money), showed persistenceover time, and partner. In every case, participants did be- were more readily engagedwhen the given have in line with this goal, eventhough their situation clearly lent itself to meeting the significant other was not, of course,physi- goal at hand. Most interestingly, partici- cally present in the experimental situation. pants were immune against the automatic For instance,in participants who usually try adoption of the goalsof othersif thesewere to make their mothersproud of them, prim- pursued in an inappropriate,socially unac- ing the representationof the mother caused ceptable wa,v. Apparently, goal contagion them to outperform control participantson will not occur if the observedgoal pursuits measuresof verbal ability. In line with the of others are perceived to be unattractive auto-motive model's predictions, priming and undesirable. the mother had no effect on the verbal abil- ity task performance of participants who IJnconscious Operation of Primed Goals pursuedother goalswith their mothers (e.g., friendship,helping her). Also, thosewho did It is one thing to claim that goalscan be acti- have the goal of making their mothers vated automatically, but quite another to ar- proud, but who were not primed with the gue that once activated, goals continue to mother, did not perform any better than did operateoutside of consciousawareness. But the control group. Both ingredients were this is indeed the strong form of the auto- necessary:the priming or preactivation of motive model, and there is now evidence the representationof one's mother, and the consistentwith this claim. For one thing, in chronic, automatic association of one's ail such automatic goal studies,participants mother with the goal of high performance. are carefully questioned and debriefed fol- In practice,then, thinking about or beingre- lowing the experiment, to make sure they minded of a certain sienificant other-which were not aware of pursuingthat goal during 34. Artomaticity rn Goal Pursuit 629 the experimentaltask. Very few if any par- relativenumbers of cooperativemoves they ticipants show this ar,vareness(the data of had made during the task). For thosein the those who do are removed prior to analy- explicit, conscious cooperation condition, ses);most are surprised,if not skeptical,that these ratings correlated significantly with we, the experimenters,had causedthem to actual behavior: Those who had reported pursuea goal without their knowledge.For having tried harder to cooperate actually example,in the Chartrand andBargh (1,996) had cooperated more than other partici- stud} lmpresslon-prlmedparnclpants wefe pants. In other words, self-reports accu- no more likely to report having tried to form rately reflected tire actual behavior. But for an impressionof the targetperson than were those in the unconscious(primed) coopera- memorization-primedparticipants, who in tion condition, self-reportsof how much turn \Mereno more likely to report having they had tried to cooperatedid not corre- tried to memorizethe information than were spond at all (correlationsnear zero) with the impression-primedparticipants. More how much cooperation actually occurred. than that, very few participants reported This is olrr strongest evidenceto date that, having pursuedeither goal while readingthe for automatically activated goals, people target's behaviors. In the Fitzsimons and are not consciouslyaware of the operation Bargh (2003) research,participants in the of thesegoals, even while they are success- fieldexperiment at a major internationalair- fully pursuing them. port, who were approachedto participate while waiting for their flight to depart, Similarities of Unconscious largely did not believethe experimenter'sex- to Conscious Goal Pursuits planation that they had beeninduced to vol- unteer to help the experimenter (or not) by Thus far, the evidence shows that uncon- first answering some questions about their scious goal pursuit produces the same ef- friend (vs. coworker). People'spersonal the- fects (in terms of goal attainment) on ories about what causesthem to do things thought, memory, and behavior'W'hether as are just do not include the idea (and thus allow known for conscious goal pursuit. for the possibility) of unconsciousmotiva- the goal has to do with how incoming so- tions or causes(rWiison & Brekke, 1"994). cial information is to be processed,how Perhaps stronger evidence as to the un- well an intellectual task is to be performed, consciousoperation of goalsis furnished by or how one is to interact with another per- Experiment 2 of Bargh et al. (2001), in son, significant performance differences which peoplewere either primed (or not) to emerge between groups primed to uncon- cooperatewith their opponentin a negotia- sciouslypwsue different goals, just as they tion task, or were told explicitly (or not) by did in previous studies between groups ex- the experimenter to cooperate. These two plicitly told (or not) to pursue such goals. factors were crossed in the design of the As Bargh and Chartrand (1'999)noted, ex- study, in order to compare the conscious actly how a given goal is put into play (i.e., versus unconsciousoperation of the same consciously or unconsciously) does not goal. As in the other goal-priming studies, seem to matter with respect to goal attain- thosewho were primed to cooperatedid so ment. Regardlessof how it became acti- more than did nonprimed participants.Also, vated, the active goal operateson the avail- not surprisingly, those who were explicitly able information that is relevant to its (consciously)told to cooperatedid so more purposes,and guidesthought and behavior than those who were not. After the experi- toward the desiredend state. mental task had beencompleted, all partici- Thus, on outcome measures (i.e., how pants were then asked to rate how much well the person attains the goal), the findings they had tried to cooperate while perform- to date show high similarity berween con- ing the negotiation task with their opponent. sciousand unconsciousgoal pursuit. How- For each participant, then, we could ever,the classicliterature on consciousgoal compare these ratings of how much they pursuit has also documentedvarious con- had consciously tried to cooperate with tent-freefeatures of consciousgoal pursuit; their actual cooperative behavior during thus, one wonders whether unconscious the negotiation (measuredin terms of the goal pursuits also cafiy these features, 630 VI. SELF-REGULATORYPROCESSES

Consequencesof GoaI Attainment had lust worked on the difficult anagrams; and the easyanagram pafticipants also out- Whenevergoals are attained,people are said performed the difticult anagram participants to erperiencepositive self-evaluativeconse- on the subsequentverbal ability test. Be- quences (e.g., succeedingon a given goal causethe high-achievementgoal was uncon- leads to feelings of pride, expecting to scious, and operating without the partici- be praised by others; Atkinson, 1957; pant's awareness)these findings indicate that Heckhausen,L977'1that should put them in one's mood and also subsequentpursuit of a positivemood. Moreoveq succeedingon a relevant, more challenging goals can be af- given goal is saidto lead to strivingfor more fected by whether one succeedsor fails at a chailenginggoals (i.e., proactive goal striv- goal one does not even know one has. ing; Bandura, 1.997).To test whether the Chartrand's findings therefore suggestthat similarity of conscious and unconscious unconsciousgoal striving leads to goal at- goal operation extends to these afteref- tainment consequences(positive self-evalua- fects of goal attainment, Chartrand (1999; tions; proactive goal striving) similar to Chartrand & Bargh, 2002) conducted sev- those of consciousgoal pursuit. eral studies in which participants were in- duced to unconsciouslypursue a goal (via a Goal Projection priming manipulation), which they then suc- ceededon or failed to meet. In one exoeri- It has always been assumedthat people pro- ment, for example,a high-achievementgoal ject not only their traits but also their goals was primed or not, and then all participants onto others.Holmes (1,978\referred to more "projec- were given a set of anagrams to solve. than just traits when he defined "process Critically, the anagrams were either very tion" as a by which personsattrib- easyto solve or impossibleto solve.In this ute personality traits, characteristics,or mo- wag Chartrand manipulated whether partic- tivations to other persons as a function of ipants succeededor failed at their uncon- their own personality traits, characteristics, scious goal to perform well. Following the or motivations" (p.677). He evensuggested anagram task, participants completed either that projection should be more easily ob- a mood measureor a test of verbal ability. servedwith motivational impulsesthan with The mood measurewas intended to tap the traits (Holmes, 1968). Accordingly,we re- predictedemotional consequences of a posi- cently tested whether the projection effects tive self-evaluation following goal attain- postulated for explicit goals also hold true ment; the verbal ability test was intended to for implicit goals (Kawada, Oettingen, tap the predicted proactive goal striving. Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2004). The resuits confirmed that unconscious In one study, the experimenter explicitly goal pursuit is characterized by the same assignedthe goal to compete to somepartic- goal attainment effects as have been found ipants (i.e.,explicit goal condition) and then for conscious goal pursuit. Take first the asked them to rate the competitive orienta- findings in the no-goal condition, in which tion of a presumedpartner participant,with no high-achievementgoal had beenprimed; whom they expectedto play a Prisoner'sDi- whether the anagram task was easy or diffi- lemma game. In the implicit goal condition, cult made no difference to mood or oerfor- the goai to compete was activated using a mance on the verbal ability test. This was scrambled sentencetechnique that exposed expected,because participants in the no-goal participants to words such as "compete," "succeed." condition had no high-achievementgoal ac- "winr" and Comparedto control tivated on which they could succeedor fail. participants, who enteredthe presumedPris- For participants in the unconscioushigh- oner's Dilemma game without any assigned achievementgoal condition, however, their or activated competition goal, both implicit moods and subsequenttask performance and explicit competition participants ex- were markedly affectedby whether they had pected the presumed partner to act more just completed the easy versus difficult ana- competitively throughout the game. These gram task. On the mood measu-re,those in results indicate that goal projection occurs the easy anagram condition were signifi- regardless of whether the goal is uncon- cantly happier than were participants who sciousor consciouslvheld. 34. Automaticitvin Goal Pursuit 631

In a follow-up experiment, the goal to Becausemuch of the researchthat has competewas implicitly activatedby sublimi- testedand supportedthe auto-motivemodel nally presentingcompetition-related words; has relied on the same priming techniques in the expiicitgoal condition,parricipants and manipulations as those previously were againasked to take a competitivestand used to study unconscious social percep- in the upcoming Prisoner'sDilemma game. tion and cognition (Bargh, 1989; Bargh & Moreover, the experimentersweakened the Chartrand, 2000), the foliowing question goal to compete by allowing some partici- arises:Could the same perceptual,nonmo- pants to meet this goal in an alternativecompe- tivational social representations(e.g., trait tition task (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1.982), concepts)that had beenprimed in thosepre- prior to performing the Prisoner'sDilemma vious studiesbe resoonsiblefor the so-called game.First, we could replicatethe goal pro- "motivational effeits" described earlier? jection effect(as compared to a no-goalcon- rffhy should the same or very similar prim- trol group) with implicit and explicit compe- ing manipulations be said to produce per- tition goal participantswhose goalshad not ceptual or nonmotivational e{fects in some been weakened. Second,however, when the studies, but motivational effects in others? goal to compete had been weakened,goal This is an important and complex ques- projectioneffects were no longerobserved in tion for which we do not yet have a com- both the implicit and the explicit goal condi- plete answer, but some additional findings tion. This finding supportsthe claim that it shed light on what that answer might even- was indeedthe participants'goal to compete tually be. At present, it appears that the that was being projected onto others, and same priming manipulation can activate not just the trait conceptof competitiveness. qualitatively different concepts or processes Moreover, it demonstratesthat implicitly ac- at the sametime (Bargh, 1,997).Thus, stim- tivated (primed) goals and explicitly as- uli related to the concept of achievementac- signedgoals are both readily projectedonto tivate or prime the perceptual construct of others, and that both seemto have the prop- achievement,the category used to identify erty of losing strength after having been achievement behavior in someone else, as servedsuccessfully. well as the motivational or goal representa- tion of achievement,which is used to ener- gize and guide our own strivings for high Motiuational : SustainedG oal Qualities performance on a task. Actiuation, Persistence, and Resumption The best evidenceto date for this proposi- Sincethe time of Kurt Lewin, motivational tion comes from Study 3 by Bargh et al. states and processeshave classicallybeen (2001), in which participants were first distinguished by features and qualities dif- primed (or not) with achievement-related ferent from those of nonmotivational, purely stimuli. Next, there was either a S-minute cognitive processes.These qualities include delay before the participant worked on the behavioral features,such as persisting in at- next task, or he or she worked on it right tempting to reach the goal when facing diffi- away)with no interpolated delay. The final culties and returning to the goal activity af- factor in the designwas the type of task par- ter being disrupted, as opposed to giving up ticipants worked on: They either read a at the first obstacle or walking away from story about a target personwho behavedin the interrupted activity (Lewin, 1935). a somewhat ambiguous achievement-ori- Atkinson and Birch (1970) identified a fur- entedmanner (the socialperception task), or ther signature of motivational states: the they worked on a verbal task, in which they tendency to stay activated or even increase tried to find as many different words as they in activation strength over time, until the de- could in a set of Scrabbleletter tiles (the per- sired outcome is reached or one has gone formance task). Note that the achievement- through an active, effortful processof disen- priming manipulation was the same for all gagementfrom wanting to attain it. Cogni- participants in that condition, whether they tive (nonmotivational) representations,in subsequentlyworked on the socialjudgment contrast, tend to decreasequickiy in activa- or the verbal performance task. tion strength over time since last use (e.g., The expected priming effects were ob- Higginset al., 1985). tained on both tasks in the no-delavcondi- 632 VI, SELF-REGULATORYPROCESSES tion, r,r'iththose primed with achievement- case) of the highest possible score on the relatedstimuli either judging the target per- task, the personwill act to removeor bypass son as more achievement-oriented(in the that obstacieif at all possible.Experimental judginenrrask condition), or findingsignifi- participantsfor whom this unconsciousgoal cantly more words (in the verbal perfor- is not operating show much less of a ten- mance task condition). than did the non- dency to keep working on the task; for primed participants.However, as predicted, them, it is just an experiment,and not a very the time delay ciifferentiallyimpacted the involvingtask at that. It is the activationand pnming effect on the perceptualversus the operation of the unconscioushigh-achieve- moiivational task. On the perceptualtask, ment goal in this experimentthat makespar- the significant priming observedunder no- ticipants care enough about their perfor- delaycondition disappearedafter the 5-min- mance to persistently strive for an ever- ute delay; this is consistentwith previous higherscore, even though they haveto do so studies of the time course of priming effects secretlyand surreptitiously(they believe)af- on social-perceptualtasks (Higgins et al., ter the stop signal has beengiven. 