Kansas Climate Profile

by Robert Ferguson Table of Contents

I. Summary for Policy Makers 3

II. Observed Climate Change in Kansas 4 A. Temperature 4 B. Precipitation 6 C. Drought 7 D. Floods 9 E. Tornadoes 13 F. World-Wide Statistics on Deaths 19

III. Public Health Impacts 20 A. Temperature-related Mortality 20 B. “Tropical” Diseases 22

IV. Future Climate projections 27

V. Emissions “Savings” 30

VI. Impact of climate-mitigation measures in Kansas 31

VII. Costs of Federal Regulation 34

VIII. Kansas Scientists reject un climate hypothesis 36

Summary

IX. References 37

X. Some Essential Readings in Climate Science 39

Robert Ferguson, President [email protected] 5501 Merchants View Square # 209 Haymarket, VA 20169 www.scienceandpublicpolicy.org (202) 288-5699

2 I. Summary for Policy Makers

n October 18, 2007, The Kansas Department of Health and OEnvironment rejected a request to build two new 700-megawatt coal-fired electricity generating power plants, citing concerns over the contribution of the proposed plants’ carbon dioxide emissions to climate change and “the potential harm to our environment and health.”

In making this finding, the Kansas Department of Health and Environment had to ignore all of the known climate history of the state of Kansas, established climate science as well as the climate model projections for the future climate of the state of Kansas. Both observations and projections clearly demonstrate that:

 Kansans have neither experienced nor are predicted to experience negative effects from climate variations and trends  There have been no overall changes in temperatures during the past 75 years  Total precipitation has increased slightly, making more water available for all to use  The frequency and severity of drought has decreased  Kansan’s sensitivity to heat-waves has declined  The number of severe storms, such as tornadoes is relatively unchanged  “Tropical” diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, or West Nile Virus have been erroneously predicted to spread due to global warming  Future projections indicate that Kansas will be less impacted by rising global temperatures – natural or otherwise – than any other state in the country

Since China alone opens a new coal-fired plant every 4 - 7 days, any Kansas-derived “savings” of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere will be made up in a matter of days, effectively exporting emissions and jobs overseas.

These facts make it inconceivable that the Kansas Department of Health and Environment would, on spurious grounds of “climate change,” deny the application to add more generating power aimed towards reducing the cost and insuring an abundant future supply of electricity, prosperity and general well-being to Kansans.

3 II. Observed Climate Change in Kansas

A. Temperature

veraged across the state of Kansas, the long-term annual temperature history shows a Aslightly upward trend over the past 112 years — the time since widespread records were first complied by the U.S. National Climatic Data Center — however, all of the temperature increase occurred more than 75 years ago, prior to the about 1930. Since then, from 1930 through 2006 there has actually been a slight decline in the statewide averaged temperature records, at a time when atmospheric CO2 concentration has increased.

Recently, Kansas has experienced a string of warm years beginning in 1998, but generally the annual temperature during this warm period has not been exceptional. While globally, it is often reported that the last 10 years were the hottest on record, in Kansas, the story is much different. Only 2 of the 10 hottest years on record statewide occurred within the past 50 years, while 8 of the state’s 10 all-time hottest years, including the 6 hottest years on record, occurred prior to 1956—more than a half-century year ago. Obviously, “global warming” has not had much of an effect on temperatures in Kansas.

Left: The 112-yr history of Kansas statewide average temperature indicates an overall warming trend, but in actuality, the entire rise occurred prior to about 1930. Right: The Kansas statewide temperature history from 1930-

4 2006 shows, in fact, that there has been a slight decline in temperatures over the past 77 years. (Data source: National Climatic Data Center, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/cag3/ks.html) Examining Kansas’ statewide temperature history since 1930 within the four seasons, one again finds no evidence of any “global warming” throughout any portion of the year. There has been a slight warming tendency during the spring season, but cooling tendencies dominate the summer and fall seasons, and there is little trend at all during the winter. Temperatures in recent years are unremarkable when set against the long-term temperature history of the state.

Winter Summer

Spring Fall

Kansas’ long-term statewide average temperature history, by season, from winter 1930 through summer 2007, as compiled and maintained by the National Climate Data Center (http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/cag3/ks.html).

5 B. Precipitation

veraged across the state of Kansas for each of the past 112 years, statewide annual total Aprecipitation exhibits an increasing trend amounting to about 10 percent more precipitation falling per year at the end of the record than at the beginning. More important than the long-term trend, the record of Kansas’ annual precipitation is dominated by year-to-year and decade-to-decade variability. During the wettest year in Kansas’ history, 1951, a total of 41.50 inches of precipitation fell, while just 5 years later, in 1956, the driest year on record, only 14.39 inches of precipitation fell. Recent annual totals show nothing unusual when compared to the observed historical record, having remained within a couple of inches of the long-term mean.

Kansas’ long-term statewide annual precipitation history as compiled and maintained by the National Climate Data Center (http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/cag3/ks.html)

6 C. Drought

s is evident from Kansas’ long-term observed precipitation history, there are often strings Aof dry years, such as in the mid-1930s and the mid-1950s. Several dry years in a row can lead to widespread drought conditions.

A dust storm approaching Colby, Kansas, Spring 1935. (photo source: http://www.oznet.ksu.edu/wdl/climate/conwk/index.asp?page=4)

However, also evident from Kansas’ precipitation history there has been a long-term upward trend in the total precipitation across the state. Consequently, the frequency and intensity of drought conditions across the state has decreased.1 The Kansas PDSI history is also dominated by shorter term variations which largely reflect the state’s precipitation variability. Droughts in

1 As indicated by the history of the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI)—a standard measure of moisture conditions that takes into account both inputs from precipitation and losses from evaporation.

7 the mid-1930s and mid-1950s mark the most significant events of the past 112 years. Nothing in recent years has come close to these historic drought events.

