Policy Bulletin

The Stanley in : Foundation What Should US Policymakers Know?

hen Southeast Asia was desig- representatives to consider recommen- nated as a “second front” in dations for US policymakers. An W the US war against terrorism essential prelude to the recommendation Cosponsored by in late 2001, in the region process was an examination of Islam in The Stanley Foundation became the subject of an intense “hearts Southeast Asia, its place in the global and The Asia and minds” campaign, as did those in the Muslim community, and present US Foundation Middle East and South Asia. Despite this policy toward Southeast Asian Muslims. new focus, approval of the United States has plummeted among Southeast Asian The Difficulty With Definitions Muslims. Some analysts point to obvious A common paradigm in US counterter- and immediate reasons, such as the unpop- rorism policy for Southeast Asia ularity of the war in Iraq among Southeast divides Muslims into “moderates” and Asians in general, Muslim or not. “extremists” and aims to strengthen the November 18-19, 2004 San Francisco, CA former while weakening the latter. A more subtle but complex source of dis- Many Southeast Asians object to this content with the United States lies in US and any other categorization of policy paradigms for Muslim Southeast Muslims in the region. In applying Asia. Many Southeast Asians complain labels under such sensitive circum- that the American view of Muslims is stances, American and Southeast Asian monolithic and inaccurate, based upon participants found that the caveats the image of the radical “Arab street.” invariably outnumbered the categories. They argue that US policy needs to be based upon a more nuanced understand- Underneath these semantic difficulties ing of and of the are problems of understanding the complexities of Muslim politics and soci- Muslim spectrum in Southeast Asia and ety in the region. the tendency to group all extremists together. This encourages a confusion of To aid policymakers in this regard, the ends and means, and ultimately can cause Stanley Foundation organized a round- More information on table on Islam in Southeast Asia in San the Southeast Asia in Improving the image of the United the Twenty-First Francisco in November 2004. This event Century program is was the fourth roundtable in an 18-month States among Muslims in Southeast available online at Asia requires not only a considera- www.stanleyfoundation.org program on Southeast Asia in the Twenty- First Century: Issues and Options for US tion of new initiatives but also a hard This Policy Bulletin Policy. Cosponsored with the Asia look at some of the assumptions that summarizes the primary undergird US policy in Southeast findings of the conference as Foundation, the meeting brought together interpreted by the rapporteur Asia. Recommendations on page 4. and program officer. American and Southeast Asian government Participants neither reviewed nor approved this bulletin. officials, scholars, and nongovernmental Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all of its recommendations, observa- tions, and conclusions. policymakers to conflate Muslim fundamentalism with the terms as much as with the arrogance of or extremism with terrorism. In an extreme worst- outsiders attempting such linguistic engineering— case scenario, this practice can turn hasty and Americans do not have the credibility in Southeast injudicious tagging of Muslim groups into a self- Asia to label Muslims. Moreover, Southeast Asians fulfilling prophecy. themselves are engaged in a struggle over Islamic terms, particularly in the political arena. In To avoid making enemies in Islamic communities, and both, secular leaders are policymakers should take a more cautious and cal- inclined to represent themselves as religious ibrated approach when it is necessary to parse nationalists, so as to co-opt the agendas (if not the Muslim communities in Southeast Asia. Many images) of their more radical rivals. Southeast Asians find the categorization of “mainstream” and “fringe” groups more acceptable, Southeast Asia in the because it describes the relation of groups to one Despite the awkwardness of defining Muslim another, rather than rating them according to identities, Southeast Asians and Americans alike Islamic intensity. In addressing the radical end of view the great majority of Muslims in the region to the spectrum, US policy should reflect an under- be moderate in their orientation and practice. On a standing that personal piety does not necessarily policy level, this would seem to give Southeast lead to violence. Distinctions should be made Asia the potential to play an important role in the between groups that advocate jihad as an internal Muslim world. Indonesia is the world’s largest struggle to follow the teachings of Islam and Muslim-majority democracy, and Malaysia stands those to whom it means armed struggle—violent out as an example of a modern Muslim state. But extremists are “the radical fringe of a radical is Southeast Asia positioned to play such a demon- fringe.” However, both American and Southeast stration effect in the global Muslim community? Asian participants acknowledged that the term jihad may be so linked to violence in popular per- Scholars point out the need to separate theology ception that it is no longer a useful term. from culture in the Islamic world, and point to six major cultural zones in the global Muslim commu- To be sure, there are difficult gray areas, such as nity: Arab, Persian, Turkish, sub-Saharan, Indian, between fundamentalists who adhere strictly to and Malay. Each of these zones has a distinct reli- Muslim law in their personal lives and those who gious identity, forged by theology, legal frameworks, would impose that practice upon others, even on and interaction with other religious and cultural non-Muslims in Muslim-majority areas. On the groups. Malay Islam, the result of voluntary rather other end of the spectrum, policymakers should than forced conversion and filtered by passage note that “moderates” are not limited to those through , has historically differed from who favor secular government over theocracy and Muslim cultural zones farther away. eschew violence but also include a number of progressive groups that believe Islam can make a At the same time, this distance has narrowed in major contribution to democracy. In addition, recent decades, particularly with the influence of policymakers should avoid rigidity in their assess- petro-dollars from the Middle East. At the present ments of Muslim groups, as they can be extremist time, in both theological and economic dimen- on some issues but moderate on others. sions, the influence of the Middle East over Southeast Asia is essentially a one-way street. Prior Southeast Asian participants pointed out that to the 1970s, many Southeast Asians went to Muslims in the region themselves use terms such Cairo, Jordan, and Baghdad for education and were as “moderates” and “extremists,” and allowed that exposed to different theological strains. Today the some working division is probably necessary for educational flows to Saudi Arabia are far heavier. policymaking. In many cases, the problem is not 2 Although Middle Eastern aid to mosques and Muslim men in Southeast Asia and manipulate Muslim schools has played a key role in some tensions within impoverished Muslim communi- Southeast Asian areas, trade itself is lackluster— ties as well as between Muslims and other for Indonesia and Malaysia, trade with the Middle religious or cultural groups. It does not follow, East is less than 5 percent of the total volume. however, that an infusion of funds would neces- sarily reverse these trends. The missing link in Middle Eastern views of Islam in Southeast this process is the quality of governance in Asia, as well as in other regions, do not encour- Southeast Asia, particularly in the wake of the age two-way transfers and influence in the near 1997 Asian financial crisis. term. For the most part, Middle Eastern Muslims see Southeast Asia as the periphery. A Southeast Asian disillusionment with the per- dangerous exception to this is Al Qaeda’s view of formance of their leaders is broad, encompassing the region, which regards Southeast Asia as an all religious groups. Discontent over the failure important operational theater. On the Islamic of governments to achieve sustainable economic world stage, however, this dynamic is beginning development in the mid and lower economic to change. Malaysia plays an important role in tiers in the region and to control corruption is the Organization of the Islamic Conference. widespread. However, these disappointments are When Prime Minister Badawi addressed the particularly acute in Southeast Asian Muslim United Nations last year, he warned Muslim communities. Indonesia has yet to recover fully leaders that they needed to pay greater attention from the 1997 crisis. Among Muslim minorities to governance and education in their countries. in the and Thailand, poor gover- nance has exacerbated economic gaps with other On the whole, however, ambitions for Southeast groups. Muslims are also critical of government Asia to serve as a moderating example for more performance on the protection of human rights, radical corners of the Muslim world are probably and here too they often find themselves on the unrealistic. A more critical policy objective may losing end. be for Southeast Asians to focus on influencing one another, by sharing best educational practices These popular views of governance often trans- and stimulating dialogue across the region among late directly into politics. In 1999 the Malaysian moderate and progressive groups. Islamic opposition party, PAS, gained support and control of two states at the local level because Religious Flashpoints of perceptions of gross injustice from the ruling or Failed Governance? party. In Indonesia, although Islamic parties are Almost immediately after the September 11 not dominant, their support is based on their attack, Southeast Asian leaders, such as President anticorruption positions. In recent years, main- Arroyo of the Philippines, stressed to American stream secular Muslim leaders have attempted to policymakers that fighting terrorism was as much give their parties and policies an Islamic cast, to or more a matter of tackling “root causes” as it was stem the popularity of more radical groups. There fighting insurgents. “Root causes” has become are signs that Prime Minister Badawi of Malaysia code for poverty in Southeast Asia, but that may is attempting to pull away from competitive dis- be too simplistic and facile an explanation for the course with PAS. However, as with President rise of extremism in a small, but potentially dan- Yudhyono of Indonesia, this is unlikely to happen gerous, minority of Muslims in the region. until their governments have gained more solid support based on their performance. Most analysts grant that terrorist groups are able to recruit poor and disenfranchised young

