ATTACHMENT C

RESPONSE TO COMMENTS ATTACHMENT C

RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

INTRODUCTION

This section responds to written comments received on the Access to the Region’s Core (ARC) project following the publication of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on November 7, 2008 and the close of the 30-day waiting period on December 8, 2008.

This attachment is organized into three sections. The first section lists by name and date each of the resource agencies, elected officials, local governments, organizations and individuals that provided comments on the FEIS. The second section identifies all of the commenters that supported the project and then FTA analyzed each letter, consolidated and summarized the issues raised by each commenter, and provided an individual response to each commenter’s issues in the order listed in the first section. The third section is a copy of each of the twenty-five letters received.

SECTION 1. LIST OF COMMENTERS

RESOURCE AGENCIES 1. Amtrak, Eleanor Acheson , Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, December 4, 2008 (AMTRAK) 2. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region II, John Filippelli, Chief, Strategic Planning and Multi-Media Programs Branch, December 8, 2008 (USEPA)

ELECTED OFFICIALS 3. Mayor of Harrisburg, PA, Stephen R. Reed, [addressed to Mary Peters, US Secretary of Transportation] December 2, 2008 (HARRISBURG) 4. Council, Christine Quinn, Speaker, December 4, 2008 (NYC COUNCIL) 5. New Jersey Senate, Thomas H. Kean, Jr., December 8, 2008 (NJ SENATE)

ORGANIZATIONS 6. Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C. (C/S 12th Avenue, LLC), Mark Chertok, November 13, 2008 (SIVE) 7. Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C. (C/S 12th Avenue, LLC), Mark Chertok, November 19, 2008 (SIVE2) 8. New York Building Congress, Richard Anderson, President, November 21, 2008 (NYBC) 9. National Association of Railroad Passengers, George L. Chilson, Chairman and Ross Capon, President & CEO [addressed to Mary Peters, US Secretary of Transportation], November 21, 2008 (NARP) 10. Jesco, Ken Pesta, Signature Account Manager, November 26, 2008 (JESCO) 11. McKirdy & Riskin, P.A., Joseph W. Grather, Esq., November 26, 2008 (MCKIRDY)

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12. JCMS, Inc., Jayanta Dutta, December 1, 2008 (JCMS) 13. Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C. (C/S 12th Avenue, LLC), Mark Chertok, December 2, 2008 (SIVE3) 14. George Harms Construction Co., Inc., Ed Nyland, President of Business Development, December 3, 2008 (GH CONSTR) 15. Partnership, Dan Biederman, President, December 4, 2008 (34TH ST PART) 16. Alan M. Voorhees Transportation Center, Martin Robins, Senior Fellow, December 5, 2008 (VOORHEES) 17. NJ Alliance for Action, Phil Beachem, President, December 5, 2008 (NJ ALLIANCE) 18. Associated General Contractors of New Jersey, Brian N. Tobin, Executive Director, December 8, 2008 (AGCNJ) 19. Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc., John Banks, December 8, 2008 (CON ED) 20. Tri-State Transportation Campaign, Kyle Wiswall, Staff Attorney, December 8, 2008 (TRI STATE) 21. Lackawanna Coalition, David Peter Alan, Chair, December 8, 2008 (LACKAWANNA)

INDIVIDUALS 22. John Kazanjian, November 12, 2008 (KAZANJIAN) 23. Mr. Anthony Scardino Jr., November 25, 2008 (SCARDINO) 24. Bernard B. Markey, December 5, 2008 (MARKEY) 25. Fred M. Perilstein, P.E., Consulting Engineer, December 8, 2008 (PERILSTEIN)

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SECTION 2. RESPONSE TO COMMENTS RECEIVED

The following letters indicated support for the ARC Project, affirming the project’s potential to enhance public transit opportunities, provide additional transit capacity between New York and New Jersey, and promote economic growth of the region: Letter #4 - NYC COUNCIL, Letter#8 - NYBC, Letter #10 - JESCO, Letter #11 - MCKIRDY, Letter #12 - JCMS, Letter #14 - GH CONSTR, Letter #15 - 34TH ST PART, Letter #16 - VOORHEES, Letter #17 - NJ ALLIANCE, Letter #18 - AGCNJ, Letter #23 – SCARDINO. Letter #7 - SIVE2 Comment: points out a typographical error, Chapter 5.6 references Appendix 5.6 for additional information regarding air quality methodology and findings should instead reference Appendix 4.6.

RESOURCE AGENCIES

LETTER 1 – AMTRAK (AMTRAK)

AMTRAK 1-1 Comment: FTA should extend the period of time for issuing the ROD until the Amtrak/NJ TRANSIT Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) has been signed and its terms incorporated into the ROD.

AMTRAK 1-1 Response: FTA has considered and rejected the request to extend the prescribed time for issuing the ROD (according to the terms of 40 CFR 1506.10(d)). The subject MOA, which is currently being negotiated between Amtrak and NJ TRANSIT, was requested by FTA not as part of the NEPA process, but rather in order to limit the potential for cost increases and/or schedule delays as the project progresses through final design. FTA generally requires that a grantee agree on a term sheet with any third party, where the issues between the parties could affect the cost or schedule for the project, prior to approving entry into final design. That term sheet must be formalized in an executed agreement prior to FTA issuing a Full Funding Grant Agreement (FFGA). As the MOA negotiations are still on-going and not related to environmental uses, FTA will not delay issuing the ARC ROD. However, the FTA does intend that good faith efforts on the part of both NJ TRANSIT and Amtrak will result in the prompt completion of these negotiations and the execution of a term sheet prior to approving entry into final design.

LETTER 2 – U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (USEPA)

USEPA 2-1 Comment: USEPA is concerned about the relatively wide range of estimated acres (19.1 to 24.9) of long term impacts to wetlands and open waters. USEPA understands that final engineering specifications may refine this number; however, NJ TRANSIT will need to be more specific when describing wetlands impacts during permitting.

USEPA 2-1 Response:

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The range of potential impacts is the result of unresolved final design issues (i.e., use of embankment vs. structure through the Meadowlands). These issues will be resolved during final design before any relevant US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and NJ Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) permits are issued.

USEPA 2-2 Comment: The FEIS does not include a mitigation plan that can be examined by the public. The ROD should note that construction on the project cannot occur until a mitigation plan is finalized and underway.

USEPA 2-2 Response:

First, FTA would like to clarify that in an e-mail from USEPA on December 22, 2008, subsequent to the issuance of the FEIS, USEPA confirmed that they meant “construction of the project in regulated wetlands,” when they wrote “construction on the project” in their December 8, 2008 FEIS comment letter. FTA will accept USEPA’s comment in the revised manner.

In response, the ARC ROD specifically requires that project construction cannot occur in regulated wetlands until a mitigation plan has been finalized and mitigation activities have started. FTA will review the mitigation plan and ensure that it will be available for public review and comment. The FEIS does not include a mitigation plan since there are issues that must be resolved during final design. During final design of the ARC project, and in support of the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Section 404 (Clean Air Act) permitting process, NJ TRANSIT will prepare a wetlands mitigation plan that will be made available for public review. The plan will specify the steps to be taken to mitigate all of the project's impacts to regulated wetlands and open waters. The range of likely mitigations for wetlands impacts is discussed in the FEIS. The FEIS (Page 4.8-26) states that compensatory mitigation will be conducted pursuant to Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources Final Rule (40CFR Part 332) published in the Federal Register on April 10, 2008 as promulgated by the USACE. Mitigation of wetland and open water impacts will require the preparation and approval of a mitigation plan as part of the USACE Section 404 permitting process. The FEIS identified several viable options for providing compensatory mitigation: • The purchase of credits from a Federal and State approved wetland mitigation bank at the Oritani Marsh or Kane Tract; • Securing credits from an approved in-lieu fee program; • The development of an independent wetland mitigation site (permittee-responsible mitigation) that could include wetland establishment/creation, enhancement, and/or preservation at ratios acceptable to the USACE and NJDEP in consultation with the Meadowlands Interagency Mitigation Advisory Committee (MIMAC) in the same watershed as the proposed impacts; or • A combination thereof.

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The preferred option is to use the Federal and State Kane Tract wetland mitigation bank under development by the Meadowlands Conservation Trust. NJ TRANSIT will advance this mitigation approach and prepare a preliminary compensatory wetland mitigation plan for review and comment by MIMAC, which includes NJDEP and USACE. This will occur during the review phase of NJDEP and USACE permit applications. Information regarding anticipated permits can be found in FEIS Chapter 11.

Concurrent with MIMAC review and comment, NJ TRANSIT will circulate the draft mitigation plan for public review and comment. Any party that commented on the ARC EIS process will be notified of the availability of the draft mitigation plan on the project’s web site as well as by individual letter. In conjunction with MIMAC and public review and comment, FTA will review and approve the mitigation plan, and the plan will be finalized and submitted by NJ TRANSIT to NJDEP and USACE for approval. Wetland mitigation will be conducted as approved and as conditioned within the issued permits. Continued coordination will take place with NJDEP and USACE to ensure compensatory mitigation compliance (FEIS Page 4.8-27).

Public examination of the proposed final wetlands mitigation plan will occur during the USACE permitting process. As part of that process, the public will be notified when the Section 404 permit application is available for 30-day review during which time the public can submit further written comments. The public notification package will include a summary of the project, projected impacts and proposed mitigation (including wetlands mitigation). The public notice will be officially posted on the USACE web site and distributed to the USACE mailing list. In addition, the ARC project website will provide updates on the Section 404 permitting process and a link to the USACE public notice and review process. Once all comments are addressed between the project team and the USACE, the USACE can issue the permit.

ELECTED OFFICIALS

LETTER 3 – MAYOR OF HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA STEPHEN R. REED (HARRISBURG)

HARRISBURG 3-1 Comment: The elimination of the Penn Station New York (PSNY) connection link is a significant omission. A significant amount of the current and future rail passenger traffic will have to continue using 100-year old tunnels that are not adequate to handle projected future passenger rail traffic.

HARRISBURG 3-1 Response: Although it would be desirable to construct the connector tunnel for redundancy and interoperability purposes, it was found to be physically infeasible to build. However, the project has been designed to support most of the functional capabilities that the connector tunnel would have provided. The FEIS Build Alternative design provides interoperability of Amtrak and NJ TRANSIT trains between the existing Northeast Corridor (NEC) and the new tracks by providing an option for Amtrak to switch to the ARC tunnel west of Swift interlocking between Secaucus and Newark. This would be particularly useful in off peak hours when the existing tunnels are most likely to be closed for on-going maintenance. In addition, the current Build Alternative design provides for the future construction of crossover tracks between Secaucus and

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Tonnelle Avenue, accommodating future flexibility for NJ TRANSIT and Amtrak operations. However, the interoperability that will be provided by the ARC project as proposed will not have the same functionality as the Penn Station connector would have had since the ARC project will not allow Amtrak trains to reach PSNY or provide for through-running NEC operations from Washington DC to Boston, MA.

As background, during Preliminary Engineering there was intense investigation into the geotechnical conditions along West 34th Street where New York Penn Station Expansion (NYPSE) is being proposed. This investigation provided more information than was available during the MIS and DEIS studies. The geotechnical conditions required that the top of the cavern be at least 90 feet below street level at West 34th Street to allow for sufficient rock cover of adequate quality (FEIS Page 2-4). Moving the station cavern lower meant that the connection between the new tunnels and PSNY was no longer physically possible, given the grade restriction needed for commuter rail operations. At that point the decision was made to eliminate the connector tunnel.

In addition, the elimination of the tunnel, which would have required significant cut and cover construction in Manhattan, eliminated many environmental impacts to properties along the right- of-way. Many of the owners of these properties objected to the impacts during the DEIS public comment period. The deeper tunnel also avoids the construction impacts on the contaminated riverbed of the Hudson River and associated water quality impacts. It also avoids the historic Hudson River bulkhead and Hudson River Park and impacts to historic buildings.

HARRISBURG 3-2 Comment: FTA should postpone the release of the ROD, which would allow the project to proceed.

HARRISBURG 3-2 Response: Several comments, including this one, suggest that issuance of the ROD by itself constitutes the final FTA approval of the ARC project. It should be noted that FTA’s issuance of this ROD indicates only that the NEPA review process has been completed. Following a ROD, a New Starts project may be approved into final design based an FTA review of the New Starts criteria in accordance with 49 USC 5309(d) and consideration of other project readiness requirement. NJ TRANSIT has requested entry into final design and FTA is currently reviewing this final design request apart from the NEPA process. During final design, the project undergoes a rigorous cost and risk assessment, and full commitment to the financial plan by all other funding partners is finalized. While there are mechanisms for pre-construction to begin during final design, it is only with execution of a Full Funding Grant Agreement that FTA commits funds for the construction of the project.

LETTER 5 – NEW JERSEY STATE SENATOR THOMAS H. KEAN, JR. (NJ SENATE)

NJ SENATE 5-1 Comment: FTA should postpone the release of the ROD until the MIS background study is released.

NJ SENATE 5-1 Response:

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During the MIS, the participants, NJ TRANSIT, PANYNJ, and New York MTA, considered 137 options for improving access between and areas west of the Hudson River in New Jersey and New York. The participants found that the MIS provided sufficient planning justification to recommend two alternatives for further consideration during the NEPA process, which ultimately resulted in the selection of a locally preferred alternative. The two alternatives recommended for further analysis in DEIS Scoping were Alternatives P and S.

The ARC MIS Summary Report was issued in 2003 to update previous findings of ARC phases 1 and 2, and to update and summarize the third and final phase of the MIS work. It established the basis to continue the project into a DEIS phase. The Summary Report established the need for new trans-Hudson rail capacity to midtown Manhattan. It recommended that, of the three alternatives evaluated in the final phase, Alternatives P, S, and G, that Alternatives P and S be advanced to the DEIS Phase for further analysis. FTA’s joint planning regulation with the Federal Highway Administration has never required that an MIS result in a formal, voluminous report. Further, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, enacted in September 1996 before the ARC MIS was completed, eliminated the MIS as a stand alone requirement. Consequently, MIS documentation apart from the ARC MIS Summary Report was never formalized nor issued by the project sponsors.

NJ SENATE 5-2 Comment: FTA should postpone the release of the ROD until outstanding questions about New Jersey’s funding mechanism have been resolved.

NJ SENATE 5-2 Response: Issuance of the ROD is not related to resolution of funding issues. The availability of New Jersey funding sources for the ARC Project is being evaluated by the FTA consistent with the New Starts process. The New Starts process is a separate process; however the process of reviewing the project for entry into final design is occurring concurrently with the issuance of the ROD. As part of the FTA New Starts process, a detailed financial capacity assessment is performed through which the FTA examines the stability and reliability of the funding sources for the project as well as the transit system as a whole. FTA looks at the strength of both the capital and operating plans, and the non-New Starts share of funding proposed for the project. FTA has already begun the financial capacity assessment for the ARC Project.

