Zerojoin: Combining Zerocoin and Coinjoin
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Pow, Pos, & Hybrid Protocols: a Matter of Complexity?
PoW, PoS, & Hybrid protocols: A Matter of Complexity? Renato P. dos Santos Blockchain Researcher at ULBRA – The Lutheran University of Brazil [email protected]. Melanie Swan Technology Theorist and Founder at Institute for Blockchain Studies [email protected] Abstract In a previous paper, it was discussed whether Bitcoin and/or its blockchain could be considered a complex system and, if so, whether a chaotic one, a positive response raising concerns about the likelihood of Bitcoin/blockchain entering a chaotic regime, with catastrophic consequences for financial systems based on it. This paper intends to simplify and extend that analysis to other PoW, PoS, and hybrid protocol-based cryptocurrencies. As before, this study was carried out with the help of Information Theory of Complex Systems, in general, and Crutchfield’s Statistical Complexity measure, in particular. This paper is a work-in-progress. Whereas PoW consensus was shown to be highly non-complex, the Nxt PoS consensus method studied shows an outstandingly higher measure of complexity, which is undesirable because it introduces unnecessary complexity into what should be a simple computational system. This paper is a work-in-progress and undoubtedly prone to incorrectness as a few cryptocurrencies may have changed their consensus algorithms. As next step, we intend to uncover some other measures that capture the qualitative notion of complexity of systems that can be applied to these cryptocurrencies to compare with the results here obtained. As a final thought, however, considering that a certain amount of chaoticity may have been potentially introduced in the Bitcoin market by the presence of the capital gains-seekers, one could wonder whether the recent surge of blockchain technology-based start-ups, even discounting all the scam cases, could not help to reduce non-linearity and prevent chaos. -
White Paper of Bitcoin Ultimatum Introduction
White Paper of Bitcoin Ultimatum Introduction 1. Problematic of the Blockchain 4. Bitcoin Ultimatum Architecture industry 4.1. Network working principle 1.1. Transactions Anonymity 4.1.1. Main Transaction Types 1.2. Insufficient Development of Key Aspects of the 4.1.1.1. Public transactions Technology 4.1.1.2. Private transactions 1.3. Centralization 4.1.2. Masternode Network 1.4. Mining pools and commission manipulation 4.2. How to become a validator or masternode in 1.5. Decrease in Transaction Speeds BTCU 4.3. Network Scaling Principle 2. BTCU main solutions and concepts 4.4. Masternodes and Validators Ranking System 4.5. Smart Contracts 2.1. Consensus algorithm basis 4.6. Anonymization principle 2.2. Leasing and Staking 4.7. Staking and Leasing 2.3. Projects tokenization and DeFi 4.7.1. Staking 2.4. Transactions Privacy 4.7.2. Leasing 2.5. Atomic Swaps 4.7.2 Multileasing 4.8. BTCU Technical Specifications 3. Executive Summary 4.8.1. Project Stack 4.8.2. Private key generation algorithm 5. Bitcoin Ultimatum Economy 5.1. Initial Supply and Airdrop 5.2. Leasing Economy 5.3. Masternodes and Validators Commission 5.4. Transactions Fee 6. Project Roadmap 7. Legal Introduction The cryptocurrency market is inextricably tied to the blockchain – its fundamental and underlying technology. The modern market is brimming with an abundance of blockchain protocols, algorithms, and concepts, all of which have fostered the development of a wide variety of services and applications. The modern blockchain market offers users an alternative to both established financial systems and ecosystems/infrastructures of applications and services. -
IFRS: Accounting for Crypto-Assets
