BASELINE RESEARCH ON FLOOR CROSSING IN THE MALDIVES
APRIL 2015 Transparency Maldives, the National Contact of Transparency International, is a non-partisan organisation that promotes collaboration, awareness raising and other initiatives to improve governance and eliminate corruption from the daily lives of people. Transparency Maldives views corruption as a systemic issue and advocates for institutional changes that will punish and prevent corruption.
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This report is produced by Transparency Maldives as part of the Parliament Accountability Project funded by the British High Commission Colombo. Any opinions expressed in this document do not necessarily represent the views of the British High Commission Colombo.
Author: Transparency Maldives Research: S&R Associates, led by Athaulla A. Rasheed, PhD, MAppL, BSocSi; and Ali Shujau, LLM, LLB Team leader: Fazla Abdul-Samad Design and layout: Dhahau Naseem
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ii BASELINE RESEARCH ON FLOOR CROSSING IN THE MALDIVES
APRIL 2015
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgements vi
Foreword vii Terminology 1 1 INTRODUCTION 2 1.1 Hypothesis building: A literature review ...... 4 1.2 Defining floor crossing ...... 4 1.3 Reasons for floor crossing ...... 5 1.4 Consequences of floor crossing ...... 6 1.5 Mechanisms that prevent or support floor crossing 6 2 METHODOLOGY 8 2.1 Research design ...... 8 2.2 Research agenda ...... 8 3 Case studies 14 3.1 Floor crossing in India ...... 14 3.2 Floor crossing in Bangladesh 16 3.3 Floor crossing in South Africa 18 3.4 Floor crossing in the United States ...... 20 4 Floor Crossing Trends in the Maldives 24 5 Survey findings and aNALYSIS 28 5.1 Definitional aspects of floor crossing 28 5.2 Reasons for floor crossing 30 5.3 Mechanisms that prevent or support floor crossing 34 5.4 Consequences of floor crossing ...... 38 Annex 1 40 REFERENCES 43 BIBLIOGRAPHY 47 v transparency maldives Acknowledgements
This survey would not have been Parliament Accountability Project, Fazla possible without the contributions and Abdul-Samad, for overseeing the survey. support of a number of people. We We also thank Transparency Maldives wish to thank Athaulla A. Rasheed and staff, Thoriq Hamid, Mariyam Shiuna, Ali Shujau for undertaking the research Ibrahim Riza, Naji Hameed, Aishath work. We thank our interns, Maishan Ibahath, and Ahmed Mohamed (Forme) Waheed and Anaan Shafeeu, and our for their assistance and support in volunteers, Anaan Anil, Ahmed Naif various capacities. Finally, we thank the Mohamed (Jin), Hussain Nawaf Rauf, and British High Commission Colombo, for Ismail Shihab, who helped to conduct their generous funding to undertake the the survey. We thank the coordinator of Parliament Accountability Project.
vi baseline research on floor crossing in the maldives Foreword
Transparency Maldives started the grand corruption, is endemic in the Parliament Accountability Project in the Maldives but there is no evidence to hope of increasing public understanding suggest that with every party defection of the Parliament’s role, function or floor crossing there is a flow of and practices, and, by extension, illicit enrichment behind it. However, generate public demand for Parliament considering the lack of transparency accountability and transparency. in asset disclosure by public officials in Transparency Maldives’ Democracy the Maldives, coupled with the public Survey conducted in 2013 indicates perception that corruption is high in that over 62% of the population has the Parliament, it is important that best no confidence in the Parliament. This is practices are adhered to, in order to very worrying given that the Parliament ensure that floor crossing does not is a key representative institution. As open a gateway for illicit enrichment and an organization that focuses on good becomes a reason for public to lose trust governance and the elimination of in the Parliament. corruption in the Maldives, it is imperative Tranparency Maldives undertook this that Tranparency Maldives’ interventions research on the basis that understanding focus on building public confidence in of public perception on floor crossing will key representative institutions such as provide insight into why the public lacks the Parliament. confidence in the Parliament. It is hoped Floor crossing is an issue that is often that international best practices and case discussed in the Maldives alongside studies of defection laws and practice in speculation of corruption in the process other countries will broaden stakeholder of floor crossing. However, there is understanding of floor crossing and limited understanding of why and how provide a baseline to take the discussion floor crossing occurs, and how public forward. perceives this. Corruption, particularly
Mariyam Shiuna Executive Director
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baseline research on floor crossing in the maldives Terminology
Consequences of floor crossing Legislative process – Parliamentary – Positive and negative outcomes of decision-making process. floor crossing. Political corruption – Manipulation Corruption – The abuse of entrusted of policies, institutions and rules power for private gain. of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political Floor crossing – Parliamentarians decision makers, who abuse their belonging to one party voting against position to sustain their power, status, their party line and/or switching and wealth. to another party during legislative process. Political institutions – All state institutions created under the Governance system – Body of all Constitution. political institutions established under the Constitution to govern political, Preventive and supporting economic, and social activities. systems – Legal and governance systems in place to address floor Legal institutions – Legislation, crossing. laws, regulations, and rules. Reasons for floor crossing – Legal system – Body of all legal Reasons why parliamentarians cross institutions. the floor.