Kansas’ long-term statewide monthly Palmer Drought Severity Index values as compiled and maintained by the National Climate Data Center (http://cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/CDO/CDODivisionalSelect.jsp)

A history of drought in Kansas can be traced back even further than we have direct rainfall measurements by analyzing information stored in annual tree ring patterns. For instance, Dr. Edward Cook and colleagues (Cook et al., 1999; 2004) were able to reconstruct a summertime PDSI record for central Kansas that extends back in time more than 1000 years. That paleoclimate moister record indicates that alternating multi-decadal periods of wet and dry conditions have occurred with semi-regularity during the past millennium, emphasizing that droughts are a normal part of the region’s climate system. In fact, the reconstructed drought history indicates that there have been many droughts in Kansas’ past that have been far more severe and longer lasting than anything witnessed during the past century, long before CO2 levels rose. When such natural droughts recur in the future, there will be heard unschooled claims that

8 they are induced by “global warming.” However, history shows drought has been for centuries a persistent, naturally occurring phenomenon in Kansas.

The reconstructed summer (June, July, August) Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) for central Kansas from 997 A.D. to 2003 A.D. (National Climate Data Center, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/pdsi.html).

D. Floods

ust as Kansas has been parched by drought in the past, it has been deluged by floodwaters. In J1951, one of the most significant floods in U. S. history inundated much of northeast Kansas as the Kansas River surged over its banks and swamped Kansas City, Lawrence, Topeka, Manhattan and many smaller towns along the way. The 1951 mid-July flood was caused by rainfall exceeding 16 inches in some areas over the course of a week. At least 19 people were killed and 1,100 injured as flood waters covered more than 2 million acres. It also damaged or destroyed 45,000 homes and 17 major bridges causing about $2.5 billion (about $17 billion in 2000 dollars) in damages.2

9 Flooding at the confluence of the Kansas and Missouri Rivers in Kansas City, July 13, 1951 (photo source: http://ks.water.usgs.gov/Kansas/waterwatch/flood/fld51.photos.html).

Scene from the 1951 flood in Topeka, Kansas, as victims are rescued from porches and rooftops (photo source: http://ks.water.usgs.gov/Kansas/waterwatch/flood/fld51.photos.html).

2 Kansas Water Science Center of the United States Geological Survey (http://ks.water.usgs.gov/Kansas/pubs/fact- sheets/fs.041-01.html)

10 In Lawrence, Kansas, mud-encrusted houses awaited their residents return (photo source: http://ks.water.usgs.gov/Kansas/waterwatch/flood/fld51.photos.html).

As devastating as the 1951 flood was in northeastern Kansas, it wasn’t even the flood of record in those parts. The biggest flood in historical times along the Kansas River occurred in 1844. However, that flood occurred prior to widespread settlement of the region, resulting in little damage or loss of life. Other major flooding events occurred in 1785, 1903 and 1993—the year of the Great Mississippi River flood.

11 Floodwaters in Topeka during the flood of 1903 (photo source: http://ks.water.usgs.gov/Kansas/waterwatch/03_and_93_floods/)

Floodwaters in Lawrence, Kansas during the flood of 1993 (photo source: http://ks.water.usgs.gov/Kansas/waterwatch/03_and_93_floods/)

12 One thing a review of the history of flooding in Kansas clearly does not show is any increase in frequency or severity that could be related to “global climate change.” The figure below shows the annual peak flow along the Kansas River at the Topeka gauging station. The big floods of 1903, 1951, and 1993 stand out prominently, but notice that there is no trend towards more or greater events. Instead, major flooding events are a natural part of the history of Kansas and its climate. They have occurred in the past and they will undoubtedly occur again in the future, without regard to any trend in global climate.

Annual peak flow of the Kansas River through Topeka, Kansas, 1902-2001 (figure source: http://www- ks.cr.usgs.gov/Kansas/pubs/fact-sheets/fs.019-03.pdf ).

E. Tornadoes

ying mostly within “tornado alley,” Kansas ranks among the most twister-frequented states Lin the country.

13 Tornado activity in the United States per 1,000 square miles (image source: National Climatic Data Center, http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/severeweather/tornadoes.html)

Claims disingenuously asserting that the number of extreme storm events, such as tornadoes will increase as a result of global warming, pointing to recent increases in the occurrence of tornadoes in the United States. However, in the United States, as in Kansas, the recent increase in tornado observations can be explained by non-climate factors such as the expanded use of Doppler radar by the National Weather Service, an increase in the number of observers (or “storm chasers”), and an increase in the population density. Consequently, small tornadoes that were once missed are now being detected by radar and the larger observing network. The number of strong tornadoes across Kansas—those less likely to have ever been missed—has actually declined since 1950, indicating that the apparent increase in the occurrence of all tornadoes is simply a reflection of our ability to detect them, rather than a true increase in the actual number of tornadoes to hit Kansas.

14 The total number of tornadoes that have struck Kansas from 1950-2006 has apparently increased (top) while the number of violent (F3, F4, F5) tornadoes each year shows a decrease (middle). This indicates, that rather than an actual increase in the total number of storms that have occurred, there has been an increase in the total number of storms that have been observed—largely made up by smaller, weaker tornadoes that are now better detected through a wider and more technologically advanced observing network. The annual number of mortalities from tornadoes shows occasional spikes, but no real trend. (Data from the Storm Prediction Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, http://www.spc.noaa.gov/climo/historical.html)

15 Still, even though the number of tornadoes impacting Kansas is not increasing (or perhaps even decreasing), Kansas remains under a natural threat of tornado disasters as its history too vividly reminds us. Earlier this year, on May 4th, 2007, a violent F5 tornado (the strongest of all storms)—the first F5 storm to hit the United States in over 7 years—struck Greensburg, KS, head-on with winds over 200 mph. Most of town was destroyed, and 9 people were killed and more than 60 injured. But the Greensburg tornado was but one of several monster F5 tornadoes to have touched down in Kansas since 1950—all of which caused extensive damages and death. The worst of all was the F5 tornado that hit Udall, KS during the night of May 25, 1955 killing

80 people and destroying much the town, long before significant post-war CO2 enhancement.