3 US Policy: Development from Southeast Asian students to study in the Aid or Public Diplomacy? United States have dropped dramatically—in Despite the seemingly abrupt turn by US foreign Indonesia, by 40 percent. Responsibility for policy to focus on counterterrorism in Southeast improving the visa situation is not restricted to the Asia after September 11, ongoing programs in the US government alone. Some universities are reluc- region that were launched before 2001 may be tant to complete the more complex documentation better suited to improve relations with Muslims requirements of the new visa policies, which con- than more targeted “hearts and minds” campaigns. tributes to the dwindling numbers of Southeast US assistance programs to promote good gover- Asians studying in the United States. nance and economic development, particularly in Indonesia, addressed “root cause” problems and Although the visa gridlock has eased somewhat, offered broad outreach to Muslims as a happy resentment toward the United States because of byproduct. Similarly, pre-2001 assistance in the the visa situation in Southeast Asian Muslim com- Philippines focused on governance issues that munities, and among Southeast Asians in general, affected all Filipinos, but also gave considerable has not abated. This new climate has harmed other attention to Mindinao. Reaping greater benefit US efforts to gain support among Southeast Asian from these programs may be primarily a matter of Muslims. The situation extends beyond the educa- increasing their scope. However, US policy is tional sector and has affected trade, as Southeast hampered by the absence of aid programs in Asian business people have found it more difficult Malaysia and Thailand, both of which have “grad- to obtain visas to travel to the United States. uated” from official assistance because of their economic levels. In these countries, American Recommendations NGOs may have a greater role to play in promot- Without question, improving the image of the ing relations with Muslim communities. United States among Muslims in Southeast Asia is a delicate undertaking. It requires not only a In contrast to development programs, US public consideration of new initiatives but also a hard diplomacy programs aimed at Southeast Asian look at some of the assumptions that undergird Muslims have been poorly conceived and poorly US policy in Southeast Asia. executed, largely because they have not been tai- lored to the region. The “shared values” campaign 1. Consider the impact on Southeast Asian launched immediately after September 11 was Muslim views of US actions in other areas of unsuccessful in Southeast Asia because treatment the Islamic world. Efforts to improve relations of Muslims in the United States is not an issue in with Muslims in Southeast Asia may be wasted the region. Although Indonesian and Malaysian if policymakers do not fully appreciate the television stations obligingly ran the campaign impact of policies in other regions, particularly videos, they inspired more derision than admira- the Middle East. US policymakers have tended tion and were ultimately a negative factor. to view Southeast Asia as parochial, concerned only with its own conflicts and development. A more serious issue is that of visas and the per- This assumption ignores the rapid spread of a ception that stricter policies in this area are a global Muslim identity in Southeast Asia, as in manifestation of anti-Islam feeling in the US gov- other regions. International Muslim conscious- ernment. Transition to new visa regulations left ness does not negate the diversity of the Islamic hundreds of applications in limbo in many US world, but reflects the impact of globalization. consulates in Southeast Asia. In some countries, US policy in the world’s Islamic “hot spots”—the recipients of Fulbright grants to study in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran—may influence United States have been refused visas. Applications Southeast Asian Muslim views of the United

