THE EARTHQUAKE, EUROPE, AND PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN TURKEY By Paul Kubicek*
Two events in 1999—the Marmara earthquake and the European Union's (EU) conditional acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy for membership--offered hope for liberalization and democratization in Turkey. In the first case, the earthquake was viewed as a factor mobilizing civil society as a force "from below" that could engender political reform. In the second, the EU became a factor providing outside pressure for change. This article suggests that the energy generated from the earthquake's aftermath has largely dissipated and that there is strong opposition from powerful forces in Turkey to meeting key EU recommendations. While there has been a change in rhetoric, making a change in policy is proving very difficult.
The wave of democratization that system is labeled, it seems well swept over much of the world in the 1990s entrenched, and despite talk of reform appeared to have bypassed Turkey. Instead throughout the decade, politics-as-usual of experiencing a democratic remained the order of the day. breakthrough, the Turkish political system Two events in the second half of remained plagued by several problems 1999 brought about renewed hope for compromising its democracy, issues political liberalization. The first was the further illustrated by the March 2001 Marmara earthquake in August that, in financial crisis and its aftermath. These addition to causing human and material included a Kurdish insurgency; human losses, exposed fissures in the edifice of rights violations; prohibitions on some the Turkish state. The hope among many political parties; corruption; thinly veiled was that these cracks would be filled by a interventions by the military into the resurgent civil society that could push for political arena; and low public confidence change “from below.” The second event in key democratic institutions. The 1999 was the decision by the European Union parliamentary elections produced a (EU) at its December summit in Helsinki coalition government that seemed likely to to accept Turkey’s candidacy for be torn between formerly implacable membership. The expectation was that the enemies on the nationalist right and the EU would help push for change, prompting social-democratic left.(1) Turkey to undertake measures to eliminate Turkey is certainly an electoral its democratic deficit in exchange for democracy but lacks many features of a admission to full membership. Arguably, liberal democracy.(2) One Turkish political one can already see results of the EU’s scientist dubbed Turkey a “delegative lobbying. A new president, one with solid democracy,” marked by personalist rule, reform credentials, has been elected, and lack of accountability, and a penchant for his push for a more liberal and open authoritarian behavior.(3) However the government has brought him into open
34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Paul Kubicek conflict with the current government, discussion need not detain us long, but one triggering the financial meltdown earlier should be aware of some of the major this year. problems facing the Turkish polity in the A year later, one can better assess 1990s and how they impinge upon how these two events and the ostensible democratization. agents of change--civil society and the EU- Human rights are commonly cited -are re-shaping Turkish politics. In other as the largest blemish on Turkey’s contexts, both actors have been deemed democratic record. Many, but certainly not instrumental in the processes of all, of these problems are connected with democratization.(4) Past results elsewhere, the Kurdish insurgency/terrorist actions.(8) however, do not guarantee success in Fighting with the separatist Kurdistan Turkey today. While the debate in Turkey Workers’ Party (PKK) broke out in 1984 has undoubtedly been transformed by these and has claimed over 30,000 lives. Both events, one wonders if this will lead to sides have been accused of massive human broad changes in the polity itself. This rights violations.(9) Away from the front article will therefore examine the ability of lines, individuals, both Turks and ethnic Turkish civil society and the EU to compel Kurds, calling for peaceful dialogue or a Turkish elites to open up the political serious discussion of Kurdish concerns system and further processes of democratic have been imprisoned under Article 312 of consolidation. the penal code, which criminalizes speech deemed to provoke ethnic or religious SHORTCOMINGS OF DEMOCRACY enmity. Turkey ranks among the leaders in IN TURKEY the world for imprisoned journalists, and several leading human rights activists have If a democracy is viewed also been imprisoned. The capture and exclusively in terms of Joseph Schumpter's imprisonment of the PKK’s leader, terms, as a system in which “individuals Abdullah Ocalan in early 1999 helped acquire the power to decide by means of a produce a Turkish military victory but the competitive struggle for the people’s question of language or cultural rights has vote,”(5) then Turkey qualifies as a been raised again by the EU membership democracy. However, this is a minimalist criteria. definition, and many would contend that A related problem in Turkey is the democracies depend upon other factors in powerful role of the military in order to function and be consolidated. politics.(10) The military has directly These include basic civic freedoms, the intervened to overthrow three governments rule of law, respect for human rights, in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and in 1997 measures of accountability, civil society, a played a central role in forcing the Islamist restrained military, and popular support for prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, to democratic values and institutions.(6) resign. Seeing Islamists and Kurds as Turkey has long-standing difficulties in threats to the state's survival, the military several of these areas. Numerous authors uses its institutionalized role in the have tackled these subjects, and they have National Security Council to set policy in identified causes ranging from the Ottoman these areas. It also exercises a role in the state tradition to Ataturk’s legacies to State Security Courts, a constitutional body Turkish political culture and deep that deals with all political crimes. In 1998, cleavages in society.(7) A detailed the European Court of Human Rights