Photo from Udall, Kansas showing the aftermath of powerful F5 tornado that ripped through the town on the night of May 25, 1955. (photo source: http://www.crh.noaa.gov/ict/udall/udall.php)

16 Photo from Udall, Kansas showing the aftermath of powerful F5 tornado that ripped through the town on the night of May 25, 1955. (photo source: http://www.crh.noaa.gov/ict/udall/udall.php)

Another devastating F5 tornado struck Kansas on June 8, 1966. This time, Topeka, KS was the target. A 22-mile long, ½ mile wide path of destruction passed through the heart of the city, leaving 16 dead and causing about $100 million in damages (in 1966 dollars), ranking it in the top-5 costliest tornadoes ever to strike the United States. Across the city, about 800 homes and buildings were completely destroyed and another 3,000 damaged, including the dome of the state capitol. Winds were estimated to have reached speeds of 250 mph.

17 Photographs of the F5 tornado and its aftermath which struck Topeka, Kansas on June 8, 1966. (photo source: The Topeka Capital-Journal, http://www.cjonline.com/indepth/66tornado/)

18 Due to its geographical location within “tornado alley,” Kansas sees a high incidence of deadly and destructive tornadoes, History also shows us that tornadoes, and will undoubtedly continue to do so into the future. There is no indication that ca warmer climate has or will increase the severity or frequency of these extreme weather events. There are, however, good reasons why a cooling climate might.

F. World-wide statistics for disaster-related deaths

s for deaths from climate related events, local and outside activists opposing permitting of Anew Kansas coal-generation stand accused of overstating the dangers. Researchers have reported that the number of people killed each year by weather-related disasters is falling.

Therefore, a central plank in the global warming argument - that it will result in a big increase in deaths from weather-related disasters - is undermined by the facts, that deaths from such disasters peaked in the 1920s and have been declining ever since.

Compared with the peak rate of deaths from weather-related events in the 1920s of nearly 500,000 a year, the death toll during the period 2000-06 averaged 19,900. This number is even more impressive considering world population exposure has increased many fold from population levels in the 1920s.

The number of deaths had fallen sharply because of better warning systems, improved flood defenses and other measures. Poor countries remained most vulnerable.

19 III. Public Health Impacts

A. Temperature-related Mortality

n oft-repeated mantra is that “global warming” will lead to an increase in the number of Apeople who will die during summer heat waves. However, the best science proves otherwise, demonstrating that instead of simply dying, people are better adapting to hot conditions.

A number of studies have shown that during the past several decades, the population in major U.S. cities has grown better adapted, and thus less sensitive, to the effects of excessive heat events (Davis et al., 2003ab). Each of the bars of the illustration below represents the annual number of heat-related deaths in 28 major cities across the United States. There should be three bars for each city, representing, from left to right, the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990. For nearly all cities, the number of heat-related deaths is declining (the bars are get smaller), and in many cities in the south and southeastern United States, there is no bar at all in the 1990s, indicating that there were no statistically distinguishable heat-related deaths during that decade (the most recent one studied). In other words, the population of those cities has become nearly completely adapted to heat waves. This adaptation is most likely a result of improvements in medical technology, access to air-conditioned homes, cars, and offices, increased public awareness of potentially dangerous weather situations, and proactive responses of municipalities during extreme weather events.

20 Annual average excess summer mortality due to high temperatures, broken down by decade, for 28 major cities across the United States. For each city each of the three bars represents the average mortality during successive decades (left bar 1964-66 + 1973-1979; middle bar 1980-1989, right bar 1990-1998). Bars of different color indicate a statistically significant difference. No bar at all means that no temperature/mortality relationship could be found during that decade/city combination (taken from Davis et al., 2003b).

As is the case for most cities in the Midwestern U.S., the pattern of heat-related mortality over time exhibited in Kansas City (indicated by KSC in the figure above)—the city in the Davis et al. studies that is most representative of the conditions in major Kansas cities—shows that the population has become better adapted to high temperature conditions. In fact, in most central Midwestern cities, including Kansas City, there were no statistically distinguishable heat-related deaths during the decade of the 1990s (the most recent one studied)—meaning that the population of those cities has become nearly completely adapted to heat waves. In general, the overall pattern of the distribution of heat-related mortality in cities across the United States indicates that in locations where extremely high temperatures are more

21 commonplace, such as along the southern tier states, the prevalence of heat-related mortality is much lower than in the regions of the country where extremely high temperatures are somewhat rarer (e.g. the northeastern U.S.). This provides another demonstration that populations adapt to their prevailing climate conditions. Even if temperatures warm naturally in the future and excessive heat events become more common, there is every reason to expect that adaptations will take place to lessen their impact on the general population.

All told, the total annual number of weather-related deaths is quite small compared to the annual overall mortality. For instance, generally in the United States the annual mortality rate is less than 1% per year, meaning that about 8,000 to 9,000 people die each year out of every million persons. In contrast, the net effect of the weather in a typical year is about 1,000 times less, or fewer than ~10 deaths per million people (Davis et al., 2004). So, despite proclamations to the contrary, the weather and climate have only an vanishingly small impact on overall mortality when the population at large is considered. This will likely remain true into the future, no matter how the climate evolves.

B. “Tropical” Disease

ropical diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, or West Nile Virus have been Terroneously predicted to spread due to global warming. In fact, they are related less to climate than to living conditions, and are best controlled by direct application of sound, known public health policies.

22 Malaria Distribution in the United States

Shaded regions indicate locations where malaria was endemic in the United States (from Zucker et al., 1996).

