Gordon Kahl and False-Flag Terrorism by Yorie Von Kahl © 2013
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CODE-NAME MARMURS: Gordon Kahl and False-Flag Terrorism by Yorie Von Kahl © 2013 Official documents finally obtained reveal a long-hidden conspiracy whereby coalesced governmental powers created a false-flag terrorist threat, chose their victims, and initiated a deadly confrontation at Medina, North Dakota, on February 13, 1983. They then illegally conspired with the chief district judge to coordinate a massive propaganda campaign, conduct a show trial of those victims, and attempted to permanently cement a tailored version of events by the execution-style murder of my father Gordon W. Kahl with a bullet to the back of his head in rural Arkansas on June 3, 1983. We have struggled for more than 30 years to uncover the agenda behind this unfortunately true story. It has been piecemeal. Many documents were hard to obtain. Others that we know exist still remain undisclosed. But, together with materials recently obtained, shocking secrets can now be exposed. What you read hereafter may leave the impression that higher powers deliberately intended to cause the death of federal (or maybe other) officers in North Dakota (or elsewhere). While a stage had been set that (as a former North Dakota U.S. Marshal indicated) would likely result in the death of one or more officers, the evidence shows that the objective was simply to initiate violence against my late father Gordon Kahl, or even to assassinate him, so that it could be exploited to achieve a desperately needed end. That needed political end was a counterterrorism program and the means to that end was a publicly viable act of domestic (false-flag) terrorism. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had been seeking to expand federal police power under the rubric of counterterrorism as a priority program within the FBI specifically and throughout the U.S. intelligence community generally. Since the highly publicized congressional hearings into the FBI’s notorious COINTELPRO operations in the mid-1970’s, the FBI in particular had suffered intense scrutiny and criticism. Congress had just finished hearings into the FBI’s activities involving undercover operations in December 1982 and persistent incompetence, generation of false information and a series of other dismal failures had attracted national attention. And, it just so happened (if you believe in coincidences) that on February 13, 1983, Congress was nearing the end of another investigation and hearings on the FBI’s performance under former Attorneys General (AG) Levi and Civiletti’s domestic security guidelines. It just so happened (whether you believe in coincidences or not) that these hearings involved AG William French Smith, III and the FBI’s pleas to Congress of a dire need to replace former AG Levi’s domestic security guidelines with Smith’s new power-expanding “domestic security/terrorism guidelines.” And, it just so happened (coincidentally) that the Reagan Administration was focusing its executive powers (read that broadly) on an expanding populist movement, and (with coincidence bordering on incredulity) the day before the incident at Medina an assistant U.S. attorney stopped the largest trial of “tax protesters” in American history at Fort Worth, Texas (in mid-trial), 1 because she had been ordered to immediately fly to Washington, D.C. in relation to something of such national import, expected to occur over that weekend, that would put an end to the “tax protest movement” once and for all. The incident occurred the next day and the Fort Worth “tax protester” trial remained in recess for over a week due to the incident at Medina. As of this writing, it’s been more than thirty years since we were brutally ambushed at Medina; and innocent men still languish in prison. For those 30-plus years, my friend and co-defendant Scott Faul and I have been in federal prison. Our 30-year Mandatory Release Date – February 12, 2013 – passed long ago. In 2002, Scott was told at a parole hearing that “Waco” and “the Randy Weaver thing” both go “back to North Dakota” and that our case “has become an institutional thing.” While Scott was expressly told he was clearly not considered “any kind of threat to the community” or a “risk” of any kind and that “there’s nothing to indicate that [he was] specifically convicted of shooting anybody or killing anybody” or even “involved in some overt act that led to the death of somebody,” he was told to expect to spend at least 25 or 30 years in prison before he could even expect to be released. Why was this innocent man not released? Because, as the examiner told Scott, “the fact of the matter is you were there” and he emphasized that “you’re paying for the fact that you were there.” The examiner made clear that: nobody’s really concerned about how this happened, how it could have been avoided, who really contributed to this, what your culpability was, ah, the fact of the matter is that you were there, um, with a