1 transparency maldives 1 INTRODUCTION
This survey involves mixed methods parliamentarians to shift their political research to explore and analyse public interests for personal gains or prestige attitudes and perceptions towards can engender acts of corruption during floor crossing in the Parliament of the the legislative process.3 Maldives and its links to corruption. It Acting or moving against the party line generates empirical data on the trends takes different forms and terminologies of floor crossing with respect to the with respect to context and language behaviour and political practices of in which it is explored. Party defecting, Maldivian parliamentarians during the party switching, changing political 2008-2015 period that can be used parties, or floor crossing are used to for advocacy purposes and to create explain this phenomenon. Sometimes dialogue between parliamentarians, civil politicians or parliamentarians change society organisations, media, and the their original party and physically move public on parliamentary best practices to other parties; whereas on other on floor crossing. occasions, parliamentarians go against One may define floor crossing as their party line, switching sides during parliamentarians belonging to one party legislative sessions, eventually leading to voting against their party line during a change of party.4 This research defines legislative sessions.1 Although the floor crossing as a practice whereby topic or the issue of floor crossing has the parliamentarian switches his/her received surprisingly little attention by legislative votes during parliamentary political analyses, literature reviewed in sessions, encompassing further actions this research shows that floor crossing leading to either voluntary or involuntary has been a common phenomenon in change of party or parties. democracies of both developed and The literature reviewed in this research developing countries that has significant shows that there are multiple factors impacts on the practice of party politics.2 pertaining to reasons for floor crossing. Floor crossing affects the democratic For example, the desire to implement process because it distorts party discipline policy, win re-election, advances within and public confidence for reasons only legislature, and gain support from entailing political and personal gains of constituency are key reasons that may politicians and parliamentarians. This motivate a parliamentarian to cross the research takes the view that a process floor during legislative sessions. Weak that creates incentives for elected democratic institutions, weak or unstable
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party systems, and disapproving as stated above. Some developed policy lines are some of the institutional countries view floor crossing not as factors affecting decision-making of a detriment to party politics but an parliamentarians during legislative occurrence pertaining to democratic sessions especially when desires are process; whereas other less developed linked to their personal and political gains.5 countries perceive floor crossing as Such motivational factors, accompanied distortionary to post-election legislative by weak democratic institutional factors, process.8 can lead to corruption within political In line with these aspects of floor decision-making process in party crossing—definition of, reasons for, systems.6 It is though inconclusive that consequences of floor crossing and the floor crossing always involves corruption mechanisms that prevent or support as its definitional aspects are not the behaviour—this research presents necessarily linked to corruption. a public perception to understand the However, whether it involves aspects of and trends in parliamentary motivational or institutional factors, floor crossing and its relations to floor crossing distorts party system and political corruption9 in the Maldives. It governance process of the ruling party, uses primary and secondary methods- and can reduce the legitimacy of political based data collection and analysis. system of the country. Due to such This research is designed with a holistic negative consequences of floor crossing, approach to understand the basic there are preventive and supporting nature of floor crossing in the Maldives mechanisms set by some countries— using both qualitative and quantitative both developed and developing countries methods of data collection and analysis. that experience floor crossing—to stop The research agenda reflects upon the or prohibit (voluntary and involuntary) following hypothesis building part. floor crossing.7 Anti-defection laws have been formulated and implemented by developed and developing countries to prevent this distortionary behaviour of parliamentarians. Defection is defecting from original party line in the legislative process for a political or personal reason
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1.1 Hypothesis building: a literature review
The first phase of data collection and Maldives. This reduces the need for a analysis involves hypothesis building review of the full literature. The research through a review of the basic literature. The acknowledges the amount of research hypothesis creates a worldview on floor done on this topic at national and global crossing and its possible connections to levels, and limits its qualitative investigation corruption, setting a baseline approach of secondary resources to the literature for collecting and analysing data on floor that specifically, not exclusively, looks crossing in the Maldives. at the basic nature of floor crossing It is not the purpose of this research to through aspects of definition, reasons, assert that parliamentary floor crossing in consequences, and political institutions. the Maldives involves political corruption. In other words, this hypothesis presents Rather it creates a framework of public a worldview for defining and analysing perception or opinion on parliamentary what floor crossing looks like and how floor crossing and its relations to political its occurrence can be related to political corruption, to provide a basic snapshot corruption in the Maldives. of what floor crossing looks like in the 1.2 Defining floor crossing
One of the key literatures reviewed in process where parliamentarians change this research includes a study conducted their party position by voting or moving to by Diana Z O’Brien and Yael Shomer10 another party against their original party involving a cross-national assessment lines during the legislative session(s).13 of party switching or floor crossing This limits or reduces the capacity of a across 20 democratic countries. political party to push forward its political Reflecting on past, but limited, studies and policy agenda, especially that of the on floor crossing, O’Brien and Shomer11 ruling party’s, to achieve its governance defines and explains the reasons and objectives, eventually leading to policy consequences of floor crossing in both failure and loss of public confidence in the developed and developing countries. legitimacy of the political system. While Consistent with other studies,12 they political parties are a key foundation to define floor crossing, synonymously democracy, such disruption to effective with party switching or defecting, as a and efficient party practices could lead
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to an ultimate weakening of the overall crossing is also identified as a determinant democratic system.14 Therefore, floor of democratic state of a party system. 1.3 REASONS FOR FLOOR CROSSING
O’Brien and Shomer15 identify two party or party line that will enhance key factors influencing parliamentarians party positions, personal prestige and to cross the floor or switch sides and chances of re-election.17 With the largest deviate from original party lines. They are resources-base, the government or the based on motivational and institutional ruling party is the most likely party that reasons. could provide parliamentarians with what Motivational factors include reasons they desire after elections.18 of maximising electoral support, Institutional reasons are based on the gaining benefits to maintain office and type of political regime, electoral systems achieve their own ideological goals and candidate selection process. When by shaping policy outcomes.16 When the political regime provides incentives parliamentarians have confidence in the for a defecting parliamentarian to switch legislative process for their re-election to party for greater political and personal office, it is likely for them to act accordingly benefits, floor crossing is a likely activity to gain support from the broader group within that political system. Presidential of parliamentarians—mostly those systems can create more incentives holding major and ruling party positions. than parliamentary systems as the head Parliamentarians can gain support of executive in presidential system has and prestige by promoting good policy little influence against parliamentarians that could build public confidence— from crossing the floor. There is limited parties that have ‘bad policy’ is likely to legislative influence on individual experience its parliamentarian crossing parliamentarians by any means of threat the floor. Parliamentarians seek to for their re-election.19 maintain affiliations with parties that will Electoral systems have a greater enhance their party hierarchy and provide influence on floor crossing decisions when desired positions in the Parliament. In ‘party leaders have no control over the such instances, parliamentarians may final rank of candidate on the ballot’, like choose to cross the floor to join the in open-list proportional representation
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systems.20 When individual evaluation party evaluation matters, it is less likely matters, candidates are likely to shift for parliamentarians to switch sides as from original party line to another party they will be surer of being re-elected by for political gain and prestige. However, original party constituents.21 in a party-centred legislature, where 1.4 CONSEQUENCES OF FLOOR CROSSING
A major consequence of parliamentary defection or floor crossing as an act that floor crossing or party defection during is ‘inherently undemocratic’ as it distorts legislative sessions is the weakening of ‘party loyalty, meaningful electoral party systems. Decisions to cross the choice, and democratic accountability’. floor create a bad image for the political Floor crossing affects the party system’s party and distort voters’ confidence stability and effectiveness by reducing in a particular party. Moreover, this the voters’ ability to hold parties results in creating instability within accountable.25 Institutional weaknesses political parties, leading to the losing of can allow political actors to maximise elections, primary voters’ support and their personal interests at the expenses partisan elite, discrediting the democratic of public interests, through corruption process entertained by party politics.22 and abuse of public office.26 Kamath, P. M.,23 Janda24 asserted party 1.5 MECHANISMS THAT PREVENT OR SUPPORT FLOOR CROSSING
Institutional factors matter in underdeveloped democracies with more determining the levels and extent of anti-defection laws experience more floor crossing.27 According to Janda28, issues of floor crossing. Due to negative countries with developed democratic consequences, both developed and less systems with lesser anti-defection laws developed democracies have adopted experience lesser issues of parliamentary anti-defection laws that prevent or floor crossing; while developing or prohibit floor crossing during legislative
