Weapons and Tactics On
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34 WEAPONSAND TACTICSON THEWESTERN FRONT I9I5.I9I8 by Chris Peers lwasveryinterested to seeJim Webster'sWorldWarI scenario They camefrom all classesof socieryand in someways made (lvargdmeslllustaedno. 38). itonly bccauseit reinforcesmy bcrtcrlrench-fighters than the old regulars.being more uscd to ownopinion that this kind of small-scalcacrion. with rhingslike usinginitiarive, but until late 1916their inexperiencecauscd artillerytr€ated as random factors bcyond lhe playersconlrol. tbemto sufferexcessile losses. On the first dayof the Sommc is the best way to gamea period in which conmunjcation bartle.for insrance.most battalions simply kept walkinginlo difficuliies made individual control of large uniis alnost machinegun fire until thc survivorswcrc piDncd down in front inpossible.On theorher hand it wasraiherdisappoinling to !ee of the Germanwirei on the othc. hand thc lst. Lancashir€ Mr. Webster(presumably for reasonsof brevily. as he must Fusiliers.a regularunit with enougbold handsIeft to train the certainlyknow better)perpetuating rhe mylh of rhe typical' reinforcements.seemtohave atleast attempted the sort of _fire trenchassauh. The ideastill seems to becurrcnt that the vears of andmovemenl tacticsin whichthe 191,1BritishExpeditionary trenchwarfare were ones of unrelievedsiagnalion. of head-on Forcehad exceu€d. but whichthe bulk ofthe Britisharmv was attacksendlessly repeated across a devastatedlandscape with not lo ma.rersain unril Io.l-l By lrle lqlo Ihe\olunreer\. or nothingmuchchanging except the casuajty tists. and no way out thosewho were left. wcrcold handsthcmsclvcs. and units such of the deadlockuntil the inventionofthe tankor the arrivalof $ the 51s1.Highland Division. whoseatlack at Beaumonr the Americans:I rememberseeing an otherwiseexcellenl Hamelin Novemberwas a modelof how it shorld havebeeD demonstrationgame a yearorso ago. in whichth€ classic trench done.were gaining a repurationas €lite troops-During 1917. Iandscapeof overlapping cralers and shattcred tree stumpshad however.the compositionof the Britishforces changed again. beenmodelled in superbdelail. but which wassupposed to Casualtieswerereplaced bv conscripls.naturallr lesskeen than representthe first day of the Sommcoffcnsive in 1916.The the volunleers had been. and the praclice of allocating organiserwas quite taken abackwhcn (boringlypedantic as reinforcemenlsand replacernents.including returning wound ever) I pointedour thai rhe batlle rook placeduring a dry cd. to batlalionsmore or lessal randombegan to crodethe summer.the Sommehad beena quietsecbr whichhad al rhar diffcrcnccsbetwcen Lrnirs. By 1918a platoonofinfantry. even in timeonly suffered seven davs bombardmentin the entirewar. oneoflhe old regularbalralions. could think itsclfluckyif it had andthat contemporarypiclures show trces wilh the l€avesslill more thanone or lwo men who had serledsince 191.1. There onthem and green fieldsscarcely churncd up at allby shellfirc. alsogrew up a faraUsricarritudc to rhc war whichwas ofren whichwas in anycase mainly shrapncl and would noi havelcfl reflectcd in morc cautious bchaviour on thc battlefield. crater.cerrarnly you czng. I.. lJr $Ih rhr.In.iren.1 "n althoughsomc uDits rctained thci. dash bngcr than others - correctdetailin what is afterallagamc. bul itwould be.r pir\ if nolably thc AunraUanswho scrc somethingof ,r 6lite corps thisidea ofthe drearysameness of trcnchwarfare lvere io pul duringthe fightingof 1918.Nevertheless thc increasein peopleoff a potentiallyvery inleresting period. So in thesebricf professionalismin the armyas a wholewenra longwav towards notesI shalltryand show a fewof the waysinwhich the batles counteractingthis tendan€!. and as the sourcesof new on the WesternFront differed from oneanother in rermsof ihe manpowerbegan to dry up it neant thai ihe formationsof the weapons,tactjcs and te rrain conditions. borh in ordertobringa summerand autumnof 1918.rbough gencrally seriously bit of varietyinto our gamesand to illustralelhe realprogress undentrenglh.once morc consistcdlargcly of veterans. ihatwas actually being lnade in rhctcchniq wnrfare uesof during The Cermansstarted rhe Nar with nuch largernumbers of thoseyears of supposedstagnation. ira'nedregulars and rescrvi5ls. hn!ing had a conscriprarm) for many vcrrs. They did call up a rough equilalent to the Kitchenerdivisions in the !olunlccr studentswho foughr ar thc THtr MEN FirstBattle ofYprcs in l9l.l. bur rhisirreplaceable *cannon-foddcr". reservoirof Far fron beingnere helpless the infantryof fulure officer material was rnassacredcven before irencb 1915to l9l8 often found themsellesin shuarionswbere wirtare properlybcgrD. and thereafier. alrhough starting fron individualcourage. skill and initiativecounted ior rnorethan