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Central European

Compulsory Consensus? The Sources of Elite Political and the Consolidation of Central and East European

By Maximilian Spinner

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD Central European University, Department of Budapest, January 2007

Supervisor András Bozóki (Central European University)

PhD Committee Zsolt Enyedi (Central European University) Sorina Soare (Université Libre de Bruxelles) Jürg Steiner (University of North Carolina)

Summary: The transitions of 1989/90 in Central and Eastern led to the installation of democratic systems with high numbers of veto players (i.e. democracies close to ’s of consensus ). The existing consensus democratic arrangements are the result of contingent dynamics and the political vacuum following the break-down of , as well as the product of external conditionalities, with particular regard to EU integration. However, when looking at contemporary Central and East European it appears doubtful that a consensus-democratic institutional set- up actually led to accommodative, consensus-oriented political elites boasting a “spirit of accommodation” and showing commitment to . In short, does not seem to have adapted to the institutional context more than 15 years after the transition to democracy and has yet to converge with more stable West European patterns. This leaves some to wonder about the likelihood for the future persistence of these systems (i.e. the consolidation of democracy in the ). The apparent absence of an appropriate political culture stands against the classical approach to political culture by and Sidney Verba (to which Lijphart also subscribes) which expects political culture, in the form of level attitudes, to adapt to institutions over time. Internalization of the norms of the democratic system is seen as a requirement for consolidating democracies by scholars in this tradition. I argue that commitment to an existing democracy does not require political elites to be fully socialised into its underlying norms or to internalise them. However, commitment does require the existence of a supportive habitus, such as a set of collective representations of democracy which are explicitly upheld and commonly valued though not necessarily internalized on the individual level. Unlike attitudes which are viewed to be based on individual socio-economic background factors and post-recruitment socialisation, collective representations are grounded in a collective memory developed during historical junctures. In this dissertation I show that for the CEE democracies the critical juncture of the 1989/90 transition to democracy offered very different discursive resources to political elites to subsequently commit to consensus democracy depending on the mode of transition. In the rather unstructured and empty public realm of collapsed communism in 1989/90, formal democratic institutions and new ways of interpreting politics had to be found simultaneously (some of which have persisted in public elite discourse). Consequently, a multilateral, gradual, negotiated and legalistic transition with moderate elite turnover offers rhetorical resources to justify consensus as a democratic practice. Political elites were endowed with rhetorical resources to argue in terms of the common good, to support established procedures and the existing institutional status quo. However, the absence of a shared judgement of the past system and the persistence of competing historical “truths” undermines the development of mutual respect between opposed political camps.

2 A unilateral transition (i.e. a more abrupt, imposed transition) marks a “new beginning” of the in terms of its and a high degree of elite turnover. It leaves a discursive legacy favouring more competitive approaches to politics, argumentation in terms of particular interests, a focus on outputs rather than procedures, and no explicit support for the existing institutional status quo. However, its legacy of initially excluding the old power holders from acquiring a stake in the new system generally undermines the development of a shared habitus supporting a specific type of democracy among all elite members. In order to test the hypotheses of my model of political culture Hungary and East , respectively, are almost cases of multilateral and unilateral transition. At the same time, both Hungary and Germany have a high number of veto players in their democratic system. Through content analysis of parliamentary speeches, stable patterns of consensualist or majoritarian speech are established for two electoral cycles. First, the lack of plausibility of the classical model focusing on individual socio-economic background factors is illustrated and the patterns expected according to the alternative model largely confirmed. Using in-depth interview data with around 60 MPs from the two cases I then demonstrate how political elites across different backgrounds and party affiliations are indeed connected by shared discourses. These discourses can then be used to delineate different outlooks and future paths for democracy. Using as a case (with the inclusion of a sample of West German MPs as a benchmark) also shows that cross-national differences in this regard are not based on general “national political culture,” but on more recent experiences. In all, transition legacies are shown to have strongly conditioned elite political culture. Yet neither ideal type of democratic transition left a discursive legacy fully compatible with consensus democracy. In a more tentative way, subsequent implications for the consolidation of democracy are formulated. While political elites with a legacy of multilateral transition (as in Hungary or Poland) are inclined to give support to the preservation of consensus-democratic arrangements, they will be obstructed in its daily operation unless they manage to establish a commonly accepted legitimacy for “the other” (rather than externalising opponents from the system). Political elites with the legacy of unilateral transition such as in East Germany or the Czech will be more likely to favour institutional changes toward more competitive, majoritarian systems rather than preserving the existing set-up. However, for changes to be achieved in a consensual, inclusive fashion they will have to find ways of accommodating other initially marginalized players in the democratic and help them establish a stake in the system. For the international dimension there can be conclusions drawn concerning EU conditionalities for newly accessed or aspiring member states: just putting in place the “right institutions” might not lead to the desired outcomes in a uniform way. Endogenous historical legacies appear to influence the way political elites make sense out of exogenously introduced institutions. Thus, a different understanding for the impact of ideational factors on the consolidation of democracy is outlined and a new understanding of transition as a historical legacy in itself is advanced.

3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is the result of a long-cultivated interest in Central and East European and politics. My attraction to issues of post-communist has never been purely or even predominantly academic. In fact, having grown up in , I regard myself as deeply socialized and shaped by the post-communist condition. I regard the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 as a crucial juncture that significantly shaped my outlook on the present, past and future (in line with the main argument of this study). Travelling extensively in Eastern Europe and Russia, working for 15 months for a Hungarian charity in 1998/99 and learning Hungarian further entrenched my fascination with the region. Consequently, I acquired a background in Russian and East Studies at the Osteuropainstitut of Berlin’s Freie Universität, and the Centre for Russian and East European Studies in Birmingham. The subsequent return to Budapest for undertaking a PhD at CEU was quite an obvious choice. At this point, one will probably understand that my perspective on the topic covered is surely not fully independent and unaffected by my pre-existing socialisation and experience (and thus in line with ’s understanding of science). In agreement with Weber I do not regard this as a disadvantage. wollen is a major drive for science. For this undertaking I regard an inside perspective and a contextual small-N approach as the best way to go (despite the suspicion it is sometimes met with by my colleagues). In fact, the most exciting part of this PhD-dissertation was the chance to learn how experience the upheavals of post-communist politics from their subjective, or rather (I should say) inter- subjective perspective. Twenty-seven Hungarian and twenty-eight East German MPs, who generously shared their limited time and exciting insights with me, deserve my gratuity. In terms of academic support first of all I express thanks to my supervisor, András Bozóki, who strongly inspired the project and enabled me to successfully conclude it. Luckily (for me) he returned to academia after having served as Hungarian Minister of Culture in 2005/6 and, ironically, turned temporarily from being my supervisor into a potential subject of my research. (In the end, I did not include him into my sample.) Zsolt Enyedi was always willing to provide detailed, insightful, and critical comments at crucial points of this project. Grzegorz Ekiert was key in helping me lay the theoretical foundations of this project during my stay at Harvard’s Department of . Jürg Steiner and Sorina Soare provided further helpful advice as committee members for the conclusion of this project. Anna Seleny, Nenad Dimitrijevic, Carol Harrington, Carsten Schneider, Umut Korkut, Emilia Palonen, and Alan Renwick gave very useful criticism on earlier drafts. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, László

4 Bruszt, Yoshiko Herrera, Samuel Huntington, Claus Offe, Robert Putnam, Gábor Tóka, Alexander Trechsel, Philippe Schmitter, and Daniel Ziblatt provided further comments on single chapters or provided inspiration by sharing and discussing ideas with me. Also important were the inputs and comments provided by fellow PhD students at doctoral seminars at CEU, but also at Harvard and at the European University Institute in Florence which helped to advance this project. CEU’s Political Science Department staff (Eva Lafferthon, Kriszta Zsukotynszky and Robert Sata) deserve thanks for their untiring administrative support. Moreover, without the patient and persistent support of Dr. Daniel Jakócs in improving my knowledge of Hungarian language my field research would have been impossible. József Kiss, head of the Budapest-based Jelenkutató Alapítvány, generously provided extensive biographical data about Hungarian MPs free of charge. Marietta Arki aided in translating the question guidelines for the interviews. Krisztina Szabados, Henriett Griecs, Gyöngyvér Szabó, Eszter Kollár, Leonard Gabriel Ciocan did very accurate and timely transcriptions of the Hungarian interviews. Beth Onyenwoke proof-read the entire dissertation and helped to cut short most of my long, German-style sentences. Funding by the CEU for the larger part of this dissertation is gratefully acknowledged, as well as an ERP- scholarship by the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes for my year at Harvard. With hindsight, I have learned that concluding a PhD dissertation is not primarily about solving relevant academic puzzles or about writing a reasonably insightful and moderately interesting piece of independent research. Above all, it is about finishing it. For this, one has to overcome all sorts of internal and external constraints. Next to one’s own inadequacies, self- or crises this also means enduring the vagaries of academic , ignoring non-constructive criticism and dealing with sometimes slightly capricious professors. However, this does not mean that writing a PhD is not rewarding. While the larger academic is probably not exactly waiting for this dissertation it was nevertheless an exciting journey for me personally and intellectually. The fact that I kept going on this journey I owe to the continuous encouragement, understanding and support of my parents and Katrin. It is to them that I dedicate this dissertation (although they deserve something better). Berlin/Budapest, 10 January 2007

Maximilian Spinner E-mail: [email protected]

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS List of abbreviations ...... 8 List of tables...... 9 PREFACE ...... 10 PART I: Introduction...... 14 PART II: The – Consensus, culture and consolidation...... 20 Relocating Lijphart: Is there consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe?20 What is consensus democracy and how can we use this concept?...... 20 Is there consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe? ...... 25 The “spirit of accommodation”: the ideational foundations of consensus democracy 32 Consensus democracy and its ideational sub-dimensions...... 32 Consensus democracy as ?...... 37 The classics of political culture: Almond & Verba and the operational code ...... 42 Socialization into democratic systems: attitudes on mass and elite levels...... 42 Attitudes into behaviour: political culture and the consolidation of democracy...... 50 Where the truth lies: the limitations of the classical model of political culture...... 54 The heretics of political culture: Discursive political culture and habitus ...... 56 Implicit and explicit cultural legacies ...... 56 Consolidating democracy: habitus as a shared understanding of legitimacy...... 65 The impact of historical junctures: modes of transition and discourses on democracy... 71 Hypotheses derived from the alternative model of political culture ...... 80 PART III: Testing the alternative model of political culture ...... 84 The cases...... 84 Hungary, East Germany and their transition legacies...... 84 Excursus: Why East Germany is not (such) a special case...... 88 Consensus democracy in Hungary and Germany...... 92 Commonalities ...... 92 Germany’s stable quasi- ...... 93 Democratic Hungary: From extreme consensus towards ?...... 96 The methodology ...... 101 Content analysis of parliamentary speeches...... 101 The code book ...... 104 Measuring consensualism: Coding and counting...... 110 Consensualism in parliamentary speeches – a content analysis ...... 112 Patterns of consenualist and majoritarian statements...... 112 The plausibility of the classical model of political culture ...... 113 The alternative model of political culture: shared discourses on democracy...... 120 The methodology: discourse analysis and “qualitative cluster analysis”...... 120 Consensus and compromise: Panacea or expensive luxury? ...... 123 Professional politics: Common good vs. particular interests, procedures vs. outcomes 137 Keeping the institutional status quo? ...... 157 Enemy or legitimate opponent? Respect towards the “other”...... 167 PART IV: Conclusions and outlook: The future of consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe...... 182

6 ...... 198 Tables...... 217 Annexes...... 239

7 List of abbreviations

CDU Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) CEE Central and Eastern Europe CoD Consolidation of Democracy DQI Discourse Quality Index (as developed by Steiner et al., 2004) EU FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) Fidesz Fiatal Demokrata Szövetsége (Young Democratic Union) FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs FRG of Germany GDR German LDPD Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Liberal Democratic Party of Germany) MSZMP Magyar Szocialista Munkaspárt (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) MSZP Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party) MDF Magyar Demokrata Forum (Hungarian Democratic Forum) MP Member of Parliament OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PDS Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic ) SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) SZDSZ Szabad Demokrata Szövetsége (Free Democratic Union)

8 List of tables

Table 1 Characteristics of majoritarian and consensus models of democracy p.20 Table 2 Two models of political culture p.71 Table 3 Modes of transition p.79 Table 4 Composition of MP samples for the 2002-2005 period p.103 Table 5 Consensualism indicators’ correlation for two parliamentary cycles p.113 Table 6 Consensualism indicators and geographical background p.116 Table 7 Consensualism indicators and year of birth p.116 Table 8 Consensualism indicators and affiliation with the former regime p.117 Table 9 Consensualism indicators and incumbency p.117 Table 10 Consensualism indicators and higher office p.118 Table 11 Consensualism indicators and entry into parliament p.118 Table 12 Consensualism indicators and type of mandate p.118 Table 13 Consensualism indicators and p.119

9 PREFACE

1. The Argument This study offers an explanation of why elite political culture in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is not consensualist despite the largely consensus-democratic institutional set-up established during democratic transition and the process of EU accession. In other words, it tries to explain why political elites in the post-communist countries of this region do not fully commit to consensus democracy. The key claim is that elite political culture has not adapted to institutions more than fifteen years after the transition to democracy. The claim rests on an empirical investigation and a theoretical argument: empirical observation shows that patterns of consensualist and majoritarian positions assumed by political elites appear to be more influenced by specific historical legacies such as the mode of transition rather than individual socio-economic background or post-recruitment factors. As a consequence, there is a variety of ways political elites in different countries make use of and interpret the institutions of consensus democracy rather than a convergence (e.g. as expected by EU conditionalities for accession). Thus, political leaders developed different kinds of commitments to the democratic system strongly depending on transition legacies. The theoretical argument runs as follows: specific discursive legacies of democratic transition (so far) have a stronger impact upon shaping the outlook of political elites than their gradual socialization into the institutional set-up of consensus democracy.

2. The Argument in context The above-introduced argument is relevant in the context of the consolidation of democracy, i.e. the persistence of younger democratic systems. While political culture has been neglected and relegated to a secondary position behind formal institutions, it actually to be re- considered as one of its key elements. This argument is based on the finding that introducing certain kinds of institutional frameworks, namely a consensus-democratic set-up, neither led to consensualist political elites nor to a similar degree of commitment by political elites to these institutions. The findings stand against the wide-spread, flawed (and often hidden) assumption among social scientists and practitioners that political culture would automatically follow institutions over time. This assumption is reflected in the European Union’s accession conditionalities, which focused predominantly on “getting the institutions right” without regard for building what Arend Lijphart calls a “spirit of accommodation” in CEE domestic politics. In fact, the latter is needed to effectively operate democratic systems characterized by

10 a high number of veto points and is apparently absent in many of the new democracies. In this regard, I view institutions and institutional change as following both rationalist and sociological dynamics. This means that, on one hand, actors aim at efficiently pursuing certain pre-existing preferences in picking institutions and interacting through them (following the “logic of consequentialism”) while, on the other hand, they also act according to the “logic of appropriateness” (i.e. in their behaviour they adapt to collective norms of “what is right”) which are embodied in these institutions.1 Therefore, this study advances an operationalization of an “appropriate” political culture in consensus democracies, looks into the origins of political culture, and compares its manifestation and some of its effects on the consolidation of democracy in two post- communist societies. A consensualist political culture is shown to be grounded in five inter- related basic ideals: consensus as a valued practice, reference to the common good, support for established procedures and the institutional status quo, as well as respect towards “the other” ( i.e. the political opponent). These elements can be derived largely from the older (now often disregarded) literature on political culture in the context of consensus democracy’s main conceptual precursor—consociational democracy. However, differing from other scholars in this tradition, I do not make a normative statement in favour of consensus democracy or any other model. My goal is rather to examine and understand why different elements of a consensual political culture are absent in CEE democracies and to discuss some of the consequences. While the classical model of political culture based on Almond and Verba’s seminal expects political culture (in the form of individually held attitudes) to adapt to institutions over time (with socio-economic background factors mediating the speed of adaptation), I advance a different concept.2 My understanding of political culture is based on explicit manifestations of collectively shared representations of democracy in the form of public discourses and habitus,3 rather than implicitly internalized and privately held orientations on the individual level. As a consequence, political culture is not conceptualised to directly impact upon behaviour of political elites (i.e. through a psychological impetus) as in the classical model. It is rather understood to be mediating the way democracy and its institutions are publicly interpreted by political elites. This way political culture also mediates what kind of behaviour can be justified as acceptable. Explicit political culture therefore

1 J March, J Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, American Political Science Review, Vol.78, No.3, Sept.1984, pp.734-749. 2 G Almond / S Verba, The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five , Princeton UP, 1963. 3 P Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. 11 constrains the way political elites can make use of institutions and what kind of political change can legitimately be argued for in the given context. This understanding of political culture thus rests on a concept of “weak socialization” through which actors come to explicitly accept the validity of certain norms or values on the collective level, but do not necessarily internalise them individually (“strong socialization”). In this notion of political culture values do not impact directly upon behaviour via deeply held attitudes on the individual level. Rather, they constrain behaviour by forcing actors to justify themselves along the lines of collectively upheld values. As a consequence, also an alternative understanding for the role of political culture in the process of the consolidation of democracy (CoD) is outlined. In my understanding of CoD political culture does not directly impact upon behaviour but constrains and enables the justification of behaviour which deviates from the status quo and thus also mediates the persistence of the democratic system. The fundamental hypothesis concerning the origins of different explicit political is based on the deep impact historical junctures such as the 1989/90 transition had on collective memories. Thus, depending on the genealogy of the democracy political elites have at their hands, different rhetorical resources are used to justify fundamental positions within the new polity. The constant reproduction of the most “successful” of these discourses establishes a habitus in the sense of Bourdieu. This then serves to structure experiences even beyond those personalities who were initially involved in crafting the new system.4 As a consequence, post-communist democracies seem to diverge in terms of elite commitment to consensus democracy and not to converge to the rather stable West European patterns. In order to demonstrate the utility of this understanding of political culture I will investigate which properties of a consensualist elite political culture are present or absent in Hungary and East Germany. Both Hungary and Germany are close to Lijphart’s ideal type of consensus democracy, while Hungary and East Germany experienced just the opposite transition dynamics in terms of speed, legal and historical continuity and elite turnover. At the same time, West Germany can be used as a unique control case for the impact of “deep national culture” as an alternative explanation. Therefore, these cases are the best possible choice in order to test whether historical legacies prevail over institutions in shaping political culture.

4 P Bourdieu, 1992. 12 3. Outline of the Dissertation In the first section, the introduction presents the puzzle and relevance of the topic in the context of theorizing the consolidation of democracy. Moreover, it introduces basic definitions for key terms used in this study. In the second section I present and then discuss Lijphart’s typology of consensus and majoritarian democracy before applying it to CEE. Identifying the missing variable of political culture (which Lijphart calls the “spirit of accommodation” in his earlier work) for explaining the stability and persistence of consensus democracies, I go on to disaggregate consensual political culture into five ideational components. In this context I also discuss another recent operationalization of the concept, namely the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) by Steiner et al., in the tradition of deliberative theory.5 Then, I outline the existing literature on political culture and democratic elites in the context of the civic culture paradigm by Almond and Verba, and its role in the consolidation of democracy.6 While discussing its methodological and epistemological limitations, I will advance my own approach to political culture, and the consolidation of democracy. The third section of the dissertation tests the patterns of elite statements expected by both the classical and my own model of political culture. For this, I compiled an original set of quantitative data derived through content analysis of parliamentary speeches by East German and Hungarian MPs in terms of consensualist and majoritarian statements. Finding no plausible relationships with social-economic background or post-recruitment factors, elite discourses derived through in-depth interviews with twenty-seven Hungarian and twenty- eight East German MPs are then investigated for collectively shared discourses along the lines expected by my own hypotheses. Finally, the findings are discussed in the broader political context of the two cases in order to illustrate their impact upon the consolidation of democracy. The fourth section summarizes and concludes the dissertation, points out caveats and gaps, outlines avenues for further research and discusses some implications for .

5 J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004. 6 G Almond & S Verba, 1963.

13

PART I: Introduction

Almost two decades after the end of communism democracy is safe and well-established in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).7 Their integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as positive assessments by groups such as Freedom House, are indicators of successful and lasting installation of democratic institutions. While it is no longer questioned that the post-communist countries of the region are democratic in the minimalist, procedural sense, academic attention has shifted to analysing various pathways of democratic development in the region and the consolidation of democracy (CoD). CoD in the broadest sense investigates the stability and survival of democratic regimes.8 In to transitologist scholarship (which focuses on the regime question) students of CoD address the question of what kind of democracy is actually developing in various countries.9 Next to institutional and behavioural factors cultural or attitudinal variables are increasingly considered in this context. Elite commitment to the existing democratic system is seen as a crucial component of CoD.10 In spite of the increasing differentiation between CEE democracies one striking commonality appears to be the fact that virtually all ended up having an institutional set-up resembling more closely the type of consensus democracy as conceptualised by Arend Lijphart. This type of democratic government, characterized by a high number of “veto players” in decision-making, is found in a number of West European countries as opposed to majoritarian forms predominantly found in the English-speaking world or South America.11 West European democracies developed consensus democracy with a power-sharing institutional set-up and utilized coalescent, co-operative elite strategies as an answer to the

7 Following a common definition the region of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe comprises Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 8 G Munck, ‘The Regime Question – Theory Building in Democracy Studies’, World Politics, Vol.54, October 2001, p.130. 9 P Schmitter / N Guilhot, ‘From Transition to Consolidation: Extending the Concept of and the Practice of Democracy’, in: M. Dobry (ed.), Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe: Lessons for the Social Sciences, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000, p.132. 10 J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 11 A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy –Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, 1999; J Colomer, ‘Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.6, No.2, 1995, pp. 74-85; H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems – , Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, pp. 345-346; A Roberts, ‘What Type of Democracy Is Emerging in Eastern Europe?’, paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, September 2004. 14 threats of deep societal cleavages (e.g. , language, class). CEE countries ended up with power-sharing institutions due to the contingent dynamics of the transition process, though largely lacking the differentiated cleavage structures and not featuring particularly consensus-oriented elite practices. Additionally, EU conditionalities for accession (e.g. decentralisation and regionalization, minority representation, independent central banking etc.) contributed to constrain institutional choices more towards a consensus-democratic set- up. Yet, in spite of the institutional set-up of consensus democracy (which regularly requires a much higher degree of willingness for compromise, coalescence and co-operation between different actors), elite political culture in the region very often appears anything but consensual. In some countries such as Poland, Hungary or Slovakia political elites seem to be more and more separated by unbridgeable cultural-ideological divides impacting day-to-day politics. In many respects well-advanced post-communist societies, such as the Czech Republic or the Eastern part of Germany, are experiencing the return and increased electoral strength of unreformed post-communist parties. Often these parties appear in the form of populist demagogues who are politically irresponsible and ostracised in the polity, thus paralysing political processes. Having achieved EU accession some observers now even see some of the new CEE member states, such as Poland or Slovakia, falling back in their democratic standards (e.g. concerning minority ). More generally, these findings shed on the expectation that institutional convergence with mainstream European institutions would also lead to a convergence in terms of elite political culture in terms of commitment and adaptation to the values of the new democratic system. I follow Max Weber’s definition of political elites: they are people who live both for and from politics.12 This implies a more than temporary commitment to politics, as well a certain degree of professionalization and routinization as opposed to amateur politicians or short-term activists. Moreover, my definition of political elites is an explicitly positional one which is the most common and reasonable approach for studying leaders in a democratic setting (as opposed to - or decision-based definitions which might be useful in less formalized contexts).13 Thus, I define political elites as the bearers of elected public offices on the national level in legislative and positions. This definition thus reflects the mainstream literature on elite sociology (e.g. Higley et al.’s definition of political elites) as

12 M Weber, Politik als Beruf, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 6th edition, 1977, p.9. 13 B Wasner, Eliten in Europa, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004, pp.119-125. 15 “ who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially”.14 In my research I will concentrate on members of parliament who, next to the government, are the most important players in shaping the development of democracy and offer a diverse pool of political views. According to mainstream democratic theory, parliament is the key location for practising democracy by the representatives of the people. Consequently, I will discuss popular support and commitment to democracy only in passing. This certainly does not mean to relegate popular political culture to being of minor interest or unimportant for the future of democracy. Nevertheless, a focus on political leaders appears justified when it comes to the question of how to operate the central constitutional positions of democracy. This is particularly true for the post-communist societies, which are still characterised by weak popular political engagement and comparatively underdeveloped civil societies.15 There are both commonalities and differences between mass and elite political culture. Therefore, my findings for politicians’ political culture certainly have to do with mass political culture too, as democratic political elites at least partially have to resonate or be able to relate to popular outlooks, norms or values. On the other hand, of course, we can expect political leaders to be able to formulate much more elaborate and detailed opinions and positions. Nevertheless, an application of my theoretical approach and methodology with some modifications to the mass population is both possible and highly desirable. This research project shall investigate how far political elites in the region have actually developed a “spirit of accommodation” in line with the institutional set-up of consensus democracy.16 More generally, I will explain what kind of commitment to the existing democracy can be found among the political leaders in these countries, discuss its sources and, in a more tentative way, address some of its implications for the future of democracy. In this regard I have to stress that I do not intend to make a normative argument in favour of consensus democracy or any other subtype of democracy. My case studies will show that adhering to the consensualist status quo may actually undermine the viability of these new democracies. Thus, in opposition to other scholars of democratisation I do not regard desirable the persistence of the initial constitutional arrangements in any case (which, in CEE, are predominantly consensus-democratic). Rather I intend to point out some of the

14 J Higley / R Gunther (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.8. 15 M Howard, The Weakness of Civil in Post-Communist Europe, Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 2003. 16 A Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, Pluralism and Democracy in the , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. 16 factors that support or inhibit the working of consensus democracy and its potential consequences for the further development of the polity. In this regard, I view institutions and institutional changes as following both rationalist and sociological dynamics. This means that actors aim at efficiently pursuing certain pre- existing preferences in picking institutions and interacting through them (i.e. the “logic of consequentialism”), and they also act according to the logic of “appropriateness” (i.e. in their behaviour they adapt to collective norms of “what is right,” which are embodied in institutions).17 Politics is not just about making choices, though the primacy of outcomes has been cultivated by mainstream political science for quite some time. This, however, diverted attention from the equally important notion of politics as a process in which develop identities, establish and further the . Politics is also about establishing meanings, reinforcing values, managing interpretations and creating visions. In this regard also political institutions create an interpretative order which provides continuity and within which political behaviour can be understood.18 For the context of consensus democracy this means that institutional constraints, such as a high number of veto players in the democratic game, forces actors to some extent to co- operate, exchange information, and seek commonly acceptable solutions for pursuing their individual interests. On the other hand, institutional constraints in themselves are not sufficient to consolidate consensus democracy. As Körösényi points out: a power-sharing consensus-democratic set-up does not create consensus by itself, but makes it more difficult, if not impossible, to govern in a majoritarian, confrontational style.19 In fact, a consensus- democratic set-up with a high number of veto players actually offers actors the resources for both confrontational and co-operative strategies.20 Put differently, if the survival of a consensus-democratic system is only dependent on either continuously favourable output for all players or upon coercion, it is built upon shaky ground indeed. This is especially the case if democratic consolidation is to go along with the upheavals of economic reform or social change. Therefore, unlike other scholars, I do not regard mere instrumental support for the democratic system as a sufficient indicator for democratic consolidation. Instrumental support means that “actors follow the rules of the

17 J March, J Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, American Political Science Review, Vol.78, No.3, Sept.1984, pp.734-749; J March, J Olsen, ‘The logic of appropriateness’, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, ARENA Working Papers 04/09, Oslo, 2004. 18 J March, J Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions – The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York: Free Press, 1989, pp.49-52. 19 A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, p.293. 20 T Börzel, ‘Demokratien im Wandel der Europäisierung’, in: J Katenhusen, W Lamping (eds.), Demokratien in Europa – Der Einfluß der europäischen Integration auf Institutionen und neue Kulturen des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2003, p.191; similarly Steiner et al. 2004. 17 democratic game because they do not see a chance to, or advantage in, changing them”.21 Yet if actors are only to pursue predefined, egoistic interests, they might not regularly prefer co- operative strategies over confrontational ones in the context of a consensualist institutional set-up (i.e. a democracy with many inbuilt veto-players). Therefore, next to mere instrumental support for consensus democracy, we should also pay attention to the normative foundations of consensus democratic institutions and their reflection in political culture. Consequently, the persistence of consensus democracy becomes more likely if political elites not only regard consensus democracy as serving their interests best but also come to embrace its underlying norms and values. In this dissertation I intend to complement the widely used classical approach to political culture based in a socio-psychological understanding of individual internalization with a discursive approach based on collective socialization. I will show that the latter approach, which relaxes some of the assumptions of the classical model, offers better explanations for the origins of current elite political cultures in CEE. Consequently, after establishing the extent to which CEE countries are endowed with a consensus- democratic institutional set-up, I will offer two theoretical understandings and operationalizations of political culture for investigating political elites’ commitment to consensus democracy. One approach reflects the classical model of political culture understood as individually internalised attitudes, the oher reflects an alternative understanding of political culture based on collectively shared discourses. Both will then be tested empirically using both quantitative and qualitative data for Hungary and East Germany and the implications for the persistence of their democratic systems will be discussed. These two cases are regarded as being among the most advanced in terms of democratic consolidation.22 Hungary and East Germany, however, experienced opposite transition dynamics in terms of speed, legal and historical continuity and elite turnover, and therefore serve as ideal cases to test whether historical legacies prevail over institutions in shaping political culture. At the same time, West Germany can be used as an ideal control case for the impact of “deep” national political culture. For this matter, I will make extensive use of original data, both quantitative and qualitative: content analysis of parliamentary speeches from two parliamentary cycles by a sample of Hungarian and German MPs as well as discourse analysis of in-depth interviews

21 C Schneider, Patterns of Consolidated Democracies. Europe and Latin America Compared, PhD dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2004, pp.53-54. 22 J Higley, Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000; U van Beek (ed.), Democracy under construction: Patterns from four continents, Barbara Budrich Publishers: Bloomfield Hills & Opladen, 2005. 18 with these MPs are used to test the patterns hypothesized. The implications of the patterns found are then discussed in the broader context by using existing findings on these cases and on other CEE countries, as well as additional sources from domestic debates and post-1989 politics in both Hungary and Germany.

19

PART II: The Theory – Consensus, culture and consolidation

Relocating Lijphart: Is there consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe? What is consensus democracy and how can we use this concept? Almost two decades after the collapse of communism democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) can be regarded as safe and under no immediate threat. This fact, next to of competitive market economies, the rule of and the ability to take over the obligations of the EU acquis communautaire, has been acknowledged by membership or candidate status to the countries of the region by the European Union. At the same time, similar to a general trend observed among West European countries, CEE democracies appear to have developed many features of what Arend Lijphart calls “consensus democracy”. In the following I will discuss the concept of consensus democracy on the basis of Lijphart’s model, review its criticisms, and appraise the extent to which it can be applied to the cases of CEE. In his widely-applied typology, Arend Lijphart differentiates between the ideal types of consensus and majoritarian democracy measured by indicators in two separate dimensions.23 One dimension (party-executives dimension) concerns the dispersion of power in the through party and electoral systems, government structure, and relations between executive and legislative. The other concerns the diffusion of power to different levels of government, or a unitary-federal dimension (e.g. through and decentralized government, bi-cameralism and strong judicial review of constitutional issues).24 Lijphart claims that the elements cluster independently in these two logically coherent dimensions which are then used to construct a two-dimensional “conceptual map of democracy”.

[table 1 about here]

Lijphart, with his concept of consensus democracy, tries to counter the notion of equating democratic government with . While majoritarian government is concentrating power in the hand of the majority, consensus government is government by “as many people as possible” through mechanisms of dispersing and sharing power.

23 The model was first outlined in A Lijphart, Democracies- Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984; and then further developed in Lijphart 1999. 24 A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy –Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, 1999, pp.2-4. 20 concentrates power in few institutions and individuals; consensus systems try to maximize the number of people involved in decision-making and divide power over institutions. These democracies tend to be more inclusive, emphasising bargaining and compromise.25 At the very extreme one could imagine consensus democracy leading to cartel politics in which political competition is very limited, hardly matter for the configuration of and only incremental political change takes place. On the other extreme, distorted majoritarianism would be a “winner-takes-all” system, where every change of government might mean a reversal of all earlier policies and allow the majority to govern in an unconstrained, unchecked way until the next elections (described by O’Donnell as delegative democracy).26 In Patterns of Democracy Lijphart lays out the empirical reality of the described contrasting models of democracy for thirty-six countries which, in most countries, are mixed cases closer to the consensus than to the majoritarian ideal type. Moreover, he claims that consensus systems are positively associated with policies of what he calls “kinder, gentler democracy,” such as higher representation of women, more equality, political participation, and social . Therefore consensus democracy, according to the author, is also normatively preferable to majoritarianism.27 Lijphart’s model has become a widely applied approach in but also met a lot of criticism. His measurements and occasionally subjective weighting of the individual indicators in the composed indicators have been criticised.28 His typology cannot easily accommodate and explain changes going on in some dimensions in certain countries.29 Moreover, the independent clustering of his two dimensions does not hold outside his sample, (e.g. for the post-communist democracies). They rather seem to be a statistical artifact of his sample of consensus democracies which is heavily biased towards West European and OECD countries.30 The same is true for the superior policy outcomes of consensus democracies

25 A Roberts, 2004, p.3. 26 G O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No.5, 1994, pp.55-69. 27 A Lijphart, 1999, pp.275-300. 28 G Amyot, Review of Lijphart’s ‘Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.18, No.1, March 1985, pp.185-187; P Policzer, Review of Arend Lijphart’s ‘Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty- Six Countries’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.33, No.4, Dec.2000, pp.837-8; G Tsebelis, Veto Players – How Political Institutions Work, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp.109-112; M Schmidt, Demokratietheorien, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 3rd ed., 2000, pp.346-355; M Flinders, ‘Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the ’, West European Politics, Vol. 28, No.1, January 2005, p.89. 29 A Körösényi, ‘Parlamentáris vagy elnöki kormányzás? Az Orbán-kormány összehasonlító perspektívából’, Századvég, spring 2001, no. 20, pp. 3-38. 30 A Roberts, ‘What Type of Democracy Is Emerging in Eastern Europe?’, paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, September 2004; J Fortin, ‘Patterns of Democracy? 21 which are co-founded by a high degree of development.31 The relationship between policy outcomes and consensus institutions is also only tested for in one dimension and not the entire model. Moreover, there are a number of definitional problems in clearly demarcating the notion of consensus democracy and its indicators from the narrower and earlier developed concept of power-sharing or consociational democracy32 (which Lijphart regards as the most extreme case of consensus democracy).33 Consociational democracy denotes power-sharing democracy in segmentally divided plural societies. The concept was developed by Lijphart on the basis of the democratic power-sharing model between political leaders of the polarized Dutch society featuring grand , proportional representation, minority veto and segmental /.34 The concept included formal institutional arrangements and more informal arrangements, elite strategies and political culture.35 Consociationalist theory was meant to explain the puzzling stability of democratic government in the Netherlands, and other deeply divided societies (e.g. , Switzerland, Austria, or even South and India).36 One of the underlying assumptions in Patterns of Democracy is the stability of consensus democracies which is no longer a dependent variable. By way of including indicators for the superior quality of consensus democracy Lijphart is justifying his normative preference of power-sharing arrangements also for more homogeneous societies. This way, consensus democracy becomes Lijphart’s model of choice and his advice to practitioners in all societies.37 Thus the initially descriptive concept of consociational democracy, which was inductively developed out of the Dutch example and later a few more cases, (which also lead

Counterevidence form Nineteen Post-Communist Countries’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Workshop in Granada, Spain, April 2005. Fortin uses partly different indicators due to lack of appropriate data. 31 K Armingeon, ‘The effects of democracy: A comparative analysis’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.41, No.1, pp.81-105. 32 The two terms are synonymous (A Lijphart, ‘Definitions, Evidence and Policy – A Response to Matthijs Bogaards’ critique’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.12, No.4, 2000, p.426). 33 K Armingeon, ‘The effects of negotiation democracy: A comparative analysis’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.41, No.1, p.86 (footnote 2), M Bogaards, ‘The uneasy relationship between empirical and normative types in consociational theory’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.12, No.4, 2000, pp.395-423. 34 A Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation – Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2nd ed., 1975. 35 For a comprehensive overview of the history and genealogy of consociational theory, in particular concerning the work of Lijphart, and criticism of consociatonalist theory see M van Schendelen, ‘The views of Arend Lijphart and collected criticisms’, Acta Politica, Vol.19, No.1, 1984, pp.19-55, as well as the other collected articles in this special issue. 36 J Steiner, Gewaltlose Politik und kulturelle Vielfalt. Hypothesen entwickelt am Beispiel der Schweiz, Bern: Paul Haupt, 1970; J Obler / J Steiner / G Dierickx, Decision-Making in Smaller Democracies: The Consociational “Burden“, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977; A Lijphart, ‘The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation’, American Political Science Review, Vol.90, No.2, June 1996, pp.258-268. 37 R Andeweg, ‘Lijphart versus Lijphart: The Cons of Consensus Democracy in Homogeneous Societies’, Acta Politica, Vol.36, No.2, summer 2001, pp.117-128. 22 to changes in the concept) became increasingly prescriptive and normative. In his earliest writings on consociational democracy in the Netherlands Lijphart still notes the diminished democratic legitimacy of power-sharing elite arrangements securing stability, which leads to de-politicization, apathy and stagnation. Also, he put particular emphasis on elite agency in running consociational democracy through the cooperation of top leaders through partly secret deals.38 Consociationalism, by definition, still included informal, implicit or unwritten rules next to formal institutional arrangements, some of which Lijphart criticised himself (e.g. secrecy, de-politicization).39 Over time, however, his scepticism for certain features of consociationalism shifted to stressing its merits of securing democratic stability in plural societies.40 In the end, Lijphart associates the broader concept of consensus democracy with better policies while the factor of democratic stability is no longer a dependent variable.41 Consideration for cultural factors also impeded the increasingly fashionable large-N-studies, and was subsequently dropped from the concept. By subsuming behavioural and cultural factors into the formal institutional indicators Lijphart’s have followed the trend towards rational institutionalist thinking in the social sciences. This is unproblematic only for the stable Western democracies which Lijphart picked for his sample. Yet, for the cases of CEE, stability needs to be treated as a dependent variable rather than a given. Thus, before wondering about possible favourable policy outcomes, we should investigate whether the democratic arrangements of one kind or another are actually stable and thus democracy consolidated (which shall be discussed further below). In this regard, Fortin’s critical judgement of Lijphart, concerning the questionable relationship between consensus democratic features and policy outcomes for the cases of post-communist countries, appears rather premature (the majority of her sample includes data on a number of countries—Bosnia, Armenia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and —which have been only questionable democracies for most of the time span of her study).42

38 A Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, pp.103-138. 39 A Lijphart, 1975, pp.123-124. 40 R Andeweg, 2001, pp.117-128. A theoretical explanation for the greater stability of consensualist settings is given by George Tsebelis who shows that an increasing number of so-called veto players leads to more stable policy outcomes while a decreasing number might lead to more instability (G Tsebelis, Veto Players – How Political Institutions Work, Princeton University Press, 2002). However, as Tsebelis’ starting point is a rather simplistic rationalist setting in which players have a priori fixed interests his model is hard to apply in real-world settings in which identities obviously do have an impact on preferences which are constantly being shaped during interaction. 41 For a more detailed critique see Bogaards, 2000, and Lijphart’s reply (A Lijphart, ‘Definitions, Evidence and Policy – A Response to Matthijs Bogaards’ critique’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.12, No.4, 2000, pp.425-431). 42 J Fortin, ‘Patterns of Democracy? Counterevidence form Nineteen Post-Communist Countries’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Workshop in Granada, Spain, April 2005. 23 Consequently, Lijphart’s casual treatment of cultural factors in the working of consociational/consensus democracy needs to be reconsidered. Simultaneously with his gradual shift from description to prescription over time, Lijphart moves away from focusing on political elites’ attitudes and behaviour to putting emphasis only on the formal-legal features of the democratic system.43 Thus, while successful consociational democracy still required the leaders of the different subcultures to bridge deep cleavages in a “self-denying fashion”,44 the requirement for a and accommodative political culture curiously is no longer part of the criteria of consensus democracy. Yet, similar to consociational democracy, the consensus model entails multiple veto points which require inclusion, negotiation and compromise between different groups. Thus it involves a “spirit of accommodation” which is very different from the competitive political culture in majoritarian democracies with their concentration of power.45 Lijphart himself concedes that consociational democracy relies on informal practices while consensus democracy focuses on formal-institutional devices, but he does not go on to discuss how far formal institutions and informal behaviour actually coincide.46 In some of his older publications on consociational democracy Lijphart demands that political elites should be accommodative and co-operative. Moreover, they to have the ability to accommodate divergent interests and demands, transcend cleavages, and join common efforts with other elites. They ought to be aware of the perils of political fragmentation and therefore have to be committed to the maintenance of the system, the improvement of its cohesion and stability.47 Later, while making clear that consensus democracy can only take root and thrive if supported by a respective political culture, he no longer elaborates on its details.48 Lijphart argues that the first four indicators in the executive-party dimension are structurally linked while the relationship with corporatism is established via political culture (i.e. the absence of a “winner-takes-all-mentality”).49 Claiming that a consensual political culture makes the establishment of consensus democracy easier Lijphart also refers to “anecdotal evidence” from Austria and Netherlands (where consensus democratic institutions led to the

43 J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, p.80. 44 A Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, pp.103-138. 45 J Steiner et al., 2004, p.3. 46 A Lijphart, ‘Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes, and Consequences’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol., No.1, 1989, p.40. 47 A Lijphart, 1968, p. 8; A Lijphart, 1975, p.54. 48 A Lijphart, 1999, p.306. 49 A Lijphart, ‘Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.41, No.1, 2000, p.108. 24 development of a consensual political culture).50 Hence the relationship between the institutional arrangements of consensus democracy and a consensual political culture becomes somewhat circular or tautological.51 In fact, Lijphart’s “spirit of accommodation” has never been measured in a systematic way until recently.52 Early critics of Lijphart have questioned the impact of consociational arrangements on elite political culture. For example, Hans Daalder viewed the Dutch model of power-sharing as a result of historically accommodative and cooperative elite orientations in the Netherlands over centuries, and not as its cause. This way he questions Lijphart’s claim of the “self- denying hypothesis” of deeply divided elites co-operating with each other.53 Similarly, Bogaards does not see any sound empirical evidence for the transformative impact of consensus democratic arrangements on political culture.54 In sum, Lijphart’s basic differentiation between majoritarian and consensus democracy is a useful typology which not only operationalizes two very different normative understandings of democratic decision-making, but can also serves for comparing the empirical reality of democracy on a global scale. Nevertheless, some qualifications are needed. Firstly, the independent clustering of the two dimensions appears to be the result of the initial case selection which has a rather limited scope in space and time. Therefore it makes sense to use the concept of veto points or veto players rather than Lijphart’s two dimensions to establish the extent of consensus-democratic institutions in a polity. Secondly, the stability of neither consensus nor majoritarian democracy can be assumed a priori. Thirdly, this is particularly the case since the existence or absence of a supportive political culture is an empirical question and does not follow automatically from the institutional features. Consequently, also an a priori normative preference for either type of democracy appears unjustified. Given these premises, in the following I will discuss this concept with regards to the new CEE democracies.

Is there consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe? What then is the relevance of Lijphart’s concept of consensus democracy for the CEE democracies? Interestingly, virtually all countries in the region ended up quite clearly on the

50 A Lijphart, 1999, p.307; A Lijphart, ‘Definitions, Evidence and Policy – A Response to Matthijs Bogaards’ critique’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.12, No.4, 2000, p.429. 51 M Bogaards, 2000, p.410. 52 J Steiner et al., 2004, p.12. 53 H Daalder, ‘The Consociational Democracy Theme’, World Politics, Vol.26, No.4, July 1974, pp. 611-612, 615-618. 54 M Bogaards, 2000, p.410. 25 consensus side of Lijphart’s typology of democracies.55 Although the two independent clusters of indicators are not present in the CEE cases mentioned above, most individual indicators clearly score on the consensual side. There is a high effective number of parties, a low share of time under minimal-winning- or single-party governments, short cabinet durations, rather high degree of electoral proportionality, high thresholds for constitutional amendments, strong judicial constitutional review, and rather independent central banks in the CEE democracies. Interest group representation is, however, rather on the majoritarian side.56 Federalism and strong are generally rare features in post- communist Europe after the break-up of the (nominally) federal states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the , resulting in comparatively small and more homogeneous states.57 Thus, at least for seven out of ten indicators, CEE countries are clearly on the consensus side of Lijphart’s typology. However, the definition of consensus democracy in CEE needs to be clarified: CEE countries have a consensus-democratic set-up in the sense of having a generally high number of veto points in their democratic decision-making. In this regard, they somewhat differ from Lijphart’s initial concept based on the Western sample in which veto points also cluster in two mutually constituting clusters of veto points. This general trend towards consensus democracy is usually explained with reference to the dynamics of democratic transition. Consensus arrangements became an outcome almost by default, and thus is a point of convergence among the different countries of the region. Institutional designers deliberately chose to insert power-sharing elements instead of opting for majoritarian solutions in response to a high degree of uncertainty and political volatility, which soon became visible in the rapid proliferation of multiple parties and rather instable party systems. Consensus institutions in the East were the outcome of short-term contingencies as transition took place in an ‘underdetermined political situation.’58 In this context institutions were hardly the outcomes of endogenous structural or cultural conditions, but rather depended on contingent power constellations, individual agency, and exogenous factors (e.g. West European models).

55 J Colomer, ‘Strategies and Outcomes in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.6, No.2, 1995, pp. 74- 85; Roberts, 2004. 56 A Roberts, ‘What Type of Democracy Is Emerging in Eastern Europe?’, paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, September 2004. 57 Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently undergoing a revision of its federalist constitution. Similarly there appears to be a tendency towards re- and de-federalisation in the Russian under the Putin presidency. Serbia-Montenegro as a federative state dissolved in 2005. 58 P Schmitter / N Guilhot, ‘From Transition to Consolidation: Extending the Concept of Democratization and the Practice of Democracy’, in: M. Dobry (ed.), Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe: Lessons for the Social Sciences, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000, p.134. 26 Majoritarian solutions were preferred only by post-communist parties when they were clearly in a strong position assuming the popularity of their individual leaders.59 Later these arrangements were often reverted once the former opposition came to power. Consensus solutions from the beginning were usually the result of a balance of power between the old elite and the opposition during transition. Cases with the dominance of opposition groups in the transition also mostly ended up with consensus set-ups as an against a potential return of communists into power or, in the case of East Germany, by institutional transfer of the predominantly consensus-democratic West German system through re-unification (see below for more details). Also, the motivation to strengthen the supported the development of consensus institutions as it led to rather rigid and a strong judicial review in deliberate opposition to the communist dead-letter constitutions. Once installed, consensus systems also have the tendency to reinforce themselves due to their inherent brakes on constitutional change.60 Finally (and quite importantly) , the process of Europeanization with its focus on subsidiarity, minority representation, involvement, regionalization, decentralisation, and monetary stability constrained the choices of aspiring EU member states in CEE and supported the development of more consensual institutions. In fact, EU conditionalities for accession put a particular focus on “getting the institutions right”. The existence of prescribed formal institutions is, of course, much easier to ascertain and to monitor than their subsequent operation. Nevertheless, by this approach the EU seems to follow Lijphart’s and others’ somewhat optimistic assumption that the existence of a specific formal institutional set-up will transform political culture (as well as bureaucratic, business, and legal cultures). In terms of their institutional set-up along the lines of Lijphart’s ten indicators, most countries of the region have not changed much for the last decade or so. While the first years after transition saw a period of some adaptation of initial arrangements via constitution- making, consensualist arrangements in these countries are rather stable. This observation mirrors Lijphart’s observation for his sample of (mostly Western) democracies which have little changed in their consensualist or majoritarian outlook for a longer period.61 Do CEE political elites therefore share a similar kind of commitment to consensus democracy as their West European colleagues? As outlined above, we cannot assume this by merely pointing to

59 H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems – Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p.32. 60 J Colomer, 1995; A Roberts, 2004. 61 A Lijphart, 1999, pp.253-257. 27 the institutional factors as Lijphart does. Also, empirically, the last one and a half decade of post-communist politics which was rather confrontational, ideologized and volatile sheds doubt on this claim. So, how far do CEE and more established consensus democracies differ? In contrast to the post-communist cases, West European consensus democracy was originally developed over time by risk-averse political leaders of rather homogeneous ideologically opposed camps in order to bridge deep historical cleavages (religious, linguistic, geographical, socio-economic) in society which threatened democratic stability in the course of growing mass mobilisation and mass franchise. Consensus democracy in Western Europe continues to work despite the attenuation of societal cleavages and the advance of new parties and political movements. Paradoxically, rather than a return to more competition, there appears to be a trend in West European politics to even more consensus and . This might result in a new division in society; not between different sub-cultural segments, but rather between the masses and the elites, leading to phenomena such as the cartel party described by Katz and Mair.62 For the last decade consensualist tendencies have been detected even in the UK (Lijphart’s prime example for the majoritarian democracy).63 Thus, Lijphart’s original model gets turned upside down: while according to power- sharing theory there can be no stable democracy in plural societies with majoritarian arrangements, consensualist set-ups now lead to some questionable distortions of democracy in increasingly homogeneous societies. The ‘cartel of elites’ which kept society together is obviously no longer required in order to secure the stability of democracy. Lijphart himself, in his earliest studies, already predicted the negative side effects of power-sharing arrangements such as de-politicization, and de-legitimation of established parties.64 Consociational or consensus democracies in a way have become victims of their own success. Bogaards observes a “degenerated consociationalism” in where the polarisation among the multiple small parties with their veto powers has become more dangerous to political stability than societal segmentation (which, in fact, has clearly diminished over the last decades).65 Anton Pelinka argues that by closing the gaps between originally deeply divided Austrian subcultures political elites destroyed their own power-base. As a consequence, the FPÖ’s rise was much more the result of the declining elite “cartel” then the

62 R Katz / P Mair, ’Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy – The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, Vol.1, No.1, pp.5-28; R Andeweg, ‘Consociational Democracy’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.3, 2002, p.533. 63 M Flinders, ‘Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the Constitution’, West European Politics, Vol. 28, No.1, January 2005, pp.61-93. 64 R Andeweg, ‘Lijphart versus Lijphart: The Cons of Consensus Democracy in Homogeneous Societies’, Acta Politica, Vol.36, No.2, summer 2001, pp.117-128. 65 M Bogaards, 2005. 28 cause of it.66 The surge of right-wing extremists capitalising on discontent with established elites is rising in other countries with a long consociationalist tradition, (such as Belgium and the Netherlands) and is a symptom of dysfunctional consensualism.67 In general, scholars point to the problem of accountability of consensus governments and the lack of clear-cut alternatives inside the system if voters want a change of government.68 While Lijphart emphasises the merits of consensus democracy for the reason of the presumed superior quality of their policies, one might argue that political elites should rather make way for more competitive politics in a number of established consensus democracies. So far, both the vested interests of established parties and the built-in inhibitions of political change seem to prevent moving away from traditional consensus democracy in Western Europe. CEE countries in their constitutional features increasingly resemble West European consensus democracies but lack the differentiated social landscape of Western European societies in the mid-20th century. Save for re-emerging ethnic cleavages in some countries, the post-communist social landscape is rather flat, unstructured, and de-mobilised.69 Therefore, there are no deep cleavages posing an immediate danger to democratic stability which would require power-sharing approaches. Moreover, in the West European context, political leaders and parties can organize political and still represent more or less stable and homogeneous groups of voters. This is less true for the much more volatile and socially disconnected party systems in CEE.70 Thus, CEE political elites have a rather different starting point for consolidating consensus democracy, and less entrenched collective interests in keeping the existing status quo. One might wonder which factors might actually condition elites’ support for consensus democracy if domestic pressure from below is absent. In terms of historical factors, pre-transition legacies are rather mixed and ambiguous in terms of carrying consensual elite political cultures in the region. Unlike the West European tradition, most CEE political elites do not have a long experience of successful, consensual cooperation in democratic settings.71

66 A Pelinka, ’Consociational Democracy in Austria: Political Change’, Acta Politica, Vol.37, No.1/2, 2002, p.145-155. 67 M Bogaards, ‘The Consociational Analogy of the European Union – A Rejoinder to Crepaz with a Comment on Kaiser’, European Union Politics, Vol.3, No.4, 2002, p.503; C Mouffe, On the political, London: Routledge, 2005, pp.64-72. 68 R Andeweg, ‘Lijphart versus Lijphart: The Cons of Consensus Democracy in Homogeneous Societies’, Acta Politica, Vol.36, No.2, summer 2001, pp.120-122. 69 Zs Enyedi, ‘The role of agency in cleavage formation’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44, No.3, 2005, p.697. 70 I van Biezen, ‘On the theory and practice of party formation and adaptation in new democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44, 2005, pp.147-174; K Armingeon, ‘Forms of government in post- communist countries’, paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Workshops, Granada, Spain, April 2005. 71 A Seleny, ‘Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies – Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland’, World Politics, Vol.51, July 1999, pp.481-519; H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, 29 Rather than bridging internal divisions through domestic demands one could argue that CEE elites, throughout the last century, were actually forced into mutual cooperation through external pressures by neighbouring great powers. Thus, exogenous factors rather than domestic developments enforced elite unity and covered deep divisions, if only temporarily and under non-democratic circumstances. Collaboration with Nazi Germany, Sovietization and later endeavours to appease Moscow against interfering with certain national variations of socialism not only determined the outlook of the respective political elites but surely had a lasting and formative impact on national collective memories until today. The history of externally constrained or even imposed choices goes on with the countries’ integration into the European Union or, more generally, CEE integration into global and international competition for access to markets and investment. Lack of adaptation to the European mainstream now threatens economic marginalization and replaces the threat of from hegemonic neighbours as in the past. Unlike other small, capitalist economies such as the Netherlands or Denmark after the World II, CEE countries are facing a much more narrowly constrained choice of institutions and policies which need to be employed in order to be accepted into the European or global capitalist mainstream. At the same time, they have much less opportunity to contribute to determine these policies on the supranational level.72 The so-called “Washington consensus” sets out “universally accepted policy goals;” new market economies have to conform next to the “Brussels consensus” (i.e. the acquis communautaire of the European Union) which covers an ever expanding field of legislation focusing predominantly on formal and technical details.73 Both imply a set of institutions and policies which are deemed beyond partisan dispute. According to Barcani and Di Quirico, democratization for the CEE countries basically meant Europeanization (i.e. the institutional adaptation to EU standards). The levers of conditionality have been powerful tools for shaping aspiring member states’ institutions.74 In this regard EU accession “” were acutely asymmetrical, as it meant that “in all areas of the acquis, the candidate countries must bring their institutions, management capacity

Post-Communist Party Systems – Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999. 72 S Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy – Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.37-54. 73 ‘The stultifying Brussels consensus’, The , 7 October 2006, p.50. 74 E Barcani, R Di Quirico, ‘Introduction’, in: R Di Quirico (ed.), Europeanization and Democratisation – Institutional Adaptation, Conditionality and Democratisation in the EU’s Neighbour Countries, Florence: European Press Academic Publishing, 2005, pp.11-24 30 and administrative and judicial systems up to EU standards, both at national and regional level.”75 This makes it even more difficult to establish how far institutional choices such as consensus democracy might not just be another external model which is somewhat ritualistically and opportunistically backed for lack of leeway. Geoffrey Pridham’s claim that CEE political elites seemingly “hardly developed their own ideas about democratic development” or “were too busy” for developing alternative concepts therefore has to be seen in the light of the overriding priority of EU accession.76 He concedes that EU accession resulted in removing institutional uncertainty following transition, but did not necessarily lead to a remaking of political culture or the dissemination and internalisation of the principles and norms underlying the new institutions.77 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon argue that there was an underlying assumption that EU conditionalities would have a “normative power”; that actors would be socialized into their underlying values, along with the power of hard economic incentives and bureaucratic leverage. However, investigating regionalization policy the authors show that the EU Commission was not so much concerned with the normative content of “capacity-building,” but primarily with organizational and technical issues. Moreover, it applied different approaches over time and with regard to different countries. The authors conclude that actually little socialization of (sub-national) elites had taken place and that Europeanization had much weaker effects than expected. They also find path dependent factors in domestic political settings to be more important than external conditionalities. 78 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that most domestic and external observers generally find little signs of accommodative and consensual patterns of elite behaviour in the region reaching the standards of established Western consensus democracies.79 Having successfully concluded EU accession some external incentives for enforcing consensualism on a narrower range of policies and institutions have diminished. At the same time EU directives are increasingly seen as lacking democratic legitimacy or as being captured by interest groups

75 Website of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement, last login: 20 October 2006. 76 G Pridham, ‘EU Accession and Democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons from the Enlargement of 2004’, in: R Di Quirico (ed.), Europeanization and Democratisation – Institutional Adaptation, Conditionality and Democratisation in the EU’s Neighbour Countries, Florence: European Press Academic Publishing, 2005, pp.67-68. 77 G Pridham, 2005, p.78. 78 J Hughes, G Sasse, C Gordon, Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe – The Myth of Conditionality, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 79 E.g. A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.292-5; R Tökés, ’Hungary: Elites and the Use and Abuse of Democratic Institutions’, in: J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000 for the case of Hungary. 31 from the old member states.80 Indeed, the first post-accession years saw a surge in electoral support for parties lacking commitment to both European integration and certain core values of liberal, Western style democracy (as seen in Poland, Slovakia or Lithuania). This included a startling revival of authoritarian, nationalistic, xenophobic, and illiberal ideas as well as a questioning of certain constitutionally enshrined key elements of consensus democracy and the EU acquis (such as minority representation in parliament). Consequently, the application of Lijphart’s model, with a mere focus on institutions, appears to have limited analytical value. While originally elite commitment to consensus democracy was (implicitly) included in the concept, this can no longer be assumed to be the case. This is particularly true for younger democracies where consensus solutions did not grow out of a longer experience of elite accommodation and cooperation. In conclusion, I have shown that CEE democracies strongly resemble Lijphart’s consensus type of democracy, characterised by a higher number of veto points in democratic decision-making (but not by two independently clustering dimensions thereof). Since the genealogy of CEE consensus democratic institutions (the initial societal landscape, historical experiences and external conditions differ quite significantly from their West European counterparts) it is not self-evident that CEE political elites actually developed a similarly consensual political culture (a “spirit of accommodation”; i.e. an ideational foundation of consensus democracy). This leads to the central research question which shall be addressed: What are the sources of commitment to consensus democracy by CEE political elites? More tentatively, what might be the consequences of elite support or opposition to consensus democracy for the stability and future development of the polity (i.e. for the consolidation of democracy)?

The “spirit of accommodation”: the ideational foundations of consensus democracy Consensus democracy and its ideational sub-dimensions As discussed above, in order to investigate the current state and some future outlooks for consensus democracy in CEE we need to go beyond institutional factors and look at ideational factors supporting this type of democracy. Before going on to discuss different models of political culture as approaches to operationalize commitment to consensus democracy, I will briefly discuss the philosophical foundations of consensus democracy and try to disaggregate the concept into sub-dimensions. This enables me to construct measurable and comparable indicators for political culture. Next to Lijphart’s own references to the ideational foundations

80 S Rose-Ackerman, 2005, pp.49-51. 32 of consensus democracy in some of his older publications, I discuss the only existing endeavour so far to operationalize the “spirit of accommodation” and explain why I chose a somewhat different approach. In his older studies Lijphart demands that elites should be accommodative and co- operative. Moreover, they need to have the ability to accommodate divergent interests and demands, transcend cleavages, and join common efforts with other elites. They ought to be aware of the perils of political fragmentation, and therefore have to be committed to the maintenance of the system, the improvement of its cohesion and its stability.81 These features of elite political culture are clearly as relevant for consensus democracy in general as they are for consociational democracy in particular. The existence of multiple veto-points presupposes a spirit of accommodation on the level of political elites for its working, regardless of whether a society is segmentally plural or not. From these short passages above one can already derive some basic ideals underlying consensus democracy which will be further developed in the following:

1. The centrality of consensus and compromise Consensus institutions require elites to be able to work together and overcome differences. Therefore compromise and consensus are to be valued as the key mechanisms for decision- making as opposed to divisive agitation, competition and imposed majority decisions.82 From a majoritarian position, consensus and compromise do not carry a value in themselves.

