sign in sign up
<<
Home , Angus Robertson, Nicola Sturgeon

IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI opinion UK | | | |EUintegration |Public UK asunitary state isassessed. Ireland. In conclusion theimpact of on thefuture of the party responses totheBrexit debate inScotland andNorthern of theEUfor thedevolved administrations andanalyses key cases. Thesecond partof thearticle assessesthesignificance Northern Ireland intheUKanddifferences betweenboth provides anoverview of thecurrent status of Scotlandand possible outcome tothefuture of theUK.Thefirstpart future of theUKasaunitary state andtoidentify various This paper aimstoassessthesignificance of Brexit for the ABSTRACT by Etain Tannam of theUnited Kingdom Brexit andtheFuture keywords IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI 2 3 2 1 (EU) intheBrexit referendum and48percent voted toremain. On 23June 2016, 52percent of theUKelectorate voted toleave theEuropean Union Introduction by Etain Tannam* Brexit andtheFuture of theUnited Kingdom Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom . * School of Religions, Peace Studies and Theology, Trinity College, Dublin 2 Dublin College, Trinity Theology, and Studies Peace of Religions, School support for independence in Scotland. 51 per cent of the Welsh electorate voted to leave the EU. See EU. to See voted the leave electorate Welsh of cent the 51 per Scotland. in for independence support cent voted toremainintheEUandScotland58percent voted toremain. implications for thefuture of theUKasaunitary state. In Northern Ireland, 55per dramatic implications of Brexit internationally, thereferendum also hasdramatic is assessed. Ireland. In conclusion theimpact of Brexit on thefuture of theUKasunitary state and analyses key partyresponses totheBrexit debate inScotlandandNorthern the article assesses thesignificance of theEU for thedevolved administrations Ireland intheUKanddifferences betweenbothcases.Thesecond part of The firstpartprovides an overview of thecurrent status of Scotlandand Northern as aunitary state andtoidentify various possible outcome tothefuture of theUK. The aimof thispaper istoassessthesignificance of Brexit for thefuture of theUK independence wason thetable. the ScottishNationalist Party (SNP),similarly saidthat areferendum on Scottish a referendum on Irish unification, andScotland First Minister of First Minister,MartinMcGuinness of thenationalist Sinn Féin (SF)party, called for Almost immediately aftertheresults wereannouncedNorthern Ireland’s Deputy hinder cross-border relations with Ireland andunravel theBelfastAgreement. various reports that Brexit could lead torenewedconflict in Northern Ireland, differences inpreferences tospark Scottishindependence. In addition, therewere the divide betweenthetwo regions andWestminster andthepotential for such different vote inScotlandand Northern Ireland from andEngland highlighted on “The British Europe Question and the Future of the ”, of the July 18 Rome, Future 2016. the and Question Europe British on “The Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), June 2016. Presented at the conference conference the at Presented 2016. June (IAI), Internazionali Affari Istituto for the prepared Paper Etain Tannam is Assistant Professor of International Peace Studies and Programme Coordinator, Coordinator, Programme and Studies Peace of International Professor Assistant is Tannam Etain

Ibid. The in analysis”, and results full referendum: “EU Note that Wales is not examined in this paper, as support for Welsh independence is weaker than than weaker is for independence Welsh support paper, as this in Wales notNote examined is that 3 , 23 June 2016, http://gu.com/p/4y4av. June 2016, , 23 . 1 Apart from the 2 The IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI 3 are purely consultative, sodevolved ministers must “follow theagreedUKline”and Committees (JMCs) setup underthe2012Memo of Understanding with Westminster implementation wasnotwithout its critics. It wasargued that theJoint Ministerial Despite overall support for inbothScotlandandNorthern Ireland, its representatives to theirAssemblies. are also partof theCabinetOffice. DAs have MPs in Westminsterand also elect running of thedevolution settlements. ThePermanent Secretaries inbothDAs cabinet byaCabinetOffice territorial Secretary ofState, whoensuresthesmooth In bothcases,eachDevolved Authority (DA) isrepresented intheWestminster voters support it andWestminster Parliament ratifies it. Scotland Act, anindependent Scotlandcanonly occurifamajority of Scottish was partof awebof newarrangements, central tomaintaining peace.Under the The ScotlandAct didnothave samecomplexity asinNorthern Ireland, where it In Scotland,devolution wasprovided for byanAct of Westminster Parliament. matters, with aSecretariat headedbyasenior Irish andBritish civil servant. Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) isaforum for consultation on non-devolved and amemberof theIrish Department of Foreign Affairs. The British-Irish in , co-headedbyamemberof theCabinetOffice from Westminster the ,theChannelIslands andScotlandhasaSecretariat Office representatives of parliaments from Northern Ireland, Ireland, Wales, England, East-West (British-Irish) institutions. (Sinn Féin) asdeputy head.Theagreement also provided for cross-border and of theDemocratic Unionist Party (DUP) IainPaisley, with MartinMcGuinness power-sharing executive inadevolved government headedbythethenleader Irish Agreement that brought toanenddecadesof violence. TheGFA created a was acentral plankof theGoodFriday Agreement (GFA) andsubsequent British- Westminster holdsreserved powers. Moreover, inNorthern Ireland devolution (January-February 1999), p. 66-96. p. 1999), (January-February BBC News BBC in Landslide”, Scots in Seats of 59 56 Wins SNP 2015: “Election See election. general UK 2015 the in Scotland in of cent votes per 50 winning support, in surge alarge had (SNP) has Party Nationalist Scottish the for Years”, 30 News BBC ToryWelsh Election in Best 2015: “Election See election. general UK 2015 the of cent in votes per won 12 party, nationalist How Your Voted”, Area Telegraph The in out Find and Breakdown Full Maps: and Results Referendum “EU Kirk, Ashley and Coles Malcolm of subordinate legislatures andassemblies.” administrations within theUK,where devolution isdefinedas“thecreation The current status of Northern Ireland andScotlandisthat theyaredevolved UK andEU 1. Thepre-Brexit status of Northern Ireland andScotland inthe Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 5 4