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 35 The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey declared that these courts--because they unity of Turkish society, which was allow civilians to be judged by the “without classes, without military--violate human rights.(11) differences.”(13) The state was therefore Defenders of the military's role say hostile to independent groups with their that it intervenes only to save democracy own agenda, as this would rip the from incapable politicians and enjoys interwoven fabric of Turkish society. State popular support in doing so. Indeed, over corporatism, in which the state created 71 percent of the public in a 1997 survey and guided various groups, was the norm. expressed high trust in it.(12) Nonetheless, This past continues to be reflected civilian politicians lack control over the in the current constitutional order. Article military while the military can veto some 13 of the constitution, written in 1982 government policies or decisions. Today under military rule, includes a host of the military remains the most reticent actor restrictions. The state has the right to on topics of political liberalization, and interpret vague notions such as “public overcoming military opposition is a interest” and “public morals,”(14) in formidable challenge to all elected leaders. effect giving it the power to stop actions it There are also limits on political does not like--ranging from workers’ competition in Turkey. By law, political protests to demonstrations by mothers of parties cannot be based on class, region, the “disappeared.” The law governing ethnicity, or religion. This provision has non-government associations is criticized been sporadically enforced, but in the in a report by the Turkish Industrialists' 1990s, two groups--Kurds and Islamists-- and Businessmen’s Association were brought into court on this issue. In (TUSIAD) as “one of the most 1993 and 1994, the pro-Kurdish People’s antidemocratic of laws in Turkish Labor and Democratic parties were legislation.”(15) Professor Ersin banned, and in 1998 the Islamist Refah Kalaycioglu notes that the laws reflect (Welfare) party, the leading vote-getter in “serious misgivings” about civil society the 1995 elections, was similarly organizations and dissuades people from prohibited. Both groups simply changed joining them.(16) Restrictions on civic their name and reorganized the parties, the groups are only sporadically enforced but, Kurds as the Peoples’ Democratic Party according to one report, in 1999 there (HADEP) and the Islamists as Fazilet were 30 closings of non-governmental (Virtue), but they remain under the threat organizations (NGOs) and 387 cases of of closure and several leaders are serving harassment, mostly to Islamic, human prison terms. rights, or suspected Kurdish groups.(17) More generally speaking, one can Turkish democracy also suffers argue that democracy in Turkey is from corruption and stagnation. Interior handicapped by a strong state tradition Minister Saadettin Tantan ranks which fosters paternalism (the “father corruption as the primary threat to state,” stability today.(18) It is also well- devlet baba) and constrains civil society entrenched. Investigations into the 1996 and independent voices. Traditionally, Susurluk scandal--in which a member of civic groups have been seen as accessories parliament, a law enforcement official, of the state, not as genuine partners able to and an internationally wanted criminal initiate action on their own. Ataturk’s were found together in a wrecked notion of “populism” stressed the organic automobile along with thousands of
36 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Paul Kubicek dollars in cash and weapons with ranked among the lowest in the world in silencers--brought no convictions, despite inter-personal trust (10%), and indicated massive public outcry. In November 2000, attitudes consistent with low political several banking scandals, one involving participation. Nevertheless, 92% agreed the nephew of former President Suleyman that despite its problems, democracy was Demirel, threw prospects for economic better than any other form of government. reform and stability into doubt. These In sum, the survey gives a somewhat have been compounded by more bank mixed rating of a democratic political failures and an open schism between culture in Turkey.(20) President Ahmet N. Sezer and the What is most important to bear in government headed by Bulent Ecevit on mind about these features is that they efforts to fight corruption. seemed to be generally permanent in the In addition, the leaders of several Turkish political system. Something major parties--Tansu Ciller of the True would have to emerge to change this Path Party, Mesut Yilmaz of the situation. In 1999, two events--the Motherland Party, and Erbakan of Refah, earthquake and the EU’s decision to all former prime ministers--have been consider Turkish membership--arguably accused of corruption, but squashed a full altered the political arena in Turkey. But inquiry by supporting each other in were these events harbingers for real and parliament. The fact that Ciller and lasting change? Yilmaz remain heads of their parties after this problem and their electoral defeats in THE EARTHQUAKE, CIVIL 1999, points to the additional difficulty of SOCIETY, AND REFORM political stagnation. The parties The Marmara earthquake of August themselves are not run in a democratic 17 was both a natural and a political manner, making it difficult for new ideas disaster. In addition to death and and leaders to emerge from below.