2. Politicians as proponents of the “common good” In the introduction to his volume Patterns of Democracy Lijphart remarks that the widely used Lincolnian definition of democracy as being “government by the people and for the people” raises two fundamental questions: “who will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be responsive to when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?” The two possible answers to this dilemma are: the majority, or as many people as possible.83 Thus, in fact, we could also formulate the two possible answers on a philosophical level as either a more representation-oriented model of democracy, or a more utilitarian one (Bentham: “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”). Thus, consensus

81 A Lijphart, 1968, p. 8; A Lijphart, 1975, p.54. 82 Compromise here denotes both a condition for consensus but also a preliminary stage of a consensus. The two are often difficult to differentiate. On the most basic level consensus also implies a changes of preferences, which however is hard to establish. (J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, p.91.) 83 A Lijphart, 1999, pp.1-2. 33 democracy requires not only an inclusive understanding in terms of participation, but also in terms of its output. Consequently, consensus democracy should focus on advancing the common good. It should aim at solutions benefiting all, or at least not make decisions by putting someone at a disadvantage for the benefit of another. For Lijphart and Crepaz this logic is embodied in the concentration of partisan interests in corporatism as opposed to the more atomistic, competitive and exclusive nature of interest group pluralism.84 Similarly, it is reflected in coalition governments, in which it is rarely possible to coherently realize individual party programs. Rather, common denominators, if only minimal ones, have to be found between two or more different parties.85 In this regard, political elites in a are therefore crucial in defining the common good and bearing collective trusteeship for the “national interest”. This stands in opposition to the less constrained competition of particular interests and their representation in the polity in majoritarian democracy. Certainly, a totalitarian vision of the common good (i.e. an essentializing claim of defining the only acceptable position) cannot be considered democratic at all. Consensus democracy is therefore not about limiting pluralism, but about reconciling differences and finding some common ground (as opposed to merely letting the majority win). This means that particular interests should not be suppressed or eliminated. However, arguments advancing particular interests should at least reflect a concern for the common good and not be made in purely egoistic terms. Nevertheless, there appears to be a certain affinity of strong consensus systems to search for authoritative, ultimate solutions, and consequently a certain elitist notion of politics as described by Dahrendorf. According to him, this notion of democracy is based on an understanding of history as being driven by synthesis, not conflict.86 Commonalities of interest, the “common good” rather than particular interests in a society, drive consensual politics.87 Political decisions are redefined into technical questions which are to be decided by independent “experts” – which Erwin Scheuch describes as the “ of the expert” in West

84 A Lijphart / M Crepaz, ‘Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.21, No.2, April 1991, p.236. 85 K Grabow, ‘Zur Rolle der Eliten in der demokratischen Gesellschaft’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, : Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006, p.33. 86 R Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, New York: W.W. Norton, 1979, pp.132-140. 87 A similar differentiation (mandate and trusteeship relations between voter and MP) is made by Kitschelt et al., 1999, pp.309-340. See also Putnam, 1973, p. 154. An alternative definition of the common good in line with the Rawlsian difference principle is proposed by Steiner et al., 2004, p.21. 34 German politics.88 This utilitarian ideal is thus connected with a rather elitist understanding of politics: as politicians are assigned to define the common good they have to be aloof of society and particularistic interests or conflicts. They have to apply a general perspective rather than a narrow-minded view. Due to their prominent position in defining the common good they are held up as role models, or even educators to the population.

3. The centrality of established procedures Consensus democracy’s institutions are based on a highly balanced formula through which different levels of government and various parties, groups or individuals are involved into the political process. These processes are meant to ideally secure the equitable consideration of all positions in order to establish the common ground between them, and to filter out self- serving or myopic demands. This often results in complex processes of decision-making involving many veto-players, which frequently comes at the expense of concrete outcomes or effectiveness. This, in turn, is often an advantage of majoritarian democracy.89 Therefore, in consensus democracies, political processes (particularly those which are meant to insure the inclusion and participation of all relevant groups) carry a value in themselves.

4. Preserving the status quo According to Lijphart the survival of consensus democracy depends on the commitment of the political elites to it.90 They must be convinced of the desirability of preserving the current system.91 As the consensus system aims at balancing the influence of all groups no one should try to change major components of this arrangement and upset the balance. I argue that this includes not only the (usually) constitutionally enshrined political institutions, but also the major configuration of economic or redistributive systems (e.g. for public offices, educational system, social welfare provisions for particular groups etc.). This “Proporzdemokratie” as described by Lehmbruch secures the socio-economic basis and a balanced distribution of material benefits among all major groups in society92 Thus, consensus democracy works best when no-one questions the basic established balance between various groups and the institutional status quo. Majoritarianism, in turn, does not aim for the conservation of a particular political or socio-economic arrangement. In societies

88 E Scheuch quoted in U Hoffmann-Lange, ‘Elite Research in Germany’, International Review of Sociology, Vol.11, No.2, 2001, p.212. 89 A Lijphart, 1999, pp.258-9. 90 A Lijphart, 1968, p. 8.; A Lijphart, 1975, p. 54. 91 A Lijphart 1975, pp.103-104. 92 G Lehmbruch, Porporzdemokraties: Politisches System und Politische Kultur in der Schweiz und Österreich, Tübingen: Mohr, 1967. 35 which are not characterized by just two homogeneous groups but by a multitude of positions on various issues, majority rule implies both temporariness and reversibility of decisions made. Rather than stability it advances pragmatic change based on current problems and constellations of actors, and gains its procedural legitimacy this way. 93

5. Respect towards “the other” Lijphart would like to see political leaders in consensus democracy avoid the “perils of fragmentation”.94 Thus, rather than cultivating and stressing unbridgeable antagonisms political elites from different camps should overcome them in order to be able to work together in the same system. In the extreme case this can lead to what Dahrendorf described as the “cartel of anxiety” in West Germany in the 1950s and 60s. There, members of the political elite, regardless of their diverse backgrounds and , avoided conflicts among each other for the sake of stability.95 Therefore, consensus institutions should be supported by mutual among political leaders of different groups which attenuate deep cleavages between them, or what Robert Putnam would call “bridging social capital”.96 A basic precondition to establish trust is the mutual recognition of political leaders from different camps as equally legitimate players in the democratic game. Consensual political elites ideally accept the stake of each participant and develop common ground concerning basic values and policies permitting some continuity even after government changes. At the very basic level, mutual respect and acceptance as legitimate opponents is surely part of any democratic system. Thus, in a consensus setting political leaders not only have to accept each others part as a legitimate player, but also need to develop trust and cooperative stances towards each other in order to work together. Political leaders in a consensus democracy are supposed to aim at making positive use out of the commonalities between parties rather than capitalising upon their differences. Majoritarianism in turn depends on politicians making clear the competing programmatic alternatives for which they stand and the discontinuities of policy after a changeover of government.

93 C Offe, ‘Politische Legitimation durch Mehrheitsentscheidung?’, in: B Guggenberger, C Offe (eds.), An den Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984, pp.153-154, pp.164-169; C Gusy, ‘Das Mehrheitsprinzip im demokratischen Staat’, in: B Guggenberger, C Offe (eds.), An den Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984, pp.70-79. 94 A Lijphart, 1968, p.8.; A Lijphart, 1975, p.54. 95 R Dahrendorf, 1979, pp.256-265. 96 R Putnam, Making Democracy Work – Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton UP, 1993; R Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. 36 The above-outlined five dimensions appear to be strongly connected, if not mutually reinforcing. For instance, it is hard to imagine political elites valuing compromise and consensus without respecting the political opponent. Similarly, the preservation of the status quo is hardly imaginable if political elites are more committed to obtain specific outcomes at the expense of going through prescribed procedures. Consequently, consensus democracy, lacking one or several of these ideational dimensions, seems rather strained or dysfunctional. In the following an alternative way to conceptualise the ideational foundations of consensus democracy and to operationalize them shall be discussed. Then turning to my own approach I will develop hypotheses about the sources of consensualism, operationalize and test them empirically.

Consensus democracy as deliberative democracy? A recent prominent proposition for conceptualising Lijphart’s “spirit of accommodation” is Steiner et al.’s discourse quality index (DQI).97 Linking the literature of consociational/consensus democracy with deliberative theory the authors explore which institutional conditions lead to a particularly high degree of , and whether this matters for policy outcomes. This way they advance the first comprehensive approach to empirically investigate the normative foundations of consensus democracy and examine Lijphart’s “spirit of accommodation” in connection with Habermasian deliberative democracy.98 At the core of the deliberative model is the idea that all arguments in a political discussion are respected with the best argument in terms of the common good prevailing. This contrasts with strategic bargaining in which personal interests are being realised by strategically acting participants.99 Thus, there is a striking similarity of deliberative democracy with the “spirit of accommodation” embodied in consensus democracy. The foundations of ideal deliberative processes have been theorized extensively by political (most notably Jürgen Habermas in his concept of ideal speech situations)100 yet the model has never been applied empirically. Steiner et al. advance the following dimensions of deliberative politics constituting the DQI which resemble in many regards the above- developed ones:

97 J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004. 98 J Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommuikatives Handeln, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983. 99 Steiner et al., 2004, p.4. 100 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. 37

1) Participation by all citizens on an equal level and without constraints.

2) Truthfulness – all participants are open about their true preferences and do not try to deceive or mislead others about their true intentions.

3) Logical justification of assertions and validity claims – i.e. participants present their arguments in a logically coherent way so that other participants can understand them.

4) Arguments should be expressed in terms of the common good, i.e. consider the well-being of others and the community at large.

5) Other participants, their demands, needs and arguments should be treated with respect.

6) Participants should be willing to yield to the better argument which means that preferences must not be fixed but be open to change. In this regard, also the difference between deliberation and bargaining becomes evident: the latter does not include a change of preferences.

These six dimensions are quantified by coding parliamentary debates. Trained assistants code speech units according to a detailed code book containing scaled definitions for the individual dimensions, determining the degree of justification offered by a speaker (possible codes: none=0, inferior=1, qualified=2, or sophisticated justification=3).101 The model is then applied to parliamentary debates in specific institutional contexts. Steiner and his collaborators find among others that a consensus democratic set-up and a higher number of veto players, as well as debates in the second as opposed to first (or single) chambers of parliament leads to a higher DQI,( i.e. higher discursive quality).102 They also show that a higher value of DQI is significantly associated with particular formal outcomes, namely consensual (i.e. unanimous or nearly unanimous) decisions. However, they find but little support for the hypothesized causal relationship between discursive quality and substantial policy outcomes in terms of (weak) egalitarianism.103

101 Steiner et al., 2004, pp.56-61. 102 Steiner et al., 2004, pp.99-137. 103 Steiner et al., 2004, pp.138-164. 38 Steiner et al.’s study is indeed an important and highly innovative contribution to the study of different which opens new, interesting avenues for comparative research. In my research, however, I will abstain from applying their approach for theoretical, epistemological and methodological reasons which I address in the following. Quite a limitation of the DQI-approach is the component of “truthfulness” and the impossible task of measuring it. Steiner et al. are well aware of the problem and leave out the “truthfulness” variable from their study which however is crucial to Habermas’ discourse ethics in deliberative democracy.104 The authors propose some proxies such as the perception of truthfulness by other participants, or approaches such as in-depth interviews for future studies.105 However, it is arguable whether it is possible to find out what participants in a political debate “really mean”. It is, in fact, contestable if participants actually know this themselves. Therefore, my approach conceptualises the “spirit of accommodation” without the dimension of “truthfulness”, which in fact does not follow directly from Lijphart’s model either. Further below, when discussing alternative approaches to political culture, I will also argue in more detail why it appears preferable to neglect “truthfulness” in epistemological and methodological terms. Also, the dimension of participation established by the authors has only limited applicability for elite politics, and the authors use it only to record whether a speaker is interrupted in his speech or not. Therefore, I do not regard this as a necessary separate dimension and relegate interruptions to the “respect”-variable.106 Moreover, my fourth component of consensus democracy, dubbed “Preserving the status quo,” is not included in Steiner et al.’s model. In fact, it even contradicts a basic claim of deliberative democracy. According to their model of consensus democracy in the deliberative tradition every political outcome should be treated as provisional and fallible and thus be revised as soon as new insights and rational arguments are accepted. In my opinion, and in accord with Lijphart and other authors (see above), I claim that temporariness and reversibility is in fact an inherent feature of democratic majoritarianism in which changing configurations of parties govern and have their differing policies realised. A stable and workable consensus democracy in turn depends on gradual, piecemeal changes only, and prefers continuity to change for its survival. In this regard, I do not find it necessary that politicians have to adjust their interests based on the logic of argumentation as demanded by the deliberative model.107

104 Steiner et al., 2004, pp.19-21. 105 Steiner et al., 2004, p.166. 106 My own code-book will be developed further below. 107 T Risse, ‘Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, Vol.54, No.1, 2000, pp.1-39. 39 Another methodological problem has to be raised concerning the coding approach of Steiner et al. The authors develop a very detailed code book differentiating very fine degrees of the individual variables (e.g. for the “level of justification”-variable mentioned above). This indeed poses a high burden on the coder and his/her interpretative skills. The authors report high degrees of inter-coder reliability among themselves after collectively developing the code book, and after a certain time of practice and preparation. It will be much more difficult though for other scholars to use the approach with similar results.108 Students assigned by the authors to code a parliamentary debate without further training therefore achieved somewhat lesser degrees of inter-coder reliability.109 Consequently, employing DQI to large scale projects with various coders not involved in developing the model will be difficult without diminishing the reliability of the fine-grained indicators. Moreover, in terms of validity it is not obvious that the individual components of DQI are indeed scalable, or can even be added up to composed indicators.110 Therefore, in my own content analysis of parliamentary speeches, I use a simpler and more easily replicated coding approach with separate, dichotomous variables which I outline further below. Finally, on a more basic level, I share some of the theoretical criticism brought forward against the deliberative model of democracy. According to Chantal Mouffe and others, consensus based on deliberative democracy is neither desirable nor possible. Mouffe argues that politics is always a power game and should be acknowledged in this way. She is against excluding “passions” (as opposed to reasoned arguments) from politics and claims that there should be no privilege to a moral, allegedly impartial and fully rational point of view. Mouffe quite correctly claims that every consensus leads to externalising certain other points of view, designates them as illegitimate and thus creates a new boundary. Participants who are relegated beyond the boundary are thus excluded from the democratic process and denied the right to legitimately defend and pursue their demands and ideas. Sometimes this exclusion might be just based on some participants’ lack of access to the process, or their limited material resources and intellectual capacities to fulfil the demanding criteria for reasoned, rationally argued discourse. Or their preferred way of expression (i.e. personal life testimonies, but also arts, music, , or even humour) do not meet the deliberative standards and are thus defined as inferior to reasoned deliberation. Externalisation of “the other” via an alleged consensus, according to Mouffe, might therefore in fact endanger democracy by pushing marginalized groups into illegality. A lack

108 Steiner et al., 2004, pp.61-62. 109 Steiner et al., 2004, pp.71-73. 110 Steiner et al., 2004, p.60, p.108. 40 of legitimate opposition from within democracy will lead to opposition forming outside democracy. The author argues that democratic politics should therefore not aim at eliminating passions and antagonisms, but at mobilising them towards the promotion of democracy. Democracy, in her opinion, requires at least two points of view: at least two legitimate opponents who do not aim at reaching consensus but to compete with each other.111 Beyond Mouffe’s critiques there are several others which cannot be elaborated on in detail in this place. To mention one example, another prominent critic of deliberative democracy shows that deliberation might actually lead to further polarization than to consensus.112 While I would not exclude the possibility that consensus on some basic issues can be established without undermining democratic competition, representation and accountability, I surely agree with some authors’ scepticism about promoting consensus or deliberative democracy as superior to other, more competitive systems. Given this and the mentioned epistemological and methodological issues for the deliberative model, I will align my own approach more closely on Lijphart’s requirements for a democratic political culture in the “spirit of accommodation” (according to the five dimensions which I developed in the beginning). In summation, in this chapter I have advanced a proposal to conceptualise the “spirit of accommodation” which, in the previous chapter, was identified as a missing variable in explaining the persistence of consensus democracy. The ideational foundations of consensus democracy were analysed based on Lijphart’s own work and the first existing study in this regard. Five sub-dimensions and their mutual constitution as ideational components of consensus democracy were outlined and their advantages to an alternative model based on deliberative theory delineated. In the next chapters I will discuss different theoretical understandings of political culture (i.e. different hypotheses of how the ideational foundations of consensus democracy can be appropriated by political elites, and how they might affect their behaviour).

111 For more details of her criticism see C Mouffe, On the political, London: Routledge, 2005. One might argue however, that also for agonistic, competitive politics a “meta-consensus” on basic rules of the democratic game is required, which offers an opportunity to (partly) reconcile deliberative and agonistic democracy (J Dryzek, S Niemeyer, ‚Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.50, No.3, July 2006, pp.634-649). 112 For more details see Steiner et al., 2004, pp.32-42. 41 The classics of political culture: Almond & Verba and the operational code Socialization into democratic systems: attitudes on mass and elite levels The above-raised research question concerning the commitment to (consensus) democracy by political elites is usually addressed with the theoretical framework of political culture. The classical notion of political culture has been shaped by the seminal work of Almond and Verba, as well as subsequent studies in their footsteps.113 However, the prominence (and predominance) of the classical model, its epistemology and methodology focusing on the individual level and the process of value internalization, limits the explanatory power of studies in its tradition. Therefore, I propose to complement the classical model with a perspective on the group level to somewhat relax its rigid assumptions about value internalization, and to shift our focus from implicit values to explicit discourses. Thus I do not aim at disproving or fully dismissing the mainstream understanding of political culture, but use a more flexible and differentiated perspective. This might enable us to better understand the origins of elite commitment to democracy, and make inferences about the persistence and future development of the democratic system (i.e. the consolidation of democracy). As I will show with my case studies, a model of explicit political culture focusing on the group level offers more plausible explanations for the origins of contemporary elite political culture in CEE. Consequently, at first I will outline the classical literature on political culture. After discussing some of its shortcomings I present the alternative concept and explain how it might complement and improve our understanding of political culture. On the basis of the classical framework I will bring out the factors expected to impact upon elite commitment to democracy in the sub-dimensions developed in the previous chapter. Then I contrast this with hypotheses derived from my own approach. The first studies of elite political culture were inductively developed psycho-analytical explanations of individual leaders’ systems. They were focusing on pathological traits in individual belief systems where conscious beliefs are viewed as rationalizations for emotional compulsions following the Freudian psychoanalytical tradition.114 From the 1960s the focus shifted to more general social background factors and processes of socialization following Almond and Verba and their concept of ‘civic culture’. Their research also departed from the limited focus on individual members of the elite by the earlier studies and opened

113 G Almond & S Verba, The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP, 1963. 114 For an overview of these approaches see: R Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976, pp.73-80. 42 new avenues for large-scale via standardized mass surveys. Almond and Verba’s approach is thus primarily focused on mass political culture, yet it also includes references to elite political culture. Their basic hypotheses about early life socialization into a civic political culture are as relevant for elites as they are for masses. Beyond that, there are specific hypotheses relating to post-recruitment socialization of political elites along the lines of the classical model by other authors which will be outlined further below. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba conceptualise commitment to the democratic system as political culture which is measured in the form of attitudes. According to them and scholars in their tradition, political culture needs to be understood as the predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and about the in a given society and the role of the self in that system.115 Their understanding of political culture still is explicitly a psychological one as in earlier studies.116 Analytically, political culture research following Almond and Verba differentiates between cognitive, affective and evaluative attitudes which relate to four major objects: 1) toward the system as a whole, 2) toward ‘input objects’ (i.e. the inflow of societal demands and their conversion into policies), 3) toward ‘output objects’ (i.e. the application or enforcement of policies), and 4) towards the self as a political actor.117 Based on different configurations of attitudes in these fields they derive three major types of political culture on the mass level: parochial, subject and participant cultures.118 Almond and Verba hypothesize that particular kinds of political culture in the form of certain combinations of attitudes fit particular systemic structures and that strong dissonances between the two lead to inevitable strain and instability.119 In reality the three ‘pure’ forms of political culture therefore appear in “systemically mixed” forms with different subcultures having different configurations of attitudes towards the system and different policy orientations.120 People develop positive, supportive evaluations towards their democratic system predominantly through early life socialization, and later through participating in existing democratic structures leading to the subsequent gradual internalization of democratic values. These values in turn are seen to impact on behaviour inducing “civicness“. Thus, the gradual socialization into the values of the democratic system is seen to also change individuals’ preferences and interests leading to a “taken-for-grantedness” of the democratic

115 L Diamond, Developing Democracy – Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999, p. 163; Almond & Verba, 1963, p.12. 116 G Almond & S Verba, 1963, p.13. 117 G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.13-15. 118 G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.16-18. 119 G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.21-22. 120 G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.23, 26-29. 43 set-up and the subsequent adoption of appropriate behaviour. Certain socio-economic background factors such as high levels of education (which is most emphasised by Almond and Verba) but also geographical origin, professional position or income, are claimed to lead to higher awareness of political issues, civic competence, participation and democratic allegiance.121 Also, historical experiences play a great role in forming political cultures.122 Due to segmental differences in social background factors, different subcultures can develop in society with different kinds of orientations towards the democratic system, its institutions and roles. According to this approach, stable political systems are characterized by a high degree of congruence between the political culture and the political system and a balanced mix of subject and participant attitudes. , who further developed some aspects of the classical approach to political culture, differentiates between diffuse and specific support for a regime. According to him diffuse support, based in a belief of legitimacy, is much more stable and thus ensuring regime persistence than more volatile specific support (which is based on positive evaluations of current regime performance and outputs).123 In particular Britain and the USA are characterized by Almond and Verba, and scholars in their tradition, as an allegiant participant political culture based on wide-spread diffuse support and thus as stable democracies. This, of course, led to a lot of criticism against the authors as being biased towards Western-style , and for employing a teleological modernisation approach in which less democratic societies would soon follow the British or American example.124 Moreover, Almond and Verba are not completely explicit about the causal arrow between democratic institutions and democratic political culture. Their overall approach stands for an impact of institutions on political culture over time. However, later on Almond also argues for a mutually supporting causality: democratic attitudes lead to (more) democratic institutions, and experience with these institutions furthers the development of civic attitudes.125 Arend Lijphart subscribes to the classical concept of political culture and his work reflects the same problem (i.e. the unclear causality between consensualist political systems and consensual political culture as outlined above).

121 G Almond & S Verba, 1963, pp.315-336. 122 G Almond, ‘The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept’, in: G Almond / S Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, London: Sage, 1980, p.24. 123 D Easton, ‘A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.5, No.4, 1975, pp.435-457. 124 G Almond / S Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, London: Sage, 1980; S Welch, The Concept of Political Culture, London: Macmillan, 1993. 125 G Almond, ‘The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept’, in: G Almond / S Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited, London: Sage, 1980, p.29. 44 With the advent of third wave democracies, especially the successful CEE democratic transitions, the classical concept of political culture which had somewhat fallen into oblivion made an astonishing comeback in political science. Public opinion surveys investigating mass attitudes towards democracy and its alternatives have become a major tool in explaining and predicting the course of democratic consolidation.126 While Almond and Verba focus on mass political culture, they also make some references to elite political culture. According to them, elite democratic political culture is responsive and complementary to popular attitudes and moreover much more supportive of democratic values.127 In the footsteps of Almond and Verba, in line with studying mass political culture, particular approaches were developed to study political elites. According to the study of elite political culture requires different methods of research than that of mass political culture. While advanced techniques of public opinion research were essential to the latter, the former requires more interpretative skills in investigating ideologies, operational codes and the cognitive processes behind political behaviour.128 According to Pye, individuals get socialized into an elite political culture when they join the elite. A national elite political culture shaping political ends and preferred means in turn is developed through historical experiences and ideological outlooks.129 The concept of an “operational code” was first applied by Nathan Leites on the Soviet in the early 1950s, in order to develop a framework for explaining behaviour by certain patterns and categories of cognition.130 Thomas Anton employs the related concept of “roles” for the Swedish political and administrative elites.131 According to Gerd Meyer the “operating code” embodies the dominant rules and norms in a society connecting formal institutions and informal behaviour which is particularly relevant for the political elites.132 In his comparative study of political elites in Britain and Italy Robert Putnam compares two national elite political cultures. He differentiates three different categories of

126 D Pollack / J Jacobs / O Müller / G Pickel (eds.), Political Culture in post-communist Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003; R Rose / W Mishler / C Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives – Understanding Post- Communist Societies, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. 127 G Almond / S Verba, The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP, 1963, pp.352-353. 128 L Pye / S Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton University Press, 1965, p.16. 129 L Pye, ‘Culture as Destiny’, in: D Pollack / J Jacobs / O Müller / G Pickel (eds.), Political Culture in post- communist Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p.8. 130 N Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951; A George, ‘The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,“ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13 No. 2, 1969, pp. 190-222. 131 T Anton, Administered Politics – Elite Political Culture in , Boston: Nijhoff Publishing, 1980. 132 G Meyer, ‘Formal and Informal Politics: Questions, concepts and subjects’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, pp.34-35. 45 politicians’ basic attitudes: political style, i.e. the way politicians approach political thinking and policy analysis (‘How do they believe?’), cognitive predispositions i.e. basic presumptions about the world, oneself and the relation to others (‘What do they believe?’), and operative ideals, i.e. the norms and values that guide political action (‘What do they believe in?’). As these three categories potentially relate to an infinite number of attitudes Putnam restricts his analysis to a central issue in each of the three fields: concerning political style he compares the extent to which politicians use ideological versus pragmatic approaches, in terms of cognition he explores the view of politicians on the conflict-driven or harmonious nature of society, and for the field of operative ideals, he investigates procedural preferences of politicians. For this undertaking he uses aggregated data from open-ended interviews with individual MPs which was coded according to pre-defined categories.133 According to him, the mentioned basic orientations inform but do not fully determine politicians’ approaches to their tasks or even the very definition of these tasks.134 The logic of would attribute a growing degree of commitment to the democratic system by political elites in newly democratised countries (due to their close involvement with the system over time and through practicing and internalising democracy) and its underlying norms and values. Robert Rohrschneider, in his comparative study of attitudes among MPs from East and West Berlin in the common Berlin parliament after 1990, differentiates between those democratic values which can only be internalized via institutional learning (i.e. democratic practice), and others which can be taken on independently from the institutional context via value diffusion (e.g. through media exposure). Thus, he finds support levels for basic liberal-democratic rights (e.g. free elections, majority decision) among East Germans to be very similar to those of West Germans. However, other “qualities of democratic citizenship”, as Rohrschneider calls them, such as political tolerance, support for pluralist competition or individual entrepreneurship are less frequently found among the East German population. They are more prevalent among West German masses and elites, as well a East German elites who enjoy a longer and closer institutional learning with the democratic set-up than the East German mass population. Intervening variables, according to Rohrschneider, are basic ideological values in addition with performance evaluations of the system, generation, and education.135

133 R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians – Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy’, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, pp.1-7. 134 Putnam, 1973, pp. 93, 127. 135 R Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, UP, 1999. 46 Unlike the mass population, political leaders, according to the classical model of political culture, are claimed to hold more coherent beliefs which are more intensely held and relatively stable as compared to those of the general population.136 Thus, a known view on a major issue of a will help to predict views on other topics. Therefore, according to this approach, finding positive attitudes in the five above-mentioned ideational categories of consensus democracy among a representative sample of political leaders in a society would make us rather confident to find a political culture on the level of political elites which is generally supportive of consensualist democracy. Adherence to certain ideologies, (i.e. coherent belief systems) as institutionalised in parties are therefore seen as relatively good predictors of individual attitudes.137 Similar to Putnam or Rohrschneider we can thus develop ideal-typical attitudes which we would expect to be present in a consensual political culture on the basis of the above- developed ideational foundations of consensus democracy. Consequently, the classical model of political culture expects political elites in consensus democratic settings to assimilate and internalise values denoting a “spirit of accommodation” as following: 1) a positive orientation to consensus, 2) a positive orientation to the common good (i.e. as being preferable to particular interests), 3) support for established procedures, 4) support for preserving the institutional status quo, and 5) respect for political opponents and their positions. A majoritarian political culture would include the opposite attitudes: 1) a positive orientation towards competition, 2) a positive orientation to particular interests (opposing the notion of a common good), 3) a positive orientation towards specific outcomes (rather than procedures), 4) support for changes to the institutional status quo, 5) disregard for political opponents and their positions. Over time, according to the classical model of political culture, we should find political elites in consensus-democratic settings to assimilate to these values and to develop corresponding attitudes. Steiner et al. show how different institutional settings (next to issue characteristics) influence the quality of political deliberation in different parliamentary settings using their above-mentioned discourse quality index (DQI).138 Unlike other approaches, however, the authors do not take individual MPs or groups of them as their level of analysis, but their debates. Thus, in a way, DQI denotes some kind of de-personalised political culture. Nevertheless, Steiner et al. basically support both the view of a socialising function of values embodied in democratic institutions in addition to a more rational choice-based perspective in

136 R Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976, p.116. 137 R Putnam, 1976, pp.88-89. 138 J Steiner et al., 2004, pp.98-137. 47 which institutions offer incentives to adopt to certain types of behaviour.139 In this regard, consensus democracy and the presence of multiple veto points should usually make MPs more accommodating for two reasons: 1) because of its inbuilt incentives to share information and to cooperate in order to come to decisions, and 2) also because of its underlying ideals of communication, mutual respect etc. The opposite is true for majoritarian systems. Certainly, the authors point out, there can be situations in which this difference does not hold (e.g. during electoral campaigns in consensus systems).140 Thus, both the rationalist “logic of consequences” and the sociological “logic of appropriateness” are expected to play a role. The DQI-approach also shows that there are quite some differences in the way different components of consensualism (or deliberative quality for that matter) change in different institutional settings, sometimes even in unexpected directions.141 So, next to institutional factors, what might be other sources for different degrees of commitment to consensus democracy according to classical political culture models? Similar to Almond and Verba, elite theorists such as Robert Putnam claim that the biggest differences in political culture can be found cross-nationally, as political elites in one country share many similar beliefs.142 Steiner et al. admit that their study could not incorporate the different cultural backgrounds and historical experiences in different nations which might have an impact on deliberative quality but plan to do so in further studies and focus group .143 Beyond national differences Putnam, again mirroring Almond and Verba, focuses on individual socio-economic background factors as another major explanatory variable. Thus, according to Putnam class position and educational background impact upon politicians’ image of society as being more conflict-ridden or harmonious. This “cognitive predisposition” in turn mediates the role-perception of politicians in the system, their degree of hostility towards fellow politicians, and support for the existing democratic set-up.144 Following these cognitive predispositions he differentiates politicians’ self- perceptions as being either towards the role of a ‘tribune’ or ‘trustee’. The former is focused towards defending the cause of one’s or class while the latter is more oriented to national and general collective interests.145 The mentioned ideal-typical roles are also

139 J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp.74-97. 140 J Steiner et al., 2004, pp.79-84. 141 J Steiner et al., 2004, pp.98-137. 142 R Putnam, 1973, pp.238-239; Putnam, 1976, p.99. 143 J Steiner et al., 2004, pp.135-136. 144 R Putnam, 1973, pp.93-136. 145 R Putnam, 1973, pp.123-125. 48 reflected in procedural preferences of problem-solving vs. bargaining.146 Certainly, both qualities are required from a politician in a modern plural and liberal democracy. However the relative weight of either role is expected to vary in the different institutional settings according to this approach. Moreover, lower class origins and/or lower educational backgrounds are expected to lead to more conflict-oriented attitudes towards politics as such, as well as towards fellow politicians, and towards a more particularistic position as opposed to emphasis on the common good. In his study on Italian and British MPs Putnam views these patterns to be predominantly the result of socialization experiences prior to gaining political office, though he does not find a significant relationship between time in office and conflict-orientation.147 However, in a later publication the author supports the view that post-recruitment socialization can take place which influences role conceptions and policy opinions. Its impact on a moderation of beliefs is viewed to depend among others on the degree of institutionalisation and the time spent in office.148 Additionally, one might argue along this line that the kind of electoral mandate might influence politicians’ role perceptions and attitudes (e.g. making a directly elected MP more oriented towards her or his constituency and its specific interests, whereas an MP elected on a list might be more oriented towards generally national issues and the common good). Furthermore, particular generational experiences are found to leave a lasting mark on attitudes. Thus, for the case of Italy Putnam finds the generations socialized in the violent upheavals of the Mussolini-era to be more conflict-oriented than younger cohorts who entered adulthood in the democratic post-war period.149 Following Mannheim, Putnam argues that every national political elite can be divided into political generations who, due to their similar and limited historical experience, have certain similar predispositions of thought and action.150 Also Rohrschneider finds generational differences in his sample. On this basis we might hypothesize that politicians socialized in Western consensus democracy are more likely to support it than those socialized in other systems. More generally for the mass level, Ronald Inglehart’s studies show how formative historical experiences shape entire generations’ attitudes, values and ways of cognition.151

146 R Putnam, 1973, pp.150-154. 147 R Putnam, 1973, pp.93-136. 148 R Putnam, 1976, pp.96-98. 149 R Putnam, 1973, pp.139-149. 150 K Mannheim, ’The Problem of Generations’, in: Mannheim – Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Paul Kecskeméti, New York: Oxford UP, 1952, pp.276-322; Putnam, 1976, p.100. 151 R Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990. 49 In sum, the classical model of political culture regards actors’ commitment to democracy hinges on the assumption of a strong socialization (i.e. the individual internalization of the values embodied in the democratic system) over time. The pace of this gradual internalization process is seen to depend on social background factors in general, and for political elites additionally on individual post-recruitment factors. In the following I will examine the way this understanding of political culture is used in conceptualising the consolidation of democracy before turning to a modified understanding of political culture.

Attitudes into behaviour: political culture and the consolidation of democracy Differently from the transition concept, the consolidation of democracy (CoD) is a rather contested theoretical approach with various definitions.152 Nevertheless, most scholars would probably agree that CoD is not just a prolongation of transition - it involves different actors, behaviours, processes, values and resources, and leads to a variety of democracies.153 CoD research also implies a move away from the short-term time horizon and focus on individual rational agency as in the transition literature towards a long-term perspective, considering both structural and cultural factors. Thus, unlike transition approaches whose mainstay were individualistic, ahistorical rational choice approaches, CoD leaves some room for contextual, historical and sociological explanations. However, its is impossible to establish a single indicator for CoD as it involves multiple players, sites and processes which call for disaggregating the concept.154 In this regard, elite commitment to democracy is therefore just one key indicator of CoD next to others which makes it hard to isolate from other factors. In the most basic sense CoD is about securing the persistence of democratic arrangements. The most minimalist definitions regard democracy as consolidated if one or several free and fair elections have been held, and if power has (repeatedly) been transferred peacefully between government and opposition.155 Two of the most prominent scholars on CoD, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, differentiate between three dimensions: behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional consolidation. Behavioural consolidation corresponds with the

152 A Schedler, ‘What is Democratic Consolidation?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1998, pp. 91-107, A Schedler, ‘Measuring Democratic Consolidation’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2001, pp. 66-92. 153 P Schmitter, ‘Transitology: The Science or the Art of Democratization?’, in: J Tulchin (ed.), The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 12-17. 154 C Schneider / P Schmitter, ‘Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of Democratization’, Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 2004, pp.67-68. 155 E.g. Huntington’s “two-turnover test”, i.e. the peaceful rendering of power of the first freely elected government to the opposition in a subsequent . S Huntington, The Third Wave – Democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp.266-267. This test would have failed obviously advanced democracies such as Japan or Italy still 40 years after the installation of their democratic system. 50 mentioned minimalist “defensive” concept of consolidation (i.e. no significant group tries to overthrow the democratic regime). Constitutional consolidation refers to the habituation of the major political actors to the established rules with violations of these rules being costly and ineffective. Attitudinal consolidation is obtained when even in the face of severe political and economic crisis the overwhelming majority of the population that any further change can only come from within the rules of the democratic game.156 Similarly, Gunther et al. emphasise the need to have stable, routinized, legitimate and institutionalized democratic behaviour to be able to talk about consolidated democracies.157 Carsten Schneider and Philippe Schmitter define CoD as processes that make mutual trust and reassurance among relevant actors more likely. CoD institutionalizes certainty about processes and uncertainty about outcomes with actors consenting to both.158 Somewhat more demanding, Elster, Offe and Preuss see democracy consolidated when the rules according to which political and but also concerning distributional conflicts are carried out are no longer object of conflict themselves.159 Thus, support for the new regime and its rules of regulating conflict and cooperation is viewed as a key factor in the process of CoD or, as Larry Diamond puts it, democratic consolidation is about a shift in political culture.160 For scholars in the tradition of the classical model this shift of political culture means the development of supportive attitudes for the existing democracy. Larry Diamond argues that there should be a broad normative and behavioural consensus on the constitutional system regardless of its performance (i.e. a high degree of diffuse support). He argues (somewhat arbitrarily) that if more than 70% of the mass public consistently believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, and no more than 15 % actively prefer an authoritarian government, democracy is consolidated.161 Generally, these approaches hypothesize the development of a supportive political culture with time passing under a stable democracy through the logic of individual socialization and value internalization following Almond and Verba. Political elites (and masses) would increasingly feature loyalty to the system and among each other

156 J Linz / A Stepan, ‘Toward Consolidated Democracies’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1996, pp. 15- 16. J Linz / A Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation : southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996, p.6. 157 R Gunther, N Diamandouros, H Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p.7. 158 C Schneider / P Schmitter, ‘Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of Democratization’, Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 2004, pp.61-62. 159 J Elster, C Offe, U Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies – Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.28. 160 L Diamond, 1999, p. 65. 161 L Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999, p. 65-70. 51 overarching all societal cleavages, with elites leading the way.162 Political elites in a consensus-democratic institutional setting are then expected to develop the attitudes favourable for consensus democracy as described above and behave appropriately (i.e. they are expected to change some basic components of their self-understanding, their role in the polity, their interests and political identities). Thus, a direct causality between internalized political culture and behaviour basically assumes that actors behave according to certain values and norms (the above mentioned “operational code”) such as those embodied in consensus democracy, even if it is against their self-interest as viewed from outside. According to this understanding of attitudinal CoD, the more actors have accepted and internalized these values the less likely they will be to try to act outside the rules of the system (or even overthrow it) as their self-understanding and their perception of interests are increasingly in line with the norms of the existing system. This claim is reflected to different degrees in the existing literature on elite political culture: Putnam, following Dahl, views attitudes as strongly informing, but not fully determining behaviour, which in turn impacts on the stability of regimes.163 However, he does not specify when and how political culture is actually a relevant independent variable. For the Italian case (without making reference to the then non-existent concept of CoD) Putnam shows how conflicting conceptions and understandings about democracy, within the elite and in relation to the system, might have a destabilizing impact. There is a clash between wide- spread concepts of and egalitarianism with more authoritarian ones among different parts of the Italian political elites in the . However, none of these concepts fits particularly well with the polyarchical democratic system in Italy.164 Thus, the existence of mutually exclusive attitudes about the “rules of the game,” or those in opposition to the existing institutions, are potentially endangering democratic stability and can lead to what Lijphart calls “centrifugal democracy”. Centrifugal democracy is characterized by a divided political culture and non-coalescent, competitive behaviour.165 The precise mechanism between attitudes, behaviour and overall regime stability is indeed hard to establish in this approach to political culture. Robert Rohrschneider criticises that scholars investigating attitudes, both those from what he calls a more “culturalist” (i.e. sociological) or a more “institutionalist” (i.e. rational choice) perspective, fail to elaborate on

162 G Almond and S Verba, 1963, pp.359-360; R Putnam, 1973, p.70. 163 R Putnam, 1973, p.7. 164 R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians – Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy’, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 230-231. 165 A Lijphart, ‘Typologies of Democratic Systems’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.1, No.1, April 1968, pp.3-44. 52 the mechanisms between attitudes and regime stability (with the majority basically just postulating the need for congruence between political culture and institutions).166 Andreas Schedler argues in favour of establishing a chain of causation between the structural framework which impacts on attitudes of actors (and, in turn conditions a great extent of their behaviour). This way, inferences about the stability of democracy and the process of deepening it should be drawn. While behaviour ought to be a primary focus of investigation, political culture in the form of attitudes and its consonance or dissonance with behaviour and institutions can serve as an additional variable to explain democratic (in- )stability according to the author.167 In this regard, political elites matter most as compared to an intermediate level of collective actors, and the popular level due to their close daily involvement with the system.168 Political elites which are consensually unified about the basic rules of the game, either through a pact or gradual convergence over time, are seen as the keystone of consolidated democracy.169 According to Pigenko, Wise and Brown democracy is consolidated if there is an elite consensus on the basic democratic institutions which in turn have an independent socialising effect on MPs’ attitudes.170 As mentioned, Almond and Verba themselves seem to assume that democratic institutions and democratic orientations are correlated and mutually supporting, a claim which is also advanced by Lijphart.171 This way causality is assumed to go both ways: institutions gradually influence attitudinal adjustment, but attitudes also gradually influence institutional change. For the cases of new democracies, particularly the post-communist societies, this claim appears problematic. Unlike the US, Britain or other established democracies (the cases from which Almond and Verba derived their concept), CEE countries hardly have any existing pluralist experiences prior to transition, nor could they develop democratic institutions and accompanying values in a gradual fashion over decades or even centuries. As outlined above, the institutional set-up in CEE is the result of contingent, partly exogenous factors, and not grown out of long-term domestic developments. In brief, scholars in the tradition of the classical model of political culture regard attitudes favourable to the existing democratic system as a key factor in securing its

166 R Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP, 1999, pp.8-15. 167 A Schedler, ‘Measuring Democratic Consolidation’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2001, pp. 67-68. 168 L Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999, p. 66. 169 J Higley / R Gunther (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 170 V Pigenko, C Wise, T Brown, ‘Elite Attitudes and Democratic Stability: Analysing ’ Attitudes towards the in Ukraine’, Europe-Asia Studies,Vol.54, No.1, 2002, pp.87-107. 171 A Lijphart, 1999, p.403. 53 persistence (i.e. its consolidation). In this understanding, political culture in the form of attitudes is seen to have an immediate impact upon behaviour. Thus, according to this approach, the more favourable attitudes we measure the better will be the prospects of democratic stability and persistence. However, the model encounters problems in explaining behaviour which is contradicting to pronounced attitudes. On these grounds, some scholars dismiss political culture (which, however, they only approach in the classical, individual attitude-based way) as irrelevant for CoD and argue for a focus on behaviour only.172 In the following I will outline a criticism of the classical model of political culture and the role of individually internalized attitudes in the process of CoD. I discuss why we need to complement our understanding of political culture based on individually internalised attitudes with a perspective on collectively shared, explicitly pronounced values. Moreover, I will outline their role for CoD in my understanding. Further below, both approaches will be tested empirically and compared in their explanatory strength in the CEE post-communist context.

Where the truth lies: the limitations of the classical model of political culture Almond and Verba’s understanding of political culture as a psychological syndrome (i.e. as being composed of values which are internalized through early life socialization and/or later learning on the individual level) reaches back to Max Weber. Weber, in his famous switchman metaphor, compared values to switchmen who determine the tracks on which interest-driven locomotives (i.e. behaviour) move.173 This understanding of political culture encounters a number of conceptual problems. While it is assumed that political culture is located in individually internalized values it is usually formulated on a systemic level, usually through the aggregation of standardized survey questions. Therefore, the classical approach is often (somewhat harshly) criticised for “psychological reductionism”.174 While dismissing the classical approach as psychological reductionism might overshoot the mark, the criticism certainly needs to be taken seriously. A concept of political culture as a unified system cannot sufficiently account for variation or contradictory orientations in individual value systems, even when allowing for the existence of segmental sub-cultures. As Joseph Schull points out, even adherents of the same ideology might hold

172 C Schneider, Patterns of Consolidated Democracies. Europe and Latin America Compared, PhD dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2004, p.53. 173 M Weber, The Sociology of Religion, 1922, p.280, quoted in: A Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, April 1986, p.274. 174 S Moscovici (ed. by G Duveen), Social Representations – Explorations in Social , Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p.4. 54 very different beliefs or interpretations of certain tenets of the ideology.175 Thus, the assumption that politicians hold coherent belief systems becomes doubtful. Consequently, measuring attitudes as the basic unit of analysis for the classical concept of political culture encounters problems of validity. This is because it hinges on the assumption that respondents to survey or interview questions report (more or less) truthfully their deeply held values and orientations. This problem is particularly evident with political elites, who may conceal their individual opinion behind rhetoric while being skilful at finding the right messages appealing to the public. Rather than expose their inner self, they know what kind of beliefs they should advocate (what is appropriate, expected, or seen as politically correct etc.) in a given context. One might even wonder how far politicians themselves actually ‘know’ what they believe, or in the words of a fictitious, disaffected citizen: “Politicians don’t have any convictions”. Therefore, while the statements of a politician (or any other respondent) will have to do something with the meaning assigned to democracy in the context of a given society, they do not necessarily reflect his/her deeply held values. Most major studies on elite political culture (Pye, Leites, or Putnam) follow the psychological approach; as does Gerard Alexander’s recent historical study on political consolidation in Southern Europe.176 He views democratic consolidation as being influenced by right wing parties’ perceptions of left wing moderation. Testing the hypothesis on the Spanish case Alexander takes politicians’ ex-post recollections about their perceptions and claims about their perceived regime options in the past at face value, and on this basis makes assumptions about internal processes. Similarly, Elena Levintova concludes the internalization of certain democratic values among Russian and Polish political elites merely from the expression of certain positions without a critical reflection on the validity of her findings.177 Putnam also points out that Italian MPs express great support in favour of consensual politics but fail to implement them in practice.178 Similarly, Rohrschneider’s profound and intriguing analysis of value diffusion and institutional learning needs to rely on the interviewees’ sincerity in reporting their attitudes (or in the researcher’s ability to correctly infer them). Thus, for investigating the state of CoD in post-communist Europe along the lines of the classical model of political culture, we are left to wonder: how we can

175 J Schull, ‘What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-Type Societies’, Political Studies, Vol. 40, 1992, pp. 728-741. 176 G Alexander, The Sources of Democratic Consolidation, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 177 E Levintova, ‘Revisiting Russian and Polish elite value orientations: Are the elites still committed to the original goals of post-communist transitions?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 2006, p.195; 178 R Putnam, 1973, p.153. 55 actually know that people’s support for (consensus) democracy has become truly “intrinsic and unconditional”?179 Almond and Verba discuss the problem of “truthfulness” only in passing. In a footnote they allude to the possibility of political leaders paying only service to democratic values. As a remedy they suggest another psychological mechanism – cognitive dissonance – according to which repeated public declarations of certain positions create pressures for the adaptation of private beliefs.180 Also Putnam is aware of the “devil-quoting-the-scripture- problem”. He discusses the arbitrary and instrumental way Italian MPs make use of term “democracy”.181 Similarly, O’Donnell marks the misfit between informal behaviour, habits and institutions which leaves scholars of CoD puzzled.182 As mentioned above, the unsolved issue of “truthfulness” is also a shortcoming of Steiner et al.’s discourse quality index for which it is not only epistemologically and methodologically relevant (e.g. as for standard surveys), but in fact forms an independent part of the deliberation indicator. Some authors such as Larry Diamond try to go around this problem by postulating high quantitative thresholds of measured attitudinal support which they regard as sufficient indicator for CoD (and which are often hardly met even by established Western democracies).183 So, even if we were to find highly consensual (expressions of) attitudes in the above- developed dimensions, what do they tell us about the likelihood of the persistence of consensus democracy? If we were to find high degrees of (reported) “intrinsic” support to consensus democracy, how do we deal with instances of behaviour obviously contradicting these attitudes?

The heretics of political culture: Discursive political culture and habitus Implicit and explicit cultural legacies Obviously, the classical understanding of political culture is not sufficient to examine political elites’ commitment to democracy as it encounters problems both in terms of validity and its explanatory power concerning behaviour. Therefore, I will propose a different conceptualization of political culture which includes non-individual, explicit sources of democratic commitment. Moreover, I will show that commitment to the democratic system does not necessarily require the full internalisation of the values of consensus democracy by individuals. Rather, a kind of “weak socialization” (or habituation) to explicitly pronounced

179 L Diamond, 1999, pp.169-170. 180 G Almond & S Verba, 1963, p.353, footnote 16. 181 R Putnam, 1973, pp.232-236. 182 G O’Donnell, ‘Illusions about Consolidation’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No.2, 1996, pp.34-51. 183 L Diamond, 1999, p.68. 56 values can also influence the persistence and future development of democracy (i.e. democratic consolidation). In this understanding, a “strong socialization” (i.e. the full internalization of the values of consensus democracy leading to a change of identity and interests, as in the classical model) is then only a rather extreme and rare case of elite commitment to the democratic system. In terms of methodology, the extent of internalization cannot be measured directly, but can only be inferred. Therefore, I will first outline the alternative understanding of political culture. Then, I will discuss how it can complement the shortcomings of the classical model. Finally, I will draw up an alternative understanding of the role of political culture in the process of CoD. The above-outlined socio-psychological notion of political culture stands in opposition to approaches broadly found in the Durkheimian tradition.184 These approaches have become increasingly influential during the last two decades, particularly in the field of theory and in .185 These approaches locate (political) culture not so much on the individual level, but rather view it as collectively shared representations constituting social life. Thus, (political) culture reflects a group’s social and cultural context and not so much their aggregated psychological traits. In his criticism of the classical approach to political culture, Stephen Welch calls for a phenomenological turn in the tradition of Cliffort Geertz’s “thick description” with an emphasis on exploring the process of meaning-construction.186 This way researchers need no longer to make strong assumptions about individuals’ “real”, (i.e. internalized) values or intentions and their reflection in surveys. Political culture is investigated more on a discursive, inter-subjective level in the form of freely available texts of all kinds. This kind of research is concerned with what Jan Kubik calls “explicit cultural legacies” (as opposed to implicit legacies which might be unconscious or remain unstated).187 Another scholar, David Laitin, conceptualises political culture not as “values to be upheld but rather points of concern to be debated.“188 Consequently, (political) culture cannot be grasped

184 E Durkheim (translated W Halls), The Rules of Sociological Method, London: Macmillan, [1895] 1982; E Durkheim, Sociology and , New York: Free Press, [1898] 1974. 185 E.g. A Morris / C McClurg- Mueller (eds.), in Social Movement Theory, New Haven: Yale UP, 1992; H Johnston / B Klandermans (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995; T Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics – Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1995 & 1999, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002. 186 S Welch, The Concept of Political Culture, London: Macmillan, 1993, pp.99-117, 162; C Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973. 187 J Kubik,‘Cultural Legacies of State Socialism: History Making and Cultural-Political Entrepreneurship in Postcommunist Poland and Russia’, in: G Ekiert /S Hanson, Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule, Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003, pp. 317-351. 188 D Laitin, ‘Political Culture and Political Preferences’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, June 1988, p. 589. 57 at the individual level, but represents a shared property, a form of knowledge of a society or a group within it.189 This kind of political culture research focused more on its aggregated, explicit form is concerned with “meaning”. Thus, political culture can be viewed as being more than the sum of a group’s psychological dispositions. In fact, it exists autonomously from individuals in the form of well-known symbols or discourses, such as collective representations.190 Actors are seen as being embedded in these constitutive settings reflecting the group’s shared history. Collective representations entail discriminating experience (what is right and what is wrong), and narratives of history “as it really was” in the form of dominant rhetorical frames. Thus, they become some kind of epistemological device.191 In the context of new democracies these discourses are linguistic resources offering to actors ways to relate to the new system on the basis of certain rhetorical frames, symbols or concepts. Groups of actors such as the political elites of a country are discursively connected by specific conventions (e.g. a shared vocabulary, figures of speech, standards of argument, criteria of coherence and verification, a certain range of assumptions and problems, etc).192 Not only political leaders approach reality rhetorically by making use of these common discursive resources.193 Yet, being the major actors in a country’s political discourse, contrary to other types of elites (academics and artists, for instance), political elites are constantly required to publicly justify their actions in order to gain the support of their electorates and constituencies.194 Similar to a “tool-kit,”195 actors apply particular discourses in order to legitimise certain institutional designs or actions, or in order to exclude other arguments from the “field of the imaginable”. They engage in “normative scheming,” as

189 A similar understanding of political culture termed “social representations” was developed by Pierre Moscovici and further developed by Daniel Bar-Tal. (S Moscovici (ed. by G Duveen), Social Representations – Explorations in Social Psychology, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000; D Bar-Tal, Shared Beliefs in a Society, London: Sage, 2000). While Moscovici and Bar-Tal have moved away from the individualistic conceptions of (political) culture, they still ground their concept in both psychological and sociological concepts. Similarly, S Neckel, ‘Die ostdeutsche Doxa der Demokratie – eine lokale Fallstudie’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol.47, No.4, 1995, p.662. 190 L Dittmer, ‘Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis’, World Politics, Vol.29, No.4, July 1977, pp.552-583. 191 C Cruz, ‘Identity and Persuasion – How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures’, World Politics, Vol. 52, April 2000, pp. 275-312; T Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics – Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1995 & 1999, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002, pp.1-38. 192 J Schull, ‘What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-Type Societies’, Political Studies, Vol. 40, 1992, p.731. 193 C Cruz, 2000, p.275. 194 M Marcussen, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans Joachim Knopf and Klaus Roscher, ’Constructing Europe? The of French, British and German state identities’, Journal of European , Vol.6, No.4 (Special Issue), 1999, pp.614-633. 195 A Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, April 1986, pp. 273-286. 58 Consuelo Cruz calls it.196 Thus, they are not fully determined by fixed value orientations, but do have a limited choice among a number of existing idioms. This concept of political culture does not require people to put faith in certain values or ideologies, but to respect them through their way of talking and behaving.197 Respect for discursive conventions requires some kind of “weak socialization;” actors must come to acknowledge certain statements or claims as true, but not necessarily alter their individual ways of cognition and private normative appraisal of these values. As a result, political culture is both constraining and enabling by informing or precluding certain kinds of action through the availability of certain discourses, which are both descriptive and prescriptive.198 Therefore, in the given context of the discursive field, actors do make choices and act ‘rationally’. Discourses define the boundaries of the possible; they contribute to shape expectations and create incentives.199 As a consequence, political elites have to submit to a certain degree of consistency in applying these discourses when interacting among themselves or when competing for voters’ support.200 However, we cannot expect them to fully submit their behaviour to these expressed values. The expectation of traditional approaches is that deeply internalised values should turn into conforming behaviour. The focus on discourses rather than systems of beliefs relaxes the assumption that values only influence action as long as they are internalized and sincerely believed. Discourses shared in the social space have a power on their own to evoke cooperation and conflict, or to give a certain meaning to particular situations or actions.201 For example, actors can “rhetorically entrap” or “shame” other actors by publicly exposing behaviour that contradicts the shared values of the community to which also the shamed actor has publicly committed. This way, actors who publicly pledge to certain ideals are either disciplined by other actors into conforming behaviour, or face possible electoral punishment and/or marginalization within the elites for “breaking the rules”. For this to happen, neither the shamer nor the shamed need to have individually accepted and internalised the validity of the truth claims on which the shaming takes place. In fact, the shamer can use commonly upheld values in an instrumental way to advance his own interests, while the shamed has left

196C Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua – World Making in the Tropics, New York: Cambridge UP, 2005, p.6. 197 J Schull, 1992, pp. 728-741. 198 C Cruz, 2000, p.278 199 C Cruz, 2000, p.279. 200 S Neckel, 1995, p.665; C Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua – World Making in the Tropics, New York: Cambridge UP, 2005, p.29. 201 A Seleny, ‘The Foundations of Post-Socialist Legitimacy’, in: A Braun, Z Barany (eds.), Dilemmas of Transition – The Hungarian Experience, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p.135. 59 the commonly declared values once they stood in the way of his egoistic interests.202 Still, these values constrain and indirectly regulate behaviour. This differentiated view of political culture and different kinds of socialization has been primarily developed by International Relations scholars, particularly in the field of Europeanization studies, for offering nuanced explanations of how community values sometimes override self-interested state behaviour. Jeffrey Checkel differentiates two types of socialization: type I (“weak socialization”) denotes conscious “role-playing” or “mimicking” of socially expected standards without their internalisation (i.e. some kind of public habituation to declared norms). Actors with type-II-socialization (“strong socialization”) in turn internalize the interests of the community. This “taken-for-grantedness” can either be achieved via gradual socialization (e.g. of young actors without strong preset orientations) or via reflective change along the lines of the Habermasian deliberative model in which actors let themselves become convinced to change their positions according to the “logic of arguing”.203 Type-II-socialization thus reflects the assumptions of the classical model of political culture and Steiner et al.’s (2004) model of deliberative quality. Thus, we can conceptualize commitment to a set of certain values (e.g. those of consensus democracy) as a continuum leading from mere rhetorical “lip-service” to deeply internalized beliefs and a change in identity that incorporates these values. Depending on the position on this continuum, behaviour is constrained to a lower or higher degree or, in the unrealistic and extreme case of full internalisation, it is virtually fixed along the lines of these values. “Weakly” socialised actors rhetorically uphold the values of the community which, however, do not override or replace their egoistic material interests at all times. Moreover, as mentioned, this approach does not exclude the possibility that actors use community values in an instrumental way to pursue preferences in line with, but not necessarily inspired by, the standard of legitimacy.204 Thus, this concept of political culture subscribes to the logic of appropriateness, but in a less rigid way by accepting that (weak) socialization into certain values does not necessitate a change of interests. Subsequent internalisation of these values through arguing, collective deliberation or individual reflection (or through psychological mechanisms such as cognitive dissonance) is nevertheless possible. In epistemological and methodological terms, however, strong socialization (with the full internalization of these

202 F Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, International Organization, Vol.55, No.1., winter 2001, pp.47-80. 203 J Checkel, ’International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework’, International Organization, Vol.59, No.4, 2005, pp.801-826; T Risse, ‘Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, Vol.54, No.1, 2000, pp.1-39. 204 F Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, International Organization, Vol.55, No.1., winter 2001, pp.62-77. 60 values) can only be inferred. Explicit rhetorical commitment is much easier operationalized as we can investigate the extent to which a discourse is shared, but we cannot establish directly as to how deeply it is anchored in individual mind-sets. This we can only infer by relating pronounced values to real behaviour. The two concepts of political culture often offer complementary explanations for the development of political culture. For both strong and weak socialization, repetition is an important mechanism. Repetition (e.g. reading a certain newspaper every day) can lead to internalisation and acceptance of the underlying values pronounced in the articles, but it can also serve to legitimise particular discourses by repeatedly restating certain “truths”. Similarly, as for the classical understanding of political culture, socialization understood as habituation is an important mechanism for transmitting discourses. Notions of explicit, discursive political culture focus on linguistic and socio-economic aspects of the production and reproduction of particular discourses rather than on psychological mechanisms. This way, political culture is quite independent from individual protagonists. So, how do collectively shared discourses develop in the first place, and how do they change? In order to be widely adopted, a discourse must draw on empirical experience of a given group. It must “make sense” or “ring true” (i.e. be based on the familiar). The same way as attitude-base political culture is not just a psychological syndrome, discursive political culture cannot be reduced to some kind of semiotic “superstructure” either. Thus, it cannot just be ‘constructed’ ex nihilo, but rather it has to be rooted in historical experience as reflected in collective memories. This limits the leeway for newly “invented traditions” or “imagined communities” by political entrepreneurs.205 Changing a dominant discourse is difficult and costly. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of behaviour outside of the rhetorical boundaries of the permissible. Yet this behaviour cannot be easily justified with the dominant discourse. It is viewed as being illegitimate, or it undermines a dominant discourse and thus the power of its advocates. Therefore, consistency of discourses is an important criterion for validation next to its capability to draw on empirical evidence. Furthermore, the producers of “true discourses” (such as , and political entrepreneurs in particular) are also subject to the truth

205 C Cruz, Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua – World Making in the Tropics, New York: Cambridge UP, 2005, pp.29-32; E Hobsbawm / T Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, New York: Cambridge UP, 1992; B Anderson, Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origins and Spread of , revised edition, London: Verso, 1991. 61 claims of these community values. They cannot escape the logic of their own discourses without losing credibility and legitimacy within the polity.206 The ‘life course’ of a discourse (i.e. its persistence and reproduction over time), is often determined by exogenous factors: contingent circumstances, the social standing of its protagonists, resonance with the public influence the reproduction, or replacement of a collectively shared discourse.207 Particularly “successful” discourses are discourses which resonate well with the public and which are convincingly “confirmed” by empirical experience, might very well outlive their original promoters, and be further reproduced by future generations of politicians. Protagonists of a discourse might not even have experienced the initial historical impetus for the emergence of a certain discourse, but are still able to credibly reproduce it by referring to well known symbols and themes. This again stresses the relevance of the national collective memory (i.e. the way history is publicly remembered and the repertoire of discourses it offers to politicians).208 An extreme example is the obvious success of populist politicians in some post-communist countries in presenting their nations as the eternal victims of greater powers. This is done by discursively relating current conflicts (e.g. the question of Kosovo’s political status) to medieval history (e.g. the of Kosovo Polje in 1389) in a way which obviously resonates convincingly with many voters (but not necessarily with external observers).209 Few scholars have attempted to apply the discursive understanding of political culture to the context of newly democratised countries. John Dryzek and Leslie Holmes, in their volume, lay out some kind of discursive maps that describe the attitudes of certain societies (namely Central East and South Eastern European, post-Soviet and Chinese societies) towards their systems. For this undertaking, they employ an innovative approach, namely Q- methodology.210 Statements derived from focus groups discussing political issues in a given country were ranked by respondents and the obtained results were analysed through cluster

206 G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, p.21. 207 S Roßteutscher, ‘Competing Narratives and the Social Construction of Reality – The GDR in Transition’, German Politics, Vol.9, No.1, April 2000, p.63; Neckel, 1995, p.665. 208 “Most of the time when I remember it is others who spur me on, their memory comes to the aid of mine and mine relies on theirs. […] There is no point in seeking where they [i.e. the memories, MS] are preserved in my brain or in some nook of my mind to which I alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them, upon condition, to be sure, that I turn towards them and adopt, at least for the moment, their way of thinking. It is in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this memory that is capable of the act of recollection.” M Halbwachs (ed. and transl. by L Coser), On Collective Memory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp.38-39. 209 Bar-Tal uses this example in a similar way to explain his (socio-psychological) model of societal beliefs (D Bar-Tal, Shared Beliefs in a Society, London: Sage, 2000, pp.xiv-xv.) 210 J Dryzek / L Holmes, Post-Communist Democratisation: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries, Cambridge UP, 2002. 62 analysis. This way the authors derive a number of dominant political narratives for each society. On their basis the authors put together nuanced pictures of very different post- communist political cultures. Although they discuss the historical background of these narratives they do not try to develop a theoretical explanation of how certain discourses are related to specific institutions or common historical experiences across countries. Dryzek and Holmes restrict themselves to description and interpretation and do not systematically investigate the origins and effects of certain concepts of democracy. Moreover, they seem not to be entirely clear of whether political culture is also based on internalized values, and in how far it can be changed in a deliberate way (e.g. by political entrepreneurs). Laura Edles’ study on elite discourses on democracy offers a detailed narrative account of the cultural factors underlying the Spanish transition process, yet without attempting broader generalization.211 In the context of post-communism, but concerning the economic transition, Yoshiko Herrera develops the concept of “imagined economies”. She shows how different local understandings of the economy developed in different Russian despite very similar economic conditions and institutions following perestroika.212 A more elaborated and systematic theoretical understanding of (political) cultures’ dynamics (but without references to democratisation) is offered by Ann Swidler. According to her concept new systems of meaning develop during unsettled times. Thus, historical junctures and structural change requires people to reorganize their “cultural tool kit” in order to develop new ways of relating to their environment.213 Moscovici calls these events “points of cleavage”.214 According to Consuelo Cruz, who applies and partly modifies Swidler’s approach, endogenous change of discursive frames becomes possible by way of constant contestation (i.e. internal interpretive conflicts within one dominant frame) which then leads to historical junctures. Consequently, this opens the discursive field for other frames to compete with the dominant ones.215 This contestation is mostly done by political entrepreneurs (i.e. the political elite) while most of the time most people are passive “users” of political culture. For political change to occur, political entrepreneurs must either advance their competing political visions and agendas within a dominant rhetorical frame, or alternatively “adjust reality” by changing the boundaries of the field of the permissible. According to Cruz, this happens simultaneously with a reconfiguration of power relations.

