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Privacy-Handbuch Privacy-Handbuch Spurenarm Surfen mit Mozilla Firefox, E-Mail mit Thunderbird, chatten und verschlüsselt telefonieren, Anonymisierungsdienste nutzen und Daten verschlüsseln für WINDOWS + Linux 2. Oktober 2021 Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Scroogled 7 2 Angriffe auf die Privatsphäre 17 2.1 Big Data - Kunde ist der, der bezahlt........................ 18 2.1.1 Google..................................... 18 2.1.2 Weitere Datensammler............................ 24 2.2 Techniken der Datensammler............................ 26 2.3 Tendenzen auf dem Gebiet des Tracking...................... 31 2.4 Crypto War 3.0..................................... 34 2.5 Fake News Debatte.................................. 37 2.5.1 Der Kampf gegen Fake News........................ 38 2.5.2 Fake News Beispiele............................. 39 2.5.3 Medienkompetenztraining......................... 43 2.5.4 Fake News oder Propaganda - was ist der Unterschied?........ 44 2.6 Geotagging....................................... 44 2.7 Kommunikationsanalyse............................... 47 2.8 Überwachungen im Internet............................. 49 2.9 Terrorismus und der Ausbau der Überwachung................. 55 2.10 Ich habe doch nichts zu verbergen......................... 59 3 Digitales Aikido 63 3.1 Nachdenken...................................... 64 3.2 Ein Beispiel...................................... 67 3.3 Schattenseiten der Anonymität........................... 68 3.4 Wirkungsvoller Einsatz von Kryptografie..................... 69 4 Spurenarm Surfen 72 4.1 Auswahl des Webbrowsers............................. 73 4.2 Datensparsame Suchmaschinen........................... 75 4.3 Cookies und EverCookies.............................. 80 4.4 Surf-Container..................................... 83 4.5 JavaScript....................................... 85 4.5.1 NoScript für Mozilla Firefox........................ 85 4.6 iFrames......................................... 87 4.7 Werbung, HTML-Wanzen und Social Media.................... 90 4.7.1 Tracking-Filter für Firefox.......................... 91 4.7.2 Tracking Protection in Firefox........................ 92 4.7.3 uBlock Origin für Firefox.......................... 93 4.8 Firefox activity-stream................................ 95 4.9 Contextual Feature Recommender (CFR)..................... 98 4.10 Browsercache und Surf-Chronik.......................... 99 4.11 Referer......................................... 101 4.12 URL-Parameter.................................... 102 4.13 Risiko Plugins..................................... 103 4.13.1 Media Plug-ins für Video und Audio................... 104 4.13.2 Anzeige von PDF Dokumenten....................... 104 2 INHALTSVERZEICHNIS 3 4.14 HTTPS-Verschlüsselung erzwingen und härten.................. 105 4.14.1 Anzeige der HTTPS Verschlüsselung................... 108 4.14.2 Vertrauenswürdigkeit von HTTPS..................... 109 4.14.3 SSL-Zertifikate via OCSP validieren.................... 110 4.14.4 Tracking via TLS Session........................... 111 4.14.5 Tracking via HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)........... 111 4.14.6 SSL/TLS Konfiguration........................... 112 4.15 Installierte Schriftarten verstecken......................... 113 4.16 HTML5 Canvas Elemente.............................. 115 4.17 Zugriff auf lokale URLs blockieren......................... 117 4.18 Der Unsinn vom Spoofen der User-Agent Kennung............... 118 4.19 Hardware Fingerprinting.............................. 120 4.20 WebRTC mit Firefox................................. 123 4.21 DNS-over-HTTPS mit Firefox............................ 125 4.22 Sonstige Maßnahmen................................. 128 4.23 Zusammenfassung der Einstellungen....................... 134 4.24 Snakeoil für Firefox (überflüssiges)......................... 136 5 Passwörter und 2-Faktor-Authentifizierung 139 5.1 Hinweise für Passwörter............................... 140 5.1.1 Firefox build-in Passwortspeicher..................... 142 5.1.2 Passwortspeicher............................... 143 5.2 Zwei-Faktor-Authentifizierung........................... 145 5.3 Phishing Angriffe................................... 150 6 Bezahlen im Netz 152 6.1 Anonyme Online-Zahlungen vor dem Aus?.................... 155 6.2 Bargeld......................................... 156 6.3 Bitcoin......................................... 158 7 E-Mail Kommunikation 160 7.1 E-Mail Provider.................................... 160 7.2 ProtonMail und Tutanota.............................. 162 7.3 Mozilla Thunderbird................................. 164 7.3.1 Account erstellen............................... 165 7.3.2 Sichere Optionen für TLS-Verschlüsselung................ 