(19) destruction, the event also highlighted This problem connects with those weaknesses in the Turkish political of trust in many political institutions and a system.(21) National and local somewhat ambivalent attitude toward governments, the Red Crescent, and the democracy. The Turkish component of the military were all subjected to scathing 1997 World Values Survey, based upon a criticism for a long list of problems. The sample of 1,907 respondents, found that State Earthquake Fund was found to have Turks had rather low levels of trust in only the equivalent of $2 in it.(22) political parties (30%), the government Government officials were accused of (51%) and parliament (52%). What is having taken bribes to allow shoddy perhaps more disturbing is the high construction that collapsed with a large number of respondents stating they would loss of life. Relief teams and materials like a strong leader who does not have to arrived late, if at all, and officials of the bother with parliament (41%), a Turkish Red Crescent were found to have government run by experts, not elected embezzled funds and sold donated officials (55%), or a military government equipment. (33 percent). Turks were also more likely The army’s first orders were to than respondents in established establish security, and military units were democracies to agree (65%) that slow to pitch in with rescue efforts of democracy produces much disorder, they civilians. President Demirel’s motorcade
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 37 The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey held up ambulances taking victims to the Institute for Near East Policy explained, “It hospital, and all he could do to console was a cliché about Turkey for decades that victims was call the tragedy “God’s will,” civic associations don’t work and that an event whose handling could not be people sit back and wait for the state to do questioned. The health minister caused a everything. That’s a cliché in the process furor by rejecting blood arriving from of being erased from the Turkish Greece. He also showed little compassion lexicon.”(26) One Turkish observer for victims by dismissing the need for expressed the hope that the 21st century portable toilets, suggesting instead that the would be the “century of civil society.”(27) displaced simply use the nearby Sea of Much of this optimism has Marmara.(23) Together, these problems subsided. True, many groups are still plunged the state into a crisis of active, and certainly civic organizations legitimacy, as the image of an all- enjoy a higher profile in Turkey than powerful, if not all-benevolent, state was before the disaster. However, they have shattered. One Turkish columnist been unable to sustain their level of concluded, “This earthquake created a political mobilization or come together to faultline in the Turkish political system. spearhead a push for sweeping reforms Everyone saw how inept the whole system beyond the arena of public safety and is--the bureaucracy, the state mechanism. disaster preparedness. Civil society, one What collapsed is the whole system. In the could say, exists more as a slogan than as a long run, the ramifications will be very reality. By the first anniversary of the drastic.”(24) quake, hope for political reform had been If there was any positive outcome largely displaced onto the European Union from this tragedy, it was the role played by or to President Sezer. In other words, Turkish citizens and citizens’ Turkish civil society was no longer viewed organizations. People rushed in to search as the primary agent for change; if change for victims, supply food and medicine, and was to come, it would be either “from build shelters for the displaced. Many outside” or “from above,” both concepts groups came together to form a Civil having a long traditions in Ottoman- Coordination Center (CCC) to make their Turkish history. work more effective. Some, such as Search Why did this pessimistic prospect and Rescue Association (AKUT), became for Turkish civil society take place? One media stars, and their heroics stood in stark important point in evaluating the issue is contrast to the performance of state organs. that Turkish civil society is far from This phenomenon--civil society responding homogeneous. Relief organizations span to natural disaster--is common, and the entire spectrum of Turkish politics. disaster relief specialists have noted that Some have a liberal orientation; some are these events “often bring changes in the status-quo-oriented or “Kemalist”; many structure of community leadership” and are Islamist; a few are alleged to have create “potential” for significant political mafia links;(28) many are apolitical. Some and social change.(25) are clearly adversarial to the state; some The general hope was that civil are described as “semi-official” or have society--as an agent--would be able to close ties to the state machinery.(29) overcome the many structural factors that Coordination among groups was had long favored the “devlet baba.” As therefore difficult. The CCC was primarily Alan Makovsky of the Washington composed of liberal groups. Islamist