211 L Edles, Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain – The transition to democracy after Franco, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 212 Y Herrera, Imagined Economies – The Sources of Russian , Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 213 Swidler 278-279. 214 S Moscovici (ed. by G Duveen), Social Representations – Explorations in Social Psychology, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p.8. 215 Cruz, 2000. 63 Political conflict and political change is thus a struggle over meaning.216 This struggle, according to Jan Kubik, also takes place by the deliberate, selective transmission of certain historical discourses while suppressing others.217 Again, a key role is played by political elites. For the economic sphere, Herrera shows how the fluidity of political and economic categories during perestroika opened the way to heterodox challenges to the orthodox mainstream, Leninist discourse. New understandings of the economy, some of which local elites used to make demands for more autonomy, replaced the previous categories.218 On the basis of these approaches, I propose a conceptualization of discursive elite political culture as the collectively shared representations of the political system by the political elites of a given society, developed at critical junctures of their country’s history.219 On the basis of the above-developed ideational foundations of consensus democracy derived from Lijphart’s work, five (meta-)discourses representing rhetorical commitment to consensus democracy can be established: 1) references to consensus as a central practice of democracy, 2) the invocation of the common good to justify arguments, 3) an emphasis on the inherent value of rules and procedures, 4) the portrayal of the current system as the best possible, and 5) positive, respectful references to the political opponent. The counterparts of these meta- discourses in turn denote a more majoritarian political culture: 1) emphasis on the value of competition rather than consensus, 2) reference to specific interests in justifying arguments, 3) an emphasis on effectiveness and specific outcomes rather than procedures, 4) advancing proposals for pragmatic changes without taboos on any political or socio-economic arrangements, 5) negative, unrespectful references to the political opponent. Thus, empirically, both classical and discursive political culture would observe the same phenomena for a fully consensual political culture. However, classical political culture would basically take repeated statements on the lines of these discourses as indicators for the internalisation of the values they pronounce and expect them to impact upon behaviour. Discursive political culture, in turn, makes no a priori assumptions about the extent of their

216 For the case of Spain see L Edles, Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain – The transition to democracy after Franco, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 217 J Kubik, ‘Cultural Legacies of State Socialism: History Making and Cultural-Political Entrepreneurship in Postcommunist Poland and Russia’, in: G Ekiert / S Hanson, Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 319. 218 Herrera, 2005. 219 There is good reason to believe that mass and elite political culture have both common and separate collective representations. As my research for the above-mentioned reasons is only concerned with the relationship between the democratic system and elite political culture I do not discuss the relationship between mass and elite political cultures nor the impact of mass political culture on democratic stability. As pointed out above, this does certainly not deny the relevance of popular political culture for democracy. However, incorporating it into this research would be beyond the feasible scope of a project like mine. Nevertheless, the proposed model of political culture can be applied to mass political culture in similar ways as shown by some recent promising studies in the field such as Dryzek and Holmes’ (2003). 64 internalisation, and rather investigates in a second step their actual reflection in behaviour. As outlined above, discursive political culture is based on non-individual sources. This stands in opposition to the classical model, which is based on individual socio-economic or positional background factors. As I will show below, the discursive model of political culture also seems to offer causal explanations for the development of elite political culture in CEE which are more plausible than the traditional ones. In summation, for a better understanding of political elites’ commitment to the existing democratic system, it makes sense to relax the rigid assumptions of individual value internalisation of classical approaches to political culture. Values can have an indirect impact upon behaviour when actors are only “weakly socialized” into them (i.e. when they explicitly accept their validity). Apart from classical understandings of political culture, this perspective requires a focus on the group level and its social and historical context rather than individual actors and their socio-economic background or elite position. Furthermore, the outlined model of discursive political culture offers different explanations about the origins of elite political culture (which shall be elaborated for the cases of post-communist CEE and be tested empirically further below). Before doing that, I will discuss the theoretical impact of this extended perspective on political culture for investigating CoD.

Consolidating democracy: habitus as a shared understanding of legitimacy The above-outlined concept of political culture based on explicit manifestations of certain values suggests a different understanding of ideational factors in the process of CoD. When investigating explicit political culture we do not know whether an individual has fully internalised the values he/she is pronouncing. Therefore, we cannot predict whether he/she will fully conform to these values in a specific situation. In my approach, the mechanism linking elite commitment and democratic persistence is not to be found in individual behaviour based on internalized values. It is rather situated in a shared habitus grounded in a group’s collective memory, which allows political leaders of a country to develop “common schemes of perception, conception and action which are the precondition of all objectification”.220 According to Pierre Bourdieu, a habitus enables actors to “partake of the history objectified in institutions”; it “makes it possible [for them, MS] to inhabit institutions, to appropriate them practically, and so to keep them in activity, continuously pulling them from the state of dead letters, reviving the sense deposited in them, but at the same time

220 P Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, pp.53-54. 65 imposing the revisions and transformations that reactivation entails”.221 Thus, the habitus is embodied, incorporated history and enables institutions to attain their full realisation. In a way, institutions and habitus are two ways of an objectification of the past.222 A particular habitus is developed and shared by the inhabitants of the same lifeworld with homologous practices such as the members of the political elite in a society.223 The habitus is developed from the collective memory; it ensures the active presence of past experiences and represents a depository of rhetorical and behavioural resources. As an analytical category habitus is an attempt to explain how a particular set of understandings can take life on its own, such as that it serves to structure subsequent understandings of experience.224 In this regard, collectively shared, explicitly used concepts are much more important than individual perception, cognition and internalisation. A habitus, in Bourdieu’s understanding, is built on the “internalisation of ” (i.e. on the explicit force of shared conventions).225 Only explicit values can be objectified. In a way, it is a process of collective socialization, a process of collective habituation to particular values. It does not exclude the possibility of individual internalisation of these values, but does not hinge on it conceptually. Put differently, the concept of habitus can conceptually incorporate notions of both weak and strong socialization. According to Gil Eyal, the concept of habitus actually overcomes the polarity between internal and external principles of explanation.226 Actors who adjust their social trajectory often do so in a collective and path-dependent way. They can, for example, jointly reinterpret the roles they have to play and, in doing so, draw on shared experiences, ways of knowing and common understandings. During historical junctures, such as 1989, they realise that the habitus they carry is not appropriate to altered circumstances, and look out for new models of behaviour and society.227 Eyal, Szelényi and

221 P Bourdieu, 1992, pp.58-59. 222 P Bourdieu, 1992, pp.56-57. 223 P Bourdieu, 1992, pp.55-60. Bourdieu and many of his students link the emergence of a specific habitus to class-related characteristics. Following Bourdieu there has been a long debate about the class character of political elites. Here, I do not intend to engage with this debate as it is not relevant for my undertaking. My definition of political elites is a positional one as in all mainstream research on democratic leadership in which politicians do share similar life- worlds but not necessarily class position. For a brief summary of the “new class”-debate, especially in the post- communist context see G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, pp.1-34. 224 Y Herrera, Imagined Economies – The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.90. 225 Bourdieu, 1992, pp.55. 226 G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, p.137. 227 G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists – Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe, London: Verso, 1998, p.9. 66 Townsend show the ‘stickiness’ of habitus for elites, especially in small CEE societies where there is only a limited pool of individuals with a similar backgrounds and collectively shared life experiences, who can fill certain key positions. These personalities develop an interactive relationship with institutions. Assuming a new position such as a parliamentary seat impacts upon the habitus of individuals, but individuals also affect the way this institution is operated.228 This way, institutions and actors shape each other in variable ways, which stand against the expectations of rational choice approaches (which would expect institutions to mediate outcomes regularly in the same way).229 This approach is compatible with sociological and historical understandings of institutionalism in which “politics creates and confirms interpretations of life.” Politics is also “a place for discovering, elaborating, and expressing meanings, establishing shared (or opposing) conceptions of experience, values and the nature of existence.” In this regard, the “processes of politics may be more central than their outcomes” in which institutions are “signals and symbols of the appropriateness of events” (i.e. their legitimacy).230 Thus, a habitus created in a particular historical setting alongside certain institutions preserves and constantly reproduces a limited repertoire of discourses and practices in relation to this institution. The doxa imposed by the habitus limits the possibilities for imaginable and justifiable change in settled times (while in unsettled times both habitus and institutions are under threat). According to Bourdieu a habitus produces an infinite number of practices (i.e. actions or manifestations of behaviour) that are relatively unpredictable (like the corresponding situations) but which are limited in their diversity.231 Consequently, the habitus developed during the political transition impacts upon the actors’ commitment to the democratic system and their support for change and continuity. The habitus is their grasp of the rules of the game.232 However, subsequent behaviour and actual changes of the political system cannot be solely explained by reference to the habitus. The habitus only creates an explicit common understanding, a shared language and collective conventions of how politics should (or should not) go along. Discourses (unlike individually held attitudes) may well outlive their original protagonists by way of their constant reproduction and transmission through other speakers (e.g. in the media), or in the words of Bourdieu – a habitus constantly tries to recreate the conditions for its own survival.

228 G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, 1998, p.8. 229 G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, 1998, p.44. 230 J March, J Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, American Political Science Review, Vol.78, No.3, Sept.1984, pp.741-742. (Brackets in original) 231 P Bourdieu, 1992, p.55. 232 G Eyal, I Szelényi and E Townsend, 1998, p.42. 67 The discursive approach to political culture and the concept of habitus have some commonalities with approaches to frame analysis or schema theory. In these approaches, frames are defined as “the ways actors conceive the world they are in and the choices they face”, whereas schemas are defined as “processors, developed through experience, used by individuals to understand information about the world”.233 Scholars investigate frameworks of understanding which are available in society for making sense out of events (i.e. they examine the organization of experience).234 Alan Renwick, who explores the course of transition in Hungary and Poland using frame analysis, shows how the main opposition actors in the two cases held very different conceptions of the situations facing them. Frames shape possible responses to certain situations, which are reinforced through their “confirmation” by experience. Thus, frames constrain the ways actors can think and act when no alternative ways of viewing a particular situation are available, imposing a “cognitive lock”. Frames also constitute opportunities (e.g. the perception of what kind of reform is acceptable) to the other side, or to the population. Similar to a habitus, frames tend to outlast the forces that create them. Also similar to a habitus (but different from classical concepts of political culture), frames do not directly impact upon behaviour but offer opportunities and constraints, leaving room for contingency and individual agency.235 As Gil Eyal argues, we should understand elite discourses not as “doctrine” (i.e. interpretations of prescribed policies and assess their precise translation into action) but as a “technology” (i.e. a form of practical reason that is relatively autonomous from both usage and abstraction, policy and theory in which struggles over its interpretation are inescapable).236 Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I prefer to apply the concepts of discursive political culture and habitus for my study, as they are more explicit and tangible for the researcher, whereas frames or schemata can also be understood as cognitive devices on the individual level, which need to be inferred indirectly. This would require us to again to make assumptions about individuals’ processes of internalisation. Frame analysis implies that actors actually have taken on and accepted a certain conception of reality when employing a particular frame. This way frame analysis might underestimate the ability of political entrepreneurs to deliberately use (and possibly abuse) different concepts of reality for their

233 E Goffman, Frame Analysis – An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Boston: Northeastern UP, 1974, p.8.; Y Herrera, Imagined Economies – The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005, p.75. 234 E Goffman, 1974, pp.9-11. 235 Alan Renwick, ‘Why Hungary and Poland Differed in 1989: The Role of Medium-Term Frames in Explaining the Outcomes of Democratic Transition’, Democratization, Feb. 2006a, Vol.13, No.1, pp. 36-57. 236 G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, pp.81-82. 68 purposes. Using the discourse-focused approach, political elites are not necessarily required to subscribe in private to their way of rhetorically relating to reality. Thus, a certain frame, a certain conception of reality might actually also be used deliberatively by a politician to impose it on others. Nonetheless, it does not exclude him/her from submitting him/herself to the truth claims of this discourse. Frames can be both cognitive structures and rhetorical devices.237 In this dissertation, my use of the term “frame” is limited to the latter while I abstain from theorising about cognition for the same epistemological and methodological reasons raised for the issue of value internalisation. Separating implicit normative support for a given system from explicit respect for certain rules consequently leads to an ontologically different understanding of the consolidation of democracy, too. Consolidated democracy is not a material thing “out there”; it is not an object, but an inference, or even just an argument.238 Andreas Schedler rightly points out that the notion of democratic consolidation resembles the concept of legitimacy. Legitimacy is not an objective feature of a system, but it is attributed to it by individuals on a subjective basis: no regime is intrinsically legitimate but it is perceived or assigned to be so. The same can be argued for democratic consolidation. As Max Weber spoke about belief in legitimacy (Legitimitätsglaube) consolidation means a “belief in stability” or an “expectation of persistence”. It is expressed by domestic actors, or by external observers such as students of democratisation.239 Linz and Stepan (i.e. two of the most prominent students of democratisation) view (attitudinal) consolidation of democracy as being achieved “when, even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further change must emerge from within the parameters of the democratic game.”240 Instead, Schedler argues, the concept should rest on the claim that actors in the democratic game believe that “further change will emerge from within the parameters of the democratic game.”241 For this, actors must share a similar understanding of the desirability of the existing system, and the legitimate way to operate it, i.e. a similar kind of commitment. Therefore, students of democracy in their judgement concerning democratic consolidation (i.e. their expectations concerning the persistence of the existing system) should rely not so much on

237 Y Herrera, 2005, p.66. 238 A Schedler, ‘Measuring Democratic Consolidation’, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2001, p.67. 239 A Schedler, ‘How Should We Study Democratic Consolidation’, Democratization, Vol.5, No.4, winter 1998, p.11; M Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (, English translation by G Roth and C Wittich, eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p.37. 240 J Linz / A Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996, p.6. 241 Schedler, 2001, p. 67. 69 exogenously imposed measurements, but on the “indicators” and yardsticks used by the actors themselves. Legitimacy, being a subjective attribution as mentioned above, is established “by showing that the decisions accomplish appropriate objectives or intentions, or by showing that they are made in appropriate ways”.242 A habitus shared by the political elite of a polity embodies this concept of appropriateness. Therefore, consensus democracy is consolidated if actors treat it as legitimate based on similar collective representations (in turn, reflecting the spirit of accommodation in their shared habitus). This verstehende perspective also avoids a normative bias for or against particular democratic systems through exogenously assigned, often arbitrary or highly demanding indicators of CoD. Using the concept of habitus CoD then means that actors share similar conventions, interpretations and justifications for the existing democratic system employing a limited set of collective discourses. For the cases of consensus democratic settings this means that actors share common discourses based on the above-mentioned, interlinked five ideational dimensions of consensus democracy. In line with Bourdieu we could therefore define the stability and persistence of the democratic set-up of CoD as a the creation of a common-sense, self-evident “consensus on the meaning of the [democratic] practices […], the harmonization of agents’ experiences and the constant reinforcement each of them receives from expression […] leading to durable dispositions to recognize and comply with the immanent demands”.243 Already , one of the earliest elite theorists in , emphasises the need for a close correspondence between the political system and the so-called “political formula” (i.e. the moral and legal principles which are used to justify any political regime).244 Similarly, Vilfredo Pareto argues that similar values define the identity of any elite.245 Even (who is often credited with having defined a “minimalist” understanding of democracy based on peaceful elite circulation via elections) laid down a number of key preconditions for its proper functioning: a well-established political elite should be fit to govern, hold a professional code of conduct and a common fund of views. Members of parliament should exercise self-control and resist selfish temptations.246 Unlike other notions of CoD, my approach applies a descriptive rather than a prescriptive perspective. Thus, it does not imply a normative preference for the democratic

242 J March, J Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions – The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York: Free Press, 1989, p.49. 243 P Bourdieu, 1992, p.58. 244 G Mosca, The Ruling Class, (ed. and rev. A Livingston), New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 71, quoted in R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians – Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy’, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 232-233. 245 V Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (transl. by C Brinkmann), Tübingen, 1955. 246 J Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1950, pp.290-295. 70 status quo put in place by transition, the persistence of a particular kind of democracy (e.g. consensus democracy), or the stability of certain institutional arrangements as such. Rather, it tries to situate political culture in the historical context. Moreover, it aims at outlining some of the implications for the future of democracy based on the relationship between the institutional setting and elite commitment embodied in the habitus (as the latter “tries to create favourable conditions for its own survival”).247 According to Leonardo Morlino, political leaders, in the case of a mismatch between institutions and political culture, might consequently either opt for strategies of (institutional) adaptation or (behavioural) appropriateness.248 Thus, explicit political culture is also offering a limited set of interpretations and options for “reasonable” political change. In case of widely shared discourses, it is more likely that endogenous political change will go along the lines prescribed by political elites’ collective representations of democracy rather than in a different way. In sum, studying elite commitment to (consensus) democracy and its implications for the persistence and future development of democracy requires us to leave the objectivist, outsider perspective and assume a “verstehende” approach trying to grasp the local knowledge and experience of the main actors. The following table puts together the basic differences between the two alternative approaches to political culture and their implications for the consolidation of democracy. In the following, I will discuss hypotheses when and how political elites in the post-communist setting of CEE might have developed a shared understandings of consensus democracy.

[table 2 about here]

The impact of historical junctures: modes of transition and discourses on democracy Having outlined the theoretical premises of the alternative understanding to political culture and its way to conceptualise the “spirit of accommodation,” I will continue by developing hypotheses about the origins of discursive political cultures. My hypotheses are derived from existing approaches in democratisation literature in general and democratic elite theory in particular. As outlined above, political culture understood as collective representations or discourses of the political system are reorganized and shaped at critical junctures in the

247 P Bourdieu, 1992, p.61. 248 L Morlino, Constitutional Design and Problems of Implementation in Southern and Eastern Europe, in: J Zielonka (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe – Volume I: Institutional Engineering, New York: Oxford UP, 2001, pp.48-108. 71 history of a society. They rely on collective, rather than individual experiences of socialization. The latest, deep historical juncture in CEE is clearly the period around the democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As the communist leadership in most CEE countries lost their hegemony over meaning, competing discourses entered the public realm.249 During these “unsettled times“, as Ann Swidler calls them, new systems of meaning and organizing action were created.250 This view also follows Jack Goldstone’s observation that the intensity of “cultural creation” fluctuates over time.251 According to him, new ideologies do not play a central role in the breakdown of a regime, but occur afterwards since “cultural innovation is following state breakdowns”.252 Similarly, Yoshiko Herrera shows how the breakdown of orthodox communist interpretations of the economy during perestroika in the Soviet Union weakened the communist system and ultimately destroyed it as it opened the way for various competing approaches.253 Through the post-totalitarian or authoritarian legacy in the countries of CEE, cultural innovation was rather strongly concentrated in the elitist interaction among and between reform communists and dissident groups.254 In their articles, András Bozóki and Anna Seleny illustrate how opposition leaders contested and gradually changed the meaning of certain key expressions of the old regime and thus came to define the new vocabulary of reform (sometimes in collaboration with parts of the old regime).255 Grzgorz Ekiert’s work shows the long-term consequences of crises of communism in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Critical junctures such as those of 1956 or 1968 were thus more important than formal characteristics of the political or economic systems of these countries in altering the relationships between party, state and society. They modified practices of the regime,

249 J Kubik, ‘Does Culture Matter in Post-Communist Transformations? Bipolar Cultural Frames in Polish Post- 1989 Politics’, paper presented at the Ideas, Culture and Political Analysis Workshop, Princeton University, 1998, p.1. 250 A Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, April 1986, pp. 273-286. 251 J Goldstone, ‘Ideology, cultural frameworks, and the process of ’, Theory and Society, Vol. 20, 1991, p.447. 252 J Goldstone, 1991, p.405. 253 Y Herrera, Imagined Economies – The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. 254 This is the reason why I chose to focus on transition dynamics and not on historical legacies as such as other approaches (e.g. Kitschelt et al.’s differentiation between different kinds of communist regimes, Kitschelt et al., 1999, pp.19-42.). The previous regime type is certainly strongly impacting on transition dynamics, too. However, the “meaning of democracy” could only crystallise and have an impact once democracy was actually put in place. Moreover, a focus on transition dynamics leaves more room for contingent agency to shape political culture rather than more rigid path dependencies. 255 A Bozóki, ’Rhetoric of Action: The Language of the Regime Change in Hungary’, in: A Bozóki (ed.), Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.263-279; A Seleny, ‘The Foundations of Post-Socialist Legitimacy’, in: A Braun, Z Barany (eds.), Dilemmas of Transition – The Hungarian Experience, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, pp.131-154. 72 transformed cultural categories, produced new collective memories and path-dependent patterns of mobilization. 256 For the protagonists of 1989 democratic transition meant “rebuilding the ship at sea” (i.e. laying lasting foundations for a full-blown democracy without time for experimentation or deliberation in an insulated environment). At the same time, the dilemma of simultaneity required the impossible task of putting in place a working , and in some cases (such as the Baltic ), state- and nation-building.257 Transition was therefore indeed an unprecedented and tremendously deep historical juncture throughout the region.258 In a way, democratic transition in CEE can be regarded as a historical threshold event with a similarly lasting effect on (political) culture as other events like the reformation, industrial or national .259 While institutional outcomes of the transition do not vary strongly across countries (and lead to a high number of veto points in all CEE countries as outlined above) transition dynamics varied quite considerably between countries. From the perspective of Europeanization literature, there is widespread agreement that the institutional build-up to European standards of democracy and market economy was quite successful but performance of these institutions varied considerably. Liborio Mattina explains this with the different attitudes of political elites towards integration in EU aspirant countries due to their different historical experiences of communism and regime change.260 Hypothesizing the relevance of the historical juncture of transition for the creation of durable discursive structures, we should therefore expect a wider degree of variation in political cultures than in institutions. Thus, according to the model just outlined, we can expect to find particular discursive frames developed out of a reorganization of historical experiences during transition. These frames will at least partly persist up to today in enabling or constraining certain forms of behaviour. According to concepts of historical institutionalism, actors in new settings will look out for interpretative rules, traditions, precedents and authoritative interpreters.261

256 G Ekiert, The State Against Society – Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe, Princeton UP, 1996. 257 J Elster / C Offe / U Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies – Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.19-21. 258 The simultaneous processes state- and nation-building and economic transition along with democratic transition in the post-communist countries also mark a strong difference to earlier transitions in the South. 259 M Lipset, S Rokkan, ‘Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments – an introduction’, in: M Lipset, S Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, New York: Free Press, 1967, pp.1-64. Thanks to Jürg Steiner for pointing this out to me. 260 L Mattina, ‘Institutional Pressures and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe’, in: R Di Quirico (ed.), Europeanisation and Democratisation – Institutional Adaptation, Conditionality and Democratisation in the EU’s Neighbour Countries, Florence: European Press Academic Publishing, 2005, pp.25-36. 261 J March, J Olsen, ‘The logic of appropriateness’, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, ARENA Working Papers 04/09, Oslo, 2004, pp.7-9. 73 According to my approach, political elites in post-communist democracies will find at least part of these in the legacy of democratic transition. Laura Edles shows how Spanish elites, through their interaction during the Spanish negotiated transition, came to redefine their interests and develop a common goal – the peaceful introduction of democracy.262 I argue that the kind of collectively “imagined” democracy depends on the particular dynamics of the transition process, i.e. political elites came to conceptualise democracy differently in different contexts of democratic transition.263 In other words, different modes of transition offered different kinds of discursive resources to its protagonists to define the new polity and their own role within it. Therefore, in the next step, we ask whether we can establish any systematic relationship between transition dynamics and political culture starting from the existing literature on elite theory and political change. How do different historical junctures influence later democratic development and what does the existing literature say in this regard? As uncertainty was still high in the first years after transition most existing studies (usually back to the mid-1990s) investigating the relationship between transition dynamics and democratic political elites focus on the acceptance of democracy by all players in general and only differentiate the degree of acceptance of democracy. Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter argue that different modes of transition can be associated with different types of democracy. They differentiate between four modes of transition: pact (i.e. compromise and elite-driven), imposition (i.e. under force and elite- driven), reform (compromise and mass-driven) and revolution (force and mass-driven). Karl and Schmitter claim that so far no mass-driven transition has lead to stable democracy. Moreover, they resume that paradoxically the very modes of transition which enhance original survivability (i.e. elite-driven) might impede change further down the road (e.g. economic reform and redistribution). Still, according to them, pacted democracies boast more flexibility for future policies than imposed ones. According to the authors, pacted democracies tend to lead to corporatist or consociational limited democracies but, later on, there seems to be a higher possibility of them to turn into pluralist democracies.264 In their co-authored piece,

262 L Edles, 1998, pp.14-15. 263 The term „imagined democracies“ is derived by analogy from Yoshiko Herrera’s above-mentioned concept of „imagined economies“ and Benedict Andersons “imagined communities” (Y Herrera, Imagined Economies – The Sources of Russian Regionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005; B Anderson, Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition, London: Verso, 1991). 264 T Karl, ’Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America’, Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1, Oct.1990, pp.1.-21. T Karl / P Schmitter, ’Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe’, International Social Science Journal, No.128, May 1991, pp.269-284. 74 Karl and Schmitter try to include the (then) new CEE cases into their matrix, but concede that the complex interaction between mass mobilization and elite action makes clear positioning difficult. The general importance of pacted transitions lies in its very procedure: negotiating and bargaining over the future of the country rather than fighting each other enabled (or even compelled) political leaders from both sides to think of each other as ‘adversaries’ rather than ‘enemies’ as in the past.265 Along the same lines, Wojciech Sadurski remarks that constitutional processes generally contribute to define roles in the new polity.266 Gerardo Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff in turn present transitions with “reform through rupture,” as in the Czechoslovak case, as more promising than revolutions from above or negotiated transitions. This is because old elites no longer have a role in shaping the new rules of the game. On the other hand, they concede that this might lead to an imposed constitution without much debate and cooperation between different groups.267 Elite theorists such as John Higley and his associates discuss in a number of publications the connection between the democratic stability after regime changes, elite circulation and so-called elite consensus. The authors show that a stable democracy requires widely differentiated and consensually unified political elites. Differentiation is meant in terms of social heterogeneity, organizational diversity and relative autonomy from each other and the state. Elite unity, according to them, has an attitudinal and an interactive component. The attitudinal dimension is defined in terms of shared beliefs and values, as well as more specific norms about appropriate conduct. The interactive dimension concerns the extent of channels and networks between different groups enabling access to key decision-making centres.268 The authors emphasize the need for a consensus on the “basic rules and codes of political conduct and the worth of political institutions,” which includes all major groups of diversified elites in the form of so-called elite pacts.269 The formulation hints that they view this consensus as containing both internalized values and rhetorical support for them while not specifically applying a certain model of political culture. Moreover, they do not define a specific set of explicit values which need to be part of this consensus but are more concerned with the process as such.

265 O Encarnación, ‘Do Political Pacts Freeze Democracy? Spanish and South American Lessons’, West European Politics, Vol.28, No.1, January 2005, p.189. 266 W Sadurski, ‘Conclusions: On the Relevance of Institutions and the Centrality of Constitutions in the Post- communist Transitions’, in: J Zielonka (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe – Volume I: Institutional Engineering, New York: Oxford UP, 2001, pp.467-468. 267 G Munck / C Skalnik Leff, ‘Modes of Transition and Democratisation: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective’, in: L Anderson (ed.), Transitions to Democracy, New York: Columbia UP, 1999, pp.193-216. 268 J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p.2. 269 J Higley, R Gunther, 1992, p.4. 75 Higley et al. view so-called elite settlements in the form of pacts or more long-term elite convergence as most promising in securing democratic stability. Concerning the post- communist countries the path to elite settlements, via long-term convergence, has little relevance (keeping in mind the absence of any organized and strong counter-elite under communism with whom the power elite might have “converged” ideologically over the course of decades).270 Therefore, according to this theory, only elite pacts remain as a viable option for securing democratic stability in the region. In a later volume on Eastern Europe Higley and Lengyel present elite consensus as a desirable outcome still to be achieved in order to have democracy consolidated. The authors regard Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic as the most advanced countries in this respect. East Germany is claimed as already having achieved this stage through German unification.271 In their latest volume Higley and Burton differentiate between the cases of Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (which basically upheld their elite settlements throughout the upheavals of post-transition politics), and the Czech Republic and Slovakia (where political elites only converged in the late 1990s). Countries such as Romania, Bulgaria or are characterized as still lacking a lasting elite pact or full post- transition elite convergence.272 In another edited volume, Higley and Lengyel add a dynamic component of elite change. Now the four kinds of elite configurations based on the two per two matrix of strong/weak elite unity with wide/narrow elite diversity are associated with a different kind of elite circulation each. Following from that, the most advanced countries in terms of their towards democratic stability are those countries where elite circulation was wide and deep in scope but also gradual and peaceful such as in the pacted transition countries. This provided a way to exclude cases like Russia from the set of successful cases.273 Consequently, according to Higley et al., a gradual, negotiated transition with a moderate elite turnover is most conducive to achieve a viable political culture and stable democracy.

270 Poland and Hungary can be regarded as closest to this elite convergence due to a higher degree of plurality allowed for in their communist parties and the existence of communication channels with the emerging opposition. 271 J Higley, J Pakulski and W Wesolowski (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1998, p.26. For criticism of the model see V Gel’man, ’Russian elites in search of consensus: what kind of consensus?’, in: A Steen / V Gel’man (eds.), Elites and Democratic Development in Russia, London: Routledge, 2003, pp.29-50; and I Tarusina, ’Elite transformation and regime change – The case of Tomsk Oblast’, in: A Steen / V Gel’man (eds.), Elites and Democratic Development in Russia, London: Routledge, 2003, p.170. 272 J Higley, M Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, pp.84- 89, 168-173. 273 J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p.4-19. 76 A different elite-centred framework is proposed by Jacek Wasilewski. He does not look for general properties of elite political culture (e.g. certain shared values) characterizing a stable democracy, but rather defines the requirements on elites in terms of cultural resources according to the tasks necessary to be performed during different stages of building democracy. He differentiates between three kinds of elites during the stages of transition, transformation and consolidation.274 The first elite (elite of ‘mission and vision’) have to bring down the old regime, enable the transfer of power and develop the basic outlines of the new system. The second elite (‘engineers and technocrats’), during the stage of transformation, have to fill the basic framework established during transition, put into action, craft, adapt and run the new order. The third elite (‘moderators and integrators’) only make smaller changes to the democratic system; they polish and refine it while habituating to it.275 Wasilewski’s three elites not only have different tasks and objectives but also operate in very different environments (in this path-dependent way, earlier developments impact on the later stages). Therefore, according to this approach, we should not look for general properties of political elites and elite political culture but rather define the requirements according to the stage and the specific context of a country.276 The author mentions that there seems to be little differences in sociological terms between the elites of transformation and the elites of consolidation, whereas there are clearer differences between them and the elite of transition. His explanation for this is that both the stages of transition and transformation were not successfully completed and left unresolved issues (e.g. for the Polish case the unresolved way of how to come to terms with the past). Leftovers of the elite of transformation can be found in the areas of privatisation and overdue reforms of social security. According to the author, these residues and unresolved issues then ‘contaminate’ the political process of the consolidation stage, prevent other issues from being solved and become even more difficult to resolve over time. Consequently, elite members sticking to and identifying with these issues often survive into the next stage and transfer ideas and attitudes into the new environment. This often impedes the achievement of the central objectives in the given stage and undermines democratic stability.277 Overall, literature on democratisation and democratic elite theory seems to reflect two competing claims about transition dynamics and the concurrent elite political cultures. While

274 This differentiation is slightly different from the usually applied two-step model of democratic transition and consolidation. 275 J Wasilewski, ‘Three Elites of the Central East European Democratisation’, in: R Markowski and E Wnuk- Lipinski (eds.), Transformative Paths in Central and Eastern Europe, Warsaw: FES/ PAN-ISP, 2001, pp.133- 142. 276 J Wasilewski, 2001, p.135. 277 J Wasilewski, 2001, p.141. 77 Schmitter and Karl, as well as Higley et al., are more process-oriented and favour a gradual, negotiated and consensual approach with a moderate degree of elite change, Munck / Leff and Wasilewski are more outcome-oriented. They define the ‘ideal’ democratic elites according to the tasks they have to perform successfully in a given environment, which implicitly includes elite turnover in the process. While Higley et al. emphasize elite consensus on common political codes, frames or discourses surrounding the rules of the democratic game, Wasilewski is more oriented towards the collective realization of specific results, which then define the outlook of political elites. There is obviously a trade-off between the two approaches. is not conducive to achieve quick and clear results in terms of policy outcomes, while rapidly pushing through specific political strategies cannot be done in a very consensual way. In fact, the two can be viewed as two opposite ideal types of transition. The former ideal type, which I call multilateral transition, is characterized by an equal distribution of contending factions in the transition process. Owing to this there is a stronger need to accommodate and negotiate a compromise, and a higher degree in elite continuity between old and new system. Transition is, therefore, more gradual, cautious and aiming for a balance between different groups. There is more emphasis on a legalist approach and “backward legitimacy” as Huntington calls it (i.e. changes are made through the established procedures of the undemocratic regime).278 Moreover, there is less emphasis on explicit policy goals for which it is harder to find common ground. This makes the process rather lengthy; in the beginning it is more vulnerable to reversion and less certain in terms of its substantial objectives. Moreover, legal continuity appears to be a higher objective than popular legitimacy (i.e. there is a less clear “new beginning”). Thus, competing claims of historical legitimacy for the live on in the polity, and protagonists of the old regime remaining in the new polity are vulnerable to questioning of their legitimacy. 279 The latter transition type, unilateral transition, is characterized by the domination of the process by the opposition, who holds sway over politics for some time after the first free

278 S Huntington, The Third Wave – Democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p.141. 279 H Arendt, , Hamondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973; János Kis on “radical ”, Jacek Kuron on “self-limitation”, Adam Michnik on “new evolutionism” etc. (B Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe, Budapest: CEU Press, 2003.); J Kis, ‘Between Reform and Revolution’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.12, No.2, s Spring 1998, pp.300-383. For a similar typology – differentiating three types of transition, i.e. transformation, replacement and transplacement see Huntington, 1991, pp.124-174. Huntington puts more emphasis on the major players and agents of change in the transition process, i.e. reformers and standpatters (WHAT’S A STANDPATTER?) in the old regime, as well as moderates and radicals in the opposition whereas my typology is more concerned with the overall dynamics of the process. In the end, his three types of transition (transformation, transplacement and replacements) are quite close to mine with an added intermediate type. 78 elections. There is less need and pressure to negotiate with the post-communists, who are weakened and/or soon marginalized. This constellation allows more leeway to the opposition to push through substantial policies, implementing far-reaching political and socio-economic changes (thus being closer to the tabula rasa approach). Transition is therefore rapid, has a set goal and appears rather irreversible from an early point in time. It also involves a higher degree of elite turnover. This way, the break with the past regime becomes more visible as the new regime seeks to build itself on a new legitimacy, not legal continuity. Thus, the winning former regime opposition also imposes a historical closure and a condemnation of the old regime. The new legitimacy might be based on an elaborated blueprint of policies whose implementation is the openly pursued aim (while procedural issues have only secondary importance).

[table 3 about here]

Among the CEE countries, East Germany and Czechoslovakia / the Czech Republic fall most clearly into the category of unilateral transition, while Hungary (and with some qualifications also Poland and Bulgaria) fall into the category of multilateral transition.280 Concerning the “new” nation states, the classification requires a closer look, but similar patterns can be found. Slovenia seems to be more on the multilateral side as the gradual democratisation process was initiated by the Communist party quite some time before free elections. Slovenia insisted on “legally” leaving the Yugoslav Federation on the basis of the Yugoslav constitution, assuring legal and historical continuity of its polity. In opposition to that, the Baltic states did not experience domestic democratisation before the very late 1980s. Unlike Slovenia, the Baltic republics, under the leadership of strong opposition movements, declared their status as Soviet Republics as null and void, seeking a renewed popular legitimacy by returning to the pre-Soviet constitutions of the 1930s (and partly even by redefining the demos). Thus, they can be regarded as being closer to the unilateral type of transition.

280 Poland’s pacted transition owes strongly to the fact that it was the first country in the region to start democratic transition. Through the particularly high uncertainty (e.g. about a potential Soviet intervention) the otherwise most powerful opposition movement in the region came to accept far-reaching compromises in favour of the post-communists. As Alan Renwick writes, the Soviets were still invisibly present at the Polish round- table in 1989. (A Renwick, ‘Why Hungary and Poland Differed in 1989: The Role of Medium-Term Frames in Explaining the Outcomes of Democratic Transition’, Democratization, Feb. 2006a, Vol.13, No.1, p.40). Only when the post-communists lack of popular support became obvious in the first semi-free election Solidarity changed to a more confrontational stance and came to dominate the process. In Bulgaria in turn, the opposition was clearly weaker than the post-communists who for some time came to dominate the process despite extensive negotiations between the two sides. 79 In the case of Slovakia, there was a higher degree of gradualism in terms of elite turnover, breaking with the past and general reform policies than in the Czech lands. While the new political elites in Prague pushed for rapid democratisation and de-, old and new Slovak leaders urged a more cautious and gradual course. Based on their different life experiences since 1968, Czech and Slovak political elites formed two very distinct discursive communities. This fact, according to Eyal, prepared the field for the latter break-up of Czechoslovakia.281 Romania, however, might not be easily categorized as a case of either unilateral or multilateral transition due to its uniquely violent revolution in 1989 and the initial lack of any relevant “new elite”.282 Thus, the typologies of multilateral and unilateral transition refer to a limited set of cases with certain properties that usually go together. The construction of this typology, and the two polar ideal types, facilitate the understanding of historical dynamics in transition and, consequently, some of the discursive sources for the development of democratic elite political cultures in the region.

Hypotheses derived from the alternative model of political culture According to the outlined model, which views critical junctures such as the transition period as being crucial for offering political elites collective representations of democracy, we should expect to find some systematic differences through the impact of these basic differences in the transition process. Moreover, if these collective representations are durable and relevant we should expect to find at least parts of them in this noticeable constellation up to today. Therefore, the basic approaches to political change and the dominant ways of interaction in the two ideal types of transition are expected to have left their mark on collective representations of the new democracy. At least partly, they are expected to be reproduced until today. Following from that we can formulate the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: Political elites’ collective representations in countries with the experience of unilateral transition promote a more competitive understanding of democratic practice than countries with a multilateral transition, where we expect to find a more consensus-oriented

281 G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. 282 The use of violence during transition by one or both sides or by an external actor might also leave a lasting mark on collective memories and thus shape political culture e.g. in cases such as Ex-Yugoslavia, Moldova, Georgia, or Tajikistan. This aspect cannot be considered in detail in this context. For some interesting insights in this regard concerning popular discourses on democracy see J Dryzek / L Holmes, Post-Communist Democratisation: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries, Cambridge UP, 2002, p.131-169. Also Linz and Stepan characterize Romania as a special case due to its legacy of “” with personalized power, the complete absence of any opposition, leading to a violent overthrow of the ruler without further elite turnover and a nationalist backlash (J Linz / A Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996, pp.345-364). 80 outlook in elite discourses on democracy in which compromise and consensus are presented as a value in itself. This hypothesis rests on the premise that, during transition, political elites came to develop a kind of collective identity by reconfiguring their way of interaction according to the above-developed model of political culture. In the rather unstructured and empty public realm of collapsed communism new ways of organizing politics had to be found. Due to the described very different constellations between opposition and post-communists in the two ideal types of transition, very different practices and forms of interaction were newly developed (or were revived from earlier periods). In multi-lateral transitions, both opposition groups and former communists are more likely to have developed a common notion of responsibility for the new system. This required them to temporarily leave aside deep differences of opinion and to develop an inclusive, coalescent approach (if only until a basic agreement about the terms of regime change was found and the first free elections held). At later points the legacy of peaceful and co-operative political change would be revived in order to achieve further decisive reform steps (e.g. constitutional reform, economic adjustment etc.) even if only rhetorically, or ultimately unsuccessfully in terms of substantive results. In unilateral transitions we would expect this common identification with the system and consensual decisionmaking to be less strong (at least with those players who were marginalized from the process) and therefore to find less emphasis on consensus-seeking positions. Instead, differences between government and opposition were fully played out, and concluded with the opposition winning their way when establishing the new system. Hypothesis 2: Formal and predictable procedures should have a much stronger weight in the elite political culture of countries with a multilateral transition. Politicians in countries with a more unilateral legacy of transition would rather emphasise the achievement of concrete policy results rather than valuing procedures for their own sake. Through the experience of transition as a highly formalized and legalistic approach, politicians in countries of multilateral transition have at their hand discourses presenting democracy as embodied in predictable, formal procedures and balanced participation of all groups. New mechanisms of negotiation, accommodation, and inclusive decision-making had to be developed before substantive reforms were started. In countries with unilateral transition, regime change and later reforms had to be pushed through by some (opposition) groups against the uncompromising communists and without an inclusive negotiating process. The quick and irreversible achievement of precise goals stood in the foreground. These substantive goals (i.e. creating a liberal democracy and a market economy), which were

81 mostly supported by a majority of the (mobilized) people, can be presented by them as being more important than particular procedures to reach these goals. In unilateral transitions, while acting as a unified group in overcoming communist rule and preparing free elections, very soon competition started between increasingly differentiated parties which developed out of the former opposition while the (unreformed) post-communists would remain ostracised. In multilateral transitions, the post-communists remained strong political players and (after a few years) became a serious contender for power.283 Thus, we might add Hypothesis 3: In societies with the legacy of unilateral transition, collective representations of democracy contrast quite strongly between the post- communists on the one side and parties developed out of former opposition groups on the other side. In this regard, they differ from the cases of multilateral transitions, where both sides have a common stake and share rather similar rhetorical frames concerning the system). Countries with a legacy of unilateral transition should therefore feature a more competitive, outcome-oriented approach to politics which is presented as the ideal in elite discursive frames (at least from the side of the former opposition), as opposed to the consensual and more procedure-oriented approach of multilateral transitions. Collective representations of democracy might therefore also feature a very different role model for politicians. Hypothesis 4: In countries of multilateral transition, political elites share a collective representation of politicians as playing the central role in the democratic process in being rather aloof of particularistic interests and collectively finding the best solution for the country, the “common good” (i.e. closer to the utilitarian model of democracy). Political elites in countries with unilateral transitions should present their own role as being representative of competing interests in the first place. Political elites (with the legacy of multilateral transition) should thus find their collective representations of democracy embodied best in the consensus institutional set-up, whereas political elites from unilateral backgrounds might present the requirements of consensus institutions as being in the way of decisive, efficient and outcome-oriented politics. Hypothesis 5: Political elites in societies with a unilateral transition background advocate

283 Kitschelt et al. point out that in democracies following “national-accommodative” communism the regime cleavage is less pronounced than in democracies after “bureaucratic ”. Assuming a strong connection between previous regime types and transition dynamics my hypotheses to some extent mirror Kitschelt’s. However, my focus is slightly different as I am not concerned with comparing party systems but political culture and the way political elites relate to the democratic system (H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems – Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p.306). 82 changes to the political system more strongly/extensively than political elites from multilateral transitions. Political elites from countries with multilateral transitions do not share a societal consensus on how to evaluate the past as opposed to those from countries with the legacy of a unilateral transition. The latter involved not only a “new beginning” in terms of political legitimacy, but also the (at least temporal) expulsion of the protagonists of the old regime, and generally a more forceful (sometimes imposed) “coming to terms with the past” resulting in a predominant condemnation and public de-legitimation of the old regime. Mutlilateral transitions allowed for the persistence of competing concepts of legitimacy of the new polity, or at least did not require actors to fully dissociate themselves from the communist (or any other previous) regime(s). Therefore, the absence of an (imposed) condemnation of the old regime(s) may lead to clashing definitions of legitimate leadership in countries with the legacy of multilateral transition, and consequently result in a lack of mutual acceptance and respect as legitimate players in the democratic system. Hypothesis 6: Political elites in democracies developed out of multilateral transition will be found to be more explicitly aiming at demarcating themselves culturally and ideologically from political opponents than in unilateral transitions.

83 PART III: Testing the alternative model of political culture

The cases Hungary, East Germany and their transition legacies In order investigate the sources of elite commitment to consensus democracy and the consequences for the future of democracy I introduced the traditional approach to political culture, its role in the consolidation of democracy and an alternative approach. Both shall now be tested empirically. The classical model of political culture in the tradition of Almond and Verba claims that consensualist institutions over time lead to a consensualist political elites via individual value internalization. Hence, we should be able to find similarities or even convergence in this regard between countries with similar degrees of consensus-democratic institutions. Differences on the way to a consensual elite political culture should be recognizable on the individual level depending on social background and post-recruitment factors as shown by Putnam and others. The alternative model in turn makes us expect clear national differences regardless of institutional similarities, and less relevance of individual variables. The impact of historical ruptures should leave a mark on collective elite political cultures. In order to assess the explanatory value of both models we need to compare political elites’ commitment to consensus democracy between societies with a very different history of transition dynamics, but similar in institutional structures. According to the classical model of political culture, differences in attitudes between the two cases should then be based in socio- economic differences between the subjects studied and, possibly, specific national traditions or subcultures. According to my alternative proposition, the above-mentioned factors are less tangible in their impact on elite political culture than historical junctures, in particular differences in transition dynamics for the CEE democracies. Hungary and East Germany are ideal cases for testing empirically the two approaches to political culture. They resemble most closely the ideal types of multilateral and unilateral transition, respectively, while sharing a similar extent of consensus democracy in terms of their institutional arrangements. At the same time, West Germany can be drawn in as a control case for an alternative explanation based on national cultural legacies. Focusing on more recent data rather than on data from shortly after the transition enables us to trace the hypothesized persistence of elite political culture conditioned by the transition juncture even after more than a decade. This would be surely a much more powerful finding than just finding a transition-related political culture shortly after transition.

84 Hungary resembles most closely the ideal-typical multilateral mode of transition. With a legacy of reforms dating back till the 1960s, a strong reform-oriented faction in the communist party and a variety of differentiated opposition groups and proto-parties (often with personal links to reformers in the administration), the country set on a gradual, negotiated transition process in which the foundations for the new democracy were laid during round-table talks in summer 1989. Probably neither power-holders nor opposition were expecting these talks to culminate in a full-blown liberal multi-party democracy just a few months later. In fact, the Hungarian transition can be regarded more as a “failed reform” rather than a revolution.284 Indicative of this is the lack of a common term in Hungarian public discourse denoting the 1989/90 events. Three terms can be heard most frequently: rendszerváltás, rendszerváltozás, or rendszervaloztatás, meaning, respectively, exchange of system, change of system, or changing of system. All three have differentiated undertones concerning the extent and agency of change, which are hard to translate precisely into English.285 Instead of a “new beginning” through constitution-making by a democratically elected assembly, the path of legal continuity was chosen (i.e. constitutional amendments through the old, illegitimate parliament). There was no large-scale purge or systematic prosecution of those aligned with the old regime, and only a moderate elite turnover. The files of the former secret service remained mostly closed to the public, and no generally accepted approach of how to judge the old regime was debated.286 In several waves Hungary’s reform communists had first replaced the older generation of leaders around the veteran leader János Kádár before younger hardliners, such as János Berecz or Károly Grosz, were replaced by more reform-oriented protagonists. During the mid- and late 1980s, very active opposition groups had developed which cultivated different degrees of engagement with the regime. Parties have a large amount of variation, ranging from the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (which featured prominent writers and in their ranks) to the revived Independent Smallholders Party and Christian Democratic Party on the right; the liberal Free Democrats (composed of various dissident circles) and the radical liberal Young Democrats (an independent student and youth group). There was already a high degree of plurality in Hungary prior to transition, if only among a

284 J Batt, ‘The End of Communist Rule in East Central Europe’, Government and Opposition, Vol.23, No.6, 1991. 285 A Arato, Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp.93-94. Also in my interviews with Hungarian MPs all three terms were used. The first one appears to be the most popular one, although more right-wing MPs frequently also use the latter two. 286 For a detailed study of Hungary’s transition and its antecedents see R Tökés, Hungary’s negotiated revolution – Economic reform, social change and political succession, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 85 limited group of elites and aspiring elites.287 The negotiated outcome of the transition assured the peaceful and constitutional change to a fully democratic system. Some components of the agreement (i.e. most prominently the way of electing the first president), however, were changed in a in favour of the proposal of the two liberal opposition parties (who had abstained from signing the agreement but not impeded its implementation).288 Economic transition in Hungary also took a rather gradual path profiting from its lead position in the region (e.g. in terms of openness and private sector share in the economy when communism collapsed). East Germany experienced the most dramatic and rapid transition from the collapse of hard-line post-totalitarian rule in autumn 1989: mass demonstrations and a mass exodus to West Germany via Hungary, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November, a short-lived East German democracy with free elections in March 1990, and culminating in reunification with West Germany in October 1990. East Germany was among the latest CEE regimes to start transition, but among the earliest ones to have concluded it with holding fully free elections in March 1990. There, the transition process, unanimously called die Wende (“the turn” or “the turning point”) in German, was dominated from the beginning by the opposition, in particular by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU, an erstwhile puppet party and ally of the ruling communists in the GDR). In alliance with some civic activists the newly founded East German Social Democrats (SPD) and, with backing from the West German Kohl government, the East German CDU soon promoted the unification and the full implementation of the West German political and market economy model. At the same time, the former communists and the more left-leaning civic activists were marginalized. They argued for the elaboration of an independent East German model of democracy which had little popular support. Rapid dominated by the opposition, and later the first freely elected East German government resulted in fast, far-reaching changes and strong discontinuities in terms of institutions, policies and personnel in order to start an irreversible integration process with West Germany. Popular legitimacy, not legal continuity, was the guiding principle of the new East German government which, backed by a strong mandate for pro-unification parties, strove to implement the West German political and market model in order to prepare for unification as quickly as possible.289 The first major step in this regard was the economic, monetary and

287 A Arato, Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp.52-63. 288 For a comprehensive perspective on the Hungarian round-table talks see A Bozóki (ed.), The Roundtable Talks of 1989 – The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy, Budapest: Central European UP, 2002. 289 E.g. Already prior to unification decentralisation and federalisation was implemented in the GDR; the social security system was rebuilt according to the Western model. 86 social union between the GDR and the FRG set up on 1 July 1990. Economic transition had many traits of a rapid, decisive “shock therapy”. However, unlike other post-communist societies, East Germany’s population was protected against the social fall-out through generous transfers from the West and the immediate full implementation of the West German social welfare state.290 Complete discontinuity with the communist GDR was marked by the on 3 October 1990, through which the West German Basic Law and the entire legal body (save for a few temporary exceptions) was extended to East Germany. In legal terms, unification took place via Article 23 of the West German Grundgesetz (Basic Law) which allows other German Länder to join the federation. Thus, West Germany was basically “enlarged” by five new Länder.291 Claus Offe reminds that unification was actually a unilateral decision of the first democratic East German government (with support and approval of the Western side, of course) in which the West German population was not asked for their assent.292 Endeavours for a newly elaborated constitution (for either an independent East Germany or the newly unified Germany) did not materialize: there was little popular support for a separate East German state, as the only historical legitimacy for its existence was based in a now discredited socio-economic model of .293 Instead, the old West German political and socio-economic model was virtually rebuilt 1:1 in the East.294 In fact, there was an easily available different option to achieve national unity in a constitutional way by establishing what Claus Offe calls a new and binding “post-totalitarian political consensus”. The adoption of a new all-German constitution by an all-German referendum was a provision actually foreseen for the case of German unification in the Grundgesetz article 146.295 This way, the fathers of the West German Basic Law had actually laid down the provisional nature of the West German constitution. Still, the Grundgesetz was given a permanent status by majority decision of the two German parliaments in 1990.

290 H Wiesenthal, ’German Unification and ’Model Germany’: An Adventure in Institutional ’, West European Politics, Vol.26, No.4, Oct.2003, pp.37-58. 291 D Conradt, The German Polity, 5th ed., New York: Longman, 1993, pp.207-208. 292 C Offe, Varieties of Transition – The East European and East German Experience, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p.14. 293 A working group of the (compared to other CEE countries politically rather irrelevant) round-table talks prepared new draft constitution for East Germany, which was also seen as a possible new all-German constitution. In the course of preparing for German unification along the lines of the Grundgesetz however it was equally disregarded by the last East German government and the Kohl government in Bonn. 294 Attempts for a major overhaul of the Grundgesetz or even the drawing up of a completely new constitution to be adopted by a popular referendum as supported by the then oppositional SPD were blocked by the Kohl government. A constitutional committee based on MPs from both chambers of parliament only agreed on minor changes, leaving out most demands by former East German activists such as more elements of direct democracy and a more substantive definition of democracy in terms of (D Conradt, 1993, pp.208-210). 295 C Offe, 1996, pp.26-27. 87 Elite turnover in East Germany was the most far-reaching in the region. Applicants for a large number of public positions have to undergo screening for links to the former secret service. Virtually all former high-ranking officials lost their office. Economic, judicial, academic and military elite positions were quickly occupied by West Germans, while political positions went predominantly to political newcomers from the newly founded or revived parties.296 A larger number of both high-ranking officials (e.g. former members of the Politburo), but also some lower ranking officials (e.g. guards who had killed people trying to escape to West Germany), were put on trial though few served sentences. The files of the former secret service, which had been saved from destruction by civic activists during the last weeks of the old regime, were made available to the public.297 According to Edinger, there were several phases of elite change in East Germany since the beginning of transition in autumn 1989, which started with elite turnover within the old regime by replacing with the younger . Since late 1989, the process was already characterized by the complete inability of the ruling elites to shape democratic transition leading to an “imposed revolution” and German unity.298 Overall, the East German case of democratisation is very close to the ideal type of unilateral transition and, therefore, represents the best choice for a case of unilateral transition.

