Historically Speaking Shiloh at 150

n February’s “Historically Speaking,” By BG John S. Brown forces began arriving there on March 11, Iwe discussed MG Ulysses S. Grant’s U.S. Army retired 1862, and fanned out to occupy an assem- successful seizures of Forts Henry and bly area dominated by scenic Shiloh Donelson. Daringly exploiting the mechanized Church. Meanwhile the Confederates, led by advantages of steamboats, he pushed up- Generals Albert Sidney Johnston and P.G.T. stream on both the Tennessee and Cumber- Beauregard, recognized the hazards of their land Rivers. He cut Confederate rail commu- separation and the vulnerability of their rail nications across these rivers and stood line. They concentrated at Corinth, where poised for even deeper penetrations into the they amassed 40,000 troops to slightly out- middle South. His twin victories left the Con- number Grant’s force of 35,000. The Confed- federates in Tennessee momentarily split in erates decided to attack. two, but an opportunity to defeat either wing in For reasons that are not altogether clear, the detail evaporated because of dithering among security thrown up by Union forces around their Grant’s superiors as to who was in charge of what and what expansive Shiloh assembly area was grossly inadequate. they should do next. A next logical geographical target for There had been perturbations in leadership as command advancing Union forces was the rail line running from passed from Grant for a while and then came back to him. Memphis through Corinth, Miss.; Chattanooga and Knox- Grant had been injured when his horse fell, and he was ville to Petersburg and Richmond, Va. This was the only moving around on crutches. Grant’s soldiers were su- continuous rail line spanning the Confederacy from east to premely confident after their twin victories and went about west. One had to travel 150 miles south of this line to find training and preparing for future advances without giving another high-volume east-west route, rail and water, run- much thought to local security. Grant and his superiors re- ning from Vicksburg through Montgomery to Atlanta. alized he would have to be reinforced to advance. Accord- Now master of the Tennessee River by virtue of Fort ingly, he personally was positioned downstream at Savan- Henry and a fleet of armed steamboats, Grant’s Army of the nah, about 10 miles from Pittsburg Landing, to facilitate Tennessee had ready access to Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., the arrival of reinforcements from MG Don Carlos Buell’s within 20 miles of the strategic rail junction at Corinth. His neighboring Army of the Ohio. Ultimately, Grant was so

A lithograph by Swedish-born artist Thure de Thulstrup depicts the two-day , near Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., when Union forces struggled to hold the line against Confederate attack at the Sunken Road and the Hornet’s Nest in April 1862. Library of Congress

86 ARMY I April 2012 aggressive he is reputed to have given far more thought to what he was going to do to his adversary than to what his adversary was going to do to him.

dvancing along poor roads in thickly wooded terrain, Athe Confederates came on line undetected within two miles of divisions commanded by Brigadier Generals William T. Sherman and Benjamin M. Prentiss. Prentiss sent out heavy patrols during the early morning of April 6, and these almost immediately came into heavy contact. The volume of fire animated the previously careless Union leadership. Sherman and Prentiss got their divisions on line quickly, and divisions commanded by MG John A. Mc- Clernand and BG Stephen A. Hurlburt marched immedi- ately to their relief. Nevertheless, the Confederate attack swept all before it for a time, forcing the embattled Union divisions back all along the line. Union camps were over- run. Union losses mounted. Unfortunately for the Confed- erates, they had oddly configured their deployment. One corps was on line in front and another on line behind. Nei-

ther corps had actual reserves. As the battle developed in Archive M. Highsmith Library of Congress/Carol the thick terrain, unrelated units became hopelessly jum- A century and a half after some of the bloodiest bled together. On the few occasions that Confederates fighting of the Civil War, the Hornet’s Nest at punched through or overlapped Federal lines, they had no Shiloh is part of the Shiloh National Military Park. forces with which to exploit. Grant first heard the gunfire at 6:30 A.M. He sped by “Well Grant, we’ve had the Devil’s own day, haven’t we?” steamship to Pittsburg Landing, arriving at 8:30. En route, “Yes,” Grant replied, then puffed on his cigar and continued, he dispatched orders rushing three additional divisions “Lick ‘em tomorrow though.” Rallying from initial unpre- into the battle area. These were drawn from his own forces paredness, Grant and his lieutenants had demonstrated com- and those of MG Buell. Meanwhile, Grant’s chief of staff mendable initiative, leadership, energy and fortitude. They gathered all the artillery he could muster and massed it had also moved in 25,000 fresh troops in less than a day, facing east on a ridge extending south from Pittsburg whereas the Confederates had none. When the Union at- Landing. At positions now memorialized as the Sunken tacked on April 7, it inexorably pushed back the weakening Road and the Hornet’s Nest, embattled Union forces strug- Confederate line. At 2:30 P.M. Beauregard ordered a with- gled desperately to hold the line farther forward. When drawal. The surviving Confederates got away in the forested others were forced to withdraw, Prentiss squared off and terrain, their retreat covered by LTG Nathan Bedford For- fought on. He was finally overrun at 5:30 P.M., by which rest’s capable cavalry. time reinforcements were arriving and a new line had Corinth fell shortly thereafter. Battlefield losses totaled formed, extending from the artillery now bristling over about 13,700 for the Union and 10,700 for the Confederates. Pittsburg Landing. At 6:00 P.M. the Confederates—some One Union brigade started the battle on April 6 with 2,750 out of ammunition and relying on bayonets—attempted a men, resumed it on April 7 with 900, and ended that day final assault on this formidable line. The assault failed. with 58 combat-capable troops remaining. Some Northern- During the course of the day’s fighting, Johnston—re- ers, appalled by the casualties and put off by Grant’s al- garded by many at the time as the most promising of the leged drinking, lobbied President Lincoln for Grant’s relief. Confederate generals—was killed, an incalculable loss. Lincoln famously retorted, “I can’t spare this man, he Having been defeated on the first day at Shiloh, Grant con- fights.” This, as we shall see, remained true. ( templated the second. An iconic anecdote has Sherman com- ing up on Grant under a tree smoking a cigar and saying, Recommended Reading:

BG John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history at Esposito, Vincent J., The West Point Atlas of American the U.S. Army Center of Military History from December Wars, Volume I: 1689–1900 (New York: Frederick A. 1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Praeger, 1959) Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol. I: Fort to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Di- Sumter to Perryville (New York: Random House, 1958) vision, in 1995. He has a doctorate in history from Indiana McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil University. His book, Kevlar Legions: A History of Army War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) Transformation 1989–2005, was published in 2011.

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