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1.5 MECHANISMS THAT PREVENT OR SUPPORT FLOOR CROSSING
sessions. Despite this key function of effectively address abuses of power and anti-defection laws, adoption and usage the misuse of public resources for private of such institutional mechanisms vary gains.’31 In electoral systems with weak across countries for varying reasons. One institutions, it is easier for vote buying and view lies with democratic characteristic political bribery to occur.32 Transparency of floor crossing that promotes electoral Maldives noted: competition, while the other lies with the more contentious effects of floor ‘The visibility of acts of crossing that involves weakening of the corruption depends on the level of core values and practices of political transparency and accountability parties.29 Established democracies within public institutions, and value freedom of parliamentarians as the readily available mechanisms a matter of democratic principle more for reporting corruption, which in than in developing democracies. Such turn also depend on the political democratic principles do not necessarily system of the country. Therefore, come from within the political party system; the perception of corruption rather they are evolved and developed as in the Maldives can only be an social, cultural and political foundations indication of a greater problem created by a more democratically mature of corruption, and a legitimate electorate.30 Therefore, the ability or claim that the overall political the effectiveness of such preventive and legal institutional framework and supporting institutional measures has weaknesses in its ability to and the reasons for having them will address corruption.’33 depend on the broader political system in place including the type and level of In view that weak institutions can interplay between the parliamentarians, facilitate political corruption, this parliamentarians and parties, and party hypothesis takes the view that an politics and constituents within that indication of floor crossing associated system. with weak institutional factors can be In an institutionalist approach, an indication that parliamentary floor ‘problems with corruption are strongly crossing has a relation to possible linked to weaknesses or shortcomings political corruption in legislative process. in the ability of the country’s broader legal framework and political system to
7 transparency maldives 2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Research design
This research adopts a mixed methods viewpoint on peoples’ opinions gathered approach to create a public perception through data from interviews. On the other of floor crossing in the Maldives. The hand, mixed methods with quantitative Maldives currently lacks a baseline approaches can enhance the feasibility research on floor crossing. This places of data collected and analysed through limitations on the present research to set the qualitative approaches, by adding a starting point on what floor crossing numerical data assessment process looks like in the Maldives. However, a that can reduce the likelihood of having mixed methods research,34 on the one contentious doubt about any impression- hand, with qualitative approaches can based research outcomes.35 In line conceptualise what floor crossing looks with this methodological approach, this like in legislative decision-making based research follows the following research on limited, but sound and comprehensive agenda. studies, and use that perception to set a 2.2 Research agenda
This research adopts a progressive 4 Formulating interview questions approach based on stages of data forms a crucial part of this research. collection and analysis through qualitative Questions are formulated based on methods followed by quantitative the hypothesis to allow accuracy methods. It involves the following stages: in explaining the public perception in terms of definition, reasons, 1 Hypothesis building through a review consequences, and properties of of basic literature available on the preventing and supporting measures issues of floor crossing (see 1.1); with respect to floor crossing in the Maldives and how they are related to 2 Conducting public interviews; corruption; and
3 Conducting a numerical assessment 5 Identifying research outcomes and of the interview results from the analysing the findings based on qualitative analysis of the interviews; the hypothesis and the short case studies undertaken in Chapter 3
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2.2 research agenda
showing an overview of regional and are formulated for public audience global aspects of floor crossing. (interviewees). This stage develops a general perception of how and why 2.2.1 CONDUCTING PUBLIC floor crossing happens in the Maldives in the view of the public. This stage of INTERVIEWS data collection and analysis creates a Public interviews form a key context-based narrative from the stories component of this research that told by relevant interviewees; but may provides a set of data to understand not consider the numerical significance and explain how public perceives about of the data gathered. This stage of data parliamentary floor crossing in the analysis will help create a public-opinion- Maldives and its relation to corruption. based assessment of what floor crossing Interviewing is a key method for empirical looks like in the Maldives. However, data collection. Collecting data through the research also uses a quantitative interviews will follow both qualitative and approach to assess the interview data quantitative methods of data collection and generate a quantified result based and analysis. There are two reasons on simple random sampling method. for using interviews as the primary method of empirical data collection. 2.2.2 QUANTIFYING First, given that the Maldives presently INTERVIEWS lacks a baseline study on parliamentary floor crossing, interviewing can provide The research uses a simple random a means to acquire information from sampling model where interviews are people, who have experienced and are conducted using random ‘digital dialling experiencing effects of floor crossing. technique’ or telephone. A list of valid Second, interviewing, in both qualitative numbers compiled from national directory and quantitative methods of research, is used to ensure authenticity of numbers provide the researcher with the best- and presumed receivers or interviewees. suited method for collecting data on Random sampling is applied to interview issues involving social world or human 200 people randomly selected from the behaviour.36 public. In human investigations, there are First stage of data collection is chances of having a biased perception; undertaken through a qualitative however, the random sampling will reduce method where a number of questions this factor by eliminating any intentional
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2.2 research agenda
selection from the researchers’ side.37 2.2.3 FORMULATING INTERVIEW Interview results are divided into three QUESTIONS categories, in a way to show, by per centage and numbers (interviewees), Both selecting interviewees and the public perceptions, with respect to formulating interview questions are definitional aspects, reasons for floor based on the hypothetical and practical crossing, mechanisms that prevent or properties pertaining to floor crossing support floor crossing, consequences explained above. Floor crossing of floor crossing, and their links to encompasses particular meanings, one corruption. The perception, by per with respect to parliamentarians voting centage and numbers, with respect to against their original party line, and these areas is assessed according to the the other where such parliamentarians following levels: eventually or immediately switch parties during legislative sessions. •• Agreed: This means that the The hypothesis also explains key and interviewee has answered ‘yes’ to general reasons for floor crossing, and the question. the consequences of floor crossing on party politics, stability and legitimacy, •• Do not agree: This means that encompassing institutional factors the interviewee has said ‘no’ or engendering political corruption. ‘not necessarily’. The research formulates a questionnaire based on the following four •• Neutral position: This means categories. that the interviewee has said ‘don’t know’ or ‘no comments’. 1 Definitional aspects of floor crossing: These levels are formulated in a way to assess, based on the hypothesis, the •• Interviewees are assessed on their public perception of floor crossing and understanding of floor crossing, its relation to corruption in the Maldives. specifically on what floor crossing People’s opinions will be categorised with means to them. respect to these levels based on how interviewees respond to the questions.
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2.2 research agenda
•• Interviewees are assessed with the strengths and weaknesses of respect to their observation of any party system in the Maldives and behaviour that could be defined as how that may have or have not a parliamentarian defecting from prevented floor crossing. his/her party line in the legislative process in the Maldives. 4 Consequences of floor crossing:
2 Reasons for floor crossing: •• Interviewees are assessed on their understanding of the •• Interviewees are assessed with consequences of floor crossing in respect to their understanding the Maldives of why parliamentarians have crossed the floor or are crossing •• Interviewees are assessed with floor in the Maldives. respect to their observation of how consequences of floor crossing •• Interviewees are assessed with have affected their life and country respect to their observation of personal behaviour of Annex 1 includes the questionnaire parliamentarians with respect formulated base on these properties or to motivational and institutional categories of floor crossing. factors leading to floor crossing. 2.2.4 IDENTIFYING RESEARCH 3 Mechanisms that prevent or OUTCOMES AND ANALYSIS OF support floor crossing: THE FINDINGS •• Interviewees are assessed on The research outcomes are based their understanding of the political on the interview findings and key case system in place in the Maldives studies on the general trend in floor and how that system can affect crossing at national, regional and global floor crossing. levels. Interview findings are categorised into four levels of assessment to indicate •• Interviewees are assessed with how interviewees understand and respect to their observation of address floor crossing in the Maldives.
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2.2 research agenda
Chapter 3 has five cases studies including two global level studies, two regional level studies, and one specified national study on the Maldives. These will generate a comparative idea of the trends of floor crossing in these contexts. Data from both these stages of research are analysed using the hypothesis developed through literature reviewed in this research. It provides a basic framework to understand and analyse definitional aspects, reasons for floor crossing, mechanisms that prevent or support floor crossing, and consequences of floor crossing.
