Islam and the Secular State
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Constantly Approximating Popular Sovereignty: Seven Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 19 (2010-2011) Issue 2 Article 2 December 2010 Constantly Approximating Popular Sovereignty: Seven Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law Wilson R. Huhn Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Repository Citation Wilson R. Huhn, Constantly Approximating Popular Sovereignty: Seven Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 291 (2010), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/ wmborj/vol19/iss2/2 Copyright c 2010 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: SEVEN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Wilson R. Huhn* constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated . .1 In 1988, renowned historian Edmund S. Morgan published Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America.2 In that brilliant and wide-ranging book Morgan traces how, between the time of the English Civil War in the mid-seventeenth century and the adoption of the American Constitution in 1787, the idea of “popular sovereignty”—the right of the people to govern themselves— replaced the notion of “the divine right of kings” as the acknowledged source of political power.3 The central theme of Morgan’s work is that while popular sover- eignty is a “fiction” in the sense that the people of a nation cannot actually rule them- selves without creating a government,4 over the centuries our ancestors constantly labored to create a society and a government which gradually came closer to the realization of that principle—a closer approximation of the ideal of popular sover- eignty.5 At the end of Inventing the People, Morgan concludes: * C. -
Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism in Iran: the Role of Identity Processes
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Nottingham Trent Institutional Repository (IRep) 1 Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in Iran: the role of identity processes Rusi Jaspal De Montfort University, Leicester, UK Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism constitute two important ideological building blocks of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet, there is no existing research into the psychosocial motives underlying the manifestation of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism at the institutional level in Iran. Here it is argued that there is much heuristic and predictive value in applying tenets of identity process theory (IPT), a socio-psychological model of identity threat and action, to the primarily socio-historical literature on anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in Iran. The paper provides a summary of anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism and ‘new anti-Semitism’ and IPT. The substantive section of the paper explores (i) how anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism may restore feelings of belonging in the Muslim world and beyond; (ii) the inter-relations between ingroup and outgroup self-efficacy; (iii) the psychosocial motivation to maintain Shiite ideology and Khomeini’s legacy; and (iv) the construction of Jews and Israel in terms of a threat to group continuity. It is suggested that insights into the motivational principles underlying anti-Semitism and anti- Zionism at the institutional level may inform empirical research into social representations of Jews and Israel in Iran. More broadly, this paper highlights the potential contribution of social psychology to existing work on anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in the humanities. -
Iran 2019 International Religious Freedom Report