New Left Review Left New in Agreement”, British-Irish of the Nature “The O’Leary, Brendan The New British Constitution British New Vernon The Bogdanor, , 8 May 2015, http://bbc.in/29aoRzY. 2015, , 8May , 1 July 2016, http://bit.ly/298jSur. , the Welsh Welsh the , 1July http://bit.ly/298jSur. 2016, Cymru, Plaid 5 TheBritish-Irish Council (BIC) comprises , 8 May 2015, http://bbc.in/29dLcKp. In contrast, contrast, In http://bbc.in/29dLcKp. 2015, , 8May , Oxford and Portland, Hart, 2009, p. 89. p. 2009, Hart, Portland, and , Oxford 4 Under theDevolution 1998Acts, , No. 233 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI 4 control. representation inBrussels actually increasedWestminster monitoring and still obliged totow theWestminster policy-line andthat Scottish“ambassadorial” practice, when Scottish Ambassadors sat on anEUCouncil meeting,theywere date wasnotchanged. elections, so as to avoid sectarian politicisation of Brexit in Northern Ireland, the the Brexit referendum beheldinadifferent period from thesummer Assembly (UUP) delegation tothe thenBritish PrimeMinister,, pleading that Regional and Studies Federal Regional in ”, in 8 7 6 this idea. members of Westminster, who argued that theyhadnotbeenconsulted at all about for issues that affected only England was heavily criticised by DUP andUUP Similarly, theConservative manifesto’s promise toprovide English-only voting “ will have thelastword.” Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 10 9 pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmniaf/48/48.pdf. Referendum and Scotland Northern Ireland andScotland,asTables 1and2show. despite thesecriticisms before Brexit, therewasmajority support for devolution in low priority Northern Ireland hadfor British government politicians. However, border relationship with Ireland or thepeaceprocess, highlighted therelatively she would support Brexit andthat Brexit would nothave any impact on thecross- announcement bythethenNorthern Irish Secretaryof State, Teresa Villiers, that as post-conflict region sharingacontested landborder with anotherstate. The referendum manifesto totheDAs’ concerns andspecifically to Northern Ireland making policy statements. regional dimension, be it Scottish, or Northern Irish, when drafting legislation or author, expressedfrustration that Westminster andWhitehall frequently forgot the and Westminster. Similarly, many bureaucrats intheDAs, interviewed bythis Northern Irish andScottishactors more accesstoinformation thanhastheJMCs interviewees, thecross-border andBritish-Irish dimensions totheGFA gave not informed enough about EUlegislation of relevance tothem.In factfor some Referendum