12 transparency maldives 3 Case studies
3.1 Floor crossing in India
from original party line.41 The existing laws remain weak as parliamentarians seek to change party position or cross the floor despite such acts being discouraged by law.42 Moreover, the Indian political system has limitations to adhere to democratic practices in party politics unlike in many developed countries that have self-regulated preventive mechanisms against forms of corruption involved in floor crossing. Many of the developed countries view floor crossing as part of a democratic process.43 However, weak As common to most South Asian political and legal institutions in place countries, India observes floor crossing can limit this democratic process from or party switching during the legislative preventing acts of corruption related to session. Although India has a democratic floor crossing.44 system with one of the most mature The literature reviewed in this research and evolving political party system in places emphasis on the anti-defection the region,38 there is a tendency and laws in India.45 This review of floor practical behaviour of parliamentarians crossing in Indian party politics seeks in crossing the floor during legislative to evaluate floor crossing with respect sessions.39 However, India is amongst to the properties of anti-defection laws countries that have legislation in place in India. Historically, anti-defection to prevent floor crossing—India has anti- laws were questioned in the political defection laws adopted in 1973, 1985 front on grounds that such preventive and 2003. According to PRS Legislative mechanisms can violate democratic Research (2009), ‘the Anti-Defection Law freedom of legislators. However, legal was passed in 1985 through the 52nd justifications have been made in favour Amendment to the Constitution, which of having such laws as it ‘seeks to added the Tenth Schedule to the Indian recognise the practical need to place Constitution.’40 Such laws can disqualify the proprieties of political and personal parliamentarians voluntarily defecting conduct.’46 It also states that that law is
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3.1 Floor crossing in India
to ‘deter “the evil of political defections”47 Sighting party defections at ‘political by legislators motivated by lure of office desertion’, Express News Service (2014) or other similar considerations’48 and informs that floor crossing engendered political activities leading to corruption.49 by lure of office is common to all many ‘Lure of office’ is a key reason why states of India, indicating the existence parliamentarians cross the floor. The of the activity throughout Indian politics.51 literature reviewed here as well as Indian democracy is founded on a preventive mechanisms stress that Indian multi-party political system. Political parliamentarians are more inclined to parties have been the driving force of switch sides or vote against their original Indian democratic system. However, the party lines hoping to have better political literature reviewed here observes that leverage or to maintain office or seat. It is Indian political parties have fragmented not obvious that such shifts are directly over the years engendering unstable linked to corruption. However, politicians governments—weak party politics is changing position for political gain have weakening the political governance self-seeking and political objectives that system in India. With 74 political parties are not always transparent.50 Talking on recorded in 1952, today, since 1989, the ‘Modi wave’ Express News Service number of political parties have been (2014) wrote: swollen to more than 177 parties.52 In Indian party politics, such fragmentation ‘In UP, where the Samajwadi Party of political parties is an indication of is being bogged down by falling defection from or political desertion of stock after the Muzaffarnagar original party ideology—by dividing the riots, many sense the insidiously original ideology.53 More importantly, growing popularity of the BJP. such behaviour can weaken the party system and weaken democratic Agriculture Minister Raja Anand institutionalism.54 Singh’s son, Kirti Vardhan Singh joined the BJP, quitting the SP. He said: “It is certainly not a political party, but a family party. Unless you are a part of the family, you cannot expect any attention.”’
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3.2 Floor crossing in Bangladesh
two members did not resign from their legislative position; but their case was concluded to declare a violation of Article 70.57 A third instance happened in 1996, when a parliamentarian belonging to the Jatiyo Party became a cabinet member of the ruling party; but this case did not violate Article 70 as the appointment was done with the consent of the Jatiyo Party. A fourth instance was noted in 2005, when a parliamentarian elected on a ticket from Awami League switched to BNP—it was declared that he violated Article 70.58 A fundamental reason for Article 70 prohibiting floor crossing is to help Although the Constitution of strengthen and stabilise parliamentary Bangladesh, by Article 70 prohibits democracy, and to make effective floor crossing by parliamentarians in the and smooth the functioning of the legislative process, parliamentary floor government. As per the above cases of crossing is not non-existent, neither a floor crossing, a shift in ideology or joining new matter in Bangladesh.55 According to another party happening with the consent Rahman (2010), a very initial instance of of the original party does not constitute floor crossing was experienced in 1995, a defection or violation of Article 70. when ‘Mr. Ebadur Rahman Chowdhury, These set the basic rationale of Article Major General Mahmudul Hasan and Mr. 70 in Bangladesh.59 However, reasons Paritosh Chakroborty, all belonging to for consent-based defection are also not the Jatiyo Party joined the Bangladesh clear—lack of transparency in decision- Nationalist Party.’56 A second instance making that engenders elements of was noted in 1996, when two members control by the ruling party can create being elected on the nomination of room for acts of corruption during such Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) were interactions between two parties in the later discovered as having appointed to legislative process.60 Meisburger (2012) cabinet posts of the ruling party. The noted according to a commentator that:
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3.2 Floor crossing in BANGLADESH
‘[U]nder the anti-defection or anti- Policy Dialogue (CPD) noted as per one floor crossing law the government commentator that ‘MPs are abstaining and the executive is in a position from such exercise for fear of being from where they can practice punished by the party high authorities,’65 dictatorship, as there is none from leading to lack of accountability in the government to protest or vote the legislative process. Furthermore, against.’61 Professor Ali Ashraf noted the following during the dialogue of CPD: Article 70 has an effect of concentrating power in the central government by ‘[T]he extra‐constitutional eliminating freedom to vote against a interventions in the political policy detrimental to original constituency, system [is] the main obstacle in the especially for those parliamentarians path of consolidating democracy ... linked to the ruling party. Forming inter- [T]he role of think‐tanks and civil party coalitions on the other hand may society organisations in building create room for government manipulation awareness on the importance of policy areas as per the political of participation among the interests of the Dhaka-based leadership citizens in a democratic society. especially when coalitions happened Regarding the boycott culture on individual basis.62 Furthermore, of the parliament, the veteran constitutional restriction on floor crossing ruling party lawmaker believed is also behind the rationale to prevent that people should make the MPs abuse of government finances.63 accountable and compel them to The property of undermining participate in the parliament. At democracy entertained by Article 70 the same time, civil society should has further raised concerns amongst ask questions and express their scholars and parliamentarians in concern over the code of conduct Bangladesh. A noted observation due issued for the MPs, he opined.’66 to the restriction imposed by Article 70 has been boycotting of the parliament Bangladesh can be identified as a by dissatisfied members. Most of the country that strictly enforces the law time the agenda of the opposition against floor crossing; but the rationale members cannot be pushed whenever behind constitutional restriction of floor the ruling party opposes it.64 Centre for crossing tends to favour power dominance
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of the ruling party or the Dhaka-based way of institutionalising floor crossing as leadership, limiting room for exercising a process of power accumulation in the democratic practices and freedom of government rather than as a mechanism expression in the legislative process. to prevent personal-interest-based Weak democratic institutionalism has a behaviour. 3.3 Floor crossing in South Africa
‘[T]he “frequent floor-crossing … As a developing country with in the Republic of South Africa … political institutions in transition, South [is]… in my opinion, an indicator Africa faces challenges in establishing … [of] … a rudimentary party democratic practices in its multi-party system with an underdeveloped political system. Parliamentary floor party loyalty, and underdeveloped crossing has been identified, by the cohesion among members literature reviewed here, as a detriment and party officials and an to the representative democratic process underdeveloped identification in South Africa since 1993, despite the with the party.”’ enactment of its Constitution that, while ensuring accountability, transparency, Professor Hans-Joachim Veen67 participatory and representative system (2006) of governance, places principles to prevent such acts of floor crossing that harms its party system.68 South Africa has adopted legislation to prevent floor crossing on grounds that it poses challenges to the representative democracy including distortion of party politics, engendering betrayal of party’s supporters by elected representatives and undermining the Constitution. Such weakening of the political system of South Africa only leads parliamentarians to seek ‘chequebook politics’69 and
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3.3 Floor crossing in SOUTH AFRICA