Excursus: Why East Germany is not (such) a special case Most comparative case studies in the context of democratic transition and consolidation have designated East Germany a case on its own, reducing its analytical use to inner-German comparisons only. 299 Usually, three major arguments are advanced as a justification. Firstly, it is argued that, through unification, East Germany ceased to exist as a state on its own. It is not a “country” and therefore could not be compared to other (“real”) countries. Secondly, the East German transition process is often presented as being completely dominated, if not pre- or over determined, by the unification issue and almost entirely driven and controlled by

296 West Germans became to occupy a few of the most prominent positions in the Länder, e.g. Prime Minister posts, and those positions which required western legal and economic expertise, (e.g. Land ministers for finance or justice) for which there were few qualified Eastern candidates. 297 For a comprehensive description of the East German democratic transition and subsequent unification with West Germany in English see G Glaessner, The Unification Process in Germany – from to democracy, London: Pinter Publishers, 1992. 298 M Edinger, ’Alte Eliten in einer jungen Demokratie? Elitenzirkulation und Elitenreproduktion unter ostdeutschen Parlamentariern’, in: H Veen (ed.), Alte Eliten in jungen Demokratien? Wechsel, Wandel und Kontinuität in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004, pp.69-70. 299 For two intra-German comparative studies on political elites in English see: R Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP, 1999; J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999. Both follow the more traditional approach to political culture. 88 West Germany.300 Thirdly, in the context of comparative elite studies, East Germany is often portrayed as not having its own political elite, both due to the absence of a national government since late 1990 and the takeover of virtually all key positions by West Germans. All three claims can be challenged. Moreover, the very nature of the East German case offers new opportunities for comparative studies (which other CEE cases do not offer, as I will discuss in the following). Firstly, on the surface, East Germany is certainly special because of the unique event of national unification in the post-communist realm, due to a part of it being located in the West. Yet, in the broader CEE context, the discontinuity of states and the coincidence of national reformulation with democratisation are rather frequent and certainly complicate comparisons. Nevertheless, the reverse of unification (i.e. the split-up of countries) has not caused us to exclude cases such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic, or Lithuania from comparative studies on democratic development. The absence of a post- surely does not imply the absence of a post-communist society, or the absence of a post- communist elite (see further below). One does not have to go as far as some authors who claim a kind of distinct national identity of East Germans301 to see that the Eastern part of the unified Germany in many regards (e.g. social structures, behaviour, value systems etc.) is rather more “post-communist” than “West German”.302 Secondly, East Germany’s transition (i.e. the collapse of communism and the installation of a freely elected government) was based on a domestic transition process whose agenda was dominated by issues such as rights, democracy, rule of law, and environmental protection. Increasing opposition to the old regime as elsewhere in the region, not the drive to unification, brought down communism and installed democracy in the GDR. Massive demonstrations in Leipzig and other in autumn 1989 were triggered by an accumulation of domestic events: obvious electoral fraud in the last local elections, increasing economic and ecological decay. Parallel developments that occurred within the Soviet bloc (Gorbachev, Solidarnosc, Hungary opening the iron curtain etc.) which also caught West Germany completely unprepared. The Leipzig demonstrators in late 1989 fought for a political liberties and democracy. Not , but civic activists, church leaders and ordinary people in the streets brought democracy to East Germany. German unification only became a real option after communism had been defeated and East Germany had

300 H Kitschelt et al., 1999, p.389. 301 M Howard, ‘An East German Ethnicity? Understanding the New Division of Unified Germany’, German Politics and Society, Vol.13/37, 1995, pp.49-70; J Yoder, ‘West-East Integration: Lessons from East Germany’s Accelerated Transition’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.14, No.1, pp.114-138. 302 J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999, p.118. 89 become democratic. The democratisation process in East Germany, which resembled other CEE countries, (e.g. Czechoslovakia) predated and enabled unification, and thus left its own legacies. Moreover, it can be also argued that, similar to the East German case, none of the other CEE transitions was free of western influences. George Soros, Radio Free Europe, and an increasing inflow of western money (both in the form of credits for the bankrupt regimes and tacit aid to the opposition), or liberalized travel regimes303 did have a significant impact on the course of transition. The above-mentioned factors enabled the diffusion of liberal democratic values or materially supported the opposition in all CEE countries (arguably in some countries much more and much earlier than in East Germany).304 Shortly after transition, the ultimate goal of EU membership then imposed very strict conditionalities (if not a predetermination) on CEE countries’ democratic consolidation, and strongly limited the leeway for domestic politics as outlined above. Thirdly, while there is no longer a national East German government there surely is a distinct East German political elite, which can be found both at the national and at the Land level. As mentioned above, unlike in other areas, elite turnover in politics did not result in a West German dominance of East Germany’s political elites. Exceptions for some key administrative positions prove the rule.305 Moreover, East German political elites can still be clearly distinguished from West German ones in sociological terms and, in many respects, resemble more some of the other CEE countries.306 Furthermore, the existence of an intermediate level of Land politics offers a distinct breeding-ground for the reproduction of East German politicians.307 Finally, the “import” of some political leaders is, in fact, not a special East German phenomenon. Current presidents of all the three Baltic states or the former Bulgarian Prime Minister (until 1946 known as the Tsar) are just the most prominent examples of (self-styled) politicians who returned to their native country only after decades of

303 Since the late 1970s it had become easier for a Pole or a Hungarian to visit West-Berlin than for an East Berliner. 304 M Spinner, The ‘National Interest’ and the Transformation of Hungarian Foreign Politics in the 1980s’, MA thesis, University of Birmingham, 2002. 305 H Derlien, ’Elitenzirkulation und Institutionenvertrauen’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, No.4, 1997, pp.539-556. In fact, most of the West German politicians assuming office in East German Länder or running in East German constituencies do have roots in the region and are just “returning”. 306 C Welzel, ‘Rekrutierung und Sozialisation der ostdeutschen Eliten. Aufstieg einer demokratischen Gegenelite?, in: W Bürklin, H Rebensdorf (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Rekrutierung und Integration, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997, pp.201-237. See also the discussion of socio-economic background factors further below with more references. 307 J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999. Also on the national level there are a number of separate East German institutions, such as so-called Landesgruppen within the factions of the parliament, or cross-factional East German working groups in the . 90 exile during which they were politically socialised and often even naturalised as citizens of Western democracies. Thus, in the light of the above-mentioned facts, East Germany appears more as an (not so) extreme case of CEE democratic transition rather than a special case “off the map”.308 History only offers a handful of cases for comparative investigation. To the dismay of some scholars history cannot be replicated in the laboratories, nor surrounding factors held constant while some variables are being manipulated. However, when looking at the impact of political culture East Germany offers quite unique chances for comparative case studies due to the (almost) “laboratory-like” conditions of the divided German nation (which allows to hold constant the tricky variable of deep “national” culture).309 Researchers excluding the case from cross-country comparisons, due to the mentioned (often superficially argued) reasons, therefore forego some great opportunities. A number of scholars in fact have discovered the great prospects East Germany offers for comparative studies in the post- communist realm, with West Germany as a control case.310 In my study I will pay special attention to the peculiarities of the East German case (but equally so to peculiar features of other CEE cases) and in particular illustrate the existence of a distinctly different East German political culture on the elite level by including a sample of West German MPs for comparison (see below). Thus, it can be explored in how far East German political culture is actually overshadowed by West German influences, and/or both East and West German political culture based in a common, deeply rooted “national” political culture reaching back into long-term historical experiences. With West German politicians as a “yardstick” we can determine the “natural” level of consensual political culture to which East Germans should have adapted according to the civic culture paradigm. This shall be measured (in an imperfect way) by establishing the number of consensus-oriented and majoritarian statements in a given period of time in speeches delivered in the same institution, i.e. the Bundestag (see below). At the same time, we can control for the impact of deep national cultural legacies, the “longue durée.” As both East German and West German MPs, who are now working in the same polity, are supposed to be endowed with the same long-lasting German cultural legacies any differences between

308 For a more extensive debate on whether or not the East German case is unique in the CEE context see: A Pickel / H Wiesenthal, The Great , Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1997. 309 R Rohrschneider, 1999. 310 M Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 2003. Also Pollack et al. include East Germany in comparative studies on CEE political culture (D Pollack / J Jacobs / O Müller / G Pickel (eds.), Political Culture in post-communist Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). One of the latest volumes in comparative democratisation with a global also includes East Germany (U van Beek (ed.), Democracy under construction: Patterns from four continents, Barbara Budrich Publishers: Bloomfield Hills & Opladen, 2005). 91 them in terms of political culture have to be based in lasting legacies of the communist period and the transition to democracy. The bigger these differences, the less support an explanation based on “deep national culture” would find.

Consensus democracy in Hungary and Germany Commonalities East Germany and Hungary experienced very different transition dynamics, and are close to the above-outlined ideal types of unilateral and multilateral transition respectively. At the same time, Hungary and Germany share rather similar, namely consensus (rather than majoritarian) institutional set-ups on the national level following the model of Lijphart. When amending the Hungarian constitution in 1989, Hungary in fact adopted a number of provisions on the basis of the German model. Both countries have moderate multi-party (rather than two-party) systems and have been governed by coalition governments rather than one-party governments. Hungary, between 1990 and 2002, was even governed by oversized coalitions only. Both countries have legislatives which, as “working parliaments” with a strong committee system, represent a counterbalance against the government (as opposed to cabinet-dominated systems). Their mixed electoral systems assure a higher degree of proportional representation than pure first- past-the-post systems. 311 Moreover, both countries have a written constitution with rather rigid requirements for constitutional amendment and strong judicial review. The German constitutional court’s rulings are seen as usually seeking a middle ground, reconciling opposed positions and thus being an important contribution to Germany’s Verhandlungsdemokratie.312 The Hungarian constitutional court is even regarded as one of the most powerful and activist ones in the world, due to its far-reaching judicial competences. This makes it a potentially very powerful veto player.313 Finally, central banks are independent from the government and, particularly in the Hungarian case, have repeatedly asserted themselves as independent players next to or

311 Lijphart deems Hungary’s as “moderately majoritarian” (A Lijphart, ‘Democratisation and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 1989-1991’, in: Gy Szoboszlai (ed.), Flying Blind: Emerging Democracy in East Central Europe, Budapest: Hungarian Political Science Association, 1992, p.102). 312 Rudzio, 2006, p.293. 313 Zs Enyedi, ‘The Survival of the Fittest: Concentration in Hungary’, in: S Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-Communist EU Member States – Parties and Party Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, p.188. 92 even against the government.314 These are clear indicators for consensus democracies according to Lijphart.315 Some constitutional elements in both countries, such as the 5%-hurdle, certainly have a rather majoritarian character though, as well as the traditionally strong fusion between executive and legislative offices. Both party systems are quite competitive and concentrate around two large parties respectively. Nevertheless, in Lijphart’s model Germany is still well on the consensualist side in the executives-party dimension covering executive power concentration, executive-legislative relationships, party systems, electoral systems and interest group representation.316 Given the far-reaching resemblance between the two countries in these dimensions the same can be argued for the Hungarian case.317 The constructive vote of no-confidence, which is in place in both constitutions, can be regarded as a neutral device between consensus and majoritarian democracy as it contributes to government stability regardless of whether a government is based on a parliamentary majority or not.318 Beyond these commonalities, I will now discuss in more detail the differences between the two cases.

Germany’s stable quasi-consociationalism (West) Germany is one of the most prominent federal democracies. In Lijphart’s study Germany even scores the highest value among the thirty-six countries in the federal-unitary dimension covering de-centralisation/federalisation, bi-cameralism, judicial rigidity, judicial review of constitutional change and central bank independence.319 Concerning the executive- parties dimension, Germany occupies a moderately consensualist position for Lijphart’s second time period (starting from the 1970s) as opposed to a more consensualist position before.320 Nevertheless, there is no doubt in Germany’s classification as a consensus democracy.321 The introduction of a high number of veto points and the strengthening of regional powers was in fact a deliberate measure by the Western Allied Powers after World

314 Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, ‘The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in Hungary’, in: S White, D Stansfield, P Webb (eds.), in Transitional Democracies, Oxford UP, 2006 (forthcoming), p.22. 315 For more details on Hungary A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.285-298; for Germany: T Rudzio, Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 7th edition, 2006. 316 A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy –Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, 1999, p.312. 317 A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.292-293. 318 A Lijphart, 1999, p.101; differently Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, ‘The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in Hungary’, in: S White, D Stansfield, P Webb (eds.), Political Parties in Transitional Democracies, Oxford UP, 2006 (forthcoming), p.15. 319 A Lijphart, 1999, p.312. 320 A Lijphart, 1999, p.255. 321 K Grabow, ‘Zur Rolle der Eliten in der demokratischen Gesellschaft’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006, p.33. 93 War II to prevent Germany from regaining a strong nationalist identity (and from re-emerging as a powerful state in Europe). In fact, the Länder, some of which were newly created or rearranged by the Western allies, were the nucleus of West German democracy in the late 1940s. Their elected representatives were charged with drawing up the Basic Law of 1949, which was then ratified by the Länder parliaments. The German Länder participate in most federal legislation through the second chamber of parliament (Bundesrat). Their administrative structures implement most of the federal legislation and therefore constantly negotiate the details of policy with the federal government. Moreover, there is a large amount of cooperation among the Länder, or between the Länder and the federal level, in areas where the Länder have all legislative powers (e.g. education, culture). In these areas Länder executives, rather than federal ministers, represent Germany on the European level. Thus, there are many inter-organisational linkages, and a large amount of joint decision-making. This is particularly visible in fiscal federalism – the Länder hold a veto right on regulating all major due to a division of revenues between centre and Länder.322 Since the 1960s, the share of legislation which the Bundesrat can veto is higher than 50%.323 A key institution of German consensus democracy is the mediation committee (Vermittlungsausschuß) consisting of members of Bundesrat and Bundestag, which draws up compromises on legislation contested between the two chambers of parliament. Steiner et al.’s impressive illustrates the high degree of deliberation, which is their measure for the “spirit of accommodation”, in this particular setting.324 Fritz Scharpf, in contrast, does not consider Germany a consensus democracy in terms of political culture as, in his opinion, partisan conflict on the national level overshadows accommodation on other levels.325 In fact, there is a lot of crossing back and forth of politicians between Länder and federal offices making a clear separation between the two levels difficult. The federalist tradition in Germany can actually be dated much further back than to the post-war period. Already, the Holy Roman , which consisted of multiple independent and a rather weak centre, was held together by consociationalist arrangements. Gerhard Lehmbruch also characterizes contemporary Germany as “quasi- consociationalist”. According to him, the idea of parity and negotiated politics leads back

322 W Rudzio, 2006. 323 W Ismayr, Der Deutsche Bundestag im Politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Ein Studienbuch, Opladen, 2000, p.289. 324 J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp.140-142. 325 F Scharpf, ‘No exit from the joint-decision trap? Can German reform themselves?’, European University Institute Working Paper, No.24 / 2005, pp.3-4. 94 until the Westphalian peace of 1648, which put an end to the thirty-year war enshrining the equal of all territories regardless of size, religion and constitution. Since then, the idea of a need for parity between centre (Reich) and periphery (individual states), between Protestants and Catholics, and later between different social groups has been foundational to German politics. Competing, hierarchical understandings of conflict management (be it Prussian or ) have been discredited in a lasting way, while competitive democracy came to play a role rather late. According to Lehmbruch, the Weimar Republic was a ‘social compact’, a failed attempt to actually put in place a working consociational democracy reconciling competitive democracy with pluralism and parity. Certain institutional legacies, however, survived or were revived in 1949 along with a competitive party system arranged around the two large parties.326 Also, the corporatist interest group policies (especially collectivised wage bargaining of peak associations), parity and co-determination (Mitbestimmung) in large enterprises’ boards, and corporatist institutions governing social security and public health care system became a key feature of German democracy.327 Beyond this, Germany is well known for its tradition of proportional distribution of posts for constitutional and other high courts, high administrative positions, the secret service etc. 328 This Proporzsystem is also a frequent feature of consociationalist democracies such as Austria or Belgium, which Lijphart regards as extreme cases of consensualist democracy (see above). Appointments, according to the rules of Proporz, can be interpreted as inserting veto players inside institutions. Over the last decades (basically since the origins of the West German state in 1949), the German consensualist set-up has changed very little. In fact, certain consensualist properties, especially concerning the powers of the second chamber (Bundesrat) have been further extended by increasing the scope of which require approval by the Bundesrat in the 1970s and 80s. Only a recent reform adopted in spring 2006 aims at reducing the number of federal laws requiring both Bundestag and Bundesrat approval (Zustimmungsgesetze). At the same time, powers of the Länder increase in other areas of legislation where they obtain exclusive legislative powers, thus reducing the extent of the German Verhandlungsdemokratie (negotiation democracy; i.e. the need for a close cooperation between the two chambers in legislation).329 In the framework of Lijphart these

326 G Lehmbruch, ‘Quasi-Consociationalism in German Politics: Negotiated Democracy and the Legacy of the Westphalian Peace’, Acta Politica, Vol.37, No.1/2, spring/summer 2002, pp.175-194. 327 G Lehmbruch, 2002, pp.175-194; K Grabow, 2006, p.34. 328 W Rudzio, 2006, p.448. 329 W Rudzio, 2006, p.282. See also: ‘Förderalismusreform: Der Kampf um Kompetenzen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 150, 1.Juli 2006, pp.6-7. On earlier reform attempts see F Scharpf, ‘No exit from the 95 changes overall actually mean no change, as Germany becomes slightly less consensualist concerning the bicameralist indicator (as the powers of the second chamber get diminished) but slightly more consensualist concerning the federalist indicator (as powers are transferred from the central government to the regions). At this moment it is still too early to say how further envisaged reforms such as a different system of fiscal federalism might change the balance of power. Overall, regardless of its rather competitive party system and quite strong executive, Germany is and remains clearly on the consensualist side of Lijphart’s typology, and is likely to do so for the near future. The high number of veto players in German democracy therefore presupposes a spirit of accommodation among its political elites.

Democratic Hungary: From extreme consensus towards majoritarian democracy? Being rather small and homogenous, Hungary is a . Still it has quite a high degree of administrative with some powers for local .330 However, there is no second chamber of parliament.331 In other indicators (e.g. constitutional rigidity, constitutional review, and arguably also central bank independence since the 2002 Euro adoption in Germany) Hungary has a higher degree of consensus institutions than Germany. Hungary’s constitutional court has been described as one of the most powerful and activist in the world, often making “political” decisions and enjoying a high reputation.332 Next to constitutional changes, a larger number of important laws also require a two-thirds majority in parliament for revision. Hungarian presidents since 1990 appear to have built up some counterweight to the government by using their right to make parliament reconsider legislation, by making public statements in which they have sometimes explicitly criticised the government, by implicitly siding with opposition positions, or by regularly inviting the leaders of all parties in parliament for consultations.333 All of this has been less frequent in the case of Germany.334 joint-decision trap? Can German federalists reform themselves?’, European University Institute Working Paper, No.24 / 2005. 330 A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, pp.159-160. 331 The introduction of a second chamber of parliament to represent civil society associations, churches, trade unions, employers’ organisations etc. has however been a recurring proposal (A Arato, Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p.77). 332 K Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Negotiations – Political Contexts of Judicial Activism in Post-Soviet Europe’, International Sociology, Vol.18, No.1, March 2003, pp.219-238; A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.161-163. 333 A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.156-158. 334 Since 1949 there have been only seven occasions when German Presidents sent legislation back to parliament for reconsideration (Die ZEIT, 26 October 2006). The current President Horst Köhler however appears somewhat more proactive than his predecessors and has repeatedy sent back legislation in 2006. 96 Moreover, Hungary has four independent ombudsmen, two of whom have a constitutionally enshrined status. They address people’s complaints about violations of their rights (e.g. civil rights, ethnic minorities’ rights, data protection) by the administration. They have repeatedly used their to confront government decisions and advanced their own proposals for changes to legislation or policy in their reports to parliament.335 Therefore, they can also serve as a (moderate) counterbalance against the dominance of majority rule and executive power, if only from a reactive position. A number of authors, therefore, view Hungary’s democratic set-up well on the consensus side of Lijphart’s framework. At the same time, this finding is contrasted with the strongly adversarial political culture (which will in fact be addressed further below).336 Beyond that, there has been some debate in Hungarian social sciences about Hungary being a consensus democracy, mostly due to a number of changes since the democratic transition in 1990. An extreme type of consensus democracy (or what Àgh calls half-made or fragmented democracy) with an overdriven separation of powers was put in place by the Hungarian negotiated transition in 1990.337 Its most extreme features, such as the large number of laws requiring a 2/3 majority, were diminished already starting in 1990. In that year another “pact” between the two largest parties, the newly governing conservative MDF and the liberal SZDSZ via constitutional amendments strongly reduced the number of laws requiring a in order to assure the governability of the country. Yet, at the same time, some new consensualist elements were introduced as a concession to the opposition (e.g. the election of their presidential candidate and agreements on the even distribution of committee chairs in parliament). The latter remained a practice until 1998. The 1994-1998 oversized coalition by MSZP and SZDSZ, in spite of its supermajority, failed to make far-reaching unilateral decisions (safe for the so-called Bokros package, which I will discuss below) against the other parties and constitutional bodies and aimed at accommodating them. The 1998-2002 conservative government, lead by Fidesz, however undermined some elements of consensus democracy (e.g. by reducing the revenue basis of local governments).338 The Orbán administration also abolished self-governing pension and health insurance funds, replacing them with agencies controlled by ministry of finance and

335 S Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to Democracy – Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.74-83; A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.163-164. 336 A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999; Zs Enyedi, ‘The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary’, in: S Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-Communist EU Member States – Parties and Party Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, p.188. 337 A Ágh, ‘Early Consolidation and Performance Crisis: The Majoritarian-Consensus Democracy Debate in Hungary’, West European Politics, Vol.24, No.3, July 2001, p.94. 338 A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, p.160. 97 thus deprived trade unions and social sector interest organizations of institutional bargaining positions in the budgetary process.339 Shifting from a weekly to a three-weekly parliamentary session timetable and from a yearly to a two-yearly budget also diminished the parliament’s role.340 The powers of the executive were strengthened by so-called “frame” laws (kerettörvények) empowering the government at the expense of the . Finally, power became increasingly centralised in a strong prime minister’s office, a feature that was kept also in the subsequent socialist administrations.341 Some scholars see Hungary’s political landscape shifting towards a bipolar (if not two- party) system with the smaller parties disappearing, closely aligning or even merging with the two large ones. This would create a party system similar to the German one, which was quite competitive from the beginning and favouring party concentration. Moreover, the rules for party finances effectively contribute to prevent the entry of smaller new parties.342 Nevertheless, some of the phenomena connected with party concentration in Hungary seem to mirror, to some extent, other post-transition countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland.343 During the first parliamentary cycle the threshold for entering parliament was raised from four to five percent (as is the case in Germany), which was predominantly motivated by the desire of the centrist parties to keep out of parliament right-wing extremist and revived communist parties. Observers also point out that the last elections were predominantly personalised and focused on the two opposite camps and their respective leaders: Orbán and Gyurcsány, reminding of American or British examples.344 Some authors, such as András Körösényi, therefore argue that over time Hungary has actually developed towards a quasi- in which the prime minister takes on a similarly strong role as the American president or the British concentrating executive power in his hands. Although Körösényi prefers to use the presidential vs. cabinet typology over Lijphart’s consensualism/majoritarianism model, his argument basically mirrors the claim that Hungary is continuously developing towards a more majoritarian system and is

339 Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, ‘The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in Hungary’, in: S White, D Stansfield, P Webb (eds.), Political Parties in Transitional Democracies, Oxford UP, 2006 (forthcoming), p.25; M Brusis, V Dimitrov, ‘Executive configuration and fiscal performance in post-communist central and eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.8, No.6, p.900. 340 At the same time however, four new standing committees in parliament were created, arguably as additional control mechanisms of the parliament (G Illonszki, ‘Parliament and Government in Hungary: a changing relationship’, Central European Political Science Review, Vol.2, No.3, summer 2001, p.80) 341 Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, 2006, pp.32-33; A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.154-156. 342 Zs Enyedi, 2006, pp.187-188. 343 A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.149-151. 344 A Bozóki, E Simon, 2006, pp.170-176. For the 2006 elections Fidesz presented a candidate for the (constitutionally not prescribed) office of vice-prime minister in analogy to the American presidential elections. Also the establishment of “shadow cabinets” by the opposition has been introduced. 98 reducing veto points in the system. Zsolt Enyedi argues that the adversarial political culture made Hungarian political elites try to bring institutions closer to their political culture as they frustrated victorious majorities rather than fostering mutual understanding.345 In his 1999 publication, Körösényi regards the confrontational political culture in Hungary as based in the need for political parties to first establish and demarcate their electorates rather than to reconcile subcultures by accommodative strategies.346 Other authors however argue that attempts to centralize and decentralize power actually came in waves.347 Attila Ágh sees as a basic pattern that conservative governments (1990-1994, and after 1998) aimed at diminishing consensualism while the social-liberal government (1994-1998) tried to “complete consensualism” but failed in this undertaking.348 Similarly, Gabriella Illonszki sees the 1994-1998 parliament as the one boasting the highest degree of inter-party cooperation and interaction, while the previous and the following parliaments were characterized by bi-polarity and conflict. She observes that, while in the first parliament (1990-1994) individual MPs were dominating the scene, power shifted to committees in the second parliament (1994-1998) and to factions in the third one (1998- 2002).349 Furthermore, oversized coalition governments remained the form of government until 2002.350 Similarly, regional decentralisation came in several waves with some reversals. While there was more decentralisation under the 1994-1998 social-liberal coalition, there was a reduction of powers for local self-administration under the following conservative government. According to Brigid Fowler decentralisation is, in fact, a valence issue in Hungary; there have been just very different arguments over the means and ways. Political elites present the relationship between central government and sub-state units as inherently conflict-ridden rather than neutral among Hungarian political elites. Hungarian parties have been attacking each other for allegedly “centralising” when in power and made negative references to the communist legacy of centralism when doing so.351 The introduction of directly elected mayors in large cities from 1994 somewhat strengthened the standing of sub-

345 Zs Enyedi, 2006, p.188. 346 A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.294-295. 347 See debate in Századvég, spring 2001, No.20, and autumn 2001, No.22, especially A Körösényi, ‘Parlamentáris vagy elnöki kormányzás? Az Orbán-kormány összehasonlító perspektívából’, Századvég, spring 2001, No. 20, pp. 3-38. 348 A Ágh, ‘Early Consolidation and Performance Crisis: The Majoritarian-Consensus Democracy Debate in Hungary’, West European Politics, Vol.24, No.3, July 2001, pp.89-112. 349 G Illonszki, ‘Parliament and Government in Hungary: a changing relationship’, Central European Political Science Review, Vol.2, No.3, summer 2001, p.85. 350 Zs Enyedi, 2006, p.186. 351 B Fowler, ’Hungary: Patterns of Political Conflict over Territorial-Administrative Reform’, in: J Batt, K Wolczuk (eds.), Region, State and Identity in Central Eastern Europe, London: Frank Cass, 2002, pp.16-35. 99 national players, but decreasing fiscal autonomy of local administration since 1998 worked in to the opposite direction.352 After the 2002 elections a number of more consensualist elements were re-established (e.g. the weekly parliamentary session and the yearly budget). Furthermore, smaller parties which have been pronounced dead keep surviving and managed to enter both the 2002 and 2006 parliaments, and observers go on waiting for the two-party system to materialize. In a similar way, observers claim the return of a more accommodative position of the prime minister towards parliament. Starting from the first freely elected prime minister Antal and his successors (Boross, Horn, Orbán and Medgyessy) there was a gradual decrease in the prime minister’s presence in parliament. Ferenc Gyurcsány, the first prime minister without a seat in parliament (prior to the 2006 elections), seemed to emphasise his commitment to parliament by spending much more time in the plenary and making his most important policy announcements in parliament (breaking with the practice of his predecessors).353 This again contrasts with plans of the re-elected Gyurcsány government in summer 2006 which includes, among others: a restriction of MPs’ immunity in cases of ordinary criminal offences, scaling down of parliament and local administration, the abolition of the intermediate megye system of territorial administration, a streamlining of the cabinet, a reduction of the number of ministers and state secretaries, and the centralisation of more powers in the prime minister’s office. The latter has been partly realized, e.g. with regards to the administration of EU funds.354 In sum, while an ultimate judgement might still be premature, there appears to be enough evidence to still regard Hungary as consensus democratic on most of Lijphart’s indicators (as done by Körösényi in 1999) despite some changes.355 While the 1990 constitutional changes basically abolished excessive and unworkable consensualist arrangements, some later developments did indeed add certain majoritarian elements. Some of them were undone again later though. Nevertheless, similar to Germany, Hungary remains a consensus democracy due to its large number of veto players. Like in the German case, a high amount of the “spirit of accommodation” is required in the cooperation between the various institutions. As outlined for CEE in general, and in the Hungarian case in particular, it makes more sense to refer to the individual properties of consensus democracy in terms of veto points than

352 Zs Enyedi / G Tóka, 2006, p.25. 353 ’Házi kassza’, HVG, 28 January 2006, pp.8-12. 354 ’Pläne der Reformer’, Pester Lloyd, 31 May 2006, p.1-2. 355 A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, pp.292-293. 100 to conceptualise two independently clustering dimensions as Lijphart does. This prevents us from assuming some kind of unified system of consensus democracy in which all dimensions are indiscriminately consensus-democratic, excluding the possibility of individual majoritarian elements (e.g. the party system), and ongoing change in both directions.

The methodology Content analysis of parliamentary speeches In the previous chapter, Hungary and East Germany were established as two cases with very different experiences of democratic transition but similar degrees of consensus democracy through their high number of veto players in democratic decision-making. In the following, I go on to discuss the approach used in order to test the two models of political culture. In a first step, I analyse elite statements quantitatively in terms of the ratio between positive and negative statements in the five ideational dimensions of consensus democracy established above. This way, standardized indicators are derived which can be used in order to confirm or disconfirm the pattern expected in both the traditional approach to political culture and in my own hypotheses. Taking these indicators as either expressions of an implicit or explicit political culture, I test for the patterns expected in the hypotheses of the two models. In this quantitative investigation, I will first apply the individualist approach of the classical model and take elite statements as the expression of individually internalized beliefs. I will then measure the extent to which they are consensualist or majoritarian. Discussing the limited plausibility of this model, in the second step the indicators will be taken as proxies for discourses and my alternative hypotheses will be tested. For this purpose, the extent to which discourses are shared across party lines and socio-economic backgrounds will be explored by drawing in qualitative data from semi-structured interviews. An in-depth analysis, focused on the five ideational dimensions of consensus democracy, then puts the discourses into the context of the existing democratic systems in the two cases. Finally, I discuss their potential to contribute to the consolidation of consensus democracy. In my case studies, I concentrate on members of parliament in the Hungarian parliament (Országgyűlés) and members of the German parliament (Bundestag) from East German constituencies. MPs are, next to high-ranking members of the executive, the most visible, powerful and influential members of the political elite and therefore justify this positional approach (which is also the most common in existing empirical research on

101 political elites in democratic societies).356 Due to the generally public character of parliamentary sessions, MPs provide extensive, rich, and systematic material which can be used for analysis. According to democratic theory, parliaments are the key setting for deliberation of the representatives of the people. Moreover, parliaments include a broader in terms of membership than any other high-ranking positional elite (e.g. the government). As the parliament is one of the key arenas of consensus democracy, I chose this strongly institutionalised context for my comparative case study in order to hold constant potential influences of this setting. Further research needs to determine in how far other settings might have an impact on consensualism.357 In this dissertation, I focus on a limited number of MPs in a limited period, namely the last two parliamentary cycles. This has to do both with reasons of feasibility, data availability and theoretical considerations. At the time of writing, there were no electronically available transcripts of parliamentary speeches for the first two electoral cycles in Hungary. As for the German case, they do exist, but cannot be searched electronically for individual MP’s contributions. At the same time, finding patterns expected in my hypotheses in parliamentary speeches during the most recent years strengthens my argument. Nevertheless, for future research, it might be an interesting task to trace these patterns also for speeches still closer to transition, and, in the future, for speeches still further away from it. For both Hungary and East Germany, I picked twenty-seven Hungarian and twenty- eight East German MPs, covering all parties represented in parliament roughly in relation to the size of the share of votes in the 2002 general elections in both Hungary and Germany.358 The sample assures a balanced mix of age, gender, professional background, regional origin (urban, rural, capital), time in parliament, and lists the single-member district MPs (national and regional) which also roughly reflects the distribution of these factors among all MPs.359

356 E.g. R Putnam, 1973; V Kaina, M Sauer, ’Ostdeutsche Eliten und gesamtdeutsche Führungsschicht im gesellschaftlichen Integrationsprozeß. Ergebnisse der „Potsdamer Elitestudie 1995“’, in: P Hübner (ed.), Eliten im Sozialismus – Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR, Köln: Böhlau, 1999, p.91. Differently Kitschelt et al. 1999, p.144, who interview both high-ranking and middle-ranking politicians. Non-democratic societies with their usually lesser degree of stable institutions might require other kinds of approaches, e.g. reputational or decision-based approaches (B Wasner, Eliten in Europa, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004, pp.119-125). 357 Variation in contexts has some influence on the quality of deliberation in Steiner et al.’s DQI. (J Steiner / A Bächtiger / M Spörndli / M Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge University Press, 2004.) 358 Both Hungary and Germany had almost synchronous electoral cycles since 1990 until the 2005 early German elections with general elections in 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002. In the electoral cycle starting from 2002 the two countries were governed by a centre-left . These similarities are another asset allowing me to control for potential short-term distortions (e.g. campaigning) and the impact of incumbency. 359 Due to their minor relevance no independent MPs were included. 102 For the East German case I focused exclusively on MPs from the East German constituencies.360

[table 4 about here]

I decided to focus on East German members of the Bundestag rather than members of the East German regional Länder parliaments or local politicians. The latter two can be more conveniently identified and separated from the all-German national context but they were already the subject of a number of studies, next to the members of the first (and last) freely elected GDR parliament in 1990.361 As I am not interested in regional discourses but national ones (and given the higher positional location of MPs), my choice for the so-far under- explored East German MPs was clear. Moreover, finding a distinct East German political culture, even among politicians interacting in a common institutional setting (the Bundestag) with West German politicians, would even further strengthen the thrust of my arguments.

360 This includes the East German Länder and the formerly Eastern part of Berlin. Two constituencies in Berlin which comprise both sections of the former East and West of the city were not included. There are a handful of MPs in East German constituencies who either moved to West Germany before 1989 and returned later or who are “Western imports”. In the field of politics elite transfer from the West is rather rare as mentioned (against the wide-spread assumption), nevertheless it is reflected also in my sample with one MP who only moved to an East German constituency in the early 1990s. The other East German MPs in the sample (as around 90% of their colleagues from East German constituencies) grew up and lived in East Germany before 1990. 361 For regional political elites see W Patzelt, ‘Ostdeutsche Parlamentarier in ihrer ersten Wahlperiode: Wandel und Angleichung’, Historical Social Research, Vol.22, No.3/4, 1997, pp.160-180; H Derlien, S Lock, ’Eine neue politische Elite? Rekrutierung und Karrieren der Abgeordneten in den fünf neuen Landtagen’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, No.1, 1994, pp.61-94; S Lock, Ostdeutsche Landtagsabgeordnete 1990-1994: vom personellen Neubeginn zur politischen Professionalisierung?, Berlin: VWF Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung, 1998; R Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP, 1999; and J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999; S Schüttemeyer, M Lübke, ‘Der Brandenburgische Landtag nach zehn Jahren – ein Parlament wie jedes andere?’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, pp.585-598; L Davidson-Schmich, Becoming Party Politicians – Eastern German State Legislators in the Decade following Democratization, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006; J Plöhn, ‘Ostdeutsche Profile in in der Politik – Vom Aufbruch zur Gesamtdeutschen Normalität’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006, pp.135- 152. For local political elites see: C Perron, ‘Eastern German and Czech Democratization from the Perspective of Local Politics’, in: L McFalls / L Probst (eds.), After the GDR – New Perspectives on the Old GDR and the Young Länder, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001, pp.221-245; and S Neckel, ‘Die ostdeutsche Doxa der Demokratie – eine lokale Fallstudie’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol.47, No.4, 1995, pp.658-680. For the 1990 GDR-parliament (Volkskammer) see H Müller-Enbergs, ‘Zwischen Bewahrung und Modernisierung. Politische Einstellungen in der letzten Volkskammer der DDR’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.248-271; B Scholz, ’Bundestag und Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.272-299; C Hausmann, ‘Die 10. Volkskammer der DDR 1990: Elitenpool der ersten Stunde’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, pp.527-541. 103 Beyond that, I will make extensive references to the existing (mostly German) literature on East German regional elites and discuss their findings in the light of my results. My initial sample of MPs was based on the then current parliaments in 2004/05 in Hungary and Germany. I first coded all statements in parliament of the MPs in my sample between the elections of 2002 (April 2002 in Hungary, September 2002 in Germany) and late September 2005 (when the last Bundestag session before early elections took place). For the preceding period (1998-2002), I coded the entire parliamentary cycle for both parliaments for those MPs who were already in parliament. Moreover, due to the PDS’s failure to jump the nationwide-5% hurdle, there were only two PDS-MPs in the 2002 German Bundestag (both of whom had won individual constituencies in East Berlin). Eight more PDS-MPs were included into the East German sample for the 1998-2002 cycle. This way, a larger sample of statements from this party could be considered (for more details, see annex 1). This is justified because in East Germany, the PDS is the third largest party, regularly scoring around 15-25%. Moreover, an additional sample containing twenty-six West German MPs serves as a control case (see below). They are equally taken from the 2002-2005 Bundestag, with a balanced mix of background factors and roughly in line with their parties’ vote shares in West Germany.

The code book Content analysis of speeches and/or public documents written by political elites is a well- established method applied in the field.362 Using the official parliamentary records for both cases for the periods 1998-2002 and 2002-2005, I coded all instances of positive or negative statements by every MP in the sample according to a codebook developed on the basis the above-developed ideational foundations of consensus democracy.363 In the following, I will outline the codebook and give examples for typical statements in the respective dimensions, which are mostly taken from parliamentary records.

1. The centrality of consensus and compromise A positive statement in this dimension counts: • presenting consensus as an ideal to be achieved in general, as being crucial for the working of the democratic system, or as being part of an ideal political culture

362 J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004; E Levintova, ‘Revisiting Russian and Polish elite value orientations: Are the elites still committed to the original goals of post-communist transitions?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 2006, p.179. 363 All parliamentary records for the mentioned period are available online at www.parlament.hu and www.bundestag.de in Hungarian and German respectively (last login: 20 October 2006). 104 • presenting cooperation and compromise between opposition and governmental parties as something necessary, useful or desirable in general, or for solving a particular problem • presenting an issue as requiring a consensual decision beyond the parties in government • formally asking one or several non-allied parties to join into consultations/negotiations/collective (beyond the normal debate in parliament or its committees) in order to find a commonly agreed solution to an issue • rhetorically diminishing the difference between government and opposition (e.g. by demanding a “responsible opposition” regardless of actual constitutional requirements e.g. for decisions by two-thirds’ majorities)

A negative statement in this dimension counts: • presenting consensus as something not generally necessary or useful, or as not carrying a value in itself for the working of the democratic system • expressing opposition to a proposed consensus solution on a particular issue, or praise for the achievements of certain results explicitly against the opposition of another party • demarcating the difference between government and opposition e.g. by refusing to take over joint responsibility for a certain decision, or declining an invitation to join negotiations for a consensus solution examples for consensus statements examples for majoritarian statements "Political culture is the culture of cooperation "Not every compromise is a good and compromise. This is lacking in our compromise" democracy." "I prefer clear majority votes over fishy deals “We prefer to have this law adopted by a with the opposition." consensus of all parties in parliament.” “This issue is of such an importance that it “We do not mind pulling through this law must be decided together by government and without the approval of party XY.” opposition.” “In spite of our 72% majority we never decided anything against the traditions of this parliament.”

105 “A serious/mature opposition would take “This government has its own way to do over its part of responsibility for this crucial things; we do not need your advice.” decision.” “This is an area of legislation where it is improper for the opposition to seek conflict with the government.”

2. Politicians as proponents of the “common good” As a positive statement in this dimension counts: • reference to “the national interest”, “our shared values” or similar denominators of common ground among all or most of the political parties • criticism of special or particular interests which stand against the national interest / the common good or similar • declaring an issue as not being suitable for political arguments, party politics or ideological debates • declaring an issue as being a scientific/technical question for whose resolution there is only one “true” answer

As a negative statement in this dimension counts: • reference to a socio-economic group (e.g. workers, farmers, business) in defining one’s position on an issue, or declaring to represent a particular socio-economic group without reference to superior categories representing the common good examples for consensus statements examples for majoritarian statements “This law serves our national interest.” “Our party rejects this law as it is contrary to the needs of smallholding farmers” “Don’t abuse this sensitive issue for political “The policies of your party make small arguments.” income earners worse off.” “Party politics has nothing to do in the field of “The government neglects workers’ interests education.” in their policies.” “There is not a leftist or rightist approach to the problem of XY, but only a national one / a correct one.”

106 “We are proposing the solution of this “Parties can only carry partial opinions, they problem on the basis of scientific expertise.” are not the general department of truth” “As politicians we have to tell the people “Coming from this region myself I know what where the truth lies with these problems.” it means to become an unemployed miner and therefore I cannot support this.” “I hope the minister regards himself as “My party and I stand for the interests of the serving the entire nation.” disadvantaged rural population”

3. The centrality of established procedures As a positive statement in this dimension counts: • praising / defending / arguing in favour of another constitutional body’s involvement in a particular decision (e.g. president, second chamber of parliament, constitutional court, central bank, ombudsman etc.) • demanding / arguing in favour of the strengthening of or defending co-decision or controlling rights for the parliament or other constitutional bodies in front of the executive • calling in the constitution in order to justify / defend one’s position or criticising an opponent by calling his/her proposals as not being constitutional • stressing the importance of certain formal procedures as a value in itself, even if at the cost of not coming to a final decision

As a negative statement in this dimension counts: • opposing / criticising / arguing against the participation of other constitutional bodies in a particular decision, or presenting them as superfluous / useless etc. in general • arguing against the increase of co-decision or controlling rights for the parliament or other constitutional bodies in front of the executive • denouncing certain formal procedures as impeding effective decisions, emphasising the value of effective decisions, or denying an inherent value to prescribed procedures examples for consensus statements examples for majoritarian statements “I am grateful for the valuable advice given to “This incomprehensible decision by the us by the President in his latest speech.” constitutional court will unfortunately prevent us from overhauling the pension system.”

107 “Only in banana-growing countries the “If we were to grant the same amount of government can overturn a decision of the speaking time to all MPs this parliament parliament.” would be unable to work.” “It’s good to consult with the Länder “Your party constantly abuses its majority in governments on this issue.” the Bundesrat [=second chamber] to obstruct our policies.”

4. Preserving the status quo As a positive statement in this dimension counts: • declaring the current constitutional system as ideal / the best possible / without alternative or similar • objecting to / denying the need for proposed changes to the constitution, or major reconfigurations of key political institutions364 (e.g. party law), or basic redistributive systems/socio-economic arrangements (basic social welfare systems, corporatist wage negotiations etc.)

As a negative statement in this dimension counts: • presenting the current constitutional system or certain parts of it as being outdated / no longer suitable / in need for change or similar • proposing / advocating / expressing support for changes to the constitution or major reconfigurations of key political institutions, or basic redistributive systems / socio- economic arrangements examples for consensus statements examples for majoritarian statements “We should not tinker with our well-balanced “This constitution was meant to be only institutions and this way upset our well- temporary. As it has become dysfunctional it working democracy.” needs to be replaced.” “What you call far-reaching reforms is in “We are having a which reflects reality undermining the social peace of this the situation of 30 years ago, which is no country.” longer sustainable and which is therefore in need for a paradigmatic/structural change.”

364 This excludes demands for changes towards more consensus institutions (see 3.). 108 5. Respect towards the other side As a positive statement in this dimension counts: • expressing support for / praising / mentioning favourably (the proposals of) another non-allied party or one of its members • expressing criticism for own party’s position • emphasising a continuity of policies after a change of government between different parties in power • asking for apology for one’s inappropriate remarks/behaviour towards the other side

As a negative statement in this dimension counts: • declaring another party or an individual politician from a different party as incompetent, irresponsible, or illegitimate to govern / to be in parliament • accusing other parties or individuals of having broken promises, or referring to him/her with derogatory characterizations • hold responsible a present or past government lead by another party for a certain problem • compare another party’s / coalition’s performance in government unfavourably to one’s own party’s/ coalition’s performance examples for consensus statements examples for majoritarian statements “I can only agree with what Mr/Mrs XY from “Party XY has proved its incompetence in [non-allied] party Z proposed.” solving the issue of unemployment when they “I thank all parties in the committee for their could not come up with a solution over the valuable contributions to our work.” last …. years.” “I have to say that I’m sorry for my “You were lying when you claimed that….” unfriendly heckling when you just spoke.” “You deceived your voters when you adopted this law.” “I see your old communist / undemocratic way of thinking is there again.” “Our economy is performing well and this is “The ongoing problems in the economy were our common success.” left to us by your party’s government.” “Both the coalition lead by party X and our coalition committed mistakes in the field of health reform.”

109 “Our government will continue the process of “Under my party’s government we reduced successfully reducing public debts started by public debts while you started to squander our predecessors in office.” again.”

Measuring consensualism: Coding and counting Statements are only counted towards the consensus/majoritarian indicator in this content analysis when they clearly matched one of the coding criteria.365 Ideally, the coding of the material should be undertaken by external, specially trained assistants and not by the author.366 Yet, in this case, this option was not feasible due to the financial constraints of the project. Nevertheless, in order to check the reliability, more than 50% of the material was coded for a second time after several weeks had elapsed and compared to the original results. This way the degree of coding concurrence between the two instances could be assessed and, in fact, proved to be quite high. Moreover, the analysis was done by alternating between the German and the Hungarian material, and between MPs from different parties in order to ensure a high degree of consistency and reliability across the entire sample.367 Surely, even with the most unambiguous codebook and the best coding specialists, this methodology will not completely close any room for interpretation to the coder. Despite these imperfections, my results appear quite clear and robust in terms of the overall patterns as will be shown below. Moreover, as mentioned above, my coding approach is more clear-cut and straightforward allowing for an easier application to other studies and testing by other scholars than Steiner et al.’s very sophisticated, highly differentiated approach. Surely, in both Steiner et al.’s and my study, contextual knowledge of current politics in the countries is needed in order to interpret MPs’ contributions. Nevertheless, while my coding instructions focus mostly on the form of arguing and look for the presence of certain key words, Steiner et al. are concerned with both form and content of the debates studied (e.g. coding the degree of justification, or changes of position). This is surely a more demanding task for the coder and leaves more room for interpretation (and possibly error).368 All instances of positive or negative statements in the five ideational dimensions of consensus democracy (identified according to the code book) were recorded, the balance

365 As the author speaks German as his mother tongue and is proficient in Hungarian he is in the position to work with the original material in both languages without intermediate translation. 366 Larger projects coding MPs speeches or interviews such as Putnam (1973) or Steiner et al. (2004) employed a number of specially trained assistants, but coding by the author is not unsual either (e.g. E Levintova, ‘Revisiting Russian and Polish elite value orientations: Are the elites still committed to the original goals of post-communist transitions?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 2006, pp.175-199). 367 This approach is recommended among others by R Putnam, 1973. 368 J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp.60-67. 110 calculated in each dimension and then overall per MP, party and country. Moreover, the “intensity” (i.e. the ratio of the statements’ balance per “speech unit”) was calculated. One speech unit includes all recorded verbal contributions of an MP to a single item on the parliamentary agenda on one day of session, regardless of length and frequency of the contribution(s).369 Thus, for example, a speech and a number of short interventions on the same item on the agenda on one day by an MP count as one unit. Two interventions on two different topics on one day, or two interventions on the topic but on different days, count as two units. In cases when only a heckling interruption (i.e. a loud remark during another MP’s speech) was recorded, this was not counted as a separate speech unit (although it was equally submitted to content analysis and counted towards the amount of negative or positive statements in a certain category, if applicable). This way, it was assured that speech units are comparable in average length between the two cases and differences in standing orders of the two parliaments accounted for.370 The balance of positive and negative statements per speech unit is thus a quantitative measure for the “intensity” and the “direction” (i.e. more consensual or more majoritarian) of MPs’ contributions in parliament in a specific ideational dimension.371 A Hungarian MP in the sample on average accumulated forty-nine speech units per parliamentary cycle, an East German MP thirty-seven speech units (see annex 4 table 1). The difference is mainly based on the fact that the Hungarian material covers a slightly longer period372, and the smaller size of the Hungarian parliament (thus allowing for more interventions in average for a single MP in the course of one parliamentary cycle).373 In general, members of smaller factions in average accumulated a larger number of speech units than members of the biggest factions, which is due to the non-proportional (i.e. consensualist) distribution of speaking time in the two parliaments.374 Also, those MPs who spoke much in 1998-2002 also continued to do so in the next parliamentary cycle, while those who were

369 For a similar coding (though independently developed approach) see J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp.55-56. The authors unit of analysis are debates, not individual MPs. 370 E.g. the Hungarian parliament’s standing order allows for more individual interventions which however are shorter in average length than in the German case. 371 For a similar coding scheme using dichotomous variables in coding texts see E Levintova, ‘Revisiting Russian and Polish elite value orientations: Are the elites still committed to the original goals of post-communist transitions?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 2006, pp.179-182. 372 While the cut-off point for both cases are the early German elections in 2005, Hungary’s parliamentary cycle in 2002 started a few months ahead of the German one. 373 The Hungarian parliament has 386 MPs, the German parliament of 2002-2005 had 603 MPs. 374 As the most extreme case the two PDS-MPs in the 2002-2005 Bundestag exhausted their statuary rights to deliver a short speech on virtually every single item on the parliamentary agenda and thus gathered more than 200 speech units each. Also, as the smallest faction in the 1998-2002 Bundestag PDS-MPs featured a high frequency of oral contributions, similarly members of SZDSZ and MDF in the Hungarian case. 111 rather reticent kept quiet later on as well.375 The use of a cumulated measure over a four-year period ensures the levelling out of possible temporary fluctuations which might distort a one- time measure (e.g. mid-term electoral campaigns or reactions to singular events). Therefore, my cumulative indicator gives a more reliable measure than a one-time measure such as a standardised questionnaire.

Consensualism in parliamentary speeches – a content analysis Patterns of consenualist and majoritarian statements From the quantitative results of the content analysis of the two parliamentary records there emerges quite a clear pattern: while the large majority of the Hungarian MPs in both electoral cycles have positive ratings in the first four ideational categories of consensus democracy, East German MPs (with the notable exception of PDS members) are rated negatively in all five dimensions. For PDS members the image is more mixed, but with quite a tendency towards more positive values (see annex 2). Thus, Hungarian MPs share an expressed preference for consensus as a practice (annex 2, table 1b). They present democratic politics predominantly as an undertaking which should aim at finding the common good rather than considering particular interests and view politicians as playing a crucial role in this regard (table 2b) They emphasise the value of formalised democratic procedures and the interplay between constitutional bodies (3b). They basically present the current political and socio- as the best possible solution denying the need for far-reaching changes (4b) (this, however, in a less uniform way as indicated by the values in the first three dimensions). Finally, Hungarian MPs are not respectful towards each other, according to the last indicator (5b). In turn East German MPs (with the notable exception of the PDS) seem not to be designating a particular value to consensus solutions in politics (annex 2, table 1a). They present democratic politics as being about the competition of different interests with politicians representing them (table 2a). They do not assign any particular value to formalized procedures (3a), or the existing institutional status quo (4a). Similar to Hungarian MPs, they are also not very respectful towards each other (5a). Only the PDS promotes a partially consensual outlook on democracy by emphasising procedures over outcomes (3a) and, interestingly, by arguing for the perseverance of the status quo of the existing (West German) system (4a).

375 The correlation between an individual MP’s number of speech units in the two cycles is 0,78 (excluding PDS). For a comparative perspective on individual MPs contributions in parliament see ‘Buzgó Rétorok és néma leventék, HVG, 28 January 2006, p.10. 112 These patterns basically stay the same for the two electoral cycles investigated and can confidently be taken as relatively stable and independent from contextual changes (such as the changeover of government in the Hungarian case in 2002).376 Drawing a scatter diagram in which each MP’s consensualism indicator in the first four categories marks a position on the x-axis for the 1998-2002 cycle (and the same indicator for the 2002-2005 period), we find a symmetrical pattern on the y-axis with points clustering close to the 45-degree line. This indicates identical positions for both x and y.377 Thus, we can be confident to be investigating phenomena which are not just temporary as they seem to persist beyond a four-year parliamentary cycle. Moreover, the clear separation between East German and Hungarian MPs becomes visible in terms of the individual indicators. During both parliamentary cycles, East German MPs predominantly figure negative values whereas Hungarians feature positive values in the first four indicators. Within the East German sample PDS-MPs feature a different configuration of these indicators, another indication of the explanatory power of my alternative model (see hypothesis 3).

[table 5 about here]

Thus, we find some preliminary support for the patterns expected in the hypotheses of the alternative model. Yet, before testing the discursive model of political culture in more detail (and investigating its relevance for CoD), the classical model of political culture will be tested for its plausibility This means taking the results from the content analysis as reflecting attitudes and investigating their association with individual background factors.

The plausibility of the classical model of political culture Testing the power of the explanatory variables for political culture along the lines of the classical approach entails the assumption that MPs’ statements reflect their attitudes.378 All MPs are under the same institutional constraints of the parliamentary setting in consensus democracy. Therefore, according to this model, differences in the respective consensualism indicators between MPs must be based in individual-level differences such as party affiliation,

376 The chance that the pattern found is just due to chance (null-hypothesis) is less than 5% for East Germany in all dimensions across the two cycles and in Hungary for all but the fourth dimension (z-tests on national level for both cycles, for East Germany calculated without PDS-MPs). The impact of incumbency will be tested separately further below. 377 The correlation coefficient of the consensualism indicator in the two cycles across all dimensions for the respective MPs is 0.71. 378 Scholars in this tradition would still make some additional assumptions about the impact of contextual factors such as incumbency, ongoing electoral campaigns or issue dimensions. My research design therefore refrains from taking a one-point measure and uses an averaged indicator for the entire electoral cycle. 113 time in office, age, etc. The impact of incumbency as a changing context and “deep” national cultural legacies will also be tested as other possible explanatory factors. In terms of quantitative results, the last dimension concerning inter-party conflict (annex 2, tables 5a/b) shows a similarity between all Hungarian and German MPs and does not allow for sophisticated differentiations and comparisons at this stage. In terms of quantitative measures, it does not follow my hypothesis. For this reason the following quantitative comparison focuses on the other four dimensions which do show clear differences between the two cases calling for explanation. Only at a later stage can a more qualitative approach investigate if the two cases really are as similar in this fifth dimension as they seem. Due to the limited amount of data it will not be possible to employ sophisticated statistical methods such as multivariate regressions. Pooling Hungarian and East German MPs allows for at least some basic comparisons and juxtapositions on the basis of a few background factors.379 Thus, the aim of this undertaking is not to fully disprove the classical model, but rather to demonstrate the explanatory strength of an alternative approach based on the notion of collective rather than individual socialization of political elites. At first we might wonder how far differences are based in deep cultural differences between Germany and Hungary (i.e. long-lasting historical differences between national political cultures). For this matter West Germany is an ideal control case as it shares the same “deep cultural” legacies as East Germany. In his famous work, Ralf Dahrendorf describes German politicians as being traditionally consensus-oriented, arguing in terms of the common good, looking for an ultimate synthesis to solve all problems, and being afraid of conflict and competition.380 Yet, according to my data, this long-lasting orientation does not seem to have re-emerged in the East German case, but does seem to have some validity for West German politicians. In all but the last dimension West German MPs show clearly positive indicators in four out of five subdimensions of a consensualist political culture (see annex 2, tables 1-5). In this regard, strangely enough, they seem more similar to the Hungarian than to the East German pattern. Therefore, it is hard to presuppose a strong impact of “deep national” political culture in this context (as we would expect this to lead to more of a convergence

379 For average measures across different groups every individual MP was given the same weight. This reflects the assumptions of the individualist, attitude-based model of Almond and Verba. An alternative approach using weighted measures depending on MP’s number of speech units did not change decisively the overall patterns reported in this place. 380 R Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, New York: W.W. Norton, 1979. 114 between East and West Germany).381 In how far these quantitative similarities in terms of consensualist statements really indicate a convergence between, say, Hungarian and West German (or more broadly West European) political culture will be discussed further below. For this, we will need to look also at qualitative aspects (i.e. the content of these statements). Variables concerning early life socialization do not play a very prominent role in most studies on elite political culture. Usually, socialization in office is viewed as having a stronger impact on politicians’ attitudes than socio-economic background.382 However, in most contemporary democracies it is not very convincing to expect these factors to (still) carry an equally strong explanatory value as in Putnam’s samples from the late 1960s and early 1970s. His representative samples combined Italian MPs with a background of socialization in a communist or fascist subculture, or British Eton- and Oxbridge-educated aristocrats together with trade union leaders from a background. By now, there is much less variation in these variables in contemporary Western democracies. Thus there is little value in testing, for instance, the impact of education on contemporary elite political culture as there are now very few MPs without a higher education in most European democracies. This lack of variation is, in fact, even more visible among politicians who grew up in rather egalitarian communist societies with relatively little social differentiation in terms of class, or income (as reflected in my Hungarian and East German samples).383 The same goes for factors such as education or gender, due to a comparatively modern and open educational system, as well as quite progressive policies concerning gender equality in the Soviet bloc. Therefore, it is also not surprising to find no clear differences based on geographical background for “attitudes” based on the mentioned indicators measuring the ideational components of consensus democracy across time. For the West German control sample of MPs with rural and urban backgrounds (in the tested 2002-2005 period) there are almost identical consensualism indictors in the first four dimensions. This supports the position that socio-economic

381 Interestingly the only West German born MP (representing an East German constituency) in my sample (SPD #2) is well in the average for all indicators among his East German colleagues rather than showing a pattern close to West German MPs (as one might expect). This finding further supports the notion that individual socialization through individual socio-economic background factors matters much less than collective socialization and the reproduction of context-dependent discourses in the specific context. 382 R Putnam 1976. 383 Few Hungarian MPs report significant amounts of additional income next to their parliamentary pay. Official declarations of MPs’ income are available at www.parlament.hu (last log-in 20 October 2006). German MPs are (so far) not required to publish additional income in numbers. However, the obligatory publication of sideline jobs indicates no potential sources of large-scale additional income for most East German MPs, either. If East German MPs do hold positions next to their parliamentary seat they are either moderately paid party positions and/or voluntary engagements in civil society organisations. This stands in contrast to a large number of West German MPs who often maintain part-time jobs such as in law firms and/or multiple well-paid positions in supervisory boards of corporate firms. (See websites of individual MPs at www.bundestag.de, last log-in 20 October 2006). 115 background factors seem to have generally lost strong explanatory power in explaining political culture.

[table 6 about here]

The small number of female MPs in the sample (due to their small share in both parliaments) prevents the testing of the impact of gender. Concerning religion, only East German MPs publish their religion if they are member of one of the officially recognized churches (Catholic or Lutheran) and thus do not allow for comprehensive comparisons.384 Again, these issues already demonstrate the limited value of the traditional explanations of socialization into different value systems based on socio-economic differences. This is especially true in the post-communist context, where political elites are rather undifferentiated due to the legacy of 40 years of levelled out social diversity. When testing the relationship between age and the indicators for consensualist statements we find little indication for the mechanism suggested by the classical model. Scatter-diagrams marking the MPs’ year of birth and the four mentioned indicators show a random pattern for both electoral cycles. They give no indication of a relationship between specific consensus-related attitudes and age. Also, there seem to be no visible generational patterns (as represented by a rather random distribution of data points in an even cloud). MPs that spent more of their life time under communism do not appear to hold attitudes particularly positive or negative in terms of a consensus-democratic political culture for any of the five indicators. Again, only the differences between Hungarian and East German MPs (with the exception of the PDS) become visible. Only West German MPs who were analysed for the 2002-2005 period score clearly on the positive side, differing from their East German colleagues.