IRAN 2019 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic and specifies Twelver Ja’afari Shia Islam as the official state religion. It states all laws and regulations must be based on “Islamic criteria” and an official interpretation of sharia. The constitution states citizens shall enjoy human, political, economic, and other rights, “in conformity with Islamic criteria.” The penal code specifies the death sentence for proselytizing and attempts by non-Muslims to convert Muslims, as well as for moharebeh (“enmity against God”) and sabb al-nabi (“insulting the Prophet”). According to the penal code, the application of the death penalty varies depending on the religion of both the perpetrator and the victim. The law prohibits Muslim citizens from changing or renouncing their religious beliefs. The constitution also stipulates five non-Ja’afari Islamic schools shall be “accorded full respect” and official status in matters of religious education and certain personal affairs. The constitution states Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians, excluding converts from Islam, are the only recognized religious minorities permitted to worship and form religious societies “within the limits of the law.” The government continued to execute individuals on charges of “enmity against God,” including two Sunni Ahwazi Arab minority prisoners at Fajr Prison on August 4. Human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continued to report the disproportionately large number of executions of Sunni prisoners, particularly Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs. Human rights groups raised concerns regarding the use of torture, beatings in custody, forced confessions, poor prison conditions, and denials of access to legal counsel. -
The Opposition of a Leading Akhund to Shi'a and Sufi
The Opposition of a Leading Akhund to Shi’a and Sufi Shaykhs in Mid-Nineteenth- Century China Wang Jianping, Shanghai Normal University Abstract This article traces the activities of Ma Dexin, a preeminent Hui Muslim scholar and grand imam (akhund) who played a leading role in the Muslim uprising in Yunnan (1856–1873). Ma harshly criticized Shi’ism and its followers, the shaykhs, in the Sufi orders in China. The intolerance of orthodox Sunnis toward Shi’ism can be explained in part by the marginalization of Hui Muslims in China and their attempts to unite and defend themselves in a society dominated by Han Chinese. An analysis of the Sunni opposition to Shi’ism that was led by Akhund Ma Dexin and the Shi’a sect’s influence among the Sufis in China help us understand the ways in which global debates in Islam were articulated on Chinese soil. Keywords: Ma Dexin, Shi’a, shaykh, Chinese Islam, Hui Muslims Most of the more than twenty-three million Muslims in China are Sunnis who follow Hanafi jurisprudence when applying Islamic law (shariʿa). Presently, only a very small percentage (less than 1 percent) of Chinese Muslims are Shi’a.1 The historian Raphael Israeli explicitly analyzes the profound impact of Persian Shi’ism on the Sufi orders in China based on the historical development and doctrinal teachings of Chinese Muslims (2002, 147–167). The question of Shi’a influence explored in this article concerns why Ma Dexin, a preeminent Chinese Muslim scholar, a great imam, and one of the key leaders of the Muslim uprising in the nineteenth century, so harshly criticized Shi’ism and its accomplices, the shaykhs, in certain Sufi orders in China, even though Shi’a Islam was nearly invisible at that time. -
Sunni – Shi`A Relations and the Implications for Belgium and Europe
FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’ SUNNI – SHI`A RELATIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR BELGIUM AND EUROPE EGMONT PAPER 35 FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’ Sunni – Shi`a relations and the implications for Belgium and Europe JELLE PUELINGS January 2010 The Egmont Papers are published by Academia Press for Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations. Founded in 1947 by eminent Belgian political leaders, Egmont is an independent think-tank based in Brussels. Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a spirit of total academic freedom. A platform of quality information, a forum for debate and analysis, a melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics, Egmont’s ambition – through its publications, seminars and recommendations – is to make a useful contribution to the decision- making process. *** President: Viscount Etienne DAVIGNON Director-General: Marc TRENTESEAU Series Editor: Prof. Dr. Sven BISCOP *** Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations Address Naamsestraat / Rue de Namur 69, 1000 Brussels, Belgium Phone 00-32-(0)2.223.41.14 Fax 00-32-(0)2.223.41.16 E-mail [email protected] Website: www.egmontinstitute.be © Academia Press Eekhout 2 9000 Gent Tel. 09/233 80 88 Fax 09/233 14 09 [email protected] www.academiapress.be J. Story-Scientia NV Wetenschappelijke Boekhandel Sint-Kwintensberg 87 B-9000 Gent Tel. 09/225 57 57 Fax 09/233 14 09 [email protected] www.story.be All authors write in a personal capacity. Lay-out: proxess.be ISBN 978 90 382 1538 9 D/2010/4804/17 U 1384 NUR1 754 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the permission of the publishers. -