political manipulation by ruling party with legislative process.75 In a dominant unavoidable acts of floor crossing with party system, floor crossing further possible links to corruption.70 causes proliferation of new parties when However, the 1996 Constitution does dominant party is capable to drawing not exclusively make schedule to indicate members of such small and new parties that acts of floor crossing can cause to its coalition—this was evident in 2003 parliamentarians to lose the job71—it and 2005.76 however provided for the adoption of In the opinion of South African legislation to regulate floor crossing. political parties, floor crossing by Institutional design by Constitution elected representatives is a detriment to is to address adverse effects of floor party politics as well as representative crossing which makes ‘individual favour- democratic system enshrined by the seeking less productive and renders Constitution.77 Antipathy towards the political system less susceptible to floor crossing is mostly shared by the rent-seeking.’72 Once the representative opposition parties. However, some system has been manipulated by major parties such as DA believed dominant ruling party, the adoption of that floor crossing is also useful in such legislation became a challenge or testing voter support in the event when at least, if adopted, a designed in a way parliamentarians are dissatisfied with to cater the dominant party.73 original party policy, to cross the floor First attempt of floor crossing was and resigned from office with the hope to observed during the 2000s. Democratic win the seats during next election testing Party (DP), the New National Party (NNP) individual loyalty of voters.78 Although and the Federal Alliance (FA) joined there are views that floor crossing together to form a coalition—Democratic becomes necessary in some occasions, Alliance. The idea was to create a floor crossing in the long run becomes majority faction in the Parliament, which advantageous to the ruling party or bigger enabled ruling party or the government parties—finally to have total manipulation to manipulate decision-making.74 The of legislative process.79 Moreover, long- literature reviewed here describes term dominance by one major party is South Africa’s party system as a single- dominant party system where the ruling party forms coalition to with other parties to manipulate decision-making in the
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3 case studies
leading to political corruption in the party 13 per cent thought of corruption system as that was observed by public as significant.’ opinion polls during the 2014 elections.80 According to Bekoe81 (2014): The representative democratic legislative mechanism encompassing ‘The ANC today is seen as more a single-dominant party facilitate corrupt and ineffective than at floor crossing in South Africa, more any time in recent years. A 2011 importantly enabling the ruling party or Afrobarometer survey showed office holder(s) to control the legislative that 50 per cent of interviewees process. Existence of a dominant ruling saw government officials as party, through time, further limits the corrupt and 25 per cent thought adaptive efficiency of the legislative that corruption was one of the system—despite what the Constitution country’s most pressing problems; provides for—to adopt and implement this is the highest concern for legislation to prevent floor crossing, corruption since 2002, when only which is in itself a detriment to the very democratic process of legislation making. 3.4 Floor crossing in the United States
P. Nokken and Keith T. Poole’s historical assessment of legislative party defection and/or party switching in the US concluded with the claim that, although the founders of the Republic placed caution in partisan politics leading to divisive politics, the US has experienced acts of legislative floor crossing for reasons mostly enhancing the likelihood for incumbent legislators’ re-election.82 Floor crossing or party defection is According to Kenneth Janda83: observed in party politics throughout the history of the United States (US). Timothy
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3.4 Floor crossing in THE UNITED STATES
‘[I]n the United States, with congress switches to the new its stable two-party system, party. Both party’s primaries identified 20 members serving become more competitive after in the House and Senate from the switch and the primaries in 1947 to 1994 who changed the switcher’s new party become their parties while in office—16 less competitive over time.’ switching from Democratic to Republican. This steady erosion of In the US, floor crossing is affected Democratic representation helped by external conditions like political the Republicans—the decided events that change partisan control of minority party in Congress the political institutions and ideological following World War II—gain reasons.85 Legislators cross the floor strength until they won control in for pride, privilege and prestige, with the 1994 election.’ a ‘vengeance’ to show that they could obtain or draw in greater support by This is relatively speaking a minimal supporting the interests of the new number measured against the timeframe party.86 For example, when Michael P. assessed above. One view for this is Forbes (Democrat) who switched back because of a solid two-party system to Republican Party in the 1990s,87 developed in the US. Solid two-party ‘Democrats were angry and organized structure means there is solid and stable around another candidate, Regina voter confidence in the supporting party. Seltzer, a 71-year-old retired librarian There are higher chances for legislators and near political neophyte.’88 On the to sustain support to gain votes for re- other hand, Forbes’ change of party election. Consistent with Aldrich and was alleged to have involved personal Bianco, Jim F. Couch and Taylor P. offerings from the receiving party.89 Stevenson84 noted that: Political support in the form of money or finance campaigning contribution from ‘[T]he [party] switch is part of political parties also increases political a strategy to increase their [or party expenditure of parties by increase switcher’s] probability of being of campaign expenditures for the party re-elected. Empirical evidence switchers.90 Such personal offerings from . . . shows that the vote shares receiving parties involved in floor crossing decrease after the member of links this activity to acts of corruption
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3.4 Floor crossing in THE UNITED STATES
within the legislative process and party member of congress with the main system—there is the likelihood of objective: keeping the job.’ affecting democratic principles attached to the electoral system.91 While floor crossing or party defection However, despite possible effects of in the US is not criminalised, the political divisive politics by floor crossing, there democratic discipline acquired by the US is no tangible support for preventing legislators and political parties creates legislators from crossing the floor in the a self-regulatory process for any issues US.92 Janda’s study on anti-defection laws pertaining to acts of floor crossing, in countries show that as a developed disincentivizing potential floor crossers country that experience floor crossing from switching and keeping party in the legislature, there is less demand confidence.96 among legislators to illegalise floor crossing in the US—it has mostly been seen as part of exercising democratic freedom.93 Reparations for any damages to original party due to floor crossing are met by a self-regulatory process within the legislators and political parties in the US. For example, studies show that floor crossing causes hatred amongst former colleagues from the original party against floor crosser as well as involves gains for floor crossers.94 Couch and Stevenson95 (2013) stated:
‘It is probable that potential party defectors are presented with a bundle of benefits; a compensation package, which includes campaign contributions, committee assignments as well as pork barrel spending. All of which would help the incumbent
22 transparency maldives 4 Floor Crossing Trends in the Maldives
Although not much research has been conducted into floor crossing in the Maldives, it is a frequent and common feature in the political spectrum of the country. Since the adoption of the Constitution 2008 paving the way, for the first time in the country, of a multi- party democratic system, the number of political parties increased, and political rallies and events became popular and frequent. Legislators form an important segment of political party membership and its leadership, although, only a handful of dominant parties are represented in the Parliament, in both the sessions following the parliamentary elections in 2009 and 2014. Under the 2008 Constitution, legislators, just as anyone else, are vested with constitutional rights and freedoms of participating in the activities of political parties.97 The role of political parties being represented in Parliament is laid down in the Regulation of the People’s Majlis, including regulations for membership in committee and subcommittees, allocation of speaking slots, etc. Hence, despite the absence of any legislative restrictions on defection of party membership after being elected to parliamentary seat, such numbers become recorded in the parliamentary official records, and public and media attention to party defection is extant. On
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4 FLOOR CROSSING TRENDS IN THE MALDIVES
the other hand, defection of voting in Maldives (PPM), the Deputy Leader Parliament, or a parliamentarian voting of PPM is reported to have stated that against the party lines is not formally ‘changing political ideologies is a right recorded as such, and fails to grab much that members have’ and the party has no attention. right of claim against the parliamentarian Many politicians see switching of that leaves from that party.98 Perhaps party membership by legislators as a owing to this viewpoint, or due to vested constitutional right which should not be interest by all political parties represented hindered or restricted. On one recent in the Parliament, no formal attempts to occasion following the switching of 3 address or regulate the issue of floor parliamentarians from Jumhooree Party crossing is evident in the recent years. (JP) to the ruling Progressive Party of
Figure 1: Change in party membership at the Parliament during the parliamentary term of 2009-2014 – based on data available from the People’s Majlis secretariat, for the period from May 2011 to November 2013.
