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Ciety,3 Based on Avery Powerful Political Consensus WHS £0 ?fi? jutr/fiJ/? 9s vis-J ISRAEL €<> »«. ACTIVITY OF MARGINAL POLITICAL GROUPS ANALYZED Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French No 5-6, Oct-Dec 8l pp 890-921 [Article by Ilan Greilsannner] [Text] This study is a comparative analysis of the main characteristics and func tions of marginal political groups in Israel. Why do we use the term "marginal" to designate non-consensus groups. The terminol ogy applied to this phenomenon by researchers is very rich. Political scientists from the other side of the Atlantic have the habit of contrasting "radical" forces with liberal and conservative parties. E. Shils has familiarized us with the con cepts of center and periphery. We also frequently find the words "extremist," "antidemocratic," "revolutionary," and so forth. If the term "marginal" has recently been in vogue—especially since 1968, although the meaning of the word has evolved since then—it is most likely because it Is a neutral expression, without any ideological connotation, that "covers the multi farious aspects of a rejection of the dominant values."+ This term thus covers not only rightwing and leftwing extremism, but also religious, antireligious and antimodern extremism and, in general, all social and political nonconformist groups. In recent years, the use of the concept of marginality has proven particularly fruit ful regarding medieval history. In studying individuals and groups which were ex cluded or which excluded themselves from society (heretics, Jews, the insane, for eigners, students, etc), and how the medieval society regarded them, one becomes aware of the fact that the marginals surprisingly reveal the consensus and myths of their environment.2 Moving from a study of marginal individuals to an analysis of marginal political forces within a given system poses problems, but the objective is still to regard the non-consensus group as a mirror or something that reveals the society as a whole. In the case of Israel, a comparative study of the characteristics and func tions of the political marginals will shed light on the values of the main majority parties, and primarily on the Labor Alignment and the Likud. Israeli society readilv lends itself to a study of marginal groups in that it is a pluralist so ciety,3 based on a very powerful political consensus, and it has a large number of extremist forces located along extremely varied ideological axes.4 After analyzing the historical process of the marginalization of these forces, we will raise two questions: What do they have in common? What is their impact on the Israeli political system? The Marginalization Process Political Diversity in the Yishuv During the first 30 years of this century, the Jewish community of Palestine (the Yishuv) was marked by extreme political diversity, a real plethora of parties.5 On the left, we find the gamut of the most varied socialisms, from the most orthodox communism to the most reformist socialism, including anarchist, labor unionist, Tolstoyan and populist currents. Immigrants from the second and third waves of immigration (aliyah) were imbued with the radical and socialist ideas widespread in Russia. On the right, developing a little later, the currents which are general ly grouped together under the term "civil camp" and which could be called anti- socialist movements: the liberal movements of various hues and the ultranationalist groups, going all the way to the extremist Revisionist Party. The fourth aliyah, which began in 1924 and was comprised mainly of Jews from Poland ruined by that country's anti-Semitic policy, was at the origin of the development of these right- wing currents. On a religious plane, the Yishuv society embodied a large number of beliefs, from the most secular to the most fanatically orthodox. Among the orthodox Jews, a fundamental cleavage occurred between the national religious groups in favor of creating a modern, sovereign state, and the anti-Zionist religious groups, which came mainly from the "old Yishuv" and were settled in the "holy cities" of Palestine. The latter formed a political group around the Agudat Israel (Union of Israel) Party and its workers' wing, the Poalei Agudat. Israel. In view of the characteristics of this small community, so diversified from an ideological standpoint, it would seem impossible to use the term marginality or to talk about marginal groups during that period. In fact, in mandated Palestine, there was no overall sovereign political grouping with its own laws and procedures for ostracism and exclusion. There was no generally accepted consensus (not even with regard to Zionism). Once this community received "self-government" from the British authorities, all groups without exception could be represented in the elected assembly (even the Communist Party, which was banned by the British, submitted lists under various names and had several assembly members). Finally, even though the Mapai (the Workers Union, and later the Erets-Israel Workers Party), a strongly