The two tropical diseases most commonly cited as spreading as a result of global warming are malaria and dengue fever. However, these are not really “tropical” at all and thus are not as closely linked to climate as many people suggest. For example, malaria epidemics occurred as far north as Archangel, Russia, in the 1920s, and in the Netherlands. Malaria was common in most of the United States prior to the 1950s (Reiter, 1996). In the late 1800s, a period when it was demonstrably colder in the United States than it is today, malaria was endemic in most of the United States east of the Rocky Mountains—a region stretching from the Gulf Coast all the way up into Northern Minnesota—including the entirety of Kansas. In 1878, about 100,000 Americans were infected with malaria; about one-quarter of them died. By 1912, malaria was already being brought under control, yet persisted in the southeastern United States well into the 1940s. By the mid-to-late 1950s, malaria was effectively eradicated from the United States. This occurred not because of climate change, but because of technological and medical advances. Better anti-malaria drugs, air-conditioning, the use of screen doors and windows, and the elimination of urban overpopulation brought about by the development of suburbs and automobile commuting were largely responsible for the decline in malaria (Reiter, 1996; Reiter, 2001). Today, the mosquitoes that spread malaria are still widely present in the Unites States, but the transmission cycle has been disrupted and the pathogen leading to the disease is absent – during a time global temperatures were rising. Climate change is not involved.

23 Mortality rate in the United States from malaria (deaths per 100,000) from 1900 to 1949, when it was effectively eradicated from the country. (Figure from http://www.healthsentinel.com/graphs.php?id=4&event=graphcats_print_list_item)

The effect of technology is also clear from statistics on dengue fever outbreaks, another mosquito-borne disease. In 1995, a dengue pandemic hit the Caribbean and Mexico. More than 2,000 cases were reported in the Mexican border town of Reynosa. But in the town of Hidalgo, Texas, located just across the river, there were only seven reported cases of the disease (Reiter, 1996). This is just not an isolated example. Data collected over the past several decades has shown a similarly large disparity between the high number of cases of the disease in northern Mexico and the rare occurrences in the southwestern United States (Reiter, 2001). There is virtually no difference in climate between these two locations, but a world of difference in infrastructure, wealth, and technology. City layout, population density, building structure, window screens, air-conditioning and personal behavior are all factors that play a large role in the transmission rates (Reiter, 2001).

24 Number of cases of Dengue Fever at the Texas/Mexico border from 1980 to 1999. During these 20 years, there were 64 cases reported in all of Texas, while there was nearly 1,000 times that amount in the bordering states of Mexico. (figure from Reiter, 2001).

Another “tropical” disease currently being falsely linked to climate change is West Nile Virus. The claim is that a warming climate is allowing the mosquito that carries West Nile Virus to spread northward and into Kansas. However, this is as demonstrably absurd as similar claims about other vector-borne diseases such malaria and dengue fever.

West Nile Virus was introduced to the United States through the port of New York City in the summer of 1999. Since its introduction, it has spread rapidly across the country, reaching the West Coast by 2002 and has now been documented in every state as well as most provinces of Canada. This is not a sign that the U.S. and Canada are progressively warming. Rather, it is a sign that the existing environment is naturally primed for the virus. Put differently, this more a travel and immigration concern that a climate one.

25 Spread of the West Nile Virus across the United States after its Introduction in New York City in 1999

1999 2000 2001

2002 2003 2004

2005 2006 2007

Spread of the occurrence of the West Nile Virus from its introduction to the United States in 1999 through 2007. By 2003, virtually every state in the country had reported the presence of virus. (source: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/Mapsactivity/surv&control07Maps.htm).

The vector for West Nile is mosquitoes not mosquito. Wherever there is a suitable host mosquito population, an outpost for West Nile virus can be established.It is not just one mosquito species that is involved. The disease has been isolated in over 40 mosquito species found throughout the United States. So the simplistic, alarmist justification that “climate change” is allowing a West Nile carrying mosquito species to move into Kansas is simply preposterous. The already-resident mosquito populations of Kansas are appropriate hosts for the West Nile virus—as they are in every other state.

Clearly, as is evident from the establishment of West Nile virus in every state in the contiguous U.S., climate has little, or nothing, to do with its spread. Logically consider that the annual

26 average temperature from the southern part of the United States to the northern part spans a range of more than 40ºF, so clearly the virus exists in vastly different climates. Again, West Nile virus was introduced in New York City—hardly the warmest portion of the country—and has spread westward and southward into both warmer and colder and wetter and drier climates. This didn’t happen because climate changes allowed its spread, but rather because the virus was introduced to a place that was ripe for its existence—basically any location with a resident mosquito population.

Thus, West Nile virus now exists in Kansas merely because the extant climate/ecology of Kansas is one in which the virus can thrive. The reason that it was not found in Kansas in the past was simply because it had not been introduced. Climate change in Kansas, which is demonstrably small compared to the natural variability of the state’s climate history, has absolutely nothing to do with it. Neither the number of coal-generation plants nor swings in average have any effect on West Nile presence.

It is worth restating that since all vector-borne diseases spreads in wide ranges of both temperature and climatic regimes, one could raise or lower the average annual temperature in Kansas by many degrees or vastly change the precipitation regime and not make a bit of difference in the aggression of the West Nile Virus. Science-challenged claims to the contrary are not only ignorant but also dangerous, serving to distract from real epidemiological diagnosis which allow health officials critical information for protecting Kansas citizens.

IV. Future Climate Projections

ttempting the make projections of the future climate is fraught with difficulties3, both from Aan incomplete scientific knowledge of the complexity of interacting physical processes, as well as the large inherent uncertainty in attempting to forecast economic activity and technology across all countries of the world and how those factors contribute to future levels of greenhouse

3 See: The Mathematical Reason Why Long-run Climatic prediction is Impossible (http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/monckton_papers/the_mathematical_reason_why_long- run_climatic_prediction_is_impossible.html)

27 gas emissions. The task is made several times more challenging when attempting to make projections at regional and local levels where the scale becomes too small to adequately/accurately model. Therefore, future climate scenarios on the level of the state of Kansas need to be weighed against all the uncertainties that go into them.

