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Automaticity in Goal Pursuit AUTOMATICITYPROCESSES CHAPTER 34 C€ Automaticity in Goal Pursuit PETERM. GOLL\TITZER IOHN A. BARGH -fh. incersectionof competenceand moti- scious attention is divided and in short sup- I vation involves the ability to attain one's plv. goals, to accomplishwhat one sets out to Two main forms of unconsciousgoal pur- do. Both modern and classictheory and re- suit have been featured in our research:one search on goal pursuit have focused mainly (automaticmotivations) a long-term,chronic on the conscious and deliberate ways that form that develops out of extended experi- people strive toward desired end states.In ence; the other (implementation intentions) this chapter,we focus on the role played by a temporary and strategic form by which automaticor unconsciousmotivations in the one sets up intended actions in advance, so competent pursuit of one's important goals. that they later unfold in an automatic fash- How can such unconsciousgoal pursuit add ion. Before describing these two lines of re- to a person's competenciesin a given do- search,we begin with some historical back- main? \ü/eshow that unconsciouslypursued ground on the concept of uRconscious goals are especially effective in keeping a motivation as it has come and gone within "on person task" and moving in thought psychology over the past century. and action toward the desired goal, even when the consciousmind is distracted or fo- cusedelsewhere. Automatic or unconscious HISTORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS motivations respond immediately and effort- MOTIVATION CONCEPT lessly to environmental conditions (triggers) that promote or support the goal in ques- The unconscioushas had a long and bumpy tion, such as in recognizing and acting upon ride through the history of psychology.Few, opportunities that otherwise might have if any,other psychologicalconcepts have in- been missed.And the efficient nature of un- stigated this much contention and polariza- consciousmotivation makes it an especially tion of opinion. William Jamesconsidered it effective means of goal pursuit in complex "a tumbling ground for whimsies," and and busy social environments in which con- Jean-PaulSartre railed againstit as a way to 624 J4. Automaticityin Goal Pursuit 675 abdicatepersonal responsibility for one'sac- Broadbent,Treisman, Norman, and others, tions. SigmundFreud, of course,champi- which showed how stimuii could be ana- oned the unconsciousas a causal force in lyzed for meaningprior to the person'scon- human thought and behavior,yet his medi- sciousawareness of them, made the idea of cal and therapeutic perspectiveled him to early motivational screeningof environmen- focus as well on the unconscious'snegative tal stimuli much more plausiblethan it had effects.Many modern-daymotivational psy- been in the 1950s (seereview by Lachman, chologists conrinue to hold this negarive Lachman, & Butterfield, 1979). opinion (Bandura 1986; Locke & Latham, Thus, the idea of unconsciousinfluences 7990; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996). on perceptiongained a great deal of traction In their treatments,unconscious influences from the cognitive revolution and soon are characterizedas rigid, undesirablehabits flourished in social and clinical psychology of thought or behavior that must be over- as well. It is now completelyuncontroversial come by consciousacts of will. in mainstream psychology. But what hap- Freud'sdynamic unconscious was primar- penedto the conceptof unconsciousmotiva- ily motivational in nature, driving behavior tion? It did not reap the benefitsof the cog- to expressand fulfill deep-seatedneeds and nitive revolution; rathe! within social wishes, and guarding and defending con- psychology,one of the consequencesof that sciousexoerience from unoleasantmemories revolution was an attempt to eliminate moti- of the p"it or threateningstimuli of the pre- vational explanations for as many phenom- sent.Following Freud'slead, the early work enaas possible (e.g., Nisbett & Ross,1980). on unconscious influences within experi- Unconscious motivation, as a scientific mentalpsychology also focusedon the motr- concept within social psychology, thus vational properties of the unconscious.This had to overcome two seDarate historical "New was the classic Look" perceptionre- resistances-the long-standing one to the searchby Bruner and Postmanand their col- unconsciousas an exolanatorvvariable. and leagues (see reviews by Allport, L955; the more recentorr.'ro motivational expla- Bruner, 1.957;Erdelyi, 1.974).The idea of nations as well. But just as researchon the perceptualdefense involved motivational in- unconscious snuck back into respectability fluenceson the initial perception and aware- through the sheep'sclothing of "attention nessof environmental stimuli. Many studies research"(Broadbent, 