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4 FLOOR CROSSING TRENDS IN THE MALDIVES
In contrast, however, floor crossing the provision in December 2012, citing was initially prohibited for elected officials that the prohibition contradicted with of the recently enacted local governance the constitutional rights of political system. The Decentralised Governance participation and the right to run for of Administrative Regions Act 2010, public office.100 Advocators against initially provided that local councilors restriction of floor crossing would cite elected under a ticket from a political party the Supreme Court decision in effectively shall lose his/her seat if he/she leaves prohibiting any proposed restrictions on or is removed from that party.99 This party switching for parliamentarians or legislative prohibition which attempted to other elected officials, and the prospects regulate floor crossing amongst elected of any legislative measures to address or officials of local governance was short- regulate floor crossing in the near future lived, until the Supreme Court invalidated are slim.
28/05/14 09/06/14 24/06/14 02/07/14 15/07/14
Figure 2: Change in party membership at the Parliament during the current parliamentary term of 2014-2019 – based on data available from the People’s Majlis secretariat, for the period from May to July 2014.
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4 FLOOR CROSSING TRENDS IN THE MALDIVES
Allegations of bribery and corruption are widespread following incidences of floor crossing. It is commonplace for the party from which the parliamentarian leaves to accuse those members and the party to which they join, of offering and accepting ‘unattainably high financial and material incentives’ to join that party, in order to boost their parliamentary representation.101 The leader of JP on one occasion stated that members defect parties for vast sums of money amounting to as much as US$ 2 million.102 In 2011, one parliamentarian announced that he himself was offered US$ 2 million to switch party membership.103 Others however, reject the notion of any bribery in floor crossing, and relate it to a ‘realistic temptation’ to transfer to a party expected to come to power in light of growing public disillusionment with democracy.104 Nonetheless, the Parliament of the Maldives has been perceived, in recent history, as the most corrupt and ineffective institution, with a lack of adequate accountability mechanisms for Parliamentarians.105 The competent authorities vested with investigatory and prosecution functions of corruption related offences have been proved ineffective in addressing allegations of corruption in inter-party defections.106
27 transparency maldives 5 Survey findings and aNALYSIS
5.1 Definitional aspects of floor crossing:
Question 1 Question 2 Have you observed floor crossing Have you observed by Maldivian parliamentarians parliamentarian from your during legislative sessions? constituency crossing the floor during legislative sessions?
82 per cent of interviewees have observed floor crossing by 61 per cent of interviewees have not parliamentarians during legislative observed floor crossing behaviour sessions in the Maldives. during the legislative process from parliamentarians of their constituency. However, 36 per cent of interviewees have observed such behaviour from parliamentarians of their constituency.
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5 SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
5.1 DEFINITIONAL ASPECTS OF FLOOR CROSSING
SUMMARY Question 3 Do you see floor crossing as an Floor crossing seems to be a act connected to corruption? common occurrence in the Parliament of the Maldives. Majority of interviewees (82%) have observed parliamentary floor crossing in the Maldives while a notable number of interviewees (36%) have observed floor crossing behaviour during the legislative process from parliamentarians of their constituency. Significant number of interviewees (80%) also believe that floor crossing is an act connected to corruption, indicating that floor crossing is perceived by the public to have a negative impact. This is particularly worrying as a survey107 80 per cent of interviewees see undertaken by Transparency Maldives in floor crossing as an act connected 2014 shows the low levels of confidence to corruption. Maldivians have in the Parliament—one of the key representative institutions. Therefore, floor crossing behaviour by parliamentarians, especially since it is largely perceived to be an act connected to corruption, has the potential to further deteriorate public confidence in the Parliament and call into question the integrity of parliamentarians as elected representatives in the eyes of the public.
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5.2 Reasons for floor crossing:
Question 4 84 per cent of interviewees believe Do you believe that the following that floor crossing happens reasons are why parliamentarians because money or some sort of cross the floor in the Maldives? gain/profit have been offered to parliamentarians to vote against (a) Personal reasons own party line or defect to another party.
(c) Because parliamentarians enhance more power and influence in the parliament by defecting to another party
70 per cent of interviewees believe that Maldivian parliamentarians cross the floor for personal reasons not very clear to the public.
(b) Because money or other gains have been offered to parliamentarians to vote 62 per cent of interviewees against own party line or believe that floor crossing happens defect to another party because parliamentarians can enhance more power and influence in the Parliament by defecting to another party.
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5.2 REASONS FOR FLOOR CROSSING
(d) When party policy is not the chances of being re-elected in line with own view or is higher by switching to another ideology party.
(f) To support constituents’ original views and ideology?