Islamic Feminism, a Public Lecture By
SUDANWORKINGPAPER Islamic Feminism, a public lecture by Liv Tønnessen, Regional Institute of Gender, Rights, Peace & Diversity, Ahfad University for Women, Sudan SWP 2014: 1 Islamic Feminism Public lecture by Liv Tønnessen, Ahfad University for Women, Sudan SVP 2014 : 1 CMI SWP ISLAMIC FEMINISM 2014: 1 In the words of Pakistani-American Asma Barlas, “I came to the realization that women and men are equal as a result not of reading feminist texts, but of reading the Quran.”1 This position has come to be known as Islamic feminism. The term has been heatedly debated and both feminists and Muslims have rejected it as two fundamentally incompatible ideas. Secular feminists reject it because they argue religion generally and Islam in particular is oppressive to women2 and many Muslim women reject it because they feel ‘feminism’ is a secular invention imposed on them from outside, from the West. Islamic feminism is indeed highly contested, but it has also been widely embraced by both activists and scholars. As Margot Badran’s article from 2002 asks, What's in a name? What's behind a name? What is Islamic feminism?3 I will in a humble way attempt to address these questions in this talk. Let me first start by saying that this is a research paper on Islamic feminism. I am not a Muslim, but I find myself fascinated and genuinely interested in the question of women and Islam. I do not under any circumstances start my engagement with the topic from a position which neither reduces Islam to be monolithic and anti-women nor a position which states that secularism is the only route to women’s empowerment. -
Islamic Calendar from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
Islamic calendar From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia -at اﻟﺘﻘﻮﻳﻢ اﻟﻬﺠﺮي :The Islamic, Muslim, or Hijri calendar (Arabic taqwīm al-hijrī) is a lunar calendar consisting of 12 months in a year of 354 or 355 days. It is used (often alongside the Gregorian calendar) to date events in many Muslim countries. It is also used by Muslims to determine the proper days of Islamic holidays and rituals, such as the annual period of fasting and the proper time for the pilgrimage to Mecca. The Islamic calendar employs the Hijri era whose epoch was Islamic Calendar stamp issued at King retrospectively established as the Islamic New Year of AD 622. During Khaled airport (10 Rajab 1428 / 24 July that year, Muhammad and his followers migrated from Mecca to 2007) Yathrib (now Medina) and established the first Muslim community (ummah), an event commemorated as the Hijra. In the West, dates in this era are usually denoted AH (Latin: Anno Hegirae, "in the year of the Hijra") in parallel with the Christian (AD) and Jewish eras (AM). In Muslim countries, it is also sometimes denoted as H[1] from its Arabic form ( [In English, years prior to the Hijra are reckoned as BH ("Before the Hijra").[2 .(ﻫـ abbreviated , َﺳﻨﺔ ﻫِ ْﺠﺮﻳّﺔ The current Islamic year is 1438 AH. In the Gregorian calendar, 1438 AH runs from approximately 3 October 2016 to 21 September 2017.[3] Contents 1 Months 1.1 Length of months 2 Days of the week 3 History 3.1 Pre-Islamic calendar 3.2 Prohibiting Nasī’ 4 Year numbering 5 Astronomical considerations 6 Theological considerations 7 Astronomical -
Social Transformation of Pakistan Under Urdu Language
