MARCH 2003 The Theory of the by Norman Barry

ver a topic of dispute for observers of share ownership provides. Free transfer of , the corporation has been shares, the main feature of corporate capi- undergoing increased scrutiny in the talism, produces that flexibility which is the Elight of current business scandals. While envy of other free enterprise forms. other forms of capitalist enterprise, such as The major problem is its apparent “privi- partnerships and single proprietorships, leges”; that is, it is claimed that the corpora- have avoided some of the wrath of socialist tion can do things that private individuals or agitators, the limited-liability corporation, business partnerships cannot do, and critics public or private, has had to endure the crit- argue that these advantages have to be paid icism of some market advocates as well as back to society. In other words, the corpora- socialists. Of course, now that most sensible tion operates under some kind of politically collectivists know that real socialism doesn’t granted license, which has to be earned. work, they have had to use a different intel- Business ethics starts from this assumption. lectual methodology to buttress their anti- Thus Thomas M. Jones wrote: “the corpora- capitalist predilections. They have chosen tion which acts in a socially responsible morality. This has turned out to be quite manner may simply be paying back society effective. Moral arguments are pretty much for the social costs of doing business, irrefutable, whereas economic ones can be costs for which firms rarely receive an subjected to some kinds of theoretical and invoice.”1 When he was secretary of labor empirical tests. Hence the craze for the in the first Clinton administration, Robert “social responsibility” of business. Reich repeatedly threatened to withdraw As a matter of fact, the invention of the “privileges” from uncooperative firms and corporation is the great achievement of promised to reward socially responsible ones Anglo-American capitalism, contributing with tax and regulatory advantages. both to its prosperity and to the freedom it What are these privileges, these gifts of promotes. But it has to be constantly society that grateful must pay defended. The most obvious advantages of for with the sacrifice of shareholder value for the corporate form are its ability to raise the benefit of “society”? First there is entity capital for investment and the liquidity that status; that is, the corporation is allegedly an artificial person, separate from its owners, Contributing editor Norman Barry (norman.barry@ which can sue and be sued. Then there is lim- buckingham.ac.uk) is professor of social and polit- ited liability for debt and for torts—stock- ical theory at the University of Buckingham in the U.K. He is the author of An Introduction to Mod- holders are liable only up to the value of their ern Political Theory (St. Martin’s Press) and Busi- investments; their private assets are pro- ness Ethics (Macmillan). tected. A third “privilege” is permanent life. 22 Limited liability (especially for torts) has the convenience of registering with it). angered even some libertarians for it seems, Although in modern Western democracies superficially, to disadvantage creditors and corporations are now governed under vari- allows individuals to repudiate debts and ous companies acts, that need not have been evade personal responsibility for (civil) the case. We have to use the state’s money, wrongs. It is also argued that separation of but we all know that private money is per- ownership from control, a product of the fectly feasible. Corporate governance is the division of labor, makes it efficient for own- same. ers to delegate management to specialists, There is nothing special about entity sta- leaving only loose authority for owners tus. Individuals get together and pool their through the board of directors. Thus irre- resources. They decide by contract to accept sponsible managers have become the new a new legal status. They can sue and be sued dictators even though they are not normally as a collective body, unlike a partnership, in owners.2 which several or joint responsibility applies. Indeed, a corporation is better viewed as a Privileges or Rights? “nexus of contracts,” rather than in strict ownership terms. The various participants But are these privileges? The most thor- operate under different types of agreement. ough analysis of the corporation, by Robert That is why the shareholders of a large com- Hessen, maintains persuasively that they are pany cannot enter the company’s premises not. If, as he maintains, the corporation without permission though they are its own- “throughout its growth . . . is a voluntary ers. A contract will specify who has the right association based exclusively on contract,” to do what. What Hessen rightly wants to then a major argument for its heavy regula- dismiss is the notion that entity status is con- tion falls to the ground and the demands of ferred by the state, since this notion implic- business ethicists become no more than the itly gives government the authority to regu- meretricious moral pleas of archbishops, late the firm beyond the requirements of professors of ethics, and other anti-capitalist regular civil and criminal law. The attribute zealots.3 Would the corporation and its of permanent life is meaningless. Corpora- defining features have emerged sponta- tions are not immortal; they regularly go neously with no help from the state or statu- bankrupt. tory law? If this is so, then it really is no dif- Of course, there is also an economic ratio- ferent logically from any other free-market nale for the creation of firms as corpora- institution. tions. If everybody dealt with one another Hessen’s major achievement is to show through pure market transactions, transac- that the critics confuse two types of corpora- tion costs would make efficient