To date, the funding sources identified for the ARC Project include $3 billion from the New Starts program, $3 billion from the PANYNJ, $2.35 billion in federal flexible funds, $1.25 billion from the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, and approximately $100 million from the New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund. FTA will look closely at the funding identified to ensure it is available and committed before awarding a FFGA. An FFGA establishes the terms and conditions for Federal financial participation in a New Starts project; defines the project; sets the maximum amount of Federal new starts funding for a project; covers the period of time for completion of the project; and facilitates efficient management of the project in accordance with applicable Federal statutes, regulations, and policy and any increase in project costs. The FFGA is not signed by the FTA until the project financing and final costs are set.

ORGANIZATIONS

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LETTER 6 [November 13, 2008] – SIVE, PAGET & RIESEL, P.C. (SIVE)

SIVE 6-1 Comment: Four reference reports (Station Action Program, Air Quality Technical Report, 35th Street Fan Plant Cooling Tower Impacts Analysis Report, and FEIS Engineering Report) should have been included in the Appendix and copies of these reports were requested.

SIVE 6-1 Response: These materials are all reference documents available upon request. They have been provided to the commenter in response to this letter. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Protection of Environment, Chapter 5 (40 CFR 1502.18) states that technical materials prepared in connection with an environmental impact statement shall be circulated with the environmental impact statement or be readily available on request. Information contained in each of the reference documents has been summarized in the FEIS or its Appendices, which is consistent with NEPA. Copies of the Air Quality Technical Report, 35th Street Cooling Tower Impacts Analysis, and the FEIS Engineering Report were sent to Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C. on December 10, 2008. The first report referenced, the Station Action Program, is actually the Station Access Program (SAP). This program is several separate efforts to improve access to transit services throughout New Jersey. Each of the strategies in the SAP is defined within the following separate documents: 1) NJ TRANSIT’s Parking Guide, 2007 Edition; 2) NJTPA Transportation Improvement Program; 3) NJ TRANSIT’s Community Shuttle Program Fact Sheet (12/2008); 4) Planning for Transit-Friendly Land Use, A handbook for New Jersey Communities, NJ TRANSIT, June 1994; and 5) transit-friendly land use information available on the NJ TRANSIT web site at www.njtransit.com. This relevant documentation and related reference materials were also included in the December 10, 2008 transmittal to Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C.

LETTER 9 – NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RAILROAD PASSENGERS (NARP)

NARP 9-1 Comment: The new ARC tunnels must link to PSNY. Failure to build this link would create severe problems for New York-New Jersey trains using PSNY, especially with regard to improved redundancy, capacity and reliability, and to accommodate track maintenance.

NARP 9-1 Response:

Although it would be desirable to construct the connector tunnel, it was found to be physically infeasible to build. As explained in the Harrisburg 3-1 response, it is not physically feasible to build the connector; however, the project has been designed to improve redundancy, capacity and reliability, and to accommodate track maintenance as described below:

• Redundancy: The FEIS Build Alternative design allows Amtrak and NJ TRANSIT trains to be routed to either the existing Northeast Corridor and PSNY or the new ARC tracks and NYPSE. The routing decision will occur west of the Hackensack River at Swift Interlocking between Secaucus and Newark. Nonetheless, it is true that trains in the new ARC tunnels will not be able to access PSNY and, thus, will not be able to provide through running service to Boston and intermediate points to the north.

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• Capacity: The ARC Project addresses the project goal of improving trans-Hudson mobility by significantly expanding rail capacity into New York City. The FEIS Build Alternative service plan would route 23 trains into existing station tracks at PSNY and 25 trains into NYPSE in the AM peak hour in 2030, more than doubling existing commuter rail capacity. The ARC service plan will also allow Amtrak to add one additional intercity train during the peak hour, which represents a 33 percent increase in capacity. • Reliability: During an unanticipated incident in the North River tunnels, reliability will be improved with the ARC Project because service going to New York could be re-routed at Swift Interlocking. However, trains that are between Swift Interlocking and the North River tunnels will not be able to be re-routed through to NYPSE and would be negatively impacted as compared to a connection to PSNY. In addition, the current Build Alternative design provides for the future construction of crossover tracks between Secaucus and Tonnelle Avenue, accommodating future flexibility for NJ TRANSIT and Amtrak operations. • Track Maintenance: When maintenance work is needed on the North River tunnels, removing one or more tracks from service, Amtrak or other trains can be diverted just west of the Portal Bridge at Swift Interlocking in Kearny, NJ. From there, trains can proceed along the new ARC tracks eastward into NYPSE.

NARP 9-2 Comment: The complete 2003 Major Investment Study (MIS) was not made available to the public; the elimination of the connection between PSNY and (GCT), Alternative G, was not properly documented.

NARP 9-2 Response: As was discussed in response to NJ Senate 5-1, the fact that the MIS background study was not released does not affect the validity of the EIS process. With respect to the comments on Alternative G, the decision not to advance Alternative G was described not only in the 2003 ARC MIS Summary Report but also as part of the scoping process for the DEIS. The elimination of Alternative G is discussed below in response to NARP 9-3.

NARP 9-3 Comment: The 2003 MIS “Alternative G”, combined with some capacity enhancements at Penn Station, would eliminate the need for NJT to build the “deep cavern” terminal.

NARP 9-3 Response:

At the conclusion of the MIS process, a decision was made not to advance Alternative G as part of the DEIS. Commenters have argued that Alternative G is a reasonable alternative and should have been carried forward for examination. The MIS Summary Report did not recommend Alternative G for further consideration for various reasons, notably because of the risks surrounding its construction and operations. It was determined that there could be extensive impacts on NYCT subway structures and the operations support systems at GCT. In addition, it would create complex train operations that could seriously affect the operational reliability of the respective railroads. Finally, the physical impacts of construction on the ability to maintain existing operations posed a significant issue.

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Alternative G provided the lowest peak hour capacity (36 trains) as a result of the limited capacity of PSNY Tracks 1-5, the relatively slow operating speeds on the track connection between PSNY and GCT and the capacity limitations resulting from bi-directional operations (NJT and Metro North) between PSNY and GCT. The slow track speeds between PSNY and GCT were determined by the tight turning radius and the steep grade needed to pass under the Sixth Avenue subway and still connect to GCT. Also, the relatively short distance between PSNY and GCT, combined with the slow acceleration and deceleration of commuter rail, prevent faster operating speeds.

Although Alternative G had the highest forecast ridership in the MIS phase, the MIS did not take into account NYC plans for significant future West Side development which had not yet been approved. Alternative G was eliminated at the end of the MIS process because its engineering challenges were greater and its ridership advantage was considered less significant when the West Side development was taken into account.

NARP 9-4 Comment: The project has serious problems for New Jersey-Manhattan commuters due to the length of time it will take to travel between the surface and the proposed deep cavern station, estimated to be four or five minutes in each direction, and raised safety and security issues associated with a quick evacuation of large numbers of people from 175 feet below ground.

NARP 9-4 Response: Safety and security elements are of utmost concern in the design of NYPSE. As described in the FEIS (Pages 4.13-7 to 4.13-9 and Pages 18-140 to 18-142), NYPSE would be a new, modern, state-of-the-art, safe and accessible station. NYPSE has been designed to meet all federal, state and local accessibility and safety regulations. Analyses of emergency evacuation from the station indicate that platform clearance meets the criteria of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 130 standard for transit stations. Adequate capacity is provided for both evacuation of the station mezzanine and emergency access to the station. Emergency access and egress to the station is provided via the three public escalators banks and four emergency stair routes, each having two independent stairways.

A comparison of walk times between existing PSNY and NYPSE demonstrates that access times are similar and that there would not be a downgrade in mobility for NJ TRANSIT rail riders. (FEIS on Page 3.4-33) The new station capacity will have wide platforms and modern stairs, escalators, and elevators that will be a great improvement over the century-old platforms and stairs in the existing parts of PSNY. While the station will be deeper than the existing platforms, modern, fast escalators will bring passengers into and out of the station quickly and safely.

Pedestrian exit times for NYPSE were estimated based on average walking speeds and the distance from platforms to the street for various possible pedestrian routes. In the Build Alternative, while overall pedestrian exit times will be improved, the actual times will vary depending on the platform location in PSNY or NYPSE and destinations at street level. Exit times to the street will be comparable to PSNY. For example, it would take about 1.5 to 2.5 minutes longer to reach Seventh and Eighth Avenues subways from NYPSE than from PSNY.

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However, walk time to Sixth Avenue/ subways would be 2 to 4 minutes less from NYPSE than from existing PSNY (FEIS Page 3.4-33).

NYPSE would also provide underground passageways for passengers to connect to existing PSNY train services, NYCT subway lines at Eighth Avenue, Seventh Avenue and Broadway/Sixth Avenue, as well as PATH service at Sixth Avenue. These pedestrian connections would provide passengers arriving at the new station full access to NYCT, LIRR, Amtrak, and NJ TRANSIT services operating out of PSNY.

NARP 9-5 Comment: The FTA Cost-Effectiveness Index ignores reliability and redundancy of connecting the new ARC tunnels with existing PSNY.

NARP 9-5 Response: The Cost-Effectiveness Index is not part of the NEPA process; however, under the FTA New Starts procedures in 49 USC 5309(d), Cost-Effectiveness is only one component of the overall rating a project receives. The issues of redundancy and reliability are considered under “Other Factors,” which have been accounted for in the ARC New Starts process. A transportation system’s redundancy and resiliency are measured by its ability to continue functioning if a link is interrupted or if a particular resource becomes scarce. It allows the system to accommodate a wide range of user needs and conditions. Without redundancy, a single unanticipated event affects thousands of travelers and system reliability suffers. ARC will provide needed redundancy for the trans-Hudson commuter rail system and to a certain extent for the NEC intercity rail service.

NARP 9-6 Comment: One way to solve the problem of constructing the PSNY Connector is to have New York City modify the elevation of the #7 subway extension.

NARP 9-6 Response: The connector tunnel between the new ARC Hudson River Tunnels and PSNY was eliminated from the ARC Project after the DEIS public comment period in April 2007. Amtrak, FRA, and the public were notified about the change within two months through the June 2007 TAC (Technical Advisory Committee) and an RCLC (Regional Citizens Liaison Committee) meeting. These changes were then discussed and analyzed in the March 2008 SDEIS. Further developments after the SDEIS were discussed in the FEIS, and are explained below.

After the SDEIS was published, the FRA, supported by Amtrak, requested that NJ TRANSIT analyze alternatives to the FEIS alignment and profile to provide an Amtrak tunnel connection (PSNY Connector) to PSNY as originally proposed in the DEIS. The PSNY Connector had been eliminated between the DEIS and the SDEIS as a result of the need to lower the station cavern profile due to the quality of the rock under West 34th Street. This deeper station profile resulted in deeper tunnels under the Hudson River and the west side of Manhattan, which precluded the construction of a connection to existing PSNY at an acceptable operating grade. At the request of the FRA and Amtrak, the FTA and NJ TRANSIT agreed to revisit the options to determine if there were any viable alternatives that had not been previously considered. Correspondence between the FRA, Amtrak and NJ TRANSIT regarding Amtrak concerns is included in Appendix 18.

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NJ TRANSIT and Amtrak, in meetings in July 2008, evaluated a conceptual connection that would avoid impacts to the No. 7 Line subway extension by splitting the tunnel tracks on the west side of Manhattan so that one set of tracks rose above (to connect with PSNY) and one set went underneath (to connect to the deeper NYPSE cavern). This alternative was dismissed as it required grades in excess of 2.5% that were deemed to be operationally infeasible. The NJ TRANSIT rail operational standard for maximum gradient on commuter rail is 2.1%. A grade above 2.1% creates unreliable operations on loaded commuter trains for tow reasons. First, trains employ steel wheels on steel rails; in contact with each other steel wheels and steel rails do not provide a lot of friction, and have difficulty climbing grades because of this low amount of friction. On level track this reduced friction permits trains to move at higher speeds with less effort. However, on grades the relationship for the movement of trains changes. Trains require more power to deploy the needed force to pull/push the train. Second, NJ TRANSIT employs a large fleet of locomotive hauled multi-level trains. To achieve the targeted capacity in terms of moving the largest possible number of passengers on each train, NJ TRANSIT expects to operate its locomotive hauled trains as either eight or ten multilevel car trains. These rail passenger cars are very heavy and place a burden on the locomotive working to pull or push them up the grade. NJ TRANSIT has found that a gradient close to 2% is the maximum that its locomotive hauled ten car multilevel trains can travel at a comfortable speed to sustain train flow capacity and operate reliably. Steeper grades increase the difficulty for the locomotive hauling the weight of the passenger cars causing the potential for a loss of train speed due to wheel slip (the momentary inability to get traction). Steeper grades also set the stage for incidents to occur where the train can not move if it were forced to stop part way up the grade. This later situation would result in the train blocking the path of any other trains and necessitate a rescue locomotive to be dispatched. A second conceptual connection was also developed after issuance of the SDEIS that assumed that the No. 7 Line subway extension final design could be modified in a way to avoid both the PSNY Connector and ARC NYPSE tunnels in order to achieve an operationally feasible connection with a maximum grade of 2.1%. Review of this alternative determined that while it is feasible from an engineering perspective, the concept required elimination or lowering of the No. 7 Line subway extension by 5 to 12 feet. The alternative would also result in significant cost and schedule impacts to both ARC and the No. 7 Line project. Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s (MTA) Capital Construction Corporation stated at a meeting in August 2008 that the modification would add a minimum of 1.5 to 2 years to the schedule for completing the No. 7 Line project, which is unacceptable to the City of New York and MTA. The alternative connection to PSNY was also limited in terms of its connectivity to tracks within PSNY in order to achieve the 2.1% maximum grade. The environmental impacts resulting from construction of this alternative would include disruption to the Hudson River bottom and cut- and-cover construction from Hudson River Park through the west side of Manhattan. MTA was also concerned about the vertical clearance between the tunnel and the LIRR West Side Yards, and the proposed development sites on the Eastern Rail Yards. The tunnels would require the relocation of the LIRR maintenance building, and would delay the agreement for developing over the rail yard. Both of these impacts were unacceptable to MTA. Although additional alternatives to make the connection from the new Build Alternative tunnels to PSNY on the west side of Manhattan were evaluated at the request of Amtrak and FRA, none

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were found that could address the various constraints that had been identified in the original analysis. Therefore, the PSNY Connector was not reinstated as a component of the Build Alternative. (FEIS Page 2-7)

NARP 9-7 Comment: One way to solve the problem of constructing the PSNY Connector is to have NJT and Amtrak accept a steeper gradient.

NARP 9-7 Response:

The answer to Comment 9-7 concerning a steeper gradient is answered above in NARP Response 9-6.

LETTER 13[December 2, 2008] – SIVE, PAGET & RIESEL, P.C. (SIVE3)

SIVE3 13-1(a) Comment: The FEIS fails to correct inadequacies in the DEIS and SDEIS with regard to the adequacy of identifying project impacts and applicable mitigation measures that were raised during the comment periods for the DEIS and the SDEIS.