4 States as much as or more than US actions in tors have responded enthusiastically to seminar Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, or Thailand. programs on Islam when offered. These can be a conduit to educating both authorizers and Beyond factoring this phenomenon into global appropriators on the nuances of Islam in policy, the United States should willingly engage Southeast Asia, as can increased attention to this Southeast Asians in dialogue on issues in other area by the Congressional Research Service. regions of the Muslim world. Washington is not Both official and NGO policy dialogues on likely to change direction on the Arab-Israeli Southeast Asia should also make an effort to conflict and other trouble spots solely in defer- include Homeland Security officials, who tend to ence to Southeast Asians, but it can do a better be forgotten in these exercises. job of explaining US policies to them. 5. Fix problems with the visa process and those 2. Include a broader spectrum of Muslims in pub- relating to ports of entry. The Bush administra- lic diplomacy efforts. While there is an obvious tion should consider establishing a Track 2 logic to making common cause with moderate blue-ribbon national commission on visa policy Muslims in Southeast Asia, it risks further to assess the impact that post-9/11 changes in alienating radical Muslims and pushing them visa regulations have had on relations with the toward violent groups. In addition to supporting Muslim world. The commission should include moderate Muslims, policymakers should attempt members from the executive branch, Congress, to widen the distance between nonviolent and business, and the education community and violent radical Muslims by increasing dialogue make recommendations for improvement with- with nonviolent groups and including them in out compromising security. exchange programs. This is a high-risk policy with a potential for high return. However, A separate but related issue is the need to ensure administrators of official and NGO exchange that Transportation Security Administration programs should select participants for these workers and other port-of-entry officials receive programs carefully, in view of US regulations training on Islamic culture and the Muslim prohibiting funding of groups that may be asso- world. Correcting visa problems will be of little ciated with terrorist groups. use if Muslims visiting the United States are met with hostile or nativist attitudes from US officials 3. Don’t focus exclusively on Muslims in complex upon arrival. and volatile situations. In a policy heavily focused on terrorism, US officials tend to focus 6. Support Muslim education but take a broader reflexively on the role of Muslims in communal approach. President Bush emphasized educa- conflicts. This may in fact exacerbate such ten- tion for Southeast Asian Muslims in his 2003 sions. US policies in conflict areas of Southeast visit to the region, but programs promised for Asia—for example, or southern Indonesia and the Philippines have yet to be Thailand—should aim for objectivity and implemented. In fleshing out this new initia- address the needs and complaints of all sides. tive, policymakers should follow the lead of In these areas, US assistance should avoid development programs. They should not only championing, and therefore booby-trapping, target Islamic schools but also pay attention to one side against the other. secular schools, public or private, that serve large groups of Muslim students. 4. Educate a broader range of US policymakers on Islam, from congressional members and staff to Beyond improving the overall quality of educa- Homeland Security officials. American legisla- tion for Muslims, the United States should