1985). But on the motivational word-search \7e have also tested goal-primed partici- task, the priming ef{ect actually increased pants' motivational tendencyto resume an significantly in strength over the S-minute interrupted goal, even in the faceof more at- delay.This is what would be expected,fol- tractive behavioral options. In this study lovringAtkinson and Birch's(1970) dynamic (Bargh et al., 2001,,Study 5), participants theory of action,if a motivational statewere were told that they would complete two dif- driving the verbal task performance. ferent tasks. Participants were first primed These findings help to establishthat our (or not) to activate the achievementgoal, goal-primingmanipulations are indeed acti- and then all participants worked on a word- vating a motivational state, as opposed to search task. Halfway through that task, a the same perceptual and nonmotivational stagedpower olltage forced everyoneto stop constructsas in prior research.Other recent work. After a S-minute delay,the power was experimentsprovide additional supportive restored, but now (as the experimenter in- evidence.In another experimentby Bargh et formed participants) there was no longer al. (2001., Study 4), participants' goal of enough time during the sessionfor them to achievement or high performance was complete both of the tasks. They were given primed (or not), and they then worked on the option of going back to the first task, or the sameScrabble word-search task. The ex- moving on to the secondtask, in which they perimenter told participants that she had to would rate eachof a seriesof cartoonsas to seeto another study in a different room but how funny they were. Pretestinghad shown would give them the signal to stop working that this cattoon-rating task was greatly pre- on the task over an intercom when the time ferred over the word-searchtask. came. Unknown to the participants, a hid- The dependent variable was the percent- den video camera recorded their behavior agesof participantsin the goal-primedver- when and after the stop signal had been sus not-Drimed conditions who went back given. The dependentvariable was whether and completedthe word-searchtask, forgo- the participant would keep working on the ing the opportunity to view and rate the car- word-search task, trying for even higher toons. As would be expectedif our goal- scores)after the experimenter gave the stop priming manipulation had produced a signal, or whether they would stop working strong motivational state, significantly more when faced with this obstacleto better per- participants in the goal-primed condition formance.The resultswere clear: Over 50% (66%) returnedto the incompletefirst task, of the participants in the achievement- compared to 35Y" of the no-goal partici- orimed condition continued to search for pants. words after the stop signal had been given, compared to just over 20% of the Summary of Goal Priming Research nonprimed participants.. Thr-rs,w-hen one places an obstacle in the Our researchhas demonstrated,first, that way of an unconsciouslymotivated person, goals can be triggered without an act of wili a hindrance to attaining the goal (in this or consciouschoice on the part of the indi- 34. Automaticity in Goal Pursuit 63] vidual, simply by the presenceof relevant The gap betweenintentions and behavior sitr:ationalcues. N{oreover, once activated, is largely due to the fact that the successful the goal continuesto operate in an uncon- translation of goals (intention) into respec- sciousfashion, with peopleunable to report tive behaviors requires solving numerous or recognize immediately afterward that problems of self-regulation,many of them they have just pulsued that goa}, even having to do with being burdened bY though they have given everyindication (on thoughts,feelings, and actionsthat are irrei- our dependentmeasures) of having done so. evant to the goal Pursr,iit at hand On severaldifferent types of commonly held (Golhvitzer, 1.996).In order to meet their goals-achievement, cooperation, impres- goals,peopie often haveto seizequickly via- sion formation, and memorization,the un- ble opportunitiesto initiate relevantactions, conscious operation of the goal produced a task that becomes particularly difficuit the same effects that others have observed when attention is directed elsewhere(e.g., when that goal is pursued with full con- when one is absorbed by comPeting scious awarenessand intent. These effects goal pursuits, wrapped up in ruminations, are not restricted to the outcome of the goal grippedby intenseemotional experiences, or pursuit. but extend to content-freecharac- simply tired). But evenif the personhas suc- ieristics, such as self-evaluation,proactive cessfullystarted to act on a set goal, the on- goal striving,projection, sustained goal acti- going goal pursuit needsto be shieldedfrom vation, persistence,and resumption. It ap- getting derailed by negative influencesfrom pears,then, that succe_ssful_g-oalp.ursuit does öutside (e.g.,temptations, distractions) and not require consciouslyheld goals and con- inside (e.g.,self-doubts). sciousinstigation and monitoring of respec- \fith all of theseproblems of goal pursuit, tive goal striving. Rather,goals can be.pur- automatic control of goal-directed action sued and attained regardlessof their status should come in handy, becauseestablished in consciousness. routines linked to a relevant context would releasethe critical goal-directed behavior immediately, efficiently, and without a con- STRATEGIC AUTOMATION scious intent. Often, however, such routines OF GOAL PURSUIT are not established,and the goal-directed IMPLEMENTATION INTENTION S behavior is not yet paft of an everyday rou- tine. Researchon implementation intentions Classic theories of motivation (e.g., Atkin- (Gollwitzer,1.993., 1,999) suggests that-as a son, 1.957,Fishbein & Ajzen, 1,975;Heck- substitute-ad hoc automatic action control McClelland, 1985; see re- can be achievedby forming implementation hausen, L977, "If views by Gollwitzer, L990; Gollwitzer & intentions that take the format, Situation Moskowitz, 1996; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, X is encountered,then I will perform Behav- 2001,) see the implementation of con- ior Y!" In an implementation intention, a sciously set goals in direct relation to the mental link is created between an antici- strength of the goal, which in turn is a pated future situational cue and an intended product of expectedutility (desirability)of instrumentalgoal-directed response. goal attainment and the likelihood that the Implementation intentions need to be dis- goal can be attained (feasibility). However, tinguished from goals or goal intentions. even though (self-setor assigned)goals to Goal intentions have the format ("I intend do more good and less bad have been to reach Zt")) whereby Z may relate to a found to be reliably associatedwith actual certain outcome or behavior to which the in- efforts in the intended directions (Ajzen, dividual feels committed. Both goal inten- 1991,; Godin & Kok, L996; Sheeran, tions and implementation intentions are acts 2002), these intention-behavior relations of willing, wherein the first specifiesan in- are modest. This is largely due to the fact tention to meet a goal, and the secondrefers that people, despite having formed strong to an intention to perform a plan. Com- intentions on the basis of high desirability monly, implementation intentions are and feasibility beliefs, faii to act on them formed in the serviceof goal intentions, be- (i.e., people are inclined but still abstain; causethey specifythe when, where, and how Orbell & Sheeran.1998). of goal-directedresponses. For instance' a 634 VI SELF-REGULATORYPROCESSES