[table 7 about here]

Beyond individual socio-economic variables there is one background factor, in the context of political socialization prior to obtaining public office, that might appear relevant indeed in the

384 See almanac of the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag, Kürschner’s Volkshandbuch Deutscher Bundestag, 2003). Neubert argues that a ‘protestant political culture’ surviving in East Germany throughout communism supported specific advantageous aspects of a democratic, post-communist East German political culture. It allowed for a focus on interpersonal communication, pragmatic, rational and ethical behaviour, as well as an emphasis on (E Neubert, ’The Political Culture of in the GDR’, in: D Berg-Schlosser, R Rytlewski (eds.), Political Culture in Germany, London: Macmillan, 1993, pp.153-169). 116 context of post-communist societies—individual membership in either the communist party or an opposition group prior to the beginning of democratic transition in summer/autumn 1989. This might lead to very different ways of socialization towards approaches of conflict and consensus. Yet there seems to be no stable pattern in this regard; for the 1998-2002 parliamentary cycle, opposition members show higher than average values for the consensus- related indicators (understood here as attitudes), while for the 2002-2005 cycle this is the case for former communists.

[table 8 about here]

Concerning political socialization in public office the classical approach supposes a gradual value internalisation through individual socialization into the political system (depending on time and position occupied). Yet, fifteen years after transition, East Germany’s political elites do not feature as consensualist a political culture as we would expect from their exposure to the system. Also, no visible change towards stronger consensualism can be observed between the two averaged periods spanning seven years for either the East German or the Hungarian case. In fact, due to the demonstrated viability of the well-working West German model and its immediate full implementation in East Germany in 1990, East German politicians should have adapted their political culture even more obviously and rapidly to consensus-based outlooks than their Hungarian colleagues (who did not have this experience, according to the model of individual socialization). Thus, we do not really find much support for a socialising impact of consensus-democratic institutions on individual MPs for the two parliamentary cycles covered. According to the data considering the contextual factor of incumbency in office, it is found not to have a great impact.385 Only in the third dimension (concerning the preference of procedures over outcomes) in both parliamentary periods opposition are MPs rated much higher than government-affiliated MPs. This is not really surprising since opposition MPs depend much more on their guaranteed procedural rights for having a say in national politics than government MPs. West German MPs, with the exception of the mentioned third dimension, show very similar distribution of consensualism values across opposition and incumbents.

[table 9 about here]

385 1998-2002 saw a Fidesz-led government in which MDF was a junior coalition partner and an MSZP-SZDSZ opposition, while an MSZP-SZDSZ government has been in power since 2002 facing a Fidesz-MDF-opposition. 117

MPs who occupied (or are currently occupying) a higher office in the executive or legislature (“frontbenchers”), and are thus to be expected to have a closer involvement and socialization into consensus democracy, do actually have higher consensualist indicators than average MPs (annex 8). Yet the differences are not huge.386 In the third dimension (concerning the preference for procedures over outcomes) for the 1998-2002 period, frontbenchers are much less consensualist than backbenchers. In the West German case MPs with experience in higher office and those without it score very similar values.

[table 10 about here]

There also appears to be no relationship between consensualism indicators and the time parliament was entered. The amount of time spent as an MP does not appear to influence consensualism either for the two post-communist samples or for the West German sample.

[table 11 about here]

Consensualism indicators do not seem to be associated with the type of parliamentary mandates of individual MPs (i.e. directly elected or list mandates). Classical approaches to political culture might make us expect to find differences here concerning dimensions two and three (e.g. with directly represented MPs more strongly representing particular constituent interests and interested in gaining particular outcomes for their voters). For West Germany, again, the very even distribution between the two is striking. This seems to be another indicator for the lack of relevance of these kinds of background factors in established democracies.

[table 12 about here]

Next to the factors of time and elite position ideology is also classified as a background factor which impacts attitudes in the classical model of political culture. Coding for different kinds of (partly overlapping) party-families (conservative, social democratic, leftist, post-

386 Coded as “higher office” were all MPs who occupied one of the following offices at any point between the first free elections in 1990 and summer 2005: government minister or state-secretary (the Hungarian “Àllamtitkár” or the German “Staatssekretär” – also on the Bundesland level), speaker or deputy speaker of parliament. 118 communist, liberal) does not bring out clear differentiations either. Interestingly, only post- communism seems to be associated with somewhat higher than average levels of consensualism indicators in the four dimensions during both parliamentary cycles. However, this is mostly due to the impact of the PDS (see above).

[table 13 about here]

In sum, the basic quantitative analysis did not establish much support for the classical model of political culture based on individual socialization. Key variables did not relate to individuals’ socio-economic background (such as age or geographical origin), nor did later socialization prior to or in public office (due to affiliation with the former regime, ideology, time in office, type of mandate or “front-bencher” status) show a visible and lasting impact on consensus-related attitudes. Some of these missing relationships can be attributed to the specific post-communist context with its lack of variation in individual socio-economic backgrounds. This is mainly due to the communist approach to modernization which levelled out socio-economic differences. Factors of post-recruitment socialization in general also appear to have little explanatory value. However, as mentioned above, this study cannot test for the possibility of a more sophisticated interaction between several of these variables due to the small number of cases and limited time frame. Again, my study does not aim at fully disproving the relevance of an attitude-based model of political culture. More sophisticated statistical analysis and a number of additional simplifying assumptions would improve the explanatory value of the classical model in this context. Nevertheless, already on this very basic descriptive level it is obvious that country (with East Germany counting separately from West Germany) is the most decisive variable in explaining variation in the indicators. Therefore, cross-national differences deserve special attention and specific, medium-term historical factors on the aggregate (rather than the individual) level appear to be a more promising source of explanation. The differences between Hungary and East Germany on the aggregate level cannot be explained, however, as being merely based in national historical legacies (since East and West Germany are shown to differ quite strongly). Consequently, a medium-term legacy-based explanation on the aggregate level as proposed in the discursive model of political culture appears reasonable, and shall be explored in the following. In short, explicit, rhetorical commitment of political elites to consensus democracy (without knowing whether it is

119 individually internalised) in the two cases appears to follow more the logic of collective rather than individual socialization.

The alternative model of political culture: shared discourses on democracy The methodology: discourse analysis and “qualitative cluster analysis” In order to give full support to the discourse-based model of political culture it now needs to be established how MPs justify their expressed consensus or majoritarian stances, and if they are indeed connected by shared discourses on democracy. It was shown above that an explanation of current CEE elite political culture (based in experiences of collective socialization) is more plausible than an explanation along the lines of the classical model with individual socialization. In order to establish how far political elites with a common experience of transition are indeed connected by shared collective representations of democracy, elite discourses shall be investigated for their inter-subjectivity (i.e. their properties which are shared across a group of people). Are there distinct figures of speech, ways of arguing, narrative conventions, or explanations in this regard which are shared by MPs across party lines, and different socio-economic backgrounds in the two cases? Do MPs in the two post-communist societies relate to distinct “toolboxes” of discursive conventions when talking about democracy? Do they share certain discursive representations of democracy, as opposed to various “model types” of politicians, with different rhetorical repertoires depending on their socialization within the polity (as described by Kéri)?387 How far do these collective representations go back into history and what kind of empirical references are made to support arguments? Do they refer to (or even idealize) certain elements of the collective memory in a logical and coherent way? In a second step, the discourses will then be discussed in the context of the existing democracies and the implications for CoD outlined. For this, discourses will be related to current CEE politics and ongoing political debates in the two countries. Additional material will also be drawn in from the media, as well as academic studies from international, Hungarian and German authors. In how far did elite discourses enable or constrain behaviour as “appropriate”? For this investigation structured interviews were conducted with the Hungarian and East German MPs in the sample and then subjected to discourse analysis. Questions in the interviews focused on the five above-developed dimensions of consensus/majoritarian democracy (see annex 3). MPs’ answers are analysed by applying a “qualitative cluster

387 L Kéri, ‘The Socialization Process for Hungary’s New Political Elites’, in: F Farnen, H Dehler, R Meyenberg-Gerau (eds.), Democracy, Socialization and Conflicting Loyalties in East and West, London: Macmaillan, 1996, pp.292-303. 120 analysis”388. This means to establish those discourses which were widely used and shared across each sample, and the major counter-themes to these discourses. In the analysis I try to stick as closely as possible with the verbatim material when arranging and summarizing the findings. I try to be sensitive to fine distinctions and, whenever appropriate, use direct quotes to illustrate the different nuances of a particular discourse.389 Unlike previous quantitative analysis I will refrain from immediate categorisation of my material. Instead, I choose to work in a more inductive fashion, letting the material speak for itself without categorisation (which inevitably removes meaning from its context).390 The central themes and frames found will be substantiated by footnotes identifying the MPs subscribing to them in order to demonstrate, in particular across party lines, the extent to which a certain discourse is shared. Moreover, I also take note if in a certain domain there are no clearly recognizable common discourses, unexpected themes and frames, or anti- hegemonic discourses. References to findings of other studies which substantiate or question my findings will be made. Discourses will also be located within their political context (e.g. current or historical events, or important domestic debates to which they make references). For further examples secondary material from the media will be used. Thus, the grounding of elite discourses in empirical reality (a major indicator for the validation of discursive political culture) will be explored, too. Finally, the findings are compared across my two cases by the juxtaposition of the summarized major discourses in each section. In addition, I will pay particular attention to those MPs who had particularly high values in certain dimensions in the previous content analysis and who thus represent either extreme cases within the expected pattern, or extreme outliers. Their in-depth answers to the interview questions (and possibly a look at their individual background) can help to understand the extent of a certain discourse, its variations and limits. In short, by a close comparison between the two cases differences in the way preferences for consensus or majoritarian democracy are being justified (and the sources of these discourses) shall be established. The lack of some clearly distinguishable major discourses which are shared across party lines (but not across countries) and/or which cannot be grounded in transition dynamics would refute the hypotheses of my discourse-based model of political culture. At the same time, the basic, rather stable patterns found in the previous

388 T Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics – Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1995 & 1999, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002, pp.23-33; L Edles, 1998, pp.22-25; J Dryzek / L Holmes, 2002, p… 389 Also, all interviews were conducted and analysed by the author. In case of a few uncertainties concerning the translation of particular statements in the Hungarian texts, several native speakers of very different age, gender and social backgrounds were asked for advice in order to ensure the highest possible reliability. 390 T Hopf, 2002, p.25. 121 quantitative analysis need to be reflected in the interview data in order to be able to conceive of a relevant habitus. Thus, results confirmed via triangulation of these two very different methods can be regarded as rather robust. Unlike positivist scholars I do not uphold the claim of being able to rise to a completely objective point of view. Instead I apply a verstehende perspective in investigating how political elites make use of certain discourses. An approach which involves the investigation of spoken or written language as its main empirical source cannot be completely objectivist, as language is (at least partly) subjective.391 Consequently, a more interpretive, constructivist methodology like this discourse analysis should not be seen as competing with mainstream positivist scholarship. Rather, it should be viewed as compensating the latter’s most obvious limitations, such as the danger of rationalist or psychological reductionism (but also not being free of shortcomings either). While the previous quantitative approach was useful in establishing basic patterns of consensual and majoritarian speech, this qualitative investigation aims at establishing more subtle relationships. In this regard I intend to follow some promising recent studies in the field which do indeed break up the existing orthodoxies and make use of both positivist and more interpretative approaches in one and the same study.392 Therefore, it is best to try to be conscious, self-critical and sincere about shortcomings in every approach. By starting of from a quantitatively established pattern and by being as explicit as possible about my framework, method of analysis, and sources (which are freely available and/or reproducible) I allow for the replication and possible refutation or correction of my results. In this context, critics might claim that MPs possibly justify their stance on consensus or majoritarian democracy in a different way when interviewed by a (foreign) student of political science than when talking in other contexts. Although this is rather unlikely,393 it

391 According to Ludwig Wittgenstein language is inextricably connected with understandings of life. Removing language from this proper context (e.g. for scientific analysis) therefore creates philosophical problems. A common understanding of language would in fact require a common understanding of life (L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe), New York: Macmillan, 1953). 392 Marc Howard (2003) in his study on civil society in CEE first uses existing survey data to establish major quantitative differences in civil society participation between Post-Communist and other democratic societies while semi-structured interviews are used to establish the reasons why people do not join civil society organisations. 393 All interviewees were asked for permission to tape, reproduce and publish the interviews. Thus, their statements are in fact no longer restricted to remain in the private realm (i.e. differing from the context of an informal conversation among two people). This way the statements gain public quality, if only in the limited realm of academia where they might be made available and attributable. Moreover, most interviewees made explicit that they will not debate any personal points of view nor reveal any information which was not already publicly available. In fact, most MPs seemed to approach the interviews as they would approach an official, publishable interview with an unknown journalist. They often also explicitly pointed towards existing sources such as their websites for further elaboration on particular issues and therefore clearly situating the interview in a public discursive field. Finally, also the fact that the interviews reflect very well the patterns of statements found 122 would not necessarily undermine the testing of my hypotheses. In other words, if many MPs “lied” to me in the same fashion, by using the same discursive frames and figures, this would already tell something about the legitimatising strength and political relevance of these discourses (e.g. in front of Western audiences). Thus, unlike other interview data in other elite studies,394 I do not need to take the honesty of my interviewees for granted. Consistency and credibility (i.e. in applying the right vocabulary and relating to existing rhetorical frames and empirical reality in order to “ring true”) rather than sincerity matters in promoting a certain objective. I will now turn to the analysis of the material which is again approached according to the above-developed dimensions of consensus/majoritarian democracy. I will proceed as follows: for all five dimensions of consensualism I will present both Hungarian and East German MPs’ answers to the respective questions in sticking very closely with the verbatim material and making numerous references. I focus in particular on those discursive elements which are particularly prominent, but also show unexpected or counter-hegemonic themes. In a third part the major discourses in each dimension for the two cases are contrasted with each other, and a thick interpretation based on the different historical dynamics of the transition process is developed and evaluated in the light of the above formulated hypotheses. Alternative explanations from the existing literature are considered and discussed as well. Furthermore, findings for other countries of the region are being explored in order to consider the scope conditions of the hypotheses. Finally, in a more speculative way, discourses in the different dimensions are being evaluated for their potential as forming a habitus supporting the consolidation of consensus democracy. In the following four sections I will thus lay out the discourses of political elites in Hungary and East Germany on consensus democracy, discuss their form, content and extent, contrast them with each other, and, more tentatively, discuss their implications for the future of democracy in the context of the existing institutional set-up.

Consensus and compromise: Panacea or expensive luxury? First, I investigate the way MPs relate to consensus as a democratic practice: how do MPs explain and justify an expressed support for more consensus-oriented or more competitive practices in the democratic system as established in the quantitative analysis? In how far are

in the quantitative analysis (see below) gives us little reason to assume that MPs spoke and argued quite differently on the issues covered in the interview setting. The (qualitative) discourse analysis thus also serves to confirm the results of the (quantitative) content analysis through triangulation. 394 E.g. R Putnam, 1973; R Rohrschneider, 1999. 123 the same justifications advanced across party lines in Hungary and East Germany respectively? What other explanations exist in the literature to explain these stances and what evidence can be found to support or question my own approach? Finally, what kind of practical constraints does a consensualist or majoritarian habitus in this regard pose to consolidating consensus democracy (i.e. how does it mediate the way political elites use and further develop the democratic system)? According to my hypotheses and suggested by the aforementioned quantitative data, we expect discourses supportive of consensus politics for Hungarian MPs and the opposite for East German ones which is also confirmed by the analysis: a) In Hungary the term “consensus” is overwhelmingly framed in very positive terms. Hungarian MPs across party lines present consensus as something inherently valuable and in many areas as indeed necessary or even indispensable. There is a striking similarity across all parties in stressing the need to address some fundamental issues such as social and economic reforms or the demographic decline in a consensual way between the (two big or all four) parties. At the same time the constant lack of consensus in Hungarian politics is deplored and blamed on a deficient political culture.395 Certain problems are presented as being too important or too severe to be left to a majority decision by the parties in government. Moreover, there is suspicion that a simple majority decision in parliament would not lead to a balanced and just outcome. It is lamented by many that through the changeover of government every four years the previous government’s major policies would be undone and reversed.396 One MP mentions the difficulty in making weighted decisions, as there is “always someone hurt”.397 Thus it seems that, according to this widely shared discourse, only co-operation and consensus would allow for continuous progress in crucial fields. As one MP put it, rather than creating artificial divisions and problems the parties should “get together in order to solve the real problems”.398 The assumed existence of “two Hungaries” (as called by a number of MSZP-MPs) or generally the existence of “two camps” in the political landscape is presented as a major impediment to Hungarian politics and blamed for the lack of positive reputation for the political elites.399

395 SZDSZ #1, 3, 4, 5, 6, Fidesz #3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 MSZP #1, 5, 6, 8, 9, MDF #1, 3. 396 Fidesz #5, SZDSZ #3. 397 Fidesz #2. 398 Fidesz #7. 399 MSZP #5, 6, 8, MDF #1, Fidesz #3, 5, 6. 124 Members of the coalition parties assure their willingness to cooperate with the opposition on major issues while at the same time criticising them for not being constructive enough, for conducting smear campaigns or spoiling the atmosphere. Opposition MPs equally accuse the parties in government of doing the same.400 Moreover, members of the opposition deplore the lack of cooperative gestures from the government and accuse them of being populist and interested in short-term gains only.401 Interestingly, self-criticism or criticism for one’s own party appears rather marginal among all Hungarian MPs.402 Only one MP associates the term “consensus” negatively by making references to the Kádárist “National People’s Front” which was meant to embody the unity of all major interest groups and organisations in a socialist society (the so-called “transmission belts”). This MP did not see the urge for the creation of what he calls “National Fronts” or grand coalitions, as Hungary was not in danger of making this necessary. Rather than aiming for compromises “parties should try to win elections”.403 This exceptional anti-consensus view is contrasted by another MP who even included consensus in his definition of democracy.404 Another MP remarked that he was well aware that a multi-party system goes hand in hand with disputes and of words, but “one shouldn’t view this as the essence of politics.”405 Moreover, some of his colleagues made positive references to countries succeeding in the creation of a national consensus, mentioning in particular the Spanish Moncloa Pacts where the major political parties decided about post-Franco Spain’s political and economic development by consensus.406 One MP even calls for the inclusion of other societal participants beyond the political parties (i.e. civil society, unions, the media, etc.) into an overall consensus or corporatist approach to politics.407 In sum, consensus and accommodation is presented as an ideal worth pursuing and something which still needs to be achieved in Hungary. In a way, consensus appears to be presented as panacea to overcome all serious problems the country faces. A deficient political culture rather than a lack of willingness is blamed for the failure of consensus politics in Hungary. The roots for this deficient political culture and the lack of consensus are widely seen in post-transition politics, where both camps see their respective time in government as a

400 MSZP #1, 6, 9, Fidesz #2, 3, 4, 5, SZDSZ #1, 4, MDF #3. 401 Fidesz #2, 3, 4, 8. 402 SZDSZ #3, Fidesz #6. 403 MDF #2. 404 Fidesz #6. 405 MSZP #5. 406 SZDSZ #3, MSZP #8. 407 Fidesz #6. 125 period during which there were attempts made to include the other parties but cooperation became impossible and decisions were undone when the “other side” came into power.408 b) In great contrast to Hungarian MPs, East German MPs clearly do not present consensus as a value in itself. Instead, facing reality and implementing clear solutions and successful reforms is presented as being more important than the achievement of compromise.409 Both government and opposition MPs mostly characterize consensus and compromise as useful and good if achieved, but often infeasible and usually being rather an impediment to decisive reforms. In fact, many stress the need of the respective government to carry responsibility for its policies on its own. It should not look for someone to take over a part of the job.410 Many MPs make clear that they generally preferred consensus411 but that “Germany can no longer afford consensus”,412 that too much time was lost in finding it413 or that there should not be “consensus at any price”.414 Working together would not necessarily mean the need to find compromises in the end.415 One MP argues that Germany has too many compromises which cannot be put into action. Therefore, instead of two dysfunctional compromises he would prefer two clear decisions, even if he could realize his ideas only in one of them and would the other see being made by a political opponent.416 Another one even talks in a disparaging way about his strong dislike for “consensus pulp” (“Konsenssoße”).417 Thus, consensus is not seen negatively, though its achievement is not presented as a goal in itself. The consensus-oriented institutional structure of the German political system, in particular the second chamber of parliament representing the interests of the Länder (Bundesrat), is blamed for the failure to achieve far-reaching changes.418 Hence competition for the best ideas should prevail rather than compromises.419 This majoritarian outlook is also part of the underlying notion of democracy advanced by some MPs: non-voters are presented

408 Fidesz #5, SZDSZ #3. 409 CDU#1, 2, 3, SPD#7, PDS#6, 8. 410 SPD#1, CDU#4, 5. 411 CDU#2, 3, Green#1, SPD#4, 5, 10, PDS#6, 8. 412 Green#1. 413 SPD#10. 414 CDU#2. 415 PDS#6. 416 CDU#5. 417 CDU #2. 418 SPD#1. 419 CDU#2, 5, SPD #8. 126 as the greatest danger to democracy “because they let a minority decide”,420 as consensus is precisely about the minority’s veto to decisions by the majority. This rather sceptical stance towards consensus politics is also reflected in some PDS MPs’ remarks.421 Yet, among PDS MPs, we also find some very supportive statements of consensualist politics which cannot be found within other parties. Thus, a PDS MP declared the Scandinavian Konkordanzdemokratie as her preferred model of politics422 while others demand more consultation with societal organisation such as unions and churches, or a cross- party consensus to fight .423 Another MP stated great disappointed with West German democracy as there is too little consensus, too many decisions over people’s heads and too much party power. For her, democracy means “protecting minorities”. 424 This stands against most other East German MPs who advance a definition of democracy as primarily being built on the majority principle: democracy is where the majority decides, be it with a one vote margin.425 In sum, East German MPs present themselves as less supportive of consensus approaches to political decision-making. While not opposing the idea of co-operation and consensus, there is much stronger agreement and emphasis on the need for political competition and the fight for better arguments. Compromise is often presented as being both costly and retarding real decisions. The picture is less clear with regards to PDS MPs, who seem to be divided on the issue if not pro-consensus. This preference for a competitive democratic system is already reflected in a survey of MPs in the first (and last) freely elected parliament of the GDR in spring 1990. When asked about their preferred model of parliament 50% of MPs support the option of a “dual model” (i.e. a parliament which is clearly divided along the lines of government and opposition with the latter presenting itself as a critical counter-balance and government in waiting). Among West German MPs in 1990 a relative majority of 39% favoured a “separation of powers”- model in which parliament as a whole serves as a counterbalance or veto player to the government (the “dual model” was supported by only 34%).426 The 1990 GDR-parliament is widely seen as the breeding ground for the first post-unification East German political elites with as much as 30% of MPs from the 1990 Volkskammer still active in regional, federal or

420 SPD#1, 2, 9. 421 PDS#6, 8. 422 PDS#7. 423 PDS#2, 5. 424 PDS #3. 425 CDU #2, SPD #4. 426 B Scholz, ’Bundestag und Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.281-283. 127 European politics in 1999.427 This obviously contributed to the promotion of different understanding of parliamentarian democracy as compared to West German MPs. In her study, Jennifer Yoder found East German members of regional (i.e. Länder) parliaments to be actually more consensus-oriented than their West German colleagues.428 As national MPs’ criticism for consensus democracy is strongly focused on the powers of the Länder-chamber in parliament (Bundesrat) there might be a latent conflict between East German MPs on the national and regional level. The Bundesrat is the major forum for representing regional interests on the national level, and few regional MPs will seriously argue against this institution. This should caution us against generalising too far from our findings beyond the national level of politics. Also, as outlined above, East German MPs are not against consensus per se. Rather, they make their preference for it conditional upon other factors (resources, time, and results). This is also reflected in the 2003/2004 telephone survey conducted by Best et al. in which around 95% of East German and around 85% of West German MPs respond positively to the question of “whether one should seek consensus even if one is right in a political conflict”.429 My interview data does not contradict but relativises this finding, thus exposing the limitations of using fixed survey questions as opposed to semi- structured, open-ended-question interviews. The following table juxtaposes some typical statements for the two cases showing their contrasting positions on the ideal of consensus in democratic politics.

Hungary East Germany Consensus on major issues is crucial to avoid Consensus is sometimes useful but mostly setbacks. unrealistic or not feasible. Consensus as an ideal still to be achieved in Competition and clear decisions are better Hungary than compromise at any price which might The Spanish Moncloa Pact is a positive impede progress. example of a national consensus. Bundesrat as a negative example for political delay through consensus mechanisms.

427 C Hausmann, ‘Die 10. Volkskammer der DDR 1990: Elitenpool der ersten Stunde’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, p.540; H Schöne, ’Vereinheitlichung und Diversität: Elitenintegration im Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, p.575. 428 J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999, pp.129-131. 429 H Best / M Edinger / K Schmitt / S Jahr, ’Zwischenauswertung der Deutschen Abgeordnetenbefragung 2003/04 – Gesamtergebnis’, Sonderforschungsbereich 580, Friedrich-Schiller Universität Jena, online http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/a3.0.html, last accessed 20 October 2006. 128 c) Having outlined and contrasted the findings from the discourse analysis of in-depth interviews and further secondary sources, I will now go own to explore the sources of these collective representations of consensus democracy and discuss their impact on CoD. Hungarian MPs and East German MPs draw on two very distinct rhetorical images of their polity. Hungarian MPs are united in portraying compromise and consensus as part of their normative constitution (i.e. their self-defining convictions and norms) which are presented as natural and which have to be respected.430 At the same time, another rhetorical frame designates Hungarian political elites as usually incompetent in achieving this ideal. Different political parties and camps claim superiority in interpreting and achieving this ideal, while their political opponents are claimed to still be further away from it. This finding prompts us to restate the conceptual interconnectedness of all five ideational components to be relevant for the working of consensus democracy: undermining the legitimacy of the potential partner in consensus politics will inhibit rather than foster the finding of consensual solutions, even when all sides assure their support for this approach. As I will show below, the lack of respect towards “the other” is a major obstacle in Hungarian consensus democracy which undermines the otherwise favourable discursive foundations for consensus democracy in the other dimensions. East German MPs (with the partial exception of PDS members), in stark contrast to Hungarian MPs, promote a competitive image of politics as an ideal which is contrasted with the time- and resource-consuming processes of finding compromises in reality. What are the sources of these diverging collective representations in the two very similar political systems? According to some authors Hungary’s political landscape is traditionally characterized by a strong inclination to consensus-oriented decision-making. Some relate this trait back to the post-1956 situation with Hungary’s milder version of communism under János Kádár. After the failed revolution, Kadar, allowed Hungary a somewhat greater degree of pluralism (as well as economic and social deviationism) than other communist countries. This required a more sensitive, less imposing political style which is claimed to live on in the new polity.431 Others trace this approach even further back in time by pointing towards the 1867 Ausgleich with the Austro-Hungarian , and the legalistic traditions developed in this context.432

430 I borrow the expression from C Cruz, 2000, p.310. 431 R Tökés, Hungary’s negotiated revolution – Economic reform, social change and political succession, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 432 A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, p.145; A Seleny, ‘The Foundations of Post-Socialist Legitimacy’, 129 In a different study, Anna Seleny argues for a traditional persistence of consensus practices in Hungary which she uses as a main factor in explaining the Hungarian “compromise-corporatist” model of democratic consolidation. Seleny points out that many practices of post-communist politics can be traced back to pre-transition cultural legacies of political interaction and dominant frames of conflict. In the content analysis of parliamentary speeches outlined above, three Socialist MPs (MSZP#3, MSZP#4, and MSZP#9, see annex 2, table 1b) show the highest value for this dimension. This underpins the view that support for consensus politics might already have been developed prior to transition, as all three mentioned MPs were already communist party members and active in professional politics at different levels during the old regime. My argument is in line with Seleny’s findings, as it does not claim that all dimensions of elite political culture developed or were “invented” only during transition. In fact, multilateral transitions by definition contain a higher degree of discursive continuity from the old regime as the system came not to be de-legitimised as strongly as in unilateral cases. Nevertheless, in my model cultural legacies from the old regime need to go through the “filter” of transition as a discursive mechanism (e.g. by active transmission, re-articulation and re-legitimisation of certain discourses and practises by political elites). That is why Seleny’s approach cannot quite explain why Hungarian political elites tend to stick to this ideal regardless of very confrontational politics. She observes this as being particularly so since the 1998 elections and the advent of the centre-right Orbán government, and the rise of the extreme-right MIÉP. How should the ideal live on if it is no longer practised? My approach focuses more on consensus as a rhetorical ideal, as an argument or a symbol rather than a “habit”. This way notions of compromise and consensus are points of reference to a romanticised past, to instances of national convergence and consensus such as 1867, the “Kádár consensus” in the 1960s and 70s, or the 1989 round-table talks (with the Spanish Moncloa talks as a role model) when both government and opposition followed self- limiting, gradualist and accommodative approaches (“radical reformism” etc.).433 While the ideal of consensus democracy as in 1989 can rarely be sustained in practice in the upheavals of post-transition politics, it obviously is still a powerful symbol. The rhetorical value of it can bolster one’s own credibility or, alternately, shame a political in: A Braun, Z Barany (eds.), Dilemmas of Transition – The Hungarian Experience, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, pp.131-154; A Seleny, ‘Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies – Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland’, World Politics, Vol.51, July 1999, pp.481-519. 433 J Kis, ‘Between Reform and Revolution’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.12, No.2, spring 1998, pp.300-383. 130 opponent. It does not have to be internalized and constantly practised, however. Thus, independently from people’s private attitudes and actual behaviour in the short run, non- consensual practices are to be condemned or deplored, and one’s own willingness to compromise constantly needs to be underlined in this context. One of the latest prominent examples for this was Prime Minister Medgyessy’s (rather unrealistic) proposal in 2004 to have all Hungarian parliamentary parties agree on a common list for the first elections to the after joining the EU. In this way, the common commitment of all major parties to the European project would be demonstrated symbolically and divisions on this crucial issue be avoided.434 The mere fact that such a proposal had the chance to be advanced officially by the Prime Minister (regardless of its minuscule chances for success) demonstrates the high political significance and value which is assigned to consensualist practices if only as a means to promote one’s own legitimacy. Different camps or parties simultaneously ask for consensual practices while attempting to monopolize the definition of who is better to achieve this ideal. Only at some points is the ideal of a national consensus (the mentioned “Golden Age”) revived. Such occasions may occur when negotiations among the four major political parties are initiated (usually in order to find compromises on key legislation). This is often, but not always, required due to a high number of key legislative items requiring two thirds majorities according to the Hungarian constitution. These meetings mostly have rather mixed results. At the same time this rhetorical frame or point of reference makes it hard for politicians arguing in favour of more competitive politics to justify their position, as they are proposing something far away from the “field of the imaginable”.435 According to Kim Scheppele this consensus-seeking, negotiated approach has also characterised the relationship between the parliament and another veto player in Hungarian democracy – the constitutional court. Through repeated rounds of law-making and subsequent rulings on the constitutionality of legislation, parliament and the powerful court tried (and often managed) to reconcile sometimes diametrically opposed positions.436 This discourse on the need to unite behind some kind of national consensus, and the task of political elites to create the foundations for this consensus, is in fact also a wide-spread topic in Hungarian academia, media and even literature. National consensus is presented as something which gave Hungary strength against external threats while the lack thereof is

434 See various articles in Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Nemzet, Népszabadság and Népszava in March 2004. 435 Cruz, 2000. 436 K Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Negotiations – Political Contexts of Judicial Activism in Post-Soviet Europe’, International Sociology, Vol.18, No.1, March 2003, pp.222-227. 131 often seen as the reason for failure and disaster (such as the Turkish occupation in the 16th century) or the loss of two thirds of after (the so-called “trauma of Trianon”). New (perceived) threats through EU accession and globalisation have reinforced this collective representation. This way, the discourse on consensus is even further legitimised and popularised. Journalists, intellectuals or other prominent personalities repeatedly call on their political leaders to put together a consensus on all kinds of issues deemed to be decisive, be it EU accession, economic reform, or others.437 Even well-known Hungarian social scientists join the choir calling for a new “elite pact”. This includes demands for pacts to stabilise fiscal policy, social welfare reform438, or even (somewhat bizarre) calls for a new elite consensus in order to solve “the “quantitative and qualitative decline of the population, the crisis of morals, [… and to secure the] safeguarding and strengthening of our culture, especially the preservation of our identity within the European Union” by some Hungarian scholars.439 There appears to be some kind of desperate desire to agree on something, contrasting the rather inimical relations and lack of mutual respect between the major political parties and camps which will be discussed further below. Thus, it was shown that explicit support for consensus appears to be an almost inadmissible part of Hungarian politicians’ habitus. Moreover, it was discussed in how far the experience of historical junctures (such as the negotiated transition of 1989) served to (re-) legitimise this approach, and in how far this explanation differs from more general explanations based in “national culture”. Beyond that, I will also outline in a more tentative way how this observation can help to understand specific problems in the consolidation of Hungarian democracy. The continuous reference paid to consensual politics raises high expectations towards political elites, as mere majority decisions on particularly sensitive topics are then thought of as being inferior in terms of their legitimacy. This in turn creates pressures for government majorities to abstain from passing particularly controversial or extensive decisions without a super-majority, even if they are not required to seek them in constitutional terms. Thus, far- reaching policy changes are then much harder to achieve regardless of existing institutional constraints in terms of veto players. A prominent example in this regard is the debate about the so-called Bokros-package of 1995. Named after the then Socialist Minister of Finance this

437 E.g. ‘Összehangolt cselekvés – Gondolatok egy középtávu társadalmi-gazdaságpolitikai megállapodásról’, Népszabadság, 27 September 2003; ‘A jobboldal visszaigazolást vár’, Népszabadság, 23 December 2003; ‘Bokros csomag: iskola- és kórházbezárás, minimálbér-eltörlés…’, Magyar Nemzet, 28 August 2006. 438 D Gyôrffy, 2006, pp.252-254. 439 K Kulcsár, ‘The new political system and the Hungarian reality’, Central European Political Science Review, Vol.6, No.19, spring 2005, p.36. 132 austerity package adopted on the verge of economic crisis included a sharp devaluation of the Hungarian Forint, the introduction of a crawling peg, a surcharge for imports, far-reaching wage and social welfare cuts, a strong reduction in public investments and public employment, as well as the introduction of study fees. It also started to transform the pension system into a partly capital-funded system and paved the way for far-reaching cash-generating privatisations of state-owned enterprises to foreign investors.440 This measure stood in stark contrast to Hungary’s very gradualist and accommodative approach to economic transition and social welfare reform. It could be argued that only the Bokros package concluded the Hungarian economic transition. In fact, the Bokros package was the only real “majoritarian” measure in Hungarian politics. This far-reaching policy was implemented without consultation between the major parties and constitutional bodies and in the context of otherwise very moderate, gradualist and accommodative policies. Having built their overwhelming electoral victory in 1994 on the promise for negotiations towards a far- reaching social-economic pact, the social-liberal Horn government endeavoured to negotiate an agreement with the Interest Reconciliation Council (i.e. the major tripartite corporatist forum) on a transformation strategy for the next three years. Thus, despite its supermajority in parliament, the Horn government employed very accommodative approaches to decision- making.441 Attila Ágh claims that Prime Minister Horn basically wanted to follow the Spanish Moncloa Pact, which has served as a powerful example and success story in Hungarian politics (which is also reflected in my interviews).442 According to David Stark and László Bruszt, the Horn government initially wanted to use negotiations and collective deliberation with the corporatist interest groups over the social pact to educate the public over the hardships yet to come. Then major actors, such as Finance Minister Bokros, decided that there is not such a thing as “deliberation in an emergency room” (i.e. the government went on to impose its measures after the failure of the negotiations and being faced with a looming major financial crisis).443 Prime Minister Horn gave a free hand to a few trusted top policy makers around Bokros who, in a coup-like fashion, announced the package surprising both politicians and the public. While this kind of secretive, top-down imposed “shock therapy” was not previously unseen in other countries of the region (or other countries undergoing economic

440 B Greskovits, ‘Consolidating Economic Reforms: the Hungarian Experience with Lessons for Poland, CASE- CEU Working Papers Series, No.31, Warsaw, 1999; D Gyôrffy, ‘ in a Low-Trust Environment: The Difficulties of Fiscal Adjustment in Hungary’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.58, No.2, March 2006, pp.239-259. 441 B Greskovits, 1999, p.17. 442 A Ágh, ‘Early Consolidation and Performance Crisis: The Majoritarian-Consensus Democracy Debate in Hungary’, West European Politics, Vol.24, No.3, July 2001, p.99. 443 D Stark / L Bruszt , Post-Socialist Pathways – Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.172-175. 133 transition) it came particularly unexpected in the Hungarian context due to the extreme consensualist discourse into which it burst like a bomb. The Bokros package was exceptional in so far as, for the first time, large parts of mass society were antagonized and disadvantaged in favour of a small entrepreneurial class whose strengthening was a major goal of the package. Moreover, it challenged the existing socio- economic status quo, in particular the role of the state in the economy and the extensive “premature welfare state,”444 and was strongly outcome-oriented. In this regard, it also differed from previous crises such as the so-called “taxi blockade” in October 1990. Thus, employing the above-mentioned dimensions of consensus democracy, it was the precise opposite of consensus. While according to most experts the Bokros package was successful in stabilising the Hungarian economy and the state budget,445 domestically it came to be seen as a political failure. This view also reflected the constitutional court’s ruling which declared void parts of the package due to its violation of certain procedures. Finance Minister Bokros consequently resigned from his post. At that time the constitutional court enjoyed popularity ratings of 90% as opposed to plummeting support for the government.446 Thus, while the economic consequences of the Bokros package have, with hindsight, proved overwhelmingly beneficial for Hungary, it continues to be presented as a negative political legacy in the light of the consensus-favouring discourses. Since its implementation the package has been constantly condemned by the great majority of politicians even from within the then social-liberal coalition for the way it was imposed on society. The term “Bokros package” or “XY package” (with XY standing for the contemporary prime minister or minister of finances) was soon turned into a populist slogan used to mobilize resistance against any kind of (fiscal) reform policies. The term Bokros-package has become a negative denominator for any kind of austerity measure proposed or implemented. In my interview sample, a younger Fidesz-MP refers to his forming experience as a student by the Bokros- package; he cites the imposition of study fees as the reason for having entered professional politics.447 A younger MSZP-MP restates the general criticism of the way it was imposed on society, although it achieved the desired outcomes.448 Thus, every new government has to convincingly assure society that it does not plan a new “Bokros”-package in order not to lose popularity (e.g. the re-elected Gyurcsány government in 2006 which is widely viewed to be

444 J Kornai, The Socialist System: The of Communism, Princeton University Press, 1992. 445 M Brusis, V Dimitrov, ‘Executive configuration and fiscal performance in post-communist central and eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.8, No.6, pp.899-900. 446 K Scheppele, ‘Constitutional Negotiations – Political Contexts of Judicial Activism in Post-Soviet Europe’, International Sociology, Vol.18, No.1, March 2003, p.233. 447 Fidesz #1. 448 MSZP #1. 134 under pressure to implement far-reaching austerity measures for preparing the accession to the EURO). Thus the Hungarian consensualist discourse constrains the options for political change, even though there are successful cases of majoritarian policies to refer to. This way the consensualist habitus embodied by Hungarian political leaders is constantly being reproduced and “re-confirmed” by the “reality” it creates. In spite of desirable outcomes methods that are recognised as inappropriate are therefore opposed.449 In brief, deliberate reform has to be defined in value-rational terms, that is, in terms of their appropriateness and not solely in efficiency-terms. Change is usually only possible in entrenched interpretative traditions and according to the authoritative interpreters of different types of rules, thus it is proceeding relatively slowly.450 Similar to the Hungarian case, according to a number of prominent scholars, German politics is historically compromise-oriented and aiming for balanced, equitable decisions.451 For some strange reason, however, support for this approach did not resurface in post- communist East Germany even after the West German consensus democracy had been installed 1:1 (as shown above). Unlike elsewhere in the region no institutional experiments were undertaken. The assumption that culture would follow institutions proved wrong, too, as the diverging results for the content analysis between East and West Germany demonstrated. Rather, a very different, more majoritarian outlook on politics was developed as shown both quantitatively and qualitatively. As Jennifer Yoder correctly observes, the process of integrating into a new system is not just about values, but also about identities.452 What kind of rhetorical resources, what kind of collective representations and common identities can East German political elites thus use to justify their “non-conformist” stance towards established West German institutions such as the Bundesrat? Unlike in the Hungarian case, there is little value and legitimacy in the widely discredited past of Nazi, Weimar or Imperial Germany. Unlike the case of Kádár’s Hungary, the communist GDR is not only viewed as an illegitimate regime but also for providing recipes for confrontational, imposing politics.453 East German political elites do not have the collective memory of consensual solutions at historical turning-points which could serve as a strong unifying symbol (therefore lacking the rhetorical resources to justify consensus politics). Basically, any collective memory of a

449 J March, J Olsen, ‘The logic of appropriateness’, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, ARENA Working Papers 04/09, Oslo, 2004, pp.17-18. 450 J March, J Olsen, 2004, p.14. 451 R Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, New York: W.W. Norton, 1979. 452 J Yoder, ‘West-East Integration: Lessons from East Germany’s Accelerated Transition’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.14, No.1, p.118. 453 The ability of the old regime to quickly push through its economic policies without the need for extensive consultations with societal groups (as opposed to today’s measures) is in fact favourably mentioned by one otherwise staunchly anti-communist MP (CDU#7). 135 “better” past would have to go back to the time before 1933 at least, and with few personalities alive who could help re-establishing this link.454 In fact, the experience of a confrontational but successful transition (i.e. a revolution in which co-operation with the petrified old regime would have been fatal and compromise impossible) rather support this notion. Although there were some elements of compromise and accommodation (e.g. round table talks) real changes occurred through decisive (but peaceful) actions from some of the groups and parties. Examples include the occupation of the Stasi-headquarters in order to prevent the destruction of secret police files, large demonstrations demanding (the speeding up of) reforms, and later reunification in which hundreds of thousands of people took part on a regular basis. In the light of this discourse the West German consensus-corporatist model is identified as an impediment to political progress, it is approached rather pragmatically and critically as creating too much delay and high costs. East German politicians are rarely found to publicly advocate consensus-solutions to current issues, whereas it is not uncommon to West German ones (e.g. as shown by a recent public appeal of leading environmental politicians from CDU, SPD, FDP and Greens for a “new consensus on environmental policy”).455 The findings for Hungary and East Germany, as ideal types for either multilateral or unilateral transition respectively, are also reflected in other CEE countries. Alan Renwick in his study shows how discursive legacies of different dissident movements in CEE collide or harmonize with certain aspects of democratic political society and thus contribute or impede CoD. The author counters the claim of Linz and Stepan, that dissident discursive legacies about an alternative political society in general might impede the consolidation of democracy, and employs a more differentiated perspective. Renwick shows that Vaclav Havel’s concept of anti-politics, which was a guiding principle in the unilateral Czechoslovak transition, has certain anti-consensual traits due to its strong claim for an uncompromising, straightforwardly sincere (but non-essentializing) grounding of politics (although Havel, as a President, stood in for accommodation and consensus).456 The approach of the Solidarity trade union during the Polish (multilateral) transition was, in turn, much more inclined to endorse compromise (which came to be viewed positively by the main opposition protagonists).457

454 C Offe, Varieties of Transition – The East European and East German Experience, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p.13. 455 ’Neue Stärke oder Niedergang’, Die Zeit, 14 September 2006, pp.36-37. 456 A Renwick, ‘Anti-Political or Just Anti-Communist? Varieties of Dissidence in East-Central Europe and Their Implications for the Development of Political Society’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.20, No.2, 2006b, pp.305-306 457 A Renwick, 2006b, pp.309-313. 136 Thus, transitions in CEE indeed left a legacy on the way political elites in different countries embrace or reject consensus and compromise. Transition contributed to create a discursive legacy, a habitus, by legitimising particular practices. Political elites are constrained in the way they can convincingly conceive of their actions and gather support for different approaches for political change. In this regard, one alternative explanation deserves some further dwelling: the factor of uncertainty. One might suggest that East German MPs do not advocate consensus politics because they did not face such a high degree of political and economic uncertainty in the post- transition years, as they were safely being taken care of by the West German “Big Brother,” and thus can afford to put on a competitive stance. To put it in Hirschmann’s words: “the light at the end of the tunnel” was closer in the East German case than in the other CEE cases. This objection has some plausibility and I do not claim to be able to fully disprove it with this study. However, I will try to put things into perspective. First of all, multilateral transitions by definition indeed do have a higher degree of political and economic uncertainty attached to their first years of operation due to the balance between old and new forces. In unilateral transitions the liberal, pro-market opposition strikes decisively against the old regime. In terms of external uncertainty, I endeavour to argue that East Germany was not in a much better position than the other CEE countries keeping in mind that the last Russian troops left Germany only in 1994. Now, whether political elites from other CEE countries with a more unilateral transition (e.g. the Czech Republic) are really as outspoken in supporting consensus politics as the Hungarians, I doubt. This, of course, I have to leave for further empirical research to prove. Finally, the factor “uncertainty” should no longer be a relevant factor once CEE democracies have joined the European Union and thus have “locked in” their integration into Western markets and the liberal democratic mainstream. From my data, no difference is noticeable in terms of consensusalist discourses prior to and after accession. Again, further research on discourses in the first post-transition years (i.e. under a higher degree of uncertainty) and in the future should look into this.

Professional politics: Common good vs. particular interests, procedures vs. outcomes The second ideational dimension of consensus democracy concerns the way demands and arguments are being advanced. Consensus democracy was shown to be based in an understanding of politics favouring the “common-good”. The third ideational dimension concerns the value of formalised, routinized procedures to assure the working of consensus democracy as opposed to a mere focus on achieving particular outputs. Therefore, in order to

137 elucidate MPs justification towards common-good or interest-based politics as well as input- or output-focused argumentation, MPs were asked to elaborate on how an “ideal MP” should look like, what they like and dislike about their job, and how the new generation of politicians should differ from current leaders. First, this shall enable us to establish possible discursive patterns in the two cases; giving support for a more common-good-focused model of political culture in the Hungarian case and a more interest-centred one for East Germany (as suggested by the quantitative analysis). While the former is being based on a focus establishing the “common good” the latter is more inclined to argue for the free competition of various particular interests. From these opposite ideals very different role models for politicians can be derived. One based on political elites as the “” of national unity (as impartial experts or intellectuals who are aloof of any particularistic groups, and who guide and/or educate the people). The other is based on the ideal of politicians as being the representatives from the middle of society who compete for the support of the voters. Both positions, of course, are to be found to different degrees in both consensus and majoritarian democracy. An extreme understanding of the common good or “national interest” (which denies the legitimacy of particular interests) equals the totalitarian vision of a homogenous or synchronized society, whereas unrestrained particularism equally destroys the foundations of and equality. Secondly, these questions enable us to inquire into the ultimate purpose of being a politician; into the meaning of politics. Do MPs portray politics rather as a purpose in itself, as being about procedures and political input which is key for consensualist politics, or do they refer to politics as a means to an end with emphasis on ultimate outcomes as found to be relevant for majoritarian politics? The quantitative data, as well as my hypotheses, suggest the more input-based model for the Hungarian case and the output-based for the East German one. In the following I will outline my findings and also discuss some of the implications for the consolidation of democracy. As the two dimensions are strongly interlinked in terms of the way they were discuss in the interviews, I will discuss them together here. a) All Hungarian MPs in the interviews portray the ideal politician first and foremost as a highly educated, knowledgeable and skilful . There is a strong, dominating discourse which explicitly demands that MPs should have a higher education,458 or that this would be useful in any case459 (one MP even demands “at least two university degrees”).460 Law,

458 MSZP#1, 2, 3, 5, MDF#1, Fidesz #5, 8, SZDSZ #4, 5. 459 SZDSZ #1, 6, Fidesz #3, 4, 6, MDF#2, MSZP#9. 460 Fidesz#1. 138 political and social sciences, history and , as well as specialist degrees (e.g. agriculture) are presented as being the most useful educational background and preparation of analytical skills for a good politician. At the same time, knowledge of (several) foreign languages is repeatedly mentioned as a crucial skill.461 Politics is portrayed by some not so much as a vocation, but rather as a chosen profession like many others.462 As one MP put it: “politics can be learned.”463 Thus, to be admitted into the rather elitist circle of politicians in Hungary, one needs to acquire cultural capital in the form of a higher education and other skills. This elitist requirement was even turned into manpower policy in 1998. The then newly elected conservative Prime Minister Orbán announced that there should be no minister without a university degree in his government.464 Subsequently, this excluded a major ministerial aspirant from his own party’s leading circle to assume ministerial office until he had finished his degree in 1999. In addition to knowledge and education, communicative and rhetorical skills – both in interacting with fellow politicians and the public—are widely mentioned as an unomitable skill. One MP refers to “theatrical” or exhibitionist orientations as being useful for this job;465 others refer to charisma, a convincing personality, leadership or “selling qualities”.466 Also mentioned are sensitivity and the ability to connect to people and understand their needs and feelings.467 But one MP makes priorities clear by saying that “professionalism is needed, not just empathy and love for people”.468 Furthermore, truthfulness,469 as well as patience or endurance,470 flexibility,471 and courage to stand for one’s opinion,472 as well as ambition or “love for power”473 are presented as crucial traits of an ideal politician. Politics is thus a way for realizing oneself.474 Consequently, for Hungarian MPs, politics is about a small elitist group of specialists organising the polity in the best possible way. Rather than embeddedness in particular social groups, Hungarian politicians cultivate the image of the disconnected intellectual or expert taking care of the common good in an impartial way. Hungarian MPs

461 MSZP#2, 3, 5, Fidesz #1, 8, MDF#1. 462 Fidesz#5. 463 SZDSZ#4. 464 Quoted in B Lomax, ‘The 1998 Elections in Hungary: Third Time Lucky for the Young Democrats’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.15, No.2, June 1999, p.124. 465 MSZP #1, SZDSZ #4, MDF#1. 466 MSZP#2, 5, 7, 9, Fidesz#2, 3. 467 MSZP#1, 7, Fidesz#3. 468 Fidesz#7. 469 MSZP#5, SZDSZ#5. 470 Fidesz#1, 2, SZDSZ#3. 471 MDF#2, Fidesz#6. 472 Fidesz#6, 7. 473 MSZP#4, 10. 474 MDF#2, Fidesz#6. 139 portray their work as part of a “harmonizing and guiding process,”475 the “realization of a higher goal,”476 or generally “shaping the fate of the country”477 (i.e. they present their work in the light of the common good). Some MPs deplore that they do not fulfil the mentioned high expectations for a professional politician and were not well enough prepared since they rather unexpectedly got involved with politics in the late 1980s.478 However, these high standards need to be met by a new generation of professional politicians479 who should be more rational and professional, not only in terms of knowledge and expertise but also in the relationship to other parties and politicians. More openness, a “normal relationship between the parties”, and “less ideological struggles” are deemed desirable.480 Yet, in a rather counter-hegemonic discourse, one MP warns that professional politicians who depend on their mandates for their living also endanger the multicoloured landscape of politics. As a consequence there might remain as little difference between the parties as “between Pepsi and Coke”.481 Others state doubt about whether a new generation can really make things better than the current one. They express apprehension that a new generation will create even more scandals, will be more ideological, more superficial, more polarised than the current one.482 Therefore, strong calls are being made for the need of a different political culture: there should be more consensus, and less ideological confrontation.483 As the “socialization was bad in this generation”, and since “everybody hurt each other already” only a new generation can make a new start.484 A new generation should ask about the past, but from distance and through an objective approach to history. They should rise beyond the personal experiences that so strongly impacted the first generation of post-communist politicians.485 Some would like to see the “communist heritage be frayed out completely” by the younger generation. Communism should not be allowed to reappear as good idea.486 One apparently marginal discourse in opposition to the stronger elitist one argues that the new generation of politicians

475 MSZP#4. 476 MDF#2. 477 SZDSZ#5. 478 MDF#1, SZDSZ#4. 479 Fidesz#4. 480 MSZP#1, 3, 8, Fidesz#1, 4, MDF#1, 3, SZDSZ#4. 481 Fidesz #4. 482 MSZP#2, SZDSZ#1, 3, MDF#1. 483 MSZP#2, 5, 7, 9, 10, Fidesz#1, 6, MDF#1, 2, SZDSZ#3, 6. 484 MSZP#6, Fidesz#3. 485 MSZP#3, 4, Fidesz#6. 486 Fidesz#5, 7, SZDSZ#5. 140 should be closer to the people (e.g. through participation in local politics); they should “be normal people” an not a “closed circle”.487 Thus, there are high demands again. This time moral requirements and personal are advanced to aspiring new politicians. Ideal politicians are portrayed as rather extraordinary personalities who can rise above the conflicts of past and present. There is also the ideal of synthesis and consensus that seems to resonate in these statements, too. Politicians are not portrayed as representatives of societal groups or constituencies, but rather as the custodians of national unity and harmony. When asked about what they like and dislike about politics, Hungarian MPs put quite some emphasis on politics as a public process and their enjoyment of being part of it. They say that they love to “be involved in great things”, “be in the centre of interest”, or to “get close,”488 to “enjoy the twirl and to be inside”489 or even to “live out one’s exhibitionism.”490 Hungarian politicians report feeling a sense of deep gratification by experiencing power and success, (e.g. by winning elections).491 MPs claim to appreciate the great personal experience through the opportunity to work on interesting and manifold topics492 and the chance to learn many new things.493 One MP complains that by all decisions there is “always someone hurt”,494 which in a way is a reversed utilitarian argument used to justify non-decisions. Rather than aiming for concrete goals Hungarian MPs report enjoying being representatives of the people in general.495 Role and identity are more important than action. Rather than realising their voters’ demands they stress the chance to create/find/tell the truth (to them)496 and to enjoy people’s trust.497 One even reports his great pleasure in realising “that people want to listen [to me].”498 Hungarian MPs thus assign a central role to themselves in the working of democracy. They are less concerned with what is the output of their work, but rather with “putting on a good show”. For them, doing politics is already a purpose in itself which is serving a higher goal. MPs seem to gain their raison d’ètre not through their mandate as elected representatives, but through their role in running the democratic institutions. Investigating the

487 MSZP#3, 6, 10. 488 MSZP#1, 2, 3, Fidesz #1, 5, SZDSZ#1, 3, 5. 489 Fidesz#1. 490 MSZP#2. 491 Fidesz#1, 7, SZDSZ #6. 492 MSZP#3, 4, 5, 7, Fidesz#4, SZDSZ#3, 4. 493 MSZP#3, 4, SZDSZ#5. 494 Fidesz #2. 495 Fidesz#2, 6, 7, SZDSZ#6. 496 MDF#1, SZDSZ#4, Fidesz#6. 497 Fidesz#7. 498 MSZP#1. 141 concept of representation among Hungarian politicians, Gabriella Ilonszki finds MPs putting most emphasis on the representation of the “national interest” before one’s constituency and party. Moreover, she finds very little explicit links of MPs to interest organisations.499 b) In contrast, East German MPs, when describing their ideal politician, clearly negate the notion of a specially trained professional and an elitist understanding of politics. Rather they quite unanimously would like to see politicians come from the middle of society, who bring sufficient experience from “real life” which is more important than specialist knowledge and expertise. Politicians should reflect the plurality of the population’s lives and experiences500 and act out of a sense of responsibility for society rather than self-realisation.501 This understanding explicitly excludes the idea of politics as a professional career choice, and also quite strongly limits the opportunities for young aspiring politicians lacking practical experience “in the real world”. The straight way into politics is actually portrayed rather negatively, even by a 29-year-old MP who presents his lack of experience in a normal profession as disadvantageous and generally rather undesirable.502 Thus, experience in a job503 and/or local politics,504 a stable character (in German: “gefestigte Persönlichkeit” which implies both maturity and a certain age)505 and other personal qualities such as endurance,506 flexibility,507 and cooperativeness508 (rather than a university degree or language certificates) should be the entry qualifications to politics. In complete opposition to the dominant Hungarian discourse, an East German MP argues that “how to become a politician cannot be studied at university.”509 Politics is in fact rather “training on the job”510 requiring constant further learning.511 In general, many East German MPs would like to see a larger variety in professional backgrounds in parliament underlining the importance of having

499 G Ilonszki, ’Representation deficit in a new democracy: Theoretical considerations and the Hungarian case’, in Gy Lengyel, Zs Rostoványi (eds.), The Small Transformation: Society, Economy and Politics in Hungary and the New European Architecture, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2001, p.483-500. 500 CDU#1. 501 SPD#1, 4, CDU#1, 2, 3, PDS#10. 502 SPD#1, 8, CDU#4, 5, PDS#4. 503 PDS#2, 3, CDU#2, 4, SPD#2, 9, FDP#1. 504 PDS#2, 3, 5, 505 SPD#1, 4, Green#1. 506 Green#1, SPD#7, 8, 10. 507 Green#1, CDU#3, SPD#7, 8. 508 Green#1, CDU#3, SPD#9. 509 Green#1. 510 PDS#6. 511 SPD#2, CDU#3. 142 more workers, natural scientists, engineers or even pensioners, and not just lawyers and social scientists who only have a certain kind of perspective.512 Only PDS MPs make a stronger statement in favour of having politicians with a special training, strong scientific background or particular expert knowledge.513 PDS MPs claim that their Marxist education in the GDR was very useful for their current role, as it prepared them for understanding the reality of capitalist democracies. They “knew how things were going to turn out”514 and therefore decided to use their insights and expertise to better the lot of the people affected. However, among the PDS there are calls for a limitation of the time in office, thus making politics a temporary vocation for otherwise socially integrated personalities.515 Thus, East German MPs describe the ideal MP as being as “ordinary” as possible and closely involved with the daily life of its constituency or voters. Rather than floating above societal groups, their conflicts and their interests politicians should come from their midst. This definition, of course, is rather contrary to the understanding of expert politicians seeking the “common good”. While also stressing communicative skills East Germans seem to refer more strongly to interpersonal rather than theatrical or rhetorical capabilities in this regard. Unlike their Hungarian colleagues they mention these skills more in the context of empathy, openness and sensitivity with regard to people’s needs,516 “Menschenkenntnis” (i.e. the ability to understand and deal with people),517 perceptive capabilities,518 or even “humbleness” and an “ability to take criticism”.519 Rhetorical skills are not prominently discussed.520 Rather than convincing or educating the people politicians should listen and win the voters’ confidence.521 In stark opposition to the dominant Hungarian discourse, good politicians, according to this East German discourse, should be good listeners rather than good speakers. This includes also the demand of not “losing contact with the ground”,522 staying an ordinary human523 and remaining truthful.524 Politicians are thus portrayed as not having any kind of

512 CDU#1, 2, PDS#8. 513 PDS#1, 2, 6, 7, 8. 514 PDS#1, 4, 5. 515 PDS#1, 2, 5, 10. 516 SPD#1, 5, 8, PDS#1, 3, CDU#3, 5, FDP#1. 517 SPD#4. 518 PDS#7. 519 Green#1, SPD#8. 520 PDS#6, 7, CDU#5. 521 FDP#1. 522 PDS#3, SPD#4. 523 PDS#10. 524 SPD#1, PDS#9, 143 superior knowledge or being able to teach the populace.525 Instead, they should be aware of their role as decision-makers. Rather than leaving decisions to so-called experts MPs should assert the primacy of politics.526 This rather anti-elitist, down-to-earth conception of politics is also reflected in East German statements regarding the question of how a new generation of politicians should look like. They would like to see less “career politicians”527 or mere “managers”.528 Ideal politicians in the future should stay “close to people” or “close to their roots”.529 They should be more genuine, sincere, or honest with their voters.530 Also, they should be able to better adapt to changes, employ new ways of thinking, and demonstrate farsightedness.531 One MP states that no change was needed.532 In line with their earlier mentioned discourse PDS MPs would like to see less party influence,533 and have more expert knowledge among politicians.534 Another PDS MP suggests that not all MPs are actually representing legitimate interests.535 When asked about what aspects of being a politician they like or dislike, in contrast to Hungarians, East German MPs present the agency-component of politics as the most exciting and important aspect of their work. Nearly everyone expresses great satisfaction to be able to decide important societal questions as an MP or at least to have an influence on many issues. In general, MPs refer to the great opportunities to influence, to shape or to create some tangible political results.536 They seem to emphasise the “political” of being a politician (i.e. the need to make decisions for or against something). Slow and protracted decisions or fishy compromises are presented as a real problem and strongly disliked.537 Unlike in the Hungarian case the expressed gratification with one’s profession is not so much connected with self-realization, but rather with “being able to do something for the people”.538 This rather pragmatic, result-oriented stance is underpinned by a dislike for too much ideological and party dominance in politics.539

525 CDU#3. 526 PDS#6, CDU#5. 527 SPD#2, 8, PDS#4, 5. 528 PDS#2. 529 Green#1, CDU#3, PDS#5, 10, SPD#7, FDP#1. 530 CDU#2, PDS#4, 9, Green#1, SPD#5, FDP#1. 531 CDU#1, 3, 4, SPD# 9, 10. 532 SPD#1. 533 PDS#1, 3, 4, 10. 534 PDS#3. 535 PDS#6. 536 SPD#1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, PDS#2, 3, 8, Green#1, CDU#1, 3, 5, FDP#1. 537 PDS#3, SPD#2, CDU# 2, 3, FDP#1. 538 SPD#1, 10, CDU#1, 5, PDS#3. 539 CDU#1, 4, PDS#6, 7, 8, SPD#6, 9, 10. 144 The de-emphasis on personal self-fulfilment in favour of devotion to delivering to the voter is also clear when considering the strong criticism advanced against superficiality, empty talking, rituals, ignorance, know-it-all attitudes or showmanship in politics.540 Hypocrisy and vanity are equally despised.541 In strong contrast to her “exhibitionist” Hungarian colleagues, one East German MP expresses that she just “does not want to be worshipped.”542 Politicians should rather make sure “not to get too far away from real life.”543 Also in the German media East German MPs are often portrayed, if not idealised this way, usually in contrast to their more prominent West German colleagues. East German MPs are presented as appreciating quiet work behind the scenes; they seem not to care for the headlines and not to aim for media attention but for “results”. Unfortunately, so this discourse claims, this way they rarely get elected into senior positions since (even with 15 years of parliamentary experience) they fail to make good use of public relations.544 East German MPs frankly admit that they are autodidacts, who are “learning by doing”. They present themselves as less ideological and more pragmatic, and more sincere than the West German “show- men”.545 The lack of privacy and becoming a “public person” is also strongly disliked by East German politicians.546 Rather than trying to embody a VIP, or even to educate the people, East German MPs take their profession as a constant learning experience where they enjoy meeting and interacting with (many different) people,547 acquire knowledge about a great variety of issues all the time,548 or travelling extensively through the country.549 In fact, a number of East German MPs made very clear that they do not like the term “political elites” when the author introduced his research interest to them. Only among PDS MPs some importance seems to be attached to the opportunity to argue and debate frequently in public, or to be able to transmit one’s “truth”.550 Unlike the Hungarians, where politics is portrayed as a harmonizing, synthesising activity for finding some kind of rational, de-politicised, passionless Habermasian consensus, East German MPs are emphasising the “political” in politics are more in the line of Chantal

540 SPD#1, 5, 7, PDS#2, 3, 7, 8, 10, CDU#4, 5. 541 CDU#1, PDS#3, 10, SPD#4, 8. 542 SPD#4. 543 PDS#1, SPD#4. 544 Interview with SPD #9 and report about other East German MPs in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 March 2005. 545 W Patzelt, ’“Seiteneinsteiger, Neulinge, Ossis…“: Die Integration ostdeutscher Abgeordneter in ‚gesamtdeutsche’ Parlamente’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, pp.545/8. 546 PDS#1, Green#1, SPD#4. 547 PDS#3, 5, 6, 7, CDU#2, SPD#4. 548 PDS#3, 7, CDU#2, 4, 5, SPD#8. 549 PDS#1, 5, CDU#2, SPD#8. 550 PDS#7, 9. 145 Mouffe, or even Karl Schmitt.551 East German MPs do not advance anything coming close to define the “common good” or “national interest” etc. Instead they make clear references to the needs of individuals or groups in society. In the end, East German MPs present themselves as caring about what politics does for the people. Outputs are also much more important than procedures. This Jacksonian, even slightly populist stance assigns legitimacy to politicians not through their separation from and superiority to the people but, quite the contrary, on being authentic representatives and executants of voters’ interests. Politicians are not there to find some ultimate common good but to directly address the needs of the diverse layers in society. Politics is not something which should be left to free-floating “experts;” it is about making decisions for different groups of people with different interests. There should be no illusion: “politicians are always lobbyists”.552 This specific East German emphasis on interest representation as opposed to notions of the common good, as well as the declared preference for outcomes as opposed to procedures, is already well reflected in the earliest surveys of East German parliamentarians in the 1990 parliament. To be unaffiliated with the former regime is seen by the new MPs as their most important quality. Thus, they have to be from the middle of society, from sub-elite positions or completely non-politicised backgrounds. They do not need to be well known or to have any political experience. PDS-MPs, already in 1990, emphasised most prominently the need for expertise and parliamentary experience.553 In a comparison with contemporary West German parliamentarians East German MPs in the 1990 freely elected East German parliament (Volkskammer) in a survey mention the representation of voters as their most important task( as opposed to their Western colleagues who emphasise their personal interest in influencing decisions). East German MPs state much stronger dissatisfaction with their opportunities to help their voters and to take care of their problems. Also, in reality, they are also much more frequently in the constituency than their West German colleagues, who are more concerned with gathering information and interacting with other members of the political elite during their working hours.554 For the case of regional (Länder) MPs Werner Patzelt finds East Germans as putting much more emphasis on responsiveness to voters and special interests (as opposed to

551 C Mouffe, On the political, London: Routledge, 2005. 552 PDS #1. 553 H Müller-Enbergs, ‘Zwischen Bewahrung und Modernisierung. Politische Einstellungen in der letzten Volkskammer der DDR’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.252-253. 554 B Scholz, ’Bundestag und Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.274-279. 146 overriding national interests) than West Germans. Both in theory and in practice, Patzelt finds East German regional MPs stressing less the exercise of “leadership”. They spent more time in their constituencies than their West German colleagues, but are still less satisfied with the number of contacts to the population.555 They put much more emphasis on pragmatic problem-solving than on the debate of basic questions. They do not care as much about their PR, in particular their relationship with the media as West Germans. Instead they are more open to interest groups. Some of these patterns, however, are found to be gradually adjusting to West German patterns.556 For Patzelt the strong emphasis on responsiveness to the voters is based in the experience of the completely unresponsive (and politically irrelevant) GDR parliament under the old regime.557 Also, Davidson-Schmich in her study finds East German members of regional parliaments to be more outcome-oriented than their West German colleagues, similar to Machatzke in an earlier survey from 1995.558 The discursive pattern found in my interviews are quite well reflected in various empirical studies throughout the last 15 years on East German parliamentarians. This also demonstrates that my findings seem to refer to rather persistent cultural differences between East and West Germany, as compared to post-communist countries with different historical experiences such as Hungary. Edinger and Vogel find East German MPs putting stronger emphasis on representing their constituency (as opposed to the country as a whole) than their West German colleagues. They argue that this might be based in their perception to represent a special East German interest.559 Still, as I will discuss below, it would be too easy to relegate this East German discourse to merely being a reaction to West German domination in political and economic terms. Below, there is again a brief summary of the major discursive differences in the two dimensions between the two cases is compiled.

