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Sitetrends – War for Talent 2017 SITETRENDS WAR FOR TALENT WHERE THE WORKFORCE & JOBS LIVE JULY 2017 3 INTRODUCTION 4 WAR FOR TALENT 5 DEFINING GENERATIONS 6 UNITED STATES DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVES 10 UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVES IN LEADING MARKETS 16 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 17 GLOBAL POPULATIONS 21 GLOBAL WORKFORCE 22 GLOBAL EMPLOYMENT 24 GLOBAL UNEMPLOYMENT 25 ABOUT H&A CONTENTS INTRODUCTION The “War for Talent” is a phrase commonly used to describe competition among businesses for quality and affordable labor. First used in the 1990s, the phrase became relevant as the United States shifted its economic focus from the Baby Boomer generation to Generation X, and as business leaders increasingly became aware of the link between talent attraction and competitiveness. Although this initial shift was characterized by the demographic change which accompanied the transition away from the larger Boomer population (who had long defined the consumer economy), the challenge associated with attracting the qualified and affordable labor necessary to sustain the consumer economy persists, even as the smaller Generation X now begins to give way to an even larger generation – the Millennials. Twenty years have passed since the phrase War for Talent was coined, and with the passage of time, perspective has provided additional insight. The workforce has changed; people aren’t retiring with the same firm where they began their careers—a trend that has certainly accelerated over the past decade. BUSINESS CHANGED Brick and mortar retail is in decline while online purchasing is giving rise to warehouse development. Fresh outlooks are needed to transition to a new normal. Certain international trends also parallel and influence the quest for talent. Offshoring and outsourcing play a significant role in local employment trends, requiring workers to have strong talent to differentiate themselves from others. The world is becoming a much closer-knit environment of cause and effect, especially as supply chains for goods are optimized and service economies are expanding to new markets where digital products are not limited by transportation costs. SITETRENDS: WAR FOR TALENT - JULY 2017 3 © 2017 Hickey & Associates. All Rights Reserved. WAR FOR TALENT The War for Talent is driven by population shifts. In retire in millions every year. Over time, technological the United States, a predictable population cycle has innovations allowed the cycle of larger followed by emerged over the past century. This cycle tends to smaller populations to accommodate sustainable run in 20-30 year periods in which larger population replacement of this workforce. cohorts are followed by smaller generations. However, as the Boomers now move into retirement, At the dawn of the 20th century the population of the members of Generation X are positioned to move into United States grew rapidly, first fueled by immigration the middle and upper stages of their careers at just and then as a result of people delaying the start of their the right time to capitalize on natural winnowing of families due primarily to the Great Depression and professional experience. This means that leadership the Second World War. People born between 1905 positions filled over the next ten years can uniquely and 1925 grew up during a period of unprecedented accommodate Generation X. immigration. They came of age at a time when jobs were initially very difficult to find and later when the In parallel with this transition is the entry of the Millennial consumer economy was secondarily stunted by war. population into the workforce. Millennials, generally in their early 20s to mid-30s, now represent a larger The post-war setting allowed Americans to finally population than the Boomers preceding them. While start a family and settle down into long term career there is clear evidence that this second population employment. At this time, the population of the United boom will mirror demands that Boomers put on the States grew quickly and thus created the Baby Boom consumer economy (more people will eventually need generation, a group which subsequently created a more products), some things have changed. The new consumer economy for all sorts of items: apparel service sector replaced manufacturing during the (the birth of style), recorded music (the Beatles), cars, coming of age of Boomers and the rise of Millennials. suburban housing, and products were all needed Information, in addition to products, is driving the or demanded by a generation larger than any in the market. Products are now manufactured in other history of the United States. countries, necessitating global supply chains driven by data-heavy logistics, further perpetuating data Yet, this growth didn’t continue forever. The smaller analytics services. Today’s global population wants Generation