UUP, UUP, Carolyn Moore, “The Impact of Devolution on EU-Level Representation: British Regional Offices Offices Regional British on EU-Level Representation: of Devolution Impact “The Moore, Carolyn Northern Ireland and the EU Northern Committee, Affairs Ireland Northern of Commons House , of Nationalismin Politics New Quebec, The the against Nations State. Keating, Michael Scottish official, interview with the 2016. May author, 19 with interview official, Scottish Ulster Unionists ask the Prime Minister to Address Five Key Areas in to EU Relation Minister Key Areas Five to the Address Unionists Prime ask Ulster 7 Therewerealso complaints that Northern Irish andScottishactors were 9 Afurthercause of frustration wasthat despite aUlsterUnionist Party , First Report of Session 2016-17, of Session Report http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 2016, , First May 26 , 25 February 2016, http://uup.org/news/4128. 2016, February , 25 , 2nd ed., Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 259. p. 2001, Macmillan, Palgrave Basingstoke, ed., , 2nd 10 Nor wasthereany specific reference intheUKGovernment’s 8 , Vol. 17, 284-285. p. 2007), No. 3(September 6 Furthermore, it wasargued that, in IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI 5 3 shows the amount of aidearmarked from 2014 to2020. funding. Since 1994,Northern Ireland hasreceived 3billion euros inEUaid.Table created tomanage EUfunds,including thePEACE packagesandcross-border model for the EU’s peaceproject. TheSpecial EUProgrammes Body (SEUPB)was generous fundingtounderpinthepeaceprocess andcited Northern Ireland asa agendas of thecross-border andBritish-Irish bodies. In addition, theEUprovided In Northern Ireland, the EUwasacentral themeintheGFA. It iscentral tothe threat. increased the significance of the EU for both regions, making Brexit a particular Indeed, asthenextsections show, devolution andtheGFA inNorthern Ireland be forthcoming, given the ScottishandNorthern Irish vote toremainintheEU. However, the question is whether after Brexit such support for the status quo will higher marginthaninScotland. In Northern Ireland in2014,therewasalso support for thestatus quo, but bya Political_Attitudes/NIRELND2.html. Source: ARK, Northern Irish Life and Times Survey 2014,June 2015,http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2014/ Do youthinkthelong-termpolicyforNorthernIrelandshould beforit ... religions (%) Table 2|Support for devolution inNorthern Ireland -Results for people of different Source: What ScotlandThinks,http://bit.ly/29lcWfj. after thereferendum) How would youvoteintheScottishindependencereferendum ifheldnow?(asked Table 1|Support for independenceinScotland(%) Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom Don’t know Other answer(specify) (Independent state) or, toreunifywith therestof Ireland? government to remainpartof theUK,with devolved to remainpartof theUK,with directrule No Yes Don’t know October 2014 49 45 6 April 2015 Total 50 16 17 11 4 42 1 51 7 Catholic 44 32 11 6 2 5 July 2015 Protestant 50 45 5 24 63 0 4 2 7 May 2016 No religion 48 41 12 39 23 19 9 3 7 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI 6 Oxford University Press, 2001. Press, University Oxford were allowed attend Council working groups, aswell ashaving parliamentary devolved administrations hadaccesstotheUKPermanent Representation and have offices in Brussels,actingasnetworking and lobbying hubs. Inpractice, the representatives. TheNorthern Ireland executive andthe European Parliament (EP)andtheCommittee of theRegions (CoR) all have regional framework – and its economic importance encourage lobbying activities. The in theEuropean Council andintheCouncil, theEU’s multilevel institutional Therefore, although, officially, only the Westminsteradministration isrepresented Funds (including agricultural programmes) for 2014-2020. lobbying. Scotlandwill receive 941million euro fundingfrom theEUStructural policies toScotlandandNorthern Ireland provides powerful incentives for such lobbying. Theimportance of foreign investment, energy andEUcommon Economic aidandthechancetoinfluence EUpolicies informally hasincentivised in certainareasof Scottishconcern, performing aquasi-ambassadorial role. lobbying. Scottishrepresentatives weregranted theright tosit at Council meetings interests in Brussels. The EU has provided a relatively open forum for regional In addition, Scottishand Northern Irish actors have assertedtheiridentity and existed in EU matters. in practice, thelineisblurred astowhere devolved andWestminster competence Northern Ireland generally and also for Scotland in the devolution era, because, Apart from its importance intheGFA, theEUhasbeenstrikingly significant for Referendum, cit., p.5. Source: House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Northern Ireland and theEU CAP Pillar 1 Rural Development Programme (CAPPillar 2) European Fisheries andMaritime Fund PEACE IV INTERREG VA European Social Fund Programme European Regional Development Fund EU funding2014-2020 Table 3|Northern Ireland Structural Funds andCAPallocation 2014-2020 Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 13 12 11 the devolved territories originates intheEU. power tomake decisions with respecttoEUpolicy, 60-80percent of legislation in www.gov.scot/ID3/300850.

Plurinational Democracy. Stateless Nations in Era Nations a Post-Sovereignty Stateless Democracy. Plurinational Keating, Michael Structural Funds 2014-2020 Funds website, Structural Government Scottish Carolyn Moore, “The Impact of Devolution on EU-Level Representation…”, cit., p. 279-280. p. on EU-Level Representation…”, of Devolution cit., Impact “The Moore, Carolyn 11 Although formally the devolved authorities do not have 12 million euros , updated 26 February 2016, http:// 2016, February 26 , updated 2,299 240 308 229 227 183 24 13 , Oxford, , Oxford, IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI 7 may affect them. exchange information about EUpolicy areasthat concern them,or legislation that the Irish government. Officials from Scotland, Northern Irelandand Ireland often develop thenew ScottishInvestment Hub inDublin andtoengagewith andlobby Government appointed aScottishRepresentative totheUKEmbassyinDublin, to Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999. Macmillan, Basingstoke, 16 15 14 SDLP) andJim Nicholson (UUP),toprotect farmingconstituents’ interests. nationalist and unionist MEPs, John Hume (Social Democratic and Labour Party, MEP, who hadonce called theEUa“papal plot,” lobbied vigorously with fellow and networking. Even before the GFA, IanPaisley, then leader of theDUP and For Northern Irish actors also, theEUhasbeenanimportant forum for lobbying UK Representation) togainexperience and networks. to many national Permanent Representations inBrussels (notjusttothe In addition, theScottishgovernment hassent out civil servants on secondment offices in Brussels. Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 18 17 Republic of Ireland Ireland and the Northern the Border. between Crossing Relationships New (eds.), O’Dowd Liam the UKisexaminedinnextsection. vote to leave. The impact of the Brexit debate on thefuture constitutional status of between ScottishandNorthern Irish preferences toremainintheEUandUK both regions. TheBrexit result highlighted thisalienation, byemphasising thegap centric governments weresubject tocriticism from unionists andnationalists in to theimplementation of devolution wasstrong. However, perceived English- Ireland, albeit at different levels and for different reasons andtheEUdimension Overall, prior toBrexit, devolution hadstrong support inScotlandandNorthern focus of ScottishandNorthern Irish attention. and advance Northern Irish interests. Thus before Brexit, theEUwasasignificant Europe was created which eventually subsumed the NICE and sought to network Northern Irish interests. After devolution, theNorthern Ireland Executive Office in The Northern Ireland Centre inEurope (NICE) wascreated in1990toprotect unionists implicitly supported such programmes andtheconcept of regionalism. funded cross-border cooperation with Ireland, gradually attitudes changedand Although initially unionists inNorthern Ireland wereopposed totheideaof EU-