38 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Paul Kubicek organizations, working together with the a dose of ‘reactionary’ religious Fazilet Party, coordinated their own indoctrination.”(34) Within a couple of efforts. In my research in the summer of months, some groups--particularly Islamist 2000, I contacted dozens of NGOs in ones--were forced to abandon their soup Turkey and asked them whether they kitchens and tent cities, as all materials had worked closely with others. None reported to be handed over to the government- systemic cooperation, and many backed Red Crescent or pulled out of the complained about the ineffectiveness and area. Other groups, however, managed to over-bureaucratic nature of the CCC, stay on by concluding agreements with which prevented it from sustaining any sort state ministries and local governments. of cooperation.(30) Other problems also Few, if any, of these groups protested the limited cooperation. For example, several actions taken against the Islamists. local search-and-rescue teams proposed Moreover, the success of arrangements creating a larger organization under the would often depend upon good relations CCC but AKUT, by far the largest, with the military. One organizer of a relief refused, claiming there was no need to do effort conceded that in order to overcome so and it could not ensure that other groups problems posed by local military officials, were of high standards.(31) If these groups she would have to tell them, “My generals could not join together, it is hard to outrank your generals.”(35) imagine how more political and social- Few wanted to challenge the state oriented ones could. In other words, while openly. This was clearest and perhaps most all groups might agree that things need to significant in the case of AKUT, whose change in Turkey, there is no consensus as standing in the public mind-set dwarfed to the directions of such changes. Thus, that of any other group. AKUT’s president loosely tied networks of relief was gently rebuked at one roundtable for organizations could not transform refusing to lead a more aggressive themselves into a movement for broader campaign against the state's handling of political change. relief measures or take on a more political The second obstacle faced by civil agenda. He defended his decision, claiming society was the state’s reaction against it. AKUT had no capacity or desire to play Immediately after the earthquake, such roles.(36) Others who have remained government officials spoke out against among the most active and well-financed-- AKUT, accusing it of trying to make the Turkish Education Volunteers, Human state look bad and of not really helping Resource Foundation, Human Settlement people.(32) Many groups had their bank Foundation, Lions and Rotary Clubs--are accounts frozen or materials confiscated, apolitical or avoid the most divisive issues as the state maintained that only the Red in Turkish politics. Many thought that Crescent was authorized to engage in relief involvement in politics would tarnish their work. Islamic groups complained the state relief work or lead to pressures on them overstepped its authority and played from above, and thus there has not been a favorites, allowing some to work but connection (with the exception of the harassing others.(33) Islamists) between groups in civil society Later, the government required all and expressly political groups such as groups to register, which one report saw as parties. a thinly veiled effort to keep out those Another weakness of civil society “who may deliver assistance together with was that it lacked a proper structure or
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 39 The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey strong roots. As the CCC's director check. Civil society did not have conceded, civil society is less a “society” this. In the end, the state had the than simply thousands of volunteers.(37) upper hand and prevailed.(41) The groups sprang up out of nowhere and had no agenda other than helping their However, this does not mean that fellow citizens. This energy could not be all hopes for reform or civil society are sustained or channeled into new directions. dead. Powerful actors in Turkish civil Today these groups, with the exception of society, especially business organizations, AKUT, do not find themselves with largely sat on the sidelines and refrained significantly more members or funds. from vocal criticism of the authorities Thus, not only did they run up against the immediately after the earthquake. state structure, but they themselves lacked However, they have since been active in the basic resources to push harder for a pushing for reform, pointedly switching democratic breakthrough. As one from purely economic concerns to far more commentator noted, “The opportunity was sensitive political ones.(42) However, in our hands, but we dropped the ball.”(38) rather than linking up with the earthquake- Over a year after the quake, the oriented civic groups, they have tended to energy and hopes invested in civil society look upon the European Union as the ally was noticeably dissipated. One leader of with the most to offer. the CCC acknowledged that the one-year anniversary would be marked more by THE EU AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE prayers than protest at such problems as The EU's decision in December the appalling housing for many survivors 1999 to consider Turkey’s candidacy for and the fact that many of the same membership came as a sharp break from contractors who had built shoddy homes earlier policy. As recently as 1997, the EU were now receiving contracts for the had rejected Turkey’s membership bid rebuilding effort.(39) The law granting a outright (while accepting those from many government/Red Crescent monopoly on ex-Communist countries), citing a variety relief work, a target for change in the days of political and economic concerns. At that after the quake, remains on the books. time, some EU leaders were unusually Some leaders speak lamely of a change in open in their criticism of Turkey. public attitudes, but no survey gives clear Luxemburg’s Jean Claude Juncker, then support to this notion.(40) Discontent presiding over the EU announced that the remains but has been insufficient to launch EU would not sit at the negotiating table a movement for broad political change with a country where there is torture. “from below.” A leader familiar with many Wilifried Martens, chair of Belgian of the relief efforts and an advocate of Christian Democratic Party, announced political reform expresses disappointment: that Europe was a “civilizational project” and that Turkey’s bid to join--given its Many had hoped and expected a culture--was “unacceptable.”(43) Turks better coordinated civil society to were mostly outraged with this decision, emerge. But this did not happen. with one Turkish daily proclaiming “Go to The earthquake was forgotten by Hell, Europe!”(44) Many argued that such some, and the state has seven a decision was blatantly unfair, as Turkey hundred years of experience in was part of Europe, a member of many organization, in keeping society in European and Western organizations, and