IFRS (#) Accounting for crypto-assets Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. What are crypto-assets? 2 2.1. Cryptocurrencies 3 2.2. Tokens (crypto-assets other than cryptocurrencies) 5 3. Accounting for crypto-assets 10 3.1. Selected activities of standard setters 10 3.2. Special situations 13 3.3. Conclusion 15 4. Supporting details 16 5. Contacts 21 1 Introduction Crypto-assets experienced a breakout year in 2017. Cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin and ether, have seen their prices surge as the public’s YoYj]f]kk`Ykaf[j]Yk]\$Yf\ÕfYf[aYdeYjc]lhYjla[ahYflk`Yn]l`mk af[j]Ykaf_dqlmjf]\l`]ajYll]flagflgl`]h`]fge]fgf&KaemdlYf]gmkdq$ a wave of new crypto-asset issuance has been sweeping the start-up fundraising world, sparking the interest of regulators in the process. 9[[gmflYflk`Yn]l`mk^YjZ]]ffglYZd]Zql`]ajj]dYlan]YZk]f[]^jge l`YlfYjjYlan]&H]j`Yhk$egklfglYZd]akl`]^Y[ll`Yll`]9mkljYdaYf 9[[gmflaf_KlYf\Yj\k:gYj\ 99K:!`YkkmZeall]\Y\ak[mkkagfhYh]j gfÉ\a_alYd[mjj]f[a]kÊlgl`]Afl]jfYlagfYd9[[gmflaf_KlYf\Yj\k :gYj\ A9K:!$Yf\l`]9[[gmflaf_KlYf\Yj\k:gYj\g^BYhYf 9K:B! `Ykakkm]\Yf]phgkmj]\jY^l^gjhmZda[[gee]flgfY[[gmflaf_^gj “virtual currencies”.1AfY\\alagf$l`]A9K:\ak[mkk]\[]jlYaf^]Ylmj]kg^ ljYfkY[lagfkafngdnaf_\a_alYd[mjj]f[a]k\mjaf_alke]]laf_afBYfmYjq *()0$Yf\oadd\ak[mkkaf^mlmj]o`]l`]jlg[gee]f[]Yj]k]Yj[`hjgb][l in this area.1 L`akYdkg`a_`da_`lkl`]dY[cg^YklYf\Yj\ar]\[jqhlg%Ykk]llYpgfgeq$ o`a[`eYc]kal\a^Õ[mdllg\]l]jeaf]l`]Yhhda[YZadalqg^klYf\Yj\k]ll]jkÌ hmZdak`]\h]jkh][lan]k&>mjl`]jegj]$\m]lgl`]\an]jkalqYf\hY[]g^ affgnYlagfYkkg[aYl]\oal`[jqhlg%Ykk]lk$l`]^Y[lkYf\[aj[meklYf[]k g^]Y[`af\ana\mYd[Yk]oadd\a^^]j$eYcaf_al\a^Õ[mdllg\jYo_]f]jYd [gf[dmkagfkgfl`]Y[[gmflaf_lj]Yle]fl& <]khal]l`]eYjc]lÌkaf[j]Ykaf_dqmj_]flf]]\^gjY[[gmflaf__ma\Yf[]$ l`]j]`Yn]Z]]ffg^gjeYdhjgfgmf[]e]flkgfl`aklgha[lg\Yl]& Afl`akj]hgjl$o]YaelgÕjklZja]Öqafljg\m[][jqhlg[mjj]f[a]kYf\ gl`]jlqh]kg^[jqhlg%Ykk]lk&L`]f$o]\ak[mkkkge]g^l`]j][]fl activities by accounting standard setters in relation to crypto-assets. -
BLOCK by BLOCK a Comparative Analysis of the Leading Distributed Ledgers
BLOCK BY BLOCK A Comparative Analysis of the Leading Distributed Ledgers Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 PRELIMINARY MATTERS 4 A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 4 THE EVOLUTION OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS 5 SEC. 1 : TECHNICAL STRUCTURE & FEATURE SET 7 PUBLIC OR PRIVATE? 7 PERMISSIONED OR PERMISSIONLESS? 8 CONSENSUS MECHANISM 9 LANGUAGES SUPPORTED 10 TRANSACTION RATES 11 SMART CONTRACTS 12 ADDITIONAL FEATURES 13 SEC. 2 : BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS 14 PROJECT GOVERNANCE 14 LICENSING 16 THIRD PARTY SUPPORT 16 DEVELOPER SUPPORT 17 PUBLISHER SUPPORT 18 BLOCKCHAIN AS A SERVICE (BAAS) PROVIDERS 19 PARTNERSHIPS 21 ASSOCIATED COSTS 22 PRICING 22 COST PER TRANSACTION 23 ENERGY CONSUMPTION 24 SEC. 3 : HEALTH INDICATORS 25 DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY 25 MINDSHARE 27 PROJECT SITE POPULARITY 28 SEARCH ENGINE QUERY VOLUME 29 FINANCIAL STRENGTH INDICATORS 30 MARKET CAP 30 24 HOUR TRADING VOLUME 31 VENTURE CAPITAL AND INVESTORS 32 NODES ONLINE 33 WEISS CRYPTOCURRENCY RANKINGS 34 SIGNIFICANT DEPLOYMENTS 35 CONCLUSIONS 36 PUBLIC LEDGERS 37 PRIVATE LEDGERS 37 PROJECTS TO WATCH 40 APPENDIX A. PROJECT LINKS 42 MERCY CORPS 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Purpose This report compares nine distributed ledger platforms on nearly 30 metrics What’s Included related to the capabilities and the health of each project. The analysis looks at a broad range of indicators -- both direct and indirect -- with the goal of Bitcoin synthesizing trends and patterns that define the market leaders. Corda Ethereum Audience Hyperledger Fabric Multichain This paper is intended for readers already familiar with distributed ledger NEO technologies and will prove most useful to those that are currently evaluating NXT platforms in order to make a decision where to build or deploy applications. -
Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-Of-Stake
Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake Michael Neuder Daniel J. Moroz Harvard University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected] Rithvik Rao David C. Parkes Harvard University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT ’20), October 21– Blockchains are intended to be immutable, so an attacker who is 23, 2020, New York, NY, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA , 13 pages. https: //doi.org/10.1145/3419614.3423265 able to delete transactions through a chain reorganization (a ma- licious reorg) can perform a profitable double-spend attack. We study the rate at which an attacker can execute reorgs in the Tezos 1 INTRODUCTION Proof-of-Stake