1958), motivation re- showed, for example, that significantly lon- searchmade its comebackunder the coverof "task ger tachistoscopicpresentation times were goals" (Srull&'Wyer, 1986;Anderson neededfor a participant to recognizetaboo & Pichert, L978). Social cognition research- words or other stimuli (e.g.,swastikas, spi- ers had shown that the outcome of informa- ders) likely to produce negativeemotional tion-processingactivities-such as organiza- reactions,compared to the recognition of tion of material in memory and ease of emotionally neutral or positive stimuli. retrieval-varied as a function of the oartic- But the New Look ideasconcerning moti- ular task goalsassigned to participants(e.g., vational influences on perceptual recogni- memorizing behavioral information vs. tion and identification had difficulty gaining forming an impression based on ic; Hamil- acceptanceinto the then-mainstreamof psy- ton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980). chological science.Erdelyi's (1974) hisrori- Accordingly, by about 1990, it had be- cal analysisand review of the New Look in- come clear that any complete modei of so- dicatesthat 1950s psychologywas just not cial cognition had to take into account the ready for the idea of preconsciousinfluences individual's task or processinggoals. The on stimulus recognition. But this all changed goal conceptbegan to be included in social "cognitive with the so-called revolution" in cognition models, mainly by assumingthat psychology of the 1.960s.Neisser's (L967) goals were representedmentally in a similar influential book, Cognitiue Psychology, for , way as was known for other classesof social example, reviewed experimental evidenceof stimuli, such as types of social behavior, preattentive or preconscious perceptual roles, and groups (Bargh, 1990; Kruglanski, analysis (e.g., pattern recognition, figural 1,996). The auto-motive model (Bargh, synthesis).Most notably,the classicresearch 1,990;see below) grew out of this idea: If and theory on attention allocation of goals were represented mentally just like 626 VI. SELF-REGULATORY PROCESSES other varietiesof socialconcepts (e.g., ste- stance,then the stereotypeeventually would i'eotypes),then the sameproperties that had becomeactive automatically upon the mere beenfound to hold for other socialrepresen- presencein the environmentof a member of tations-slrch as ti-recapability of becoming that group (Bargh,1989; Breweq 1988). activatedoutside of consciousa\,vareness- Under the assumptionthat goals,too, are should hold for goals as well. And so the representedmentally, and becomeautomati- conceptof unconsciousmotivation made its caily activatedby the sameprinciples, then "un- return to scicntrficpsychology: It was goal representationsshould be capable of conscious" becauseit was automatic in the automatic activation by featuresof the con- senseof beingtriggered and guided by exter- texts in which thosegoals have been pursued nal stimuli instead of an act of conscious often and consistentlyin the past. If a given choice and subsequent conscious control individual always competed with his or her "motivarion" (Bargh,1,994), and it was be- siblings,then the goal of competitionshould causegoai representationswere the particu- become automatically activated upon just lar cognitive concepts being automatically the mere presence of a sibling. In other activated. words, it should becomeactive even though the person may not intentionally and con- sciouslychoose to competeat that time and AUTO.MOTIVE THEORY: in that situation. AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION The auto-motive model further assumes AND PURSUIT OF PERSONAL GOALS that, once activated in this unconscious manner, the goal representationwould then The auto-motive model of unconsciousso- operate in the same way as when it is con- cial motivations built upon the researchof sciously and intentionally activated; that is, the 1970s, and especiallythe 1980s, that the model predicts that an automatically ac- demonstratedthe automatic activation capa- tivated goal would have the sameeffects on bility of social mental representations,such thought and behavior as when the person as trait concepts (e.g., honest, aggressive), consciouslypursues that same goal (i.e., as attitudes,and group stereotypes(see reviews when the goal is activated by an act of con- by Bargh, L989; Brewer, 1988; Wegner & scious will). In essence,then, the original Bargh,1,997). This researchshowed that fre- auto-motive model (Bargh, 1,990) derived quently used mental representations will, the historicalnotion of unconsciousmotiva- over time, become active upon the mere tion from the basicprinciples of modern-day presenceof relevant information in the per- cognitive psychology. son's environment. For stereotypes, this Such theoretical derivations are all well
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