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New York City Office of Emergency Management Joseph F. Bruno, Commissioner 1 Table of Contents

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New York City Office of Emergency Management Joseph F. Bruno, Commissioner 1 Table of Contents New York City Office of Emergency Management Joseph F. Bruno, Commissioner 1 Table of Contents HYPERLINK FEATURE PREPWhereverARING there is a handFOR cursor icon, 2009 you can click to get more information H1N1 onINFLUENZA that subject online. nt first detected the H1N1 virus in New York City when a large pg.1 Introduction: Commissioner’s Letter pg.2 Plan and Prepare for Emergencies pg.10 Educate the Public About Preparedness pg.14 Coordinate Emergency Response and Recovery pg.18 Collect and Disseminate Critical Information pg.22 Seek Funding to Support the Overall Preparedness of NYC Introduction: Commissioner’s Letter Dear Fellow New Yorkers, New York City is a complex place. Aging infrastructure and a growing population make the potential for emergencies a matter of routine. The rapid development and bustle of the city creates confusion even in the airspace above the city. The Office of Emergency Management (OEM), with its 24-hour Watch Command, remains vigilant and prepared to respond and bring all of the needed resources of this great city to any emergencies that may affect us. This is OEM’s third report, covering July 2007 to November 2009, and we have made it digital to align our actions with Mayor Bloomberg’s campaign for a greener New York City. In spring 2009, a new strain of the H1N1 flu virus surfaced in New York City. Fortunately, OEM and the Health Department had the City’s Pandemic Flu Plan prepared and had already developed a pandemic flu guide. The Health Department, Department of Education, OEM, and many other agencies worked together to develop a massive response to prepare for the likely return of the H1N1 virus in fall 2009. This program, which harnessed the planning power of a large number of City agencies and other governmental and private sector groups, included operational plans detailing vaccination for the city’s 1.4 million school children, alleviating overcrowded hospital emergency departments, continuance of education, feeding and medical programs for public school children who might be displaced due to a flu outbreak, and public messaging and outreach. With so much going on in New York City, it is important to keep New Yorkers informed about emergencies to help them stay safe. In 2008, the City introduced Notify NYC, a public emergency notification system, in four pilot areas. Since going citywide in May 2009, Notify NYC has alerted more than 27,000 residents to 184 incidents around the city. As I look back on the past two years and the developments in the City’s emergency plans, responses, and education campaigns, I see great advances. I also see a bright, energetic, and innovative future for this great agency. Sincerely, Joseph F. Bruno Commissioner New York City Office of Emergency Management 1 Members of New York’s Urban Search and Rescue team hone their search and rescue skills at a drill in upstate New York. 2 Over the past two years, OEM has continued to work with key partners throughout New York City and the region to build plans that increase the City’s ability to respond to and recover from local disasters. PREPARING FOR COAstAL Plans STORMS New York City’s Coastal Storm Plan PREPARING FOR 2009 (CSP), initially developed in 2006 I<8;PE<NPFIB H1N1 INFLUENZA and upgraded each year, is made up G8E;<D@:=CL In April 2009, the NYC Health of a series of plans that describe the Department first detected the H1N1 citywide response to a major coastal virus in New York City when a large storm, particularly a hurricane. number of students from St. Francis Electrical disruptions, lack of drinking Preparatory School in Queens began water, damaged communications showing symptoms of flu-like illness. systems, and debris-clogged OEM worked with many agencies streets could result from a variety to support the Health Department’s of storm hazards. OEM has revised operations. When the outbreak and expanded the CSP to prepare subsided toward summer, OEM and the city for any of these all-hazards the Health Department developed consequences. the H1N1 Fall Planning Taskforce, with city and state agency partners and key stakeholders including public and private hospitals and clinics, E\nPfib:`kp and private sector and non-profit F]ÔZ\f]<d\i^\eZpDXeX^\d\ek organizations. This task force revised D`Z_X\cI%9cffdY\i^#DXpfi Afj\g_=%9ilef#F<D:fdd`jj`fe\i existing flu plans and strengthened K_fdXj8%=Xic\p# ?\Xck_:fdd`jj`fe\i the City’s protocols for healthcare surge, occupational health and In April 2009, when the H1N1 virus safety, vaccination, keeping schools emerged in NYC, OEM posted the Ready New York Pandemic Flu guide open, and resource management. on the City’s website. Soon after, the guide was available for download in 23 languages. 