40 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Paul Kubicek had waited years for membership, in resolution of that case, Turkey may also contrast to those Eastern European states ban the death penalty to conform to which jumped into the line.(45) European norms, and there is extensive Despite the fact that membership in discussion in the Turkish press of the need the EU is seen as the “crowning for constitutional reform, particularly on achievement of a process began in the issues of freedom of speech and political nineteenth century,” as one scholar put it, competition. (46) Turkish-European relations have had Another factor is the support of all numerous troubles including human rights Turkish political parties--including the issues, Greece and Cyprus, and a lingering previously-opposed Islamists--in favor of belief that Turkey remains outside joining the EU. However, this does not European cultural norms.(47) Despite guarantee they are willing to take the steps signing an Association Agreement with the demanded by Europe. Feelings of EC in 1963, membership has been slow in nationalism, pride, sovereignty, fear of coming. An application in 1987 was creating domestic instability, and rejected out of hand, and hopes that the opposition to specific things being Customs Union, which went into effect in demanded are among the causes for January 1996, would lead to membership rejecting these demands. There are were dashed in 1997. suspicions of Europeans as having sought The EU's policy reversal in 1999, to carve pieces from the country’s national signaling a willingness to consider Turkish territory after World War One, the so- membership if the Turks could meet the called “Sevres Syndrome” for the 1919 Copenhagen Criteria, (48) was thus a Treaty that would have dismembered the major event in Turkish-EU relations and Ottoman Empire. European support for within Turkey itself. But now the EU Armenian and Kurdish groups opposing insisted that achieving the long-desired Turkey also does not bolster Europe’s membership would require Turkey to adopt image in the eyes of many Turks. There is numerous reforms, particularly on freedom a strong belief that Western Europeans are of expression and political organization prejudiced against Turks.(50) Public and on human rights. opinion surveys in 1990 and 1997 (before There are several reasons to expect the decision was made to exclude Turkey) Turkey to meet this test. Several reveal high levels of distrust of the EU.(51) commentators, for example, have pointed In the past, Turkey has paid little attention to prior positive influence of the EU in or mere lip service to previous European promoting economic and political reforms condemnations of Turkish policy, in Turkey.(49) Possible examples cited particularly with respect to the Kurds. include the return to civilian rule in 1983, Moreover, it is worth noting that Turkey market liberalization, the lifting of various can (and has successfully done so in the political restrictions in 1987, repeals on past) play off the EU and the United States, bans on using the Kurdish language, and counting on virtually unconditional support changes in the Anti-Terror Law in 1995. from the latter. Thus, even if the EU makes The EU could also claim some effect on domestic reform in Turkey a top priority the fate of Ocalan, who has been sentenced (and it may lose interest or fudge Turkey’s to death, but may escape hanging partly “progress”), Turkey may not prove to be due to objections from the EU and other subservient to EU demands. organizations in Europe. Pending final
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 41 The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey
What is most discernible in Turkey that erupted when a rumor spread that the today is ambivalence about the nation’s EU might prohibit the sale of a beloved prospective membership bid. While the national dish, kokorec, grilled lamb goal of ascension to the EU is clearly intestines. desired, this does not mean a willingness to Ziya Onis persuasively argues that meet European demands. For example, the Turkish policymakers do not fully realize EU wants Turkey to recognize the Kurds how the EU has changed in recent years, in as a minority and to grant them rights particular in emphasizing human rights. guaranteeing their ability to express and Turkish elites are likely to prove very preserve their language and culture, unwilling to make all the changes desired including media and schools in Kurdish. by the EU, and thus the transition to full This step remains anathema to most of the membership will be “slow and Turkish political spectrum, which notes protracted.”(54) that Kurds are treated the same as all other Indeed, there is plenty of evidence citizens and do not qualify as a minority to question whether this transition will take under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty of place at all. The sticking points are, 1923, which gave international recognition predictably, the Kurds and the role of the to the Turkish Republic.