Even if one were determined to believe invalidated model projections, the future climate change projections made from the latest “state-of-the-art” regional climate models for Kansas and the Midwestern United States, are quite modest, and anything but alarming.

“No supercomputer, no A team of scientists led by Zaitao Pan of St. Louis University matter how powerful, is able to prove recently concluded a modeling study using a regional-scale definitively a simplistic hypothesis that says the climate model aimed at examining how the climate of the central greenhouse effect is responsible for United States may change in the future. What they found was a warming.” Syun-Ichi Akasofu

“warming hole” centered over Kansas, indicating that future 81 temperature change there would be very small. Further, they found this “warming hole” to be the result of an interaction of local and regional atmospheric circulation features that are too small to be adequately modeled in most global climate models. Thus, examining the projections from global climate models and focusing in on Kansas would produce inaccurate and misleading conclusions.

When Pan et al. (2004) move past flawed modeling to real climate observations, they report that:

In the last 25 years of the 20th century most major land regions experienced a summer warming trend, but the central U.S. cooled by 0.2–0.8 K. In contrast most climate projections using GCMs show warming for all continental interiors including North America. We examined this discrepancy by using a regional climate model and found a circulation-precipitation coupling under enhanced greenhouse gas concentrations that occurs on scales too small for current GCMs to resolve well. Results show a local minimum of warming in the central U.S. (a ‘‘warming hole’’) associated with changes in low-level circulations that lead to replenishment of seasonally depleted soil moisture, thereby increasing late- summer evapotranspiration and suppressing daytime maximum temperatures. These regional-scale feedback processes may partly explain the observed late 20th century temperature trend in the central U.S. and potentially could reduce the magnitude of future greenhouse warming in the region. [Emphasis added]

28 Graphically, the results of Pan et al. are striking in their illustration that future temperatures in Kansas and the surrounding region of the central United States should change to only a small degree under conditions of rising greenhouse gases.

Projected change in summertime maximum temperatures across the United States from the 1ate 20th century to the mid-21st century. Notice that the region of the least temperature rise (less than 1ºC in the next 50 years) is centered over the state of Kansas (source: Pan et al., 2004).

In layman terms, neither Pan nor anyone else knows what future Kansas climates will look like. Policy considerations built on such faulty guesswork have straw as their foundation.

As a further point about climate cooling in Kansas, consider the paper by Suckling and Mitchell (2000). The authors studied the spatial and temporal variation of the climate boundary4 in the central U.S. over the 100-year period 1900- to 1999. They broke this 100-year time period into four equal parts: 1900-1924, 1925-1949, 1950-1974, and 1975-1999

4 Comprising much of Missouri, eastern and central Kansas, south-central and southeaster Nebraska, southern Iowa and west-central Illinois.

29 What did they find? In the words of the authors, they found that “winters were cooler or more severe during these latter periods [150-1974 and 1975-1999] compared to the two earlier quarter-century periods.”

What does it mean? The results clearly show, contrary to climate models and claims of some that a northward migration of warmer climate zones to central North America does not appear to be occurring. It shows that the central U.S. – including Kansas – was warmer before an elevation of man-made greenhouse gases and cooler during the two decades of increasing CO2 levels.

Further, the authors also note that the same pattern holds true for the summer mean temperatures. These studies suggest a strong case against claims of man-made “global warming” – catastrophic or otherwise – gripping Kansas now or anytime in the near future.

V. Emissions “Savings”

30 ince China alone opens a new coal-fired plant every 4 -7 days, any Kansas-derived S“savings” of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere will be made up in a matter of days, effectively exporting emissions and jobs overseas.

VI. Impacts of climate-mitigation measures in Kansas

lobally, in 2003, humankind emitted 25,780 million metric tons of carbon dioxide

G(mmtCO2: EIA, 2007a), of which the state of Kansas accounted for 79.9 mmtCO2, or only 0.31% (EIA, 2007b). Further, this proportion of manmade CO2 emissions from Kansas will decrease over the 21st century as the rapid demand for power in developing countries such as China and India quickly outpaces the growth of Kansas’s CO2 emissions (EIA, 2007b).

During the past 5 years, global emissions of CO2 from human activity have increased at an average rate of 3.5%/yr (EIA, 2007a), meaning that the annual increase of anthropogenic global CO2 emissions is more than 10 times greater than Kansas’s total emissions. This means that even a complete cessation of all CO2 emissions in Kansas would be entirely subsumed by rising global emissions in about one month’s time. A fortiori, regulations prescribing a reduction, rather than a complete cessation, of Kansas’s

CO2 emissions will have absolutely no effect on global climate.

Wigley (1998) examined the climate impact of adherence to the emissions controls agreed under the Kyoto Protocol by participating nations, and found that, if all developed countries meet their commitments in 2010 and maintain them through 2100, with a mid- range sensitivity of surface temperature to changes in CO2, the amount of warming “saved” by the Kyoto Protocol would be 0.07°C by 2050 and 0.15°C by 2100. The global sea level rise “saved” would be 2.6 cm, or one inch. A complete cessation of CO2 emissions in Kansas is only a tiny fraction of the worldwide reductions assumed in Dr.

31 Wigley’s global analysis, so its impact on future trends in global temperature and sea level will be only a minuscule fraction of the negligible effects calculated by Dr. Wigley.