• The FEIS, like its predecessors, still fails to meet the fundamental precept underlying NEPA: that an EIS must take a “hard look” at project impacts and identify applicable mitigation measures. The FEIS fails to meet these basic requirements in a variety of respects.

SIVE3 13-1(a) Response: The FEIS addresses all issues raised in Sive Paget’s comments on the ARC DEIS and SDEIS. Those comments are contained in Chapter 18 of the FEIS.

The DEIS, SDEIS and FEIS meet the fundamental precepts of NEPA through the consideration of a range of alternatives. A comprehensive alternatives analysis was completed prior to the ARC DEIS which identified a conceptual alignment for a new trans-Hudson tunnel. This alternatives analysis is described in the DEIS (Chapter 2, Pages 2-1 to 2-7). In addition, consistent with NEPA requirements, public scoping meetings were held to identify alternatives and solicit public comments on possible alternatives. These alternatives were evaluated and screened to identify a preferred alternative, the DEIS Build Alternative, which was evaluated in the DEIS. Subsequent to the DEIS, additional alignment alternatives and locations for project elements, including fan plants and station entrances, were evaluated to avoid, minimize or mitigate environmental impacts, to optimize operations, to address constructability concerns, to contain costs, and to address capital construction risks.

The DEIS, SDEIS and FEIS meet the fundamental precepts of NEPA through their comprehensive consideration of project impacts across 18 environmental factors (transportation, land use and demographics, environmental justice, visual and aesthetic resources, air quality, noise and vibration, ecology, water resources, parklands, soils and geology, contaminated materials, safety and security, energy, electric and magnetic fields, utilities, indirect and cumulative effects, archaeological resources, and historic resources). For each of these

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environmental factors, the methodology is presented in a series of methodology reports contained in FEIS Appendix Volume I. The methodologies employed include federally-accepted analytical techniques designed to fairly consider the impact of the Build Alternative throughout the project area within each environmental factor. The depth of analysis within each factor for all of the elements of the Build Alternative is based on the information available through the latest project design (as documented in the FEIS Engineering Report).

The DEIS, SDEIS and FEIS also meet the fundamental precepts of NEPA with the identification of mitigation measures. The DEIS, SDEIS, and FEIS Build Alternative elements were designed to avoid or minimize environmental impacts wherever possible. As stated in Chapter 2 of the SDEIS, design refinements presented in the SDEIS avoid environmental impacts to the west side of Manhattan associated with the previous DEIS Build Alternative. Where impacts could not be avoided or further minimized, the EIS commits to specific mitigation measures as described within each section of Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. Where specific mitigation measures can not be identified prior to final design (e.g. they require further design details or subsurface investigations not yet available), a clear process has been established in the appropriate FEIS mitigation sections with commitments to define and implement necessary mitigation.

In addition to NEPA compliance with the review of these 18 environmental factors, the ARC DEIS, SDEIS and FEIS include a Section 4(f) Evaluation pursuant to federal regulations contained in 23 CFR Part 774 as required for any transportation project which may use a public park recreation area, or a wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance; or a historic site of national, State or local significance.

SIVE3 – 13-1(b) Comment: The FEIS fails to correct specific inadequacies in the DEIS and SDEIS with regard to:

• adverse environmental impacts of the Project on New York City land use, zoning and public policy for the West Side of Manhattan. • the SDEIS improperly asserted that the Project would have no direct impacts on Lot 675 and that no portion of C/S 12’s property would be utilized for the Project and • the actual duration of construction-related impacts on C/S 12’s prospective development on Block 675 and on New York City’s zoning, land use planning and public policy for development of the West Side of Manhattan.

SIVE3 13-1(b) Response: As described in response to comment SIVE 13-1(a), the FEIS includes an assessment of environmental impacts and that has concluded that the project would be consistent with zoning, land use planning and public policy on the West Side of Manhattan (FEIS Page 4.2-36). Furthermore, comments made on the DEIS or SDEIS have been addressed in the FEIS. The responses to individual comments have been documented in Chapter 18 of the FEIS.

The commenter stated that the DEIS, SDEIS and FEIS fail to address project-related impacts to Block 675. Throughout the design and environmental review process for the project, the design team has investigated alternatives to both tunnel alignment and construction methods in order to improve operating and construction efficiencies and to avoid environmental impacts to the West

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Side of Manhattan. As a result, there have been changes to the impacts to Block 675 as well as other properties at each stage of the EIS process. These changes have been represented in the three separate documents comprising the EIS (DEIS, SDEIS and FEIS).

In the DEIS (Chapter 4.2, page 4.2-29), it was disclosed that there would be impacts to Blocks 674 and 675 as a result of cut-and-cover and fan plant construction. The ARC SDEIS (Chapter 4.2, pages 4.2-11 and 4.2-12) explains that the refined tunnel design, which was deeper than the DEIS design, eliminated the need for cut-and-cover construction related impacts on the west side of Manhattan thereby eliminating, the surface impacts to Block 675. The FEIS Comment 172-D response (Chapter 18, pages18-76 and 18-77) further explains that the deeper tunnels reduce impediments to future development directly above the alignment, such as the Special Hudson Yards District, the Special Chelsea District, the West Side Rail Yard, East Side Rail Yard, Hudson River Park, and the High Line.

At the time of the SDEIS, it was not anticipated that any portion of Block 675 would be used for construction staging. Therefore, the SDEIS Build Alternative had no surface impacts to Block 675. Subsequent to the issuance of the SDEIS, however, Block 675, which is immediately to the north of Block 674, was identified as a location for storage of Con Edison vehicles. The FEIS Comment 177-S response discusses the use of Block 675 and its potential impacts (see Chapter 18, pages 18-78 and 18-79). The use of Block 675 is also described in FEIS Chapter 5.2, page 5.2-2, Chapter 3.6, page 3.6-25, and Chapter 5.1, page 5.1-18. These sections explain that the portion of Block 675 used to temporarily store Con Edison equipment would be available for development once construction on Block 674 is completed and the Con Edison operations are returned.

SIVE3 13-2Comment: Impact of Deferring Development on Block 675

• The FEIS fails to consider the impacts of deferring the development of Block 675 for a decade due to construction of the ARC Project on land use, zoning and public policy for the West Side of Manhattan.

SIVE 13-2 Response: The FEIS contains a discussion of the project’s impacts to development on Block 675 (FEIS Page 5.2-2). The discussion explains that during construction, no development will occur on Block 675, thus Block 675 would not be available for development until approximately 2017. The specific impacts are difficult to identify at this time due to the block’s complicated status. Block 675 is currently used as a parking facility for trucks and buses, and contains several one- story industrial buildings but it is zoned commercial, which allows high density development. The block’s future is also uncertain. While the owner has submitted an application for an as-of- right building permit to construct a 60-story hotel on the western side of the block, as described on Page 2-46 of the No. 7 Subway Extension - Hudson Yards Rezoning and Development Program FGEIS, New York City has identified the site as a future underground tow pound and a garage for the Department of Sanitation, with a park on the surface. New York City began condemnation proceedings on the block and held a public hearing on September 9, 2004, to explain their intentions. They have not taken any additional actions toward condemnation since then. Nor has, New York City taken any action on the building permit application.

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The FEIS contains an explanation of the block’s current status, and an explanation of the impacts the ARC Project would have on future development, without specifying the type of development that would be impacted, because that is not yet known. The FEIS explains that the development plans would be delayed until construction of the ARC Project is complete, and Block 675 is no longer needed either as a staging area or as a temporary area for the relocation of Con Edison’s activities. The FEIS identifies that the “property owners would be compensated for the use of the property during this construction period” (FEIS, Page 5.2-2). Pursuant to NEPA regulations, compensation can only be negotiated after the NEPA process is complete and the Record of Decision has been issued. NJ TRANSIT and the PANYNJ will comply with applicable state and federal regulations with regard to the displacement and relocation of any businesses located on Block 675 (FEIS, Page 5.2-4).

As discussed above and explained in the FEIS (Page 5.2-2), a clear development scenario for Block 675 has not yet been finalized. Currently, the zoning for Block 675 is identified on Figure 4.2-8 of the FEIS as commercial, with plans for a Department of Sanitation Garage and tow pound (FEIS Page 4.2-24). Further, as shown on Figure 4.2-10, the adopted Hudson Yards Rezoning indicates the use of Block 675 as transportation and recreational space, although the property is not currently a park or designated a mapped park.

The FEIS considers the impacts of deferring the development of Block 675 based on the No. 7 Subway Extension - Hudson Yards Rezoning and Development Program FGEIS for that block. The impact of delay to development is disclosed on Pages 5.18-11 and 5.18-12 of the FEIS. Since the exact timing of any future development on Block 675 is not known, the impact is described qualitatively as “‘negative indirect impacts on municipal fiscal conditions due to deferred tax ratables, municipal property tax collections and job creation, and delayed implementation of needed municipal parkland.” NJ TRANSIT will coordinate with New York City and Con Edison to possibly have portions of the site in suitable condition for redevelopment prior to completion of the Build Alternative construction, as a means of accommodating future development as expeditiously as possible (FEIS Page 5.18-11).

SIVE3 13-3 Comment: The FEIS ignores cumulative impacts of the project and the proposed western rail yard mixed use development:

• The FEIS fails to consider adequately the cumulative impacts of operation of the ARC Project and the impacts associated with construction and operation from the large-scale Western Rail Yard development that would take place just one block north of Block 675, particularly with respect to traffic, air quality, transit, and pedestrian impacts.

SIVE3 13-3 Response: The FEIS does consider the ARC Project’s cumulative impacts with other development projects in the vicinity of ARC on the west side of Manhattan. Under NEPA, an agency is required to study “cumulative impacts” which are “impacts on the environment which result from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal of non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions” (40 CFR § 1508.7). NEPA does not mandate that an agency consider the

16 Attachment C

cumulative impacts of future actions that are merely speculative and have not yet completed the required NYC process for new development projects.

The FEIS cumulative analysis relies on a list of accepted development projects transmitted by the New York City Department of City Planning (NYCDCP) to NJ TRANSIT that NYCDCP requested to be included in the ARC Project No Build. That list, which is described in the FEIS includes the approved Hudson Yards Development (HYD) Plan on FEIS Table 4.2-9 (FEIS Pages 4.2-26 to 28), plus additional development on soft sites throughout the area surrounding the ARC Project listed on FEIS Table 4.2-8 (FEIS Pages 4.2-23 to 25). All of the projects included on these tables have been included in the FEIS traffic, air quality, pedestrian, and transit quantitative cumulative analyses.

The HYD Plan is referred to in FEIS Table 4.2-9. There has been one major change to the HYD Plan since it was approved in 2005. The proposed Mixed-Use Facility/Jets Stadium on the MTA’s Western Rail Yard (WRY) has been eliminated. The FEIS cumulative analyses continue to include the Mixed Use Facility/Jets Stadium because the City of New York has not removed this facility from the environmental analysis of the HYD area. Because the FEIS uses this analysis as the foundation for its No Build, the Mixed Use Facility/Jets Stadium remains in the analysis. Further, no new development has reached the level of reasonable foreseeability requisite for inclusion a cumulative impacts analysis. In light of the changes to the Mixed-Use Facility/Jets Stadium proposal, a new plan for this area is emerging that is referred to as the WRY project. Were the new WRY project to advance to completion at some point in the future, there would be a difference in the cumulative impacts in that area due to the difference in uses for the site, from entertainment/ recreational for the Mixed- Use Facility/Jets Stadium to residential/commercial for the WRY project. But because the WRY project has not been sufficiently advanced, no assessment of its environmental impacts is available for inclusion in the FEIS quantitative cumulative analyses. Plans for the WRY project continue to evolve between the MTA and the developer selected for the site. An EIS is being prepared pursuant to New York State and New York City environmental regulations. The development concept described in the WRY’s draft scoping document (October 2008) proposes approximately five to six million square feet of mixed-use residential and office space; however the final mix of uses has not yet been defined. A public scoping meeting was held on October 2, 2008, and the plan is now being re-evaluated by the developer and the MTA. The FEIS acknowledges the proposed WRY project and the potential for significant development. As noted on Page 4.2-30 of the FEIS, the expected development of the MTA/LIRR John D. Caemmerer West Side Yards would be one of the largest developments in the area bringing a significant amount of residential and commercial space to the area. The WRY project is not included in the quantitative analysis, but is considered generally in terms of indirect and cumulative long-term and construction-related impacts in the FEIS. (FEIS Pages 4.18-19 and 5.18-13).

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Cumulative Traffic Analysis

The ARC cumulative traffic analysis is based upon the development scenario described above. The 2030 ARC scenario includes the Hudson Yard Development Plan (FEIS Table 4.2-9), the additional development on soft sites (FEIS Table 4.2-8), and an additional 0.5% annual background growth to bring the background conditions up-to-date. (FEIS Page 3.3-8) The Mixed Use Facility/Jets Stadium remained in the ARC traffic analysis because it was part of the most accurate set of data available at the time that was contained in the original Hudson Yards FGEIS and has not yet been removed from the City of New York’s Hudson Yard Development Plan. As already noted above, no new development has yet reached the point of foreseeability for inclusion in the analysis. Soft sites were updated in May 2007. Base traffic counts were not physically updated but were updated in the analysis based on the new build year (2030) and the new list of soft sites’ development potential provided by the NYC Department of City Planning (DCP) (Table 4.2-9). This was done in 2007. In addition, the FEIS commits to additional data collection and analysis in the west midtown Manhattan area to account for the 34th Street BRT Project (FEIS Page 3.3- 9). The potential traffic impacts of the newly proposed WRY development would be different from the traffic impacts than the Mixed Use Facility/Jets Stadium, although it is not capable of analysis today. Cumulative Air Quality Analysis

The ARC Project’s cumulative air quality analysis is based on the list of approved projects cited on FEIS Tables 4.2-8 and 4.2-9 (FEIS Pages 4.2-23 to 4.2-28) as referred to on FEIS Page 5.18- 13. The analysis was derived from the FEIS traffic analysis as already discussed above.

The FEIS assumes that the New York City taxi fleet will be all-hybrid by 2030. (FEIS Page 3.3- 11). The commenter states that New York City’s effort to convert to an all hybrid fleet has been struck down in court. That decision pertained to conversion to an all-hybrid taxi fleet by 2012. However, given that the analysis year for the ARC Project is 2030 and that New York City’s long range plan, PlaNYC, contains a plan for an all-hybrid taxi fleet by 2030, it is reasonable to continue to assume this will happen.

Cumulative Transit and Pedestrian Analysis

Existing pedestrian volumes described in the FEIS reflect new pedestrian counts conducted in the study area for the ARC Project in 2007. Future No Build pedestrian volumes were developed by adding to these new pedestrian counts the updated Hudson Yards development program pedestrian volumes (which include other ‘soft’ sites) and then applying a 0.5 percent per year background growth rate as discussed in the FEIS. (FEIS Page 3.4-13) These results were reviewed and analyzed in close consultation with the NYCDCP and the New York City Department of Transportation to ensure they are consistent with the NYC CEQR Technical manual.