3 Winning designs from the What If New York City… post-disaster housing design contest. Here are some more ways the CSP has DISAstER HOUSING “What If New York City…” grown over these past two years: RECOVERY PLAN With support from the Rockefeller The Disaster Housing Recovery Plan Foundation and in consultation with Emergency Sheltering addresses three phases of post- Architecture for Humanity-New York, The City’s emergency shelter disaster housing: emergency sheltering, OEM sponsored an open design program has the capacity to house interim housing, and permanent competition to generate temporary 600,000 people in more than 570 housing. The plan details housing housing solutions for the thousands secure, staffed, and supplied facilities options for displaced residents after of New Yorkers who might be displaced throughout the city. the emergency sheltering phase. It in the event of a catastrophe. Architects, coordinates the talent and expertise industrial designers, engineers, StormStaff Training Program of city, state, and federal agencies inventors, and students from 30 With the help of the City University of to rebuild communities as quickly countries answered OEM’s call for New York, OEM created StormStaff, a as possible and provide renters and innovative proposals. These designs training program for City employees homeowners access to new housing outperform traditional post-disaster who would staff shelter facilities options. The plan includes a decision- housing solutions, mobile homes, during an emergency. The training making playbook and a structure for by addressing issues unique to urban includes pre-incident training online regional and national expansion. areas, such as high population and classroom courses, and just-in- density and lack of open land. time training at the shelters through printed materials, videos, and In January 2008, 10 winners were instructor-led training. awarded $10,000 each to further refine their designs as the foundation for OEM’s SAHANA Shelter Management Disaster Housing Recovery Plan. System The winning designs varied widely Developed in partnership with the and included the use of recycled City’s Department of Information shipping containers, housing barges, Technology and Telecommunications experimental carbon fiber compounds, (DoITT), SAHANA helps OEM assign and off-the-grid sustainable strategies. City staff to the shelters and direct After another evaluation by a technical residents into the largest emergency advisory committee, two of the 10 sheltering system in the country. designs were recommended for SAHANA maintains a roster of more further development and prototyping. than 140,000 City employees who All 117 submissions, including the winners, would staff evacuation centers and are currently exhibited online for shelters and has the ability to notify public viewing at www.whatifnyc.net. and deploy these staff within hours. 4 Heavy rain leads to flooding on the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway. MITIGATING DISAstERS MANAGING DISAstER REspONDING TO FLAsh In 2008, OEM led the development LOGIstIcs FLOODS of New York City’s Natural Hazard Charged with distributing life- sustaining On the morning of August 8, 2007, Mitigation Plan to assess the city’s supplies like food, water, and ice to the a major rain storm caused flooding natural hazard vulnerabilities and public within 72 hours of a disaster, OEM in the city’s streets and subways, to identify mitigation opportunities. developed the Disaster Logistics Plan. disrupting the morning commute of The plan represents a partnership The plan identified eight staging areas millions of New Yorkers. In response, among 39 city, state, and federal and more than 200 points of distribution the Mayor’s Office of Operations government authorities, and in the city, and outlines the systems, convened the Flood Mitigation combines input from the private processes, and procedures required to: Task Force, which included OEM, sector, academic institutions, the Department of Environmental • rapidly acquire supplies. community organizations, and Protection, the Department of citizens. It is the backbone of the • manage staging areas to receive Sanitation, the Department of City’s mitigation program and equipment, materials, and personnel. Transportation, the Fire Department, provides a strategic plan to secure • distribute supplies to emergency and the Police Department. The task and apply federal mitigation funds operations or directly to the public. force developed procedures to identify in New York City over the long term. fast-moving storms and prepare the Emergency Supply Stockpile City’s roads and sewers ahead of time. The City’s emergency supply stockpile By outlining steps like cleaning catch consists of 5,700 pallets of medical basins in recurring flood locations, supplies, personal care items, cots, monitoring known and projected blankets, food, water, and baby and flood-prone areas during intense rains, pet supplies. It is designed to support and establishing assistance centers, the basic needs of thousands of the plan details the steps the City will people for up to seven days. It can be take to mitigate the effects of flash deployed in 48 hours to distribution floods on residents and infrastructure.
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