53 per cent of interviewees believe that floor crossing occurs when party policy is not in line with parliamentarians’ own view or ideology. 66 per cent of interviewees believe that supporting the views and ideology of constituents is not a (e) When there are better deciding factor in parliamentarians’ chances of being re-elected decision to cross the floor. in the other party
53 per cent of interviewees believe that floor crossing happens when
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5.2 REASONS FOR FLOOR CROSSING
SUMMARY corruption—in particular, those concerning misappropriation of Out of six possible reasons why funds and illicit enrichment—are parliamentarians may decide to cross the thoroughly investigated. floor in the Maldives, interviewees identify the following as the main reasons: 3 62 per cent of interviewees believe that parliamentarians cross the 1 70 per cent of interviewees believe floor because they stand to gain that parliamentarians cross the floor more political power and influence for individual or personal reasons in the Parliament—and presumably not very clear to the public. This in their new political party—by lack of transparency regarding the doing so. motives behind parliamentarians’ decision to cross the floor can Apart from these three reasons, further encourage distrust in a interviewees also identify several society where citizens are already other reasons why parliamentary floor deeply cynical of politics and have crossing occurs. One reason is that little confidence in representative parliamentarians may cross the floor institutions. when the party policy is not in line with their own view or ideology. In other words, 2 84 per cent of interviewees believe ideology is one factor that determines floor crossing happens because parliamentarians’ allegiance to political parliamentarians receive money parties. 53 per cent of interviewees or some sort of material gain from acknowledge that this allegiance or another party by voting against loyalty may waver for entirely legitimate own party line or switching parties. reasons such as irreconcilable ideological It is worth mentioning here that differences between parliamentarians one way to sever the connection and their respective parties. However, between floor crossing anda notable number of interviewees corruption is by making the asset (44%) also disagree that this is one of declarations of parliamentarians the reasons why parliamentarians vote public and by building a against their party line or switch parties, comprehensive asset declaration thus indicating that there is no strong regime where allegations of consensus on a positive relationship
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5 SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
5.2 REASONS FOR FLOOR CROSSING
between floor crossing and preserving the ideological independence of parliamentarians. This view is further supported by the fact that 53 per cent of interviewees believe that parliamentarians engage in floor crossing behaviour for purely ambitious reasons such as maximising the chances of being re-elected by switching to another party. This indicates that floor crossing may very well discourage the advancement of political parties as parliamentarians, despite being elected with a party affiliation, have the power to act independently of party rules as their mandate is driven by their own political ambitions rather than the advancement of their political parties— or even, by extension, their constituents. In fact, 66 per cent of interviewees believe that supporting or honouring the principles and interests of constituents is not a deciding factor in parliamentarians’ decision to cross the floor. That said, a notable number of interviewees also view that floor crossing occurs not necessarily because parliamentarians have a higher chance of being re-elected by doing so. This indicates that there is no strong consensus on the relationship between floor crossing and the chances of being re-elected.
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5.3 Mechanisms that prevent or support floor crossing
Question 5 Question 6 In your view, are the legal and Do you believe that the issue governance systems in place of floor crossing should be strong enough to stop or prevent addressed through the following parliamentary floor crossing? ways?
(a) Laws should be in place to prevent or restrict floor crossing
94 per cent of interviewees view that the legal and governance systems in place are not strong enough to stop or prevent parliamentary floor crossing. 87 per cent of interviewees believe that the issue of floor crossing should be addressed through laws that prevent or restrict floor crossing.
(b) It should be a self-regulatory process
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5.3 Mechanisms that prevent or support floor crossing
75 per cent of interviewees do (d) It’s not an issue and can be not believe that the issue of floor allowed to exercise freely crossing should be addressed through a self-regulatory process where parties can discipline floor crossers and address any negative effects of floor crossing.
(c) Should be allowed to exercise freely, but any act 68 per cent of interviewees believe of corruption related to that floor crossing is an issue and floor crossing should be cannot be allowed to exercise addressed through law freely.
92 per cent of interviewees believe that the issue of floor crossing should be addressed by allowing it to be exercised freely, but with the exception that any act of corruption related to floor crossing should be addressed through law.
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5.3 Mechanisms that prevent or support floor crossing
Question 7 Question 8 In your view, are the legal In your view, do political parties institutions in place strong of the Maldives encourage enough to stop or prevent parliamentary floor crossing? corruption in parliamentary floor crossing?
80 per cent of interviewees view that political parties of the Maldives 88 per cent of interviewees view encourage parliamentary floor that the legal institutions in place crossing. are not strong enough to stop or prevent corruption in parliamentary floor crossing.
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5 SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
5.3 Mechanisms that prevent or support floor crossing
SUMMARY crossing can be addressed through law. However, while some form of a regulatory An overwhelming majority of system is desired, majority of interviewees interviewees (94%) believe that the legal (75%) disagree that it should be a self- and governance systems in place are regulatory process where political parties not strong enough to stop or prevent are allowed to discipline floor crossers parliamentary floor crossing. It must and address any negative consequences be noted that the Maldivian Parliament of floor crossing—thus hinting a lack of currently does not have any legislation public confidence in the party system to in place that prohibits or sanctions floor successfully or even effectively combat crossing. Although parliamentarians (with corruption in general. the exception of independent members) are elected with a party affiliation, they are not legally obligated to retain their party label during the whole of their mandate. However, the survey shows that majority of interviewees want some sort of a legal mechanism that either prohibits or regulates parliamentary floor crossing. 87 per cent of interviewees believe laws should be in place to prevent or restrict floor crossing. This further establishes that there is a considerable level of public concern against floor crossing. However, this concern exists not because parliamentarians cross the floor, but rather because the public does not believe floor crossing can happen without corruption involved. This is why an overwhelming majority of interviewees (92%) believe that while floor crossing should not be prohibited and allowed to exercise freely, it must be monitored so that any acts of corruption related to floor
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5.4 Consequences of floor crossing:
5.4 Consequences of floor crossing:
Question 9 Question 10 In your view, does floor crossing In your view, can floor crossing weaken your confidence and undermine democracy and support for your party position weaken party system? as a constituent of the party?
81 per cent of interviewees view 62 per cent of interviewees view that floor crossing undermines that floor crossing weakens their democracy and weakens party confidence in and support for their system. party position as a constituent of the party.
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5.4 Consequences of floor crossing:
SUMMARY political parties and the interests of their constituents. Therefore, what is observed Majority of interviewees (62%) here is that there is considerable level of believe that floor crossing weakens public concern that floor crossing enables their confidence in and support for their political corruption and opportunism, respective political parties. However, which ultimately creates a legitimacy a notable number of interviewees also crisis for parliamentarians and affects maintain that floor crossing does not the legitimacy of the Parliament as a affect their support for their parties. democratic institution. This indicates that there is no strong consensus on a negative relationship between floor crossing and constituents’ confidence in political parties. Perhaps one reason for this is that, as more than half of interviewees acknowledge, parliamentarians may have, in some cases, entirely genuine or legitimate reasons for floor crossing—for example, ideological differences between parliamentarians and their respective political parties. However, majority of interviewees (81%) believe that parliamentary floor crossing undermines representative democracy and weakens the Maldivian multi-party political system. This view is not surprising when majority of interviewees see floor crossing as an act connected to corruption, and believe that parliamentarians cross the floor (in some cases, at least) not because of principles of ideology, but rather to pursue personal ambitions that may very well compromise the principle mandate of their respective
39 transparency maldives Annex 1
Interview questions and assessment methods
Interview results are divided into four 2 Do not agree: This means that categories, in a way to show, by per the interviewee has said ‘no’ or centage and numbers (interviewees), ‘not necessarily’. the public perceptions, with respect to definitional aspects, reasons for floor 3 Neutral position: This means crossing, mechanisms that prevent or that the interviewee has said ‘don’t support floor crossing, consequences know’ or ‘no comments’. of floor crossing, and their links to corruption. The perception, by per These levels are formulated in a way centage and numbers, with respect to to assess, based on the hypothesis, the these areas is assessed according to the public perception of floor crossing and following levels: its relation to corruption in the Maldives. People’s opinions will be categorised with 1 Agreed: This means that the respect to these levels based on how interviewee has answered ‘yes’ to interviewees respond to the questions. the question. Interview questions
1. DEFINITIONAL ASPECTS OF Question 1 FLOOR CROSSING: Have you observed floor crossing by Maldivian parliamentarians during •• Interviewees are assessed on their legislative sessions? understanding of floor crossing, Question 2 specifically on what floor crossing Have you observed parliamentarians means to them. from your constituency crossing the floor during legislative sessions? •• Interviewees are assessed with Question 3 respect to their observation of any Do you see floor crossing as an act behaviour that could be defined as connected to corruption? a parliamentarian defecting from his/her party line in the legislative process in the Maldives.