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The FEIS’s transit ridership analysis includes all of the future development contained in the development scenario described above. The ridership forecasts for 2030 without ARC on each New York City Transit (NYCT) subway line are from the MTA’s ridership forecasting model, Regional Transportation Forecasting Model (RTFM) (FEIS Appendix 3.1). The FEIS analysis with regard to subway capacity conditions was conducted pursuant to procedures described in the NYC DCP CEQR Technical Manual. Although the MTA’s RTFM estimated greater ridership on the #2 than the #3 subway lines, NYCT agreed that it is reasonable to assume that passengers would use the lines interchangeably based on NYCT’s knowledge of passenger loadings on the two lines. This use of the lines would be true for both south of 34th Street and prior to the split of the lines in Brooklyn. The #2 and #3 subway lines operate identical services through Manhattan and eight stops into Brooklyn. (FEIS Appendix 3.1, FEIS Subway Line-Haul Analysis). In accordance with CEQR Technical Manual guidelines, in cases where more than one subway line is available in a given area, appropriate percentages can be assigned to each of the lines. SIVE3 13-4 Comment: The FEIS ignores cumulative construction impacts of the project and the proposed western rail yard mixed-use development:

• ignores cumulative construction impacts of the project and the proposed Western Yards mixed-use development, and • fails to consider adequately the cumulative impacts of the contemporaneous construction of the Project and of other major development and transportation projects that would affect Manhattan’s West Side.

SIVE3 13-4 Response: The cumulative impacts of construction were considered in the FEIS. Because the Western Rail Yard project development was uncertain at the time of the analysis, construction-related impacts associated with the Western Rail Yard are identified qualitatively. (FEIS Pages 5.18-10 to 5.18- 16). As discussed in response to SIVE3 13-3 above, all of the projects that are detailed enough to allow an environmental analysis were included in the cumulative impact analysis. Specifically, for the peak construction year of 2012, background levels for construction-related traffic and air quality analyses incorporated proposed construction-related activity associated with the Hudson Yards Redevelopment Plan and other West Side development as listed on Page 4.2-22.

The FEIS explains that delayed potential development of dedicated Build Alternative construction areas, such as portions of Block 674 and Block 675, would result in impacts on municipal fiscal conditions due to deferred tax ratables, municipal property tax collections and job creation, and delayed implementation of needed municipal parkland on the west side of Manhattan. (FEIS Page 5.18-12)

SIVE3 13-5 Comment: The FEIS significantly underestimates the time frame for project construction and attendant delays:

• The FEIS does not consider the delay in the commencement and duration of construction in New York due to the difficulty in shifting components of the Con Edison facilities from

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Block 674 to Block 675, obtaining the requisite approvals and dealing with contamination and archeologically significant sites, so that the actual construction period, and its attendant impacts, are not appropriately analyzed. • The FEIS fails to consider the delay in commencement and duration of construction in New York due to: o Relocation of Con Edison operation and equipment o Delays from contamination and archaeological sites o Permitting delays

SIVE3 13-5 Response: New Jersey Transit has developed a Project Master Schedule for the ARC Project. This detailed schedule contains a series of milestones and identifies the numerous steps in the process leading from the ROD to opening day of the new ARC service. Key steps in the process that are reflected throughout the FEIS, and are incorporated in the Project Master Schedule, include the USACE Section 404 permit (FEIS Page 4.8-28), NJDEP and NYSDEC environmental approvals with regard to contaminated materials (FEIS Page 4.12-23), and the Section 106 Programmatic Agreement (FEIS Pages 6-20, 6-23, and 6-33). The Project Master Schedule includes the construction schedule for the ARC Project and incorporates the time required to bring these processes to their conclusion (USACE permit, NJDEP or NYSDEC approval, Section 106 coordination). In addition, the FEIS and the Project Master Schedule reflect the potential for variability in this process and identify advanced due diligence activities to partially mitigate future risks and impacts to the implementation schedule.

With regard to Block 674, these permitting and environmental issues have been addressed as discussed below.

• NJ TRANSIT and PANYNJ have discussed with Con Edison the components need to be relocated and the site improvements and site clearing required prior to initiating construction of the ARC Project. These discussions include Con Edison’s operations requirements as well as their estimated timeframe to relocate existing Con Edison equipment to an alternate site to allow for their continued operation. • Gasoline and diesel fuel underground storage tanks related to a former gas station on the Con Edison facility were replaced in 1998 and petroleum-impacted soil and groundwater were removed. The results of geotechnical borings advanced during Preliminary Engineering in the vicinity of the Con Edison site indicate that identified contaminants are consistent with historic fill and not likely attributable to specific areas of environmental concern. (FEIS page 4.12-23). Therefore, no schedule risk is anticipated related to storage tanks. • NYSDEC approved a conceptual remedial approach for the site on Block 674 in 2006 (FEIS Page 4.12-23, NYSDEC 2006). PANYNJ representatives have met with NYSDEC and discussed the location of the project on the western portion of Block 674. Consistent with the previously stated findings, NYSDEC has confirmed that there is no other known contamination on the site and the schedule is accurate. • During construction, if excavated materials reveal contamination, sites will be mitigated through the disposal of contaminated soils off site, reuse on site under institutional and engineering controls, or reuse off site. If contamination is discovered on sites and if the material is not excavated and disposed of off site, contamination will be mitigated with

20 Attachment C

institutional or engineering controls consistent with state and federal requirements (FEIS Pages 4.12-26 and 4.12-27). This has been considered in the Project Master Schedule. • The potential for archaeologically sensitive remains under Block 674 has been considered (FEIS pages 6-32 and 6-33) and the time required to address the stipulations in the Programmatic Agreement relevant to such remains are accounted for in the Project Master Schedule. Block 674 has been identified as potentially containing archaeological remains (piers and wharves) at the Twelfth Avenue Fan Plant/Construction Access Shaft site (Block 674). Further information regarding the presence of archaeologically sensitive remains is provided in the Phase IA report (August 2005, January 2008 and May 2008). (FEIS page 6- 6) As stipulated in the Programmatic Agreement, an archaeological monitoring protocol will be developed prior to construction (FEIS pages 6-27; 6-33 to 6-34; FEIS Programmatic Agreement).

SIVE3 13-6 Comment: The FEIS does not analyze the cumulative impacts of the proposed portal project in conjunction with the proposed ARC project:

• The FEIS fails to consider the cumulative impacts of the Portal Bridge Project, even though the ARC Project is dependent on approval and implementation of that proposal.

SIVE3 13-6 Response: Cumulative impacts of the Portal Bridge project have been considered in the FEIS. Wetland impacts are discussed on Page 4.18-13 as well as in Section 4.8 on Page 4.8-29. Both the Portal Bridge and ARC project would remove auto trips from the region and would have positive long- term air quality and traffic impacts, as disclosed in the FEIS on Page 4.18-12. Construction- related impacts to Amtrak and NJ TRANSIT passengers are discussed on Page 5.18-1. As noted, NJ TRANSIT would coordinate with Amtrak to limit service disruptions to off-peak hours to minimize passenger inconvenience.

A cumulative assessment of wetlands impacts and a coordinated program for wetlands mitigation has been discussed by NJ TRANSIT with MIMAC on numerous occasions (see FEIS Appendix 4.8) and a commitment to develop a coordinated approach to wetlands mitigation is presented in FEIS Section 4.8. MIMAC includes the regulatory agencies (NJDEP and USACE) with the responsibility of issuing permits, approving wetland mitigation proposals, and overseeing compensatory mitigation compliance.

SIVE3 13-7 Comment: The FEIS does not address adequately the impacts of climate change on the project and project emissions of greenhouse gases:

• The SDEIS did not address either the effects of climate change on the Project or the potential overall impacts of the Project on greenhouse gas emissions. The FEIS does not address adequately the effects of climate change on the Project especially the effects of sea level rise/flooding on Project facilities and drainage.

SIVE3 13-7 Response: Climate change is a global problem caused by emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) from every conceivable source in every nation of the world. A study by the American Public Transportation

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Association titled “Public Transportation’s Contribution to Greenhouse Gas Reduction” by Todd Davis and Monica Hale of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), September 2007, suggests that investments in transit generally lead to long-term reduction in the growth of GHG emissions. However, the impact of any one transit project on GHG emissions is miniscule within the global context of the problem, and although improvement of all transit across the United States may have a measurable impact on the environment from the overall reduction in GHG emissions, a single transit project by itself will not. Therefore, FTA does not view climate change as a useful consideration in choosing a preference from among the alternatives considered during the NEPA review of a single proposed transit project. Furthermore, at this point, the overall increase or decrease in global GHG emissions resulting from an individual transit project is so small that it would not be possible to predict the impact of that project on the global climate.

The SDEIS did not calculate the impacts of the Project on greenhouse gas emissions, however, the FEIS analysis showed that the ARC project would actually reduce greenhouse gases by reducing the vehicle miles traveled (FEIS Page 4.6-18 at Table 4.6-12; FEIS Appendix 4.6) and, thus, would generate long-term regional air quality benefits. This has been confirmed with additional research that was conducted subsequent to the DEIS, as documented in FEIS Appendix 4.6. Given these facts, it is not viable to evaluate the effects of climate change on the project.

The FEIS does acknowledge that flooding events in the New Jersey portion of project area could be expected to increase in frequency or amplitude if the documented sea-level rise continues (FEIS Page 4.9-4). However, no records of significant flooding exist for the project area in Manhattan (FEIS Page 4.9-8). Furthermore, the first floor elevation of the 12th Avenue Fan Plant is above the 100 year Hudson River flood line.

Further, the examples of global warming do not address projects analogous to ARC and any analysis would involve speculation on flooding connected to future sea level rise, which is not required in the FEIS.

SIVE3 13-8 Comment: The FEIS does not consider alternatives that would avoid impacts to Blocks 674 and 675:

• The FEIS does not consider alternatives that would avoid the impacts on Blocks 674 and 675 and on land use, zoning and public policy for the West Side of Manhattan that would result from the inability to develop these Blocks.

SIVE3 13-8 Response:

The selection of a location on the West Side of Manhattan for a construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant is constrained by two factors: the alignment of the project and the surrounding land uses. The construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant must be located above or in very close proximity to the project tunnel’s alignment and must be consistent with existing and planned land uses.

22 Attachment C

The basic criteria for site selection for the construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant was to find sites adjacent to and above any proposed alignment that are not developed with major structures, or other permanent uses that cannot be at least temporarily moved. (FEIS Appendix 2: FEIS Build Alternative Alignment Routing and Station and Ancillary Facility Location Selection). Since west Manhattan is a densely developed area, the project will use the same location for the construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant to minimize impacts to land use, zoning and public policy. Multiple impacts would be created by using separate sites for the construction staging area/access shaft and the fan plant. Moreover, it is common construction practice to consolidate on one site especially with underground tunneling. Using one location for the construction staging area/access shaft, and constructing a fan plant on a different location, would create multiple impacts. Alignment The project alignment is dictated by acceptable track geometry for desired train speeds, as well as by geotechnical conditions. In order to maintain acceptable track geometry into NYPSE, the new ARC tunnels are required to enter Manhattan between West 27th and West 31st Streets. Alignments entering south of Block 673, which lies between West 27th Street and West 28th Streets, would have required a highly curved alignment that would be extremely difficult to construct in the soft soils below the Hudson River and would have resulted in operating speeds that would not support the targeted service level needed to accommodate the project’s 2030 ridership. The northern limit of feasible alignments was determined to be below the southern portion of Block 676, between West 30th and 31st Streets, as alignments north of this would require the ARC tunnels to cross below the existing North River tunnels. Crossing below the existing North River tunnels would not be possible given the needed clearances between the existing North River tunnels and the new ARC tunnels, and the resulting gradients that would have precluded reliable rail operations and reduced rail capacity below the targeted level. Land Use The location for the construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant needs to be as close as possible to the Hudson River, in order to ventilate the ARC tunnels under the Hudson River. Along with the alignment constraints described above, this limited the possible locations for the construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant. Existing land uses on the eastern shore of the Hudson River were studied to determine potential locations for siting of a construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant. Each location was investigated with respect to space requirements for construction operations and potential resulting impacts. Placement of a fan plant in the Hudson River or in Hudson River Park was considered infeasible due to constructability difficulties and severe environmental impacts. Placement of the construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant in the MTA/LIRR John D. Caemmerer West Side Yards was also not considered feasible due to the severe impacts on Long Island Rail Road operations. The only two locations that met the needs for the construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant were Block 674 and the Terminal Warehouse Building Block 673 between West 27th and 28th Streets. The Terminal Warehouse Building is an historic structure (FEIS Chapter 7) and placement of a fan plant in the structure may have constituted an adverse impact. Such impacts must be avoided if possible, based on the requirements of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (FEIS Page 7-13). Given the tunnels alignment, use of the

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Terminal Warehouse Building would also have resulted in additional impacts through the construction of plenums from the new tunnels under Block 674 to a fan plant in the Terminal Warehouse Building. Finally, placement of the fan plant in the Terminal Warehouse Building would have resulted in the displacement of at least some of the existing businesses that currently occupy space in the building. Therefore, Block 674 was considered the most appropriate site for the construction staging area/access shaft and fan plant. (FEIS Appendix 2: FEIS Build Alternative Alignment Routing and Station and Ancillary Facility Location Selection) Use of Block 674 would require the relocation of Con Ed facilities and activities to Block 675. Block 675 lacks large structures or other permanent uses, and was therefore considered feasible for the relocation of the uses on Block 674 (Con Ed equipment and vehicles) during construction of the project. Based on information provided by the New York City Department of City Planning, there are no approved plans for development on Block 675 which would be impacted by temporary relocation of Con Ed activities. SIVE3 13-9(a) Comment: The FEIS relies on conclusory assertions without factual substantiation and unlawfully defers the identification and analysis of mitigation. The FEIS unlawfully defers discussion of measures to mitigate significant environmental impact of the ARC Project and asserts a variety of conclusions about the supposed lack of any significant environmental impacts that are unsupported by any study or analysis.

SIVE3 13-9(a) Response: The response to USEPA 2-2 describes how the FEIS addressed wetlands mitigation. Other environmental factors are discussed in each appropriate response to other Sive Paget 13 comments.

SIVE3 13-9(b) Comment: Correspondence from the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) to the FTA raised significant concerns that are not addressed in the FEIS. In commenting on the change in design from the DEIS to the SDEIS that eliminated the proposed connection to Pennsylvania Station (which is continued in the FEIS), the Administrator of the FRA stated that, “if implemented, the revised NJT proposal could hasten, if not require, the need for an additional tunnel under the Hudson when compared to the original proposal in the DEIS.” Letter from Joseph H. Boardman, FRA Administrator, to James Simpson, FTA Administrator, dated June 26, 2008). The letter continued to caution that “this less capable design would result in net adverse impacts in security, maintainability, and the ability of the system as a whole to respond to unexpected events such as an accident in out of the current Hudson River tunnels. These are all issues that should be fully considered before release of the final EIS or a decision to provide Federal funding to the project. While the FEIS seeks to address the concerns about the connection to Penn Station by showing it is not reasonable (FEIS at 2-7), the FEIS do not disclose or discuss the serious adverse impacts described in the DFRA Administrators’ letter. This failure is a significant omission in the FEIS.”