(52) Turkish military in politics. Prime Minister The EU also wants a series of Bulent Ecevit has denied there is even a reforms to broaden speech protections and “Kurdish” issue, claiming the problem is prohibit the state from banning political primarily caused by the relative poverty of parties. These steps also remain southeastern Turkey, where most of the controversial, and when Turkish political Kurds live. Deputy Prime Minister, Devlet figures have echoed the need to reform the Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Action constitution, the military has made clear its Party (MHP), has emphatically declared opposition.(53) Even the smaller and that Kurdish education and broadcast was largely symbolic (no official executions “not going to happen.”(55) Another MHP have occurred since 1984) step of deputy, responding to the general concern abolishing the death penalty has provoked of Europe on human rights, claimed that debate and the nationalist party coalition issues that “go against the fiber of our member threatened to bring down the country are not matters open to government in response to such a step. discussion.”(56) When some leaders, such One important problem here is that as Foreign Minister as Ismail Cem, seemed the EU takes for granted its right to willing to agree that Kurds should have a intervene in the affairs of member right to broadcast in Kurdish, he was countries. Turks see the EU membership as rebuked by Demirel, who said this would a symbol of full acceptance as a modern, lead to separatist violence.(57) European country, as well as large amounts In November 2000, after the EU of economic aid. Yet if Turkey were to offered an accession partnership agreement become an equal member, it would have to (one that pointedly did not include the accept a great deal of interference in its word “Kurds”), Ecevit appeared ready to domestic affairs and a clear loss of national compromise but Bahceli was insistent. “It sovereignty, particularly on such sensitive is impossible to say that the European issues as human rights, constitutional Commission is making a goodwill reform, and the role of the military. A approach. It is not possible for Turkey to small symbol of this issue is the outrage look warmly at cultural and ethnic rights
42 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Paul Kubicek that can fuel ethnic clashes and conclude that “it is not clear that Turkey in division.”(58) The current Turkish the end will want to become part of the government risks collapse if it tries to meet EU”’ (63) At minimum, a radical shift in EU criteria on this thorny issue. While new prevailing attitudes would have to occur elections could help solve this problem, for government leaders to have the there is no guarantee they would produce a confidence to make reforms and not be coalition more amenable to EU punished at the ballot box, to say nothing suggestions. of actions by the military. One does not, as Equally serious has been the yet, see the emergence of an unequivocal reaction of the military, which has opposed pro-EU party, much less a pro-EU EU encroachments on its political role and coalition. issues it sees as national security questions. To some extent, the EU is equally In addition to granting Kurds cultural unenthusiastic and ready to seize on rights, Turkey is also being asked to disagreements to avoid giving membership reform the National Security Council and to Turkey. The EU has a full plate with State Security Courts to ensure civilian expansion to several former members of control over the military--an EU norm. The the Soviet bloc in Europe and with its own military has resisted any such moves, internal reform. Given that Turkey is claiming that the requirements go too far relatively large, less economically and are not “in line with Turkey’s developed, has problems with Greece, and reality.”(59) Mesut Yilmaz, deputy prime might be a major source of immigrants, minister in charge of relations with Europe, Europe is not likely to be in a big hurry to said the army believed that the reforms accept Turkey as a member. As a result, if required by the EU would split up the Turks grow skeptical that they will ever be country.(60) Some observers might note let in, the EU's leverage for reform will that the military might make some further decline. concessions on certain matters, but at this A possible alternative would be if point it does not seem ready to embrace the the EU would cave in to Turkish EU’s recommendations in their entirety. sensitivities and reduce its demands. In short, as one report concluded, European governments in the past have “while Turkish officials continue to play been unwilling to press too strongly for lip service to the idea of EU membership, reform, and Turkish governments have there is so far little evidence that the state used this factor to water down reform.(64) establishment has fully grasped the Certainly Turks could weaken EU fundamental shift in mentality, the demands by noting that many European willingness to compromise and work with governments place restrictions on speech others, that EU membership would and political activity (especially against entail.”(61) Another author, noting that would-be Nazi parties) for the sake of state some small steps have been taken, security, and Turkey does no different in concluded sadly that Turks have been like its battle against separatists or Islamists students doing homework only because the who threaten the fundamental teacher tells them to do it; there is no constitutional order.(65) In short, the EU recognition that the “work” might actually standing firm and Turkey making the be necessary or valuable.(62) Given that necessary reforms is only one of several Turkey has yet to really tackle the most possible outcomes, and not necessarily the sensitive issues, it is not unreasonable to most likely.