possibleimpiementation intention in the ser- implementation intentions on translatine vice of m-eetingthe healrhgoal of eatingveg- goal intentionsinto behavior shows rhat all etarian food would link a suitable siruä- of theseproblems benefitfrom the strategic tional cue (e.g., one's order is taken at a automation of goal pursuit provided by im- restaurant) to an appropriate goal-directed plementarionintentions. behavior(e.g., asking for a vegetarianmeal). The mental if-then links createdby imple- Getting Started mentation intentions are expected to falili- tate goal attainmenton the basisof various This problem of goal pursuit embracesthree psychologicaiprocesses thar reiate to both different issues, each of which militates the anticipated situation and the linked against effectiveiy getting started on one's behavior (Goliwitzer, 1999). Becauseform- goals. The first has ro do with remembering ing implemenrationintentions implies the se- one's goal intention (Einstein& McDaniel, lection of a critical future internäl or exrer- 1,996).I7hen acting on a given goal is not nal cue (i.e., a viable opporruniry), it is part of one's routine, or when one has to assumedthat the mental representationof postponeacting on it until a suitableoppor- this situation becomes highly acrivated, tunity presentsitseif, one can easilyforget ro hence more accessible.This heishtenedac- do so. Dealing with many things ät o.r.., o, cessibilityshould make it easiertä detect the becoming preoccupied by a particular task, critical situation in the surrounding environ- can make this even more likelS especially ment and to attend readily to it e-venwhen when the given goal is new or unfämiliai. one is, busy with other things. Moreover, Empirical support of this reason for the in- once the critical cue is encountered, the re- tention-behavior gap comes from retrospec- sponse specified in the then part of the im- tive reports by inclined abstainers.For ex- plementation intention should be triggered ample, 70% of parricipanrs who had in an auromatic fashion that is immödiate, intended to perform a breast self-examina- efficient, and without necessitating a con- tion but failed to do so offered forgetting as scious intent. In summary. the formation of their reason for nonperformance (Milne, implementation intentions is a strategy of Orbell, & Sheeran,2002;Orbell, Hodgkins, regulating goal pursuit that switches con- & Sheeran,1,997). Also, meta-analysishas sciouscontrol of goal-directedacdon to au- shown that the longer the time interval be- tomatic control. fween measuresof goal intentions and goal Researchon action control via implemen- achievement,the less likely it is that inien- tation intentions to date has focused on the tions are realized(Sheeran & Orbell, 1998). following three questions: Are implemenra- These findings suggest that remembering tion intentions of help in overcoming the one'sgoal intentions doesnot come easyto various problemsof goal pursuit?Do imple- people. mentation intentions indeed allow for the But even if one remembers what one is automatic control of goal-directed action? supposed to do, there is another problem And what kind of price do people pay when that may need to be resolved, namöly, seiz- self-regulatingtheir goal puisuiis by forming ing the opportunity to act. This problem is if-then plans? likely to be especiallyacute when there is a deadline for performing the behavior, or Implementation Intentions when the opportunity to act is presented Help Overcome Classic Problems only briefly. In these circumsrances,people of Conscious Goal Pursuit may farl to initiate goal-directed responses becausethey fail to notice that a gooä time The consciousself-regulation of goal pursuit to get started has arrived, they af,e unsure often runs aground. This is true, whether the how they should acr when the momenr pres- problems at hand are relared ro gerting ents itself, or they simply procrastinate. started, staying on track in the face of inter-- Oettingen, Hönig, and Gollwitzer (2000, nal or external disturbances,keeping up mo- Study 3) showed that considerableslippage tivation in the face of difficulties, or switch- can occur even when people have formed ing from ineffectiveto more effectivemeans. strong goal intentions to perform a behavior However, researchon the effects of forming at a pafticular time. Participants were pro- 34. Automaticityin Goal Pursuit 635 vided with diskettescontaining four concen- vance when, where, and how one wants to tration tasks and formed goal intentions to move toward goal attainmentameliorate the perform thesetasks on their computersat a problemsof action initiation speliedout ear- pa.rticulartime each'$Tednesdaymorning for lier. Various studies on the effects of imple- the next 4 weeks.The program on the dis- mentation intentions on the rate of goal at- kette recorded the time that participants tainment suggesta positive answer to this startedto work on the task from the clock question given the type of goals that have on participants' computers. Findings indi- been found to benefit from forming imple- cated that the mean deviation from the in- mentation intentions. For instance, Goll- tendedstart time was 8 hours, that is, a dis- witzer and Brandstätter (1997) analyzed a crepancy of 2 hours on average for each goal intention (i.e., writing a report about specified opportunity. Similar findings were how one spent ChristmasEve) that had to obtained by Dholakia and Bagozzi (2003, be performed at a time (i.e.,during the sub- Study2) when participants'task was to eval- sequent Christmas holiday) when people uate a website that could be accessedonly were commoniy busy with other things. Sim- during a short time window. Here, only ilarly, Oettingen et al. (2000, Study 3) ob- 37% of participantswho formed a respec- served that implementation intentions help tive goal intentionwere successfulat accom- people to act on their task goals (i.e.,taking plishing the task. In summary, people may a concentrationtest) on time (e.g.,at L0 e..u. not get started with goal pursuit, because in the morning of every'Wednesdayover the they fail to seizegood opportunities to act. next 4 weeks).Other studieshave examined There are also many instancesin which the effects of implementation intentions on peopleremember their goal intentions (e.g.,, goal attainment rates with goal intentions to order a low-fat meal) and recognize tha.t that are somewhat unpleasant to perform. an opportunemoment ls upon them (e.9.,lt For instance, the goal intentions to perform is lunchtime at one's usual restaurant) but regular breast examinations (Orbell et al., nonethelessfail to initiate goal-directedbe- 1997), cervicalcancer screenings (Sheeran & haviors, becausethey start to reflect anew Orbell, 2000), resumptionof functional ac- on the desirabilityof the goal intention (i.e., tivity after joint replacementsurgery (Orbell start to havesecond thoughts). This problem & Sheeran,2000), and engagingin physical has to do with overcoming an initial reluc- exercise (Milne et al., 2002), were all more tance to act that is likelv to arise when peo- frequently acted on when people had fur- ple have decided to pursue a goal that in- nished these goals with implementation in- volves a trad.e-offbetween attractive long- tentions. Moreover, implementation inten- term consequencesversus less attractive tions were found to facilitate the attainment short-term consequences(Mischel, 1,996). of goal intentions when it is easyto forget to For example, a strong goal intention to or- act on them (e.g.,regular intake of vitamin der low-fat meals is commonly formed on pills, Sheeran& Orbell, 1,999;the signingof the basis of long-term deliberative thinking, work sheetswith the elderlS Chasteen,Park, according to which eating low-fat food is & Schwarz,2001,). perceivedas highly desirable;however, once The results of these studies suggest that the critical situation is confronted, short- implementation intentions indeed facilitate term desirabilityconsiderations are triggered the initiation of goal-directed behaviors by that occupy cognitive resourcesat the mo- simplifying this process (i.e., making it less ment of action (e.g.,the low-fat meal is per- effortful). This conclusion is also supported ceived as tastelessat the critical juncture). by the finding that the beneficial effects of Such dilemmas between the head and the implementation intentions are commonly heart should thus also get in the way of more apparent with difficult-to-implement readily acting on the respectivegoal in the goals comparedto easygoals. For instance, good (Loewenstein, implementation intentions were more effec- face of opportunities'!7elch, \X/ebeqHsee, & 2001; Metcalfe & tive in helping people to complete difficult, Mischel, 1999; Trafimow & Sheeran, in compared to easy,personal projects during press). Christmas break (Gollwitzer Ec Brandstätter, So the questionarises: Does forming im- 1,997, Study 1). And forming implementa- plementation intentions that plan out in ad- tion intentions was more beneficial to fron- 636 VI. SELF.REGULATORYPROCESSES