SIVE3 13-9(b) Response: Both the NARP 9-6 (and HARRISBURG 3-1) responses discuss the elimination of the PSNY Connector Tunnel.

24 Attachment C

SIVE3 13-9(c) Comment: The FEIS fails to address adequately air quality impacts arising from excavation of soil containing asbestiform minerals. While acknowledging that the release of this material into the air is a concern, it only addresses compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s standards. However, OSHA standards are designed to protect workers, and they do not necessarily protect the public that may be exposed to asbestos during the construction process.

SIVE3 13-9(c) Response: The air quality analysis conducted for construction-related activity is consistent with NEPA and CEQR requirements and does address construction-related emissions, particularly relative to dust for both workers and the public. A Dust Control Plan will be implemented to reduce and monitor dust. Mitigation for air quality, as well as noise and vibration impacts, include enclosures or other barriers to minimize or eliminate impacts to the public (see FEIS Page 5.6- 19). SIVE3 13-9 (d) Comment: The FEIS fails to address the means by which contamination would be remediated. It simply states that contamination found during construction would be mitigated. The FEIS should contain a description of the anticipated remedial approaches, the extent to which residual contamination may remain, and the precautions that would be taken to protect the public again such residual contamination.

SIVE3 13-9(d) Response: Contamination in the form of serpentinite, as noted in the FEIS Page 4.11-7, is believed to contain naturally occurring asbestiform materials, has been reported on the west side of Manhattan in the project area. If disturbed, the asbestiform could pose inhalation hazards during construction. Mitigation for this, if appropriate, will be addressed as part of the Health and Safety Plan (FEIS Page 5.12-12). The approach to mitigation of contaminated materials is discussed on FEIS Pages 5.12-11 and 5.12-9. Mitigation for contamination found during construction will be specified in a Construction Environmental Control Plan, Remedial Action Work Plan and Health and Safety Plan, as identified on FEIS Page 5.12-12, and will be subject to NJDEP, NYSDEC, and NYCDEP oversight.

SIVE3 13-9(e) Comment: A Fan Plant that would be 106 feet in height, and 39 feet wide and 181 feet deep is proposed for Block 674. The FEIS concedes that the operation of a Fan Plant would cause noise levels that exceed the New York City Noise Code. (FEIS at 5.7-11.) Although the FEIS asserts that there would be no significant noise impacts from the operation of the Fan Plant because “silencers” would be added to the fan exhaust system (FEIS at 4.7-59), there is no study demonstrating that addition of silencers would in fact mitigate such otherwise significant noise impacts.

SIVE3 13-9(e) Response: The effectiveness of silencers in mitigating fan plant noise is based on silencer performance data cited in the manufacturer (IAC) specification catalogue. This mitigation is also being used in other projects in the region, such as the East Side Access project. The data in the IAC specification catalogues is a based on laboratory tests. According to the IAC catalogue, a 10- foot long silencer would provide approximately 24-dBA noise reduction; a 7-foot long silencer would provide approximately 20-dBA noise reduction; and a 5-foot long silencer would provide

25 Access to the Region’s Core ROD

approximately 17-dBA noise reduction. As is common practice, during final design of the fan plants, a more detailed noise analysis would be conducted to identify the noise levels at the nearest receptors (during the different modes of fan plant operation). This analysis will be used to determine the required silencer lengths to meet FTA noise criteria and applicable requirements of the New York City Noise Code. (FEIS Noise/Vibration Technical Report, page 24). SIVE3 13-9(f) Comment: The FEIS does not provide support for its assertion that the tunnel in the River would not impact the piles supporting the Hudson River Bulkhead in Hudson River Park. (FEIS at 5.11-12.) Should the tunneling affect the structural integrity of the piles, the bulkhead could collapse, causing the loss of a portion of Hudson River Park and significantly impacting the aquatic life in the area.

SIVE3 13-9(f) Response: The FEIS Build Alternative tunnels’ depth below the Hudson River Bulkhead is sufficient to avoid impact to the Bulkhead timber piles. The Hudson River Tunnels alignment beneath the timber piles of the bulkhead has been designed to ensure the integrity of the bulkhead. Based on pile lengths inferred from historical documents, including construction reports by the Chief Engineer for the ARC project (THE Partnership, 2008. Preliminary Engineering Underground Excavation Impacts on Major Structures Report, Rev 1, February 5, 2008. CIN: NJT 06-046-02- P09.04-NJT-08F-2985), pile tips are 31 feet above the crowns of the proposed tunnels. The 31 foot clearance provides assurance that the structural integrity of the piles will not be affected. (FEIS Page 2-18)

SIVE3 13-9(g) Comment: The FEIS provides no basis for its assertion that soils beneath the Hudson River are not at high risk for liquefaction. (FEIS at 5.9-9.) This is a subject of obvious importance, as the occurrence of liquefaction could significantly impact the bottom of the aquatics of the River.

SIVE3 13-9(g) Response: As discussed above, the FEIS is based on a Preliminary Engineering effort that includes a geotechnical borings program in which liquefaction was specifically addressed (THE Partnership, 2008. The Tunnel Design Calculation: Liquefaction Potential Evaluation of Hudson River Soil Strata, revision), May 8, 2008. Regarding liquefaction, geotechnical analysis performed on the core samples collected as part of the geotechnical borings program indicated that the fine-grained Hudson River soils would not be susceptible to liquefaction when subjected to seismic shaking. The FEIS assertions are based on that borings program. SIVE3 13-9(h) Comment: The EIS does not explain what impacts, if any, would occur from “ground improvement” in advance of TBM (tunnel boring machines) breakthrough to the Twelfth Avenue access shaft.

SIVE3 13-9(h) Response: As stated on Page 5.1-18, the extent of needed ground improvement required is under review. Such analysis is typically done during final design. However, as further stated on Page5.1-18, if required, any ground improvement would be within the right-of-way of Twelfth Avenue and “… would be during off-peak periods, at night, or on weekends to minimize impacts to traffic operations”. The ground improvement would consist of either freezing or jet grouting to stabilize the ground during construction. As described on Page 5.11-5, “ground stabilization”

26 Attachment C methods such as grouting will be performed to stabilize the ground and/or limit groundwater inflow if geotechnical conditions indicate such precautions.

SIVE3 13-10 Comment: The FEIS defers any discussion of measures to mitigate the impacts of using portions of Block 674 for the excavation shaft and construction staging by referencing “negotiations” with Con Edison to reduce such impacts. SIVE3 13-10 Response: When mitigation measures cannot be determined by the time of the issuance of the FEIS and require additional information is needed, such measures are finalized during final design. The specific mitigations cannot be finalized until negotiations with Con Ed are complete. The FEIS commits to the process to continue these negotiations. The FEIS contains a discussion of measures to mitigate the impact of using portions of Block 674 for the ARC project. In the FEIS and Record of Decision, NJ TRANSIT commits to developing a series of final mitigation measures with Con Ed. Discussions to finalize these mitigation measures are underway between Con Ed, NJ TRANSIT, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. As noted in Con Ed’s letter, dated December 8, 2008 and responded to in Letter 19, Con Ed is concerned about a number of issues:

1. NJ TRANSIT must not impair Con Ed’s ability to maintain its operations; 2. NJ TRANSIT must account for traffic flow for Con Ed vehicles; 3. NJ TRANSIT must secure use of appropriate space at Block 675 for relocation of Con Ed equipment on a schedule that does not impact Con Ed’s operations; 4. NJ TRANSIT must return the property (Block 674) in a manner that does not adversely impact future needs on that site; 5. NJ TRANSIT must pay all relocation costs; and 6. NJ TRANSIT must perform all work in a manner that does not restrict the ability to build on the property (Block 674) in the future.

Agreement between NJ TRANSIT and Con Ed on all these issues will be completed before project construction begins in this area.

LETTER 19 – CON EDISON (CONED)

CONED 19-1 Comment: Con Edison supports the ARC project, and Con Edison has been working with NJ TRANSIT over several years to resolve issues relating to the ARC project’s impacts on its utility operations. Although the FEIS revisions address issues raised by Con Edison, FTA’s approval of the project must be conditioned on the following:

1. NJ TRANSIT must conduct the ARC project in a manner so as to not impair Con Edison’s ability to maintain its operation, including the Flush Facility and Fueling Facility; 2. NJ TRANSIT must conduct the ARC Project in a manner so as to provide sufficient ingress and egress and traffic flow for Con Edison’s vehicles to continue operating in an efficient

27 Access to the Region’s Core ROD

manner without any disruption of operations and to ensure that the necessary transportation routes are available for Con Edison operations; 3. NJ TRANSIT must secure use of appropriate space at Block 675 for the relocation of Con Edison’s operations as described in the FEIS on a schedule that allows Con Edison to relocate without any impact to operations; 4. NJ TRANSIT must complete the ARC project and return the property within an agreed upon schedule in a manner that does not adversely impact any future Con Edison needs on that site; 5. NJ TRANSIT and PANYNJ must pay for all of Con Edison’s direct and indirect relocation costs; and 6. NJ TRANSIT must perform all ARC project work in a manner that in no way interferes with, impedes, or restricts Con Edison’s ability to build on the property in the future, including, but not limited to, Con Edison’s ability to build on the site after the ARC Project Twelfth Avenue fan plan and shaft are constructed or imposes any additional costs on Con Edison’s ratepayers in order to build on the site.

CONED 19-1 Response: NJ TRANSIT will continue to work with Con Edison through final design and construction to ensure that Con Edison’s concerns are addressed. FTA will not execute an FFGA until NJ TRANSIT has an agreement with Con Edison. As specified in Attachment B, Summary of Mitigation Measures, NJ TRANSIT has made specific commitments in light of the issues raised by Con Edison. NJ TRANSIT will work with Con Edison to maintain the full functionality of their site after construction of the fan plant. NJ TRANSIT will also coordinate with Con Edison regarding proposed infrastructure construction and operation, temporary relocation of affected Con Edison equipment and vehicles and existing and proposed Con Edison site operations to avoid, minimize or mitigate temporary impacts to these operations and Con Edison’s ability to provide utility service to its customers.

LETTER 20 – TRI-STATE TRANSPORTATION CAMPAIGN (TRISTATE)

TRISTATE 20-1 Comment: Tri-State encourages NJ TRANSIT to continue to work with NYCDOT to ensure the ARC pedestrian improvements and mitigations are effectively implemented.

TRISTATE 20-1 Response: As explained in Chapter 3.4 of the FEIS, New York City Department of Transportation (NYCDOT) has proposed sidewalk improvements in the area of and along Seventh Avenue from West 31st Street to West 34th Street. These improvements would increase the size of some sidewalks and corners and reduce the length of some crosswalks in the area, which could address increased future pedestrian volumes approaching PSNY. As referenced in the FEIS on Page 3.4-35, NJ TRANSIT, in coordination with NYCDOT, has developed pedestrian mitigation measures and has committed to work with NYCDOT to implement them.

28 Attachment C

TRISTATE 20-2 Comment: Tri-State is disappointed that the project’s study area does not expand southward from the project area, specifically noting pedestrian issues on the 32nd Street approach to PSNY at Seventh Avenue.

TRISTATE 20-2 Response: In the SDEIS, the analysis area for the pedestrian analysis was expanded north and east of PSNY. This area was selected because the majority of peak period NJ TRANSIT riders have destinations north and east of PSNY.

In their comments on the SDEIS, the New York City Department of Transportation and the New York City Department of City Planning requested that the analysis area be expanded to include all places where the ARC Project’s impacts exceeded the threshold used for CEQR analysis. The CEQR guidance requires that any place where pedestrian volumes increase by at least 200 people in the AM peak 15-minute period should be included in the analysis. Based on that new analysis, the pedestrian study area was expanded for the FEIS from West 35th Street to West 41st Street between Eighth and Sixth Avenues. The analysis area was not extended to south of PSNY because no areas south of PSNY met the threshold of 200 people in the AM peak period. (FEIS Page 3.4-24 to 3.4-28)

LETTER 21 – LACKAWANNA COALITION (LACKAWANNA)

LACKAWANNA 21-1 Comment: The proposed project should be delayed until the reasons for the elimination of Alternative G are disclosed to the public:

• The public has not had an opportunity to learn precisely why the original goal of the East Side Access was removed from the project. • The public has not had an opportunity to review materials used to make the decisions to eliminate Alternative G from further consideration. • The Major Investment Study Summary Report recommends a result that contradicts the findings presented in the [MIS Summary] report under the performance measures detailed in the report.

LACKAWANNA 21-1 Response: The goals of the ARC Project, which were selected through a public process during the MIS, have remained consistent through the NEPA process. The five goals of the ARC project are:

• Improve Trans-Hudson Mobility; • Utilize, Improve and Expand the Capacity of the Region’s Existing Transit Infrastructure to the Maximum Extent Possible; • Maintain a Safe and Secure Transit System; • Maintain and Enhance the Economic Viability of the Region; and • Preserve and Protect the Environment.

These goals and their objectives are provided in Chapter 1 of the FEIS. Increasing rail access to Manhattan has always been the most important reason for advancing the ARC Project. Access to the East Side of Manhattan was never a stated goal of the ARC Project.

29 Access to the Region’s Core ROD

The public was given numerous opportunities to comment on the MIS study process and findings. There were regularly scheduled citizens meetings and the MIS technical work that culminated in the MIS Summary Report was presented to the RCLC at a public meeting in April 2002. The MIS Summary Report was available to the public prior to the EIS Scoping Meetings at which the public had additional opportunities to review and comment on the work completed through the MIS. The ARC DEIS team maintained a mailing list which included the MIS mailing list and this list was used to notify the public about public meetings, RCLC meetings, project news, updates to the project website and the availability of documents.

For additional discussion of the elimination of Alternative G, see responses to NJ SENATE 5-1 and NARP 9-3.

LACKAWANNA 21-2 Comment: Designation by North Jersey Transportation Planning Authority of the current proposal as the Locally Preferred Alternative (“LPA”) should not be accepted:

• The LPA that was approved in 2005 does not apply to the current ARC Project, because the ARC Project has changed significantly since that time.

LACKAWANNA 21-2 Response: Re-adoption of a Locally Preferred Alternative by the relevant Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) to reflect changes that occur as the project moves through preliminary engineering is specifically required by FTA policy guidance as part of the New Starts process. FTA adopted this policy to ensure that changes that occur as a project advances are indeed still supported by the planning process.