168 7.3.3 Sichere Konfiguration des E-Mail Client.................. 170 7.3.4 Datenverluste vermeiden.......................... 174 7.3.5 Wörterbücher installieren.......................... 174 7.3.6 Spam-Filter aktivieren............................ 175 7.3.7 Spam vermeiden............................... 175 7.3.8 RSS-Feeds................................... 179 7.3.9 Filelink..................................... 180 7.4 Private Note...................................... 181 8 E-Mails verschlüsseln 183 8.1 E-Mails verschlüsseln mit Thunderbird...................... 185 8.1.1 Eigenen OpenPGP Schlüssel erstellen oder importieren......... 186 8.1.2 Eigenen OpenPGP Schlüssel mit GnuPG verwenden.......... 186 8.1.3 Den eigenen öffentlichen Schlüssel verteilen............... 187 8.1.4 Fremde Schlüssel importieren........................ 188 8.1.5 Fremde Schlüssel akzeptieren bzw. verifizieren.............. 189 8.2 Gedanken zum Mailvelope Browser Add-on................... 189 8.2.1 Mailvelope mit GnuPG nutzen....................... 191 8.2.2 Mailvelope und Autocrypt......................... 191 8.3 Einige Ergänzungen zum Thema GnuPG..................... 192 8.3.1 Gedanken zur Auswahl und Stärke von Schlüsseln........... 194 8.3.2 GnuPG Smartcards nutzen......................... 194 4 INHALTSVERZEICHNIS 8.3.3 Adele - der freundliche OpenPGP E-Mail-Roboter............ 197 8.3.4 Memory Hole Project............................. 198 8.3.5 Autocrypt................................... 199 8.3.6 Verschlüsselung in Webformularen..................... 200 8.3.7 OpenPGP-Verschlüsselung für Kontaktformulare............ 201 8.3.8 OpenPGP Keyserver............................. 204 8.3.9 Web des Vertrauens (WoT).......................... 205 8.4 Verschlüsselte Dokumente per E-Mail senden................... 208 9 Instant Messaging und Telefonie 209 9.1 Verschlüsselte Telefonie............................... 212 9.1.1 SRTP/ZRTP Verschlüsselung........................ 213 9.1.2 Verschlüsselt chatten und telefonieren mit qTox............. 213 9.1.3 Skype???.................................... 217 9.2 Instant Messaging................................... 218 9.2.1 Messenger Threema............................. 224 9.2.2 Messenger Signal App............................ 226 9.2.3 Messenger Telegram............................. 230 9.2.4 Messenger basierend auf [matrix]..................... 236 9.2.5 Chatten mit Jabber/XMPP.......................... 238 9.2.6 Messenger Wire................................ 240 9.2.7 Einige weitere Messenger (unvollständig)................. 241 9.3 Videokonferenzen mit Jitsi Meet.......................... 242 10 Anonymisierungsdienste 244 10.1 Warum sollte man diese Dienste nutzen?..................... 244 10.2 Tor Onion Router................................... 246 10.2.1 Security Notes................................. 249 10.2.2 Anonym Surfen mit dem TorBrowserBundle............... 250 10.2.3 TorBrowser für Android Smartphones................... 257 10.2.4 OnionBrowser für iPhones......................... 257 10.2.5 Sicherheitskonzept für hohe Ansprüche.................. 258 10.2.6 Anonyme E-Mail Accounts......................... 261 10.2.7 Anonym Bloggen............................... 264 10.2.8 Anonymes Instant-Messaging........................ 264 10.2.9 Gajim (Linux) und Tor Onion Router................... 266 10.2.10 Dateien anonym tauschen via Tor..................... 267 10.2.11 Tor Onion Services.............................. 269 10.2.12 Tor Bad Exit Nodes.............................. 274 10.2.13 Tor Good Exit Nodes............................. 276 10.3 Finger weg von unseriösen Angeboten....................... 278 11 Anonyme Peer-2-Peer Netzwerke 280 11.1 Invisible Internet Project (I2P)............................ 282 11.1.1 Installation des I2P-Routers......................... 282 11.1.2 Konfiguration des I2P-Router........................ 284 11.1.3 Anonym Surfen mit I2P........................... 285 11.1.4 I2P Mail 1 (Susimail)............................. 287 11.1.5 I2P Mail 2 (Bote)............................... 289 11.1.6 I2P IRC..................................... 292 11.1.7 I2P BitTorrent................................. 293 11.2 DSL-Router und Computer vorbereiten...................... 295 INHALTSVERZEICHNIS 5 12 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) 296 12.1 VPN Dienste als Billig-Anonymisierer....................... 298 12.2 Empfehlenswerte VPN-Provider.......................... 299 12.3 Verschiedene VPN Lösungen für Linux...................... 300 12.3.1 OpenVPN mit Linux............................. 300 12.4 IPsec/IKEv2 VPN Client mit Windows 10..................... 301 12.5 Das VPN Exploitation Team der NSA....................... 302 13 Domain Name Service (DNS) 305 13.1 DNSSEC Validierung................................. 306 13.2 Verschlüsselung
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