555 Similarly PDS #1. The opposite position (i.e. a strong dislike for constituency work) is expressed by Fidesz #4. 556 W Patzelt, ‘Ostdeutsche Parlamentarier in ihrer ersten Wahlperiode: Wandel und Angleichung’, Historical Social Research, Vol.22, No.3/4, 1997, pp.164-169. 557 W Patzelt, ’“Seiteneinsteiger, Neulinge, Ossis…“: Die Integration ostdeutscher Abgeordneter in ‚gesamtdeutsche’ Parlamente’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, p.566. 558 L Davidson-Schmich, Becoming Party Politicians – Eastern German State Legislators in the Decade following Democratization, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, p.58; J Machatzke, ’Einstellungen zum Umfang staatlicher Verantwortung – Zum Staatsverständnis der Eliten im vereinten Deutschland’, in: W Bürklin, H Rebensdorf (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Rekrutierung und Integration, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997, pp.340-350. 559 M Edinger, L Vogel, ’Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes of East and West German Parliamentarians – Findings from the Jena Parliamentary Survey (2003-4)’, Czech Sociological Review, Vol.41, No.3, 2005, p.378. 147 Hungary East Germany The ideal MP is an omniscient, multilingual The ideal MP has experienced real life and a orator who enters politics after finishing a real job before entering politics. He/she acts graduate degree in Oxford with merit. He/she out of a sense of responsibility, not self- is a real professional and realises her-/himself realisation. Politics is not a profession, it’s a in interacting with voters and fellow MPs. calling. Not talking but listening to the people My generation did not have the chance to is most important. develop all these skills, besides our political PDS: A Marxist education and specialised culture is rotten. training in the GDR helped me to understand how a capitalist system works. ------It’s great to convince people or fellow It’s great to learn what the people have to tell politicians about your ideas. It’s bad that and be able to make a difference for them. It’s politics has such a poor reputation in our bad that it takes so much time and energy to country. achieve something. c) Having contrasted the findings for the two cases regarding the second and third ideational dimensions of consensus democracy (i.e. references to the common good, and the superiority of procedures over outcomes) I will now discuss possible sources for these differences. Again, two very distinct major discourses shared across party lines can be observed in the two cases, this time concerning the more philosophical question of how an ideal politician should look like. Hungarian MPs portray the ideal politician as being part of some kind of elitist circle of highly educated professionals. Qualification for office is based on knowledge and expertise. Thus, whether one can become a politician depends on who he/she is. East German MPs in turn qualify good politicians by whom they represent and what they do. Hungarian MPs portray politics as ideally run by an elitist circle of experts who, through their leadership qualities, can well communicate their activities to the people. Communication rather takes place top-down or within the elite. East German MPs view the ideal politician as being as close as possible to ordinary life with his/her ears and eyes close to the people.560 Their ideal politician represents a certain segment of society from which he/she receives the input to his/her work. Thus, implicitly for Hungarian MPs, political elites are meant to define the ultimate goals, the common good, which are then communicated to the people. East

560 See also J Yoder, From East Germans to Germans? The New Post-Communist Elites, Durham: Duke UP, 1999, pp.127-128, for very similar findings on the self-image of members of regional parliaments in East Germany in the mid-1990s. 148 German MPs portray politicians more as agents of different interests in society who have to make political decisions. Only PDS members feature more elitist discourses, stressing the importance of specialist knowledge of politicians. Concerning the dimension about procedures vs. outcomes Hungarian MPs express a strong emphasis on politics as a process of interaction within the political elite – they stress their enjoyment of interacting, arguing, debating, communicating etc. According to this discourse politicians play a role; they need to engage in finding the truth and communicate it to the population. Their public image as a matters strongly to them and they express concern about general politicisation. East German MPs present themselves as being focused towards achieving concrete results for the people. They do not feature a particularly elitist esprit de corps. They portray themselves as being free of elitist presumption or aspirations as popular enlighteners or educators but rather stress the value of “local knowledge” for their work. They express concern about cumbersome processes which are often in the way of concrete achievements. They express opposition to de-politicisation and the predominance in politics of experts trained in particular subjects. If we take these discourses as rhetorical devices employed by politicians to communicate and legitimate their role in politics, rather than attitudes, we find the mentioned discourses strongly reflecting the setting of the transition to democracy. In the East German case civic activists gained legitimacy by being completely unaffiliated with the old elites, by being untainted with any ideology, coming from occupations far away from politics, coming from the middle of the ordinary mass population (“Wir sind das Volk!”), and this way challenging and exposing the regime which claimed to represent the people. Through this authentic, non-elite status they gained “moral capital” as outlined by Lenka Siroky for the Czech case.561 The PDS, in turn, is trying to “revalue” their cultural capital from the old system (i.e. their good education in both specialised fields and Marxist ideology) for coping with the new system. An alternative explanation which relates this understanding of direct representation back to the practice of communist parliaments, where all major societal groups (e.g. peasants, workers, writers, artists, scientists, women, youth etc.) were symbolically represented appears rather implausible due to the complete de-legitimation of the old regime. To some extent this somewhat populist self-idealisation or self-belittlement could be characterised as a reaction to West German political culture (which obviously values self- promotion, professionalism, specialist expertise and elitist self-consciousness more strongly). However, as shown above, the emphasis of being an ‘ordinary’ citizen as opposed to being

561 L Siroky, Dissidents and Engineers – The Rise and Fall of Moral Capital, MA-thesis, Harvard University, 2004. 149 affiliated with the old regime was already the major asset of self-characterisation for the new East German political elites in the 1990 GDR parliament (Volkskammer) when unification was hardly on the agenda yet, and interaction with West German politicians rather sparse. Thus, confrontation with “the other”, the experience of a different political culture in the united Germany, might have very well reinforced this theme which originated in the transition of East Germany. Thus, the habitus of the “plebeian underdog” tries to create the conditions for its own reproduction and survival by offering plausible interpretations and concurrent strategies for changed circumstances. Instead of emphasising the fact of being unaffiliated with the old regime, East German MPs now emphasise in how far they are different from the established West German elites (who traditionally feature a strong overrepresentation of males, civil servants, professional party officials, lawyers and self-employed professionals).562 In the mid-1990s East German MPs were, on average, significantly younger than Westerners (47 vs. 54 years), had a higher share of women in their ranks (30% vs. 10%) and still a notable dominance of natural sciences and technical backgrounds as opposed to the prominent representation of legal and social sciences, and among West German MPs.563 These differences have diminished but are still noticeable in the new millennium.564 Since recruitment for elite positions of East German politicians now has to go through the filter of Western criteria (e.g. long-standing party involvement, experience in the public sector, legal expertise etc.) certain East German experiences and perspectives become increasingly marginalized.565 Still, East German MPs seem to be trying to act according to this plebeian ideal, even though it might mean to be disadvantaged in terms of posts and media coverage (see above). Obviously, playing the “outsider”-theme appears more promising and convincing in defining one’s role than joining the mainstream in a context which is seen as de-valuing the biographies of East Germans and raising West German (or EU-)”experts” to being the ideal.

562 T Rudzio, Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 7th edition, 2006, pp.407-426. 563 V Kaina, M Sauer, ’Ostdeutsche Eliten und gesamtdeutsche Führungsschicht im gesellschaftlichen Integrationsprozeß. Ergebnisse der „Potsdamer Elitestudie 1995“’, in: P Hübner (ed.), Eliten im Sozialismus – Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR, Köln: Böhlau, 1999, pp.87-105; B Scholz, ’Bundestag und Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.284-286. 564 J Plöhn, ‘Ostdeutsche Profile in in der Politik – Vom Aufbruch zur Gesamtdeutschen Normalität’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006, pp.138-141. 565 A Segert, ‘Allokationsprozesse deutscher Eliten – Diskussion der Kolonialisierungsthese’, in: L McFalls / L Probst (eds.), After the GDR – New Perspectives on the Old GDR and the Young Länder, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001, pp.287-307. 150 In this regard, certain socio-economic background factors which are supposed to influence political culture (in the form of attitudes in the classical model) do indeed matter, but in a different and more straight-forwards way. The new freely elected East German MPs on average were younger, more female, more religious and had a stronger educational background in natural sciences (rather than politicised subjects such as law or economics) than the late communist leadership.566 This may also (in some way or another) have imbued them with different values and orientations due to different individual social backgrounds. More importantly, it endowed them with cultural capital and rhetorical resources to distance themselves from the personalities representing the past: old, ungodly, ideologically blinded, self-righteous and obstinate men. Few East Germans had openly protested or rebelled against the regime since those who did often paid the price by losing their freedom, health and/or their home. Under these circumstances no alternative elite could develop, but an alternative understanding of politics without elites. According to Jürgen Plöhn today no political class exists in East Germany as typical East German politicians only share the way they adapted to the former regime but otherwise have very different individual profiles and experiences.567 These “un-affiliated” people avoided the need to make ideological commitments during the old regime by using the marginal opportunities of academic self-realisation in the natural sciences. Sometimes they joined a “bloc” party, such as the nominally Christian democrat or Liberal parties, as a “compromise” when they were pressured into joining the communist party.568 They practiced free speech only in the protected sphere of church activities and rarely openly challenged the regime until shortly before its breakdown. Several MPs in the interviews stressed that they were “no heroes”, “no freedom fighters” and “no martyrs”.569 Christian Welzel differentiates four types of political affiliation in the GDR: communist party members, members, opposition activists and the non-affiliated. In absolute terms the formerly non-affiliated now represent the largest share of the new East German elites.570

566 C Welzel, ‘Rekrutierung und Sozialisation der ostdeutschen Eliten. Aufstieg einer demokratischen Gegenelite?, in: W Bürklin, H Rebensdorf (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Rekrutierung und Integration, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997, pp.208-209. 567 J Plöhn, ‘Ostdeutsche Profile in in der Politik – Vom Aufbruch zur Gesamtdeutschen Normalität’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006, p.150. 568 L Davidson-Schmich, Becoming Party Politicians – Eastern German State Legislators in the Decade following Democratization, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, p.23. In my sample, CDU #1 mentions work place pressure to join the SED as the reason for his decision to join the CDU. This meant commitment to a socialist GDR under the leadership of the SED, but less of an ideological commitment to communism as such. 569 SPD #1, 4, 6, PDS #1, 4. 570 Welzel, 1997, pp.218-222. 151 In 1989/90, after 40 years of communist indoctrination from the cradle to the grave, a biography of non-affiliation was already statement enough to be a legitimate new face in politics in a society still full of former petty apparatchiks and Stasi informers. Having withstood communist indoctrination, if only in a self-created niche, helped these people to be regarded the most authentic personalities for a new beginning in the Arendtian sense. Soon, both the old leaders and the most radical civic activist were marginalized.571 In truth, we do not need the detour of value internalisation of the classical model to explain the pre-eminent traits of this new political culture, of the habitus brought about by the new political elites. Pre- transition biographies were devalued or revalued by going through the filter of transition and thus became a resource or a liability for different kinds of individuals. Interestingly, and in line with my argument, references to particular interests and their representation (rather than an elite-defined common good) are most frequent in the content analysis of parliamentary speeches among those East German MPs who immediately started their political career in 1989/90 on the national or regional level (e.g. CDU #2, CDU #5, CDU #6, SPD #1, see annex 2, table 2a). The pronounced differences in this regard between East and West Germany on the one hand, and certain similarities between West Germany and Hungary on the other, also speak against an alternative explanation which would point towards the higher degree of social differentiation and modernization in Germany as a whole (as opposed to Hungary) which might have lead to these different understandings of political representation. This non-elitist stance of East German MPs also goes some way in explaining why, according to the content analysis, they assume an output- rather than input-oriented approach to democracy (i.e. valuing political outcomes rather than procedures for themselves). Unlike Hungarian MPs East German parliamentarians define themselves through their pragmatism in closely representing their voters’ needs and demands. Interestingly, this position is assumed by all but two MPs who have a background in regional politics before entering the parliament (CDU #1 und CDU #6). Save for PDS-MPs, they are the only East German parliamentarians featuring predominantly positive statements towards the established procedures of consensus democracy, making mostly positive references to the inclusion of the Länder. This might actually indicate a possible socialization impact of regional politics as already mentioned above (in line with the classical model of political culture). In contrast to East Germans, aspiring democratic politicians in Hungary (during the period of transition) had to distinguish themselves by their expertise, charisma or moral

571 H Arendt, On Revolution, Hamondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973. 152 authority, be it as an urban intellectual with abstract ideals about the future democracy, a populist writer defining the essence of the nation, or as a post-communist reformer finding the right balance between market and state. Rather than challenging the old elite by being as far and as different as possible from the leaders of the old regime, the Hungarian opposition sought to reach an equal footing with them through their cultural capital as distinguished scientists, philosophers, writers, legal or economic experts (as Hungarian Kádárist communism was not fully de-legitimised in the eyes of the Hungarian population). Gradual co-optation of non-party experts into the administration had increased the value of cultural capital since the 1970s while the 1989 transition involved only moderate elite turnover among the former communists.572 Rather than representing a constituency the opposition sought legitimacy through gaining elite status. To the Hungarian elites of 1989 the birth of democracy at the round table talks was based on collective deliberation, as opposed to the Aufbruch (=awakening, departure) by the East Germans which made the established order break down through action. Some East German MPs make explicit references to their experience of the significance of real political agency during transition (i.e. the power of political decisions to intentionally change the course of history). They refer to this memory in order to reject the “de-politicisation of politics”, to counter calls for expert governments, or to argue against claims that politicians are powerless in the context of globalisation.573 Hungarian MPs in turn constantly make references to the orderly, expert-led transition and the first freely elected parliament full of little “ (sociologist, , poet…) kings” serving the common good which, in the light of contemporary quarrels and problems, appears like a Golden Age (though it was not seen as such during that time). Even if Hungarian MPs do not (any longer) come close to the ideal, they very much present the omniscient, polyglot, free- floating academic as their ideal politician and value the elaborated procedures of democratic decision-making. Unlike East German MPs, who focus on representing different interests in society, Hungarian MPs put strong emphasis on being representatives of the common good (or the national interest). However, it often seems that every party or camp claims for itself to define or represent the common good and to exclude the other side from it. Hence, MPs from left and right accuse each other of representing only their own party’s interest, or a small minority of the rich, rather than helping the poor or furthering the entire nation.574 Thus, while

572 G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists – Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe, London: Verso, 1998. 573 CDU#5, PDS#6. 574 Fidesz #1, 2, 3, MSZP #3, SZDSZ #3. 153 the discourse of common-good orientation is strongly pronounced, it is partly usurped in order to delegitimize political opponents. In line with the model of political culture outlined above, I would argue that the common-good discourse has become part of the collective, explicit political culture of Hungarian MPs. However, it did not lead to a full adaptation of behaviour away from self-interested positions towards collective norms, which we would expect if full internalisation had occurred on the individual level. An attempt to explain why this did not happen is advanced further below when discussing the dimension of “respect towards the other”. Thus, both Hungarian and East German MPs use their own biography as a resource of legitimacy and keep emphasising these old ideals, although patterns of elite recruitment and interaction have changed since then. In contrast to their pronounced ideal of the socially embedded MP, only 8% of East German MPs work in a “normal” profession next to their mandate, as opposed to 28% of West Germans.575 Few poets and historians have remained in Hungarian politics,576 and natural scientists or protestant theologians become less prominent among East German MPs. However, authenticity as being as “ordinary” and as close to the people as possible in the East German case, and being as “educated” as possible in the Hungarian case is still demanded in order to enter politics. Some statements are, in fact, clearly defensive to ongoing changes and try to “raise the bar” for future politicians (e.g. “at least two university degrees, at least two foreign languages” vs. “be more mature and have experienced real life”) or deplore the deviations from the transition ideal (“we did not have the chance to be better prepared for politics” vs. “we need less career politicians”). Both Hungarian and East German political elites define themselves and the ideal which needs to be aspired in front of the collective memory, in front of the ideal of democratic transition. Also, in other post-communist countries we can find analogous discursive cultures with regards to defining the conflicts between common good vs. particular interests, and procedures vs. outcomes in democratic politics. A survey conducted among Polish MPs in the mid-1990s finds discourses around the common good as the most dominant definition for the essence of politics. Moreover, Polish MPs also advance very elitist understandings of politicians lamenting a lack of experts. They voice little appreciation for particularistic or

575 H Best, M Edinger, Manuscript for presentation „Politik als Beruf und Berufung“ in the German Bundestag , 15th December 2004, Sonderforschungsbereich 580, Friedrich-Schiller Universität Jena, online http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/a3.0.html, last accessed 20 October 2006. 576 G Illonszki, ‘Parliament and Government in Hungary: a changing relationship’, Central European Political Science Review, Vol.2, No.3, summer 2001, pp.72-103; ‘Öregedett a parlament, bár száznál több as új képviselô’, Népszabadság, 16 May 2006. 154 conflict-oriented definitions of democracy. However, similar to their Hungarian counterparts, they claim their colleagues follow egoistic or particularistic motives.577 Alan Renwick, in his study on the legacies of dissident discourses, points out Vaclav Havel’s explicit rejection of routinized institutions and his emphasis on “people-centred” politics.578 Havel’s famous greengrocer described in The Power of the Powerless starts “living within the truth” just by no longer putting up signs with empty communist propaganda slogans. There is indeed nothing heroic, elitist or extraordinary about this exemplary greengrocer – he just starts being an authentic person again with his position in society.579 The “truth” in this regard is not defined in an essentialist fashion, but just as the expression of an authentic daily life. These bottom-up concepts of the democratic polity stood in contrast to the dominant discourses among Hungarian dissidents who were explicitly arguing in favour of routinized democratic institutions with prominent protagonists such as János Kis warning against “anti-politics”. Very similar positions could be found among leading members of the Polish opposition.580 Also Gil Eyal, writing on the Czech and Slovak cases, contrasts the differing ideals and meta-discourses of dissidents and later political elites in Prague and Bratislava. He contrasts the essentializing discourses among the Slovak political elites with the dominant Czech position which rejected the idea of guiding society by superior teleological knowledge. Thus, while the Slovak political elites aimed at preserving and protecting their claim to teleological knowledge (“prognosticators”), and presented themselves as bearers of the national interest or the common good, the former Czech dissidents focused on establishing conditions in which life could be authentic again (i.e. “living without the lie”). They limited their role to being “pastors” rather than educators. Eyal finds the sources of these different responses to the 1989 break-down of communism as based in homologous life experiences of Czech dissidents and monetarist on the one side, and Slovak managers, economists and nationalist historians on the other side to the historical juncture of 1968.581 Eyal demonstrates very convincingly the impact of historical watersheds on discursive cultures. Different life experiences of Czech and Slovak intellectuals after the failed 1968

577 B Mach, W Wesolowski, ‘Politiker in Zeiten der Transformation: „Transformational correctness” oder divergierende Wahrnehmungen?’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, No.3, 1999, pp.382-388. 578 A Renwick, ‘Anti-Political or Just Anti-Communist? Varieties of Dissidence in East-Central Europe and Their Implications for the Development of Political Society’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.20, No.2, 2006a, pp.306-315. 579 V Havel et al. (ed. by J Keane), The Power of the Powerless – Citizens against the State in Central Eastern Europe, London: Hutchinson, 1985, pp.31-44. 580 A Renwick, 2006a, pp.306-315. 581 G Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites – From Prague Spring to the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, pp.59-134. 155 reform experiments and the different conclusions drawn from it by the two groups lead to the demarcation of these very different discursive communities. For the Hungarian case some commonalities can be found between the Slovak discourse of rational, “prognostic” guidance of society as described by Eyal with the Hungarian Socialists’ discourse on “enlightened modernisation”. The latter defined a new role for the former technocrats as experts for economic development and social planning from above, as described by Bozóki.582 Similarly, as in the Slovak case, Hungary’s transition was initially dominated by a coalition of communist soft liners, reform economists, nationalist historians and writers who were trying to marginalize more radical dissidents and student activists. In this regard, it is also clear why in the East German case most PDS MPs do not share the mainstream East German political culture. Being part of the formerly regime-affiliated and privileged strata or professions their life-worlds were very different from those of the “apolitical” or “unaffiliated” during the old regime. We do not know whether PDS members who, in their majority, were also members of the communist party until 1989 really assimilated communist convictions during that time, or whether they were just opportunistic fellow travellers who were advancing their career chances. However, it is clear that their biography offers very different explicit aspects for justifying and legitimising professional and life choices. As the old party membership is at least partly being replaced now by younger people without political involvement in the old regime (such as PDS MP #17 in the sample) this demarcation becomes less marked, or even contested inside the party. Concerning the consolidation of consensus democracy the relevance of the above- outlined discourses might be less discernible than in the previous section concerning the issue of consensus as a democratic practice. On the most basic level, it is clear that East German and Hungarian politicians raise very different expectations towards the political system. East Germans focus on political outputs might clash with the limited ability of consensus- democratic systems to deliver rapid decisions. I would not go as far as denoting their predominant output-orientation as a sign of an inferior “subject” political culture, as in Almond and Verba’s typology (i.e. a political culture focused on government as delivering specific benefits but being unconcerned with input processes and participation).583 In fact, East German MPs have been shown in several studies to be much more in favour of

582 Eyal, 2003, p.110; A Bozóki, ‘The Ideology of Modernization and the Policy of Materialism: The Day after the Socialists’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.13, No.1, 1997, pp.56-102. 583 G Almond / S Verba, The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton UP, 1963, pp.16-18. 156 participatory direct democratic elements than their West German colleagues. 584 This interesting difference, which some authors also relate to the legacy of transition, will not be further investigated in this context.585 Nevertheless, the gap between rhetorical demands on the system and real outputs (e.g. concerning the convergences with West German living standards or the struggle against unemployment in East Germany) surely leads to support arguments expressing alienation from the established procedures, or even an outright rejection of the democratic system. In fact, several surveys have confirmed that, among the general East German population, support for the democratic system is made conditional upon socio- economic performance.586 In the Hungarian case hostility towards the system might easier grow out of the obvious gap between Hungarian MPs constantly self-proclaimed high moral and professional standards and their poor performance in this regard or, put differently, their weak individual internalisation of the values of consensus democracy. As Hungary’s Prime Minister Gyurcsány remarked in an interview, Hungarian political parties “have not yet accepted that also the other parties stand in for the common good”. Yet, he rather self-righteously excluded his own party from this accusation in line with the dominant discourse described here.587

Keeping the institutional status quo? According to the above-outlined quantitative analysis of MPs’ statements Hungarian MPs (across party lines) feature expressed support for the current institutional set-up of the political and major redistributing systems. East German MPs (with the exception of PDS members) are overall expressing more support for changes to the status quo. In the following I intend to explore as to whether these differences in the fourth ideational dimension of consensus democracy are based in discursive foundations which are shared across party lines and based in historical references. For this matter I asked MPs in the interviews about the

584 V Kaina, ’Zwischen den Welten: Die Funktionsbewertung des politischen Systems in Führungsschicht und Bevölkerung’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, No.1, 2000, pp.131-155; B Scholz, ’Bundestag und Volkskammer. Meinungsprofile von Abgeordneten im Vergleich’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.292-293. 585 The content analysis of speech unit also incidences of positive and negative mentioning of direct democratic elements were recorded. For East Germany the ratio of positive minus negative statements overall was 1 per 18 speech units (with particularly strong contributions from PDS members), for West Germany 1 per 50 speech units, while for Hungary negative statements against direct democracy even weighted slightly stronger than positive ones (-1 per 250 speech units). 586 C Zelle, ‘Socialist Heritage or Current Unemployment: Why Do the Evaluations of Democracy and Socialism Differ Between East and West Germans?’, German Politics, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1999, pp. 1-20; J Grix, ‘East German Political Attitudes. Socialist Legacies vs. Situational Factors – A False Antithesis’, German Politics, Vol.9, No.2, August 2000, pp.109-124; H Meulemann, ’15 Jahre und kein bisschen gleicher? – Unterschiedliche Werte in West- und Ostdeutschland’, Neue Gesellschaft – Frankfurter Hefte, Vol. 50, No. 9, 2004, pp.26-29. 587 Interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, Der Tagesspiegel, 21 October 2006. 157 present, past and future: what was good about the old system? Should it have been kept or could it potentially be reintroduced? What mistakes have been committed during transition, and what needs to be changed? Moreover, the context of the discourses established will be explored and possible implications for CoD will be discussed. a) Hungarian MPs are presenting themselves as quite happy that the old regime is gone for good. Yet, they decline to engage in a debate about the possible merits of the past system. As “the system was not working,” it is an “illusion” that anything should have been kept or can be revived again.588 Since the old regime broke down completely, there was nothing worth to be kept.589 In fact, some argue, rather too much stayed (i.e. the system is “not yet rooted out well enough”, as the opposition was too undetermined in the beginning).590 Debating the shortcomings of the current status quo, however, appears as approaching a taboo, especially when comparing it to the past. Only when pressed, some MPs admit that some issues (e.g. with regards to health care, family support, integration of gypsies or social mobility through education, and the situation of agriculture) were indeed better in the past.591 However, rather than arguing for a selective re-incorporation of certain elements of the past system, they dismiss the old system in toto and would not even like to engage in a discussion of what could be learned from the past. When asked about the current political and socio-economic system and proposals for potential changes, virtually all Hungarian MPs are arguing there was no real need for changes since everything was working well or at least better than in the past. Any “messing” with the system in turn might upset the “sharply balanced” arrangement “which is dancing on a razor blade”.592 Only when really pushed, Hungarian MPs elaborate some ideas for possible changes to the political system. Some proposals which were frequently debated in the Hungarian political scene (such as a smaller parliament,593 a directly elected president594 or a second chamber595) find some support but are equally met with opposition.596 In particular, the issue of the presidential election is controversial. While it is argued that a directly elected president with little political powers can be a vital component of democracy, as shown by the

588 MSZP#1, 2, 7, 10, Fidesz#1, 2, 4. 589 SZDSZ#1, 3, 4, 5, Fidesz#5. 590 MDF#1, 2, 3, SZDSZ#6. 591 MSZP#2, 4, 9, 10, Fidesz#1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7. 592 MSZP#2, 4, 7, 8, Fidesz#1, 2, 5, 6, 7, SZDSZ#1, 3, 4, MDF#1, 2, 3. 593 MSZP#1, SZDSZ#1, 6, Fidesz#5. 594 MSZP#1, 3, 4, 8, 10, MDF#1, 3. 595 MSZP#4, 8. 596 Against smaller parliament: Fidesz#2, MSZP#4; against directly elected president MSZP#2, Fidesz#2, 3, 4, SZDSZ#3, 4, 5, 6. 158 Austrian, Polish or Slovak examples,597 Slovakia is also raised as a negative example where a popular vote would have almost brought the demagogue Meciar back into office.598 Some argue for a stronger president,599 while others are undecided about the role of the president.600 In general, arguments against any reconfiguration of the political system rest on the claim that the institutional configuration is perfect and sharply balanced; any changes would upset this balance, and possibly lead to unexpected upheavals.601 In fact, many arguments go in the direction of strengthening or extending consensual institutions. Rather than electing the president by popular vote, parliament should make sure to elect the president with a 2/3 majority vote in any case or even by a high degree of consensus.602 MPs demand an ombudsman for future generations (which would add another veto player, who is able to limit the possibility for far-reaching decisions with a future impact e.g. on natural resources or debt levels),603 more regional powers and a reform of local administration.604 One MP argues that a new constitution would be useful, but that this was not a real option at the moment.605 Some MPs from the two big parties state support for a majoritarian electoral system, and more directly elected MPs,606 while MPs from the two smaller parties argue against a two-party system, and demand a 3%-hurdle.607 Other issues mentioned concern civil service reforms,608 minority issues609 and the fight against .610 Again, a change of political culture and mentality is demanded, as people are “too ignorant or too politicised.”611 Overall, Hungarian MPs seem to be united in a conservative discourse stressing the benefits of the current system. Debate about potential changes is being rejected as dangerous or useless, especially concerning a reconsideration of merits of the past system, or the proposals voiced cancel out each other rather than pointing towards some common issues and goals. Most proposals seem to aim towards strengthening the consenualist character of the Hungarian democracy by introducing or reinforcing the powers of certain veto players.

597 MSZP#8. 598 SZDSZ#3. 599 MSZP#8, 10. 600 Fidesz#6. 601 MDF#2. 602 MDF #1, MSZP #5, Fidesz #2. 603 Fidesz#6. 604 MSZP#1, 3, 4, Fidesz#1, 5, MDF#2. 605 MDF#1. 606 MSZP#3, Fidesz#4. 607 SZDSZ#1, 6, MDF#1. 608 Fidesz#1, MSZP#3, 9. 609 MSZP#8. 610 SZDSZ#5, Fidesz#6, 7. 611 Fidesz #3, MSZP#8. 159 Hungarian political elites in their expressed desire to work together consensually (see above) actually only agree on the status quo put in place by transition as their common denominator. Debates about the learning from the past are being edged out as either dangerous or useless. b) Similar to Hungarian MPs, most East German parliamentarians (except for PDS-members) would say that “I’m not really sorry that not too much stayed of the old system”.612 Yet this does not prevent them from arguing for selective reconsideration of the past system’s merits, especially in the area of social welfare and education. In particular, the East German educational system is presented as being superior to the West German one (which was introduced after unification)613 including kindergartens,614 higher education,615 professional training,616 and sports.617 Additionally, the general configuration of , in particular the health care sector,618 as well as support for families or socially disadvantaged in the GDR is presented as a success story which should have been kept after unification.619 Furthermore, the potential of East German science and core industries620 as well as emancipative women’s policies are raised.621 In all these areas, according to East German MPs, one should reconsider an overhaul of the current system and a potential reintroduction of the past GDR arrangements. Concerning the institutional status quo East German MPs seem to widely agree that, if not a new constitution, then at least a far-reaching overhaul of the constitution was needed.622 Interestingly, in particular a number of established (West) German elements of consensus democracy are approached in a highly critical way. Firstly, the existing federalist system is deemed ripe for a far-reaching reform. East German MPs demand a clearer separation of powers between the federal government and the Länder administration, and less power for the Bundesrat (second chamber of the parliament comprised by representatives of the Länder governments) as it is viewed to be blocking many necessary reforms.623 Instead of too much time-consuming and costly co-decision between Länder and the central government, there should be more leeway for separate legislation of both Länder and centre without the need to

612 SPD#1, CDU#1, 6. 613 PDS#1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, SPD#1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, CDU#4, 6, FDP#1. 614 PDS#3, SPD#6, 7, 8, 10, CDU#6. 615 PDS#6. 616 CDU#4, PDS#5, FDP#1. 617 PDS#1, 9. 618 PDS#2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, Green#1, SPD#4, 5, 7, 9, CDU#3, 4. 619 PDS#5, 8, 10, SPD#5, 8. 620 PDS#1, CDU#3. 621 SPD#1. 622 SPD#1, 5, 6, CDU#3, PDS#2, 5, 9. 623 In fact some of these reforms have been initiated since conducting the interviews (see above). 160 consult in the Bundesrat.624 Also, elections on the federal level and in the Länder should be synchronised in order to avoid constant electoral campaigns (giving national weight to regional elections and resulting in changes of majority in the Bundestag).625 Thus, while East German MPs seem to be critical of the current federal set-up they are not against federalism as such, but rather would like to see it disentangled and reconfigured towards more competition between the different entities. In addition, some MPs again make clear their preference for a stronger majoritarian system which they would also like to see realized (e.g. by an increase of single-mandate districts)626 which would also help to weaken the power of parties.627 In line with statements described above East German MPs demand “more real majority decisions, and less compromises”.628 One MP argues for a longer term of office for parliaments and simultaneous elections in all Länder (which would avoid having constant campaign time).629 Some MPs claim that constitutional issues are not of concern, but rather a change of mentality is most needed.630 Only among PDS members do we find more conservative discourses arguing for a strengthening of the existing consensus set-up as already discovered in the quantitative analysis. A third chamber of parliament with “societal interest” representation consisting mostly of experts nominated by various groups should have a veto against elected politicians.631 Civil society should be more strongly involved.632 In fact, PDS MPs argue that the original vision of the (West German) constitution still needs to be realized in terms of securing basic rights and popular participation in democracy.633 Therefore, certain recent changes in the constitution (e.g. concerning the Asylum law or the privatisation of public utilities) are strongly criticised for undermining the spirit of the Grundgesetz.634 Parliament as a whole and individual MPs should not voluntarily give up powers to parties or to the executive, but rather should aim to strengthen their rights.635 Thus, PDS MPs do not only put emphasis on defending those consensualist features of the system which secure its position as

624 SPD#1, 2, 8, 9, 10, CDU#2, 4, FDP#1. 625 SPD#10. 626 SPD#6. 627 PDS #7. 628 SPD#8, 9. 629 SPD#10. 630 CDU#5, 6, SPD#7. 631 PDS#3, 4. 632 PDS#10. 633 PDS#2, 5, 8, 9. 634 PDS#2. 635 PDS #8, 10. 161 a small party, but more broadly defend the existing system based on the West German model which therefore cannot be explained from a position of mere self-interest. East German MPs expressed willingness to undertake major reforms both in the political system and other major fields such as social welfare, education, and employment. A 1995 survey shows East German elites636 as less satisfied with the functioning of the democratic system and more in favour of reform than their West German counterparts. At that point, however, elite members affiliated with the PDS and the Greens saw the greatest need for changes.637 In the early 1990s, shortly after unification, PDS’s criticism was still characterised by a basically sceptical stance towards (West German) capitalism and democracy, similar to those members of the East German Greens who originated in those dissident groups which argued for a renewed democratic socialist East Germany. Since the initiation of certain far-reaching reforms of the German social market economy (mostly in consensus among the major parties, including the Greens, and some constitutional changes concerning issues such as immigration, internal security, and recently issues of power distribution between the federal centre and the Länder etc.) the PDS is now increasingly presenting itself as the most conservative party in this regard, as shown both by my quantitative and qualitative analysis. Again, the PDS argues from an ostracised, outsider position for the conservation of specific arrangements in the Grundgesetz, which the other parties see as no longer tenable. Thus, while political contexts and contents have changed, the PDS remains (or is kept) outside of the consensus of the established parties. This consensus used to be in favour of continuity with the West German model until about the mid-1990s and is now (moderately) in favour of modernising and reforming the system. Already most of the 1990 Volkskammer MPs emphasised specific good sides of the old regime and wanted to see health care, child care and educational systems kept after unification.638 Demands for the reintroduction or preservation of certain elements of the East German socio-economic arrangements are not just a reaction by East German politicians to the economic decline in the mid-1990s, or a “little brother”-syndrome developed against patronizing West German political elite. Therefore, an alternative explanation based on these mechanisms cannot fully explain the development of these positions as they were already present before unification and the experience of the West German system.

636 The survey covered also economic and civil society elites. 637 V Kaina, ’Zwischen den Welten: Die Funktionsbewertung des politischen Systems in Führungsschicht und Bevölkerung’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, No.1, 2000, pp.131-155. 638 H Müller-Enbergs, ‘Zwischen Bewahrung und Modernisierung. Politische Einstellungen in der letzten Volkskammer der DDR’, in: O Niedermeyer, R Stöss (eds.), Parteien und Wähler im Umbruch – Parteiensystem und Wählerverhalten in der ehemaligen DDR und den neuen Bundesländern, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, pp.259-261 162 East German politicians’ critical position towards the federal set-up of the polity are also reflected in Best et al. survey data from 2003/4, in which a mainstay of exclusive Länder legislative and administrative authority is questioned: 74% of East German regional MPs (as opposed to 44% of Westerners) supported the view that high school curricula and exams should be standardized and centralised rather than remain an exclusive responsibility of the Länder. Thus, East German regional MPs in this survey actually support a downgrading of their own role in this regard. Among members of the Bundestag even 90% of East German MPs favour a centralisation of administrating secondary education (as opposed to 48% of West German ones).639 Other studies confirm East German politicians’ much more critical position towards certain veto players in German consensus democracy, in particular towards the involvement of Länder administrations, when compared to their West German colleagues. Investigating the long-term impact of participation in opposition activities in 1989 on later political participation, Karl-Dieter Opp argues that satisfaction with the working of the existing democracy is higher with those people who were more involved in the activities in 1989 than with passive bystanders. Moreover, those who were involved in 1989 see themselves as more competent and capable to achieve political changes today. His explanatory mechanism is based on socio-psychological explanations: the internalisation of protest norms, the “effort justification hypothesis”, and socialization into particular groups and networks. However, his results support my findings and point to the decisive impact of transition on shaping positions towards political change and continuity.640 Therefore it is not surprising that in the previous content analysis of parliamentary speeches the highest values for arguments in favour of changing the current status quo were measured with MPs who were initially rooted in the GDR dissident movement (e.g. CDU #5, Green #1, see annex 2, table 4a).

Hungary East Germany In 1989 we achieved the best possible Our current system is good, yet with hindsight outcome under the given circumstances. we should have kept certain achievements of As the old system broke down there is the GDR – we should also consider their nothing we should consider to reintroduce, selective reintroduction.

639 H Best / M Edinger / K Schmitt / S Jahr,’ Zwischenauswertung der Deutschen Abgeordnetenbefragung 2003/04 – Gesamtergebnis’, Sonderforschungsbereich 580, Friedrich-Schiller Universität Jena, online paper, 2004, online http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/a3.0.html, last accessed 20 October 2006. 640 K Opp, Die enttäuschten Revolutionäre – Politisches Engagement vor und nach der Wende, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997, p.227. 163 rather too much still stayed. Lets not temper with the result of the round- The Basic Law requires a major overhaul to table talks, it would endanger the well- reflect today’s realities. balanced stability of our democracy. There are some minor things which could be There is no value in keeping institutions possibly improved but it would not be worth which have become dysfunctional. upsetting the status quo / it is not possible to change because of our political culture. Rather than changing our institutions we German federalism in its current form is too should change the way we interact among the cumbersome and costly. We need to have political elite and teach the people to clearer demarcations between central and appreciate our democracy. Land governments and competition among the Länder. ------PDS: We should realise the original vision of the constitution and defend it rather than change it. c) Again we can recognise a basic difference in the way the democratic system is rhetorically approached in the two cases. Hungarian MPs present the current set-up of the democratic system as the best possible solution. The question of possible changes or alternatives is put under taboo, or at least presented as a futile undertaking and only reluctantly discussed with mutually contradictory demands, even within one party. East German MPs, while not questioning the foundations of the democratic system and clearly preferring it to the past, present themselves as much more open to debate both the adaptation of the current system and the reconsideration of positive achievements of the old regime (mostly in the area of social policy and education). Also, concerning proposals for reform, there is a strong emphasis on reducing consensus arrangements in the federal system and diminishing the powers of the second chamber. Interestingly, as already found in the content analysis, PDS MPs are the most outspoken defenders of the (West) German constitution. Why do East German MPs feature a much more critical position towards the institutional set-up in place than Hungarians given the fact that a well-working (and widely appreciated) constitution just fell into the laps of the former while the latter had to go through a long and uncertain process of rewriting their constitution? Why should the hardly reformed

164 post-communist PDS have adapted best to the new system? This puzzling outcome certainly contradicts strongly the assumptions of an attitude-based understanding of political culture with individual socialization and value internalisation as a mechanism. If, however, we regard the transition process as a defining moment not only for the institutional basis of the new democracy but also for a new collective identity of the new political elite, we might offer a different explanation: Hungarian political leaders are connected by the common achievement of the 1989 round-table talks which resulted in the establishment of the new order via constitutional amendments. Their legitimacy thus originates in this achievement. Since this defining moment there have been few common achievements or goals shared between the major parties. Moreover, due to the gradualist and accommodative mode of transition there has been no comprehensive approach to deal with or come to terms with the past. Thus, there is no way in which all major parties could approach the past and draw lessons from it in a uniform way. Due to the accommodative, non-confrontational and inclusive nature of the Hungarian transition the short period in 1989/90 remains a “golden era” (between a much contested past and a contested present and future) in the collective rhetorical repertoire of Hungarian politicians. Concerning changes (or even potential alternatives) to the existing system different parties would draw on very different historical precedents or concepts of legitimacy which were not destroyed by an imposed transition (as in unilateral transitions such as the East German one). Therefore, Hungarian MPs stick to the status quo rather than potentially opening a Pandora’s Box which could potentially lead to the clash of very different historical concepts of democracy, or nationhood. These latent concepts of historical legitimacy of the Hungarian polity span from a renewed version of Kádár’s happy goulash socialism on to nostalgic Horthyite dreams of corporatist or clerical authoritarianism on the right (including the revival of a Greater Hungary, undoing the “trauma of Trianon”, i.e. the loss of territory and Hungarian population following World War I.). In East Germany there have been extensive efforts to “come to terms with the past” with much less controversy concerning the judgement of the old system. It was completely pulled down by the democratisation of the GDR, and there is little nostalgia left for any other previous regime among mainstream politicians. Unification, however, was less defining for a collective identity, least so for the PDS. East German politicians did not hold a stake in the creation of the current system: West German democracy and social market economy was presented to East Germans as the best possible system and little debate devoted to alternatives. Unification basically meant the effective enactment of the West German legal

165 system in East Germany as of 3rd October 1990. The drawing up of a new German constitution was obstructed by the Kohl administration, and debates in the constitutional committee of the Bundestag only resulted in minor changes to the Grundgesetz (see above). Consequently, as East German MPs do not hold an active stake in the current system, they can surely argue in a much more pragmatic way for change and do not have to put up taboos as the Hungarians. After a clear break with the old system, and the generally shared condemnation of its most negative traits, it is also possible now to selectively reconsider some of its more favourable elements are when judged against obvious shortcomings of the current system. Hungarian MPs, in turn, disagree on almost everything, save the success of the 1989 transformation and its institutional legacy. Unlike the East German opposition Hungarian dissidents in 1989 lacked mass support and thus (pre-)democratic legitimacy. Behaving as if they were already in a democratic Rechtsstaat during the round-table talks by sticking to the letter of the existing constitution, they peacefully negotiated and achieved an institutional consensus endowed them with some kind of Ersatz legitimacy.641 Thus, references to the 1990 round-table talks and their outcomes carry a strongly positive meaning denoting not only the birth of Hungarian democracy, but also the knighting of its new political leaders. Criticising, questioning or even changing the outcome of the round-table talks from the beginning thus has always aroused suspicion and fierce protest (since the original institutional status quo is discursively linked with the legitimacy of the major Hungarian parties and their protagonists). Interestingly, when asked about personalities who are most significant for Hungarian democracy virtually all MPs in the interviews name the first democratically elected Prime Minister József Antall. He seems to be the only commonly embraced figure-head of Hungarian democracy beyond party lines. Next to him, MPs predominantly mention only personalities from pre-democratic times such as the hero of the 1948 revolution Lajos Kossuth, or even King Stephen the Great from the 11th century, or depending on their party affiliation, one of the post-1990 prime ministers. Thus, next to the current democratic system as “the best possible”, any alternatives have an un-democratic or pre-democratic overtone and draw on very different lines of history and historical legitimacy. Nevertheless, this consensus on the institutional status and its historical legitimacy does not prevent politicians from (ab-)using this discourse in attempting to discredit and de- legitimise political opponents. Thus, calling someone a traitor of the 1990 agreement, or demands for a new “national round-table” in order to undo the governments’ mistakes are

641 J Kis, ‘Between Reform and Revolution’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.12, No.2, spring 1998, pp.300-383. 166 rhetorical endeavours to redefine and lay exclusive claims to the legacy of 1990.642 They are surely not based in a fully consensualist political culture since the crucial dimension of respect towards the other (see below) is missing. Using the above sketched-out differentiation between weakly and strongly socialized actors, we might hypothesize that Hungarian political elites are only weakly socialized since they accept the validity of this discourse but did not fully adapt their individual behaviour to it. Concerning the consolidation of democracy, the absence of an explicit normative elite consensus on the existing set-up could be seen as a lack of democratic credentials.643 This, however, appears to be grounded in a conservative understanding of democratic consolidation favouring the status quo put in place by transition. In fact, a consensus on reconsidering certain arrangements, which appears to be the case among East German elites (without the PDS) is surely a sign of more democratic maturity than an institutional consensus due to a lack of ability to agree on anything else (as in the Hungarian case). In the East German case, of course, adapting the institutional status quo in order to better reflect East German political culture will hardly be possible against the resistance of established West German elites and, paradoxically, the PDS.

Enemy or legitimate opponent? Respect towards the “other” Finally, concerning the last dimension of elite commitment to consensus democracy I intend to investigate how political elites in the two cases justify the predominance of negative, confrontational or even derogative statements about other parties which were found in the quantitative analysis. Also, I will try to explore in how far Hungarian and East (and West) German MPs are similarly constituted as implied by the results of the quantitative analysis. Therefore, interviewees were asked about what or who is to be blamed for the currently most urgent problems (which were defined by the interviewee in the preceding question). Moreover, I asked which individuals or parties had changed most strongly since transition and why these changes took place. Thus, I will outline and compare discourses describing MPs respect to wards the political “other”. a) Hungarian MPs are quick to call in the mistakes of previous governments and other parties in this regard. While some, mostly rightist MPs put all blame on the current leftist government

642 E.g. ‘Radikalisabb Fideszt akarnak a jobboldali értelmiségiek’, Magyar Nemzet, 12 September 2006. 643 J Higley / R Gunther (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; J Higley, J Pakulski and W Wesolowski (eds.), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1998; J Higley / Gy Lengyel (eds.), Elites after State Socialism – Theory and Analysis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 167 (under then Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy), in particular for cuts in housing and family support, and the inept preparation for EU accession,644 another MP blames the “economic lobby who stands behind the current government”.645 Yet another MP blames the first democratically elected (conservative) Antall government for being too little concerned with the economy. Also the Horn government is presented as having made grave mistakes646 and being too unconcerned with society.647 Finally, the Orbán government is accused by leftist MPs for “populist, superficial solutions”.648 Leftist governments in turn are indicted for lacking political visions for the country.649 While criticizing mostly the other side for mistakes of the past, there are a few MPs who argue that everyone in the political elite and all previous governments were engaged in , trying to please their voters with “electoral presents” and were too cowardly to commit to needed far-reaching reforms.650 Moreover, a number of useful policies were often cancelled or reversed after one electoral cycle with the return of the opposition into government.651 Members from both left and right parties concede that they were not brave enough when in power and did not have real long-term visions.652 Again a deficient political culture is blamed for these shortcomings. This leads to parties which are too preoccupied with themselves rather than real problems653, and an irresponsible media654 with no short-term solution to this problem.655 Concerning the change of persons and parties since transition some Hungarian MPs admit that everybody changes/ed,656 and (although there was no longer a communist- anticommunist antagonism)657 each party accuses one or all of the others of having betrayed the ideals of transition or as having never really been a democratic party. Whereas the post- communist MSZP is accused of either still being the same and/or having turned into the worst capitalists, Fidesz is characterized as a party which changes its colours every few years. The liberal SZDSZ is being portrayed as a party which betrayed the ideals of the former

644 Fidesz#2, 7, SZDSZ#3. 645 Fidesz#1. 646 Fidesz#7. 647 MSZP#1. 648 MSZP#1, 5, 10, SZDSZ#2, 3, 4. 649 MDF#2. 650 SZDSZ#3, 4, 6, MSZP#8, 10, MDF#2, 3. 651 Since the first free election in 1990 (with the coming to power of the conservative Antall government) Hungary experienced two returns of the post-communists: in 1994 and 2002. They, in turn, were interrupted by the conservative Orbán-government who came to power in 1998. In 2006, for the first time in modern Hungarian democracy, a government was re-elected (namely the socialist-liberal coalition of Prime Minister Gyurcsány). 652 Fidesz#2, 3, MSZP#4, SZDSZ#1, 6. 653 MSZP#4. 654 SZDSZ#3. 655 MDF#1, SZDSZ#5. 656 MSZP#3, 5, 7, Fidesz#3, 5, 6, 7, SZDSZ#3. 657 SZDSZ#5, Fidesz#7, MSZP#7. 168 opposition and opportunistically allied with the post-communists. According to some MPs from the other parties, MSZP basically stayed what it was, it only “refined its cadre techniques,” or “got democratic legitimacy” through the new system. But in reality “democracy is a straightjacket for them.”658 Only on the surface they changed from communists into democrats.659 According to an alternative theme, MSZP changed the most: “from communists and informers into capitalists,” “from [being obedient to] Moscow to [being obedient to] Brussels,” as “they never stood with the people” and always have several faces.660 According to MSZP-members themselves (and some of their liberal coalition partners) the MSZP made the largest changes before 1989 and, since then, is a reliable democratic party.661 MSZP and their liberal allies from the SZDSZ in turn view the conservative Fidesz as the most unreliable and ever-changing party which turned from a dynamic youth party into a “Forza-Italia-like populist party.” Fidesz succeeded in “forgetting their [liberal] roots,” and moving to “extreme right” via “;” their leader, Viktor Orbán, turned “from an aggressive democrat into an aggressive power-seeker”.662 Orbán was a danger to democracy, an “immoral, cynical pretender” and a “professional liar”.663 Fidesz accusations against MSZP are presented as being hypocritical since “they had more communists in their government than MSZP does have now”.664 Fidesz-MPs present their own party as the one that stayed (or went back to be) true opposition.665 Fidesz is portrayed as having had to change some of their ideological tenets, as it had to “collect and gather the right,” and at the same time experienced a natural generational change and thus became more conservative.666 SZDSZ is denounced by rightist parties as having changed strongly from the “harshest opposition to joining the communists in 1994,” in “giving up ideals for power,”667 or “turning ultra-liberal”668 or be again radical.669 SZDSZ-members themselves admit to having changed, to have had to learn their lesson, and that there exists “some schizophrenia in the party,” as “anti-communism is no longer relevant.”670 The small MDF, sometimes denounced as

658 Fidesz#2, 6, SZDSZ#3, MDF#2. 659 Fidesz#7. 660 Fidesz#1, 4, MDF#3. 661 MSZP#1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, SZDSZ#5. 662 MSZP#1, 2, 3, 5, 10, SZDSZ#1, 2, 3, 5, 6, MDF#1. 663 SZDSZ#2. 664 MSZP#8. 665 Fidesz#1. 666 Fidesz#2, 3, 4, 5, 7, MDF#2, 3. 667 Fidesz#1, 2, 3, 5, MDF#3. 668 MDF#2. 669 MSZP#1, 10. 670 SZDSZ#1, 2, 5. 169 moving left,671 views itself as the only stable and unchanged party which stands for “200 years of continuity” and the Lakiteleki ideals (where one of the constituting meetings of the Hungarian opposition took place).672 Inter-party relations on the discursive level in Hungary can be characterized as anything but consensualist. Countless amounts of press articles, speeches and public statements by members from all parties, but more prominently from right wing politicians, could further illustrate a discourse meant to exclude and de-legitimise “the other side” from the polity. While politicians from the MSZP and their liberal coalition partners are being attacked for MSZP’s roots in the old regime and accused of trying to re-establish political, economic and in Hungary, Fidesz and their right-wing allies are being accused of building a “shadow-state”.673 Hungarian MPs appear to largely lack basic respect towards the political opponent and deny protagonists from other parties to be a legitimate player in the democratic game. b) In the East German case MPs are quite reluctant to put blame on a particular party or government for the current problems. In fact, insincerity and lack of action by every government so far is quite prominently mentioned, in particular the failure to reform the social security system, and for the accumulation of debts out of fear to take unpopular decisions.674 Also, the drive to consensus is raised as a cause for inaction and uncourageous decisions.675 Some MPs make clear that its “everybody’s mistakes – don’t blame always the others”.676 There is some mentioning of western takeover as causing the major problems677 and the dominance of western lobbies and interests which lead to the East “falling of the rim”.678 Moreover, one must not forget that the economic structure of the old system was not viable679 and that Germany is exposed to the problems connected with globalisation and international security.680 But it is also claimed that people are too pessimistic and that the situation is much better than often presented.681 Concerning change and continuity among the political parties in East Germany, the PDS still remains somewhat controversial as it directly connects to the old communist SED.