protocol. As an example, an attacker with 40% of the Blockchains are designed to be immutable in order to protect against staking power is able to execute a 20-block malicious reorg at an attackers who seek to delete transactions through chain reorga- average rate of once per day, and the attack probability increases nizations (malicious reorgs). Any attacker who causes a reorg of super-linearly as the staking power grows beyond 40%. Moreover, the chain could double-spend transactions, meaning they commit an attacker of the Tezos protocol knows in advance when an at- a transaction to the chain, receive some goods in exchange, and tack opportunity will arise, and can use this knowledge to arrange then delete the transaction, effectively robbing their counterparty. transactions to double-spend. We show that in particular cases, the Nakamoto [15] demonstrated that, in a Proof-of-Work (PoW) setting, Tezos protocol can be adjusted to protect against deep reorgs. -
Aggregate Cash System: a Cryptographic Investigation Of
Aggregate Cash Systems: A Cryptographic Investigation of Mimblewimble Georg Fuchsbauer1,2, Michele Orrù2,1, and Yannick Seurin3 1 Inria 2 École normale supérieure, CNRS, PSL University, Paris, France 3 ANSSI, Paris, France {georg.fuchsbauer, michele.orru}@ens.fr [email protected] Abstract. Mimblewimble is an electronic cash system proposed by an anonymous author in 2016. It combines several privacy-enhancing techniques initially envisioned for Bitcoin, such as Confidential Transactions (Maxwell, 2015), non-interactive merging of transactions (Saxena, Misra, Dhar, 2014), and cut-through of transaction inputs and outputs (Maxwell, 2013). As a remarkable consequence, coins can be deleted once they have been spent while maintaining public verifiability of the ledger, which is not possible in Bitcoin. This results in tremendous space savings for the ledger and efficiency gains for new users, who must verify their view of the system. In this paper, we provide a provable-security analysis for Mimblewimble. We give a precise syntax and formal security definitions for an abstraction of Mimblewimble that we call an aggregate cash system. We then formally prove the security of Mimblewimble in this definitional framework. Our results imply in particular that two natural instantiations (with Pedersen commitments and Schnorr or BLS signatures) are provably secure against inflation and coin theft under standard assumptions. Keywords: Mimblewimble, Bitcoin, commitments, aggregate signatures. 1 Introduction Bitcoin and the UTXO model. Proposed in 2008 and launched early 2009, Bitcoin [Nak08] is a decentralized payment system in which transactions are registered in a distributed and publicly verifiable ledger called a blockchain. Bitcoin departs from traditional account-based payment systems where transactions specify an amount moving from one account to another. -
Review Articles
review articles DOI:10.1145/3372115 system is designed to achieve common Software weaknesses in cryptocurrencies security goals: transaction integrity and availability in a highly distributed sys- create unique challenges in responsible tem whose participants are incentiv- revelations. ized to cooperate.38 Users interact with the cryptocurrency system via software BY RAINER BÖHME, LISA ECKEY, TYLER MOORE, “wallets” that manage the cryptograph- NEHA NARULA, TIM RUFFING, AND AVIV ZOHAR ic keys associated with the coins of the user. These wallets can reside on a local client machine or be managed by an online service provider. In these appli- cations, authenticating users and Responsible maintaining confidentiality of crypto- graphic key material are the central se- curity goals. Exchanges facilitate trade Vulnerability between cryptocurrencies and between cryptocurrencies and traditional forms of money. Wallets broadcast cryptocur- Disclosure in rency transactions to a network of nodes, which then relay transactions to miners, who in turn validate and group Cryptocurrencies them together into blocks that are ap- pended to the blockchain. Not all cryptocurrency applications revolve around payments. Some crypto- currencies, most notably Ethereum, support “smart contracts” in which general-purpose code can be executed with integrity assurances and recorded DESPITE THE FOCUS on operating in adversarial on the distributed ledger. An explosion of token systems has appeared, in environments, cryptocurrencies have suffered a litany which particular functionality is ex- of security and privacy problems. Sometimes, these pressed and run on top of a cryptocur- rency.12 Here, the promise is that busi- issues are resolved without much fanfare following ness logic can be specified in the smart a disclosure by the individual who found the hole. -