a lery highlevel of moraleand ability. the ccrman army\!enr everbefore in theabsence oforders or supportfrom above.so it downhillall the wny. Until late 1916rhe cermans\!ere is importanlfor thecorrect feel of the gameto decidewho your generallybetter trained rhan the Britishand hardlvinferior in snall band of men sruck in the middle of No Man s Land morale.bur rhe 'ernhle los.e, or rhr hrrrlesar Verdrrnand on actuallyreprbsents. The British Army of 1915.for example. the Sommecould not be replaced.as the British casualties consistedlargely of Territorial unirs. the rcgularshaving could.from a poolof unlouchedmanpo$er. The realisationof alreadybeen killed off, but by the autumnNew Arny divisions theAllies malerialsuperiority also began to affecrmorale. and (ie. Kitchener'svolunleert vere beingfed into rhe line and by rhetime of the batles of Passchendaeleand Cambraiin late thesetook rhe brunt of rhe followingyear's fighling on the l9l7 masssurrend€rs were taking place which would havc bccn Somme.At this sragein rhe war whole batralionsand even unthinkrbleavearbefore- However. agreat boosr wasgiven in divisionswould consist oftroops raised at the sameiime andin early l9l8 by the arrilal on the WesternFronr of rroops the same region, and enormousdifferences betwecn rhe releasedfrom rhe East b! rhesigningofpeace with Russia.They performanceof differentunits were only to be expecled.Most had had an easvwar by comparjsonwith the Westernersand "Kitchener" of the men of the ne\rly raised baltalionshad suffe:edless from the prevailingdemoralisarion. brr wereless receivedonly the sketchiestoftraining, but morethan made up experiencedin thespecial conditions oflrench warfare. But this for thiswith enthusiasm.at leastuntil afterthe Somrne.which rimethere w€re also a numberof€lite units.lhefarnous "Big Storm wassupposed to be the Push whichwould end rhewar. Battalions. which had rcceivedthe best recruirsas well as specialisedtraining for auack by infilrrarion, and which Germamfton Ea5lemFront. althoughalsafs a smallninority werea decisivefactor in the 1918 Normal 2-3 Germanoffcnsives of 1918.There tended by now to be a very CennanStorm-ftootr, l9l8 3 wjdegap betwcen the bestand rhc worstcerman units.but all would still hale had a much higher proportion of veteran regularsihan the Bntish,mainly because there had been more TACTICS of them in the nrst place.Officers were alsogeneralty more Obviouslythe qualityof the troopscmployed influenced the expcrienced.although there were fewer of them.Finally. it is tacticsthey could use in battle.and th€ wayin whichan attack wonh meniioningthat borh sidesregarded the Prussiansas wascarried out wouldvary greatly ' dcpendingon the datea.d rnoreformidable opponents than the less war,keen Bavarians nationalityoithe altackcrs.The 1914British regulars had been andSaxons. but it wasprobably only in the lasryearofthe war notedfor their skill in 'fire andmovement tactics.with small that the latter'slack of motivationbecame noticeabte. groupsgiving each other coveringfire as they advancedin a The Frencharmy. like the German.was a conscriprforce seriesofrushes. but althoughthis approach remained the ideal fromthe start, and borc the brunt oflhe fightingonthe Wesrem in mostarmies, it wasseldomsubsequently achieved. Although Front for the first two ycarswhile the British built up then as we haveseen some units with a highproportion of regulars forces.Therefore it is nor surprisingthat until the end of 1916 weretryingthis as late as 1916. most British troops by thattime lhe Frenchwere on the wholemuch rnore skilled in rheartack werenotorious for the clumsyway in whichthey would attack. thantheirallies. at leanwher€ rhe generals d;d nor require them Ttreworst example was probably at Loosin September1915. to advancewith rifles shoulderedand bands playing, and whentwo NewArmy divisionsadvancedin ten huge close,order generallymore experiencedin trenchwarfare. On the othel columns,unsupported by arlillery. into Germanmachine-gun handtheirdisciplinc was lessstrictand they were believedto be fire. but thingshad not improvedmuch by the summerof the lesstenacious in defence a view whichwas refuted bv their followingyear.Attackingtroops were also often weighed down splendidperl,,'mrnce ar Ve'dun lr doe,seem. hu$e!e;, lhar by 60 1o 70 poundsof €quipment,making running almosr thrsstereotypema)'applywith morcjustice to thelarge number impossible,and wereexpccted to advancein long, regularly- of Frenchcolonial troops, mostllr Africans, who whetherby spacedlines without regard for the natureofthe groundor the trarmngor temperamentwere rnostsuired to the offensive. use of cover; the training manualsused before the Somme Evenmore than the cermansrhe Frenchrhrew awaytheirbesi offensiveregarded the volunteerbattalions as too inexperi, menin fruirlessattacks