671 Fidesz#1. 672 MDF#1, 2, 3. 673 ‘A jobboldal visszaigazolást vár’, Népszabadság, 23 December 2003. 674 SPD#2, 5, 8, 9, 10, CDU#4, PDS#6. 675 Green#1. 676 PDS#3, SPD#2, Green#1. 677 SPD#1. 678 CDU#3. 679 SPD#2, CDU#4. 680 PDS#3, SPD#2, 5, 10, CDU#3. 681 SPD#1. 170 Its membership is to large extent holdovers from the GDR. Nevertheless, the reservations towards the post-communist PDS appear rather mild if seen in the light of the mutual resentments between Hungarian parties. Some East German MPs argue that the PDS has changed since the old times.682 They agree that the PDS accepts democracy, and has taken on a new role.683 However, some MPs claim that the PDS in fact did not change at all since the end of the old regime.684 According to its own members, the PDS has nothing in common with the SED685 and stayed truest to the ideals of an East German democracy of 1989/90686 (while the Social Democrats would not deserve their name).687 Surprisingly critical views are presented on former East German civic activists who can be found in almost all parties now. They are being criticised for abandoning their idealistic stance and an East German identity in exchange for power, office and recognition in the West.688 Finally, members of the former “bloc parties” who were integrated into their West German sister parties meet criticism for ,689 in particular by members of the (newly founded under transition) SPD and Green party, who in turn are claimed to have stayed truest to their old ideals. 690 Some claim that the former bloc party members are even now still close to the post-communist PDS in terms of their mindset.691 In the end, there seems to be some agreement that one should focus on individuals’ development rather than on parties or groups since “everybody changed”692, and “only apolitical people stay the same”.693 Also, there is a noted absence of derogatory, personally offensive statements towards other MPs as frequently recorded in the Hungarian case, both in the speech material used for content analysis and during the interviews. Thus, East German elite political culture is indeed competitive and majoritarian as the number of confrontational statements is higher than the number of accommodative ones. Nevertheless, beyond this quantitative finding, East German MPs seem to accept each other as equally legitimate political opponents, unlike their Hungarian colleagues. East German MPs’ pragmatism in dealing with political opponents has also been confirmed by other studies. According to Werner Patzelt, East German MPs claim not to mind

682 SPD#1, 4, CDU#5. 683 CDU#1, SPD#2, 7, 8, PDS#7, 8. 684 CDU#3, SPD#6, 10. 685 PDS#3, 6. 686 PDS#2, 4. 687 PDS#2, 3. 688 CDU#1, 2, 3, PDS#2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, SPD#2, 6, 10, FDP#1. 689 CDU#1, SPD#2, 4, 7, 8, 10, PDS#2, 6. 690 SPD#1, 7, Green#1. 691 SPD#1, 8. 692 CDU#1, 2, 4, 5, PDS#5, SPD#5. 693 CDU#5. 171 voting for the proposals of other parties if they find them convincing (which they have done, especially in the first post-transition years). This, of course, has been a particular nuisance for their West German colleagues, who are used to more political demarcation and party discipline.694

Hungary East Germany The government of party X [from the other False promises by politicians and exaggerated camp] is mostly to blame for the biggest expectations created by all parties are to problem our country is facing. blame for the current problems. My party stayed truest to the democratic X, Y and Z [all different parties] managed ideals of 1989. most quickly to become like “Westerners”. The party/parties X (and Y) of the other camp betrayed and abandoned these ideals for the sake of power. c) In sum, while East German MPs present themselves as rather unwilling to designate guilt and shame on each other while admitting some kind of collective responsibility, Hungarian MPs trade mutual accusations for political failure in the past. East German parties seem to mutually accept each other as equal parties, only with some reservations remaining towards the post-communist PDS. Accusations of opportunism are brought forward against former civic activists who are now a small minority found among all parties, and members of former “bloc parties” (but not against entire parties or political camps, as in the Hungarian case). Thus, in a way, political constellations from the transition period are partly still reproduced in which PDS and some of the civic activists stand against the other parties. While being critical and outspoken about one’s opponents past there appears to be little attempts to rhetorically de-legitimise certain parties or political positions as such. Instead, shame is put on individuals. Thus, the East German discourse rather lacks the destructive friend-foe-logic which characterizes the Hungarian one. Despite a conflict-oriented stance towards other parties (as found in the quantitative analysis) there appears to be some common ground concerning the image of the past and its use in present discourses among East German

694 W Patzelt, ’“Seiteneinsteiger, Neulinge, Ossis…“: Die Integration ostdeutscher Abgeordneter in ‚gesamtdeutsche’ Parlamente’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, Vol.31, No.3, September 2000, p.560. 172 politicians regardless of party affiliation and other background factors. This view is underpinned also by Eckhart Jesse in his study on former GDR dissidents.695 The Hungarian political elite is strongly divided by party lines in mutually accusing each other of betrayal, opportunism or questioning one’s democratic credentials and thus trying to deny them an equal standing in the polity.696 In front of increasingly confrontational politics Gabriella Illonszki speaks about the dissolution of the elite agreement of 1989 in Hungary.697 Anna Seleny reports similar developments.698 Thus, in spite of similar negative ratings in the quantitative indicator for consensualism (in the above-outlined content analysis from parliamentary speeches), there seem to be some significant qualitative differences between the two cases. While East German MPs present a collegiate but competitive understanding of democratic politics with everyone accepted as an equal player, Hungarian MPs are trying to de-legitimise political opponents by rhetorically excluding them from the common polity. The former appears to be an indicator for a “normal” competitive political culture, while the latter appears rather problematic and out of place for both consensus and majoritarian democracy. Therefore, the finding of similar quantitative results from the fifth dimension should not automatically lead us to draw similar conclusions for the two cases. As shown in the quantitative analysis, even among consensus-oriented politicians (such as the West German ones) we overall find more negative than positive remarks towards the political opponent. In fact, expecting more praise than criticism for the political opponent (which would lead to a positive score in this dimension) might be too unrealistic even for strong consensus systems. In the light of the qualitative results it might actually make sense to reformulate the fifth indicator and its coding instructions in order to be able to better grasp the differences between the two cases by better specifying the notion of “respect towards the other”. Some authors blame an “ancient cultural divide” for the current polarization in Hungary.699 This “deep culture”- explanation, as mentioned above, usually fails to account for the mechanism which made this divide come to life again and become a powerful marker in

695 E Jesse, ’Einleitung’, in: E Jesse (ed.), Eine Revolution und ihre Folgen – 14 Bürgerrechtler ziehen Bilanz, Berlin: Ch.Links, 2000, p.19. 696 A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, pp.166-167. 697 G Illonszki, ‘Ist die Kontinuität der Elite von Bedeutung?’, in: H Veen (ed.), Alte Eliten in jungen Demokratien? Wechsel, Wandel und Kontinuität in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004, pp.233- 242. 698 A Seleny, ‘Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies – Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland’, World Politics, Vol.51, July 1999, pp.481-519. 699 D Gyôrffy, ‘Governance in a Low-Trust Environment: The Difficulties of Fiscal Adjustment in Hungary’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.58, No.2, March 2006, p.252. 173 some contexts and not in others. Another explanation is advanced by János Kis, one of the most prominent participants during the 1989 round-table talks and established political philosopher. According to Kis, the “unwritten rules” of Hungarian democracy did not consolidate as opposed to the mere constitutional rules. He deplores Hungarian politicians’ lack of moral standards and the absence of other qualities such as self-restraint, moderation, and mutual trust, which very much in line with my definitions, are prerequisites for a workable consensus democracy. Kis sees the origins of this problem already in the transition context. Secret talks between the then major opposition party, the conservative MDF and the ruling MSZMP (in which, among others, the of the president was agreed), undermined the legitimacy of the democratisation process and the official round-table talks. That is why, according to Kis, two other opposition parties, namely Fidesz and SZDSZ (the party he co-founded and led at that time), could not sign the final agreement of the round- table talks.700 In a rather rare event in the Hungarian transition they mobilized the people and managed to initiate and win a referendum on the contested issues. According to Kis the absence of the mentioned unwritten rules lead to a deep polarisation between left and right. In this climate losers of the elections always had to fear they would lose everything, not just power and office. This understanding of politics as a zero-sum game, according to Kis, leads to an opportunist and populist short-sighted competition in which ever more untenable promises are being made and necessary long-term sacrifices cynically postponed.701 Other scholars blame the reformed post-communists and the failure to implement far- reaching elite turnover for the ongoing elite divisions and lack of common ground. Arguing from a more rightist position Tamás Fricz talks about a return (or even a “roll-back”) of the old post-communist elites, who either managed to keep their jobs in the administration, came back after the 1994 landslide electoral victory of MSZP, or hibernated in managerial positions in newly privatised enterprises. According to Fricz, for post-communist leaders it was easy to switch their loyalties from Moscow to Brussels or Washington rather than to represent the “real interests of people”.702 While the latter claim seems more like a personal opinion rather than a scientifically founded finding, the sociological argument about the moderate elite turnover (and its impact upon the way claims to democratic legitimacy are established) is surely valid. In fact, every change of government has been used by the newly elected

700 Interview with János Kis with Index.hu online magazine, 14 July 2004, (online www.index.hu, accessed 14 July 2004). 701 J Kis, A politika mint erkölcsi probléma, Budapest: Èlet és Irodalom, 2004, pp.300-302. 702 T Fricz, ‘Die alte Elite im neuen demokratischen Ungarn”, in: H Veen (ed.), Alte Eliten in jungen Demokratien? Wechsel, Wandel und Kontinuität in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004, pp.285- 307. 174 government to make a declaratory break with the previous government, such as the 1998 programme of the newly elected Orbán government solemnly announced: “less than a regime change but more than a change of government” (“rendszerváltásnál kevesebbet de kormányváltásnál többet”),703 or as promised by the oppositional Fidesz’ prior to the 2006 elections: “new economy, new state, new politics”.704 The initial defection from the ideal of consensually negotiated change, the original sin of “betraying” the transition consensus and subsequent attempts to rhetorically exclude other players from the democratic game, is thus a prominent and re-current theme among the political elites. It is used both as an excuse for one’s own indecent behaviour and as a moral cudgel against one’s opponents. Furthermore, as Kis’ writings illustrate, it has also become a prominent explanation in Hungarian political science for the deep . While I agree with Kis on the key importance of the round-table talks in this regard, I would not like to imply an inevitable automatism between the mentioned historical events (i.e. the specific dynamics of negotiated revolution, and contemporary political culture). There is surely an element of agency which requires someone to make active and deliberate use of the discursive resources provided by history in a certain way. In this regard, prominent personalities of Hungarian politics such as Viktor Orbán, István Csurka or József Torgyán cultivated and popularised a divisive discourse in which battles of the past (“communists vs. opposition”), and recent past (“communist turncoats and their allies vs. true democrats during the round- table talks”) are rhetorically extrapolated into the present. Discourses about the need for consensus politics are used in order to legitimate the opposite: confrontational, exclusive approaches in which the “common good” is defined according to narrow party interests and in which consensus denotes the exclusion of the political opponent who becomes an enemy.705 Contingent events, such as the situation after the round-table talks discussed by Kis, but also other crises (e.g. the so-called “Taxi-blockade”) after an increase in petrol prices, the mentioned Bokros-package in the 1990s, or the recent political crisis following a leaked tape with Prime Minister Gyurcsány admitting to have lied to the voters, give an opportunity to opposition parties to shame the respective government for having left the path of consensus, common good and preservation of the status quo. In the light of these commonly upheld values fallible politicians (who no longer stand for “the truth”), and far-reaching changes to the existing socio-economic arrangements appear particularly outrageous (or can be presented

703 ’Konszenzus vagy pillérdemokrácia?’, interview with Ervin Csizmadia, Népszabadság, 7 October 2002. 704 ’Gyurcsány változást, Orbán új rendszerváltást ígér’, Magyar Hírlap, 16 October 2005. 705 A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, p.169. 175 as such). Therefore, in the long term, further external crises (as Bourdieu calls them) might undermine and possibly replace the existing habitus by exposing its arbitrary nature and dissociation from reality.706 Paradoxically, the historical ideal of consensus as provided by the round-table talks in its discursive distortion lends itself particularly well to the construction of an externalised “other”. As Chantal Mouffe remarks, every consensus in a democracy in fact marks a new boundary which, by definition, excludes certain ideas or people from the polity. Defining the consensus thus means externalising rather than including the political opponent. Claiming to be the (only) “true” heir of the democratic consensus established in 1989 externalises other participants from the polity and denies them an equal democratic legitimacy. The other side’s disagreement on the “true” interpretation of certain events, institutions or policies is then easily presented as “proof” of their illegitimate position and their positioning against “the people”, “the nation” or other denominators of the common good. The accusation of being outside of the 1989 consensus, to be outside Hungarian democracy, is probably the most severe claim which can be made against a democratically elected MP. As discussed in the previous sections this far-reaching absence of mutual respect is also overshadowing the other dimensions of a consensual political culture and therefore makes it hard to denote Hungarian elite political culture as “consensual” without further qualifications. Emilia Palonen investigates this logic of the discursive construction of “the other” in Hungary in detail. According to her the major Hungarian parties create and constantly recreate a “bipolar hegemony” which serves as an interpreting device for all issues. There is a “totalising system” of demarcation and “political fixedness of identity” which forces ordinary citizens into taking sides involuntarily by occupying symbols and discourses of daily life. National symbols, memorials, national holidays, or even so far empty signifiers such as “polgári” (which can be translated as both “civic” and “bourgeois”) are being assigned with new meanings in order to impose totalising divisions on society. This “structure of political articulation and identification” is maintained through constant re-articulation. According to Palonen both left and right parties use this destructive discourse in order to maintain their position in the political system due to lack of other markers in the post-communist context, and at the same time in order to safeguard against the emergence of potential alternatives. This way, a negative “consensus” in the Mouffian sense is being constructed (which defines democracy as “politics without the other”). Polarization, Palonen observes, is in many regards

706 P Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. 176 similar to the politics of consensus, as it is in fact “two consensuses divided by a ”.707 This is particularly problematic when these protagonists of consensus politics implicitly or explicitly claim moral superiority of their approach to political competition by equal contenders, as does not allow for compromise. Körösényi argues that the confrontational political culture will persist for sometime in spite of largely consensus-democratic institutions as parties need to create stable camps of supporters.708 Similar developments are now being reported by observers for the Polish right wing parties.709 There, also soon after transition, a confrontational style developed and MPs expressed derogative positions on other parties in order to de-legitimate them in a survey conducted.710 A multilateral transition leaves a discursive legacy making the polity open to attack by competing claims of historical legitimacy, and makes some of its major protagonists potentially vulnerable to accusations concerning their role in the past. It also requires skilful political entrepreneurship to turn these “resources” into political capital. As it seems, political elites have not always been successful in this regard. In the early 1990s the parties of the centre-right Antall-government failed to establish a nationalist, Christian-conservative “Hungarian” version of modernization and demonize socialist or liberal positions. did not manage to build up again a stable subculture.711 Polarizing positions and radical fringe discourses on both left and right lost out at elections. Yet, later on, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz was much more successful at establishing a steep cultural-political cleavage between left and right. Zsolt Enyedi shows how the originally left- libertarian party managed to reinvent itself on the right, burning all bridges behind itself and at the same time shape voters’ attitudes and their identification with new cleavages. Thus Fidesz, to a certain extent, managed to turn political into primary divisions.712 According to some authors the Hungarian right is currently building up its own societal pillar with its own civil society, media, educational institutions, historical and social-scientific institutes etc. This way, an alternative understanding of modernity and modernisation, with a focus on national identity, religion, and localism (“family”, “community”, “Hungarian soil”, “middle class”) shall be socially embedded in society in declared opposition to the market-friendly,

707 E Palonen, Political Polarization in Contemporary Hungary, unpublished manuscript, Budapest, 2006. 708 A Körösényi, Government and Politics in Hungary, Budapest: CEU Press, 1999, p. 709 Die Welt, 27 September 2006. 710 B Mach, W Wesolowski, ‘Politiker in Zeiten der Transformation: „Transformational correctness” oder divergierende Wahrnehmungen?’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie, No.3, 1999, pp.393-395. 711 Zs Enyedi, ‘Organizing a Subcultural – The Case of the Hungarian Christian Democrats’, Party Politics, Vol.2, No.3, 1996, pp.377-396. 712 Zs Enyedi, ‘The role of agency in cleavage formation’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44, No.3, 2005, pp.697-720. 177 cosmopolitan, and anti-clerical positions of the left camp (which is claimed to have re- occupied the key positions and definitional hegemony in all reins of life). Few areas have been left out of this build-up of essentializing antagonisms, most prominently Euro-Atlantic integration.713 Nevertheless, political elites in Hungary appear to have been only partially successful in superimposing their polarization on society, and in a number of instances have probably gone too far in articulating divisions. This is supported by indicators such as the ongoing survival of the long pronounced-dead smaller parties and two successive electoral failures for Fidesz’ particularly confrontational style. Some more recent attempts to personalize historical guilt and expose senior politicians of both left and right for their (or their family members’) involvement with committed in the 1956 revolution, or collaboration with the communist secret service, frequently backfired (in some cases even increased the popularity of the shamed person).714 Obviously, in theses instances, political leaders failed to change the boundaries of the “field of the permissible” as they used discourses which did not resonate well with the larger public. Similarly in the Polish case, cultural-ideological polarization has worked less well in the early and mid-1990s than later on. Some explanations in the literature see the origins of contemporary polarization already in pre-transition legacies. Anna Seleny finds the “us vs. them”-logic to persist in the Polish case since the rise of Solidarity in the 1980s, but this does not suffice in explaining the ups and downs of polarizing politics over time.715 Finally, yet another explanation is thinkable: frustration with unworkable consensus institutions might have led some actors to seek a remedy by imposing a new, polarized logic of politics, even if it meant going beyond the boundaries of democratic competition.716 Therefore, further research is needed in order to better establish the systematic and the more contingent factors impacting upon the timing and impact of cleavage formation by political entrepreneurs using the discursive legacies of transition.717 In fact, one might expect another wave of exclusivist ideological demarcation from both left and right in countries like Hungary, Poland or Slovakia after years of externally imposed in the run up to EU

713 ’Konszenzus vagy pillérdemokrácia?’, interview with Ervin Csizmadia, Népszabadság, 7 October 2002. 714 A Bozóki, E Simon, ‘Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Hungary’, in: G Meyer (ed.), Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006, p.167. 715 A Seleny, The Political Economy of State-Society Relations in Hungary and Poland, New York: Cambridge UP, 2006. 716 This explanation seems to be suggested by Zsolt Enyedi, ‘The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary’, in: S Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-Communist EU Member States – Parties and Party Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp.177-201. 717 In this regard, external sources such as the influence of foreign models on major protagonists (e.g. Fidesz’ preference for a clearly demarcated ‘British’ two-party system) might play a role (Seleny, 2006, p.253). 178 accession now followed by some disappointment of EU membership (e.g. with the new conservative Polish President promising a “moral revolution”).718 Up to 2004, one might argue, an externally imposed consensus on EU integration had prevented cultural-ideological divisions from gaining too much ground among CEE political elites. The deception experienced by many Hungarians following a leaked tape with the admission of Prime Minister Gyurcsány to have lied to voters “day and night” might further fuel disrespect, polarization and unwillingness to coalesce between the camps and have a similar impact as the deception described by Kis following the round-table talks.719 Political entrepreneurs on the right take Gyurcsány’s admission as “proof” of a crypto-communist conspiracy in which Hungary is going to be turned into a Russian colony again.720 Demagogues on the left use the violent against the Gyurcsány government (in the weeks following the crisis) as an attestation of the right’s irresponsibility and undemocratic character.721 Beyond that, it is also possible that, in the future, the 2006 events in Hungary will be regarded as a new historical juncture which led to the discharge of some of the above- described discourses focusing around consensus and co-operation (as they were so severely undermined by elites’ behaviour).722 At the time of writing it is far too early to pass a judgement on the long-term effects of these events. In sum, while I would not claim that this kind of destructive, confrontational logic follows automatically from pacted, multilateral transition, it is, however, one of the possible uses of this legacy by political entrepreneurs. This approach is much less conceivable in countries with the legacy of a unilateral transition. In these cases there can hardly be credible competing claims to authorship of the new democratic system. The issue of what Huntington calls the “torturer problem” is largely solved by judicial or administrative means in cases of unilateral transitions (i.e. former protagonists of the old regime are inhibited from taking on higher positions in the new polity through lustration or even criminal prosecution).

718 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 September 2006. 719 Thanks to Anna Seleny for pointing me to this parallel. 720 Opposition leader Viktor Orbán in an interview warned that under the current social-liberal government Hungary was in danger to become “Gazprom’s happiest barrack” in an allusion of Hungary’s former self- labeling as the “happiest barrack in the Soviet bloc” (‘Robbanásveszélyes Orbán-szavak’, Népszabadság, 5 January 2007). 721 In fact, the Hungarian MSZP in 1989/90 made a much more radical break with the past than its Polish counterpart, both in terms of party organization and rhetorical distancing from the past. At the same time the persistence of a small holdover communist party in Hungary makes it easier for the MSZP to disassociate itself from its past and claim a modern, social-democratic image. (A Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past – The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe, Cambridge UP, 2002, pp.105-114). 722 There were, however, signs that neither the social-liberal government nor the conservative coalition were willing to engage in an all-out confrontation. In this regard, especially the moral authority of the President as a symbol of national consensus and impartiality was respected by both sides (e.g. when he indirectly called upon the prime minister to have a vote of confidence in parliament and urged the opposition to moderate their public mobilisation strategy) (Népszabadság, Magyar Nemzet, Magyar Hírlap September/October 2006). 179 Multilateral transitions in turn face the dilemma of implementing historical justice while keeping up the rule of law.723 Thus, potentially competing claims of superior democratic legitimacy of one actor over another are hardly persuasive in countries of unilateral transition, or can only be advanced as long as the post-communists entirely reject the new democratic system. Therefore, among German political elites the PDS, which initially came to be seen as the unholy relicts of an illegitimate regime, has meanwhile been accepted into the democratic mainstream. It has even become a valuable coalition partner in several East German Länder governments. This political reality is even accepted by most CDU-MPs. The PDS is no longer being rhetorically or in any way credibly de-legitimised as a return of the red menace (as done in the mid-1990s).724 Therefore, East German political culture in this regard seems to well reflect the logic of a competitive, majoritarian democracy. Given the fact that in terms of its party and electoral systems Germany is indeed rather majoritarian than consensus, and this is good news.725 East German MPs seem to express the logic of agonist but not inimical political competition; they do not strive to establish agreement by necessity but they do express respect for the political opponent as a legitimate competitor for power. In this regard they appear to be in the of stable Western democracies with competitive party systems. In this dimension they also match the West German political culture. Thus, while the quantitative analysis of parliamentary speeches showed a similar degree of non-consensualist statements for all three samples, there is a qualitative difference between Hungary on the one hand and the two German samples on the other: Hungarian MPs largely use derogatory or (negatively) moralising statements for characterizing their political opponents as shown in the interviews. German MPs in parliamentary speeches and in the interviews also criticise their opponents and try to positively contrast themselves from other parties. However, they do this without denying the other’s democratic legitimacy. In fact, in parliamentary speeches (next to criticism of political opponents) there are very often conciliatory statements thanking each other for the good discussions in committee sessions. Appreciation for the useful contribution of the other side is pronounced, something which is rarely heard in the Hungarian parliament.

723 S Huntington, The Third Wave – Democratization in the late twentieth century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp.214-231. Also Jon Elster discusses the limited possibilities for historical justice in cases of pacted transitions (J Elster, Closing the Books – Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, Cambridge UP, 2004). 724 ’Kein Eros, kein Logos’, Die ZEIT, 14 September 2006, p.8; ’Rot-Rot, na und?’, Die ZEIT, 5 October 2006. 725 Lijphart, 1999, pp.143-170. 180 Hungarian MPs offer rather negative accounts about their political opponents while at the same time explicitly hold up the ideal of consensus and accommodation. This way again the existing institutional framework might be overtaxed with the expectations raised. If political consensus and consensual relations between different political parties is declared as the standard to be met, conflicts and disagreements appear even more unacceptable or even illegitimate. Furthermore, if these ideals are used to advance one’s own position and to discursively externalise political opponent from the polity the stability of the democratic system is indeed under threat. At the moment, Hungarian elites defend non-consensualist behaviour by referring to established symbols of consensus, national unity and the common good in exclusivist terms. Demands for a “second transition” or the “conclusion of transition” aiming at the purge of old elites, retroactive justice and reprivatization advanced by right- wing politicians are surely undermining the stability of the democratic system.726 Thus, in Hungary political conflicts are not yet immune from being carried over into higher-order conflicts over legitimacy and abstract rule-making and thus not meeting Elster, Offe and Preuss’ definition of democratic consolidation.727 As long as Hungary’s political elites continue to frame democratic politics as a zero-sum game democracy is in trouble, and a workable consensus democracy is ever further away.

726 A Arato, Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimacy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp.106-121. 727 J Elster / C Offe / U Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies – Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.28. 181 PART IV: Conclusions and outlook: The future of consensus democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

This dissertation ventured to address the question in how far a consensus democratic institutional set-up led to a consensualist elite political culture in the new democracies of CEE. Political elites in the region do not seem to be strongly committed to consensus democracy. Therefore, the wide-spread expectation that political culture would adapt to institutions over time appears flawed. Consequently, this dissertation advanced an alternative explanation for the sources of elite political culture. Rather than individual socialization based on the internalization of norms such as those embodied in consensus institutions, I found collective socialization through historical junctures and their reproduction in collective memories leaving a greater mark on elite political culture. Thus, elite political culture in the region is still to a great extent conditioned by historical legacies rather than contemporary institutions. This dissertation started from the observation of the apparent mismatch between institutions and political culture in the region. A critical review of Arend Lijphart’s concepts of consensus and majoritarian democracy reveals the hidden assumption of an elite political culture featuring a “spirit of accommodation” going along with stable consensus-democratic arrangements. Unlike the developed Western democracies in Lijphart’s sample, consensus democratic institutions in CEE were created in a largely exogenous manner. They were the result of contingent uncertainties in the post-communist context and external influences from the EU rather than the result of long-term experimentation and domestic adaptation. So what makes a consensual political culture, as opposed to a majoritarian one? While the structural-institutional features of consensus democracy can be easily quantified and compared using Lijphart’s indicators and the related concept of veto players, the “spirit of accommodation” has remained without a systematic operationalization for a long time. Steiner et al.’s Discourse Quality Index (DQI) is the first promising attempt in this regard. However, the introduction of deliberative theory into the concept encounters a number of theoretical and methodological problems, most notably the impossible task of establishing actors’ “truthfulness” as one of their criteria for a consensual political culture. Therefore, I advance a different conceptualisation of a consensual political culture derived from Lijphart’s earlier writings based on five dimensions: 1) support for consensus and compromise as central elements of policy-making, 2) reference to the common good, 3) support for established procedures, 4) support for the preservation of the existing institutional

182 status quo, and 5) respect towards political opponents. Thus, this study asked in how far these properties are present in current CEE elite political cultures, and endeavoured to establish some of the sources for cross-national differences. More tentatively, some implications for the consolidation of consensus democracy were outlined, too. In my concept of political culture politicians’ rhetorical repertoire (but not necessarily their internalized values) is influenced by the availability of rhetorical resources to justify and legitimise behaviour. These rhetorical resources are in particular conditioned by historical junctures such as the democratic transitions of 1989/90. These junctures not only established new democratic institutions but also the vocabulary for politicians to refer to the political system, their own role and that of their opponents. Coding East German and Hungarian deputies’ speeches in parliament for the five dimensions of consensus democracy the greatest differences were found cross-nationally. Moreover, I show that the patterns found are rather stable over time. By drawing in West Germany as a benchmark I give evidence that the differences between Hungary and East Germany cannot just be reduced to long-term, deep national political culture. Similarly, individual background variables such as age, time in office or political affiliation do not appear to be strongly associated with consensualism. Therefore, an explanation based on the classical understanding of political culture grounded in the individual socialization and internalisation of (consensualist) values lacks plausibility in this setting. One reason for this might be the increasing homogeneity of political elites in modern democracies, and in particular the levelling out of socio-economic differences in former communist regimes of CEE. Consequently, I turn to explanations based on collective socialization experiences through historical junctures and the collective memory thereof. Discussing the legacies of multilateral and unilateral transition in the region, I show that neither offers a discursive repertoire fully supportive of consensus democracy. By way of a meticulous discourse analysis of data generated through in-depth interviews with nearly sixty MPs I show the extent to which Hungarian and East German are connected by shared discourses across party lines and other background variables. Hungary is a case close to the ideal type of multilateral transition (i.e. transition with a gradual, negotiated, accommodative, legalistic approach without an explicit break with the past). It was found to feature political elites with shared collective representations emphasising the value of consensual decision-making, reference to the common good, the centrality of established procedures and the institutional status quo. However, due to the persistence of competing notions of historical legitimacy, political entrepreneurs are able to

183 establish sharp cultural-ideological divisions and deprive each other of recognition as equal participants in the democratic game. East Germany, as a case closer to the ideal type of unilateral transition, experienced an abrupt, imposed regime change with the exclusion of the protagonists of the old regime. This marked a “new beginning” with little legal or historical continuity. As a consequence, East Germany was found to lack a common elite discourse with regards to the democratic system connecting the other parties with the post-communist PDS, as well as connecting East and West German MPs (even within the same parties). Thus, differently from both West German and PDS-MPs, non-PDS East German MPs argue in favour of competition rather than consensus, they invoke particular interests rather than the common good, underline the importance of outcomes rather than procedures, and argue in favour of far-reaching changes to the institutional status quo. In quantitative terms similar to their Hungarian colleagues, East Germans (as well as West German) MPs voice more negative than positive statements with regard to political opponents. However, the qualitative analysis shows that, unlike in the Hungarian case, MPs basically accept each other as equally legitimate players in the democratic game. Using Bourdieu’s concept of habitus I then illustrate how these shared discourses might constrain or enable political behaviour by demarcating legitimate avenues for change and persistence and thus impact upon the persistence of the democratic system, i.e. the consolidation of democracy. Thus, for the Hungarian case I discuss how the expressed preference for consensualist decision-making delegitimizes and impedes fully legal majoritarian decisions, while on the other hand the lack of respect for “the other” undermines co-operation by rhetorically externalising political opponents from the system. For the East German case, the rather anti-consensualist discourses of non-PDS MPs clash with the established traditions of West German “quasi-consociationalism”. This way, East German MPs fail to develop a commonly shared supportive habitus for the existing system, with PDS MPs (in line with West German MPs) mostly supporting conservation or furthering of the consensualist system, and the other East German MPs arguing for change. Following from this differentiated perspective, the conclusions about CoD must also be differentiated between the CEE countries. In countries with the legacy of a multilateral transition the absence of a comprehensive debate about the past makes the new polity vulnerable to potential usurpation by both left and right with mutually exclusive understandings of historical legitimacy. Unlike in unilateral transitions, there was no “new beginning” in the Arendtian sense (i.e. the building of the new polity on a clear break with the old regime). Thus the old regime, or any previous regimes prior to communism, are not

184 univocally delegitimized and can be taken up again by political entrepreneurs to promote alternative visions of modernization and democracy (e.g. corporatist-clerical and ethnocentric authoritarianism or some kind of reform socialism) in order to deny equal legitimacy to political opponents as demonstrated in the Hungarian case. Next to a higher degree of personal continuity in politics there are, in these countries, a higher number of members of the old regime’s political elites that have benefited from “spontaneous” or insider privatisation and moved from political into economic leadership positions.728 This fact offers another target for attacks from the right against post-communist parties accusing the latter as illegitimately still profiting from their former position, or even as conspiring against the new system. Thus, while promoting an otherwise consensus-oriented political culture and commitment to the institutional status quo, the lack of mutual respect and acceptance as equal players in the democratic game can severely undermine the daily working and the credibility of consensus democracy. The consolidation of democracy in the case of multilateral transitions therefore depends on the ability of political elites to mutually accept each other and engage in a constructive dialogue over the past. In the Hungarian case, if the confrontational style between the different parties continues, it will further undermine the working and the popular acceptance of the democratic system, in particular given the high expectations raised by political elites themselves. If democratic politics is presented as being based in defining the common good, in avoiding disagreement or conflict, and in assuming a morally superior, truthful position it becomes vulnerable to be overtaxed by disappointed expectations. This might be particularly the case if consensus democracy is associated with elitist, non-transparent and sometimes anti- participatory discourses and practises. A lack of pragmatism by political elites and a de- politicization of the masses are blamed for the failure of consensus or consociational democracy in the past (e.g. in the case of ).729 As Manfred Schmidt notes, consociationalism presupposes the existence of autonomous segments in society while consensualism furthers their development.730 In this regard, the consolidation of consensus democracy in CEE appears problematic due to the conspicuous absence of well-defined and rather stable social groups. Therefore, political parties might engage in “cultural engineering” from above and try to achieve social embeddedness. As mentioned above, in the Hungarian case this is one of the strategies

728 G Eyal, I Szelényi, E Townsend, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists – Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe, London: Verso, 1998; D Stark / L Bruszt , Post-Socialist Pathways – Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 729 A Lijphart, ‘Consociational democracy’, World Politics, Vol.21, No.2, 1969, pp.222-224. 730 M Schmidt, Demokratietheorien, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 3rd ed., 2000, p.340. 185 pursued by the right who lack organisational embeddedness more than the post-communist left. The left can still rely on relatively extensive local party organisations. Moreover, managers affiliated with the old regime enjoyed a head-start in the privatisation process, as well as a continuous presence in other organizations (media, trade unions etc.). Historically, the establishment of clear ideological boundaries has often increased political stability. Perhaps we are already observing new cleavages in the making as some authors argue that parties in countries such as Hungary and Poland attempt to turn political differences into primary ones.731 This could result in two (or more) relatively stable camps which have their own definitions of basic values, modern society and the common good and in which voters only elect their camp’s leaders (but also where consensus is required for the highest national offices and policies). As one MP put it: “Hungarian politicians are unable to compromise because they do not know their positions. When you do not have a position, a standpoint or a goal you are unable to compromise.”732 Therefore, consensus democracy might work better once political parties have developed clear-cut, stable socio-cultural profiles and at the same time have established the boundaries of acceptable discourse. Cases with the legacy of unilateral transition are, in turn, are less vulnerable to competing concepts of democracy and modernization since the previous regime(s) alongside with its claim to historical legitimacy was fully discarded during the revolutionary transition to democracy. Also, a higher extent of Vergangenheitsbewältigung was imposed upon society e.g. through far-reaching and systematic lustration campaigns, the opening of secret service and state archives, public commemorations, teaching at schools etc.733 However, the initial exclusion of protagonists of the former regime and the imposition of the new system by the former opposition furthers a rather majoritarian democratic discourse, prevents all players from developing of a common stake in the system resulting in a lack of understanding for the worth of consensus-democratic arrangements. In countries with the legacy of unilateral transition, political elites might therefore come to find their understanding of democracy to be better served by more competitive, majoritarian institutions. Thus, institutional adaptation towards diminishing the number of

731 Zs Enyedi, ‘The role of agency in cleavage formation’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44, No.3, 2005, pp.697-720. 732 MDF #2. 733 Vergangenheitsbewältigung has surely also taken place in countries such as Hungary and Poland yet with largely competing interpretations of the past and without a serious dialogue between the opposing camps. In Hungary different symbols have been used and even major national holidays are celebrated separately by left and right parties. Different versions of history have been promoted by various governments and were subsequently institutionalised through competing museums, memorials or historical institutes. Lustration and about the old regime’s archives has been initiated in a more selective and opportunistic fashion (e.g. the campaign by the Oleksy government in Poland in the early 1990s). 186 veto players might be a possibility to increase the acceptance of the system (e.g. as attempted by the two major Czech parties in the 1998 “opposition agreement”).734 This might increase their effectiveness and output-orientation, which is a major pillar of their political leaders’ yardsticks for democratic legitimacy. At the same time destructive polarization (as in the cases of multilateral transitions) appears less likely. Therefore, there is also little reason to fear from more competition. In these , danger looms rather from the fringes of the political spectrum if consensus politics remains unchanged. In countries with multilateral legacies, major changes to the transitional status quo are also pursued sometimes opportunistically by individual actors and parties (as described above for Hungary). However, a large-scale departure from the status quo put in place by transition will probably meet stronger resistance as it threatens the legitimacy of major parties which are connected to the 1989 democratic beginning, threatening further polarization. Beyond that, the “special case” of East Germany deserves further dwelling. My conclusions for the consolidation of democracy in East Germany are different from most of the existing literature. There, East German political elites are often viewed as being among the most advanced in terms of a democratic political culture because of the rapid adoption of the well-functioning West German democratic institutions and their convergence to the West German political culture.735 However, the story looks more complicated. In fact, convergence concerning the consensus-conflict dimension between East and West has not been achieved as yet. East German MPs (without the PDS) are quite united in arguing for some far-reaching changes towards diminishing consensualism and advance very similar justifications for their stance. This in turn might put pressure on the established West German elites and lead to conflict inside the German polity, especially within the large parties SPD and CDU which are strong in both East and West Germany. Conflicting East-West positions about the future of German democracy within the major parties emerged not only recently (e.g. in the context of reforming Germany’s federalism, or the corporatist health care system).736 Especially for East

734 A Roberts, ‘Demythologising the Czech Opposition Agreement’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.55, No.8, December 2003, pp.1273-1303; M Novák, ‘The Relevance of Small Parties – From a “General Framework” to the Czech Opposition Agreement’, Czech Sociological Review, 2000, Vol.36, No.1, pp.27-47; S Saxonberg, ‘A New Phase in Czech Politics’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.10, No.1, 1999, pp.96-111; J Higley, M Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, pp.168-170. 735 M Edinger, L Vogel, ’Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes of East and West German Parliamentarians – Findings from the Jena Parliamentary Survey (2003-4)’, Czech Sociological Review, Vol.41, No.3, 2005, pp.375-399. 736 E.g. Die Welt, 27.11.2006, DER SPIEGEL 29.11.2006. 187 German MPs the established in 2005 is probably a rather unpopular experience in consensus democracy as it is associated with deadlock and ineffectiveness.737 Ideally, one could imagine East German politicians as the “vanguard” of institutional reform in the united Germany against the opposition of established West German politicians and the PDS.738 Perhaps a better inclusion of East German demands in current reform endeavours might help to also establish a genuine legitimacy of the constitutional set-up among the East German population, a sense of ownership in line with the Habermasian Verfassungspatriotismus.739 Paradoxically, the post-communist PDS presents itself as the most conservative force in terms of their attachment to the West German democratic system, defends its consensualist foundations and established corporatist welfare policies. Thus, in a way, the role of the PDS as an unreformed post-communist party needs to be reconsidered. While the PDS does not share the East German meta-discourse it is no longer questioning the democratic united Germany in its current constitutional set-up. Thus, unlike other scholars who argue that the PDS is a unique East German phenomenon which explains the differences between East and West German political elites in terms of political culture,740 I showed that the PDS is in fact in some regards more similar to West German MPs’ positions than to the other East German MPs. An explanation based on individual socialization and value internalisation would be rather misleading in this regard. In fact, an attitude-based explanation of PDS-MPs positions would probably come to the paradoxical finding that they internalised best the values of West German democratic institutions, as they voice the strongest support for a conservation of the status quo. Differently from that, an explanation based on the different experience of life worlds and historical junctures can indicate why PDS MPs in many regards are closer to the West German habitus of professional politicians and do not share the discursive world of the East German political late beginners from the other parties. In terms of the consolidation of democracy the PDS might therefore not so much be a danger to the status quo but instead be an obstacle to further change. As the PDS is currently reshaping its profile as a party defending West German consensus democracy and its classical

737 When asked during the interviews about the desirability of a Grand coalition to solve the country’s major problems most MPs responded very negatively in 2004/5. 738 This idea became particularly evident when for a short time in 2005/6 both CDU and SPD were chaired by East Germans. 739 J Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1990, pp.147-176. 740 M Edinger, L Vogel, ’Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes of East and West German Parliamentarians – Findings from the Jena Parliamentary Survey (2003-4)’, Czech Sociological Review, Vol.41, No.3, 2005, p. 395; D Segert, ’The PDS – Regional Party or a Second Social-Democratic Party in Germany?’, in: A Bozóki, J Ishiyama (eds.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002, p.166-187. 188 achievements (e.g. corporatism) it might shed its negative stigma of a formerly communist party and become an attractive option for West Germans as well. PDS’ recent opening to disaffected former Social Democrats, trade unionists or Greens and its planned re-christening as an all-German “Leftist Party” points into this direction. In the wake of Germany’s large- scale overhaul of the established welfare system the chance opened up for the post- communists to establish themselves as a powerful veto-player and keeper of the status quo. Also in other CEE societies post-communist parties might well assume the role of a conservative force claiming to guard societies against too much political and socio-economic change (e.g. as demanded by Brussels or international investors). For convincingly assuming this role, post-communist parties are in a much better position in countries with a unilateral transition where they can easily distance themselves from the political “mainstream” and thus the consensus on EU membership. In countries with a multilateral transition in turn, post- communist parties are major protagonists of the European consensus and cannot easily distance themselves from it. There, a danger arises rather from the populist right which can blame problems associated with EU membership on post-communist “opportunists” and “traitors to the nation.” Finally, I have to restate that East Germany can indeed increase the universe of cases among the post-communist democracies and, together with the control case of West Germany, be used for comparative studies in a fruitful way.741 Following from my study, we need to reconsider our traditional understanding of political culture which usually relies on differentiation in socio-economic background factors of politicians and long-term processes of gradual, individual socialization into existing democracies. Neither condition really holds in a convincing way for the young and socially flattened post-communist democracies. Thus, the “collective memory” is added as another dependent variable in explaining political cultures in general, and Lijphart’s “spirit of accommodation” in particular. For the global application of Lijphart’s model political culture should be reconsidered and form part of his typology of consensus and majoritarian democracy (as in his original concept of consociational democracy). In sum, the key finding of this thesis is that political elites’ commitment to their democratic system is mediated to quite some extent by the legacies of democratic transition. A reorientation of political culture research towards mechanisms of collective rather than individual socialization (and thus a stronger emphasis on explicitly shared discourses rather than implicitly held attitudes) also helps to overcome some of the epistemological and methodological problems connected with the classical socio-psychological approaches.

741 M Spinner, ‘Working at Democracy’, European Political Science, Vol.5, No.4, December 2006, pp.417-422. 189 Focusing on explicitly expressed and reproduced discourses rather than implicitly internalised attitudes enables us to explore political culture, its sources and impact without having to make assumptions about individuals’ internal processes and their honesty in expression. As illustrated, even without supposing individual internalisation, collectively shared values can shape behaviour by delineating appropriate, socially acceptable action. In fact, relaxing the requirement of a “strong socialization” with individual value adaptation to a weaker notion of collective socialization (with an explicit acceptance of group norms) appears also more realistic for conceptualising elite political culture. Including the possibility of a “weak socialization” into our concept of political culture allows us to explore the sometimes cynical or opportunistic use of normative discourses. For example, commonly held values can be used in order to shame others into conforming behaviour and/or to give credit to one’s own (often purely self-interested) positions. This way, discourses are part of behaviour and not separate from it.742 In this regard, my study is only a first exploratory undertaking. Mainstream political science has by and large stuck around the civic culture paradigm since the mid-1960s. While developing more powerful statistical tools, basic assumptions barely changed. More sophisticated and differentiated concepts of socialization, value diffusion and political culture which have been developed in other fields of social sciences (such as in International Relations) were hardly embraced. However, while the classical approach in its dependence on value internalisation might be too rigid, many constructivist approaches might be too inconclusive in their results. Therefore, I tried to make use of some of the insights from other bodies of literature and combine them with established approaches from elite sociology, democratic theory, transititology and consolidology, consociationalism, and comparative history in an interdisciplinary fashion. I apply both quantitative and qualitative approaches in exploring a large set of original data, draw on a large number of existing studies about the two cases throughout the last two decades, and discuss several alternative explanations. Therefore, the scope of the study is rather limited in space and time. Further research is required to test the hypotheses for other CEE cases (e.g. the Czech Republic as another case of unilateral transition, and Poland as a case of multilateral transition). Some findings from the existing literature are at least pointing towards similar patterns as in my approach, as mentioned above. Surely, some caveats regarding the uniqueness of the East German transition remain: East German MPs as part of a larger polity in which they have to adapt to

742 P Donati, ‘Die Rahmenanalyse politischer Diskurse’, in: F Keller et al. (eds.), Handbuch sozialwissenschaftlicher Diskursanalyse, Band 1: Theorien und Methoden, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2001, p.169. 190 pre-existing, well-working institutions might make different use of discursive legacies than MPs in other CEE democracies (which are at the same time engaged in state- and nation- building and the development of new party systems). A close inspection of the Czech case, which is the most similar in terms of its transition dynamics to East Germany, might be useful in this regard. Given the findings from the existing literature I am still confident that it will indeed show largely similar patterns. As the classical model, my approach to political culture is not free of conceptual shortcomings either. It appears better at explaining persistence rather than change. Therefore, it seems most promising to use both the classical and the discursive approach to political culture in a complementary way. Over time individual socialization, generational turnover to politicians without active experiences of the pre-1989 period and the fading out of collective memories about transition might very well play an ever growing role in determining the outlook of political elites. Also, the discursive power of increasingly far-away historical junctures will decrease. For younger generations, different experiences and discourses will increasingly influence political behaviour, or new interpretations of past points of common reference may arise. Moreover, it is possible that other crucial post-transition events left their mark on elite discourses. In this regard, East Germany is quite an extreme case, not for the fact of German unification but for the experience of two historical junctures of unilateral political change (democratisation in 1989/90 and unification in late 1990) in a very short time period. Nevertheless, Polish students of democratisation have alerted me to the fact that Polish transition also experienced several crucial historical junctures: the foundation of the Solidarity movement, the imposition of martial law, round-table talks and the first semi-free elections to fully free elections, a provisional constitution in 1992 and a “complete” constitution in 1997. In this regard, further studies will be highly important, especially in the East German case which experienced a large-scale discharge of former East German dissidents from the Bundestag with the 2005 elections.743 Will their leaving the political stage also weaken the specific East German non-conformist discourses in the polity and speed up the convergence between East and West German political culture? Also, further major and minor historical junctures (such as the 2006 in Hungary following the Prime Minister’s admission to have lied to the public for years) will probably impact the way democracy is being interpreted and approached in the future.

743 ‚Dem Bundestag gehen die DDR-Bürgerrechtler aus’, DER SPIEGEL, 20 June 2005; ’Der Herbst der Wildblumen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, No.28, 17 July 2005, p.8; J Plöhn, ‘Ostdeutsche Profile in in der Politik – Vom Aufbruch zur Gesamtdeutschen Normalität’, in: O Gabriel, B Neuss, G Rüther (eds.), Eliten in Deutschland – Bedeutung, Macht, Verantwortung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006, pp.138-141. 191 So what are other general implications from this for the fate of democracy in CEE? Elite political culture and politicians’ patterns of talking as “verbal behaviour”744 is surely a relevant and important subject for research already in its own right.745 Beyond that, elite political culture has a role to play in the future development of young democracies. As remarked by Dryzek and Holmes, without a supportive discourse acceptance for the existing democratic system can only rest on habituation, pragmatic compliance (based on performance), or coercion.746 As my research showed, habituation appears at least partly doubtful; pragmatic, temporary compliance and outright coercion remain rather questionable or normatively unacceptable mechanisms for the consolidation of democracy. As mentioned earlier, consensus-democratic institutions offer both resources for accommodative and conflict-oriented strategies and do not automatically lead to an “appropriate” consensualist political culture.747 Thus, democratic political elites advancing consensus and accommodation as a yardstick for their own legitimacy will also be measured in this regard. Political elites who set themselves up as authentic plebeian contestants have to live up to this ideal, even when institutional or external constraints strongly limit the range of action. Leaders advancing demands for far-reaching and extensive new policy outputs not only raise high expectations but also frustrate them by getting bogged down in the consensus-focused decision making processes. This can be used as a powerful argument against consensus democracy, or even democracy in general. If consensus democracy is not explicitly valued on normative grounds (e.g. for including minorities and assuring equitable participation), but rather presented as being in the way of necessary decisions its future becomes conditional upon its own in-built institutional mechanism to prevent change (while at the same time possibly increasing frustration and alienation). For investigating the future of consensus democracy I showed that it makes sense to disaggregate the concept and not to lump together different dimensions of consensualism. As illustrated for the Hungarian case, political elites might not be consensualist in all five dimensions but in fact develop partly contradicting positions between the different dimensions (i.e. by calling for consensus politics and at the same time not expressing respect for political opponents). Therefore, it is oversimplifying the affair to call Hungarian (or other) political

744 R Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians – Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy’, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, p.xi. 745 G Pomper, Passions and Interests – Political Party Concepts of American Democracy, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992, p.2. 746 J Dryzek / L Holmes, Post-Communist Democratisation: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries, Cambridge UP, 2002, p.9. 747 T Börzel, ‘Demokratien im Wandel der Europäisierung’, in: J Katenhusen, W Lamping (eds.), Demokratien in Europa – Der Einfluß der europäischen Integration auf Institutionen und neue Kulturen des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2003, p.189. 192 elites in CEE merely “consensual” if they show some traits of consensualist political culture but miss others. Following from that, the concept of democratic consolidation has to be rethought, too. Rather than employing an a priori prescriptive-normative position in favour of the existing status quo and/or consensus democratic institutions we should apply a more descriptive- analytical verstehende position from the perspective of major protagonists. An ahistorical, purely rationalist and positivist approach might miss some key sources for explaining democratic persistence and change. Thus, a mixture of positivist and constructivist approaches with quantitative measures to establish patterns and qualitative methods to explain them might be a fruitful way in this regard. Moreover, I endeavoured to free the typology of consensus and majoritarian democracy from its frequent normative undertone. Having a consensus democratic set-up in a homogenous society is not good (or bad) per se. In the context of approaches investigating the consolidation of democracy we should therefore more critically scrutinize in how far the freezing of the institutional arrangements put in place by transition is desirable, and whether these arrangements actually enjoy stable and sustainable commitment of both political elites and masses. In my study, I concentrated on the structural legacies of transition in the form of discursive resources. Surely, the articulation and the use of these resources also depend on political entrepreneurship as other studies have shown.748 Therefore, there will hardly be exactly the same patterns of consensual political culture in two countries. As important as elite political entrepreneurship in this regard is popular resonance. In this dissertation I focused only on the “supply side” of discourses and did not look at the “consumers” (i.e. the mass population).749 Elite discourses must definitely be anchored in the empirical realities of the respective society; they need to “ring true”, be attractive and appealing to voters or otherwise soon fall into oblivion.750 Thus, the resonance of elite political culture in the general population is indeed an important aspect which deserves further research. In this regard, this study might be just the first step for a more extended project. Nevertheless, for the key importance of political elites in the establishment of CEE

748 Zs Enyedi, ‘The role of agency in cleavage formation’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.44, No.3, 2005, pp.697-720. 749 For an attitude-based model of democratic supply and demand between elites and mass population see: R Rose / W Mishler / C Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives – Understanding Post-Communist Societies, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, pp.3-24; pp. 201-227. 750 S Roßteutscher, ‘Competing Narratives and the Social Construction of Reality – The GDR in Transition’, German Politics, Vol.9, No.1, April 2000, p.61. 193 democracies, and given their ongoing dominance due to the rather weak civil societies, my focus appears well-justified.751 In this study I focused predominantly on developing a different understanding of political culture and aimed at establishing some of its antecedents and sources. Further studies have to elaborate more systematically the role of political culture also as an independent variable for which I only offer some illustrations and more tentative conclusions. Also, the precise mechanisms mediating the relationship between political culture and behaviour need to be elaborated in more detail. This can be done using Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as I propose, or other suitable concepts. For this undertaking, again, it seems advisable to employ approaches already used successfully in other subfields of social sciences (e.g. in the International Relations and Europeanization ).752 Additionally, Steiner et al.’s approach which looks into some of the consequences of the “spirit of accommodation” in line with deliberative theory is a further possible avenue to follow in this regard.753 Concerning my own focus on the sources of contemporary elite political culture, it will also be necessary to further differentiate transition types beyond the simple dichotomy of unilateral versus multilateral transition. For example, a third ideal type of transition is well imaginable in which elites of the old regime start a pre-emptive democratisation process in order to prevent a regime overthrow by the opposition, or in order to evade the need to engage in negotiations with them.754 This type might fit better cases such as Romania or Bulgaria, and possibly also cases from CIS countries, or even countries outside the post-communist realm. This way, scope conditions of the approach can be extended and a much larger universe of cases be covered. More generally, my approach to investigate the origins of elite political culture can surely be employed to other contexts and specific hypotheses can be formulated about the impact of other historical junctures. My approach also contributes to the growing “legacy”-literature which takes serious initial conditions for the long-term path-dependent development of democracy. Next to the well-discussed legacies of state and society under the old regime I historicize transition and show that in fact it became a legacy in itself through the collective memory. Thus, in the long term, the old wisdom that “institutions matter” is complemented by the insight that history matters, too. In this context, the utility of historical and sociological institutionalist

751 M Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe, Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 2003. 752 E.g. the special volume of International Organization devoted to “Institutions and Socialization in Europe” (International Organization, Vol.59, No.4, 2005). 753 J Steiner, A Bächtiger, M Spörndli, Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action – Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge UP, 2004, ‘Chapter 5: Discourse and its consequences’, pp.138-164. 754 Thanks to László Bruszt for alerting me to this point and discussing some of its implications with me. 194 approaches next to rationalist institutionalist perspectives needs to be restated. With hindsight, and separate from the claim of rational-choice transitologist scholarship, it therefore did make a difference whether democratic transition was unilaterally imposed or multilaterally negotiated. Democratic transition was more than an underdetermined political situation as it already carried in itself parts of the genetic (i.e. discursive) material for the future development of the democratic system put in place. While different modes led to establish similar types of democratic institutions, they offered rather different meanings for operating and making sense out of them. Also, a long-established causality (i.e. the relationship of political culture on the mode of transition) was enriched by a new perspective in which transition dynamics also condition political culture. As a consequence, we cannot just extrapolate pre-transition political culture into the new system and basically assume continuity. I surely accept the well-justified position that pre-transition legacies influenced the way transition took place and continue to have an impact also in the new polity. A recent publication by Anna Seleny very well works out how the differences in state-society relations, with different ways of framing and approaching conflicts and conflict resolution during the old regime, contributes to current political cultures.755 Also, for the East German case, the persistence of some longer cultural traditions is possible (e.g. the Prussian tradition of a strong, centralized state as opposed to the consociational traditions in the rest of the German Empire). However, it is not by necessity (as I have shown), that deep historical legacies translate into a contemporary political culture. In this regard, transition was shown to be a crucial historical juncture which works like a filter for existing practices and memories, and as an incubator for new ones. Thus, I also contribute to the growing body of literature concerned with the history of ideas of the 1989 transitions in CEE. National and regional legacies do remain important. The “long shadow” of history in the form of transition legacies is still notable in elite political cultures in new democracies almost two decades after transition and should therefore not be neglected. In sum, discursive legacies of the democratic transitions of 1989 as shown in my research (but also other crucial historical junctures) can create certain path dependencies which enable or constrain political leaders to engage in political change beyond the opportunities and constraints exercised by institutional structures. This approach might therefore improve our ability to investigate success and failure of political change in these countries. Future research along the lines of my approach can further lay out the variety in democratic pathways of CEE democracies and establish commonalities and differences

755 A Seleny, The Political Economy of State-Society Relations in Hungary and Poland, New York: Cambridge UP, 2006. 195 between countries in a more systematic way. In this regard, not only more cases should be looked at but also longer time frames be covered. For the case of Hungary data availability in terms of electronically accessible parliamentary records limited my study to two parliamentary cycles. A focus on earlier elite discourses which were still closer to the transition and contrasting them to contemporary discourse might further reveal change and continuity in terms of collective representations. In general, political culture might take new avenues after the 2004 EU accession of the CEE countries. Removing the external constraint to consensualist politics in the form of accession conditionalities we might now see a further increasing variety of political culture off the European consensualist mainstream. Therefore, I would also like to draw some tentative and preliminary conclusions for the international context. External actors such as the EU might need to employ a more differentiated approach to these countries. As shown, similar institutions as prescribed by EU directives were used and interpreted in quite different ways. Therefore, the European Union’s focus merely on formal institutions might not automatically lead to the desired results (e.g. in terms of decentralisation, monetary policy etc.) if political cultures do not fully reflect the “spirit of accommodation”. Consequently, a more differentiated perspective and a better understanding of domestic constellations and “home-grown” understandings of democracy might be useful. CEE countries externally enforced compliance with prescribed recipes in the run-up to the 2004 EU accession should not make us expect instant consolidation of these institutions, even in countries usually deemed as more advanced in terms of liberal democracy. Post-2004 elections in Poland or Slovakia brought to power governments exhibiting less univocal commitment to , minority representation or a non-politicised public administration and . Similar developments are feared for Bulgaria and Romania after their recent accession to the EU in January 2007. This has led some scholars to refer to this process as “constrained” consolidation, or even an “unfinished” democratisation.756 Therefore, a closer comparison of post-transition and post-accession discourses might be useful in establishing patterns of change and continuity of political cultures. In the long run, it will be interesting to compare in how far a strong, externally conditioned process of institution-building (in the cases of CEE) leads to success stories similar to the cases of West Germany or Japan (which developed well-adapted political cultures). Also in post-WWII Western Europe, consensus democracy took a long time to consolidate. Therefore, even two

756 András Bozóki, Zsolt Enyedi and László Bruszt, discussion at EUDO-seminar, European University Institute Florence, 12 October 2006. 196 decades after transition it might be premature to make an ultimate judgement about the consolidation of the CEE democracies.

197 Literature

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Various articles from German, Hungarian and international dailies, weeklies and online journals including among others DER SPIEGEL, Die ZEIT, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Berliner Zeitung, Deutschland, Die Welt, Der Tagesspiegel, Népszabadság, Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Nemzet, HVG, Index.hu, Pester Llyod, The Economist.