Social Transformations in Contemporary Society, 2021 (9) ISSN 2345-0126 (online) SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF PAKISTAN UNDER URDU LANGUAGE Dr. Sohaib Mukhtar Bahria University, Pakistan [email protected] Abstract Urdu is the national language of Pakistan under article 251 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Urdu language is the first brick upon which whole building of Pakistan is built. In pronunciation both Hindi in India and Urdu in Pakistan are same but in script Indian choose their religious writing style Sanskrit also called Devanagari as Muslims of Pakistan choose Arabic script for writing Urdu language. Urdu language is based on two nation theory which is the basis of the creation of Pakistan. There are two nations in Indian Sub-continent (i) Hindu, and (ii) Muslims therefore Muslims of Indian sub- continent chanted for separate Muslim Land Pakistan in Indian sub-continent thus struggled for achieving separate homeland Pakistan where Muslims can freely practice their religious duties which is not possible in a country where non-Muslims are in majority thus Urdu which is derived from Arabic, Persian, and Turkish declared the national language of Pakistan as official language is still English thus steps are required to be taken at Government level to make Urdu as official language of Pakistan. There are various local languages of Pakistan mainly: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi, Kashmiri, Balti and it is fundamental right of all citizens of Pakistan under article 28 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to protect, preserve, and promote their local languages and local culture but the national language of Pakistan is Urdu according to article 251 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. -
Anti-Semitism: a Pillar of Islamic Extremist Ideology
Anti-Semitism: A Pillar of Islamic Extremist Ideology In a video message in August 2015, Osama bin Laden’s son, Hamza bin Laden, utilized a range of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel narratives in his effort to rally Al Qaeda supporters and incite violence against Americans and Jews. Bin Laden described Jews and Israel as having a disproportionate role in world events and the oppression of Muslims. He compared the “Zio- Crusader alliance led by America” to a bird: “Its head is America, one wing is NATO and the other is the State of the Jews in occupied Palestine, and the legs are the tyrant rulers that sit on the chests of the peoples of the Muslim Ummah [global community].” An undated image of al-Qaeda terrorist Osama bin Laden and his son, Hamza Bin Laden then called for attacks worldwide and demanded that Muslims “support their brothers in Palestine by fighting the Jews and the Americans... not in America and occupied Palestine and Afghanistan alone, but all over the world…. take it to all the American, Jewish, and Western interests in the world.” Such violent expressions of anti-Semitism have been at the core of Al Qaeda’s ideology for decades. Even the 9/11 terrorist attacks were motivated, in part, by anti-Semitism. Mohamed Atta, a key member of the Al Qaeda Hamburg cell responsible for the attacks, reportedly considered New York City to be the center of a global Jewish conspiracy, and Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who masterminded the attack, had allegedly previously developed several plans to attack Israeli and Jewish targets. -
Announced on Monday, July 19, 2021
FINAL RESULT - FALL 2021 ROUND 2 Announced on Monday, July 19, 2021 INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, KARACHI BBA, BS (ACCOUNTING & FINANCE), BS (ECONOMICS) & BS (SOCIAL SCIENCES) ADMISSIONS FINAL RESULT ‐ TEST HELD ON SUNDAY, JULY 4, 2021 (FALL 2021, ROUND 2) LIST OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES FOR DIRECT ADMISSION (BBA PROGRAM) SAT Test Math Eng TOTAL Maximum Marks 800 800 1600 Cut-Off Marks 600 600 1420 Math Eng Total IBA Test MCQ MCQ MCQ Maximum Marks 180 180 360 Cut-Off Marks 88 88 224 Seat S. No. App No. Name Father's Name No. 1 7904 30 LAIBA RAZI RAZI AHMED JALALI 112 116 228 2 7957 2959 HASSAAN RAZA CHINOY MUHAMMAD RAZA CHINOY 112 132 244 3 7962 3549 MUHAMMAD SHAYAN ARIF ARIF HUSSAIN 152 120 272 4 7979 455 FATIMA RIZWAN RIZWAN SATTAR 160 92 252 5 8000 1464 MOOSA SHERGILL FARZAND SHERGILL 124 124 248 6 8937 1195 ANAUSHEY BATOOL ATTA HUSSAIN SHAH 92 156 248 7 8938 1200 BIZZAL FARHAN ALI MEMON FARHAN MEMON 112 112 224 8 8978 2248 AFRA ABRO NAVEED ABRO 96 136 232 9 8982 2306 MUHAMMAD TALHA MEMON SHAHID PARVEZ MEMON 136 136 272 10 9003 3266 NIRDOSH KUMAR NARAIN NA 120 108 228 11 9017 3635 ALI SHAZ KARMANI IMTIAZ ALI KARMANI 136 100 236 12 9031 1945 SAIFULLAH SOOMRO MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SOOMRO 132 96 228 13 9469 1187 MUHAMMAD ADIL RAFIQ AHMAD KHAN 112 112 224 14 9579 2321 MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH KUNDI MOHAMMAD ASGHAR KHAN KUNDI 100 124 224 15 9582 2346 ADINA ASIF MALIK MOHAMMAD ASIF 104 120 224 16 9586 2566 SAMAMA BIN ASAD MUHAMMAD ASAD IQBAL 96 128 224 17 9598 2685 SYED ZAFAR ALI SYED SHAUKAT HUSSAIN SHAH 124 104 228 18 9684 526 MUHAMMAD HAMZA -