Cross-Border Cooperation in Northern Ireland andEtain the Republic in of Tannam, Northern Ireland Cooperation Cross-Border Scottish Government official, interview with the 2016. May author, 19 with interview official, Government Scottish Scottish Government official, interview with the author, 2016. June 1with interview official, Government Scottish Carolyn Moore, “The Impact of Devolution on EU-Level Representation…”, cit., p. 279. p. on EU-Level Representation…”, of Devolution cit., Impact “The Moore, Carolyn Etain Tannam, “Public Policy: The EU and the Good Friday Agreement”, in John Coakley and and Coakley John in Agreement”, Friday Good the and EU The Policy: “Public Tannam, Etain , Dublin and Portland, Irish Academic Press, 2007, 104-124. p. Press, Academic Irish Portland, and , Dublin 16 14 15 In 2015,theScottish , 18 17

IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI 8 June 2016, http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/?p=2494. b07d6nhz. 26 June 2016, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/1.2700593. June 2016, 26 www.scotsman.com/news/poll-puts-support-for-scottish-independence-at-59-1-4163338. EU, with threequartersof theelectorate supporting Remain. example, in , approximately 30 percent of theelectorate voted toleave the Northern Ireland, 41percent and44percent respectively supported Leave, EU andEngland voted toleave, theSNPwould notwant areferendum on Scottish not belinked toScottishindependence. remain intheEU, Sturgeon argued that theresults of theBrexit referendum should a second Scottish referendum on independence.While urgingvoters tovote to Scotland, wasambiguous about theimplications of aLeave vote inEngland for Therefore inthereferendum campaign, Nicola Sturgeon (SNP),First Ministerin full sovereignty, sobeingintheEUcontradicted that aim. were opposed toremaininginthe EU, on thebasisthat theSNPaimedtoachieve 23 22 21 20 19 supported leaving sovereignty. Before thereferendum, approximately one thirdof SNPmembers For example, for some Scottishnationalists, theEUeroded Scottishnational the mainparties. DUP supported aleave vote. However, thereweredilemmas andor/divisions inall Remain vote, asdidSinn Féin, theSDLP andtheUUPinNorthern Ireland, but the the nextparagraphs show. Officially inthe Brexit campaign, theSNP supported a the Brexit campaign andtotheresult itself, particularly intheSNP’s approach, as However, there were contradictions in Scottish and Northern Irish responses to Scotland showed that support for independencehad risento59percent. response inNorthern Ireland. Two days aftertheBrexit results, opinion polls in Brexit catalysed nationalism inScotland andmetwith animmediate nationalist 2. Brexit andScotlandNorthern Ireland Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 26 25 24 27 membersof theSNPannounced theirdecision tosupport theLeave campaign, there wasanarrower marginof support for Remain than inLondon. In June 2016, their support for thestatus quo ifeconomic circumstances worsened. commentators speculated that nationalists inNorthern Ireland could also weaken Scottish voters to support remain. supporting anearlier poll that Scottishnationalists arenomore likely thanother

Ibid.

What Scotland Thinks Scotland on What Europe?”, in Supporters SNP How United Are Just “So Curtice, John , 26 June 2016, http:// June 2016, , 26 Scotsman at 59%”, The independence in for Scottish support puts “Poll John Curtice, “So Just How United Are SNP Supporters on Europe?”, cit. Supporters SNP How United Are Just “So Curtice, John “EU referendum: full results and analysis”, cit. analysis”, and results full referendum: “EU Scottish Government official, interview with the author, 24 May 2016. theMay 24 author, with interview official, Government Scottish BBC Radio 4, Today (Morning News), 3 June 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/ News), 3June 2016, Today 4, (Morning Radio BBC The Irish Times Irish The in Change”, Poll May Unlikely for Border Now But That “Brexit: Moriarty, Gerry 21 andtheoverall Scottishresult wasnotunambiguous. For 25 Polls recorded that one thirdof SNP voters 26 Even if Scotlandvoted toremain inthe 22 In Scotlandandin 20 19 Some 23 , 6 so , 24

IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI 9 Sturgeon-referendum-strategy.html. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/SNP/11939276/SNP-split-over-Nicola- 2015, October campaign isconspicuous byits very absencenorth of theborder.” decision on its future. With justaweektogo, theEuropean Union referendum the campaign, “Scotlanddoes notlook like acountry about tomake anhistoric quickly in Scotland. eu-but-public-weary-of-brexit-opinion-polls-1.2684662. Times Irish government that cut fundingtoScotland, 31 30 29 28 27 although: cautious approach to linking Brexit to an independence referendum was that Apart from adivision of SNPopinion about Brexit, thereason for Sturgeon’s referendum. vote presented a golden opportunity towinsupport for independenceinasecond the one hand,it wasreported that for , former SNPleader, aLeave This nuanced position reflects adivide inSNP leaders’ approaches to Brexit. On base of at least 60percent. independence inthenearfuture, but would wait until independencehadasupport Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 33 32 Guardian scottish-independence-bid-in-event-of-brexit-vote-34776955.html. http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/snps-angus-robertson-warns-of- Vote”, Event of Brexit in Bid Independence Belfast Telegraph in of Scottish warns business would lead toincreasedsupport for independenceinScotland,particularly from referendum wasslightly confusing in warningthat an English vote toleave theEU of afledgling Scottishstate. Thus, theSNP’s rhetoric intherun-up tothe Brexit controls andotherbarriers totradethat would hamper theeconomic success have acommon currencywith England and,inaddition, therecould becustoms Sturgeon. 2016, https://www2.rcn.org.uk/newsevents/congress/2016/news/Keynote-speech-from-Nicola- economic quagmire. itself wasnegotiating withdrawal from theEUwould create aconstitutional and complexity of negotiating independencewith Westminster, when Westminster http://www.snp.org/_snp15_nicola_sturgeons_opening_speech.