NJ TRANSIT worked with the two MPOs that have planning jurisdiction for the project area, the North Jersey Transportation Planning Authority (NJTPA) and the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC), to ensure that the current project was included in their long range plans. The ARC Locally Preferred Alternative was originally adopted by NJTPA in September 2005, and by NYMTC in March 2006. Since that time, as the project changed, NJ TRANSIT worked with each MPO to ensure that their long range transportation plans were consistent with the changed project elements. In November 2008 each long range transportation plan was amended to make the project consistent with the project analyzed in the FEIS.

LACKAWANNA 21-3 Comment: The Project as currently proposed should be rejected because it would not represent an appropriate use of scarce State funds:

• We object to the currently proposed ARC Project since it represents an expenditure that New Jersey cannot afford, and cannot demonstrate a plan for raising the amount of money that the current plan would require it to contribute to the entire project (ARC and Portal Bridge) as currently devised.

LACKAWANNA 21-3 Response: The FEIS is an environmental document and does not address funding issues. Availability of New Jersey funding sources for the ARC Project is being evaluated as part of the New Starts

30 Attachment C

process. As part of this process, a detailed financial capacity assessment is performed through which the FTA examines the stability and reliability of the funding sources for the project as well as the transit system as a whole. The FTA looks at the strength of both the capital and operating plans, and the non-New Starts share of funding proposed for the project. FTA has already begun the financial capacity assessment for the ARC Project.

For additional information on project funding, see response to NJ SENATE 5-2.

LACKAWANNA 21-4 Comment: The Project as proposed should not be approved because it would cause a severe downgrade in the mobility of a large segment of rail riders on NJ TRANSIT:

• Changes to the project serve to downgrade the quality of access that rail riders will have to Manhattan. Riders on the Morris and Essex and Montclair-Boonton lines will be “evicted” from Penn Station. • Combined with the loss of connectivity with other services and the extra time needed to reach the platforms from street level, it is manifestly unfair to force riders out of Penn Station and into NYPSE.

LACKAWANNA 21-4 Response: The current operating plan for ARC has the Morris and Essex and the Montclair-Boonton lines going to NYPSE, as discussed in FEIS Page 2-12 to 2-15. The FEIS Build Alternative service plan would route 23 trains into existing station tracks at PSNY and 25 trains into NYPSE in the AM peak hour in 2030. M&E Lines (Dover/Summit), the Gladstone Branch and the Montclair- Boonton Line services would serve NYPSE. NEC and North Jersey Coast Line (NJCL) electric service would serve PSNY (SDEIS Page 2-30).

NJ TRANSIT’s basic approach is to assign specific rail lines to either PSNY or NYPSE based on the current ARC operating plan. Since some rail stations in New Jersey are served by more than one rail line, rail lines that serve the same stations in New Jersey are grouped, when possible, in either PSNY or NYPSE. For example, the Morristown Line is grouped with the Montclair/Boonton Line since those two lines stop at some of the same stations in New Jersey. The ARC Project addresses the project goal of improving trans-Hudson mobility by significantly expanding rail capacity into New York City. The FEIS shows that passengers utilizing NYPSE will have equal or better access as compared to PSNY passengers, given that NYPSE is on the northeast side of existing PSNY (the direction of flow for most pedestrians leaving PSNY) and also that NYPSE has improved access to NYCT subways, especially at Sixth Avenue/Broadway. The FEIS also shows that underground connections will be constructed between NYPSE and existing PSNY to facilitate movement of pedestrians between the two facilities.

For more discussion of pedestrian travel times, see response to comment NARP 9-4.

LACKAWANNA 21-5 Comment: The Project should be rejected because it deprives New Jersey Rail riders of a level of mobility available to similarly situated riders in other states:

31 Access to the Region’s Core ROD

• New Jersey train travelers will be at a comparative disadvantage to travelers from New York State suburbs and Connecticut because they will have only one station in New York City.

LACKAWANNA 21-5 Response: The comments may be true, but the project purpose is to improve mobility from New Jersey to midtown Manhattan, not to provide the same level of mobility as Metro North or LIRR riders. The Build Alternative meets the ARC project goal of improving trans-Hudson mobility to midtown Manhattan. Today, travelers from all parts of the region have access to only one station in Manhattan – Long Island to PSNY, and the northern New York suburbs and Connecticut to GCT. The LIRR’s East Side Access project will give travelers from Long Island access to two stations when it is complete. While Metro North is looking to create access to PSNY for its passengers, the NEPA environmental document for this project has not yet been issued.

Furthermore, NJ TRANSIT has looked at ways to provide for future access to the east side of Manhattan, however, any extension of rail service must wait until the NYC Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) finishes construction of its Water Tunnel #3 around 2015. Extending east from NYPSE would require constructing a tunnel in the vicinity of NYCDEP’s Water Tunnel #1, the only tunnel providing water to Manhattan below 34th Street (FEIS page 2- 4). The City of New York will not allow any construction near Water Tunnel #1 until the new Water Tunnel #3, which is currently under construction, is functioning. At that time, NYCDEP will close Water Tunnel #1 for maintenance and will cooperate with NJ TRANSIT to look for ways to extend rail service to the east. The project would go through a separate funding and environmental review process. That process would include public participation in an analysis of alternatives. NJ TRANSIT is already discussing potential options for extending eastward with the MTA.

LACKAWANNA 21-6 Comment: The Portal Bridge Capacity Enhancement Project and ARC should be consolidated for consideration as a single project:

• The Portal Bridge Project and the ARC Project are not separate projects. The Portal Project has no independent utility without the construction of the ARC Project. • The proponents of the two projects have never even alleged that the Portal Bridge Project has any independent utility in the absence of the ARC Project. If the ARC Project is not built, there is no need to replace the Portal Bridge. • This segmentation of the two projects is improper. • The cost of replacing the Portal Bridge should also be allocated to the entire cost of the ARC Project.

LACKAWANNA 21-6 Response: The Portal Bridge project is separate from the ARC Project with its own independent utility (FEIS Page 2-10) because the existing Portal Bridge poses reliability concerns due to its aging and limiting infrastructure and must be replaced. The Portal Bridge is a critical part of Northeast Corridor operations for Amtrak and NJ TRANSIT. The existing bridge’s miter rails, which allow the rails to disengage and the bridge to open and close, are unreliable and have been an ongoing problem since the bridge was constructed over 100 years ago. Bridge openings for

32 Attachment C marine traffic have increased the likelihood of mechanical malfunctions, which cause the bridge to remain in the open position for long periods of time, causing disruption to commuter and intercity rail service. This condition degrades existing rail service reliability and justifies the independent utility of the Portal Bridge Capacity Enhancement project.

In a September 13, 2006 letter to NJ TRANSIT, the FTA agreed that the Portal Bridge project had “…independent utility and was a separate project undergoing a separate NEPA review from the ARC Project”. Recognizing the relationship between the Portal Bridge and ARC projects, FTA specified that a completed Portal Bridge Record of Decision would be required before the ARC Record of Decision would be issued. The Portal Bridge Record of Decision was issued on December 23, 2008. Similarly, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) in their April 10, 2007 comments on the ARC DEIS further confirmed the independent utility of the Portal Bridge and ARC projects. The FTA and USEPA determinations were based upon several considerations, including the importance of the Portal Bridge to Amtrak and NJ TRANSIT for movement across the Hackensack River and the current condition of the aging structure.

Because of its independent utility, the cost of the Portal Bridge Project is not part of the cost of the ARC Project. Rather, a separate funding strategy is being developed for the Portal Bridge Project. Moreover, the Portal Bridge Project is being advanced separately as a joint project by Amtrak and NJ TRANSIT and was subject to a separate environmental review process. The FEIS for the Portal Bridge project does not include the ARC Project in its No Build, and the merits of the Portal Bridge Project have been demonstrated in its FEIS.

LACKAWANNA 21-7 Comment: Near-term improvements that would have substantially increased rail capacity should be restored to the project for baseline comparison purposes:

• We object to the removal of certain “near term” improvements from the original ARC project and we call for the restoration of these improvements into any “baseline” option for consideration of this project. Explain what near-term improvements are part of the “no-build" and if there is any difference in them from the 2003 MIS Summary Report. • NJT now alleges in the FEIS document (Chapter 2 and Response to Comment 45-S at 18-34) that the near-term improvements were actually part of the Build Alternative. NJT acted improperly by not detailing these improvements as a baseline alternative. • The “near term” projects were removed from the ARC Project, and there was no “baseline” alternative used in the analysis of the ARC Project. • NJT has consistently refused to provide a baseline alternative that is more than a “no-build” in clear violation of FTA policy.

LACKAWANNA 21-7 Response: This comment was responded to in the FEIS on Page 18-34. As discussed on that page, these near term improvements were included in the No Build Alternative.

While there were near-term improvements listed in the MIS Summary Report, some but not all of these were included at the beginning of the DEIS process. As stated above, these near-term improvements, which are assumed to be complete by 2030, are included in the ARC No Build

33 Access to the Region’s Core ROD

Alterative and are identified on FEIS Pages 2-9 to 2-11. The project includes properly defined No Build and Baseline alternatives as documented in Chapter 2 of the DEIS, SDEIS and FEIS.

The Transportation Systems Management (TSM) Alternative, a required alternative to be studied in the alternatives analysis process, was identified in the MIS, but dropped from further consideration early in the DEIS process since it did not adequately meet ARC goals and objectives. Some TSM elements have already been implemented and are included as part of the No Build Alternative, such as bi-level coaches and new ferry service on the Hudson and East Rivers (DEIS Page 2-6).

The New Starts Baseline Alternative consists of improvements to the transit system that are relatively low in cost and represent the “best that can be done” to improve transit without major capital investment in new guideway infrastructure. As such, it is different than the No Build Alternative against which environmental impacts are measured in this NEPA document.

Under the New Starts evaluation process FTA reviews the project justification and local financial commitment criteria for each candidate project seeking funding and assigns a rating for each criterion. For some of the project justification criteria, the proposed project is compared against a New Starts “baseline alternative”. A separate Baseline Alternative was developed by NJ TRANSIT and approved by FTA for the New Starts submittal. The New Starts Baseline Alternative includes enhanced off-peak rail service to Newark, Hoboken and New York. For the ARC Build Alternative, the New Starts evaluation is used in conjunction with the evaluation process under NEPA, for which the FEIS has been prepared. Thus the project conforms to both the NEPA and New Starts processes.

LACKAWANNA 21-8(a) Comment: The commenter suggests that questionable representations made in the SDEIS and FEIS documents give rise to “public confusion” because of (a) misleading terminology such as the reference to the additional station capacity under West 34th Street as New York Penn Station Expansion, while that station will be “a separate facility” from the existing Penn Station; (b) labeling changes made to the project between the DEIS and the SDEIS as “refinements” to the Build Alternative, when they are “significant changes that eliminate many desirable features of the original plan”; (c) the understatement of access times from the street to the platforms in the new terminal; and (d) the uncertainty of the number of NJ TRANSIT and AMTRAK trains entering PSNY during the peak commuting hours.

LACKAWANNA 21-8(a) Response: a) & b) Terminology: Throughout the DEIS, SDEIS and FEIS documentation, great care was taken to describe the project and its impacts, including the station depth, the station location, access and egress times, train capacity and many other complex, interrelated project elements. The primary purpose of TAC and RCLC meetings was to provide the public with the opportunity to understand in greater detail and discuss one-on-one the specifics of the project.

c) Pedestrian exit times: While the commenter discusses access times to NYPSE, the FEIS analysis, as described in response to NARP 9-4, assessed egress (exit) times from station platforms to the street. An access time analysis was not performed given that the main concern would be pedestrians exiting the station during an unanticipated event. In addition, the demands

34 Attachment C

on NYPSE would be greatest when several train loads of passengers would be exiting the station. Pedestrian exit times were estimated for combinations of platform and street locations from Penn Station New York and NYPSE (FEIS page 3.4-33). Based on average walking speeds, it would take about 1.5 to 2.5 minutes longer to reach the Seventh or Eighth Avenue subway or the street from NYPSE. (FEIS Page 3.4-33) Alternatively, as noted above, exit times to Sixth Avenue/Broadway would be 2 to 4 minutes less. The commenter is making a general conclusion (2.5 minute exit times) based on only one of the possible pedestrian routes, the entrance of PSNY at 32nd Street and Seventh Avenue. d) Current peak hour train capacity: The commenter notes that NJ TRANSIT alleges that 23 NJ TRANSIT and AMTRAK trains enter PSNY during the peak commuting hour, and in reality 25 NJ TRANSIT and AMTRAK trains enter PSNY during the peak commuting hour. The difference between 23 trains per hour and 25 trains per hour is the difference between the number of trains that can be operated in one peak hour versus the number of train that can be operated over a two hour peak period. In the FEIS, station capacity is referenced in peak hour train capacity because it is a capacity standard used by all commuter rail operations. NJ TRANSIT’s rail service has a two-hour peak in the AM and PM to accommodate the high volumes of ridership. In the FEIS, the 23 trains per hour is based on the maximum number of trains that can be reliably operated in each of the two consecutive peak hours.

While it is often possible to exceed 23 trains in one peak hour, it is not possible to maintain this for 2 consecutive peak hours. The number of trains in the peak hour does vary by 1-2 trains depending on what minute the train arrives at the terminal. For instance, if one or two trains arrive at the first or last minute of the hour, the number of trains in that hour will exceed the 23 trains per hour used in the FEIS. However, on average there are 23 trains per hour in the two peak hours (FEIS Page 18-48, Response to Comment 87-D).

LACKAWANNA 21-8(b) Comment: NJT’s responses to Comments 41-S, 42-S, 49-S, 145-D, 330-D, 332-S, 333-D, 399-S and 421-S were totally non responsive.

LACKAWANNA 21-8(b) Response: Each of the comments cited were carefully reviewed and responses were developed and included in FEIS Chapter 18. The specific references to these comments in FEIS Chapter 18 are listed below. Where additional information has also been provided in this Attachment to the ROD, those references have also been noted. • Comment 41-S: refers to the MPO selection process and LPA designation. This comment was responded to on FEIS Page 18-32 and response to LACKAWANNA 21-2 in this document. • Comment 42-S: refers to the West End Wye track additional travel time without upgrade, which was responded to on FEIS Page 18-32. • Comment 49-S: refers to the elimination of Alternative G that was responded to on FEIS Page 18-38 and response to LACKAWANNA 21-1 in this document. • Comment 145-D: refers to the NYPSE station depth and travel times to street that were responded to on FEIS Page 18-66 and response to LACKAWANNA 21-4 in this document.

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• Comment 330-D refers to how ARC and existing tunnels would work together if there is a problem. This issue was responded to on FEIS Page 18-142 and response to NARP 9-1 in this document. • Comment 332-S refers to station depth, inconvenience and safety/security risk, which was responded to on FEIS Page 18-143 and response to NARP 9-4 in this document. • Comment 333-S refers to station depth and the potential risk for a terrorist attack. This issue was responded to on FEIS Page 18-143. • Comment 399-S: inquired if N J Transit considered obtaining more EMU’s for existing and electrified line. This comment was responded to on FEIS Page 18-174. • Comment 421-S: Requested FTA to hold an ARC RCLC meeting. This comment was responded to on FEIS Page 18-181.