216

Tables Table 1 Two dimensions and ten characteristics of majoritarian and consensus models of democracy (and their indicators) according to Lijphart (1999):

Executive-Parties Dimension 1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets vs. executive power-sharing in broad multi-party coalitions (percentage of time under minimal winning coalition or one-party cabinets) 2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant vs. executive- legislative balance of power (average time of cabinet duration) 3. Two-party vs. multi-party system (effective number of parliamentary parties) 4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral system vs. proportional representation (index of electoral disproportionality) 5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups vs. coordinated and corporatist interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation (index of interest group pluralism)

Federal-Unitary Dimension 1. Unitary and centralized government vs. federal and decentralised government (index of federalism) 2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislative vs. division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses (index of bicameralism) 3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities vs. rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities (index of constitutional rigidity) 4. Systems in which legislatives have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation vs. systems in which laws are subjects to judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts (index of judicial review) 5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive vs. independent central banks (index of central bank independence) (Source: Lijphart 1999)

217

Table 2 Implicit political culture Explicit political culture (“operational code”) (”collective representations of democracy”) Units of analysis Attitudes Discourses Level of analysis Individual Group Extent of socialization Strong (i.e. internalisation), Weak (i.e. explicit acceptance of “taken-for-grantedness” values) Ways of appropriation Social learning, individual Practice, discursive reproduction of culture reflection, collective deliberation, “logic of arguing” Change Gradual 1.) Gradual (adoption of new practices) 2.) Sudden (breakdown of doxa due to external crisis – historical juncture) Relationship with Impacts directly upon behaviour Mutual constitution – legitimises behaviour behaviour, enables and constraints it Conditions for Positive attitudes towards Embeddedness of institutions in persistence of system, congruence between habitus (shared interpretation and democracy attitudes, behaviour and legitimation for practices) institutions Concept of CoD Prescriptive Descriptive Normative Analytical Static (preservation of status Dynamic (allowing for change) quo) Epistemological Objective; expert knowledge Intersubjective; “verstehende”, perspective participant knowledge Predominant Survey research Discourse analysis methodology

218

Table 3: Mode of transition Unilateral Multilateral Elite actors opposition dominating Balance between power-holders and opposition Approach to Change Swiftness, decisiveness, ‘shock Gradualism, balance, therapy’ accommodation Major objective of actors New legitimacy Legality Conception of history New beginning, clear break Continuity, past regime(s) not with the past fully de-legitimized Focus on Outcomes Procedures Uncertainty Lower Higher Irreversibility Higher Lower Way of implementation Apply/impose well-tried Negotiate among competing ‘blueprints’ ideas Elite continuity Lower Higher Popular participation (in the Higher Lower beginning)

219

Table 4 Composition of MP samples for 2002-2005 period Hungarian MPs Hungarian sample East German East German MPs sample* Average age in 2004 46,63 years 48,00 years 49,79 years 49,25 years Gender m/f 90,9% / 9,1% 89,9% / 11,1% 63,8% / 36,2 % 80% / 20% Education higher/ secondary/primary 94,5% / ? / ? 96,3% / 3,7% / 0% 82,5% / 11,3% / 90% / 5% / 5% 6,2 % First elected 1990/ 1994 / 1998 / 15,8%/19,8%/ 37,0%/25,9%/ 34,7%/7,4%/ 35%/10%/25%/30% 2002 30,3%/34,3% 22,2%/14,8% 31,6%/26,3% (1990**: 15 %) (1990**15,8%) Mandate direct/list 45,6%/ 40,7%/ 59,8% / 40,2% 65%/35% (r=regional, n=national) 36,3%(r), 18,1%(n) 29,6% (r), 29,6 (n) Origin rural/urban/capital ? 14,8%/37%/48,1% 42,4% / 51,1%/ 30%/50%/20% 6,5% * does not include complementary PDS MPs from 1998-2002 Bundestag 1990** first freely elected East German parliament March-October 1990

220

Table 5:

Correlation between consensualism indicators for two parliamentary cycles

2

1,5

1

0,5

2002-2005 0 -1,00 -0,50 0,00 0,50 1,00 -0,5

-1

-1,5

-2 1998-2002

Legend: blue squares :East German MPs; yellow squares :Hungarian MPs This table depicts the scores for the content analysis of parliamentary speeches of East German and Hungarian MPs in the first four dimensions. The scores for the first parliamentary cycle (1998-2002) and the second parliamentary cycle (2002-2005) demonstrate a clustering of Hungarian MPs’ indicators above zero and the East German MPs’ indicators below zero in these dimensions.

221 Table 6: a) Sample 1998-2002: overall average: N=45 (22 East Germany/ 23 Hungary), urban background: N=33 (12/21), capital city background: N=15 (5/10), rural background: N=10 (6/4)

Consensualism and geographical background (1998-2002)

0,2

0,15

0,1

0,05

0

-0,05

-0,1 consensualism value consensualism -0,15 rural background -0,2 capital city background -0,25 urban background 1 overall average 2 3 4 consensualism dimension

This table depicts the scores of the first four dimensions of consensualism, i.e. the “spirit of accommodation” for the pooled Hungarian-East German data according to the geographical background of MPs. The data was derived from content analysis of individual MPs’ speech contributions in the two parliaments for the given period according to the above-outlined codebook. A systematic relationship between geographical origin and consensualism indicators is not noticeable. Moreover, there is no stable pattern if this table is compared to the next parliamentary cycle (see below). The following tables follow the same logic (i.e. East German and Hungarian data are pooled and the relationship to other individual-level factors is depicted across the two parliamentary cycles for the first four dimensions of the “spirit of accommodation”). consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

222

b) Sample 2002-2005: overall average: N=47 (20/27), urban background: N=34 (11/23), capital city background: N=17 (4/13), rural background: N=13 (10/3)

Consensualism indicators and geographical background (2002- 2005)

0,2

0,15

0,1

0,05

0

-0,05 -0,1

consensualism value -0,15 rural background capital city background -0,2 urban background -0,25 1 overall average 2 3 4 consensualism dimension

consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

223 c) Sample for West Germany (2002-2005): rural background: N=12, urban background: N=13, capital city background: N=1 (not depicted)

Consensualism indicators and geographical background (West German MPs, 2002-2005)

0,55

0,45

0,35

0,25

0,15

0,05 consensualism value consensualism -0,05

-0,15 rural background urban background -0,25 1 overall average 2 3 4 consensualism dimension consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

224

Table 7:

Consensualism indicators and year of birth (1998-2002)

2,00

1,50

1,00

0,50

0,00 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 -0,50 consensualism value -1,00

-1,50

-2,00 year of birth

Consensualism indicators and year of birth (2002-2005)

2,00

1,50

1,00

0,50

0,00 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 -0,50 consensualism -1,00

-1,50

-2,00 year of birth

Legend: blue squares: East German MPs (CDU, SPD, Greens and FDP); brown triangles: East German MPs (PDS); yellow circles: Hungarian MPs, red circles: West German MPs This table pools all scores for consensualism dimensions 1- 4.

225 Table 8: a) Sample for 1998-2002: overall average: N=44 (21 East Germany / 23 Hungary)757, communist party: N=16 (8//8), opposition group: N=17 (6/11)

Consensualism indicators and affiliation with the former regime (1998-2002)

0,5

0,4

0,3 e

0,2

0,1

consensualism valu 0

-0,1 opposition group communist party -0,2 overall average 1 2 3 4 consensualism dimensions consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

757 One East German MP who lived in West Germany until 1990 was excluded from the average. 226 b) Sample for 2002-2005: overall average: N=46 (19 East Germany / 27 Hungary)758, communist party: N=11 (3/8), opposition group: N=17 (6/11)

Consensualism indicators and affiliation with the former regime (2002-2005)

0,5

0,4 e 0,3

0,2

0,1

0 consensualism valu consensualism -0,1 opposition group communist party -0,2 overall average 1 2 3 4 consensualism dimensions

consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

758 One East German MP who lived in West Germany until 1990 was excluded from the average. 227

Table 9: Incumbents 1998-2002: N=18 (9 East Germany / 9 Hungary), opposition 1998-2002: N=27 (13/14), incumbents 2002-2005: N=27 (11/16), opposition 2002-2005: N=20 (9/11)

Consensualism indicators and incumbency

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0

consensualism value -0,1

-0,2 opposition 2002-2005 incumbents 2002-2005 -0,3 opposition 1998-2002 incumbents 1998-2002 1 2 3 4 consensualism dimension consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

228 c) Sample for West Germany 2002-2005: Incumbents: N=13, Opposition: N=13

Consensualism indicators and incumbency (West German MPs 2002-2005)

0,5

0,4

0,3 e 0,2

0,1

0 consensualism valu -0,1

-0,2

-0,3 opposition 1 2 incumbents 3 consensualism indicators 4 consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

229

Table 10: a) Sample for 1998-2002: higher office: N=14 (5/9), no higher office: N=31 (17/14) Sample for 2002-2005: higher office: N=19 (6/13); no higher office: N=28 (14/14)

Consensualism indicators and higher office

0,60

0,50

0,40 e 0,30

0,20

0,10 consensualism valu 0,00

-0,10 higher office 2002-2005 no higher office 2002-2005 -0,20 higher office 1998-2002 1 2 no higher office 1998-2002 3 4 consensualism dimension consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

230 b) Sample for West Germany 2002-2005: higher office: N=5, no higher office: N=21

Consensualism indicators and higher office (West German MPs 2002-2005)

0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0 consensualism value -0,1 -0,2 higher office 1 2 no higher office 3 4 consensualism dimension

consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

231

Table 11: a) Sample for 1998-2002: 1990-94: N=18 (8 East Germany / 10 Hungary); 1994-98: N=12 (5/7); 1998-2002: N=15 (9/6)

Consensualism indicators and entry into parliament (1998-2002)

0,70

0,60 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 0,00 consensualism value consensualism -0,10 -0,20 1990 -0,30 1994 1 2 1998 3 4 consensualism dimension consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

232 b) Sample for 2002-2005: 1990-94: N=17 (7/10 ), 1994-98: N=9 (2/7), 1998-2002: N=11 (5/6), 2002-: N=10 (6/4)

Consensualism indicators and entry into parliament (2002-2005)

0,70 0,60 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10

consensualism value consensualism 0,00 -0,10 1990 -0,20 1994 -0,30 1998 2002 1 2 3 4 consensualism dimension consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

233

c) West German sample: prior to 1990: N=3, 1990-1994: N=3, 1994-1998: N=4, 1998-2002: N=6, 2002-2005: N=10

Consensualism indicators and entry into parliament (West German MPs 2002-2005)

0,7

0,6

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

consensualism value consensualism 0

-0,1 before 1990 -0,2 1990 1994 -0,3 1998 1 2002 2 3 4 consensualism dimension

consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

234 Table 12: a) Sample for 1998-2002: direct mandate: N=20 (11 East Germany / 9 Hungary), list mandate: N=25 (11/14) Sample for 2002-2005: direct mandate: N=24 (13/11), list mandate: N=23 (7/16)

Consensualism indicators and type of mandate

0,50

0,40

s 0,30

0,20

0,10

0,00 consensualism value consensualism

list 1998-2002 -0,10 direct 1998-2002 -0,20 list 2002-2005 1 2 direct 2002-2005 3 4 consensualism dimension consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

235 c) Sample for West Germany (2002-2005): direct mandate: N=13, list mandate: N=13

Consensualism indicators and type of mandate (West German MPs 2002-2005)

0,45

0,35

0,25

0,15

0,05

consensualism value -0,05

-0,15 list 1 2 direct 3 4 consensualism dimension consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

236

Table 13: a) Sample for 1998-2002: overall average: N=45 (22 East Germany/ 23 Hungary), conservative: N=12 (3/9), social democratic: N=16 (8/8), liberal: N=7 (1/6), leftist: N=25 (18/7), post-communist: N=17 (9/8)

Consensualism indicators and ideology (1998-2002) 0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0

-0,1 consensualism value

post-communist -0,2 leftist liberal social democratic -0,3 conservative overall average 1 2 3 4 consensualism dimension

consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

237 b) Sample for 2002-2005: overall average: N=47 (20/27), conservative: N=17 (6/11), social democratic: N=19 (10/9), liberal: N=7 (1/6), leftist: N=23 (13/10), post-communist: N=13 (2/11)

Consensualism indicators and ideology (2002-2005)

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0 consensualism value -0,1 post-communist leftist -0,2 liberal social democratic conservative -0,3 overall average 1 2 3 4 consensualism dimension

consensualism dimensions denote: 1 general support for consensus and compromise 2 reference to the common good 3 support for established procedures 4 support for the status quo 5 respect towards “the other”

238

Annexes Annex 1: The samples a) Sample of MPs for Hungary MP s Year Entered Education Origin Mandate Other office speech Political e of parliament 1998-2002/ units 1998- affiliatio x birth first in 2002-2006 2002 / n in June 2002-2005 1989 Fidesz #1 m 1975 2002 higher rural -/list -/8 --- Fidesz #2 m 1970 1998 higher urban list/list 42/52 --- Fidesz #3 m 1962 1998 higher rural list/direct 35/40 --- Fidesz #4 m 1963 1998 higher urban direct/direct 28/9 --- Fidesz #5 m 1966 1990 higher capital direct/list minister (1999-2002), 37/25 Fidesz vice-president of parliament (2002-05), Fidesz #6 m 1961 1998 higher urban direct/list 10/9 --- Fidesz #7 m 1968 1993 higher urban direct/list vice-president of 57/147 Fidesz parliament (2002-04) Fidesz #8 m 1961 1990 higher urban direct/direct 62/18 Fidesz MSZP #1 m 1968 2002 higher capital -/list state secretary (2002-06) -/121 --- MSZP #2 m 1953 1994 higher capital direct/direct state secretary (1996-98) 41/55 MSZMP MSZP #3 m 1958 1994 higher capital list/list 23/9 MSZMP MSZP #4 m 1942 1994 higher capital list/direct state secretary (2002-06) 31/46 MSZMP MSZP #5 m 1936 1994 higher urban list/list 53/48 MSZMP MSZP #6 f 1953 2002 higher capital -/direct minister (2002-05) -/0 --- MSZP #7 m 1952 1998 higher rural list/list state secretary (2002-06) 3/5 MSZMP MSZP #8 m 1946 1994 higher capital list/direct state secretary (1994-98, 47/10 MSZMP 2002-06) MSZP #9 m 1946 1990 higher rural list/direct minister (1994-98) 38/32 MSZMP MSZP#10 f 1951 1998 higher urban direct/direct state secretary (2003-06) 103/125 MSZMP SZDSZ #1 f 1949 1990 higher capital list/list 162/149 SZDSZ SZDSZ #2 m 1952 1990 higher capital list/list 3/1 SZDSZ SZDSZ #3 m 1954 1990 higher capital list/list state secretary (1997-98) 41/80 SZDSZ SZDSZ #4 m 1955 1994 higher urban list/list state secretary (2002-06) 40/4 --- SZDSZ #5 m 1946 1990 higher capital list/direct state secretary (1994-97) 47/50 SZDSZ SZDSZ #6 m 1958 1990 higher urban list/list 63/29 SZDSZ MDF #1 m 1955 1990 higher urban direct/list 69/95 MDF MDF #2 m 1942 1990 higher capital direct/direct minister (1990-1993) 43/26 MDF MDF #3 m 1967 2002 secondary capital -/list -/234 MDF MSZMP = Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (communist party until 1989); state secretary= államtitkár

239

b) Sample of MPs for East Germany 2002-2005 MP s Year Entered Education Origin Mandate Other office speech Political e of parliament 1998-2002/ units affiliation in x birth first in 2002-2005 1998- Sept. 1989 2002 / 2002- 2005 CDU #1 m 1948 2002 higher urban -/list Land prime -/70 CDU*** minister(1993-94) CDU #2 m 1957 1990 primary rural direct/direct 34/27 --- CDU #3 m 1954 2002 higher urban -/list -/6 SED CDU #4 m 1975 2002 higher urban -/direct -/88 --- CDU #5 m 1959 1990*,1998 higher capital list/list 40/37 church opposition group CDU #6 m 1955 1998 higher urban direct/direct Land minister 14/40 Neues Forum (1990-1998) SPD #1 m 1945 1994 higher rural direct/direct 6/11 --- SPD m 1940 1998 higher rural direct/direct 20/13 SPD #2**** (W.Germany) SPD #3 m 1956 1990*,1990 higher rural direct/direct State secretary 35/15 church (2000-2002) opposition group SPD #4 f 1959 2002 secondary urban -/direct -/8 --- SPD #5 f 1952 1998 higher rural direct/direct 12/1 --- SPD #6 m 1944 1990 higher capital direct/direct State secretary 24/10 --- (1998-2000) SPD #7 m 1959 1990*,1990 higher urban direct/list Minister (1998- 36/28 --- 2005) SPD #8 m 1950 1990 higher urban direct/list State secretary 49/50 --- (1998-2005) SPD #9 m 1949 1990 higher urban direct/direct 19/14 --- SPD#10 f 1958 2002 higher urban -/direct -/12 --- PDS #1 m 1958 1998 higher urban list/- 8/- SED PDS #2 m 1952 1994 higher rural list/- 8/- SED PDS #3 f 1954 1994 higher urban list/- 59/- SED PDS #4 m 1940 1998 higher rural list/- 85/- SED PDS #5 m 1947 1994 higher rural list/- 80/ SED PDS #6 f 1961 2002 higher capital -/direct -/267 SED

240 PDS #7 f 1971 1998 secondary urban list/- 35/- --- PDS #8 f 1963 1998 higher capital direct/direct 60/281 SED PDS #9 m 1931 1958**, 1998 higher rural list/- 14/- SED PDS#10 m 1951 1990*,1990 higher capital list/- 123/- SED Green#1 f 1964 1994 higher urban list/list 35/23 Neues Forum FDP #1 m 1947 1990 higher rural list/list 33/8 LDPD***

SED = Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, East German communist party Neues Forum = biggest civic opposition group in GDR 1989/90 1990* = member of the first freely elected GDR-Parliament (March-October 1990) 1958**= member of the communist GDR parliament *** = members of “bloc parties” in the GDR (Liberal Democratic Party, LDPD; and Christian Democratic Union of East Germany, CDU) **** = MP lived in West Germany until 1990 State secretary= Staatssekretär

241

c) Sample of MPs for West Germany (2002-2005) MP sex Year Entered Education Origin Mandate Other office speech units of parliament 2002-2005 birth first in CDU #1W m 1952 1998 higher rural direct 22 CDU #2W m 1954 2002 higher rural list 18 CDU #3W m 1967 1998 higher urban list 17 CDU #4W m 1943 1972 secondary rural direct State secretary (1989-1998) 6 CDU #5W m 1959 2002 secondary urban direct 6 CDU #6W m 1941 1983 higher urban list State secretary (1994-1998) 20 CDU #7W m 1956 1991 higher urban list 17 CDU #8W m 1951 2002 higher rural direct 14 CDU #9W m 1958 2002 higher rural direct 18 CDU #10W f 1955 2002 higher capital list Land state secretary (1996- 16 1999) CDU #11W f 1966 1998 higher urban direct 33 SPD #1W m 1945 1996 primary rural direct 7 SPD #2W f 1953 2002 higher urban direct 32 SPD #3W m 1954 1998 higher urban direct 24 SPD #4W f 1952 1994 higher rural direct State secretary (2000-2005) 51 SPD #5W m 1959 2002 higher urban direct 5 SPD #6W m 1954 2002 higher rural direct 16 SPD #7W m 1943 2002 primary urban list Minister (1998-2002) 1 SPD #8W m 1962 1998 higher rural list 3 SPD #9W m 1940 1990 secondary urban list 20 SPD #10W f 1945 1980 higher urban list 28 SPD #11W f 1950 1990 higher urban direct 15 Green #1W m 1946 1994 higher rural list 52 Green #2W f 1983 2002 secondary rural list 24 FDP #1W f 1950 1998 higher rural list 70 FDP #2W m 1942 1994 higher urban list 39

State secretary= Staatssekretär

(sources: Országos Választási Iroda, Országgyülési Képviselök, Budapest, 2002, Jelenkutató Alapitvány Budapest 2004; Deutscher Bundestag, Kürschner’s Volkshandbuch Deutscher Bundestag, 2003 and 2006.)

242 Annex 2: Quantitative results of the content analysis of parliamentary speeches This and the following tables give the full data on the content analysis of parliamentary speeches for individual MPs across the two cases and two parliamentary cycles in the mentioned five dimensions plus a West German control sample for the second cycle. Denoted are the numbers of positive or negative statements in the respective dimension for all oral contributions of each MP during the respective parliamentary cycle as coded according to the code book, the overall balance and ratio per speech unit which is the ultimate score for individual MPs in the respective dimension for the respective cycle.

Table 1: Statements about the value of consensus a) balance balance balance balance 2002-05 1998-2002 1998-2002 consensus - speech units speech units speech consensus + consensus+ consensus - East Germany East Germany East Germany East Germany balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

CDU # 1 - - - - - CDU # 1 2 4 -2 70 -0,03 CDU # 2 2 3 -1 34 -0,03 CDU # 2 1 5 -4 27 -0,15 CDU # 3 - - - - - CDU # 3 3 -3 6 -0,5 CDU # 4 - - - - - CDU # 4 6 -6 88 -0,07 CDU # 5 4 21 -17 40 -0,43 CDU # 5 9 16 -7 37 -0,19 CDU # 6 2 -2 14 -0,14 CDU # 6 1 11 -10 40 -0,25 SPD # 1 0 6 0 SPD # 1 5 -5 11 -0,45 SPD # 2 3 3 0 20 0 SPD # 2 1 4 -3 13 -0,23 SPD # 3 4 6 -2 35 -0,06 SPD # 3 5 4 1 15 0,067 SPD # 4 - - - - - SPD # 4 1 1 8 0,125 SPD # 5 1 1 12 0,08 SPD # 5 0 1 0 SPD # 6 1 2 -1 24 -0,04 SPD # 6 8 -8 10 -0,8 SPD # 7 6 7 -1 36 -0,03 SPD # 7 0 28 0 SPD # 8 1 -1 49 -0,02 SPD # 8 3 -3 50 -0,06 SPD # 9 1 4 -3 19 -0,16 SPD # 9 4 11 -7 14 -0,5 SPD # 10 ------SPD # 10 2 -2 12 -0,17 PDS # 1 2 2 8 0,25 PDS # 1 - - - - - PDS # 2 1 1 8 0,13 PDS # 2 - - - - - PDS # 3 3 2 1 59 0,02 PDS # 3 - - - - - PDS # 4 9 2 7 85 0,08 PDS # 4 - - - - - PDS # 5 5 2 3 80 0,04 PDS # 5 - - - - - PDS # 6 - - - - - PDS # 6 1 29 -28 267 -0,1 PDS # 7 3 4 -1 35 -0,03 PDS # 7 - - - - PDS # 8 7 2 5 60 0,08 PDS # 8 6 25 -19 281 -0,07 PDS # 9 2 0 2 14 0,14 PDS # 9 - - - - - PDS # 10 11 3 8 123 0,07 PDS # 10 - - - - - Green # 1 4 12 -8 35 -0,23 Green # 1 10 14 -4 23 -0,17 FDP # 1 2 4 -2 33 -0,06 FDP # 1 0 0 0 8 0

243

CDU #7W Green #2W SPD #9W SPD #6W SPD #4W SPD #3W SPD #2W SPD #1W CDU #11W CDU #10W CDU #9W CDU #8W CDU #6W CDU #5W CDU #4W CDU #3W CDU #2W CDU #1W FDP #2W FDP #1W Green #1W SPD #11W SPD #10W SPD #8W SPD #7W SPD #5W

West Germany 2002-05 17 14 18 10 6 4 2 2 6 1 2 6 6 1 0 7 9 8 1 9 3 7 7 2 5 6 consensus + 0 4 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 3 2 0 2 0 consensus - 13 13 16 10 -1 6 4 1 2 5 1 2 4 5 0 0 6 8 8 0 7 3 6 7 5 4 balance 51 24 32 33 16 18 14 17 20 17 18 22 39 70 24 52 15 28 20 16 7 6 6 3 1 5 speech units -0,05 0,31 0,25 0,25 0,21 0,19 0,06 0,14 0,59 0,25 0,24 0,28 0,27 0,15 0,10 0,17 0,25 0,33 0,14 0,81 1,14 0,17 0,33 0,00 0,00 0,00

244 balance/ speech unit

Table 1b) balance balance balance consensus - consensus - consensus speech units speech units speech consensus + + consensus + consensus Hungary 2002-2005 2002-2005 Hungary Hungary 1998-2002 1998-2002 Hungary balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

Fidesz # 1 - - - - - Fidesz # 1 0 0 0 8 0 Fidesz # 2 10 10 42 0,24 Fidesz # 2 11 0 11 52 0,21 Fidesz # 3 1 -1 35 -0,03 Fidesz # 3 4 0 4 40 0,1 Fidesz # 4 4 -4 28 0,14 Fidesz # 4 5 0 5 9 0,56 Fidesz # 5 12 12 37 0,32 Fidesz # 5 3 0 3 25 0,12 Fidesz # 6 2 2 10 0,20 Fidesz # 6 0 2 -2 9 -0,22 Fidesz # 7 4 4 0 57 0 Fidesz # 7 9 1 8 147 0,05 Fidesz # 8 11 11 62 0,18 Fidesz # 8 21 0 21 18 1,17 MSZP # 1 - - - - - MSZP # 1 44 2 42 121 0,35 MSZP # 2 14 14 41 0,34 MSZP # 2 26 0 26 55 0,47 MSZP # 3 15 1 14 23 0,61 MSZP # 3 4 0 4 9 0,44 MSZP # 4 23 3 20 31 0,65 MSZP # 4 24 0 24 46 0,52 MSZP # 5 18 2 16 53 0,30 MSZP # 5 5 0 5 48 0,1 MSZP # 6 - - - - - MSZP # 6 0 0 0 0 0 MSZP # 7 1 1 3 0,33 MSZP # 7 6 0 6 5 1,2 MSZP # 8 12 1 11 47 0,23 MSZP # 8 2 0 2 10 0,2 MSZP # 9 18 18 38 0,47 MSZP # 9 21 2 19 32 0,59 MSZP # 10 30 1 29 103 0,28 MSZP # 10 23 3 20 125 0,16 SZDSZ # 1 25 3 22 162 0,14 SZDSZ # 1 26 0 26 149 0,17 SZDSZ # 2 1 1 0 3 0 SZDSZ # 2 0 0 0 1 0 SZDSZ # 3 2 1 1 41 0,02 SZDSZ # 3 32 4 28 80 0,35 SZDSZ # 4 3 1 2 40 0,05 SZDSZ # 4 12 0 12 4 3 SZDSZ # 5 18 2 16 47 0,34 SZDSZ # 5 15 4 11 50 0,22 SZDSZ # 6 9 1 8 63 0,13 SZDSZ # 6 19 3 16 29 0,55 MDF # 1 7 7 69 0,10 MDF # 1 26 1 25 95 0,26 MDF # 2 3 3 43 0,07 MDF # 2 6 0 6 26 0,23 MDF # 3 - - - - - MDF # 3 40 4 36 234 0,15

245

Table 2: Statements referring the Common good a) balance balance balance balance 2002-05 1998-2002 1998-2002 speech units speech units speech East Germany East Germany East Germany East Germany common good - good common common good - good common common good + good common common good + good common balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

CDU # 1 - - - - - CDU # 1 7 18 -11 70 -0,16 CDU # 2 1 29 -28 34 -0,83 CDU # 2 4 21 -17 27 -0,63 CDU # 3 - - - - - CDU # 3 1 3 -2 6 -0,33 CDU # 4 - - - - - CDU # 4 4 26 -22 88 -0,25 CDU # 5 2 19 -17 40 -0,43 CDU # 5 5 16 -11 37 -0,30 CDU # 6 1 1 0 14 0 CDU # 6 7 35 -28 40 -0,70 SPD # 1 1 3 -2 6 -0,33 SPD # 1 2 11 -9 11 -0,82 SPD # 2 8 -8 20 -0,40 SPD # 2 2 5 -3 13 -0,23 SPD # 3 5 7 -2 35 -0,06 SPD # 3 4 8 -4 15 -0,27 SPD # 4 - - - - - SPD # 4 2 4 -2 8 -0,25 SPD # 5 0 5 -5 12 -0,42 SPD # 5 0 1 0 SPD # 6 0 2 -2 24 -0,08 SPD # 6 3 6 -3 10 -0,30 SPD # 7 7 -7 36 -0,19 SPD # 7 0 28 0 SPD # 8 1 11 -10 49 -0,20 SPD # 8 1 13 -12 50 -0,24 SPD # 9 6 7 -1 19 -0,05 SPD # 9 7 4 3 14 0,21 SPD # 10 ------SPD # 10 5 8 -3 12 -0,25 PDS # 1 4 1 3 8 0,38 PDS # 1 - - - - - PDS # 2 5 5 8 0,63 PDS # 2 - - - - - PDS # 3 33 20 13 59 0,22 PDS # 3 - - - - - PDS # 4 37 28 9 85 0,11 PDS # 4 - - - - - PDS # 5 16 9 7 80 0,09 PDS # 5 - - - - - PDS # 6 - - - - - PDS # 6 11 111 -100 267 -0,37 PDS # 7 21 2 19 35 0,54 PDS # 7 - - - - PDS # 8 20 12 8 60 0,13 PDS # 8 14 103 -89 281 -0,32 PDS # 9 7 1 6 14 0,43 PDS # 9 - - - - - PDS # 10 61 25 36 123 0,29 PDS # 10 - - - - - Green # 1 4 11 -7 35 -0,20 Green # 1 21 7 14 23 0,61 FDP # 1 17 -17 33 -0,52 FDP # 1 1 -1 8 -0,13

246

balance balance 2002-05 speech units speech West Germany Common good - good Common Common good + good Common balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/

CDU # 1W 13 2 11 22 0,50 CDU # 2W 25 8 17 18 0,94 CDU # 3W 11 2 9 17 0,53 CDU # 4W 4 0 4 6 0,67 CDU # 5W 6 0 6 6 1,00 CDU # 6W 10 0 10 20 0,50 CDU # 7W 12 2 10 17 0,59 CDU # 8W 7 10 -3 14 -0,21 CDU # 9W 6 3 3 18 0,17 CDU # 10W 5 1 4 16 0,25 CDU # 11W 25 10 14 33 0,42 SPD # 1W 1 1 0 7 0,00 SPD # 2W 28 7 21 32 0,66 SPD # 3W 16 9 7 24 0,29 SPD # 4W 17 4 13 51 0,25 SPD # 5W 1 0 1 5 0,20 SPD #6W 11 0 11 16 0,69 SPD #7W 0 0 0 1 0,00 SPD #8W 4 0 4 3 1,33 SPD #9W 19 2 17 20 0,85 SPD #10W 19 11 8 28 0,29 SPD #11W 8 1 7 15 0,47 Green #1W 11 1 10 52 0,19 Green #2W 18 4 14 24 0,58 FDP #1W 42 20 22 70 0,31 FDP #2W 16 7 9 39 0,23

247

Table 2b) balance balance balance speech units speech units speech common good - good common - good common common good + good common common good + good common Hungary 2002-2005 2002-2005 Hungary Hungary 1998-2002 1998-2002 Hungary balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

Fidesz # 1 - - - - - Fidesz # 1 0 8 0 Fidesz # 2 15 7 8 42 0,19 Fidesz # 2 3 2 1 52 0,02 Fidesz # 3 9 2 7 35 0,40 Fidesz # 3 0 40 0 Fidesz # 4 9 3 6 28 0,21 Fidesz # 4 1 1 9 0,11 Fidesz # 5 14 14 37 0,38 Fidesz # 5 7 2 5 25 0,20 Fidesz # 6 7 2 5 10 0,56 Fidesz # 6 5 5 9 0,50 Fidesz # 7 8 1 7 57 0,12 Fidesz # 7 31 4 27 147 0,18 Fidesz # 8 25 1 24 62 0,39 Fidesz # 8 13 3 10 18 0,56 MSZP # 1 - - - - - MSZP # 1 11 6 5 121 0,04 MSZP # 2 2 2 41 0,05 MSZP # 2 1 1 55 0,02 MSZP # 3 7 7 23 0,30 MSZP # 3 1 -1 9 -0,11 MSZP # 4 9 1 8 31 0,26 MSZP # 4 9 2 7 46 0,15 MSZP # 5 5 2 3 53 0,06 MSZP # 5 5 1 4 48 0,08 MSZP # 6 - - - - - MSZP # 6 0 0 0 MSZP # 7 1 1 3 0,33 MSZP # 7 6 6 5 1,20 MSZP # 8 2 2 47 0,04 MSZP # 8 10 2 8 10 0,80 MSZP # 9 17 1 16 38 0,42 MSZP # 9 10 3 7 32 0,22 MSZP # 10 15 15 103 0,15 MSZP # 10 24 5 19 125 0,15 SZDSZ # 1 52 5 47 162 0,29 SZDSZ # 1 16 6 10 149 0,07 SZDSZ # 2 1 1 3 0,33 SZDSZ # 2 1 1 0 1 0 SZDSZ # 3 6 1 5 41 0,12 SZDSZ # 3 21 13 8 80 0,10 SZDSZ # 4 9 4 5 40 0,13 SZDSZ # 4 1 1 0 4 0 SZDSZ # 5 8 1 7 47 0,15 SZDSZ # 5 17 6 11 50 0,22 SZDSZ # 6 12 12 63 0,19 SZDSZ # 6 15 5 10 29 0,34 MDF # 1 21 3 18 69 0,26 MDF # 1 17 1 16 95 0,17 MDF # 2 2 2 43 0,05 MDF # 2 9 1 8 26 0,31 MDF # 3 - - - - - MDF # 3 26 10 16 234 0,07

248

Table 3: Statements about preferences for established procedures a) balance balance balance balance 2002-05 1998-2002 1998-2002 procedures - procedures speech units speech - procedures units speech procedures + procedures procedures + procedures East Germany East Germany East Germany East Germany balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

CDU # 1 - - - - - CDU # 1 29 6 23 70 0,33 CDU # 2 5 5 0 34 0 CDU # 2 6 2 -4 27 -0,22 CDU # 3 - - - - - CDU # 3 1 1 0 6 CDU # 4 - - - - - CDU # 4 10 10 0 88 CDU # 5 9 17 -8 40 -0,20 CDU # 5 13 22 -9 37 -0,24 CDU # 6 1 2 -1 14 -0,07 CDU # 6 13 9 4 40 0,10 SPD # 1 1 -1 6 -0,17 SPD # 1 1 9 -8 11 -0,73 SPD # 2 2 3 -1 20 -0,05 SPD # 2 1 9 -8 13 -0,62 SPD # 3 5 15 -10 35 -0,29 SPD # 3 2 5 -3 15 -0,20 SPD # 4 - - - - - SPD # 4 1 4 -3 8 -0,38 SPD # 5 3 3 12 0,25 SPD # 5 0 1 0 SPD # 6 3 15 -12 24 -0,50 SPD # 6 1 17 -16 10 -1,60 SPD # 7 7 15 -8 36 -0,22 SPD # 7 4 45 -41 28 -1,46 SPD # 8 9 15 -6 49 -0,12 SPD # 8 4 36 -32 50 -0,64 SPD # 9 4 6 -2 19 -0,11 SPD # 9 4 24 -20 14 -1,43 SPD # 10 ------SPD # 10 12 -12 12 -1,00 PDS # 1 7 7 8 0,88 PDS # 1 - - - - - PDS # 2 0 8 0 PDS # 2 - - - - - PDS # 3 11 4 7 59 0,12 PDS # 3 - - - - - PDS # 4 19 19 85 0,22 PDS # 4 - - - - - PDS # 5 26 4 22 80 0,28 PDS # 5 - - - - - PDS # 6 - - - - - PDS # 6 88 8 80 267 0,30 PDS # 7 13 35 0,37 PDS # 7 - - - - PDS # 8 53 3 50 60 0,83 PDS # 8 117 4 113 281 0,40 PDS # 9 5 2 3 14 0,21 PDS # 9 - - - - - PDS # 10 36 1 35 123 0,28 PDS # 10 - - - - - Green # 1 9 13 -4 35 -0,11 Green # 1 3 37 -34 23 -1,48 FDP # 1 4 5 -1 33 -0,03 FDP # 1 2 3 -1 8 -0,13

249

balance balance 2002-05 speech units speech procedures - procedures procedures + procedures West Germany balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/

CDU # 1W 5 0 5 22 0,23 CDU # 2W 5 1 4 18 0,22 CDU # 3W 3 0 3 17 0,18 CDU # 4W 9 0 9 6 1,50 CDU # 5W 2 0 2 6 0,33 CDU # 6W 2 0 2 20 0,10 CDU # 7W 4 0 4 17 0,24 CDU # 8W 1 0 1 14 0,07 CDU # 9W 11 0 11 18 0,61 CDU # 10W 15 0 15 16 0,94 CDU # 11W 5 0 5 33 0,15 SPD # 1W 1 1 0 7 0,00 SPD # 2W 2 6 -4 32 -0,13 SPD # 3W 6 1 5 24 0,21 SPD # 4W 16 6 10 51 0,20 SPD # 5W 3 0 3 5 0,60 SPD #6W 9 5 4 16 0,25 SPD #7W 0 0 0 1 0,00 SPD #8W 1 1 0 3 0,00 SPD #9W 4 2 2 20 0,10 SPD #10W 16 0 16 28 0,57 SPD #11W 1 1 0 15 0,00 Green #1W 26 6 20 52 0,38 Green #2W 5 5 0 24 0,00 FDP #1W 10 2 8 70 0,11 FDP #2W 8 0 8 39 0,21

250

Table 3b)

balance balance balance speech units speech - procedures units speech procedures - procedures procedures + procedures procedures + procedures Hungary 2002-2005 2002-2005 Hungary Hungary 1998-2002 1998-2002 Hungary balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

Fidesz # 1 - - - - - Fidesz # 1 5 5 8 0,63 Fidesz # 2 6 4 2 42 0,05 Fidesz # 2 9 9 52 0,17 Fidesz # 3 0 35 0 Fidesz # 3 4 4 40 0,10 Fidesz # 4 5 1 4 28 0,14 Fidesz # 4 1 1 0 9 0 Fidesz # 5 2 2 37 0,05 Fidesz # 5 11 3 8 25 0,32 Fidesz # 6 1 1 10 0,10 Fidesz # 6 6 6 9 0,67 Fidesz # 7 45 3 42 57 0,74 Fidesz # 7 115 8 107 147 0,73 Fidesz # 8 7 7 0 62 0 Fidesz # 8 14 14 18 0,78 MSZP # 1 - - - - - MSZP # 1 18 1 17 121 0,14 MSZP # 2 28 28 41 0,68 MSZP # 2 10 2 8 55 0,15 MSZP # 3 13 13 23 0,57 MSZP # 3 1 1 9 0,11 MSZP # 4 24 24 31 0,77 MSZP # 4 14 14 46 0,30 MSZP # 5 29 29 53 0,55 MSZP # 5 2 1 1 48 0,23 MSZP # 6 - - - - - MSZP # 6 0 0 MSZP # 7 0 3 0 MSZP # 7 1 1 0 5 0 MSZP # 8 49 1 48 47 1,02 MSZP # 8 8 1 7 10 0,70 MSZP # 9 7 7 38 0,18 MSZP # 9 10 1 9 32 0,28 MSZP # 10 17 17 103 0,17 MSZP # 10 8 2 6 125 0,05 SZDSZ # 1 27 27 162 0,17 SZDSZ # 1 20 3 17 149 0,11 SZDSZ # 2 0 3 0 SZDSZ # 2 0 1 0 SZDSZ # 3 12 41 0,29 SZDSZ # 3 25 12 15 80 0,19 SZDSZ # 4 12 12 40 0,30 SZDSZ # 4 4 0 SZDSZ # 5 34 10 24 47 0,70 SZDSZ # 5 10 1 9 50 0,18 SZDSZ # 6 15 15 63 0,24 SZDSZ # 6 8 1 7 29 0,24 MDF # 1 15 1 14 69 0,20 MDF # 1 6 6 95 0,06 MDF # 2 16 16 43 0,37 MDF # 2 8 8 26 0,31 MDF # 3 - - - - - MDF # 3 26 13 13 234 0,06

251

Table 4: Statements about support for the institutional status quo a) balance balance balance balance 2002-05 1998-2002 1998-2002 status quo - status quo status quo - status quo status quo + status quo status quo + status quo speech units speech units speech East Germany East Germany East Germany East Germany balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

CDU # 1 - - - - - CDU # 1 2 5 -3 70 -0,04 CDU # 2 3 14 -11 34 -0,32 CDU # 2 4 -4 27 -0,15 CDU # 3 - - - - - CDU # 3 0 6 0 CDU # 4 - - - - - CDU # 4 17 -17 88 -0,19 CDU # 5 1 32 -31 40 -0,78 CDU # 5 3 2 -1 37 -0,03 CDU # 6 1 1 0 14 0 CDU # 6 1 7 -6 40 -0,15 SPD # 1 2 -2 6 -0,33 SPD # 1 14 -14 11 -1,27 SPD # 2 1 4 -3 20 -0,15 SPD # 2 4 -4 13 -0,31 SPD # 3 4 12 -8 35 -0,23 SPD # 3 5 -5 15 -0,33 SPD # 4 - - - - - SPD # 4 0 8 0 SPD # 5 2 -2 12 -0,17 SPD # 5 0 1 0 SPD # 6 3 -3 24 -0,13 SPD # 6 2 3 -1 10 -0,10 SPD # 7 5 13 -8 36 -0,22 SPD # 7 1 -1 28 -0,04 SPD # 8 4 12 -8 49 -0,16 SPD # 8 5 -5 50 -0,10 SPD # 9 12 -12 19 -0,63 SPD # 9 4 -4 14 -0,14 SPD # 10 ------SPD # 10 12 -0,33 PDS # 1 3 -3 8 -0,38 PDS # 1 - - - - - PDS # 2 2 2 0 8 0 PDS # 2 - - - - - PDS # 3 24 21 3 59 0,05 PDS # 3 - - - - - PDS # 4 35 13 22 85 0,26 PDS # 4 - - - - - PDS # 5 18 12 6 80 0,10 PDS # 5 - - - - - PDS # 6 - - - - - PDS # 6 52 13 39 267 0,15 PDS # 7 17 5 12 35 0,34 PDS # 7 - - - - PDS # 8 20 10 10 60 0,17 PDS # 8 68 29 39 281 0,14 PDS # 9 1 2 -1 14 -0,07 PDS # 9 - - - - - PDS # 10 28 15 13 123 0,11 PDS # 10 - - - - - Green # 1 2 28 -26 35 -0,74 Green # 1 1 44 -43 23 -1,87 FDP # 1 2 13 -11 33 -0,33 FDP # 1 1 -1 8 -0,13

252

balance balance 2002-05 Status quo - speech units speech Status quo + Status quo West Germany balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/

CDU # 1W 6 2 4 22 0,18 CDU # 2W 1 3 -2 18 -0,11 CDU # 3W 2 0 2 17 0,12 CDU # 4W 0 0 0 6 0,00 CDU # 5W 1 0 1 6 0,17 CDU # 6W 0 0 0 20 0,00 CDU # 7W 1 0 1 17 0,06 CDU # 8W 2 0 2 14 0,14 CDU # 9W 1 0 1 18 0,06 CDU # 10W 0 0 0 16 0,00 CDU # 11W 2 4 -2 33 -0,06 SPD # 1W 0 0 0 7 0,00 SPD # 2W 1 1 0 32 0,00 SPD # 3W 6 5 1 24 0,04 SPD # 4W 3 1 2 51 0,04 SPD # 5W 0 0 0 5 0,00 SPD #6W 0 0 0 16 0,00 SPD #7W 0 0 0 1 0,00 SPD #8W 2 1 1 3 0,33 SPD #9W 0 1 -1 20 -0,05 SPD #10W 11 1 10 28 0,36 SPD #11W 0 1 -1 15 -0,07 Green #1W 7 6 1 52 0,02 Green #2W 1 1 0 24 0,00 FDP #1W 0 7 -7 70 -0,10 FDP #2W 5 4 1 39 0,03

253

Table 4b) balance balance balance status quo - status quo status quo - status quo status quo + status quo + status quo speech units speech units speech Hungary 2002-2005 2002-2005 Hungary Hungary 1998-2002 1998-2002 Hungary balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

Fidesz # 1 - - - - - Fidesz # 1 0 8 0 Fidesz # 2 5 4 1 42 0,02 Fidesz # 2 1 1 0 52 0 Fidesz # 3 2 -2 35 -0,06 Fidesz # 3 0 40 0 Fidesz # 4 1 -1 28 -0,04 Fidesz # 4 0 9 0 Fidesz # 5 0 37 0 Fidesz # 5 1 1 25 0,04 Fidesz # 6 1 -1 10 -0,10 Fidesz # 6 0 9 0 Fidesz # 7 4 16 -12 57 -0,21 Fidesz # 7 6 3 3 147 0,02 Fidesz # 8 4 -4 62 -0,06 Fidesz # 8 2 -2 18 -0,11 MSZP # 1 - - - - - MSZP # 1 0 121 0 MSZP # 2 8 3 5 41 0,12 MSZP # 2 5 4 1 55 0,02 MSZP # 3 2 1 1 23 0,04 MSZP # 3 0 9 0 MSZP # 4 6 4 2 31 0,06 MSZP # 4 2 2 46 0,04 MSZP # 5 12 2 10 53 0,19 MSZP # 5 1 -1 48 -0,02 MSZP # 6 - - - - - MSZP # 6 0 0 0 MSZP # 7 0 3 0 MSZP # 7 0 5 0 MSZP # 8 9 2 7 47 0,15 MSZP # 8 5 5 10 0,50 MSZP # 9 4 4 38 0,11 MSZP # 9 2 3 -1 32 -0,03 MSZP # 10 3 3 103 -0,03 MSZP # 10 1 2 -1 125 -0,01 SZDSZ # 1 4 4 0 162 0 SZDSZ # 1 2 9 -7 149 -0,05 SZDSZ # 2 0 3 0 SZDSZ # 2 0 1 0 SZDSZ # 3 1 2 -1 41 -0,02 SZDSZ # 3 9 2 7 80 0,09 SZDSZ # 4 6 1 5 40 0,13 SZDSZ # 4 0 4 0 SZDSZ # 5 11 3 8 47 0,17 SZDSZ # 5 8 2 6 50 0,12 SZDSZ # 6 2 2 63 0,03 SZDSZ # 6 1 -1 29 -0,03 MDF # 1 3 3 69 0,04 MDF # 1 1 2 -1 95 -0,01 MDF # 2 1 -1 43 -0,02 MDF # 2 5 5 26 0,19 MDF # 3 - - - - - MDF # 3 9 5 4 234 0,02

254

Table 5: Statements denoting respect for political opponents a) balance balance balance balance respect - respect respect - respect 2002-05 respect + respect respect + respect 1998-2002 1998-2002 speech units speech units speech East Germany East Germany East Germany East Germany balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

CDU # 1 - - - - - CDU # 1 3 71 -68 70 -0,97 CDU # 2 2 95 -93 34 -2,74 CDU # 2 2 52 -50 27 -1,85 CDU # 3 - - - - - CDU # 3 4 -4 6 -0,67 CDU # 4 - - - - - CDU # 4 3 132 -129 88 -1,47 CDU # 5 3 108 -105 40 -2,63 CDU # 5 8 89 -81 37 -2,19 CDU # 6 24 -24 14 -1,71 CDU # 6 17 121 -104 40 -2,60 SPD # 1 2 -2 6 -0,33 SPD # 1 1 22 -21 11 -1,91 SPD # 2 1 53 -52 20 -2,60 SPD # 2 6 43 -37 13 -2,85 SPD # 3 1 61 -60 35 -1,71 SPD # 3 5 19 -14 15 -0,93 SPD # 4 - - - - - SPD # 4 6 -6 8 -0,75 SPD # 5 3 8 -5 12 -0,42 SPD # 5 1 -1 1 -1,00 SPD # 6 1 34 -33 24 -1,38 SPD # 6 6 75 -69 10 -6,90 SPD # 7 6 48 -42 36 -1,17 SPD # 7 13 -13 28 -0,46 SPD # 8 3 36 -33 49 -0,67 SPD # 8 3 24 -21 50 -0,42 SPD # 9 2 56 -54 19 -2,84 SPD # 9 8 69 -61 14 -4,36 SPD # 10 - - - - - SPD # 10 2 8 -6 12 -0,5 PDS # 1 1 9 -8 8 -1,0 PDS # 1 - - - - - PDS # 2 1 3 -2 8 -0,25 PDS # 2 - - - - - PDS # 3 14 53 -39 59 -0,66 PDS # 3 - - - - - PDS # 4 15 55 -40 85 -0,47 PDS # 4 - - - - - PDS # 5 12 68 -56 80 -0,70 PDS # 5 - - - - - PDS # 6 - - - - - PDS # 6 34 245 -211 267 -0,79 PDS # 7 6 39 -33 35 -0,94 PDS # 7 - - - - PDS # 8 9 46 -37 60 -0,62 PDS # 8 36 261 -225 281 -0,80 PDS # 9 1 8 -7 14 -0,50 PDS # 9 - - - - - PDS # 10 7 63 -56 123 -0,46 PDS # 10 - - - - - Green # 1 2 75 -73 35 -2,09 Green # 1 18 100 -82 23 -3,57 FDP # 1 6 27 -21 33 -0,64 FDP # 1 1 16 -15 8 -1,88

255

balance balance respect - respect 2002-05 respect + respect speech units speech West Germany balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/

CDU # 1W 15 30 -15 22 -0,68 CDU # 2W 4 34 -30 18 -1,67 CDU # 3W 7 27 -20 17 -1,18 CDU # 4W 7 4 3 6 0,50 CDU # 5W 2 9 -7 6 -1,17 CDU # 6W 8 14 -6 20 -0,30 CDU # 7W 5 7 -2 17 -0,12 CDU # 8W 0 15 -15 14 -1,07 CDU # 9W 3 9 -6 18 -0,33 CDU # 10W 1 25 -24 16 -1,50 CDU # 11W 1 71 -70 33 -2,12 SPD # 1W 4 4 0 7 0,00 SPD # 2W 2 22 -20 32 -0,63 SPD # 3W 8 30 -22 24 -0,92 SPD # 4W 16 36 -20 51 -0,39 SPD # 5W 2 1 1 5 0,20 SPD #6W 3 13 -10 16 -0,63 SPD #7W 0 1 -1 1 -1,00 SPD #8W 0 5 -5 3 -1,67 SPD #9W 0 20 -20 20 -1,00 SPD #10W 2 18 -16 28 -0,57 SPD #11W 2 10 -8 15 -0,53 Green #1W 8 47 -39 52 -0,75 Green #2W 1 25 -24 24 -1,00 FDP #1W 9 45 -36 70 -0,51 FDP #2W 6 36 -30 39 -0,77

256

Table 5b) balance balance balance respect - respect respect - respect respect + respect + respect speech units speech units speech Hungary 2002-2005 2002-2005 Hungary Hungary 1998-2002 1998-2002 Hungary balance/ speech unit unit speech balance/ unit speech balance/

Fidesz # 1 - - - - - Fidesz # 1 24 -24 8 -3,00 Fidesz # 2 3 26 -23 42 -0,55 Fidesz # 2 4 53 -49 52 -0,94 Fidesz # 3 20 -20 35 -0,57 Fidesz # 3 4 46 -42 40 -1,05 Fidesz # 4 1 10 -9 28 -0,32 Fidesz # 4 2 12 -10 9 -1,11 Fidesz # 5 3 17 -14 37 -0,38 Fidesz # 5 3 42 -39 25 -1,56 Fidesz # 6 9 -9 10 -0,90 Fidesz # 6 3 9 -6 9 -0,67 Fidesz # 7 3 69 -66 57 -1,16 Fidesz # 7 11 256 -245 147 -1,64 Fidesz # 8 35 -35 62 -0,56 Fidesz # 8 7 31 -24 18 -1,33 MSZP # 1 - - - - - MSZP # 1 63 131 -68 121 -0,56 MSZP # 2 4 18 -14 41 -0,35 MSZP # 2 13 32 -19 55 -0,34 MSZP # 3 3 10 -7 23 -0,30 MSZP # 3 2 2 9 0,22 MSZP # 4 3 35 -32 31 -1,03 MSZP # 4 9 20 -11 46 -0,24 MSZP # 5 1 9 -8 53 -0,15 MSZP # 5 5 16 -11 48 -0,23 MSZP # 6 - - - - - MSZP # 6 0 0 0 MSZP # 7 4 -4 3 -1,33 MSZP # 7 4 5 -1 5 -0,20 MSZP # 8 24 -24 47 -0,51 MSZP # 8 2 26 -24 10 -2,40 MSZP # 9 1 19 -18 38 -0,47 MSZP # 9 3 12 -9 32 -0,28 MSZP # 10 67 -67 103 -0,65 MSZP # 10 12 85 -73 125 -0,58 SZDSZ # 1 5 109 -104 162 -0,64 SZDSZ # 1 35 89 -54 149 -0,36 SZDSZ # 2 1 4 -3 3 -1,00 SZDSZ # 2 0 1 0 SZDSZ # 3 3 72 -69 41 -1,68 SZDSZ # 3 22 91 -69 80 -0,86 SZDSZ # 4 3 41 -38 40 -0,95 SZDSZ # 4 4 12 -8 4 -2,00 SZDSZ # 5 2 56 -54 47 -1,15 SZDSZ # 5 5 54 -49 50 -0,98 SZDSZ # 6 1 38 -37 63 -0,59 SZDSZ # 6 7 19 -12 29 -0,41 MDF # 1 2 12 -10 69 -0,14 MDF # 1 12 16 -4 95 -0,04 MDF # 2 3 12 -9 43 -0,21 MDF # 2 7 15 -8 26 -0,31 MDF # 3 - - - - - MDF # 3 17 121 -104 234 -0,44

257

Annex 3: The Interviews a) Approach The interviews were conducted by the author from late March till early July 2004 in Hungary, and mid-July till mid-September 2004 in Germany (i.e. in the middle of both parliaments’ four-year electoral cycle) during which both countries were governed by a middle-left coalition government.759 MPs were initially contacted by e-mail. The e-mail introduced the author as a German PhD-student in Political Science with an interest in current Hungarian/East German politics and asked for a one-hour interview about the MP’s political career and his/her views on a number of political issues. From the 386 Hungarian MPs around 200 randomly selected ones were approached by e-mail. Only the first two or three interviewees were deliberately selected and approached through personal contacts in order to enable a “smooth start” of the project due to the initial belief that a foreign researcher might have a hard time gaining access to (and obtain the confidence of) a sufficiently large and diverse number of Hungarian MPs. This proved to be rather unjustified, as twenty-seven interviews were conducted and many more MPs expressed their willingness to take part (around 40%). A completely random selection process was, as in most other respectable elite studies, infeasible.760 Having interviewed several representatives from all parties (MSZP, Fidesz, SZDSZ and MDF) in parliament from different generations, gender,761 a large variety of professional and geographical backgrounds, list and directly elected MPs (including a number of MPs holding additional offices in local/regional politics), the executive, parliament or their party, backbenchers and frontbenchers etc., a high degree of qualitative saturation was achieved and therefore many more MPs who had signalled willingness to participate were not asked for an appointment in the end. As for the smaller number of potential interviewees all 97 East German MPs were approached by e-mail. The response rate was much higher than in the Hungarian case (around

759 Originally, it had been expected that both parliaments would serve their entire electoral cycle (as usual) allowing the author to ultimately cover almost identical periods in the quantitative analysis of statements in parliaments. The interviews, however had already been conducted in the (anticipated) middle of the electoral cycle in order to avoid potential short-term influences or after-effects of electoral campaigns. The rather unexpected dissolution of the Bundestag and calling of early elections somewhat shortened the overall time frame covered for the East German case. 760 H Kitschelt/ Z Mansfeldova/ R Markovski/ G Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems – Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p.146; R Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy – Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford UP, 1999, p. 761 Women are strongly underrepresented in the Hungarian parliament (see table), particularly in the two conservative opposition parties from which none of the few female MPs was available for an interview. 258 90%).762 In their replies all but four MPs expressed their willingness to be interviewed. This is a remarkably high number if compared to other studies using interviews with national or regional MPs. Again, a suitable number of MPs based on a large distribution of background criteria was finally picked and interviewed. In general, the response rate in Hungary was higher among MPs from the governing parties (MSZP and SZDSZ). In the East German case response rates were highest among SPD and PDS members. Therefore, one might speculate whether leftist parties have a higher inclination to participate in these kinds of interviews or whether it has to do with incumbency.763 However, there appeared to be no systematic differences in terms of cooperativeness which was the case for the great majority of the interviewees. The interviews were conducted by the author in the form of pre-structured open-ended questions in which MPs were asked about their own background and self-image, the reasons for their political engagement, their “version” of the transition process, of the current system and proposals for change. The author intervened only to clarify, or to probe obviously illogical statements, or in case of excessive departure from the topic. Otherwise the MPs were given the (obviously very much appreciated and rather rare) opportunity to develop extensive statements on the questions asked in a relaxed atmosphere. Due to the above-mentioned under-representation of the PDS in the 2002 Bundestag based on the national 5%-hurdle it was decided to include some additional former PDS-MPs into the sample. Only one of the additional eight PDS interviewees is no longer active in “high” politics. The others hold Länder and/or local council mandates and/or high party functions and/or had (unsuccessfully) run for the European Parliament meanwhile and/or were planning to run for the next Bundestag and/or Länder parliaments.764 Therefore, they can be regarded as being part of the top East German political elite and the best possible choice to represent the PDS in the sample. Thus the East German sample overall consists of 29 interviews from the mentioned three large parties in a balanced distribution of age, gender and other background factors, and also included one Green and one FDP MP. The latter parties,

762 Best et al. report a response rate of 59-89% for telephone interviews conducted with German regional MPs in 2003/4, national MPs between 18-31% depending on the party. The highest rates were among East German members of regional parliaments. (H Best / M Edinger / K Schmitt / S Jahr, ’ Zwischenauswertung der Deutschen Abgeordnetenbefragung 2003/04 – Gesamtergebnis’, Sonderforschungsbereich 580, Friedrich- Schiller Universität Jena, online paper, 2004, online http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/a3.0.html, last accessed 20 October 2006, pp.5-6). 763 Similar observations by R Putnam, 1973, and R Rohrschneider, 1999. 764 Four of these former MPs ran again in 2005 and two of them regained their mandates in the Bundestag. 259 however, hardly play a role in East German politics and owed their representation in the Bundestag to the parties’ performance in the West.765 For the interviews a pre-structured, pre-tested questionnaire in Hungarian and German (on the basis of an English original) was used. To ensure semantic correspondence the Hungarian questionnaire was translated and re-translated into English with the help of experienced native speakers with a background in social sciences. All interviews were taped and transcribed except for two instances of technical malfunction. Extensive back-up notes taken during the talks were used to reconstruct missing or incomprehensible parts of the tape records. One East German MP chose to answer to the questionnaire in writing due to temporal absence from Germany. Otherwise, the interviews lasted between 40 and 120 minutes, on average around 60 minutes. Most of them were conducted in the MPs’ offices in Berlin or Budapest. One Hungarian and three German MPs were interviewed in their local constituency offices. Three Hungarian MPs were interviewed in the context of an informal press meeting which the author was allowed to join. The additional former PDS MPs were interviewed in their current places of work (2) in Berlin and Magdeburg, the PDS party headquarters in Berlin (2), cafés in Berlin (2), the author’s home in Berlin (1), and the former MP’s home in Berlin (1). Except for three interviews which were conducted in the context of the press meeting, all other interviews were not attended by any other person. There seems to be no indication whatsoever that the setting (if only for the degree of background noise) had any remarkable impact on the course and content of the interviews. The German interview tapes were transcribed by the author, the Hungarian ones by hired native, experienced assistants. The entire transcribed material amounts to around 800 pages (1,5 spaced, 12-point) and can be made available for scientific purposes upon request.

765 In regional elections in East Germany both FDP and Greens regularly fail to pass the 5%-hurdle. 260 b) Guideline for questions • Why did you become a politician? Was there a particular event or a particular personal experience as a major reason? • Which ability, experience, or training do you regard as important for being a good politician? • Social-economic status (as far as not available from other sources), i.e. age, education, rural/urban background, profession, parents / family background • Other individual information (as far as not available from other sources or discussed above) e.g. party member since when, party membership under old regime, participation in former anti-communist opposition / round-table talks etc. • Where would you place your party on the same scale? • What do you find most appealing about politics? What do you dislike most about it? • In what way should the new generation of politicians differ from the current one? • How much of a politician’s past should be known to his/her voters? • Is there a moment when one needs to draw a ‘thick line’ in dealing with the past? • How well do you think society has dealt with its recent past? • What event and which personality do you regard as the most important for your country’s democracy and in general since 1989? Why? • With the wisdom of hindsight – is there anything of the old system which would have been worth keeping and why? • If you look back to 1989 – what were your aspirations, hopes, ideas of how democracy should look like? How much of it has been realized? • When you look back at the changes of 1989/1990 with the wisdom of hindsight, what were the mistakes committed then, what could have been done better? • Should the democratic system be maintained as it stands now? What needs to be changed and why? • How would you define democracy? • Do you think that it would be a good idea to have the President directly elected by the people? Why? • Who of the main actors of 1989/90 have changed the most? In what way did they change? • What are three gravest problems the country is facing currently?

261 • Who or what is to blame for these problems? The current system, the old system, a certain party or government, certain indiviudals or policies, international factors or else? • How do the conflicts of interest involved in connection with (the most important problem mentioned) impact on the governability of the country? • What are the major advantages and disadvantages following from the establishment of a economy in this country? • Do you think there is a lack of democracy in some areas of life, e.g. in the working place? • Which group is the greatest danger for democracy in this country at the moment?

262