Nicola Sturgeon speech at the centenary congress of the Royal College of Nursing, 20 June 20 of Nursing, College Royal of the congress centenary at the speech Sturgeon Nicola Opening speech at annual the (#SNP15) SNP conference Opening speech Sturgeon, Nicola The Polls”, The in Opinion of Brexit Weary but Public EU Back Politicians “Scottish Geoghegan, Peter Simon Johnson, “SNP Split over Nicola Sturgeon Referendum Strategy”, cit. Strategy”, Referendum Sturgeon Nicola over Split “SNP Johnson, Simon The Telegraph The in Strategy”, Referendum Sturgeon Nicola over Split “SNP Johnson, Simon speech to Hewlett Packard, London, 6 June 2016. See “SNP’s Angus Robertson Robertson Angus “SNP’s See 6June 2016. London, Packard, to Hewlett speech Robertson Angus The Nightmare”, The Sturgeon’s in Become Could That Opportunity Golden The “Brexit: Kidd, Colin the Pound would beeven more difficult than itwasin2014ifScotlandwere back in2014areeven more acute now. Theprice of oil isdown. Sharing a hardsell. Theissues of public financeandthecurrencythat heldthem Some polls suggest that such a referendum could be won […] it would be , 14 January 2016, http://gu.com/p/4fzbq/stw. 2016, , 14 January 30 , 15 June 2016, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/scottish-politicians-back- June 2016, , 15 andparticularly ifBrexit led toanewmore right-wing Westminster 28 Ontheotherhand,for aformer SNPspindoctor, Kevin Pringle, the 32 29 Indeed, for one commentator, writing in the last week of For example, ifScotlandjoined theEuro, it would nolonger 27 31 but areferendum would notoccur , 15 October 2015, 2015, October , 15 33 , 6 June 2016, , 6June 2016, , 18 , 18 10 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI News Brexit, in theirBrexit campaign. Arlene Foster (DUP) announcedthat theDUP supported In Northern Ireland, like theSNP, Sinn Féin, theDUP andtheUUPfacedadilemma remained, hinting that perhaps such asolution could befound for Scotland. an example of acasewhere partof astate left theEU, but theotherpart,Denmark Westminster andwith theScottish Parliament. In addition, hecited Greenland as the Way”,the TheJournal.ie in http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/node/2113. 2016, March Second Referendum”,Second NewsTalk in Its Will’ Ponders - SNP against outEU Taken of the Been Has “‘Scotland Quann, Jack also See Brexit. www.newstalk.com/podcasts/Moncrieff/Highlights_from_Moncrieff/145711/SNP_responds_to_ 36 35 34 that anewindependencevote was“definitely on thetable.” However, when theresults wereannounced,Nicola Sturgeon quickly stated Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 37 was very low key: the SNPsupported Remain, despite divisions, theBrexit debate inNorthern Ireland Thus, even more thanintheScottishcase,where themajority partyingovernment, damaging its vote shareintheMay 2016Assembly elections. Remain side,but it delayed indeciding,asits leadership wasconcerned about the partisannature of party politics inNorthern Ireland. TheUUPsupported the to support Brexit implied that Sinn Féin would take theopposite position, given Sinn Féin’s deepopposition toneoliberal policies. However, theDUP’s decision the EU’s implementation of austerity policies during theIrish economic crisisand supported theRemain side,thedecision todo sowasnotstraightforward, given in thepast,arguingthat theEUeroded national sovereignty. Although they in Northern Ireland, nationalist Sinn Féin have notsupported EUmembership she stated that all DUP membersshould reflect on their own decision. Similarly, would be a period of “constitutional wrangling” SNP spokesperson stated that thereferendum would notbeimminent, asthere that independence may obtain 60 per cent support within a year. However, an was thegroundswell of dismay at Brexit that theSNPnow feels more confident to meetinEdinburgh inlate June todiscussScotland’s position. Arguably such government toallow areferendum inthenextyear. Shealso invited EUleaders results, sheannounced that legislation would beput inplacebytheScottish