Les Aspects De Mouridisme Au Senegal
UNIVERSITE DE SIEGEN DÉPARTEMENT DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES THÈSE DE DOCTORAT DE 3e CYCLE EN SCIENCES POLITIQUES Présentée à la faculté des sciences sociales de l'Université de Siegen dans le cadre du programme de doctorat de 3e cycle en sciences politiques pour l'obtention du grade de « Philosophie Doctor » (Ph. D.) THIAM, El Hadji Ibrahima Sakho TITRE: Thèse dirigée par Professeur Dr. Jürgen Bellers (Directeur de thèse) Professeur Dr. Bernhard Oltersdorf (Co-directeur de thèse) Jury Professor Dr. Jürgen BELLERS (Université - Siegen) Professor Dr. Bernhard OLTERSDORF (Université - Siegen) PDin Dr. Leila BENTABED (Université - Siegen) Professeur des Universités (Université Sorbonne-Paris IV) Professor Dr. Jürgen SCHLÖSSER (Université - Siegen) 1 Ibrahim Thiam Les aspects du mouridisme au senegal Ibrahim Thiam Les aspects du mouridisme au senegal Tectum Verlag Ibrahim Thiam Les aspects du mouridisme au senegal Zugl.: Siegen, Univ. Diss. 2010 ISBN: 978-3-8288-2311-2 Umschlaggestaltung: Ina Beneke Umschlagabbildung: Atamari, www.wikipedia.de, Touba mosque Tectum Verlag Marburg, 2010 Besuchen Sie uns im Internet www.tectum-verlag.de Bibliografische Informationen der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Angaben sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar. El Hadji Ousmane Thiam Adja Ngoné Wade Toute la famille Meissa Deguène Thiam Préface Le développement économique semble être une réalité ayant échappé aux pays où la religion majoritaire est musulmane. A l’exception de quelques uns, ces pays donnent la triste impression que cette orientation religieuse est un obstacle au dé- veloppement. Les nombreuses études relatives à la communauté religieuse mouride du Sénégal conceptualisent et précisent la question centrale de l´économie dans l’enseigne- ment islamique. -
Florida State University Libraries
)ORULGD6WDWH8QLYHUVLW\/LEUDULHV 2021 Richard II: A Criticism of the Mechanisms of Divine Right Jackson Kendall Alley Follow this and additional works at DigiNole: FSU's Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES RICHARD II: A CRITICISM OF THE MECHANISMS OF DIVINE RIGHT By JACKSON ALLEY A Thesis submitted to the Department of English in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in the Major Degree Awarded: Summer, 2021 The members of the Defense Committee approve the thesis of Jackson Alley defended on March 31 2021. Professor Bruce Boehrer Thesis Director Asst. Professor Elizabeth Coggeshall Outside Committee Member Asst. Professor Carla Della Gatta Committee Member Signatures are on file with the Honors Program office. 2 ABSTRACT Through a careful look at historical and textual evidence, this essay will endeavor to argue that, by allowing Bolingbroke’s ascension to the throne to be consistent with divine right politics, Richard II critiques divine right politics as a means of commenting on the crisis of succession. Showcasing the ways in which divine right doctrine holds royalty accountable to God, Richard II plays off the insecurities of the audience, underscoring questions about the institution of divine right politics that were long circulating in Elizabethan political discourse. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction – 5 The Question of Divine Right – 6 A Historical Perspective on Divine Right – 12 A Historical Perspective on Elizabethan Society – 18 Final Act – 26 Works Cited - 28 4 INTRODUCTION It is certainly true that no conception of authority was more magnanimous or widespread in Early Modern Europe than the divine right of kings.