Tougher Sulphur Rules Call for Closer Heed to Practices
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INSERE 02/12/15 DOSSIER ENLEVE 02/01/16 Tougher sulphur rules call for closer heed to practices Far stricter regulations governing fuel sulphur content introduced on 1 st January 2015 for vessels trading into or within designated Emission Control Areas (ECAs) pose substantial technical and operational challenges, as well as higher costs, for the shipping industry. The ECAs currently subject to the cut in the sulphur constituent of fuel from 1.0% to 0.1 % encompass the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the English Channel and the zone within 200 nautical miles of the US, the coastal waters around Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, and Canada. Compliance strategy can entail the use of alternative fuels with less than 0.1 % sulphur, such as LNG or methanol, or can be achieved by fitting an approved exhaust gas cleaning system (‘scrubber’) For ships trading in and out of ECAs, however, the new threshold limit will predominantly be met by bunkering both high and low sulphur fuels, and switching between the two. Marine gas oil (MGO) and marine diesel oil (MD O) at or below 0.1 % sulphur are the most widely available options. Therein lies the nub of the problem. The machinery in many vessels, notably the two- stroke propulsion engines in larger and deepsea ships, plus the associated lubricants, have been optimised for running on heavy fuel oil (HFO) rather than fuel with a very low sulphur content. Difficulties can arise during the fuel switchover process and through sustained operation on distillates or ultra-low sulphur fuel oils. These primarily stem from the effects of the low sulphur and low viscosity characteristics of the distillate on machinery systems designed in essence for HFO. If not addressed from the outset, and handled with care, the risk is one of accelerated engine and component wear and, in a worst-case scenario, loss of power or plant failure. Experience gained under the California Air Resources Board (CARB) sulphur limit regulations in the US, whereby a number of operational difficulties, including power loss, have been reported when vessels have been switching from HFO to distillate, have underscored the need for closer attention to procedures and crew training. In the context of two-stroke machinery especially, it has also become increasingly apparent that the industry must accept that fuel switching should be simultaneously accompanied by changeovers in cylinder oils, to obviate the risks of problems developing. The MARPOL Annex VI legislation that has foisted the stricter air emission limits on shipping in northern Europe and North America will only increase in reach as time goes on. Apart from the anticipated creation of new ECAs in other key trading regions, the sulphur rules will gain added global weight in the not too distant future. Outside ECAs, the current global cap of 3.5% stands to be reduced to 0.5%. This is to be implemented in 2020, or in 2025 at the latest, depending on a 2018 review of compliant fuel availability. All-in-all, there is every need for ship owners and operators to review and refine operational procedures and technical preparedness regarding fuel switching. Advice on preparing for low sulphur fuel usage is now widely available from classification societies, P&I Clubs, and other sectors of the marine community. Guidelines in a new paper from MAN Diesel & Turbo hold particular practical value given the company’s foremost ranking in the two-stroke, low-speed propulsion engine market. Key recommendations by MAN are that fuel viscosity should not be less than 2degC at the engine inlet and that an immediate changeover be made to low-BN(base number) cylinder oil when switching to fuel containing less than 0.1 % sulphur in two-stroke engines. The use of high-BN cylinder oil is not advised when running on 0.1 % or less sulphur. The high alkaline lubricants, or high-BN oils, are extremely effective in engines running on HFO in neutralising sulphuric acid formation and preventing corrosion of piston rings and cylinder liner surfaces. However, when operating with fuels of less than 0.1 % sulphur, such as distillates, the cylinder lube oil additives tend to build up as deposits, which may disturb the lube oil film and lead to subsequent problems. By contrast, the use of low-BN cylinder lube oils with a low amount of deposit-forming additives and good detergency properties, coupled with operation at the lowest recommended feed rate, can avoid deposit build-up and its associated complications. For two-stroke engines continuously ingesting fuels of 0.1 % or less sulphur, MAN suggests the adoption of piston rings with a cermet coating, to reduce the risk