The Irish Irish The on in Brexit”, Villiers Theresa Joins Foster Arlene Referendum: “EU Hughes, Brendan “Sinn Féin Wants a Vote on a United Ireland after Brexit and a Second Scottish Referendum Is on Is Referendum Scottish aSecond and Wants Brexit Féin aVote after “Sinn on aUnited Ireland Highlights from Moncrieff from Highlights to in Brexit”, Responds “SNP Gethins, Stephen Centre on Constitutional Change Blogs Change on Constitutional Centre in Change”, is Only Constant “The Keating, Michael subject toanother. within theEU, subject toone setof financial regulations andtheUKoutside, parties with differing views hasmeant the Northern Ireland Executive has that partypolitics inWestminster hasgiven it. Power-sharing between It does seemasifthe debate inNorthern Ireland haslacked theintensity , 22 February 2016, http://www.irishnews.com/news/2016/02/22/news/-425429. 2016, February , 22 37 but indeference tounionist farmers’worries about losing CAPpayments, , 24 June 2016, http://jrnl.ie/2842816. June 2016, , 24 34 , 24 June 2016, http://www.newstalk.com/reader/47.301/75773/0. June 2016, , 24 36 and various discussions with , 24 June 2016, http:// June 2016, , 24 35 Theday afterthe , 15 , 15 11 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI Referendum the Way”,the cit. unitary state areassessed. itself. In theconclusion, theimplications of Brexit for thefuture of theUKas unionist security inNorthern Ireland aswell aspotentially underminingtheGFA was quick to say there would notbea border poll, nationalist reactions undermine Sinn Féin’s initial reaction reflected political posturingandthe Irish government could take five years or more to work out. There are four possible outcomes, as for Ireland, theUKandNorthern Ireland, assome commentators state that Brexit EU, even iftheUKleaves. Arguably, there istimetowork out suitable arrangements Scotland andNorthern Ireland do carve out adeal that allows themremaininthe the UKandEUinaftermath of theBrexit referendum andon whether Finally, theUKasaunitary state restsalso on thespecific agreements made between the timingof a referendum. not overwhelmingly supportive of theRemain side,sotheSNPwill becautious on or would jeopardise the GFA, after a hard-won peace.Thirdly, Scottish voters were is equivocal that a majority in Northern Ireland would support Irish unification, is enshrinedbytheGFA for aslong asthemajority supports it. Even with Brexit, it Northern Ireland, supported Brexit. Secondly, Northern Ireland’s status intheUK regards Northern Ireland, theDUP, thepartywith thelargestsupport basein to theargument that Brexit hasprecipitated thebreak-up of theUK.Firstly, as because of Brexit andthechaosleft inits wake. However, therearesome caveats had notsupported independencein2014will support it inasecond referendum people in Northern Ireland. It is very possible that in Scotland many of those who to leave theEUwasmetwith dismay bymostpeople inScotlandandbymany the Brexit vote wason adifferent planefrom mereeuroscepticism. Thedecision the restof theUK.Like theUK,theyhadtheirshareof eurosceptics. However, the UK.ScotlandandNorthern Ireland werenotnecessarily more europhile than age groups andregions andmostof all it may well contribute tothebreak-up of The UKvote toleave theEUhaschangedutterly relations intheUK.It hasdivided Conclusion called for areferendum inNorthern Ireland on Irish unity, “aborder poll.” However, when theReferendum results wereannounced,Sinn Féin immediately Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 39 38

“Sinn Féin Wants a Vote on a United Ireland after Brexit and a Second Scottish Referendum Is on Is Referendum Scottish aSecond and Wants Brexit Féin aVote after “Sinn on aUnited Ireland Northern Ireland and the EU Northern Committee, Affairs Ireland Northern of Commons House the possible consequences south of theborder. Ireland, where therehasbeensubstantial attention devoted toaBrexit and muted debate appears to contrast with the situation in the Republic of in theway that hasbeenthecaseinScotland, for instance.Thisrelatively not beenable toarticulate aclear position around which debate canfocus , cit., p. 3. p. , cit., 38 39 Even if 12 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI National Health Service, because of thestrength of sterling.” remain intheUKbecause of theeconomic security it brings,because of theBritish increase. Under theGFA’s security net,“many nationalists have beencontent to However, ifeconomic fortunes changeddrastically, thenthislikelihood could It iscurrently unlikely that Northern Ireland would leave theUK,given theGFA. other countries who might leave –“contamination.” The EU’s key fear isthat bymakingexceptions for theUK,it sets aprecedent for push it through, unless theNorthern Ireland post-conflict situation aided its cause. Irish governments, ifthefirstdidnotoccur,but it isunclear how far Ireland could movement of labour,that ismigration. Thesecond option would bepushedby migration tothedebate, theNorway option would oblige theUKtoallow free but would have nocontrol over that budget. In addition, given thecentrality of among Leave campaigners about thisoption. TheUKwould pay into theEUbudget, and Protestants 48percent. diminish andCatholics now comprise 45percent of theNorthern Irish population UK leaves theEU, theeconomic rationale for nationalists tostay intheUKcould 40 may well beworkable: Ireland opt tostay intheEU, following theGreenland example. Thislatter option UK’s departurehasbeenratified bytheEU. Alternatively, Scotlandand Northern a referendum inroughly ayear and amajority support independence before the As regardsScotland,thelasttwo options seemthemostlikely ones –Scotlandholds some intheleave campaign. The first option, the“Norway option,” hasbeenmooted and even supported by 4. 3. 2. 1. regards ScotlandandNorthern Ireland: Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 43 42 41 com/magazine/story/2016/06/brexit-change-europe-britain-us-politics-213990. Ireland.” of Europe. Less certain, but quite possibly, all or part of Northern Ireland will join “In five years therewill no longer beaUK.Scotlandwill beindependent andpart bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36628894.

Ibid.