X that followed the Boomers may have goods manufactured in China to be as accessible to caused the consumer economy to slow without them as they were when the consumer could have productivity innovations, such as computer technology bought the good locally. and the internet, which allowed fewer people to do more with fewer resources. For a while, the sheer number of Boomers in the workforce offset the drop in numbers of the next generation. Today, Boomers SITETRENDS: WAR FOR TALENT - JULY 2017 4 © 2017 Hickey & Associates. All Rights Reserved. DEFINING GENERATIONS FIG. 1: DESCRIPTIONS OF GENERATIONS 1905-1925 1945-1965 GREATEST/GI 1925-1945 (BABY) BOOMERS SILENT GEN 1985-2005 1965-1985 MILLENNIALS 2005-2025 GEN X GEN Z Future population projections indicate a second of three generations in their workforce to be a population contraction: Generation Z. Generation Z sustainable model. This allows for seasoned leadership, ranges from children born today up to high school mentoring, and on-boarding to happen in predictable students. Trends in employment similarities between cycles with the potential for career tracks to naturally Boomers and Millennials can also be linked to develop, thus promoting an environment suitable to a Generation X and Generation Z. Thus, five predictable meritocracy and predictable turnover. population cycles can be shown over the past 100 years in the United States, and while challenges exist in This analysis will compare the populations in key world finding appropriate talent in today’s workforce, these markets before examining specific job trends in the challenges have distinct benefits for the United States United States. To demonstrate the broad impact of economy. the War for Talent, we examine key regional global economies. For this paper, China and India will Figure 1 outlines the generational trends in the United represent Asia, Mexico and Brazil will represent Latin States. Many businesses employ multi-generational America, and Germany and the United Kingdom will workforces and find deploying significant proportions represent Europe. SITETRENDS: WAR FOR TALENT - JULY 2017 5 © 2017 Hickey & Associates. All Rights Reserved. UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVES DOMESTIC This report examines certain key occupations and their relationship to all other jobs in the United States. Past employment trends have been forecasted to 2021 to model expected wage inflation and job growth and contrast this future five-year period with prior growth. Occupations were selected in order to represent key parts of the economy. These occupations include: • All United States Jobs • Financial Clerks (Financial Sector) • Business Jobs • Customer Service Jobs • Software Developers (Services Sector) (Information Technology Sector) • Team Assemblers (Manufacturing and Production • Retail Workers Sector) (Retail Sector) • Material Movers • Administrative Jobs (Transportation and (Services and Support Sector) Warehousing Sector) SITETRENDS: WAR FOR TALENT - JULY 2017 6 © 2017 Hickey & Associates. All Rights Reserved. UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVES DOMESTIC Wage inflation for targeted jobs shows growth in all sectors except team assemblers (production), which is flat, and retail sales, in which there is a decline corresponding to incremental gains for material movers (Figure 2). Wage inflation in IT will continue to outpace many other jobs as the demand for software developers continues to increase at record pace, both in the United States and abroad. FIG. 2: RATE OF WAGE INFLATION 13% 7% 7% 11% Δ 2012-2016 ALL Δ 2016-2021 JOBS 10% 9% % % 9 9 % % 9% 9 9 8% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5.4% RETAIL BUSINESS CUSTOMER SOFTWARE ADMIN MATERIAL FINANCIAL TEAM WORKERS JOBS SERVICE DEVELOPERS JOBS MOVERS CLERKS ASSEMBLERS SITETRENDS: WAR FOR TALENT - JULY 2017 7 © 2017 Hickey & Associates. All Rights Reserved. DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVES CONTINUED Wage growth for software developers is partially caused by the lack of available labor, which will not be able to keep pace with demand (Figure 3). High growth customer service and material mover jobs are evidence of a growing service sector and a consumer economy driven by online purchasing. FIG. 3: JOB GROWTH 35% % 9% 33 8% Δ 2012-2016 ALL Δ 2016-2021 JOBS 22% 21% 19% 18% % % 14 13 14% 11% 7% 4% 3% 4% RETAIL BUSINESS CUSTOMER SOFTWARE ADMIN MATERIAL FINANCIAL TEAM WORKERS JOBS SERVICE DEVELOPERS JOBS MOVERS CLERKS ASSEMBLERS -2% -3% SITETRENDS: WAR FOR TALENT - JULY 2017 8 © 2017 Hickey & Associates. All Rights Reserved. DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVES CONTINUED Nationally, business jobs, software developers, customer service, and material mover jobs are all increasing the number of available jobs in relation to all other jobs over the next five years (Figure 4). Team assembler jobs are expected to double
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