Blockchain & Cryptocurrency Regulation
Blockchain & Cryptocurrency Regulation Third Edition Contributing Editor: Josias N. Dewey Global Legal Insights Blockchain & Cryptocurrency Regulation 2021, Third Edition Contributing Editor: Josias N. Dewey Published by Global Legal Group GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS – BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION 2021, THIRD EDITION Contributing Editor Josias N. Dewey, Holland & Knight LLP Head of Production Suzie Levy Senior Editor Sam Friend Sub Editor Megan Hylton Consulting Group Publisher Rory Smith Chief Media Officer Fraser Allan We are extremely grateful for all contributions to this edition. Special thanks are reserved for Josias N. Dewey of Holland & Knight LLP for all of his assistance. Published by Global Legal Group Ltd. 59 Tanner Street, London SE1 3PL, United Kingdom Tel: +44 207 367 0720 / URL: www.glgroup.co.uk Copyright © 2020 Global Legal Group Ltd. All rights reserved No photocopying ISBN 978-1-83918-077-4 ISSN 2631-2999 This publication is for general information purposes only. It does not purport to provide comprehensive full legal or other advice. Global Legal Group Ltd. and the contributors accept no responsibility for losses that may arise from reliance upon information contained in this publication. This publication is intended to give an indication of legal issues upon which you may need advice. Full legal advice should be taken from a qualified professional when dealing with specific situations. The information contained herein is accurate as of the date of publication. Printed and bound by TJ International, Trecerus Industrial Estate, Padstow, Cornwall, PL28 8RW October 2020 PREFACE nother year has passed and virtual currency and other blockchain-based digital assets continue to attract the attention of policymakers across the globe. -
Blockchain and Cryptocurrency in Africa a Comparative Summary of the Reception and Regulation of Blockchain and Cryptocurrency in Africa
Blockchain and Cryptocurrency in Africa A comparative summary of the reception and regulation of Blockchain and Cryptocurrency in Africa 2018 Baker McKenzie, Johannesburg IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: The material in this report is of the nature of general comment only. It is not offered as legal advice on any specific issue or matter and should not be taken as such. Readers should refrain from acting on the basis of any discussion contained in this report without obtaining specific legal advice on the particular facts and circumstances at issue. While the authors have made every effort to provide accurate and up-to-date information on laws and policy, these matters are continuously subject to change. Furthermore, the application of these laws depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each situation, and therefore readers should consult their lawyer before taking any action. Information contained herein is as at November 2018. CONTENTS PREFACE ............................................................................................................................................1 GEOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 2 COUNTRY PROFILES ..................................................................................................................... 3 1. Botswana ................................................................................................................................................................... 3 2. Ghana .........................................................................................................................................................................4 -
How to Not Get Caught When You Launder Money on Blockchain?