Gerry Moriarty, “Brexit: Border Poll Unlikely for Now But That May Change”, cit. Change”, Poll May Unlikely for Border Now But That “Brexit: Moriarty, Gerry “How Brexit Will Change the World”, the Will Brexit Magazine Change Politico in “How BBC News BBC in Hannan, Daniel MEP Brexit with exchange Newsnight Scotland and/or Northern Ireland stay intheUKandremainEU. the EUat anaccelerated speed. Scotland and/or Northern Ireland leaves theUKandstays intheEU, or rejoins and theUKmaintain theirFree Trade Area (dating from 1935). Scotland andNorthern Ireland leave theEUandacaveat ismadetoallow Ireland travel continues betweenIreland andtheUK. The UK leaves the EU, but is part of the Single Market, so free movement and Council, , andtheIsle of Man–arecurrently notpartof Many UKdependencies –including threemembersof theBritish-Irish 43 42 40 Indeed, theUSdiplomat, Richard Haass,hasstated: However, it would bedifficult toreacha consensus , 25 June 2016, http://www.politico. June 2016, , 25 , 25 June 2016, http://www. June 2016, , 25 41 However, ifthe 13 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI Possible”, in BrexitVotePossible”, in Blog the EU. UK-Irish relations will also remain close, given theircommon interests (for is also certainthat Irish relations with Scotlandwill deepen,given Ireland’s status in place with theconsent of bothgovernments andamajority inNorthern Ireland. It managing Northern Irish politics andany dismantlement of theGFA will only take on Ireland. It is certainthat the British-Irish relationship will bedeeply central to despite Brexit. Apart from the UKitself, themostimmediate impact of Brexit will be for the cases of Northern Ireland and Ireland and will allow free travel and trade, will withdraw from theUK.Time will tell whether theEUwill make allowances support for Brexit, thepeaceprocess andtheGFA, it isunlikely that Northern Ireland Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland is less certain and given the political elite has accelerated thenationalist cause immensely. created, even before Brexit. So Brexit is not the cause of Scottish nationalism, but it UK, culminating ineither Scotlandleaving theUK,or afederal UKsystembeing perception. It isvery likely that therewould have beenconstitutional changeinthe governments, have dismissedtheir interests. Northern Irish actors also sharethis Scottish interests andthat successive governments, but particularly Conservative evolved over decades.Thoseroots lie inaperception that Westminster hasignored – the roots of Scottish nationalism are far deeper and have and it may well winmajority support. It isalso clear that Brexit is notacause of that referendum isheld,some Scottishvoters will move totheindependencecamp Brexit hasactedasacatalyst for calls for anotherreferendum inScotlandandthat if for the future of theUK as aunitary state is not definite. However, it isclear that Overall, writing inearly July 2016,theprecisesignificance of the Brexit referendum questionable. In particular, Spain may object,fearing aprecedent for Catalonia. However, whether theEUwould agreeon allowing Scotland enter separately is any UKministerial veto over EUdecision-making. Northern Ireland asay inagenda-setting andinlaw-making andit would remove way.) The retention of one Commissioner and their MEPs would give Scotland and (A judge toserve intheEuropean Courtof Justice could benominated inthesame be nominated bytherelevant government andappointed bytheUKgovernment. ratio over time,reflecting Scotland’s greater population. TheCommissioner would appointment could berotated between ScotlandandNorthern Ireland, ina3:1 In practice, the now vacated UK Commissioner’s role could be kept, but the Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom 45 44 Ibid.

