This is a shortened public version of the original report (Part II Section A [pp.12–31] and Part II Section C [pp.36–55] omitted).
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Nature and Dimension of Risks 57 Dual-Use Potential and Implications for Bioweapons Proliferation 58
E. Potential Perpetrators: Motivations to Use Synthetic Biology and Nanobiotechnology 59 Non-State Actors 59 State programs 61
PART III Response Options: Towards a Culture of Awareness in Responsible Biotechnology 63
A. The Networked Approach: Establishing a Web of Prevention 66 Shortcomings of Traditional Arms Control Approaches 66 Towards a Human-Centric Network Approach 67 Need for a Common Vision and Common Strategy to Secure Biology 69 Recommendations 70
B. Elements of the Networked Approach 71 1. Outreach, Education, and Awareness-Raising 71 1.1. Low Level of Dual-Use Awareness 71 1.2. Broad Stakeholder Involvement and Tailored Education 72 1.3. ‘Going Out’ with Key Messages 74 Recommendations 77 2. Codes of Conduct 78 2.1. Code of Conduct Initiatives in Synthetic Biology 80 Recommendations 83 2.2. Codes of Conduct in the Gene Synthesis Industry: Screening Frameworks 83 Recommendations 91 2.3. Code of Conduct Initiatives in Nanotechnology 91 Recommendations 96 3. International Arms Control: Existing Instruments and Potential Future Options 97 3.1. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) 97 3.2. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 99 3.3. Australia Group (AG) 100 3.4. Implications and Future Options for Biotechnology 102 3.5. Implications and Future Options for Nanotechnology 105 Recommendations 107 4. Technological Potential for Countermeasures 108 4.1. Synthetic Biology for Biological Defense 108 4.2. Nanotechnology for Biological Defense 111 Recommendations 119
Excursus: Amateur Biology 120 Characterization of the Community 120 Safety and Security Concerns 123 Addressing the Concerns 124 Recommendations 126
Conclusions 127
Annexes 130 Experts 130 Glossary 133 Bibliography 152 Abbreviations 161
TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1. Selection of viral threat agents 17 Assessment Summary Table 1. Synthesis of a known pathogenic virus (including the “booting” of the virus) 18 (excluding multi-drug resistance) 21 Assessment Summary Table 3. Complete synthesis and booting of the bacterial genome 23 Assessment Summary Table 4. Minimal chassis approach with gene modules 23 Assessment Summary Table 6. Engineering of metabolic pathways in existing bacteria (Keasling approach) 26 Assessment Summary Table 7. Engineering of metabolic pathways with minimal genome chassis (JCVI approach) 26 Assessment Summary Table 8. Simple alteration of a few genes with phages 28 Assessment Summary Table 9. Integration of complex alterations in host with phages 29 Assessment Summary Table 10. Self-development of modular transporters 31 Assessment Summary Table 11. Adaptation of existing modular transporters for hostile purposes 31 Assessment Summary Table 12. Self-Development of nano-carriers/-capsules 38 Assessment Summary Table 13. Adaptation of existing capsules/carriers for hostile purposes (e.g. from industry) 39 Assessment Summary Table 14. Nano-enabled weaponization of previously not considered toxins 41 Assessment Summary Table 15. Nano-enabled misuse of gene-targeted technologies 42 Assessment Summary Table 16. Nano-delivery of prions targeting animals 44 Assessment Summary Table 17. Development of a triggerable bioweapon 49 Assessment Summary Table 18. Circumvent vaccine (anthrax example) 51 Assessment Summary Table 19. Overstimulation /suppression of the immune response 51 Assessment Summary Table 20. Misuse of nanodiagnostics technologies 54 Assessment Summary Table 21. Computational design of new bioactive molecules 55
Figure 1. Costs of DNA sequencing and synthesis in US Dollars per base 13 Figure 2. Nucleotide sequence database growth (DDBJ, EMBL, GenBank) 14 Figure 3. Longest produced synthetic DNA 16 Figure 4. Need for a Common Vision and Common Strategy to Secure Biology 70 i
Foreword
By Dr. Jonathan Lucas, Director, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice research Institute