"And tal lobe patients,who typicaily have severe critical stimulus: if my friend ap- problems r,vith executive control, than to proaches me with an outrageous request, college students (Lengfelder& Gollwitzer, then I'11ignore it!" 200I, Study2). Two sets of experimentsanalyzed the ef- fects of suppression-orientedimplementa- tion intentions.The first looked at the con- Scayingon Track troi of unwanted spontaneousattention to Many goaiscannot be accomplishedby sim- tempting distractions(Gollwitzer & Schaal, ple, discrete,one-shot actions but require 1,998).Participants had to perform a boring continuous striving and repeated complex task (i.e.,a seriesof simple arithmetictasks) behavioral performances to be attained. while being bombardedwith attractive dis- (e.g.,video clips of award- Once a o.trotr has initiated thesemore com- tracting stimuli 'Whereas plex goäl pursuits, bringing them to a suc- winning commercials). control par- cessful ending may be very difficult when ticipantswere askedto form a mere goal in- certain internal (e.g., being anxious, tired, tention ("I will not let myself get dis- overburdened) or external stimuli (e.g., tracted!"), experimental participants in temptations,distractions) are not conducive addition formed one of two implementation "And to goal realization but instead generatein- intentions: if a distractionarises, then "And terferencesthat could potentially deraii the I'll ignore it!" or if a distractionarises, ongoing goal pursuit. Thus, one wonders then I will increasemy effort at the task at whether implementation intentions can fa- hand!" The ignoreimplementation intention cilitate the shielding of such goal pursuits always helped participants to ward off the from the negativeinfluences of interferences distractions(as assessed by their task perfor- from inside and outsidethe person. mance), regardlessof whether the motiva- There are two major strategiesin which tion to perform the tedioustask (assessedat implementation intentions can be used to the beginning of the task) was low or high. shield an ongoing goal pursuit: (1) direct- The effort-increase implementation inten- ing one's implementation intentions toward tion, in contrast, was effective only when the suppressionof negativeinfluences, and motivation to perform the tedious task was (2) directing one's implementation inten- low. Apparently, when motivation is high to tions toward spelling out the ongoing goal begin with, effort-increase implementation pursuit, so that it becomessheltered from intentions may create övermotivation that these negative influences. For example, in hamperstask performance.It seemsappro- the realm of social competence:If a person priate therefore to advisemotivated individ- wants to avoid being unfriendly to a friend uals who suffer from being distracted(e.g., who is known to make outrageous re- ambitious students doing their homework) quests, she can protect herself from sho'uv- to resort to ignore implementation inten- ing the unwanted unfriendiy response by tions rather than to implementation inten- forming suppression-orientedimplementa- tions that focus on the strengthening of ef- tion intentions.Suppression-oriented imple- fort. mentation intentions can take different for- The second set of experiments analyzing mats. The person may'focus on reducing suppression-orientedimplementation inten- the intensity of the unwanted response by tions studied the control of the automatic intending not to show the unwanted re- activation of stereotypicalbeliefs and preju- "And sponse: if my friend approachesme dicial evaluations (Gollwitzer & Schaal, with an outrageousrequest, then I will not 1,998).Invarious priming studies,with short respond in an unfriendly manner!" But the stimulus-onsetasynchronies of lessthan 300 person may also try to reducethe intensity ms between primes (presentationsof mem- of the unwanted responseby specifying the bers of stigmatized groups) and targets initiation of the respectiveantagonistic re- (adjectivesdescribing r,elevant stereotypical "And sponse: if my friend approachesme attributesor neutralpositive-negative adjec- with an outrageousrequest, then I will re- tives), implementation intentions helped to spond in a friendly manner!" Finally, sup- inhibit both the automatic activation of ste- pression-orientedimplementation intentions reotypicalbeliefs and the prejudicialevalua- may even focus a person away from the tions relative to women. the elderly, and the 14.Arrr,rnr'rricirv in C,tal Ptirsuit 637 homeless.These implementation intenrions Goliwitzer and Bayer (2000; Gollwitzer, (i.e., if-then plans) specified being con- Bayer,& McCulloch, 2005) testedthis hy- fronted with a member of the critical grolrp pothesisin a,seriesof experimentsin which "Then in the if part, and either I won't ste- participantswere asked(or not) to make if- "Then reotype" (respectively, I won't evalu- then plans regardingthe implementationof "Then ate negativeiy") or I will ignore the an assignedtask goal. Prior to beginning group membership" in the then part. Re- work on the task, participants' self-states gardlessof which then parts were used,both were manipulated,so that the task at hand types of suppression-orientedimplementa- becamemore difficult (e.g.,a state of self- tion intentionswere effective. definitionai incompietenessprior to a task The researchpresented in the preceding that requiredperspective taking; Gollwitzer two paragraphsused implementationinten- & Wicklund, L985;a good mood prior to a tions that specifieda potential interference task that required evaluation of others in the if part. The specifiedinterference was nonstereotypically;Bless & Fiedler, 1995; linked to a then part that describedan at- and a state of ego-depletionprior to solv- tempt at suppressingthe unwantednegative ing difficult anagrams; Baumeisteq 2000; influence of this interferenceon one's goal Vluraven, Tice, & Baumeister,1998). The pursuit. Self-regulationby this type of imple- induced critical self-statesnegatively af- mentation intention implies that one has to fectedtask performanceonly for those par- be in a position to anticipatethese potential ticipants who had not planned out in ad- interferences on the way to the goal; one vance how they wanted to perform the task evenneeds to know what kind of unwanted at hand (i.e., had only set themselvesthe responsesthese interferenceselicit, if one goal to come up with a great performance). prefersto specifynot showing this response Implementationintention participantswere in the then part of the implementation inten- effectivelyprotected from the negativeinflu- tion (rather than showing a goal-directedre- encesassociated with the induced detrimen- sponse or simply ignoring the interfering tal self-states. event).Fortunately, a simpler way to use im- This researchprovides a new perspective plementationintentions to protect an ongo- on the psychologyof self-regulation.Com- ing goal pursuit from getting derailed is also monly, effective self-regulation (Baumeister, available. Instead of gearing one's imple- Heatherton, & Tice, 1994) is understood in mentation intentions toward anticipated po- terms of strengthening the self, so that the tential