We now apply Dr. Wigley’s results to CO2 emissions in Kansas, assuming that the ratio of U.S. CO2 emissions to those of the developed countries which have agreed to limits under the Kyoto Protocol remains constant at 39% (25% of global emissions) throughout the 21st century. We also assume that developing countries such as China and India continue to emit at an increasing rate. Consequently, the annual proportion of global CO2 emissions from human activity that is contributed by human activity in the United States will decline. Finally, we assume that the proportion of total U.S. CO2 emissions in Kansas – now 1.4% – remains constant throughout the 21st century. With these assumptions, we generate the following table derived from Wigley’s (1998) mid-range emissions scenario (which itself is based upon the IPCC’s scenario “IS92a”):

Table 1 Projected annual CO2 emissions (mmtCO2)

U.S. Global Developed (39% of Kansas Year emissions: countries: developed (1.4% of U.S.) Wigley, 1998 Wigley, 1998 countries) 2000 26,609 14,934 5,795 80 2025 41,276 18,308 7,103 99 2050 50,809 18,308 7,103 99 2100 75,376 21,534 8,355 117

Note: Developed countries’ emissions, according to Wigley’s assumptions, do not change between 2025 and 2050: neither does total U.S or Kansas emissions.

In Table 2, we compare the total CO2 emissions saving that would result if Kansas’s CO2 emissions were completely halted by 2025 with the emissions savings assumed by Wigley (1998) if all nations met their Kyoto commitments by 2010, and then held their emissions constant throughout the rest of the century. This scenario is “Kyoto Const.”

32 Table 2 Projected annual CO2 emissions savings (mmtCO2)

Year Kansas Kyoto Const. 2000 0 0 2025 99 4,697 2050 99 4,697 2100 117 7,924

Table 3 shows the proportion of the total emissions reductions in Wigley’s (1998) case that would be contributed by a complete halt of all Kansas’s CO2 emissions (calculated as column 2 in Table 2 divided by column 3 in Table 2).

Table 3 Kansas’s percentage of emissions savings

Year Kansas 2000 0.0% 2025 2.1% 2050 2.1% 2100 1.5%

Using the percentages in Table 3, and assuming that temperature change scales in proportion to CO2 emissions, we calculate the global temperature savings that will result from the complete cessation of anthropogenic CO2 emissions in Kansas:

Table 4 Projected global temperature savings (ºC)

Year Kyoto Const Kansas 2000 0 0 2025 0.03 0.0006 2050 0.07 0.0015 2100 0.15 0.0023

33 Accordingly, a cessation of all of Kansas’s CO2 emissions would result in a climatically-irrelevant global temperature reduction by the year 2100 of about two thousandths of a degree Celsius. Results for sea-level rise are also negligible:

Table 5 Projected global sea-level rise savings (cm)

Year Kyoto Const Kansas 2000 0 0 2025 0.2 0.004 2050 0.9 0.019 2100 2.6 0.039

A complete cessation of all anthropogenic emissions from Kansas will result in a global sea-level rise savings by the year 2100 of an estimated 0.04 cm, or less than two hundredths of an inch. Again, this value is irrelevant in every way.

Even if the entire United States were to close down its economy completely and revert to the Stone Age, without even the ability to light fires, the growth in emissions from China and India would replace our entire emissions in little more than a decade. In this context, any cuts in emissions from Kansas would be extravagantly pointless.

VII. Costs of Federal Regulation

nd what would be the potential costs to Kansas of legislative actions designed to cap Agreenhouse gas emissions? An analysis was recently completed by the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), under contract from the American Council for Capital Formation and the National Association of Manufacturers (ACCF and NAM), using the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS); the same model employed by the US Energy Information Agency to examine the economic impacts.

For a complete description of their findings please visit:

34 http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/cost-of-climate-change-policies/

To summarize, SAIC found that by the year 2020, average annual household income in Kansas would decline by $947 to $3069 and by the year 2030 the decline would increase to between $3994 and $7283. The state would stand to lose between 11,000 and 17,000 jobs by 2020 and between 28,000 and 37,000 jobs by 2030. At the same time gas prices could increase by more than $5 a gallon by the year 2030 and the states’ Gross Domestic Product could decline by then by as much as $5.7 billion/yr.

And all this economic hardship would come with absolutely no detectable impact on the course of future climate. This is the epitome of a scenario of all pain and no gain.

The economic impacts in Kansas of federal legislation to limit greenhouse gas emissions green. (Source: Science Applications International Corporation, 2008, http://www.accf.org/pdf/NAM/fullstudy031208.pdf)

35 VIII. Kansas Scientists Reject UN’s Global Warming Hypothesis

At least 300 Kansas scientists have petitioned the US government that the UN’s human caused global warming hypothesis is “without scientific validity and that government action on the basis of this hypothesis would unnecessarily and counterproductively damage both human prosperity and the natural environment of the Earth.”

They are joined by over 31,072 Americans with university degrees in science – including 9,021 PhDs.

The petition and entire list of US signers can be found here: http://www.petitionproject.org/index.html

Names of the Kansas scientists who signed the petition:

Dwight L. Adams, MD, Stephen R. Alewine, Donald R. Andersen Jr., Thornton Anderson, William L. Anderson, Harrison Clarke Anderson, MD, Ernest Angino, PhD, Amalia R. Auvigne, MD, James F. Badgett, D. Bahm, Richard C. Bair, Nathan S. Baldwin, Larry Bale, Cliff Bale, Mark J. Bareta, Neal Barkley, Campbell C. Barnds, Lynn Shannon Bates, PhD, Curtis M. Beecham, PhD, Delfin J. Beltran, MD, John S. Black, Charles Blatchley, PhD, Robert G. Boling, Lawrence Glenn Bradford, PhD, Don L. Braker, Brian W. Braudaway, Wesley G. Britson, Robert A. Brooks, PhD, Bruce C. Brooks, Ward W. Brown, DVM, Dail Bruce, Joan Brunfeldt, MD, Ralph W. Bubeck, MD, William M. Byrne, PhD, Jon M. Callen, Earl D. Carlson, Charles T. Chaffin, PhD, James E. Connor, Ted L. Cooper, Max E. Cooper, Murray D. Corbin, MD, Patrick Ivan Coyne, PhD, Kent Craghead, Phillip T. Cross, Robert Hamblett Crowther, Glenn Crumb, PhD, James R. Daniels, Chad Davies, PhD, Eugene William Dehner, PhD, Ronald A. Dial, J. W. Dohr, Leslie J. Doty, John Doull, PhD, Rod Duke, David W. Dukes, Marilyn Duke- Woodside, MD, A. F. Dyer, Joe R. Eagleman, PhD, Donald R. Eidemiller, Darrel Lee Eklund, PhD, Al Erickson, Michael J. Eslick, Roger W. Evans, MD, Eugene Patrick Farrell, Gregory A. Farrell, Gene Richard Feaster, PhD, Roger Fedde, PhD, Stephen L. Ferry, Theodore C. Finkemeier, John R. Floden, Carl A. Fowler, Steve Frankamp, Dale E. Fulcher, David W. Garrett, Dick A. Geis, MD, Donald R. Germann, MD, James N. Glenn, MD, Clifford Glenn, Earl F. Glynn, Bruice Gockel, Kenneth L. Goetz, PhD, Peter J. Gorder, PhD, Robert C. Gorman, Albert J. Gotch, PhD, Douglas D. Graver, Lewis L. Gray, Jerry Green, Mary Ann Grelinger, M. Griffin, PhD, William C. Groutas, PhD, John T. Growney, MD, Larry Haffey, Stephen F. Hagan, MD, Quinlan Halbeisen, Wesley H. Hall, MD, Otto Hallier, William W. Hambleton, PhD, Mark

36 A. Hamilton, Robert M. Hammaker, PhD, Scott E. Hampel, T. Harder, PhD, Geoffrey O. Hartzler, Kirk Hastings, Douglas H. Headley, Dennis R. Hedke, Sandy Herndon, B. Heyen, PhD, Robert J. Hodes, Brett A. Hopkins, PhD, Robert Hopkins, Marta Howard, William C. Hutcheson, DVM, Roscoe G. Jackson II, PhD, Michael D. Jackson, MD, Byron E. Jacobson, Dale P. Jewett, Leland R. Johnson, PhD, David W. Kapple, Kim Karr, PhD, Suzanne Kenton, Michael Kerner, John Kettler, Cecil M. Kingsley, Philip G. Kirmser, PhD, Kenneth J. Klabunde, PhD, Robert W. Klee, Karl Joseph Kramer, PhD, Burke B. Krueger, Jack K. Krum, PhD, Daniel O. Kuhn, James E. Kullberg, Michael J. Lally, Roger O. Lambson, PhD, David L. Lamp, Mark Larson, Richard Leeth, Richard Leicht, E. C. Lester, Jingyu Lin, PhD, Glenn Liolios, John B. Loser, James Loving, Leon Lyles, PhD, Keith D. Lynch, PhD, Franklin F. Mackenzie, Susan L. Mann, Robert A. Martinez, Gayle Mason, Keith Mazachek, PhD, Thomas McCaleb, Robert J. McCloud, Richard E. McCoy, James L. McIlroy, George M. McKee Jr., Alvin E. Melcher, DVM, Dwight F. Metzler, Frank Midkiff, Clinton F. Miller, Leon J. Mills, PhD, Eldon F. Mockry, Reginald B. Moore, Norman R. Morrow, DVM, Fred Moss, DVM, Vincent U. Muirhead, E. A. Munyan, MD, Vincent U. Murihead, Joseph K. Myers, Jay F. Nagori, C. Nobles, Charles Arthur Norwood, PhD, Carl E. Nuzman, Verda Nye, Rocky Nystom, Daniel J. Obrien, PhD, Steven P. O'Neill, Thomas E. Orr, Dennis D. Ozman, Randy C. Parker, Kyle Parker PG, Dean Pattison, Charles W. Pauls, Wayne Penrod, Bill Perry, Heide Petermann, Leroy Lynn Peters, PhD, David Pflum, Max E. Pickerill, PhD, Danny L. Piper, Don Plisek, Jack J. Polise, Arthur F. Pope, Donald L. Poplin, Robert Pratt, John J. Ramm, Thomas E. Ray, Dean D. Reeves, MD, David Relihan, James C. Remsberg, Robert L. Reymond Jr., Charles A. Reynolds, PhD, Brian K. Richardet, Larry J. Richardson, David Allan Ringle, PhD, Kenneth Roane, Edward H. Roberts, James W. Rockhold, Richard L. Ronning, Karl K. Rozman, PhD, Kenneth Russell, James M. Ryan, PhD, Frederick Eugene Samson, PhD, Fred Samson, PhD, L. A. Sankpill, Larry V. Satzler, Michael J. Sauber, Kelly B. Savage, Robert R. Schalles, PhD, Charles Schmidt, J. Richard Schrock, PhD, Robert Samuel Schroeder, PhD, Warren D. Schwabauer Jr., Charles M. Schwinger, James E. Sears, Paul A. Seib, PhD, Arnold W. Shafer, MD, Dexter Brian Sharp, PhD, Brett E. Sharpe, Brian A. Sheets, Leland M. Shepard, Lloyd W. Sherrill, Merle Dennis Shogren, Mark A. Shreve, Ray Shultz, Glen L. Shurtz, PhD, James Van Sickle, William E. Simes, Larry Skelton, Edward Lyman Skidmore, PhD, Bruce G. Smith, Randall K. Spare, DVM, Feliz A. Spies, Robert P. Spriggs, Jerry L. Stephens, William T. Stevenson, PhD, Jeffrey Smith