business tion. The first are those created in medieval impossible.4 It is rational, therefore, for England, when bodies such as churches and firms to develop via bilateral contracts, boroughs were given certain corporate priv- which give managements control over work- ileges in return for fealty to the Crown. In ers. The latter are of course free to leave. the early years of the American Republic, Corporations are firms, though not all firms some states granted similar advantages to are corporations. organizations that acted for the public; for example, they built canals and bridges. Limited Liability The other type, the modern business cor- poration, which is solely responsible to its Limited liability is perfectly explicable in owners, the shareholders, was treated simi- contracting terms. No creditor is compelled larly. But Hessen argues that the business to accept it, and sometimes it is circum- corporation is nonetheless very different. It vented when one or more of the sharehold- emerges through contract and does not ers guarantee debts beyond their investment depend at all on the state (apart from having in the company. Indeed, it is merely conve- 23 Ideas on Liberty • March 2003 nient that a company should claim limited ever, if they took out insurance, that might liability as a whole rather than for the credi- well produce a moral-hazard problem: the tor to negotiate with each shareholder indi- protection that insurance offers itself might vidually. There is an implicit contract of lim- produce laxness on the part of companies ited liability unless it is explicitly stated to and severe problems for the insurance mar- the contrary. It is quite wrong to assume, ket. We have already seen this in the current then, that the formation of the corporation travails of the Lloyds insurance market in is a device by which unscrupulous individu- London. It had historically been a curious als can escape debts. Indeed, there are proce- unlimited-liability company, and its mem- dures by which creditors can recover money bers (“Names”) were badly hit by the tort from shareholders if companies were to dis- claims it has had to pay in the last ten years. tribute high dividends in advance of a debt. In the future all new Names will have to Although limited liability was a feature of offer limited liability. the various companies acts that were passed If corporations were to lose limited liabil- in nineteenth-century Britain and America, it ity for torts, it would produce some change had already emerged through free contract- in corporate behavior, but it is not the sort ing. If creditors had felt especially victimized of change that capitalism could not cope by limited liability it would not have devel- with. After all, moral hazard has been a oped spontaneously. And, of course, it has problem ever since insurance began, and great utilitarian value in the raising of capi- methods have been found to mitigate its tal. Furthermore, it is not a feature exclusive worst effects. What is interesting, however, to corporations. Limited partnerships have it is how limited liability for torts first came also. about. Of course, it is now in statute, but Limited liability for torts, however, is it began, presumably, in common-law another matter, for one can’t imagine poten- processes. It must be the only example in tial tort victims freely contracting to limit American law that reduces the claims of tort their claims for damages for the (uninten- victims. That should make libertarians think tional) wrongful actions of a corporation. a little more carefully about the supposed Hessen argues that limited liability for torts sanctity of the common law. I can’t imagine should not have occurred and only did so a libertarian law code being designed to because of the difficulty of extending the let obvious tortfeasors evade their responsi- notion of vicarious liability (whereby the bilities. master is liable for the wrongful actions of his servant) to the corporation.5 He thinks Corporate Crime that this idea was an unfortunate conse- quence of the entity concept, as if the corpo- A serious danger in the entity theory of the ration were something separate from its corporation has turned out to be the attribu- owners. Hessen is critical of the deliberate tion of criminal liability. If the corporation creation of one-man corporations, which exists as an artificial person separate from have the sole purpose of avoiding tort liabil- the individuals who compose it, then it is not ity, (“I didn’t do it; the company did.”) surprising that it should be said to have Contrary to some opinion, it is quite con- some kind of surrogate “mind” enabling it ceivable that capitalism could function ade- to act with a mens rea, that is, from a guilty quately without limited liability for torts. motive. It is true that the original prosecu- Large companies could pay the costs of tion of the Ford Motor Company for reck- actions (even under American tort law), and less homicide in the famous Pinto case failed, smaller companies would be advised to take but since then there have been a number of out insurance. Still there are some interesting successful prosecutions of companies for points here. If companies lost limited liabil- actions that one would have thought only ity for torts, they would have an incentive to real, live humans could commit.6 The Boeing supervise their staff more carefully. How- Corporation was found guilty of corporate 24 The Theory of the Corporation

An explanation of the genesis of the corporation suggests that its responsibilities are not to that nebulous entity “society,” but to those who create it and invest their money in it. Any obligations that they owe to anyone else must be a function of their decisions as private persons. And the managers of the enterprises that they create owe duties only to the owners, or to anyone else in a contractual relationship with the firm.