couple other guys with weapons in opposition to law enforcement, and shots were exchanged, and law enforcement lost that day in a sense. They lost that day and then the next day after and, and for the rest of your life you lost, because now you’re paying the price. The “opposition…to paroling any of you guys,” he made clear, is from “prosecutor kinds of sources and law enforcement and those kinds of people.” The examiner personally was no malicious man; he merely expressed the espirit d’ corps that had overtaken the agencies, a spirit of revenge. But even this examiner (and others) who act to maintain this institutionalized policy, had (and have) no inkling of the real agenda behind this case. Our case is a political case. Scott and I are political prisoners. If you think it has not or does not affect you and the future of this country, you are wrong. You have a need and a right to know. Overseeing the political landscape of the early 1980s was an administration promising a restoration of pre-Carter regime status quo powers to the American intelligence community. A “New FBI” was nervously awaiting congressional approval of proposed “guidelines” hoping 2 thereby to restore powers severely restricted by former AG Edward Levi. Congress was reviewing the proposed “guidelines” while scrutinizing the FBI’s behavior under AG Levi’s “guidelines.” To the Reagan Administration’s dismay, the liberal media’s continuing exhortation over the FBI’s recent COINTELPRO abuses and more recent debacles (such as ABSCAM) obstructed any favorable review and, instead, had induced submission of a bill to check such abusive powers by statute. A rapidly expanding populist-based national tax protest movement having absorbed increasing numbers of so-called “far-right” conservatives naturally interacted and reciprocated with Midwest farm communities imperiled by the family farm crisis that had itself become a nationally sensitive political issue. A disjointed “survivalist” element had begun to swell those ranks. As 1982 wound down, General Frank Salcedo, Reagan’s Head of FEMA’s Civil Security Division, had reportedly announced that no less than 100,000 American citizens “from survivalists to tax protesters, pose serious threats to civil security.” The Reagan Administration had joined forces with well-financed agenda-driven special interest groups long tied to domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, which together focused their concerted energies to crush that mutually perceived threat – an expanding populist movement. “Counterterrorism” had officially become the raison d’être of the Reaganite intelligence community and a special Presidential Directive gave the FBI primary responsibility over the field. Executive Orders (EOs), Presidential Directives (PDs) and associated memorandums, policy statements, rules and regulations had been signed, issued and implemented, authorizing the agencies to “proactively” respond to “crises” and “terrorism” including “threats,” all of which were being newly redefined. Thousands of politically active and vocal American citizens were being drawn into the vortex of the new definitions as terrorist threats. AG Levi’s existing “guidelines” restricting the FBI were an impediment to “counterterrorism” becoming the FBI’s newest priority program and were blocking the means to that political end. In less than 2 years from the implementation of AG Levi’s “guidelines,” the FBI’s “domestic security investigations dropped from 4,868 to 102” and, from 1977 to 1980, acts of domestic terrorism dropped from over 100 per year to only 20. Domestic terrorism was threatening to disappear. These fortunate conditions together with continuing FBI abuses under existing guidelines resulted in proposed legislation to limit FBI powers further. Congress’ publicized intent sent shivers down the spine of the covert intelligence community and threatened the very future of its covert warfare culture. If that culture was to survive and thrive, Congress had to be derailed, public opinion had to be reversed, former AG Levi’s restrictive “guidelines” had to go, and AG Smith’s new expansive “guidelines” had to be approved. AG Smith’s proposed “guidelines” were designed to create a police power that made formerly abused powers look tame. Despite dwindling terrorist acts, DOJ and FBI executives urged before Congress an immediate and desperate “need ‘to ensure protection of the public from…the changing nature of domestic groups…prone to violence’” and sought power to deal 3 with “certain enterprises which sought…‘to further political goals through activities,’” which, under expanding definitions, could be construed to involve violent crimes. To fit “terrorist organizations” and “domestic groups” within the new and expanding definitions, the new “guidelines” would “replace” AG Levi’s existing “’specific and articulable fact’ standard” with a “’reasonable indication’ standard,” which required no “specific facts or circumstances indicating a past, current, or impending violation” of any law.