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 43 The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey
Finally, even if Turkey were to be unleashed by the earthquake. While that make concessions on key points, will they tragedy may have created an opening, it is make a great difference? Kurdish may be now largely closed. Europe may be able to legalized as a language for media and push harder for a democratic breakthrough, education, but new questions would be and clearly some Turks, including raised: will the state fund Kurdish- President Sezer, would be amenable to language schools? Who will draw up the such an undertaking. Yet powerful forces curriculum for them and will students be are working against such moves. Even taught a "Kurdish" version of history? Will minimal concessions on the Kurdish issue, the state license a Kurdish-language TV legal changes, or limits on the army's station? What is the line between political influence could bring down expressing culture and endorsing governments. Moreover, change “from separatism? As for taking the military out above” or “from outside” may do little to of politics, it will be hard to eliminate the further a broader democratic ethos or informal role the military plays and it repair an ossified party system. might continue to enjoy continued legal protection against those who would *Paul Kubicek is an assistant professor of impugn its “moral character.” In short, political science at Oakland University, there are a host of unknowns. It is naïve Rochester Michigan, USA. He has both to assume that meeting EU conditions previously taught at Koc and Bogazici would not cause further problems for Universities in Istanbul. He thanks Deniz Turkey and to believe that joining the EU Senol and Uyan Pinar for research or doing what the EU wants--while assistance and the University of Wyoming possibly helpful in a variety of respects-- and Bogazici University for providing would eradicate all the shortcomings of financial and logistical support. Turkish democracy and society is naïve. A version of the paper was presented at the CONCLUSION conference of the Association for the Study It is still fair to argue that the of Nationalities in New York, April 2001. prospects of deepening democracy in The author would like to thank many Turkey are better today than at any time in readers of previous versions of this the past decade. The war with the PKK is manuscript for helpful suggestions: Ebru essentially over. A new president speaks Erdem, Mehtap Cevher, Ilter Turan, Bill passionately about the need to adopt liberal Hale, Thomas W. Smith, Binnaz Toprak, reforms. The EU is offering a substantial and M. Hakan Yavuz. carrot if Turkey can tackle some of its democratic shortcomings. NOTES Significant barriers remain, 1. Paul Kubicek, ‘The 1999 Turkish however, sufficient to raise doubts that Elections,’ Mediterranean Politics, Vol.4, much will actually change. At present, no.2 (Summer 1999), pp. 186-192. there no denying that there is much 2. For more on this distinction, see Larry rhetoric about change. Much of this, Diamond, ‘Is the Third Wave Over?’ however, has been heard before, and Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, no.3 (July reform--if it came at all--was modest at 1996), pp. 20-37. best and often disappointing. Some had 3. Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish hoped that forces for liberalization would Politics: Challenges to Democratic
44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Paul Kubicek
Consolidation (London: Lynne Rienner, 9. Some of the more comprehensive 2000), pp. 151-154. reports come from Human Rights Watch 4. For civil society, see Vladimir and the US State Department. The latter Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics (New concedes that there continue to be ‘serious’ York: Free Press, 1992), and Timothy human rights violations. The 1999 version Garton Ash, History of the Present (New of their reports can be found at York: Random House, 2000); for the EU,
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) 45 The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey
21. See Alpaslan Ozerdem and Sultan 35. Interview with Hale Tinic, coordinator Barakat, “After the Marmara earthquake: of Koc University’s relief effort, July Lessons for avoiding short cuts to 2000. disasters,” Third World Quarterly 21:3, 36. Nasuh Mahruki in Roundtable, June 2000: 425-439. ‘Toplum, Sivil Toplum Orgutlerini, 22. Milliyet, 19 August 1999. Hosuna Giden Bir Filmi Seyreder Gibi 23. For the most critical reports, see The Seyretti’, Cognito, no. 20, 1999, pp. 261- Guardian, 28 August 1999; Washington 262. Post, 27 August 1999; Turkish Daily News, 37. Yuksel Selek, in Sivil Toplum, p. 289. 24 August 1999; and Turkish Probe, 22 38. Yilmaz Karkoyunlu in Roundtable August 1999. ‘Toplum…,” Cognito, no. 20, 1999, pp. 24. Sedat Engin from Hurriyet, quoted in 253-254. Washington Post, 29 August 1999. 