theft, and the prosecution and persecution of out of the original joint-stock companies. Exxon in the Alaskan oil spill proceeded Indeed, Hessen suggests a continuum over a (fairly minor) criminal offense.7 There in which a business starts out in single- have been more serious examples. proprietor form, develops into a partnership, The United Kingdom has been vexed and finally emerges as a corporation.9 by this issue. Following the Zeebrugge ferry disaster, in which over 200 people Business Ethics were drowned, there have been endless demands that corporations be charged with An explanation of the genesis of the cor- manslaughter.8 In that case, there was such a poration suggests that its responsibilities are prosecution, but the judge threw it out on not to that nebulous entity “society,” but to the ground that the whole range of individ- those who create it and invest their money in ual wrongs that occurred could not be aggre- it. Any obligations that they owe to anyone gated into a corporate wrong. The company else must be a function of their decisions as charged, P&O, was not actually involved in private persons. And the managers of the the tragedy. It had simply later taken over enterprises that they create owe duties only the firm thought to be responsible. But it is to the owners, or to anyone else in a con- noteworthy that the prosecution did not try tractual relationship with the firm. In a the individuals directly responsible for the famous essay written 30 years ago, Milton tragedy. We seem to have come a long way Friedman said that the social obligations of from the traditional idea of personal culpa- business agents were to increase the profits bility for action. of the companies for whom they worked, Oddly enough, the only prosecution for subject only to the basic rules of society, corporate manslaughter that has succeeded “both those embodied in the law and those in the United Kingdom involved a one-man embodied in ethical custom.”10 corporation. Here, of course, a clear line of But there is a problem with “ethical cus- responsibility could be established. It might tom.” It has ceased to be limited to the do’s be difficult to do so in a large corporation, and don’ts of any civilized order, and has but that is not a reason to use the entity idea now been expanded widely. It includes what of the corporation as a substitute for indi- philosophers call supererogatory duties, vidual wrongdoing. that is, worthy but not compelling. Those When we examine the idea of the corpo- virtuous actions, such as employing ration legally and morally, it is not such a ethnic minorities irrespective of marginal- remarkable institution, since some of its fea- productivity considerations, taking special tures appear in business organizations that care of the environment, not trading with do not take the corporate form, such as part- certain unfashionable nations, and building nerships and trusts. What is distinctive about swimming pools for deprived children, have it is the easy transfer of shares, which arose now become as compulsory as the basic 25 Ideas on Liberty • March 2003 moral and legal rules. But these new duties ers have, they are unlikely to be contracts can hardly be described as ethical, since cor- of ownership. porate executives normally perform them The striking thing about business’s current with shareholders’ money and often without problems is that they illustrate an old issue their permission. in corporate governance. For all the advan- Company annual reports are replete with tages of financing by freely transferable mission statements that boast the firms’ stock, it does generate an agency problem. moral profile. Is this what Friedman meant How do we ensure that the agents, the by customary morality? I hardly think so, employees, act on behalf of the principals, but in these morally ambiguous times it is the owners? Won’t they shirk on the job and difficult to know what that is. Some share- divert to themselves income that should go holders themselves may not object to such to the stockholders? Adam Smith’s objec- morality, and the new activists seem more tions to the joint-stock company were on anxious to tilt the firm in the right moral these efficiency grounds rather than derived direction than to chivvy managements to from moral reasons. He thought that only a produce better results. The moral argument single proprietor would have the incentive to has been helped by the separation-of- act efficiently. Of course, he was not pre- ownership-and-control thesis: if the dis- scient and did not anticipate the devices, persed shareholders can no longer hold the including the takeover, that capitalism management to account, then why should would develop to ensure that managers not society set the agendas of companies? would pursue owner value. Law and practice are confused about this. It is interesting to note that none of the On the one hand, company executives have proponents of the separation-of-ownership- a fiduciary duty to the stockholders and may and-control thesis, from Adolph Berle and only pursue noncommercial activity if it has Gardiner Means through to J.K. Galbraith some positive effect on shareholder value.11 and modern business ethicists, ever inquired But on the other, corporations are recog- into these new developments. They were nized as part of society with a concomitant simply against the corporation, unless it duty to advance its well-being even if that could be compelled to do good. might entail some loss to shareholders.12 1. Quoted in John Hood, “Do Corporations Have Social An equally dangerous idea is that property Responsibilities?,” Ideas on Liberty, November, 1998, p. 680. owners should not be decisive in the man- 2. See Adolph A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (: agement of a company, but that other Macmillan, 1932). “stakeholders” should be influential in such 3. Robert Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation (Stan- ford, Cal.: , 1979), p. 43. things as plant relocation, remuneration, 4. See Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Econom- and takeovers. Of course, it is easy to show ica, vol. IV, 1937, pp. 386–405. 5. Hessen, pp. 18–21. that with a number of stakeholder groups 6. See Norman Barry, Business Ethics (London: Macmil- holding divergent goals, no rational decision lan, 1998), pp. 57–58. 7. Ibid., p. 62. could ever be reached. There would be only 8. Ibid., pp. 65–66. endless conflict.13 At least stockholders can 9. Hessen, chapter 4. 10. , “The Social Responsibility of Business be assumed to have one overriding goal, Is to Increase Its Profits,” reprinted in Thomas E. Beauchamp to maximize the value of their stock. But and Norman E. Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business, sixth ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2001), p. 51. most of the corporate moral activists are 11. Dodge v. Ford (1919). Kantians, believing that certain absolutely 12. A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow (1953). 13. See Norman Barry, “The Stakeholder Theory of Corpo- binding moral duties should always trump rate Control Is Illogical and Impractical,” The Independent utility. Whatever contracts these stakehold- Review, Spring 2002, pp. 541–54.

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