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ANNEX 1
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
2. REASONS FOR FLOOR (d) When party policy is not in line with CROSSING: own view or ideology
•• Interviewees are assessed with (e) When there are better chances of respect to their understanding of being re-elected in the other party why parliamentarians have crossed the floor or are crossing floor in the (f) To support constituents’ original Maldives. views and ideology?
•• Interviewees are assessed with 3. MECHANISMS THAT PREVENT respect to their observation OR SUPPORT FLOOR CROSSING: of personal behaviour of parliamentarians with respect •• Interviewees are assessed on to motivational and institutional their understanding of the political factors leading to floor crossing. system in place in the Maldives and how that system can affect Question 4 floor crossing. Do you believe that the following reasons are why parliamentarians cross the floor •• Interviewees are assessed with in the Maldives? respect to their observation of the strengths and weaknesses of (a) Personal reasons party system in the Maldives and how that may have or have not (b) Because money or other gains have prevented floor crossing. been offered to parliamentarians to vote against own party line or Question 5 defect to another party In your view, are the legal and governance systems in place strong enough to stop (c) Because parliamentarians enhance or prevent parliamentary floor crossing? more power and influence in the parliament by defecting to another party
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ANNEX 1
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Question 6 4. CONSEQUENCES OF FLOOR Do you believe that the issue of floor CROSSING: crossing should be addressed through the following ways? •• Interviewees are assessed on their understanding of the (a) Laws should be in place to prevent consequences of floor crossing in or restrict floor crossing the Maldives
(b) It should be a self-regulatory •• Interviewees are assessed with process respect to their observation of how consequences of floor crossing (c) Should be allowed to exercise have affected their life and country freely, but any act of corruption related to floor crossing should be Question 9 addressed through law In your view, does floor crossing weaken your confidence and support for your (d) It’s not an issue and can be allowed party position as a constituent of the to exercise freely party?
Question 7 Question 10 In your view, are the legal institutions In your view, can floor crossing undermine in place strong enough to stop or democracy and weaken party system? prevent corruption in parliamentary floor crossing?
Question 8 In your view, do political parties of the Maldives encourage parliamentary floor crossing?
42 transparency maldives REFERENCES
J&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pmg.org.za%2Fdocs%2 1 INTRODUCTION F2007%2F070130floorcross.doc&ei=KDPNVK6JFcfv8 1. Janda, Kenneth (2009) Laws Against Party gWq84CoCg&usg=AFQjCNEbgFjJI3pZUHlodPrhU0xp Switching, Defection, or Floor-crossing in National 0F-6JA&sig2=Wderrk5MXqQ92mmYAw_3EQ Parliaments, at http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/ 13. See O’Brien & Shomer (2013) above n. 4. uploads/wp0209.pdf. 14. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 3. See Desposato, ScottW (2006) “Parties for Rent? 16. See Fenno, Richard. 1973. Congressmen in Ambition, Ideology and Party Switching in Brazil’s Committees. Boston: Little Brown; O’Brien & Shomer Chamber of Deputies.” American Political Science (2013) above n. 4. Review 50 (1): 62–80.; Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999). 17. See Aldrich, John, and William Bianco. 1992. “A Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, Game Theoretic Model of Party Affiliation of Candidates and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and Office Holders.” Mathematical Computational 4. Janda (2009) above n. 1; Desposato (2006) above Modeling 16 (8/9): 103–16; Herron, Erik. 2002. “Causes n. 3. Hug, Simon, and Reto Wüest (2011). “Ideological and Consequences of Fluid Faction Membership in Positions of Party Switching.” Presented at the 2011 Ukraine.” Europe-Asia Studies 54 (4): 625–39. ECPR Joint Sessions, St. Gallen, Switzerland; O’Brien, 18. Rose-Ackerman (1999) above n. 3. Diana Z. & Shomer, Yael (2013). ‘Cross-national analysis 19. See Janda (2009) above n. 1; O’Brien & Shomer of party switching.’ In Legislative Studies Quarterly, (2013) above n. 4. XXXVIII(1). 20. O’Brien & Shomer (2013) above n. 4, p. 119. 5. Janda (2009) above n. 1; O’Brien & Yael, 2013 21. See Csaba, Nikolenyi (2011) “Political Institutions above n. 4; McElroy, Gail (2003) “Party Switching in the and Party Switching in Post-Communist Legislatures.” European Parliament: Why bother?” Paper prepared Presented at the 2011 ECPR Joint Sessions, St. Gallen, for presentation at the 2003 meeting of the European Switzerland; O’Brien & Shomer (2013) above n. 4. Consortium for Political Research, Marburg, Germany. 22. See Janda (2009) above n. 1; O’Brien & Shomer September 18-21; Müller, Wolfgang, and Kaare Strøm (2013) above n. 4; Majola, Saptoe, & Silkstone (2007) (1999). Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties above n. 10; Grose, Christian R. and Yoshinaka, Antonie in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: (2003). ‘The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching Cambridge University Press. by Incumbent Members of Congress, 1947-2000). In 6. See Janda (2009) above n. 1. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 28(1), pp.55-75. 7. See Mainwaring. Scott (1991) “Politicians, 23. Kamath, P. M. (1985) “Politics of Defection in India Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative in the 1980s,” Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 10, (October), Perspective,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1. 1039-1054. (October), 21-43. 24. Janda (2009) above n. 1. 8. Janda (2009) above n. 1. 25. O’Brien & Shomer (2013) above n. 4. 9. Political Corruption is the manipulation of policies, 26. Rose-Ackerman (1999) above n. 3. institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of 27. Ibid. resources and financing by political decision makers, 28. Janda (2009) above n. 1. who abuse their position to sustain their power, status 29. See Janda (2009) above n. 1; Democracy and wealth (see Transparency International [2015] Development Programme (2006) “Impact and Future of “FAQs on corruption”, at https://www.transparency.org/ the Floor Crossing Legislation,” Political forum report, whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/). Forum, June 22. 10. O’Brien & Shomer (2013) above n. 4. 30. Janda (2009) above n. 1. 11. Ibid. 31. Transparency Maldives (2014). National Integrity 12. Desposato (2006) above n. 3; Hug & Wüest (2011) System Assessment 2014. Maldives: Transparency above n. 4; Janda (2009) above n. 1; Majola, X., Saptoe, E. Maldives, p. 28. & Silkstone, C. (2007), “Floor Crossing: Germany, United 32. Rose-Ackerman (1999) above n. 3. Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Lesotho and Kenya”. Paper 33. Transparency Maldives (2014) above n. 31. prepared by Information Service Section: Research Unit. at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s& source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFsQFjA
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