LACKAWANNA 21-8(c) Comment: There is also an allegation of reduced travel time through the creation of one-seat ride opportunities and improved platform egress that is not substantiated in the FEIS or in Response to Comment 64-S in FEIS Chapter 18.

LACKAWANNA 21-8(c) Response: The ARC Project would reduce travel time for thousands of travelers. This is shown in the FEIS on Page 3.1-22 and is an essential component of calculating the cost effectiveness of the project for New Starts purposes. The greatest travel time savings would go to travelers from along the Bergen/Main Line, Pascack Valley Line, and Raritan Valley Line going to New York City. For example, from Suffern, New York, travel time would decrease by five minutes. Travel time on the Raritan Valley Line from Raritan to New York City would decrease by seven minutes. Without ARC, passengers on these lines have to transfer at Frank R. Lautenberg Station in Secaucus or Penn Station in Newark. With ARC, there would be a one-seat-ride to New York City. LACKAWANNA 21-9 Comment: The Project as currently devised is contrary to FTA policy with respect to mobility improvements, operating efficiencies, transportation system user benefits, and direct and indirect cost of alternatives and should be rejected.

LACKAWANNA 21-9 Response: The issues raised in this comment are analyzed in FTA’s New Starts process, rather than in a NEPA document. The New Starts process culminates in a project rating by FTA based on a set of quantifiable criteria. These criteria include mobility and cost measures, which are described below. The project is consistent with FTA’s policies and NJ TRANSIT continues to address the referenced New Starts mobility and cost measures (including mobility improvements, environmental benefits, cost effectiveness, operating efficiencies, transit-supportive land use policies and future patterns) in its annual New Starts submittal to the FTA. The project received an overall project rating of “medium-high” in FTA’s FY2009 Annual Report to Congress which means it may continue to advance through the federal process. The FTA has evaluated the project as favorable based on performance against these quantifiable mobility and cost measures.

LACKWANNA 21-10 Comment: NJTPA approval of the ARC Project at its current cost level should not be recognized.

• The project cost is misrepresented in the MPO documents

36 Attachment C

LACKWANNA 21-10 Response: When NJTPA adopted the project as part of the fiscally constrained long range plan in November 2008, they specifically identified that the ARC Project had a $9.1 billion capital cost. Since none of the cost of the project were coming from New York, fiscal constraint was not an issue in NYMTC’s adoption of the project in their long range transportation plan. The $9.1 billion includes $8.7 billion for construction of the project and some rail equipment needed to operate the opening day (2017) service plan. The $9.1 billion also includes $400 million for additional rail equipment need to operate the 2030 service plan.

The two different cost figures are discussed in the NJTPA resolution. NJTPA Resolution # A- 525: Approval of an amendment to the regional transportation plan to update the cost of the ARC Tunnel (adopted November 10, 2008) states: “Whereas, the base project cost remains unchanged ($7.6 billion), the cost of constructing the ARC Project has increased to $8.7 billion, because of added escalation and contingency requirements requested by the Federal Transit Administration. The project will also acquire $400 million in new train cars and related equipment to be purchased in 2030. This addition will bring the total to $9.1 billion.”

LACKAWANNA 21-11 Comment: The connector tunnel between the ARC Tunnel and existing PSNY was eliminated.

• Amtrak and its riders would also be harmed, since the project as redefined in June, 2007 now precludes interoperability between the existing Amtrak Northeast Corridor (NEC) Line and the proposed new line to be built by NJT.

LACKAWANNA 21-11 Response: Please refer to response to Harrisburg 3-1 and NARP 9-1 for the PSNY Connector discussion.

LACKAWANNA 21-12 Comment: New Jersey riders are harmed by this project because the project entails: a) a new deep cavern terminal, b) precluding access to the east side of Manhattan and c) riders on the M & E and Montclair-Boonton Lines would loose access to PSNY.

LACKAWANNA 21-12 Response: New Jersey riders will not be harmed by this project, see responses to a) NARP 9-4, b) Lackawanna 21-1 and c) Lackawanna 21-4 for responses to these comments.

INDIVIDUALS

LETTER 22 – MR. JOHN KAZANJIAN (KAZANJIAN)

KAZANJIAN 22-1 Comment: The commenter referenced a Kearny, New Jersey rail station where people can board a commuter train. He asked where the site is located. He also asked if a Kearny rail station is mentioned in the FEIS.

KAZANJIAN 22-1 Response:

37 Access to the Region’s Core ROD

A Kearny Station is not mentioned in the FEIS; however, there is reference to a Kearny sub- station, which is used to provide electric power in Kearny. There are no plans for a commuter rail station in Kearny as part of the ARC project. In a separate action, NJ TRANSIT is working with Kearny on a Transit Oriented Development plan for a possible station in Kearny on the Harrison-Kingsland Branch, although there is currently no rail service on this line. If built with federal funds, such a station would be subject to a separate NEPA process.

LETTER 24 – MR. BERNARD MARKEY (MARKEY)

MARKEY 24-1 Comment: Morris and Essex line riders would have to spend an additional 3-4 minutes each way going around a large loop to get to the new tunnel rather than running along, or parallel to existing Northeast Corridor Tracks.

MARKEY 24-1 Response: Morris and Essex line riders have direct access to the new ARC tunnels and NYPSE via the NEC and would not use the proposed Secaucus loop. The loop would be used by Main/Bergen, Pascack Valley, and Port Jervis line trains.

MARKEY 24-2 Comment: The new tunnel will terminate in a new station well below the existing Penn Station resulting in minutes of extra time for Morris and Essex, and other line riders, to get to the surface.

MARKEY 24-2 Response: As discussed in response to NARP 9-4, a comparison of walk times between existing PSNY and NYPSE demonstrates that egress times are similar and that there would not be a downgrade in mobility for NJ TRANSIT rail riders (FEIS on page 3.4-33). The current ARC operating plan has the Morris and Essex and the Montclair-Boonton lines using NYPSE. NYPSE will have wide platforms and modern stairs, escalators, and elevators that will be a great improvement over the century-old platforms and stairs in the existing parts of PSNY. While NYPSE will be much deeper than the existing PSNY platforms, modern, fast escalators will bring passengers into and out of NYPSE quickly and safely.

MARKEY 24-3 Comment: The project currently terminates at Penn Station. The project should provide for two tracks going to the vicinity of Grand Central Station.

MARKEY 24-3 Response: The ARC project terminates at NYPSE. The reason an alternative to have the project go to GCT was eliminated (Alternative G ) is discussed in response to NJ SENATE 5-1.

For discussion of issues related to eastward extension of the project and Water Tunnels #1 and #3, please see response to LACKAWANNA 21-5.

38 Attachment C

LETTER 25 – MR. FRED PERILSTEIN, P.E (PERILSTEIN)

PERILSTEIN 25-1 Comment: The “Federal infrastructure repair economic stimulus package” now being discussed in Washington, D.C will permit the addition of desired ARC project enhancements (PSNY Connector, 8-track station, and East Side extension) that were deleted from the project for budgetary reasons.

PERILSTEIN 25-1 Response: Whether or not an economic stimulus package would provide any more funds for this project is speculative, however, the availability of additional funds alone does not address all of the reasons why each of the components identified were changed.

PSNY Connector The reasons for deleting the connector are described in response to HARRISBURG 3-1.

8-track station The DEIS Build Alternative did include two, 2-track-over-2-track caverns under West 34th Street. The DEIS station configuration did require that the northern cavern would extend beyond the West 34th Street public right-of-way limits under private properties on the north side of West 34th Street. In addition, the service plan for the DEIS Build Alternative only utilized six outfitted tracks, four on the upper level and two on the lower level. The FEIS Build Alternative station cavern is a single, 3-track-over-3-track cavern that would fit within the public right-or-way limits. The FEIS Build Alternative service plan would continue to utilize six station tracks as defined in the DEIS Build Alternative but would not provide additional expansion capacity. The FEIS Build Alternative station cavern design responded to concerns expressed by New York City, property owners and businesses regarding the impact that the underground station construction in the original location could have on redevelopment plans for the north side of West 34th Street, between Eighth and Seventh Avenues in Manhattan. (SDEIS Pages 2-12 to 2- 13).

East Side extension Response to LACKAWANNA 21-5 discussed the ability to extend service to the east. PERILSTEIN 25-2 Comment: Although the Tappan Zee Bridge replacement project is not mentioned in the FEIS, this project which will have a direct effect on northern New Jersey residents, and NJ TRANSIT should have a voice in this project.

PERILSTEIN 25-2 Response: In FEIS Chapter 2, page 2-11, the Tappan Zee Bridge/I-287 Corridor DEIS is described and categorized as a planned project not included in the No Build Alternative. It explains that if this project was implemented, it could impact the Build Alternative. Because a Locally Preferred Alternative has not been adopted into the MPO’s (NYMTC) Long Range Plan and a DEIS has not been issued, it is not included in the FEIS evaluation. Coordination is ongoing with the project sponsors to ensure that the ARC project is compatible with and does not preclude this project.

39

ATTACHMENT C

COMMENT LETTERS

900 Second Street, N.E. Suite 308 Washington, D.C. 20002-3557 Phone 202-408-8362 Š Fax 202-408-8287 Š [email protected] Š http://www.narprail.org

November 21, 2008

The Honorable Mary Peters U.S. Secretary of Transportation

Dear Secretary Peters:

We strongly urge you not to allow the Federal Transit Administration to sign a Record of Decision in New Jersey Transit’s Access to the Region’s Core project. The elimination of the connecting link between the new tunnels and New York Penn Station makes this project unworthy of federal funding in its present form. It is unacceptable to make such a huge infrastructure investment and ten years hence have New York Penn Station still linked to New Jersey only by the existing, century old pair of tunnels.

Further, we ask you to oppose—and urge your successor to oppose—federal funding for this project so long as NJT keeps secret the documentation underlying the 31-page "Executive Summary" of the 2003 Major Investment Study. The public is entitled to all 1,600 pages of the analysis that led to the rejection of constructing a link between NYP and Grand Central Terminal and the decision to build a separate, dead-end terminal on Manhattan's west side, which many advocates believe is a waste of scarce resources.

Again, if this project goes forward in its present form, the practical reality is to forever preclude Amtrak trains and certain New Jersey Trains from ever using the new tunnels.

More information is in the pages accompanying this letter. We would appreciate the opportunity to make a presentation to you or your staff. Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

George L. Chilson Ross B. Capon Chairman of the Board President and CEO

Our Mission: A modern, customer-focused national passenger train network that provides a travel choice Americans want cc: The Honorable Joseph Boardman, Federal Railroad Administrator The Honorable Sherry E. Little, Acting Federal Transit Administrator U. S. Senators and U. S. Representatives along the Northeast Corridor Major city mayors along the Northeast Corridor William Crosbie, Acting President, Amtrak Amtrak Board of Directors

Supporting information regarding views of the National Association of Railroad Passengers on New Jersey Transit’s Access to the Region’s Core

List of Contents: I. New Tunnels Must Link to Penn Station II. Why any tunnel project that does not include an NYP link should be rejected III. FTA Cost Effectiveness Index IV. Connection between Penn Station and Grand Central (“Alternative G”) V. Not a new issue for us Appendix A. Final EIS Discussion of Connection and the No. 7 Subway Extension Appendix B. Gradients

I. New Tunnels Must Link to Penn Station

While there is widespread agreement that two more Hudson River tunnels are needed, the public is largely unaware of the limited utility of what is planned. The public will be outraged when the truth is more widely known, and especially in response to service interruptions the connection might have avoided.

Failure to build this link would create severe problems for New York-New Jersey trains using Penn Station. This includes Amtrak trains (Acela Express, Northeast Regionals, Keystone Service, Carolinian, Palmetto and several overnight trains) and about half of New Jersey Transit trains.

Already, single-track operation on weekends required for track maintenance is bumping up against growing service demands. Moreover, single-track operation would continue to cause dramatic problems at random other times due to emergency blockages by disabled trains, and for extended periods in the case of major overhauls of the tunnels.

NJT’s plan until June, 2007, included this vital connection between the new tunnels and Penn Station. The abandonment of that connection makes this project unworthy of federal funds.

In Manhattan, the new tunnels would link only to a new, dead-end NJT terminal 175 feet under 34th Street and 14 stories below and 200 feet north of Penn Station. Moreover, the capacity of this planned, new terminal has been reduced from eight tracks to six, and effective capacity and reliability further reduced by elimination of the tail tracks on both levels because New York City has prohibited NJT from coming within a 200 foot radius of the century old Water Tunnel #1 under Sixth Avenue. We are not aware that NJT has reduced its ridership projections to be consistent with the project’s downsizing.

There are at least four potential ways to solve the problem, using U.S. DOT’s substantial leverage to “encourage”: • NJT to revisit its earlier plan involving a routing above the #7 extension and some cut-and-cover construction. • New York City to modify the elevation of the #7 subway extension; • Enhancing capacity of Penn Station and planning for a Penn Station-Grand Central link (see section IV), Alternative G in the 2003 Major Investment Study. • NJT and possibly Amtrak to accept a steeper gradient than they would prefer;

With regard to the second bullet, the Final EIS (FEIS) states that, from an engineering standpoint, modifying the elevation of the #7 subway by five to 12 feet would permit restoration of the vital connection to NJT’s existing plans. However, “the modification would add a minimum of 1.5 to 2 years to the schedule for completing the No. 7 Line project, which is unacceptable to the City of New York and MTA.” See Appendix A for more of the relevant FEIS text. (The #7 subway extension is being built without federal funds.)

The FEIS does not say when NJT revealed its changed plans to the City of New York or Amtrak. Timing of those revelations would give an indication of how seriously one should take NJT claims that they really wanted the link and did everything reasonable to make it happen. NJT announced the change in late June, 2007, and the agency presumably was aware of the possible change and its implications for the link well before then.

It is outrageous that a “project for the centuries” will be substandard because today’s officials are unwilling to accept or enforce such a small delay.

The current NJT plan, though nominally designed around the needs of New Jersey- Manhattan commuters, contains serious problems for them, notably: • the length of time it will take to travel between the surface and the proposed deep cavern station, estimated to be four or five minutes in each direction; • the continued dependence of NJT and Amtrak trains using Penn Station on two, century-old tunnels, with a lack of redundancy in the event one or both 1910 bores close for any reason. (Penn Station will continue to be a major terminal for both NJT and intercity trains.) • safety and security issues associated with any attempt at a quick evacuation of large numbers of people from 175 feet below ground.

II. Why any tunnel project that does not include an NYP link should be rejected

(1) Today’s security-conscious world cries out for the redundancy and operational flexibility of the pre-June, 2007 plan. Consider the implications of having the existing tunnels (used by both Amtrak and NJT trains) disabled either temporarily or, heaven forbid, for days or months. Under the present plan, it would be impossible to maintain any kind of run-through service—either existing intercity service, or needed services within the region (for example, Trenton-Stamford; Long Island-New Jersey).