interferences and the disruptive re- self can meet the challengeof being a power- sponses they trigger, one may form ful executiveagent. Therefore, most research implementationintentions geared at stabiliz- on goal-directed self-regulation focuses on -We ing the ongoing goal pursuit at hand. strengthening the self in such a way that again use the example of a tired person v,rho threats and irritations become less likely, or is approached by her friend with an outra- on restoring an aheady threatenedor irri- geousrequest, and who will likely respond tated self. All of these maneuvers ate tar- in an unfriendly manner: If this person has getedin the end on changing the self, so that stipulatedin advancein an implementation the self becomesa better executive.Instead, intention what shewill converseabout with the findings of Gollwitzer and Bayer (2000) her friend, the critical interaction may sim- suggesta perspectiveon goal-directed self- ply run off as planned, and being tired regulation that gets around changing the self should thus fail to affect the person's relat- by facilitating action control via linking it to ing to her friend. As is evident from this ex- srtuatronalcues. ample, the present self-regulatory strategy People'sgoai pursuits, however,are threat- should be of specialvalue wheneverthe in- ened not only by detrimental self-statesbut fluenceof detrimentalself-states (e.g., being alsoby adversesituational conditions. Many tired, irritated, anxious) on derailing one's situations have negative effects on goal at- goal-directedbehavior has to be controlled. tainment,unbeknownst to the personwho is This should be true whether or not suchself- striving for the goal. A prime exampleis the states andlor their nesative influences on socialloafing phenomenon,in which people one's goal-directedbehävior reside in con- show reduced effort in the face of work set- sclousness. tings that produce a reduction of account- 638 VI. SELF-REGULATORYPROCESSES

ability (i.e., performance outcomescan no of mediators ro change the loss frames longer be checkedat an indrviduallevel). Be- adopted by conflicting parries into gain cause people are commonly not aware of frames),or not under the person'scontroi. this phenomenon,they cannot form imple, Moreoveq peopleare often ,rot u*ur. of the mentation intentions that specifv a soiial adverse influences of the current environ- loafing situation as a criiical siruation, ment (e.g.,a deindividuatedwork setringor thereby rendering an implementationinten- a loss-framednegotiation setting), or they tlon that locuses on suppressingthe social do not know what alternative kind of envi loafing responseas an unviable seif-regula- ronmentaisetting is actuallyfacilitative (e.g., tory strategy.As an alternative,peopl. -ny an individualized work seting or a gain- again resort to forming implementationin- framed negotiarion serting). In"such p.ifor- tentionsthat stipulatehow the intendedtask mancesituations, the self-regulatorysüaregv is to be performed, thus effectively blocking of specifyingcritical situations in the if pait any negative situational influencei. of an implementation intention and linking Supporting this contention, when Endress them to a coping responsein the then part (2001,) _performed a social loafing experi- does not qualify as a viable alternative ielf- ment that used a brainstorming task (i.e.. regulatory strategy. Rather, people need to participants had to find "r *"iy differeni resort to the strategy of planning out their uses for a common knife as possible),she goal pursuitsin advancevia implementation observed that implementation intentions intentions, thereby protecting them from ad- ("And if I have found one solution, then I verse situational influences. will immediately try ro find a different solu- qioq!"), but not goal intentions("I will try to Motivation find as many different solutions as possi- Control ble!"), protected participants from iocial Ideally, people set themselvesgoals in line loafing _effects. Findings reported by with their beliefs that the goal can actually Trötschel and Gollwrtzer (2004) also sup- be attained (i.e., goal strength reflects per- porr the norion that goal pursuitsplannäd ceivedfeasibility; Oetingen, 2000; Oerdngen, by forming implemenration intentiäns be- P1k, & Schnetter,2001). Such beliefs may come invulnerable to adversesituational in- take the form of high-outcome expectarions fluences. In their experiments on the self- or more specific high self-effrcacyexpeca- regulation of negotiation behavior, loss- tions (i.e., beliefsthat one possesseswhat it framed negoriation settings failed to unfold takes to reach the goal; Bandura, 199V).ln their negativeeffects on fair and cooperarive any case,a personwho has decidedto strive negotiation outcomeswhen the negotiators for a certain goal on rhe basis of high expec- had in advanceplanned out their go"alinten- tations should be highly motivated ro siive tions to be fair and cooperarive,with if-then for the chosengoal. Still, one wonders what plans. Finally, in further experiments, happenswhen people run into difficulties in Goliwitzer (1,998)observed that competing trying to implemenr the goal. Will they sim- goal intentions activated outside of a per- ply adjust their outcome expectations and son'sawareness (by using goal-priming-part -thispro- self-efficacybeliefs downwards, rhus losing cedures described in the first oJ motivation to strive for the goal? As Kuhl chapter) failed to affect a pe.son'songoing (1,984)has pointed out, people can and do goal pursuit, if this goal pursuit was planneä push back by keeping up their motivation to out in advance via implementation inten- pursuethe goal at hand (i.e.,they engagein tions. motivation control). It appears, then, that the self-regulatory Becauseovercoming the self-doubts origi- strategy of planning out goal pursuiis in ad- nating from difficulties and failures is a vance via implementation intentions allows rather complex affair for which some people the person to reap the desired positive may be better equippedthan others (Dweck, outcomes,without having to changethe en- 1999; Elliot & Thrash, 2002), Gollwitzer vironment from an adverseto a facilitative and Bayer (2004) wondered whether the one. This is very convenient,because such self-regulatory strategy of forming imple- environmental change is often very cumber- mentation intentions could be used to facili- (e.g., some it takes the costly interventions tate such motivation control. In a first ex- 34. Automaticityin Goal Pursuit 639

periment, high school studenrswere asked when to switch to a different straregy or to perform a very challenging marh resr means, becauseaction control is then dele- composedof 10 individual problems.In the gated to this specifiedcue. The self-reguia- mere goal intention condition, the students tory strategyof simply settinggoals (e.g.,to had to take the testwith the assignedgoal o{ avoid the escalationof commitment by al- excelling on it (i.e., correctly solve a very ways pursuing the best straregy)should be large number of problems). In the impie* comparatively less effective,because it de- mentation intention condition, participants mands effortful deliberation of the insrru- had to furnish this goal intention r,vith the mentality of the chosenstrategy or meansin "And following if-then plan: as soon as I situ (i..., when failure experiences are start to work on a new problem. then i tell mounting), which-to make things worse- myself:I can do it!" Even though the mean will likely be biasedby self-defensiveness. number of problemssolved was very low in Henderson, Gollwitzer, and Oettingen the whole sample(i.e., 3.5 problems),imple- (2004, Study 1) tested the hypothesisthat mentation intention participants solved sig- furnishing disengagementgoais with imple- nificantly more problems (4.3 problems) mentation intentions should help people to than mere goal intention participants (2.8 relinquish a failing strategyof goal pursuit problems). Apparently, the simple plan of more effectively.For this purpose,a classic assuring themselvesof their high self-effi- paradigm was usedthat createsa strong es- cacy when taking on a