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The Truth Norm Account of Justification View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Apollo THE TRUTH NORM ACCOUNT OF JUSTIFICATION Alexander Greenberg Trinity Hall University of Cambridge 6th July 2017 This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy THE TRUTH NORM ACCOUNT OF JUSTIFICATION ABSTRACT This thesis is about the relationship between a belief being justified and it being true. It defends a version of the view that the fundamental point of having a justified belief is to have a true one. The particular version of that view it defends is the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm – i.e. a norm or standard that says that one should believe something if and only if it’s true. It claims that belief being subject to such a truth norm can explain which beliefs count as justified and which do not. After introducing the idea of a truth norm (Ch. 1), the argument of my thesis involves two main stages. Part One of the thesis (Chs. 2-3) contains the first stage, in which I argue that my way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in epistemology, is much more likely to be successful than a more popular way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in the philosophy of mind. Part Two (Chs. 4-7) contains the second stage, in which I argue that the truth norm can indeed explain justification in the way I’ve outlined. I do this by answering four criticisms that have been made of the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm. These criticisms claim that a truth norm should be rejected because, in turn, a truth norm cannot guide belief formation (Ch. 4), because a truth norm prescribes believing all the truths (Ch. 5), because a truth norm never prescribes suspending judgement (Ch. 6), and because a truth norm in some cases prescribes making problematic trade-offs of having one false belief for the sake of having many true beliefs (Ch. 7). I argue that all of these criticisms fail. But it is through answering these criticisms that we can see the contours of a defensible explanation of justification in terms of the truth norm. Alexander Greenberg July 2017 i DECLARATION This thesis is 78,612 words in length. The word count, including footnotes and references, falls within the range specified by the Degree Committee of the Faculty of Philosophy. This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For financial support, I’d like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for funding this thesis, the Cambridge Philosophy Faculty and an anonymous donor for writing-up grants, and my college, Trinity Hall, for travel grants. I’d like to thank my supervisors, Tim Crane and Arif Ahmed. Throughout this thesis I owe so much to their help. I’d also like to thank Tim in particular for continuing to support and to have faith in me during the times in which work was difficult, especially in the periods before and after my intermission. I also thank my examiners, Pascal Engel and Richard Holton, for a rich and helpful discussion of the thesis. Special thanks are due to Lucy Campbell and to Chris Cowie for countless discussions, which aided me immeasurably in writing this thesis. For various philosophical discussions over the past five years, I also thank Lukas Skiba, Dan Brigham, Fiona Doherty, Nakul Krishna, Bernard Salow, Lubomira Radoilska, Louise Hanson, Rob Trueman, Tim Button, Rae Langton, Jane Heal, and Hugh Mellor. Thanks are in particular due to those who have read and commented on work that would form part of this thesis, Lucy Campbell, Chris Cowie, Nakul Krishna, Fiona Doherty, Bernard Salow, Selim Berker, and Conor McHugh. I’m also grateful to audiences in Cambridge, Edinburgh, Fortaleza, and King’s College London, who listened to and commented on previous incarnations of various parts of this thesis. I’d also like to thank the various friends, both old and new, who have kept my spirits up over the last five years, in particular Lucy Campbell, Chris Cowie, Lukas Skiba, Ellisif Wasmuth, Jenni Sidey, Nakul Krishna, Fiona Doherty, Dan Brigham, Christopher Clarke, Ian Felce, Raphael von Blumenthal, Mark Johnson, Jack Miller, Sam Baron, James Dowman, Simon Coplowe, and Ross Frame. I’d also like to thank the members of the Trinity Hall rugby team, and the gardens teams of Trinity Hall and King’s College Cambridge (epecially Helen Cripps), with whom I worked during my intermission. I’d also like to thank Chris Rowland and Heather Sanderson. Special thanks are due to my family – my parents in particular – for putting me up (and putting up with me) for a year when I had nowhere else to live. Thanks to my erstwhile roommate Eggbert for keeping me company. And most of all thanks to Lucy Campbell for keeping me sane, and for tirelessly reminding me, despite my protestations, that writing this thesis was possible. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Summary of Chapters ............................................................................................................... 1 List of Norms and Principles ................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 1. Introduction............................................................................................................ 9 1. The truth norm account of justification in context ................................................ 10 1.1. Veritism ...................................................................................................................... 10 1.2. Justification as a normative notion ........................................................................... 12 2. How a truth norm explains justification .................................................................. 16 2.1. Objective and subjective norms on belief ............................................................... 19 2.2. What are the ‘good means’ of conforming to a truth norm? ................................. 22 3. Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 26 Part Two. How and How Not to Argue for a Truth Norm ............................................... 29 Chapter 2. How Not to Argue For a Truth Norm .............................................................. 31 1. Can a truth norm explain what distinguishes belief from other attitudes? ........... 32 2. Can a truth norm explain the normativity of content? ........................................... 37 3. Can a truth norm explain the transparency of doxastic deliberation? ................... 40 4. Can a truth norm explain the impossibility of believing at will? ............................ 47 5. Can a truth norm explain Moore’s paradox? ........................................................... 50 6. A better way: belief is subject to a truth norm because that explains epistemic justification ................................................................................................................. 54 6.1. The appeal to this methodology in ethics ................................................................ 57 6.2. A limitation of this methodology ............................................................................. 62 7. Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 63 Chapter 3. The Unity of Justification .................................................................................... 65 1. Different methods that justify beliefs ...................................................................... 65 1.1. Why something must unify different methods that justify beliefs......................... 66 1.2. What could unify different methods that justify beliefs? ....................................... 69 1.3. How a truth norm unifies different methods that justify beliefs ........................... 72 2. Different properties that bear on the justification of a belief ................................ 75 vii 2.1. The variety of properties of a belief that can bear on its justification ................... 76 2.2. Why something must unify the different properties that bear on the justification of belief ....................................................................................................................... 80 2.3. How a truth norm unifies the different properties that bear on the justification of belief ........................................................................................................................... 82 3. Alternative explanations of what unifies justification ............................................. 88 3.1. A knowledge norm .................................................................................................... 88 3.2. An evidence norm ..................................................................................................... 91 3.2.1. The common-sense concept of evidence ...............................................................
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