(2) As then-Amtrak President & CEO Alex Kummant stated in his April 28 letter to NJT, “Failure to construct two short connections into Penn Station in Manhattan

2 from the proposed ARC tunnels constitutes…a breach in long established goals to expand Northeast Corridor operational capability. Considering the very substantial, and even unprecedented, projected increase in the number of passenger trains operating over the entire Northeast Corridor (as documented by all NEC users in Phase I of the Northeast Corridor Master Plan), and with such projected increases centered upon travel to Manhattan, Amtrak has real concerns that the existing NEC trans-Hudson rail tunnels will prove inadequate to sustain operations in the future” (bolding added).

(3) New York City arguably has the world’s greatest untapped potential for intense development of intercity rail services to relieve air congestion. That potential will remain largely unrealized if the ARC project goes forward as currently conceived. Amtrak has been reduced to arguing with New Jersey Transit over access to “slots” and to saying that they will require fifth and sixth tunnels. However, it seems more likely that, as stated in NJT’s summary of Amtrak’s position at page 18-24 of the Final EIS, “the new ARC tunnels will likely be the last rail tunnels constructed under the Hudson River for many generations.”

(4) Maintenance is basically limited to 55-hour weekend windows, yet growing demand for weekend service—both commuter and intercity—is bumping up against those windows. Again quoting Kummant: “Amtrak further regrets the loss of numerous advantages the joint connection to Penn Station would have provided to security, operational redundancy, and maintenance flexibility to minimize service outages. The ARC tunnels, now providing sole benefit to NJ TRANSIT services, can no longer be considered part of a broader integrated Penn Station terminal system intended to accommodate day-to-day requirements under widely varying conditions and very large train volumes.”

III. FTA Cost Effectiveness Index

We understand the pressure on NJT from FTA criteria which focus on travel minutes saved and ignore reliability and redundancy: anything increasing project costs without saving more minutes makes the project weaker when measured against FTA criteria. But these criteria are wholly inappropriate when applied in a post-9/11 world to a key strategic asset in such a densely populated area.

IV. Connection between Penn Station and Grand Central (“Alternative G”)

The New Jersey Association of Railroad Passengers argues that creation of this connection, “Alternative G” in the 2003 Major Investment Study, combined with some capacity enhancements at Penn Station, would eliminate the need for NJT to build the three track over three track "deep cavern" terminal.

According to the 2003 MIS, there is sufficient track capacity on the lower level of Grand Central Terminal to absorb NJT trains that would be through-routed to that station. Moreover, the original ARC scoping document highlighted the fact that 70% of job sites on the east side of Manhattan are within a 10 minute walk of Grand Central, the same

3 criteria for Penn Station is only 36%. Even if these percentages change as the area near Penn Station develops, NJT’s present plan will force a huge proportion of New Jersey commuters to fend for themselves to make their way to the East Side of Manhattan on already overcrowded transportation facilities.

The National Association of Railroad Passengers is intensely frustrated that the documentation of this so-called “Alternative G” remains under wraps after five years. The only thing made public from the 2003 Major Investment Study is a 31-page “Executive Summary.” We have tried and failed to get FTA (including at the Administrator level) to force NJT to release the full report, but the response is always “it is just a draft and not appropriate for release.”

We have been told that this is a 1,600 page document and, despite application through New Jersey’s Open Public Meeting Records Act, have been unable to secure its release. This study was conducted using public funds for the benefit of the public and the public should have access to its analysis that led to its conclusions.

Given the huge dollar amounts and long-term opportunity costs involved, it is not reasonable to ask the public to assume that the 2003 report contains a rational basis for eliminating Alternative G, and that NJT’s response to pro-Alternative G “Comment 9-D” at pages 18-19 and 18-20 of the recently-released ARC Final EIS is objective.

V. Not a new issue for us

In conclusion, I need to note that we have been working on this concern for a long time, going back to January meetings with FTA officials, and our New Jersey colleagues have at this for 15 years. We are not Johnny-come-latelys and turn to you only out of exasperation at how the project is unfolding.

Appendix A. Final EIS Discussion of Connection and the No. 7 Subway Extension

From ARC Final EIS, page 2-7 (bolding added; PSNY = Penn Station New York; NYPSE = the separate, new 34th Street terminal NJT plans)

"At meetings in July 2008, NJ TRANSIT and Amtrak evaluated a conceptual connection that would avoid impacts to the No. 7 Line...A second conceptual connection was developed that assumed that the No. 7 Line subway extension final design could be modified in a way to avoid both the PSNY Connector and ARC NYPSE tunnels in order to achieve an operationally feasible connection with a maximum grade of 2.1%. Review of this alternative deemed that while it is feasible from an engineering perspective, the concept required elimination or lowering of the No. 7 Line subway extension by 5 to 12 feet. The alternative would also result in significant cost and schedule impacts to both ARC and the No. 7 Line project. MTA's Capital Construction Corporation stated at a meeting in August 2008 that the modification would add a minimum of 1.5 to 2 years to the schedule for completing the No. 7 Line project, which is unacceptable to the City of New York and MTA.

4

"The alternative connection to PSNY was also limited in terms of its connectivity to tracks within PSNY in order to achieve the 2.1% maximum grade. The environmental impacts resulting from construction of this alternative would include disruption to the Hudson River bottom and cut-and-cover construction from Hudson River Park through the west side of Manhattan. MTA was also concerned about the vertical clearance between the tunnel and LIRR West Side Yards, and the proposed development sites on the Eastern Rail Yards. The tunnels would require the relocation of the LIRR maintenance building, and would delay the agreement for developing over the rail yard. Both of these impacts were unacceptable to MTA.

"Although additional alternatives to make the connection from the new Build Alternative tunnels to PSNY...were evaluated at the request of Amtrak and FRA, none were found that could address the various constraints that had been identified in the original analysis. Therefore, the PSNY Connector was not reinstated as a component of the Build Alternative."

Appendix B. Gradients.

The following comments are included in case the question of how steep a grade is acceptable is seen as reducing the utility of the project (for example, as ruling out the connection between the new tunnels and Penn Station).

Some organizations adhere rigidly to “ideal” engineering standards even when the result is a substandard project that ignores a strong business case for a steeper grade. NJT claims its locomotive-powered trains have trouble making existing 2% grades. However, if NJT has contemplated for over a year having no connection at all, they presumably could develop an operating plan that minimizes use of the connection by trains with locomotives.

There are 4% grades used by diesel-powered commuter trains in Ogden, Utah, and electric commuter trains in Philadelphia (outbound from Center City to the airport).

NJT has a standard maximum of 2% (more conservative than Amtrak’s standard), although 3% was considered during the project study phase and later rejected.

Prepared November 21, 2008

5

Alan M. Voorhees Transportation Center www.policy.rutgers.edu/vtc Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 33 Livingston Avenue 732-932-6812 New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901 Fax 732-932-3714

Mr. Tom Schulze ARC Project Director NJ TRANSIT One Penn Plaza East, 8th Floor Newark, NJ 07105-2246

December 5, 2008

Dear Mr. Schulze:

I am writing to convey to NJ TRANSIT my strong and continuing support for the Access to the Region's Core Project (ARC) as outlined in the Draft Final Environmental Impact Statement. As the initial director of ARC from 1994 to 1998, I have long viewed this project as a necessity for meeting the growing demand for travel between New Jersey and New York City, particularly to midtown Manhattan. During this past decade, operations on the Northeast Corridor into Penn Station New York have reached practical capacity.

Demand on NJ TRANSIT commuter rail services to Penn Station New York has quadrupled since 1980 – including a 25 percent spike since the events of September 11, 2001 -- and is projected to continue trending upwards. As documented by researchers at Rutgers University, 75 percent of all new jobs created in Manhattan during the 1990s were captured by New Jersey residents, in large measure because of the improved commuter rail access provided to Manhattan. Because of the significant wealth generation of Manhattan, it is critical to assure increased trans-Hudson rail capacity to accommodate future growth from west of the Hudson to this job market. The realization through ARC of a one-seat ride into midtown Manhattan for a number of important rail corridors is another extremely positive feature of the project.

As the late George Warrington so eloquently advocated, only with this once-in-a-hundred-years investment in ARC can we meet that growing demand. As new challenges, such as volatile energy prices and greenhouse gas emissions, inexorably propel us toward a greater future reliance on our public transit assets, the timely delivery of this project becomes ever more essential. Without ARC – and its more than doubling of precious rail capacity in midtown Manhattan from west of the Hudson - - New Jerseyans’ incomes, economy and aspirations for transit mobility will be stifled in the coming decades. With ARC, not only will service to midtown Manhattan increase and improve, but the new capacity could facilitate the extension of commuter rail into a number of underused corridors within New Jersey and beyond.

Sincerely,

Martin E. Robins Senior Fellow, Alan M. Voorhees Transportation Center

TESTIMONY

OF

PHILIP K. BEACHEM

PRESIDENT

NEW JERSEY ALLIANCE FOR ACTION

AT THE PUBLIC HEARING ON THE

ACCESS TO THE REGION’S CORE (ARC)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2008

My name is Phil Beachem. I am the President of the New Jersey Alliance for Action. The Alliance for Action is a non-partisan and non-profit organization of over 600 business, government, labor and academic organizations. Since 1974, we have been dedicated to improving the economy and our quality of life through sound and environmentally sensitive infrastructure development. Transportation improvements have been at the heart of the Alliance’s 34 year history, from our support for the creation of NJ TRANSIT to our support of the tunnel project.

Not many people realize this --- but today our entire commuter rail system narrows down to an obsolete, century-old, two-track railroad under the Hudson River. Each morning, “one single track” handles all of NJ TRANSIT’s and Amtrak’s trains traveling to New York City. It’s unbelievable that our state and this region, one of the most powerful regions in the country and the entire world --- relies on such an antiquated and unreliable system in the year 2008. I often compare this tunnel project to the widening of the middle of an hour glass and without expanding it, we are constrained as to how many trains can reach New York City.

Most importantly we have a project that will do exactly what we set out to do. “Double” the number of trains to New York --- from 23 to 48 trains each hour. That gives every station and every person a transfer free ride. It also allows us to create much more train service within New Jersey --- encouraging more people to leave their cars behind.

The last time we created rail capacity under the Hudson was almost 100 years ago. This current planning study, Access to the Region’s Core, actually began in the late 80’s and considered 137 different ways to build this type of project and studied them extensively.

Almost twenty years later we are in an extraordinary position to move forward today. Both states completely support this project and NJ TRANSIT and the Port Authority are moving quickly with over 250 engineers advancing the engineering on this project. We are on our way forward today. Governors Corzine and Paterson, the Senators and key congressional representatives have studied and support the project and understand what it takes to move this project forward through NJ TRANSIT and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey --- and that commitment is on display today.

As it has in the past, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has recommitted its support for regional infrastructure projects through a strong demonstration of financial support to this project and other infrastructure projects that benefit the region.

We also have leaders from the business, labor, transportation and environmental communities all supporting the project. Today is our time to get this done. The New Jersey Alliance for Action has joined forces with the New York Building Congress to co- chair a public education campaign to explain the benefits of this project to the public.

We wholeheartedly support the project. Thank you.

December 8, 2008 Mr. Tom Schulze ARC Project Director NJ Transit One Penn Plaza East, 8th Floor Newark, NJ 07105-2246 [email protected]

VIA EMAIL

Re: Comments on the Access to the Region's Core Tunnel Final Environmental Impact Statement

Dear Mr. Schulze:

We submit the following comments on the above-referenced Final Impact Statement ("FEIS") for the Access to the Region's Core ("ARC") tunnel.

Tri-State strongly supports the ARC project as documented in the FEIS. The need for new transit capacity is critical. Ridership on NJ Transit is at an all-time high and will only grow as concern about oil supplies and climate change cause commuters to look for alternatives to their cars. In addition, the economic climate has increased the importance of transit infrastructure projects – a 2004 study by the Surface Transportation Policy Partnership found that Public Transportation investment created more jobs than either new road capacity or road and bridge repair.1 The ARC project is an important piece in our region's future and we applaud the efforts of all the agencies involved.

Congestion in the train tunnels under the Hudson severely impedes the ability of Amtrak and NJ Transit to move efficiently between states. ARC doubles the capacity of cross Hudson NJ Transit service. The new tunnel will reduce congestion by promoting mass transit ridership, and for existing commuters, the quality of trips will improve through better timetables and more timely trains. The new tunnel will also be a huge boost for residents from Southern New York, and northern and northwestern New Jersey,

1 Setting the Record Straight: Transit, Fixing Roads and Bridges Offer Greatest Job Gains, Surface Transportation Policy Project (Jan. 18, 2004), available at http://www.transact.org/library/decoder/jobs_decoder.pdf. 350 West 31st Street 212.268.7474 (p) Suite 802 212.268.7333 (f) New York, NY 10001 tstc.org enhancing service on the Montclair/Boonton and Morris/Essex train lines and allowing more one seat rides from Bergen and Rockland Counties.

Tri-State is pleased to see concerns about the project's pedestrian impacts are addressed in a more comprehensive fashion in the FEIS. The inadequate pedestrian features surrounding the current Penn Station are causing dangerous situations for commuters and residents. The corner of 34th Street and Seventh Avenue is among the worst in the city for accidents involving pedestrians. These conditions will worsen as more people use the station and the surrounding blocks.

To this end, Tri-State applauds NJ Transit's cooperation with the New York City Department of Transportation to mitigate the increased pedestrian volumes' impact on the sidewalks, crosswalks and corners surrounding the project area.2 The FEIS cites several planned mitigation measures including the relocation of street furniture and vendors and the retiming of crosswalk signals. There is also a network of underground connections to the existing Penn Station and surrounding subway stations that will help mitigate pedestrian pressure on the sidewalks. Many of sidewalks in the area will require widening and the allocation of street space may require redistribution. Tri-State encourages NJ Transit to continue their cooperation with NYC DOT to ensure the ARC project is maximally compatible with pedestrian improvements and impact mitigation is effective and concurrently implemented.

Tri-State is disappointed to note that the project's study area does not extend southward from the project area. The pedestrian environment surrounding the current Penn Station is already dire and will get worse with the increased traffic from the new tunnel. For instance, on the 32nd Street approach to Penn at Seventh Avenue, pedestrians are crowded off of the narrow sidewalks, past the idling busses and into the street. NJ Transit must address these conditions and approach NYC DOT with solutions to an increasingly dangerous situation.

The ARC project is vital for the health of our regional economy and environment and we strongly support NJ Transit’s efforts to bring this project to fruition. However, NJ Transit must continue to be mindful that their riders' commutes don’t end at the station; they continue out onto the streets around Penn Station. Commuters deserve a safe and easy commute for their entire journey, and an attractive environment for the portions of their trip that rely on walking. We must ensure that the city streets are prepared for the influx of those taking advantage of this great project.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Truly,

Kyle Wiswall Staff Attorney

2 NJ Transit, FEIS, p. 3.4-17.