5 promote understanding of America through ad hoc opportunities, the United States should the Southeast Asian educational system. In provide assistance for ongoing regional networks Malaysia, for example, the US government and of Muslim scholars and civil society groups to NGOs should support American studies pro- help build permanent scaffolding for such dia- grams at public universities, where the subject logue. Given the obvious sensitivities, such is seldom offered. assistance should be channeled through field- based American NGOs. 7. Make longer-term study and exchange the foun- dation of a public diplomacy program. Public diplomacy programs often support the sound bite, with video campaigns and whirlwind tours of the United States for busy Muslim leaders. Longer-term programs that encourage Participant List in-depth study or experience are likely to pro- vide a greater payoff. A greater proportion of Cochairs funds should be channeled to Fulbright and Catharin E. Dalpino, Adjunct Professor, American Field Service programs. However, Southeast Asian Studies, Georgetown University this measure should be matched with improved and The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced visa policies, or these programs will not be International Studies, The Johns Hopkins fully utilized. Beyond increasing funding to University existing programs, the Bush administration and Congress should consider President Gordon R. Hein, Vice President of Programs, Yudhyono’s invitation for the Peace Corps to The Asia Foundation return to Indonesia. Program Coordinator 8. Promote dialogue between American Muslim Elizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, The intellectuals and their Southeast Asian coun- Stanley Foundation terparts. The growing group of American Muslim academics is an untapped resource in Rapporteur public diplomacy programs and even as infor- Elina Noor, M.A. Candidate, Security Studies mal diplomats in Southeast Asia. These Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign scholars are experienced in interfaith dialogue Service, Georgetown University and so can offer insights on other religions in the United States to their coreligionists in Participants Southeast Asia. Moreover, they see no contra- Zachary Abuza, Associate Professor of Political diction between Islam and democracy. Science, Simmons College 9. Facilitate intra-Muslim networks and dialogue Osman Bakar, Malaysia Chair of Islam in in Southeast Asia behind the scenes. In many Southeast Asia, Center for Muslim-Christian areas of Southeast Asia, the issues most likely to Understanding, Georgetown University give rise to violent extremism are not between Muslims and other religious groups, but within Douglas Bereuter, President, The Asia Foundation the Muslim community. The United States should support intra-Muslim dialogue but can- John J. Brandon, Director, International Relations not be an obvious broker in this process. Beyond Program, The Asia Foundation

6 Bahtiar Effendy, Lecturer, State Islamic Ann Marie Murphy, Assistant Professor of University Jakarta Comparative Foreign Policy and Asian Politics, John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and Donald K. Emmerson, Director, The Southeast International Relations, Seton Hall University Asia Forum, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University Kevin F. F. Quigley, President, National Peace Corps Association Edward Gresser, Project Director, Progressive Policy Institute Angel Rabasa, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND

Heng Pek Koon, Assistant Professor, School of Victor G. Raphael, Chief, Southeast Asia International Service, American University Division, Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Marie Huhtala, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State Amina Rasul-Bernardo, Convenor, Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy Erik Jensen, Senior Law Advisor, The Asia Foundation Sheldon W. Simon, Professor of Political Science, Arizona State University Kasit Piromya, Ambassador of Thailand to the United States Daniel H. Unger, Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University James Klein, Representative for Thailand, The Asia Foundation Bridget Welsh, Assistant Professor, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School R. William Liddle, Professor of Political Science, of Advanced International Studies, The Johns College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, The Hopkins University Ohio State University Mark Woodward, Associate Professor of Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Foreign Religious Studies, Arizona State University Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Frances A. Zwenig, Senior Country Director, US- Congress ASEAN Business Council

G. Eugene Martin, Executive Director, The Philippine Facilitation Project, United States The Stanley Foundation Staff Institute of Peace Leslie Winter, Program Associate Loren Keller, Writer/Editor Patricia Martinez, Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their gov- ernments or organizations. Edward Masters, Cochairman, The United States-Indonesia Society

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