39.Interview with Zafer Kirac of CCC, 25. Frederick Cuny, Disasters and July 2000. Development (Oxford: Oxford University 40. All surveys suffer from numerous Press, 1983), p. 13 and p. 101. methodological problems, including 26. Quoted in Washington Post, 25 August sampling and no ex ante baseline of 1999. attitudes of comparison. One survey, 27. Yaprak Ozer, quoted in Sivil Toplum however, pointedly did find that only 20% Kuruluslari ve Yasalar-Etik-Deprem of victims living in temporary housing (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi, 2000), p. 302. have changed their political party 28. Ayfer Tunc, Roundtable ‘Depremin orientation. See report from Istanbul Sosyal ve Siyasal Etkileri,’ Cognito no. 20, University Faculty of Economics, 1999, p. 179. “Economic and Social Aspect of 17 29. Akin Atauz, ‘Deprem ve Sivil Toplum August Earthquake in Kocaeli and Sakarya Orgutleri,’ Birikim, no. 125/126, Sept./Oct. Region, unpublished draft, 2000. 1999: 89-94. 41. Interview with Omer Madra, President 30. Interviews with Demet Gural, of Acik Radyo, July 2000. Executive Director of Human Resource 42. The most well-known report is that of Development Foundation, Ikbal Polat of Tanor, Perspectives on Democratisation, Human Settlement Foundation, and Turkan 1997. Saylan, President of Association in 43. Ayin Tarihi (January-March 1998), pp. Support of Modern Living, June-July 2000. 144-145. 31. Milliyet, 25 June 2000, and interview 44. Hurriyet, 13 December 1997. with Memet Tanrisever, head of AKUT 45. Muftuler-Bac, 2000, p. 163. training division, July 2000. 46. Udo Steinbach, ‘The European 32. Turkish Daily News, 29 August 1999. Community, the United States, the Middle 33. Interviews with Ahmet Selamet, head East, and Turkey,’ in Heper and Evin, of Mazlumder’s Istanbul branch 1994, p. 109. organization, Ibrahim Kalendar of 47. Muftuler-Bac, Turkey’s Relations with Istanbul’s Fazilet Party, and Hasan Ali a Changing Europe (Manchester: Celik, head of Sakarya Fazilet Party, July Manchester University Press, 1997), and 2000. Paul Kubicek, ‘Turkish-European 34. Turkish Probe, 5 December 1999, p. 2. Relations: At a New Crossroads?’ Middle East Policy, Vol.6, no.4 (June 1999), pp. 157-173.
46 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2001) Paul Kubicek
48. Adopted in 1993, this specifies that Turkey Update (www.turkeyupdate.com), prospective EU members must be 1) 22 June 2000 democratic and respect human rights; 2) 53. For example, in September 1999, the have basic macroeconomic stability and military reacted very harshly to the ability to deal with market competition; suggestion of Sami Selcuk, head of the and 3) able to adopt the acquis Appeals Court, that the constitution was communautaire, the body of EU law. In illegitimate because it was adopted under addition, Turkey was expected to make military rule. progress in relations with Greece, 54. Ziya Onis, ‘Luxembourg, Helsinki and especially over Cyprus. The last topic, a Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of foreign policy question, is largely beyond Recent Turkey-EU Relations,’ Government the scope of this paper. and Opposition, Vol.35, no.4 (Autumn 49. Muftuler-Bac, 2000, Ali 2000), pp. 463-483, at 465. Karaosmanoglu, ‘The Limits of 55. Turkish Daily News, 20 July 2000. International Influence for 56. Turkey Update, 22 June 2000 and 23 Democratization,’ in Heper and Evin, July 2000. 1994; and Ihsan Dagi, ‘Democratic 57. Marvine Howe, ‘Turkey’s Kurds Look Transition in Turkey, 1980-1983: The Forward to Enhanced Cultural Rights as Impact of European Diplomacy,’ Middle Turkey Moves Toward EU Membership,’ Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, no.2 (April Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 1996), pp. 124-141, and ‘Human Rights, Vol. 19, no.5 (June 2000), p. 31. Democratization and the European 58. Turkey Update, 14 November 2000. Community in Turkish Politics: The Ozal 59. Turkey Update, 22 June 2000. Years, 1983-1987,’ Middle Eastern 60. Reuters, 6 September 2000. Studies, Vol.37, no.1 (2001), forthcoming. 61. Turkey Update, 22 June 2000. 50. Karaosmanoglu, p. 127 62. Cuneyt Ulsever in Turkish Daily News, 51. Esmer, 1999, p. 42. In 1990 64% said 18 July 2000. they did not trust the EU; in 1997, the 63. Morton Abramowitz, ed. Turkey’s figure was 51%. Only 15% in 1997 Transformation and American Policy expressed a high degree of trust in the EU. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 52. By the terms of this treaty, only non- 2000), p. 5. Muslims qualify as minorities. However, 64. Reuters, 6 September 2000. as one observer noted, the Treaty in Article 65. Thanks to William Hale for alerting to 39 does allow for the use of any language the author to this possible strategy. by Turkish citizens. See Nicole Pope,
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