of seizures and scuffing. Fuel supply and circulation systems are generally optimised for HFO, which means a high temperature is maintained so as to reduce the viscosity to the required level before the engine inlet. When running on low viscosity fuels, the temperature of the fuel system must be kept as low as possible to ensure a suitable viscosity at engine inlet. Installation of coolers, and possibly also chillers, may be necessary so as to build in a margin for safe and reliable operation. Overall, close control of the temperature gradient is vital during fuel changeovers. The risk of encountering incompatibility issues can be reduced by checking the compatibility between fuels when bunkering. Although this can be done via independent laboratory analysis, manual checking by means of a kit carried aboard is a more practical proposition. RECOMMENDATIONS by MAN Diesel & Turbo for operating on ultra-low sulphur fuels* Know what is bunkered; Inform the crew regarding specific challenges; Have adequate training and procedures; Use appropriate cylinder oils, and evaluate the feed rate; Use low-BN (base number) oil for low-sulphur fuel; Use high-BN oil for high-sulphur fuel; Fuel pumps should be in adequate condition(if not, starting problems could occur); Ensure the adequacy of the fuel system, including checks on the necessary cooling equipment; Use dedicated tanks for the different fuels, and do not mix different fuels, to avoid compatibility issues; Clean the fuel and remove cat-fines; Use the correct temperature on the centrifuges in order to maximise removal of cat-fines; Be cautious when switching fuel, follow the procedures and monitor temperature and viscosity. *‘Guidelines for Operation on Fuels with less than 0.1% Sulphur’, paper by MAN Diesel & Turbo. Issue 54 March/April 2015 Ship Management International INSERE 04/12/15 DOSSIER ENLEVE 04/01/16 Bulk Trade-Off: Blood for Money in Indonesia By Mario Vittone Nickel ore from Indonesia is loaded in remote ports like Obi Island (in yellow), far from the prying eyes of regulators. The trade is profitable, but is coming at an enormous human cost. On February 17th of this year, the Harita Bauxite sank off Cape Balinao in the South China Sea. Of the twenty-four men aboard, only nine survived. The sea can be a dangerous place, of course, and things happen out there, but the Harita Bauxite’s sinking is troubling beyond the tragic loss of fifteen men. That’s because the loss wasn’t a huge surprise. Indeed, many in the maritime industry all but knew it would happen. You see, the 192-meter bulk carrier was bound for China from Indonesia with 47,450 metric tons of nickel ore in her holds. That particular maritime activity – shipping nickel ore from Indonesia to China – has quickly become one of the most dangerous jobs in the world and the deadliest activity in modern shipping. On October 27th, 2010, the M/V Jian Fu Star sank while carrying nickel ore from Indonesia to China. (13 fatalities) Fourteen days later, on November 10th, the M/V Nasco Diamond sank while carrying nickel ore from Indonesia to China. (21 fatalities) Twenty-three days after that, on December 3rd, the M/V Hong Wei sank while carrying nickel ore from Indonesia to China. (10 fatalities) The next year, things went well until Christmas Day, when the M/V Vinalines Queen went missing. All twenty-three of her crew were thought to have been lost until six days later when the M/V London Courage happened upon Dau Ngoc Hung, a 31- year-old survivor, in a life raft. The Vinalines Queen had sunk while carrying nickel ore from Indonesia to China. (22 fatalities) In just under fourteen months, sixty-six mariners died in the Indonesia to China nickel ore trade. By January of 2012, that trade made up only .06% of bulk cargo shipments worldwide, but accounted for 80% of the fatalities in bulk shipping. Put another way, if all bulk trade in the world was as hazardous as the nickel ore trade from Indonesia in those 14 months, there would have been over 100,000 fatalities during the same period. When the Harita Bauxite sank, those numbers worsened. There clearly was a problem and it wasn’t that nickel ore couldn’t be safely shipped, but that it wasn’t being safely shipped. What is happening In all four sinkings, from October 2010 to December of 2011, it was determined that the vessels had capsized due to liquefaction of their nickel ore cargo. Simply put, the cargo was too wet. When agitated by the motion of the ship, the otherwise sandy ore turned to a flowing mud that sloshed around in the beam-wide holds, causing the giant ships to list and then roll over. Nickel ore, and other dry-bulk products prone to liquefaction, are moved safely around the world all the time. Shippers simply have to make sure the product is dry enough to ship.