Brendan O’Leary, “Detoxifying the UK’s Exit from the EU: the AMulti-National from Exit Is UK’s the Compromise “Detoxifying O’Leary, Brendan designed for theUK. treaty, theTreaty of Rome, also envisioned associate status –theywere European Union, andpartsof themoutside. Thetermsof thefoundational UK, have partsof theirterritories subject to theirsovereignty within the the European Union. Soit’s already true that sovereign states, including the , 27 June 2016, http://wp.me/p6zUkq-V8., 27June 2016, 44 45 14 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI there areeven more turbulent years ahead. years of austerity andeconomic turbulence, particularly for Ireland andtheUK, and Scottishpolitical andeconomic priorities. What iswithout doubt isthat, after EU’s terms,British-Irish governmental cooperation, as well ason Northern Irish uncharted waters. Its exacteffects will depend on theUK’s withdrawal process, the Overall, theBrexit referendum result hasbrought theEU, theUKandIreland into counterparts often agreedinmany areas. will also have lost anally inbargainingtheEU, where theyandtheirBritish supporting theUKwith supporting theEUandalso Scotland.Irish governments to lobby Irish ones for support intheEU. Irish governments will have tobalance example, Northern Ireland, culture, emigration and trade). UK politicians will seek Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom Updated 2July 2016 15 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI news/-425429 in Brendan Hughes, “EUReferendum: Arlene Foster Joins TheresaVilliers on Brexit”, publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmniaf/48/48.pdf the EUReferendum, First Report of Session 2016-17, 26May 2016,http://www. House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, aQ Scrutiny”, inParliaments and Legislatures Blog, 4April 2016,http://wp.me/p627zq- Stephen Herbert, “TheScotlandAct 2016:New Challenges for Parliamentary polls-1.2684662 world/uk/scottish-politicians-back-eu-but-public-weary-of-brexit-opinion- Polls”, inTheIrish Times, 15June 2016,http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ Peter Geoghegan, “ScottishPoliticians BackEUbut Public Weary of Brexit Opinion 1.2689383 in Peter Geoghegan, “Brexit: Kenny Warns of ChangeinRelations If UKLeaves EU”, Scotland Thinks, 6June 2016,http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/?p=2494 John Curtice, “SoJust How United Are SNPSupporters on Europe?”, inWhat ly/298jSur and Find out How Your Area Voted”, in Malcolm Coles andAshley Kirk, “EUReferendum Results andMaps: Full Breakdown College Dublin Press,2005,p.110-131 New Territorial Politics in Ireland and theUnited Kingdom, Dublin, University John Coakley, Brigid Laffanand Jennifer Todd (eds.),Renovation or Revolution? John Coakley, “TheNorth-South Relationship: implementing theAgreement”, in 429-445 in Scotland”, inRegional and Federal Studies, Vol. 16,No. 4(December2006),p. Paul Cairney, “Venue Shift Following Devolution: When Reserved Meets Devolved Vernon Bogdanor, TheNew British Constitution, Oxford andPortland, Hart,2009 University College Dublin Press,2005,p.18-34 Revolution? New Territorial Politics in Ireland and the United Kingdom, Dublin, Politics”, inJohn Coakley, Brigid Laffan and Jennifer Todd (eds.),Renovation or Arthur Aughey, “Devolution intheUnited Kingdom: Asymmetry inTerritorial References Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom The Irish News, 22February 2016,http://www.irishnews.com/news/2016/02/22/ The Irish Times, 18June 2016,http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/- The Telegraph, 1 July 2016, http://bit. Northern Ireland and 16 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI Press, 2007,p.104-124 Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, Dublin and Portland, Irish Academic Coakley andLiamO’Dowd (eds.),Crossing theBorder. New Relationships between Etain Tannam, “Public Policy: TheEUandtheGoodFriday Agreement”, in John Ireland, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999 Etain Tannam, No. 233(January-February 1999),p.66-96 Brendan O’Leary, “TheNature of theBritish-Irish Agreement”, inNew LeftReview, Compromise Is Possible”, inBrexitVote Blog, 27June 2016,http://wp.me/p6zUkq-V8 Brendan O’Leary, “Detoxifying the UK’s Exit from theEU: AMulti-National Irish Times, 26June 2016,http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/1.2700593 Gerry Moriarty, “Brexit: Border Poll Unlikely for Now But That May Change”, inThe (September 2007),p.275-291 Regional Offices in Brussels”, inRegional and Federal Studies , Vol. 17,No. 3 Carolyn Moore, “TheImpact of Devolution on EU-Level Representation: British gov.uk/ webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403030652/http://tmc.independent. for the House of Commons (The McKay Commission), March 2013, http:// William McKay (ed.), Manchester University Press,2010 Colin Knox, Devolution and theGovernance of Northern Ireland, Manchester, Nightmare”, inTheGuardian, 14January 2016,http://gu.com/p/4fzbq/stw Colin Kidd, “Brexit: The Golden Opportunity That Could Become Sturgeon’s Era Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy. Stateless Nations in aPost-Sovereignty node/2113 Change Blogs, 15March 2016,http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/ Michael Keating, “TheOnly Constant isChange”, inCentre on Constitutional Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland, 2nded.,Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 Michael Keating, SNP/11939276/SNP-split-over-Nicola-Sturgeon-referendum-strategy.html The Telegraph, 18October2015,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ Simon Johnson, “SNPSplit over Nicola Sturgeon Referendum Strategy”, in Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom , Oxford, Oxford University Press,2001 Cross-Border Cooperation in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Nations against the State. TheNew Politics of Nationalism in Report of theCommission on theConsequences of Devolution 17 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 16 - JULY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-96-5 © 2016 IAI Latest IAIWORKING PAPERS Brexit andthe Future of theUnited Kingdom www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo Brunetti, 9-I-00186 Rome, Italy and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects. (AffarInternazionali), two series of research papers (QuaderniIAIand Research Papers) publishes anEnglish-language quarterly (TheInternational Spectator), anonline webzine and theMiddle East;defence economy andpolicy; andtransatlantic relations. TheIAI in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean research sectors are:European institutions andpolicies; Italian foreign policy; trends and abroad andisamemberof various international networks. More specifically, themain that end,it cooperates with otherresearch institutes, universities andfoundations inItaly and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences andpublications. To economy andinternational security. Anon-profit organisation, theIAIaimstofurther Founded byAltiero Spinelli in1965,does research inthefields of foreign policy, political Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) 16 |08 16 |09 16 |10 16 |11 16 |12 16 |13 16 |14 16 |15 16 | 16 |07 06 3224360 06 3224363 Giorgio Gomel, Europe and Israel: AComplex Relationship Negotiations Nilgün Arısan andAtila Eralp, Critical Juncture in Cyprus Approach toGlobal Development, Resilience and Sustainability Development Policy Management (ECDPM), ANew EUStrategic Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)and European Centre for European Foreign and Security Policy Nicolò Sartori, Oil Price Volatility and theImplications for Etain Tannam, Brexit and theFuture of theUnited Kingdom Implications of an EUwithout theUK Funda Tekin, Brexit or No Brexit? Political and Institutional Electoral Experiment Spitzenkandidaten Procedure: Reflecting on theFuture of an Johannes Müller Gómez andWolfgang Wessels, The Democratic Consolidation Pietro Marzo,Why Youth Empowerment Can Sustain Tunisia’s Rossella Marangio, Somalia: ALong Road Ahead Parliamentarism Intergovernmentalism, New Supranationalism, and New Vivien A.Schmidt, TheNew EU Governance: New