How to Not Get Caught When You Launder Money on Blockchain? Cuneyt G. Akcora1, Sudhanva Purusotham2, Yulia R. Gel2 Mitchell Krawiec-Thayer3, Murat Kantarcioglu2 1University of Manitoba, 2 UT Dallas, 3 Monero Research Lab 65 Chancellor Circle Winnipeg, MB, Canada R3T 2N2 [email protected], fSudhanva.Purushotham, ygl, [email protected], [email protected] Abstract transactions and circumvent existing AI-based money laun- dering techniques. Our insights, however, are intended not to The number of blockchain users has tremendously grown in assist criminals to obfuscate their malicious activities but to recent years. As an unintended consequence, e-crime trans- motivate the AI community for further research in this area actions on blockchains has been on the rise. Consequently, public blockchains have become a hotbed of research for de- of critical societal importance and, as a result, to advance veloping AI tools to detect and trace users and transactions the state of art methodology in the AI-based cryptocurrency that are related to e-crime. money laundering detection. We argue that following a few select strategies can make In the remainder of this paper, we first identify tech- money laundering on blockchain virtually undetectable with niques that can be used by criminals to launder money on most of the currently existing tools and algorithms. As a re- blockchain and then empirically show why these techniques sult, the effective combating of e-crime activities involving would be effective in hiding patterns used by potential AI cryptocurrencies requires the development of novel analytic models. methodology in AI. 2 Related Work 1 Introduction The success of Bitcoin (Nakamoto 2008) has encouraged Cryptocurrencies have emerged as an important rapidly hundreds of similar digital coins (Tschorsch and Scheuer- evolving financial tool that allows for cross-border transac- mann 2016). -
A Survey on Volatility Fluctuations in the Decentralized Cryptocurrency Financial Assets
Journal of Risk and Financial Management Review A Survey on Volatility Fluctuations in the Decentralized Cryptocurrency Financial Assets Nikolaos A. Kyriazis Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, 38333 Volos, Greece; [email protected] Abstract: This study is an integrated survey of GARCH methodologies applications on 67 empirical papers that focus on cryptocurrencies. More sophisticated GARCH models are found to better explain the fluctuations in the volatility of cryptocurrencies. The main characteristics and the optimal approaches for modeling returns and volatility of cryptocurrencies are under scrutiny. Moreover, emphasis is placed on interconnectedness and hedging and/or diversifying abilities, measurement of profit-making and risk, efficiency and herding behavior. This leads to fruitful results and sheds light on a broad spectrum of aspects. In-depth analysis is provided of the speculative character of digital currencies and the possibility of improvement of the risk–return trade-off in investors’ portfolios. Overall, it is found that the inclusion of Bitcoin in portfolios with conventional assets could significantly improve the risk–return trade-off of investors’ decisions. Results on whether Bitcoin resembles gold are split. The same is true about whether Bitcoins volatility presents larger reactions to positive or negative shocks. Cryptocurrency markets are found not to be efficient. This study provides a roadmap for researchers and investors as well as authorities. Keywords: decentralized cryptocurrency; Bitcoin; survey; volatility modelling Citation: Kyriazis, Nikolaos A. 2021. A Survey on Volatility Fluctuations in the Decentralized Cryptocurrency Financial Assets. Journal of Risk and 1. Introduction Financial Management 14: 293. The continuing evolution of cryptocurrency markets and exchanges during the last few https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm years has aroused sparkling interest amid academic researchers, monetary policymakers, 14070293 regulators, investors and the financial press. -
Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution
Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution Peter Van Valkenburgh March 2019 coincenter.org Peter Van Valkenburgh, Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution, Coin Center Report, Mar. 2019, available at https://coincenter.org/entry/e-cash-dex-constitution Abstract Regulators, law enforcement, and the general public have come to expect that cryptocurrency transactions will leave a public record on a blockchain, and that most cryptocurrency exchanges will take place using centralized businesses that are regulated and surveilled through the Bank Secrecy Act. The emergence of electronic cash and decentralized exchange software challenges these expectations. Transactions need not leave any public record and exchanges can be accomplished peer to peer without using a regulated third party in between. Faced with diminished visibility into cryptocurrency transactions, policymakers may propose new approaches to financial surveillance. Regulating cryptocurrency software developers and individual users of that software under the Bank Secrecy Act would be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it would be a warrantless search and seizure of information private to cryptocurrency users. Furthermore, any law or regulation attempting to ban, require licensing for, or compel the altered publication (e.g. backdoors) of cryptocurrency software would be unconstitutional under First Amendment protections for speech. Author Peter Van Valkenburgh Coin Center [email protected] About Coin Center Coin Center is a non-profit research and advocacy center focused on the public policy issues facing open blockchain technologies such as Bitcoin. Our mission is to build a better understanding of these technologies and to promote a regulatory climate that preserves the freedom to innovate using blockchain technologies.