new) individual prob- calation tendency (Bobocel& Meyer, 1994): lem helped participanrs to perform well. Participantshad to chooseand subsequently In a follow-up experiment, we asked col- justify their choice among four different legestudents to solvea seriesof Raven Ma- strategiesof performing an assignedtest trices that 'S7e became increasingly more diffi- measuringan important aptitude (i.e., gen- cult. again established a mere goal eral academicknowledge). Prior to working intention group (i.e., correctly solve a very on the test with the chosensrraregy, partici- large number of matrices)and an implemen- pants in the mere goal intention condition "As "I tation intention group (i.e., soon as I repeatedthe statement, will always pur- start working on a new matrix, I'11tell my- sue the best strategy!" Participantsin the im- self that I can do it"). In addition. rherewas plementation intention condition repeated also a group of goaI intention participanrs this goal intention to themselves,along with "And who had to tell themselvesright after having the plan, if I receive disappointing received the goal intention instruction that feedback,then I'11switch to a differenr srrat- "I they could meet this goal (i.e., can do egy!" In line with our expectationsthat im- it!"). As it turned out, only the implementa- plementation intentions facilitate switching tion intention group achieveda superiorper- to a different straregy,19 olt of 29 partici- formance on the tesr. This finding suggests pants (66%) in the goal intention group, that again, implementation intentions allow and 27 out of 29 participants (93o/") in the for effective motivation control, and that implementation intention grolrp, disengaged this is achievedby linking self-assuringsrate- from their initial strategy when false failure ments to distinct critical cues. feedbackwas given on participants'quality of test pertormance. Switching to More EffectiweMeans The Psychological There is a further self-regularory problem Mechanisms Underlying Implementation with successfullymoving toward goal attain- Intention Effects ment: switching to better means when the chosenmeans turn out to be unproductive It is assumed(Gollwitzer, L993) that imple- (Carver & Scheier,1999; Gollwitier, 1990). mentation intentions manageto switch the Peopleoften fail readily to disengagefrom a consciousand effortful mode of the control chosenfailing strategyor meansbecause of a of goal-directed action to the auromatic strong self-justification morive (Brockner, mode of action control (i.e., direct control 1,992).Such escalationeffects should be re- by specifiedinternal or external cues). To duced effectively,however, by the use of im- empirically test such a shift, it does not suf- plementation intentions that specify exactly fice to show that many of the problems of 644 VI. SELF.REGULATORYPROCESSES goal pursuit that are difficult to master by fied viable opportunities. for .presenting conscious and effortful self-regulationare counterargumentsto a serles ot raclst re- more easilymastered by forming implemen- marks made by a confederate.Participants tation intentions (as has been extensively with implementation intentions initiated demonstratedin the studies reported ear- counterargumentssooner than did partici- lier). One would aiso like to seeexperiments pants who had formed the mere goal inten- that more directly assesswhether the ac- tion to counterargue. tion control achievedby implementationin- The efficiencyof action initiation was fur- tentions does indeed cafiy features of ther explored in two experimentsusing a automaticity: immediate, efficient, and not go-no-go task embedded as a secondary requiringconscious intent. task in a dual-taskparadigm (Brandtstätter, Lengfelder,& Gollwitzer.,20AL, Studies 3 and 4). Participantsformed the goal inten- ImbIement ati on Int ention s : ^ ,f. t n. tion to pressa button as fast as possibleif I he JDecüLedJltuatrcn numbers appearedon the computer screen, S*ii, ""a efficient responding to the critical but not if letterswere presented. Participants situation specifiedin the if part of an imple- in the implementation intention condition mentation intention implies that this situa- additionally made the plan to press the re- tion is readily attended to and easily de- sponsebutton particularly fast if the number tected (Gollwitzeg Bayer, Steller, & Bargh, three was presented.Implementation inten- 2002). One study, using a dichotic-listening tion participants showed a substantial in- paradigm,demonstrated that words describ- creasein speedof respondingto the number ing the anticipated critical situation were three compared to the control group, re- highly disruptive to focused attention in im- gardless of whether the simultaneously de- plementation intention participants com- manded primary task (a memorizationtask pared to goal intention participants(i.e., the in Study 3 and a tracking task in Study 4) shadowing performance of the focused at- was either easy or difficult to perform. Ap- tention materials decreased).In another parently, the immediacy of responding in- study using an embedded figures test duced by implementation intentions is also (Gottschaldt,1,926), where smallera-figures efficient, in the sensethat it doesnot require are hidden within larger b-figures, enhanced much in the way of cognitiveresources (i.e., detection of the hidden a-figures was ob- can be performed even when demanding served with participants who had specified dual tasks have to be performed at the same the a-figure in the if part of an implementa- time). tion intention (i.e.,had made plans on how Two experiments by Bayer, Moskowitz, to create a traf{ic sign from the a-figure). and Gollwitzer (2002) testedwhether imple- Similarly Aarts, Dijksterhuis, and Midden mentation intentions lead to action initiation 3,999) used a lexical decision task and even in the absenceof conscious intent. In found that the formation of implementation these experiments,the critical situation was intentionsled to subjects'faster lexical deci- presented subliminally and immediacy of sionsfor thosewords that describedthe crit- initiation of the goal-directedresponse was ical situation. assessed.Results indicated that subliminal presentation of the critical situation led to a speed-up in responding in implementation ImDlementationIntentions : participants but not in goal intention partici- Tie SpecifiedGoal-Directed Behauior pants. These effects suggest that, when The postulatedautomation of action initia- planned via implementation intentions, the tion has also been supported by the results initiation of goal-directedbehavior becomes of various experiments that tested immedi- triggered by the presenceof the critical situa- acy, efficiencS and the presence-absenceof tional cue, without the need for further con- conscious intent. Gollwitzer and Brand- sciousintent. srätrer(1,997, Study 3) demonstratedthe im- Additional process mechanisms underly- mediacy of action initiation in a study in ing the effects of implementation intentions which participants had been induced to on action control have been explored. For form implementation intentions that speci- instance, furnishing goals with implementa- 34. Automaticity pursuit in Goal 641 tion intentionsmight produce an increasern Indeed, using different ego_depletion goal commrtmeni, which para_ in turn cause drgms, research participants heightenedgoal attainmenr. who used Howeveq this implementation intentions nyporhesrshas to self_regulatein not received any empirical one rask support. did not show reduced selT-reeula_ For instance,when Brandstäiteret rory capacity_in a subsequenttask. Whäther al. (2001, 1,) analyzed-h.th.. heroin lludy the rnrtial selt_regulationtask was addrcts suffering from withdrawal control_ would ling emotions *hil. watching benefit from forming implementation " hrrrrorou, inten_ movie (Gollwitzer &.Bayeq tions to submit a newly-composed ZOOO)or per_ curricu_ fo^rminga Stroop tusk ium vitae beforethe end lWebU Ac'St..iurr, of the'duy,th"y "i* 2003, 1), implemenration *.ry_Il9.d pafticipanrs, lrldy inrentions commitmerrt to do successfuily preserved so. \fhile the majority . self_regulatory