• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE SELF-ABSORPTION OBJECTION ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE SELF-ABSORPTION OBJECTION BY JEFFREY D’SOUZA, M.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy McMaster University © Copyright Jeffrey D’Souza, March 2017 McMaster University DOCTOR OF ARTS (2017) Hamilton, Ontario (Philosophy) TITLE: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and the Self-Absorption Objection AUTHOR: Jeffrey D’Souza, M.A. (Ryerson University); H.B.A. (University of Toronto) SUPERVISOR: Professor Mark Johnstone NUMBER OF PAGES: vii, 155 ii Lay Abstract: In this dissertation, I advance a neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation that is immune from what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo- Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they wrongly prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to sidestep this objection, I offer what I call the altruistic account of motivation. On this account, the virtuous agent’s main reason for acting virtuously is based on her desire to act in accordance with a particular conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness. iii Abstract: Aristotelian eudaimonism – as Daniel Russell puts it – is understood as two things at once: it is the final end for practical reasoning, and it is a good human life for the one living it. This understanding of Aristotelian eudaimonism, on which one’s ultimate reason for doing all that one does is one’s own eudaimonia, has given rise to what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to adequately address this objection, I break with those contemporary neo- Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation that insist that the virtuous agent ought to be understood as performing virtuous actions ultimately for the sake of her own eudaimonia (enlarged, no doubt, to include the eudaimonia of others). On the alternative neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation I go on to defend – what I call the altruistic account of motivation – the virtuous agent’s ultimate reason for acting virtuously is based on a desire to act in accordance with her particular conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness. More specifically, on the altruistic account of motivation I advance, the virtuous agent may be understood as being motivated by human goodness, valuing objects and persons only insofar as they participate in human goodness, and where all of the virtuous agent’s reasons, values, motivations, and justifications are cashed out in terms of human goodness – as they say – “all the way down.” iv Acknowledgements: I would like to thank everyone who has helped make it possible for me to complete this thesis. This list includes more people than I can mention here, but I am especially indebted to a few individuals, and I think that the virtues of gratitude and honesty require me to explicitly recognize these individuals here. First, I would like to thank Dr. Jo Kornegay for instilling in me a passion and love for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Her teachings captivated me, and helped me appreciate and understand the significance of Aristotle’s ethics, the importance of moral character, and the value in studying what it means to live well. Second, I would like to thank my 1st Reader, Dr. Violetta Igneski. Her uncanny ability to always be able to put her finger on the contentious premise or missing link in of one of my arguments, challenged me to refine my ideas, and sharpen my criticisms. My project greatly benefited from being able to work closely with her, and I am grateful for all of her help. Third, I would like to thank Dr. John Hacker-Wright. His expertise of contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics challenged me to explore the thrust behind the self-absorption objection, meaningfully grapple with extant neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation, and helped me to develop my own positive view. He has been a remarkable mentor and friend to me, and I feel very lucky to have had him serve as my 2nd Reader. My greatest debt is to my Supervisor, Dr. Mark Johnstone. His knowledge and understanding of Aristotle’s ethics and moral psychology helped me immensely in developing the structure, views, and arguments contained in this dissertation. I am especially thankful for all of his comments, questions, guidance, patience, support, and friendship, without which this dissertation would not have been possible. I feel very blessed to have been able to work closely with such a brilliant mind, and virtuous individual. Finally, a special thanks to all of the faculty (especially Dr. Elisabeth Gedge), administrators (Kim Squissato and Rabia Awan) and students in the Department of Philosophy at McMaster University. The support, guidance, and friendship I received from all of you made these past few years remarkable. v I dedicate this dissertation to all of the virtuous individuals in my life. The excellence that you have all displayed in living well has inspired me, and has been a constant source of strength. vi Contents Introduction... ………………………………………………………………….….1 1. The Self-Absorption Objection....……………………………………………..11 1.1. The Self-Absorption Objection: A Historical Overview.…………………...13 1.2. Contemporary Critiques …………………………………………………….22 1.3. The Test ……………………………………………………………………..34 2. The Self-Absorption Objection: Responses & Rejoinders ....……………...…38 2.1. Julia Annas’ Developmental Approach ………………………………….…40 2.2. Mark Lebar’s Two Standpoint Approach …………………………………..49 2.3. Christopher Toner’s Reconceptualization Approach ……………………….61 3. The Occurrent Motivation of the Virtuous Agent ...…………………………. 68 3.1. The Recognition View ……………………………………………………...69 3.2. In Defense of the Recognition View ………………………………………..78 4. Why A Neo-Aristotelian Need Not Adopt the Eudaemonist Axiom …………85 4.1. The Eudaemonist Axiom & Aristotle’s Ethics ……………………………..86 4.2. The Eudaemonist Axiom: Unsettling the Foundation ………………………90 5. An Altruistic Account of Motivation ……………………………………..…107 5.1. Altruism & Eudaimonism …………………………………………………109 5.2. Early Moral Education & Natural Virtue ………………………………….114 5.3. An Altruistic Account of Moral Motivation ………………………………118 5.4. The Altruistic Account of Motivation and Aristotle’s Ethics ……………. 130 5.5. The Virtuous Agent’s Account of Motivation: A Harmonious Account … 135 Conclusion.…………………………………………………………………..…139 Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………144 vii Ph.D Thesis – Jeffrey D’Souza; McMaster University – Philosophy Introduction “Suppose, when wondering whether we really ought to act in the ways usually called moral, we are told as a means of resolving our doubt that those acts are right which produce happiness. We at once ask: ‘Whose happiness?’ If we are told ‘Our own happiness’, then though we shall lose our hesitation to act in these ways, we shall not recover our sense that we ought to do so.” (Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”1912) What matters, morally speaking, is not just what we do, but why we do it. Following Immanuel Kant, we may think that actions performed in accordance with duty, though not from the motive of duty, may be said to have absolutely no moral worth.1 If this seems too strong, we may want to follow Aristotle, who holds that voluntary actions performed in accordance with the moral virtues are in some sense praiseworthy, but who nonetheless insists that a truly virtuous action, must, mutatis mutandis, be performed for the right reason.2 Regardless, however, of where we stand on the question of whether a motive can affect the moral quality of an action, I take it that most will agree that when it comes to “character- based” normative ethical theories – that is, those on which the assessment of one’s character is taken to be primary – the evaluation of motives ought to play a central role.3 This is because, as Bernard Mayo has correctly emphasized, virtue ethics has to do with “being” – as opposed to “doing” – and, in order to get an accurate sense as to what type of person someone is, we must pay special attention to the inner qualities of the agent, including, and most importantly, one’s motivations.4 No doubt, some moral philosophers may wish to push back here, and insist that we can get an accurate sense of what type of person someone is without paying attention to the individual’s motivations. One might argue that we can get a fairly good idea regarding the content of an individual’s character simply by 1 Take, for instance, Kant’s “sympathetic philanthropist” who acts beneficently toward others, but only because he finds “an inner pleasure in spreading happiness” to others. For Kant, “an action of this kind, however right and however amiable it may be has … no … moral worth.” Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. H.J. Paton (1964) P. 66. 2 Aristotle writes “but for actions in accord with the virtues to be done temperately or justly it does not suffice that they themselves have the right qualities. Rather, the agent must also be in the right state when he does them. First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and, third, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state.” EN 1105a 29-35. 3 A notable exception here is Julia Driver.

Load more

  163

Copy Link