37 Stevenson, PhD, Robert R. Stolze, Robert Stolzle, Richard L. Stoppelmoor, Doug T. Stueve, Bala Subramaniam, PhD, James W. Suggs, Stuart Endsley Swartz, PhD, Saeed Taherian, PhD, Marcus K. Taylor, Leslie Thomas, Timothy C. Tredway, Richard S. Troell, James M. Tullis, Steven G. Turner, Richard M. Vaeth, M. Van Swaay, PhD, Gary Vogt, Rosmarie von Rumker, PhD, Bruce L. Wacker, Wilber B. Walton, Dennis L. Wariner, Robert K. Wattson Jr., Laurence R. Weatherley, PhD, Allan R. Weide, MD, Ronald L. Wells, PhD, Kenneth R. Wells, Jerry R. Werdel, Steve S. Werner, Tom J. Westerman, Eric R. Westphal, PhD, Carol J. Whitlock, Wendell Keith Whitney, PhD, W. Keith Whitney, PhD, William Wiener, James C. Wiley, Jim Wiley, Don K. Wilken, Robert L. Williams Jr., Thomas Williams, Allen K. Williams, Lonnie D. Willis, DVM, Robert G. Wilson, PhD, Steven J. Wilson, Earl C. Windisch, Elmer J. Wohler, Russell L. Woirhaye, Jim Wolf, Charles Hubert Wright, PhD, Ralph G. Wyss, Shawn Young, Dwight A. Youngberg, Mario K. Yu, MD, Michael T. Zimmer, Adam D. Zorn, Glen W. Zumwalt, PhD

IX. Summary

bviously, the data contained within this report—both the actual observed climate history Oof Kansas, as well as state-of-the-art projections of the future climate of Kansas—make it clear that the officials at the Kansas Department of Health and the Environment made their decision to reject the permits for the two new coal-fired power plants contrary to the best available science.

We have detailed observations illustrating that to a large degree that climate variability from year-to-year and decade-to-decade plays a more major role in Kansas’ climate than any long- term trends. Such short-term variability will likely continue dominating Kansas’ climate into the future.

On the timescale of the past 75 years, Kansas’ climate shows no statically significant warming trend in statewide average annual temperature, while statewide total annual precipitation has increased about 10% leading to a decrease in the frequency and/or severity of droughts. Clearly,

38 these trends indicate that local and regional processes have been more important than global ones in determining local climate variations.

The same holds true for extreme weather and weather-related events—droughts, floods, tornadoes—exhibiting no trends that could be related to “global warming.” Instead, as historical records have shown that these types of events have marked Kansas’ past, and will continue to do so into the future.

Also, the climate is shown to have little, if any, impact on the overall health of Kansas’ population. Instead, application of direct measures aimed at combating the negative impacts of heat waves and vector-borne diseases prove far and away to be the most efficient and effective methods at improving the public health.

Taken together, overwhelming observational evidence demonstrates that “global climate changes” are having no detectable (if any) impact on the lives of Kansans and future projections strongly suggest for a continuation of the same.

Further, no action by Kansas will have any detectable effect on the future rate of global climate change, yet legislative actions to reduce carbon dioxide emissions will negatively impact the state’s economic future. This is an all pain, no gain scenario for the citizens of Kansas.

39 X. References:

Cook, E.R., Woodhouse, C.A., Eakin, C.M., Meko, D.M., and Stahle, D.W.. 2004. Long-Term Aridity Changes in the Western United States. Science, 306, 1015-1018.

Cook, E.R., Meko, D.M., Stahle, D.W. and Cleaveland, M.K. 1999. Drought reconstructions for the continental United States. Journal of Climate, 12, 1145-1162.

Davis, R.E., et al., 2003a. Decadal changes in summer mortality in the U. S. cities. International Journal of Biometeorology, 47, 166-175.

Davis, R.E., et al., 200b. Changing heat-related mortality in the United States. Environmental Health Perspectives, 111, 1712-1718.

Davis et al., 2004. Seasonality of climate-human mortality relationships in US cities and impacts of climate change. Climate Research, 26, 61-76.

Pan, Z., et al., 2004. Altered hydrologic feedback in a warming climate introduces a “warming hole.” Geophysical Research Letters, 31, L17109, doi: 10.1029/2004GL020528.

Reiter, P., 1996. Global warming and mosquito-borne disease in the USA. The Lancet, 348, 662.

Zucker, J.R., 1996. Changing Patterns of Autochthonous Malaria Transmission in the United States: A Review of Recent Outbreaks. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2, 37-43 Energy Information Administration, 2007a. International Energy Annual, 2005. U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/contents.html

Energy Information Administration, 2007b. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States, 2006. U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/0573(2006).pdf

Wigley, T.M.L., 1998. The Kyoto Protocol: CO2, CH4 and climate implications. Geophysical Research Letters, 25, 2285-2288.

40 XI. Some Essential Readings in Climate Science

Environmental Effects of Increased Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide http://sitewave.net/pproject/review.pdf

Why Has “Global Warming” Become Such A Passionate Subject? http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/reprint/akasofu_cool_it.html

Current Issues in Climate Science: Focus on the Poles http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/sppi_originals/current_issues_in_climate_science_focus_on_the_poles. html

Carbon Dioxide and Global Change: Separating Scientific Fact from Personal Opinion http://www.co2science.org/scripts/CO2ScienceB2C/education/reports/hansen/HansenTestimonyCritique. pdf

Al Gore's United States Senate Environment and Public Works Committee Testimony http://ff.org/centers/csspp/pdf/20070522_isdo.pdf

Hurricane Threat to Florida Climate Change or Demographics? http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/originals/hurricanethreat.html

“Consensus? What “Consensus”? Among Climate Scientists, The Debate Is Not Over http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/monckton_papers/consensus_what_consensus_among_climate _scientists_the_debate_is_not_over.html

The Myth of Dangerous Human Caused Climate Change

41 http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/sppi_originals/the_myth_of_dangerous_human_caused_climat e_change.html

35 Inconvenient Truths: The errors in Al Gore’s movie http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/monckton/goreerrors.html

Peer Review? What Peer Review? Failures of scrutiny in the UN's Fourth Assessment Report http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/sppi_originals/peerreview.html

What is Wrong with the IPCC? http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/other/whatiswrongwiththeipcc.html

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