re- of the implementa_ sources,as demonstrated tion intenrion parricipanrs by gieater persis_ succleded in tence on subsequent handing in difficult br unsolvable the curriculum ,ritae in time, tasks. nong the goal intention participanrs 9{ suc_ To test whether suppression_oriented ceededin this task. Thes. im_ t*o gro.rpr, how_ plementation intentioni ever, did create rebound ef_ not differ in rerms äf th.i, goul fects, commitment Gollwitzer; Tiötschel, ".rJ Sumner (.,I feel committed to compose (2004) ,.I ran rwo e.xperiments using re_ a curriculum vitae,' and have to .o*il.t. paradigms.developed by Mäcrae, this task") measuredafrer the goal inte.rtion :.ul.h, bod.enhausen,and Jecren(1,994). In both and implemenrationintention" instructions studies,.participantsfirst had to s.rppress had been administered. This finäing the was expression of stereorypesin a firit^_impres_ replicated with young adults who partici_ sion formation task thät focused pated.in a profeisionäl d.".l"p;;;t on a parric_ work_ ular member of a stereotyped snop (Uerrrngener group (i.e., al., 2000, Study 2), and homelesspeople). analogous results Rebounj *", Ä."rored in were repoited in research terms of either subsequentexpression of ste_- on rhe effects of implemätation intentions reorypesin a task that demanäedthe evalua_ on meeting health promotion and disease gf rhe group of homelesspeople in gen_ prevenriongoals (e.g., Orbell et al., 1997). :ioT eral (Study1), or a lexicaldecision taskihar assessedthe accessibilityof homelesssrereo_ Potential types (Study participants Costs of Action Control via 2). who had been Implementation Intentions assignedthe mere goal öf controlling srereo_ typical thoughts while Given the many forming "rr"i-pr.r_ benefits of forming"of imple_ sion of mentation the given homelessp.r.o.r were more intentions, a question ärry stereotypicalin their judgments of homeless possiblecosts arises.Two irrt.r., have been pggpt. in general (Study 1) and empirically so far: showed a Tillr.d Flrrt, for*ing hrgher accessibilityof lmplementatron intentions homelessstereorypes may be a very (Syd.y 2)- than cosrly self-regulatory participants who had bäen srrategyii it produces asked to lurnish a hrgh degree rhis lofty goal with relevant of ego depletion "rrä .orrs._ if-then quently plans. Rather thän"causire ,.bo.rrrd handicapsneeded seff_regulatory re_ imp lemen ta tion intentiorrs'ap pea. sources.Second, even though iäplementa_ ;ffec.g, to De ln preventingthem. tion intentions can succeJrf"ily' .etrecttve - ,.lppr.r, Although implemenration intenrions unwanted thoughts, feelings, seem and actions in to achleve their a grven context, effects without much cost, these very thoughts, feel_ this does nor mean that the ,.g,ri*io., of ings, and actions may reboo"d i"ä t.mpo_ goal pursuit via implementarion iiterrtiorrs rally subsequenr,different context. is foolproof. In everyday life, p.opt. The assumption_thatimplementation rnuy nor in_ succeedin forming effectiveimpiementarion tentions subjectbehavior rö the direct con_ lntentronsfor various reasons. trol of situational.:ues (Gollwitzer, For instance, 1993) in the if part of an implementation implies that the self is not implic"t.ä intention- *h.r, person may. spec^ifyan opportunity behavior is controlled via i;ple;;;rarion I that hardly ever arises.Or in the then part of intentions.As a consequence,the self an should implementation intention, p.opl. not becomedepleted when tu.k p.rformance may falsely specify behaviors th"t harrä ,.ro rs regulated by implementation intentions. ,rr- st-rumentalitywith respect to reachins the 647 VI. SELF-REGULATORYPROCESSES goal, or behaviorsthat turn out to be out- want to adjust the type of implementation sideof people'scontroi. intention formed to the self-regulationprob- There is also the question of how con- lem at hand. For instance,while suppres- cretelypeople should specifythe if and then sion-orientedimplementation intentions are parts in their implementationintentions. If viable when certain distractions, tempta- the goal is to perform well on a given task tions, and unwanted responsesare antici- goal, one can form an implementationinten- pated, plans that bolster the ongoing goai tion that holciseither this very behavior in oursuit are needed in situations in which the then part or a more concreteoperation- goal pursuit is threatened by detrimental ahzation of it. The latter seemsappropriate self-statesand adversesituationai influences whenever a whole affay of specific opera- of which the individual is not aware. tionalizationsis possible,because planning Researchon the potential costs of using in advance which type of goal-directed implementation intentions indicates that behavior is to be executed,once the situa- they do not drain self-regulatoryresources tion specifiedin the if part of the impiemen- (i.e., produce ego depletion), and suppres- tation intentionis encountered,prevents dis- sion-orientedimplementation intentions are ruptive deliberationin situ (with respectto not associatedwith rebound.Thus, forming choosing one behavioral strategy over an- implementationintentions suggestsitself as other). An analogousargument applies to an effective and quite cost-free self-regula- the specification of situations in the if part tory strategy of goal pursuit; people can of an implementation intention. People achieve süong effects by making simple should specifythe situation in the if part to plans. such a degreethat a given situation will no longer raisethe question of whether it quali- fies as the critical situation. Finally, simply CONCLUSIONS concretizing a goal intention by putting more context-related information into the The idea of unconscious motivation has a "I descriptionof the desiredbehavior (e.g., long intellectual history but has only re- will solve math problems at my desk each cently become integrated into mainstream Wednesdayat 10 P.M.!")will not achievethe psychologicalscience. Theoretical advances same beneficial action control effects as a in cognitive psychology over the past quar- goal intention ("I will solve math prob- ter-century have made the notion of uncon- lems!")that is furnishedwith a implementa- sciousmotivation much more plausibiethan tion intention ("And if it is 10 p.v. on before, enabling researchersto generate nflednesday,then I will sit down at my models of unconsciousmotivational influ- desk!"; Oettingenet al., Study 3). encesthat are in harmony with basic cogni- tive principles. By thinking about goals as another form of mental representation,sub- Summary of Research ject to the samerules and principles as are on Automating Goal Pursuit known to hold for other mental representa- by Forming Implementation Intentions tions, researchershave establishedthe effects The benefitsof the self-regulationstrategy of of unconsciouslyoperating information-pro- forming implementation intentions is evi- cessing, achievement, and interpersonal dent in the numerous studies documenting goals. And by testing the effects of making the effects of imolementation intentions if-then plans (i.e., forming implementation in helping people overcome the various intentions that specify an anticipated critical problems of goal pursuit. Whether getting situation and link it to an instrumentai goal- started, staying on track in the face of directed response) on overcoming classic interferences, holding up motivation, or problems of goal pursuit, researchershave switching to more effective means, research discovered that people may strategically pafiicipants r,vhoformed impiementation in- (i.e., by a consciousact of will) automate tentions were better in solving these prob- their goal pursuits by setting up action plans lems than researchparticipants who oper- in advance. ated on the basis of mere goal intentions. All of this implies that competent perfor- This researchalso indicatesthat peoplemay mancesmay come about not only by con- 34. Automatrcityir-r Goai Pursr-rit 643 scior-rsgoal setting and consciousguidance M. Sorrentino(Eds.), Handbook of motiuationand of the respectivegoal pr-rrsuitsbut also by re- cognition(Vol. 2, pp. 93-130). 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