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The Future of Consensus Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

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The Future of Consensus Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe Central European University Compulsory Consensus? The Sources of Elite Political Culture and the Consolidation of Central and East European Democracies By Maximilian Spinner Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD Central European University, Department of Political Science Budapest, January 2007 Supervisor András Bozóki (Central European University) PhD Committee Zsolt Enyedi (Central European University) Sorina Soare (Université Libre de Bruxelles) Jürg Steiner (University of North Carolina) Summary: The transitions of 1989/90 in Central and Eastern Europe led to the installation of democratic systems with high numbers of veto players (i.e. democracies close to Arend Lijphart’s concept of consensus democracy). The existing consensus democratic arrangements are the result of contingent dynamics and the political vacuum following the break-down of communism, as well as the product of external conditionalities, with particular regard to EU integration. However, when looking at contemporary Central and East European politics it appears doubtful that a consensus-democratic institutional set- up actually led to accommodative, consensus-oriented political elites boasting a “spirit of accommodation” and showing commitment to consensus democracy. In short, political culture does not seem to have adapted to the institutional context more than 15 years after the transition to democracy and has yet to converge with more stable West European patterns. This leaves some to wonder about the likelihood for the future persistence of these systems (i.e. the consolidation of democracy in the region). The apparent absence of an appropriate political culture stands against the classical approach to political culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (to which Lijphart also subscribes) which expects political culture, in the form of individual level attitudes, to adapt to institutions over time. Internalization of the norms of the democratic system is seen as a requirement for consolidating democracies by scholars in this tradition. I argue that commitment to an existing democracy does not require political elites to be fully socialised into its underlying norms or to internalise them. However, commitment does require the existence of a supportive habitus, such as a set of collective representations of democracy which are explicitly upheld and commonly valued though not necessarily internalized on the individual level. Unlike attitudes which are viewed to be based on individual socio-economic background factors and post-recruitment socialisation, collective representations are grounded in a collective memory developed during historical junctures. In this dissertation I show that for the CEE democracies the critical juncture of the 1989/90 transition to democracy offered very different discursive resources to political elites to subsequently commit to consensus democracy depending on the mode of transition. In the rather unstructured and empty public realm of collapsed communism in 1989/90, formal democratic institutions and new ways of interpreting politics had to be found simultaneously (some of which have persisted in public elite discourse). Consequently, a multilateral, gradual, negotiated and legalistic transition with moderate elite turnover offers rhetorical resources to justify consensus as a democratic practice. Political elites were endowed with rhetorical resources to argue in terms of the common good, to support established procedures and the existing institutional status quo. However, the absence of a shared judgement of the past system and the persistence of competing historical “truths” undermines the development of mutual respect between opposed political camps. 2 A unilateral transition (i.e. a more abrupt, imposed transition) marks a “new beginning” of the polity in terms of its legitimacy and a high degree of elite turnover. It leaves a discursive legacy favouring more competitive approaches to politics, argumentation in terms of particular interests, a focus on outputs rather than procedures, and no explicit normative support for the existing institutional status quo. However, its legacy of initially excluding the old power holders from acquiring a stake in the new system generally undermines the development of a shared habitus supporting a specific type of democracy among all elite members. In order to test the hypotheses of my model of political culture Hungary and East Germany, respectively, are almost ideal cases of multilateral and unilateral transition. At the same time, both Hungary and Germany have a high number of veto players in their democratic system. Through content analysis of parliamentary speeches, stable patterns of consensualist or majoritarian speech are established for two electoral cycles. First, the lack of plausibility of the classical model focusing on individual socio-economic background factors is illustrated and the patterns expected according to the alternative model largely confirmed. Using in-depth interview data with around 60 MPs from the two cases I then demonstrate how political elites across different backgrounds and party affiliations are indeed connected by shared discourses. These discourses can then be used to delineate different outlooks and future paths for democracy. Using East Germany as a case (with the inclusion of a sample of West German MPs as a benchmark) also shows that cross-national differences in this regard are not based on general “national political culture,” but on more recent experiences. In all, transition legacies are shown to have strongly conditioned elite political culture. Yet neither ideal type of democratic transition left a discursive legacy fully compatible with consensus democracy. In a more tentative way, subsequent implications for the consolidation of democracy are formulated. While political elites with a legacy of multilateral transition (as in Hungary or Poland) are inclined to give support to the preservation of consensus-democratic arrangements, they will be obstructed in its daily operation unless they manage to establish a commonly accepted legitimacy for “the other” (rather than externalising opponents from the system). Political elites with the legacy of unilateral transition such as in East Germany or the Czech Republic will be more likely to favour institutional changes toward more competitive, majoritarian systems rather than preserving the existing set-up. However, for changes to be achieved in a consensual, inclusive fashion they will have to find ways of accommodating other initially marginalized players in the democratic game and help them establish a stake in the system. For the international dimension there can be conclusions drawn concerning EU conditionalities for newly accessed or aspiring member states: just putting in place the “right institutions” might not lead to the desired outcomes in a uniform way. Endogenous historical legacies appear to influence the way political elites make sense out of exogenously introduced institutions. Thus, a different understanding for the impact of ideational factors on the consolidation of democracy is outlined and a new understanding of transition as a historical legacy in itself is advanced. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation is the result of a long-cultivated interest in Central and East European history and politics. My attraction to issues of post-communist societies has never been purely or even predominantly academic. In fact, having grown up in East Berlin, I regard myself as deeply socialized and shaped by the post-communist condition. I regard the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 as a crucial juncture that significantly shaped my outlook on the present, past and future (in line with the main argument of this study). Travelling extensively in Eastern Europe and Russia, working for 15 months for a Hungarian charity in 1998/99 and learning Hungarian further entrenched my fascination with the region. Consequently, I acquired a background in Russian and East Studies at the Osteuropainstitut of Berlin’s Freie Universität, and the Centre for Russian and East European Studies in Birmingham. The subsequent return to Budapest for undertaking a PhD at CEU was quite an obvious choice. At this point, one will probably understand that my perspective on the topic covered is surely not fully independent and unaffected by my pre-existing socialisation and experience (and thus in line with Max Weber’s understanding of social science). In agreement with Weber I do not regard this as a disadvantage. Verstehen wollen is a major drive for science. For this undertaking I regard an inside perspective and a contextual small-N approach as the best way to go (despite the suspicion it is sometimes met with by my colleagues). In fact, the most exciting part of this PhD-dissertation was the chance to learn how politicians experience the upheavals of post-communist politics from their subjective, or rather (I should say) inter- subjective perspective. Twenty-seven Hungarian and twenty-eight East German MPs, who generously shared their limited time and exciting insights with me, deserve my gratuity. In terms of academic support first of all I express thanks to my supervisor, András Bozóki, who strongly inspired the project and enabled me to successfully conclude it. Luckily (for me) he returned to academia after having served as Hungarian Minister of Culture in 2005/6 and, ironically, turned temporarily from being my supervisor into a potential subject of my research. (In the end, I did not
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