dominant party, did appear early on, it was, however, not in a position to prevent a myriad of other small parties and movements from developing and consolidating. The Three Main Currents / Despite this plethora of parties and absence of exclusivity, three currents—or rather three groups of forces—broke away rather quickly and became consistently stronger. The first two were the social-democrat current (a relatively cohesive I 00 (group) and the antisocialist current without cohesion, as it was formed by several small groups of moderates, liberals, nationalists, etc). This cleavage ran along a socioeconomic axis and responded to the question: What should the production rela tions be in the new Jewish society of Palestine? For part of the Yishuv, the objective was to build a socialist and democratic society of workers based on the labor union organization. For a minority, in con trast, the goal was to establish a liberal society, allowing the private sector to flourish and giving the Hisadrut only a purely secondary role. It was a left-right cleavage,6 which was reflected at all levels of the social fiber: kibbutzim and cooperatives versus the urban middle classes; farm workers versus proprietors and small businessmen However, there is a controversy among specialists in the political history of the Yishuv as to the degree of ideological intensify of these various groups. With respect to the origins of the Mapai (founded in 1930), Yonathan Shapira regards the Workers Union (1919-1930) as a powerful bureaucratic machine, with oligarchic and slightly doctrinaire tendencies, whereas Yosef Gorni for instance, stresses the ideological components of the first Israeli socialism.' The "religious" axis divided the various parties around the question of what tvpe of relations should be established between the political sphere and religion, with in both the autonomous Yishuv and the future Jewish state. This is how the third important political current developed, the national-religious movement, which wanted close ties between religion on the one hand (practice of the "Shabbat," holidays, food laws, marriage laws, etc), and public life, on the ether. In the beginning, these three main movements—socialist, antisocialist and reli gious Zionist—seen to have taken fairly firm ideological stands. Then they filled out and expanded, and gradually lose their doctrinal content to become "catchall parties." Occo Kirchheiner described this process whereby a party gradually gives up any ambition of being the intellectual and moral leader of the masses and turns into a catchall party. The model cf the catchall party has been greatly criticized, but it relates quite well to the development of the three main Israeli political movements: the Socialise Alignment (Maarakh), the Coalition of the Right (Likud), and the National Religious Party (Mafdal). However, it is important to bear the following in mind: The Alignment development as a "catchall party" much earlier than the other two movements. —The right was not always united. For a long rime the Liberal Party (or the "gen eral Zionists"; rejected the ultranaClonal1st options of Begin's right and at times even joined with Labor. The rightist movements have been united for the past 15 or so vears. —finally, the Religious Party was never as important as the other two movements, and was never able to take power. It has merely tried to have a part of the power dv beading certain key sectors (today the interior, the police, discussions on ter ritories, education, etc). Moving Toward "Catchall Parti es' cios_tL miUtants'orto _>__ - "L^SOf"^ 0minanttnere„weremovements""Seratried°rtocoalitionsabsorb allof theorganizations,political forcesand f«_£ members of .S^___TS_f_ V°terS' f°r f^1*' did n°C alwa*S follow' Some zers departed for he em _ f" xTlT..*!? *' "S^ f- SOme "*- S™athi- _w____sa___2S5S3_S 2fs____-__S_SC3rs::=?-«•*• ^•s'^irii'current of the _____£,__ls_ti„ .fifocces-! 8 °' ka:liberaisby l°"iS° P"11^'a°d ch«But*«-_____the -Jority ana the "proper role" granted to thHi T'^^ J" ""^^ t0«"d the »*"* s __ ££- _£:SS^£?=^s,=; ---—s sr__.-=-,-• . Er__Sextremists r_3___^?_£ot the Erets-Israel on the other. And£&»-in 1Q77 i-h_ —u came to power, further expanding its electorate among the Wr classes- It'aJ^d^rriitMe _£_2°,_ ^V*8™^ ** expanded, although not as much. 3S__r__5H___?_=J^~«s»"^ir o:Sl£S _3_a ^^i"™?-«• "=««=: ssa, • ls__s^^aswBs;ars_i;_i«r_. -"i™?!;"1*-drau1"8 tts —»b' >»— >-. or «tl6he tgl Se6hIe; P'-y "catchall parties," which received 78 per- vague. To a verv gri_t extan? rh_, ' "* 8° ^"^ * 1981' are raCher and "transfers%f™votersr'and ^ofollowersIrrrRCSare a constant"" appealinSoccurrence.to theThesamedividingpublic, •pmwi.'.aiuwui 6} _•________! "---••_.-:•_...,-..• •i__i.r ro_L_t„r »fiol^«l. 3ir.ce each of these parties is basec on a largely i_to--l ^.V* a J*" ""?Cl«"'" "" "**»*«* are both ideological and „5 !ul 5*_: e *ii«°s*nc 5 *apn-*H on the central (and not just "unionist") role ___T___ ft.^"" J *?"» iC3 Prefer"" f« Che public and cooperative sec- :J!!_,_S.
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